Protected Neoliberalism

Perverse Institutionalization and the Crisis of Representation in Postdictatorship Chile

by
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The results of Chile's December 1997 parliamentary elections revealed the existence of 3,700,000 voters who chose not to voice a preference.[1] If we consider the nearly 1,000,000 young people who did not register in the electoral rolls, the abstention of registered voters, and the null and void ballots cast, the total comes to 40 percent of the potential electorate—a striking figure by Chilean standards. This nonvoting rate marked a sharp decline in formal political participation.[2] Initial interpretations of these electoral figures on the part of political elites and the press explained them as an expression of apathy and depoliticization. My research in Chile, however, suggests that this significant proportion of missing votes is more likely a conscious rejection of the political system and the institutional order inherited from the dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet (1973–1990). My contention contradicts the claim that more highly institutionalized party systems facilitate a deepening of democracy (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; Scully, 1995). Quite to the contrary, the data strongly suggest that the institutionalization of Chilean political parties into a network of exclusionary institutions designed to "protect" a restricted democracy has limited their representative capacity and led to a loss of legitimacy at the grass roots reflected in electoral withdrawal.

This problem is intimately linked with neoliberalism, an ideology of the free market that has led to the restructuring of the economy and the state, effectively reducing the role of governments in providing social welfare and regulating economic activity at the domestic and the international level

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(MacEwan, 1999: 4). The authoritarian features cemented into the 1980 Constitution (such as nonelected senators, an electoral law that results in skewed representation, and institutions with veto power over the legislature) serve as a convenient administrative tool for political elites in that they limit popular representation and discourage participation. The veto power over Congress of unelected bodies and the military's continuing autonomy ensure the continuation of the "protected democracy" established by the constitution, which, in turn, guarantees the continuity of the policies of the Pinochet dictatorship, foremost of which is its free-market economic model.[3] Consensus on economic policy between the leaders of the ruling Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia and the parties on the right, moreover, has resulted in their continuing commitment to the maintenance of political stability at the expense of the mobilization of social demands.[4] In this context, the political will of those party leaders who propose to deepen democracy is continually challenged by the authoritarian enclaves that establish the boundaries of Chile's restricted democracy.[5]

This article will examine the nature of Chilean parties, their links to society, and their presence at the grass roots in the country's postdictatorship period. After an overview of the dynamics of the contemporary party system, I will narrow the focus to the parties of the center-left and incorporate perceptions from the grass roots—from Santiago's *poblaciones* (shantytowns)—where these parties have traditionally had strong support.[6] The analysis will therefore involve two levels: the national and the local. Rather than focus on an evaluation of electoral choices and outcomes of elections, I will focus on the relations between parties, party militants, and residents of these neighborhoods in order to analyze the impact of the macro-level context of elite politics on local-level political mediation and party identification. I contend that, as a reflection of the national level, there has been an erosion of the organic link between party militants and grass roots activists at the local level, leading to increasing dealignment (erosion of citizen loyalty to a party that is not replaced by loyalty to another party), weakening party identification, and political alienation.

The data originate primarily from 90 unstructured interviews conducted in José María Caro (where I lived for two months), Lo Hermida (where I lived for eight months), Villa La Reina, Lo Sierra, Nuevo Amanecer, Esperanza Andina, La Pintana, El Manzano, Santa Ana, and Santa Rosa de Lima in October 1996 (before the municipal elections) and September 1997 through March 1998 (before and after the parliamentary elections). Since each *población* is unique in its political and social origins and history of party intervention, not one of them could be considered typical. They vary in their histories of party identification and degree of organization and mobilization.

They also represent diverse areas of Santiago and vary in mode of origin (for example, whether as part of a state housing program or an illegal land invasion) and historical period of settlement. I sought to interview residents with a history of party activism and residents with no party affiliation or history who were active in the community. I also spoke with many young people in the course of my participant observation.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Since the beginning of Chile's transition to democracy following the defeat of Pinochet in the 1988 plebiscite, many analysts have praised the resurgence of Chile's strong political party system. In fact, party system institutionalization is singled out as the leading agent of a successful transition to democracy (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; Scully, 1995; A. Valenzuela, 1994; O'Donnell, 1994; Bosworth and Munck, 1997). These analysts emphasize the continuities from the pre-1973 party system—continuities in the adherence of party elites to well-established practices and codes of behavior and in deep party loyalties among constituents—and credit them with a revival of Chile's historical tripartite division between center, left, and right. These continuities are attributed to the fact that Chile is a case of *re*democratization in which long-held democratic traditions and an early-established party system have increased the possibilities for the consolidation of democracy following the period of military rule. As Frances Hagopian (1993: 464–467) has noted, analyses such as these fail to give adequate attention to the impact of military rule on the networks of mediation and representation. They fail to capture the fact that the context in which parties now operate has been vastly transformed by the policies, practices, and legacies of the dictatorship.

This transformed scenario is essentially characterized by the consolidation of the neoliberal economic model, in force for more than 20 years. Strict adherence to the rigors of the free market had produced a booming economy, as well as low inflation and low unemployment by Latin American standards, until the recession caused by the shock of the Asian crisis demonstrated the vulnerability of these successes in 1998–1999. This model has resulted in and is reliant on the permanent marginalization of certain sectors from the market, a debilitated labor movement, increased inequality of income distribution, job insecurity, and low wages, illustrating the failure of the model's benefits to "trickle down" (see Martínez and Díaz, 1996; Collins and Lear, 1995; Rosenfeld and Marre, 1997). In 1987–1996, the richest 20 percent of households received 57 percent of the total personal income, while the bottom 20 percent received only 3.8 percent (MIDEPLAN, 1998). By contrast,

in 1969, figures for Greater Santiago showed the top quintile getting 43 percent of the total income and 7.7 percent for the bottom (Oppenheim, 1993: 155). In fact, income distribution in Chile is now even more regressive than that in less industrialized Latin American countries such as Honduras, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic.[7] Changes in the international arena such as the demise of state socialism, the increasing globalization of capital, and the touting of Chile as the model for the developing world by the "Washington consensus" has undoubtedly buttressed the continuity of the military regime's economic model.[8] Accordingly, the state's social policy-making prerogatives have been curtailed by the privatization of much of the state-run health, education, and social security systems (Vergara, 1993). These changes have resulted in a reconfiguration of what constitutes the "political" into a category that can no longer accommodate a compensatory social project.

The continuity of many of the social and economic policies of the military regime following Chile's transition to democracy has been ensured by the constraints on decision-making and the representative capacity of political institutions established by the 1980 Constitution, which designates the military as the "guardians of the republic" and mandates the existence of a series of so-called authoritarian enclaves. These include 9 designated senators (2 chosen by the president, 3 by the Supreme Court, and 4 by the military-dominated National Security Council) giving the right a majority in the Senate, a binomial electoral law that results in the overrepresentation of the right, and an amnesty law that guarantees impunity for the military for human rights crimes committed through 1978, among others (see J. S. Valenzuela, 1992: 57–105).[9] In addition, Pinochet was sworn in as lifetime senator in March 1998—a privilege accorded to him by the 1980 Constitution. This brought the number of senators not elected by popular vote to 10 (out of a total of 48), until Pinochet finally resigned from the Senate in 2002 after the Supreme Court's decision that he was unfit to stand trial for human rights crimes due to dementia. Chile is the only case in which, in the postdictatorship period, a former dictator has been awarded a seat in the legislature—the very institution that he had disbanded in 1973.

A very important continuity from the period of military rule is decentralization—local redistricting and the transfer of public services to municipal control. This process has reinforced social segregation between rich and poor communities and intensified the marginalization of the popular classes. Municipal administrations in impoverished areas struggle to stretch scant resources to cover tremendous needs (Petras, Leiva, and Veltmeyer, 1994: 145–152; Oppenheim, 1993: 162–163). Although a Fondo Común Municipal was established to redistribute resources from rich to poor municipalities, the magnitude of the differences reveals the existence of two very different

Chiles. In 1980–1984, for example, Providencia and Las Condes, two of Santiago's wealthiest municipalities, accounting for 21 percent of Greater Santiago's population, received 57 percent of all municipal investment, while the poor municipalities of La Cisterna, La Granja, Conchali, and Pudahuel, which together house 36 percent of the population, made do with a meager 9 percent (Oppenheim, 1993: 162).

In response to institutional pressures for continuity and commitment to a free-market economy, political elites have circumscribed the participatory functions of party structures, adopting a technocratic approach to political activity that has led to widespread disengagement from formal politics at the grassroots. In terms of participation and representation, the changes in the party system over the past 15 years clearly outweigh their continuities from the predictatorship period. Several Chilean analysts have noted that the party system has in fact fallen into a crisis of legitimacy. Manuel Antonio Garretón situates the problem among elite politicians who operate above the level of their party's established and ostensibly participatory decision-making mechanisms. He argues that they avoid debate over issues, relying instead on polls and technical solutions—practices that have tended to shatter the party-society matrix (1993: 27). Génaro Arriagada attributes the crisis to a bipolar (two-party) electoral choice (a result of the binomial electoral law, which creates two-member districts) imposed on an electorate with a multiparty tendency and on a lack of democracy in intraparty structures (1997: 67–71).

Tomás Moulian emphasizes the extreme ideological homogenization exhibited by today's parties. "The crisis of politics in contemporary Chile," he says, "is the false death of ideologies perpetrated by a hegemonic [neoliberal] ideology that attempts to technify politics and kill alternative ideologies" (1997: 56). He points out that ideological divisions played an important role in the precoup party system by generating programmatic parties that ordered and channeled social conflicts, elevating the level of political discourse. "With the disappearance of the party as a referent of definitive programs, interaction between political elites becomes reduced to disputes over power" (interview, June 8, 1998).

Since the return of electoral politics in 1990, parties have been administrated from above by very few hands through cupular agreements made without the participation of grassroots party militants. As Oppenheim (1993: 227) points out with respect to the first Concertación government (1990–1994), "Negotiations often went on behind closed doors, as did Concertación decision making. These actions resulted in a lack of connection between the grass roots, on the one hand, and party and governmental elites, on the other." As the Socialist party militant Hernán Coloma explains, "This was a practice which arose during the first Concertación government, where the decisions

to be made were very difficult and it seemed necessary when negotiating with the armed forces. It would not have been easy for party militants to understand certain secret agreements [between the Concertación and the military] that are only now being revealed" (quoted in Cruz, 1998: 7).

As Petras, Leiva, and Veltmeyer (1994: 69–75) have noted, the linchpin of the negotiations between the military and the Christian Democratic and Socialist leaders, the key partners in the Concertación, was the abandonment of certain democratic ideals over the exigencies of capital. The Concertación's discourse of social harmony and "growth with equity" replaced the old left discourse of social justice; "growth with equity" means giving market-driven distribution a helping hand through limited social programs targeted at the poorest sectors. These policies reduced the number of those living in poverty in the first half of the 1990s (from the 1981 figure of 5.2 million to 3.8 million in 1994), although levels remained high with roughly 27 percent of households classified as poor or indigent (Loveman, 2001: 343). Political elites have thus maintained neoliberal hegemony through the careful deployment of the contradictory notions of exclusionary practice (policy making that is impervious to citizen participation) and inclusionary discourse dependent on the successful marketing of Chile as the "jaguar of Latin America" to transnational capital and to sectors of Chile's popular classes as well.

To summarize the changes in the political landscape since the return to electoral politics, Chile's tripartite division has been replaced by two major electoral blocs—a center-left coalition and a divided right coalition—and the left, which is considerably fragmented (see Table 1 for a view of this grouping based on the 1996 and 1997 elections). The Partido Demócrata Cristiano (Christian Democrats—PDC), a party that historically swings between the center and the right, reemerged as the strongest party from the 1989 presidential election to the 1997 parliamentary election (but has been in electoral decline since then). Together with the Partido Radical Socialdemócrata (Radical Social Democratic party—PRSD, formerly the Radical party), the Partido Socialista (Socialist party—PS), and the Partido por la Democracia (Party for Democracy—PPD), they make up the Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia. The acceptance of neoliberalism divides the renovated left (the PS and the PPD) from the Partido Communista (Communist party—PC), the Partido Humanista (Humanist party—PH), and other smaller parties on the left, such as the defectors from the PDC in the 1960s, the Izquierda Cristiana (Christian Left—IC), and the Movimiento de Acción Popular Unida (Move- ment for United Popular Action—MAPU). The left was divided in the 1997 parliamentary election into two factions: the Alternative Democratic Left (PC, MAPU, and independents) and the New Left (PH, Ecology Movement, and independents).

TABLE 1
Election Results by Electoral Bloc, 1996 and 1997

	1996 Municipal[a]	*1997 Parliamentary (Senators)*[b]	*1997 Parliamentary (Deputies)*[b]
Center/left			
Christian Democratic Party (PDC)	23.1	29.2	23.0
Radical Social Democratic Party (PRSD)	5.8	1.8	3.1
Socialist Party (PS)	9.5	14.6	11.1
Party for Democracy	10.1	4.3	12.6
Independents	1.0	0.2	0.8
Total	49.5	50.1	50.6
Right			
National Renewal Party (RN)	12.2	14.8	16.8
Independent Democratic Union Party (UDI)	3.0	17.1	14.4
Center-Center Union Party (UCCP)	2.5	0.4	2.2
Party of the South (SUR)	0.3	2.6	0.4
Independents	13.8	4.6	4.7
Total	31.8	39.5	38.5
Left			
Communist Party (PC)	5.3	8.4	6.9
Humanist/Green Party (PH)	1.4	2.2	2.9
Independents	1.0	0.2	0.7
Total	7.7	10.8	10.5

Sources: Servicio Electoral, Santiago, Chile, (1996) and Ministerio del Interior, Chile, http://www.elecciones.gov.cl.
a. Including void and blank ballots.
b. Excluding void and blank ballots.

The alliance of the PS/PPD and the PDC is an uneasy one and may have outlived its original strategic intention of minimizing the electoral chances of the right. Tensions both between these parties and within them flare up at various political conjunctures. For example, while the PS/PPD agreed to support a PDC presidential candidate in the 1989 and 1993 elections, the PDC appeared hesitant to support the PS/PPD candidate Ricardo Lagos, winner of the 1999 presidential election. The October 1998 arrest of Pinochet in London further exacerbated these tensions when the left wing of the PS/PPD strongly objected to then-President Frei's decision to fight Pinochet's extradition to Spain in the name of Chilean sovereignty. Distance grew between the right wing and the left wing of the PDC when Senator Frei Bolívar (PDC) left his party to pursue an independent presidential candidacy on the right (see Moulian, 1999).

While the right is also divided between the fervently Pinochetista Unión Democrática Independiente (Independent Democratic Union—UDI) and the slightly more moderate and liberal Renovación Nacional (National Renewal—RN), these differences were not enough to prevent the formation of an electoral coalition in national elections. The focus on the human rights crimes of the dictatorship brought about by the arrest of Pinochet put the right (especially the UDI) on the defensive. One of the consequences of this was the resurgence of paramilitary groups threatening violence if Pinochet was not returned to Chile. Along with the UDI, there is another party that emphasizes the center but is part of the right, the Unión Centro-Centro (Center-Center Union party—UCCP). The UCCP is headed by the populist supermarket magnate Francisco Javier Errázuriz. After a strong showing in the first presidential elections of the transition (15 percent), the UCCP share of the vote declined to less than 5 percent in 1997, and the party found itself under pressure to broker proportional power-sharing alliances with the right-wing coalition headed by UDI and RN.

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Institutionalization of party systems is typically seen as something that facilitates the working of democracy. Guillermo O'Donnell (1994: 62) characterizes strongly institutionalized structures in representative democracies as guided by a "rule-like force of certain codes of conduct that shapes the behavior of relevant agents." Where this is lacking and political actors do not faithfully follow the rule of law, as in "delegative democracies," clientelism and corruption fill the void. Uruguay and Chile, as cases of *re*democratization, are seen as having been able to revive earlier political institutions that other Latin American countries lacked (O'Donnell, 1994: 68). But what if those revived institutions are radically different in their representative scope and if the legal framework within which they must operate contains undemocratic features such as designated senators and other nonelected structures with veto power over the legislature? What are the consequences for political parties when they are embedded in a network of institutionalized power relations that favor organized interests loyal to the previous regime (in the Chilean case to an unpopular and antipopulist military dictatorship)?

Mainwaring and Scully are more specific with regard to the institutionalization of Latin American party systems. They outline four conditions that an institutionalized party system must establish (1995: 4–5): (1) There must be stability in the rules of interparty competition and regularity in the patterns of competition between parties. (2) Major parties must have somewhat stable

roots in society, and party labels must be meaningful to citizens. (3) Major political actors must accord legitimacy to the electoral process and to parties and parties must play a key role in determining access to power. (4) Party structures must be firmly established and well organized. Stability, regularity, organization, and legitimacy (among elites) stand out as key terms in this framework. But can parties remain institutionalized if their legitimacy is eroded at the base level? If so, for how long? I raise these questions because, according to Mainwaring and Scully's criteria, the Chilean party system scores top marks in institutionalization, along with Uruguay and Costa Rica. Yet recent polls, my research, and the results of the 1996 municipal election and the 1997 parliamentary elections all reveal an increasing delegitimization of existing political parties. Ideological homogenization and pragmatism in party discourse have tempered party competition and made party labels much less meaningful to citizens. Internal party elections and processes have been fraught with tensions and difficulties. Finally, whereas political actors generally abide by the rule of law and respect election results, party structures are much less permeable to citizen participation.

In their typology of party models in Western postindustrial societies, Katz and Mair suggest that the development of parties has reflected a dialectical process in which each new party type generates a reaction that stimulates further development, thus leading to yet another party type, and so on (1995: 5–28).[10] They identify three party types common in the twentieth century: the mass party, the catch-all party, and the cartel party. These parties can be placed on a continuum that stretches from society to the state. Parties of the center and left in Chile were clearly mass parties, institutions through which well-defined social groups (classes) participated in politics, made demands on the state, and attempted to win elections by mobilizing grassroots support. Their projects had social reformation as a goal. Their leadership actively recruited party members, and membership was central to an individual's identity. In contrast, today's parties, with the exception of the Communist party, show more characteristics of the catch-all party. As Katz and Mair note, this type of party attempts to capture the interests of all sectors through the mass media and employs professional media experts and publicists, viewing the electorate as consumers. The goals of catch-all parties revolve around social amelioration rather than reform, and representation is sacrificed to policy effectiveness (1995: 17–18). Party organization is controlled from the top down and membership is marginal to an individual's identity. The change from mass parties to catch-all parties, however, occurred in Western industrialized states as a consequence of the consolidation of economic liberalism in the first half of the twentieth century. In a developing country such as Chile, this shift has had a tendency to generate a strong

current of "antipolitics," especially among young people and the popular classes.[11]

The next party type to develop, according to Katz and Mair, is the cartel party, which is divorced from civil society and acts as an agent of the state. In the cartel party, elites view politics as a profession, competition is contained, and campaigns are exclusively capital-intensive, professional, and centralized and rely on resources provided by the state. Cartel parties share with their competitors an interest in collective organizational survival, which may act as an incentive not to compete.

It is important to consider the role that political parties potentially play in deepening democracy and making government accountable to its citizens. As Huber, Rueschemeyer, and Stephens point out, formal democracy may remain formal democracy and not evolve into participatory or social democracy without the strong organization of labor and electoral strength of pro-labor parties (1997: 335). They define formal democracy as a political system with four features: "regular free and fair elections, universal suffrage, accountability of the state's administrative organs to the elected representatives, and effective guarantees for freedom of expression and association as well as protection against arbitrary state action" (1997: 323). By this definition, Chile's "protected democracy" falls short of formal democracy because the Senate is not fully composed of elected representatives and the government has to share power de jure with institutions whose bases are not democratic in origin.[12] For Chile's political system to cross the threshold to full (if formal) democracy, political parties must reclaim their traditional roles as institutions that mobilize and channel citizen demands. The need and demand for effective political participation (beyond voting) and political parties' inability to serve as conveyors of collective claims are at the root of the crisis being experienced by the party system.

At play are two notions of participation—one in which citizens mobilize to make collective claims on the state and another in which social actors are expected to participate in the solution of their own problems at the grassroots level. Parties operating under the neoliberal, restricted-democratic context of Chile's transition have adopted the latter notion and evade the mobilization of social demands. The cost of this in terms of their to their bases of support and its toll on the prospects for the completion of the transition to democracy are important questions.

In short, notions of institutionalized party systems should focus on how the party system is institutionalized, on the network of institutions in which parties are embedded, and on the effects these factors have on their representative capacity, permeability to citizen participation, local mediation, and legitimacy at the grass roots. Putting Chile's perverse institutionalization at

the center of the analysis also reveals the gap between political scientists' concern with institutionalization and many political elites' lack of concern with ridding their institutions of Pinochet's taint. By focusing on the different types of parties this institutionalization allows it is possible to clarify and concretize the changes in party-society relations.

It will become evident in the next sections that Chile's party system has moved away from civil society and toward the state—a development that is partly a consequence of the authoritarian legacy but also the result of the lack of political will to mobilize the citizenry to pressure for a plebiscite, a measure that is seen as the only way to bypass the constraints inherited from the military regime. The Communist party supports holding a plebiscite to eliminate the authoritarian enclaves, as do sectors within the Concertación such as its Plebiscite Commission, headed by Fanny Pollarolo (PS). In addition, the Movement for National Dignity was organized by Senator Jorge Lavandero (PDC) with the specific purpose of pressuring for a plebiscite.[13] Without the reforms necessary to endow the constitution with the legitimacy it now lacks, parties will continue to lose legitimacy, and in a context of extreme social inequality such as that which exists in Chile, political alienation may continue to contribute to social disintegration. The other, perhaps remote possibility is that the newly mobilized sectors in evidence in 1998–2001 (for example, the Mapuches in the south, the teachers' union, the student movement, and pobladores in eastern Santiago who are staging land invasions) may unite to carry through the historic project of deepening democracy.

CHANGES IN PARTY SYSTEM DYNAMICS AND PARTY STRUCTURES

Historically, political parties in Chile penetrated deeply into society. As Garretón points out, "The fundamental vehicle for the creation of identities was politics, like a kind of religion in which its high priests were political parties" (1993: 20). A sort of amalgamation of society and parties was one of the central features of this scenario. Politics became a totalizing subculture in this context, where parties spanned the whole ideological spectrum, with a tripartite split of right, left, and center, with comparable levels of support. The result was an intensely competitive dynamic that escalated in the pre-1973 period and became what Giovanni Sartori described as one of the most polarized party systems in the world (1976).

Following the 1973 military coup, parties were banned, and party activists of the left and in certain cases also the center were severely repressed. Party activists continued to operate clandestinely, but with any political activity

subject to punishment, meetings were difficult to organize and extremely risky to hold. During the first 12 years of the dictatorship, communication between party directives in exile and remaining militants operating covertly in Chile was strained and often led to confusion and conflict. Under these conditions, power became concentrated in a limited number of highly committed party leaders. The drive for party membership recruitment following the victory of the no vote in the 1988 plebiscite and preceding the 1989 presidential elections (fueled by the law of political parties decreed by Pinochet, which stated that parties must have a minimum of 35,000 registered members) gave way to an initial proliferation of new parties in addition to the reconstitution of parties from the predictatorship period. The party system became streamlined in the course of the 1990s with the disappearance of many small parties and the defection of the Humanist-Green party, the MAPU, and the IC from the Concertación before the 1993 presidential election.

Not only has the party system changed significantly in its composition but parties have changed their political strategies, reflecting an increasing "Americanization" of politics. For the parties that make up the two electoral blocs, campaigns are now big-money affairs, increasingly financed by business conglomerates or "grupos."[14] They now employ publicists and image consultants, and campaign-financing information is not publicly disclosed. Television is the main venue for political exposure, and marketing plays an important role in the production of near-identical propaganda and slogans. These practices have hampered the chances of the left for competing on an equal footing with the Concertación and the right. As one PC neighborhood council president in Lo Sierra noted, "The damage that this government has caused us has been worse than that of the dictatorship, because the dictatorship annihilated us physically but the others are annihilating us silently, not giving us any space. They have closed the doors so that we can't get to where our people can hear our ideas. Television is the force . . . without it you slip into anonymity" (interview, October 1997).

Responding to polls that show that political parties command the lowest social prestige among national institutions, party labels are barely visible (if present at all) in campaign material. As one publicist puts it, "Electoral publicity has eliminated the party referent precisely because Chileans are against party organizations" (López-Hermida, 1996). Emphasis is now placed on the individual candidates, and campaign rhetoric overwhelmingly stresses "the person, not the party." I will first consider institutional factors that are contributing to the delegitimization of political parties and then factors not directly tied to the authoritarian legacy, which rely more on the political will of elites.

PERVERSE INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND THE CRISIS OF REPRESENTATION

One of the most striking changes in the structure of party competition has been the result of the binomial electoral system: the formation of two major electoral blocs of parties, which imposes an essentially bipartisan system with a centripetal dynamic on a multiparty system that used to have a centrifugal dynamic. The binomial electoral system (which replaced the proportional system of the past) acts as a persistent incentive in the coalescence of these two blocs. These blocs rely on candidates' being chosen by negotiation at the coalition level, limiting the electoral choice of the voter and individual party member. As Arriagada argues, these negotiations have caused enormous harm because they have led to the public perception of politics as an activity that is based on electoral calculations made by elites, on which citizens have no impact (1997: 67–68). This, therefore, reinforces the separation between the people and the political system. As one Socialist party militant from Nuevo Amanecer pointed out with regard to his party (interview, June 1998):

> [The PS] has become a programmatic party of people who are registered but have no power of decision and no education in political militancy. The education of the cadre that existed before no longer exists. . . . Now we have a strong candidate [Lagos] who could get to be president, but I think this model will not change and it will be just like in the United States, where independently of who's on top, the system will always be the same.

In addition, the binomial system also produces an important block of voters without representation and results in the election of runners-up with percentages substantially lower than that of the second-place candidates in the party slates with the majority vote. Commenting on the results of the 1997 parliamentary elections, one political scientist pointed to these factors as the most grievous defects of the binomial electoral law: "If you add the votes for the Communists, the blank and void votes, the vote for the UCCP and the Humanist Party, and those who did not register," noted Mario Fernandez (1997: 25), "this amounts to a very high number of voters and potential voters who lack congressional representation." Fernandez continued, "How can it make sense to have more than 15 percent of the population without representation while several candidates are elected with less than 10 percent in their districts as a result of the system, which rewards them but punishes persons who obtain more than 20 percent?" For example, because of the restrictions of the binomial electoral law, the PC was excluded from congressional repre-

sentation despite its strong showing in the 1997 parliamentary election in which candidate Gladys Marín received 15.7 percent of the vote in her district. These contradictions lead to the perception that one's vote does not count and further alienate the voter from the political system.

Another institutional factor contributing to the delegitimization of the political system and parties is the constraint on the legislative process constituted by the designated senators. Bills passed by the Chamber of Deputies are contingent on negotiation with this nonelected block of senators in order to become law because, together with the right (which is overrepresented as a result of the binomial electoral system), they form a block with veto power. One example is the bill to end the observation of the anniversary of the military coup, September 11, as a national holiday. This bill was approved three times by the Chamber of Deputies, the last time on July 8, 1998, with a vote of 69 for, 38 against, and with 1 abstention. When it had been twice rejected in the Senate, the president of the Senate, Andrés Zaldivar, and Pinochet agreed to replace the coup celebration with a Day of National Reconciliation. This was seen by the left as a return to the closed-door negotiations in which the institutional forms of restricted democracy were brokered during the final years of the military regime, and it once again foregrounded PDC leaders and Pinochet. The Pinochet-Zaldivar pact also elevated Pinochet to his desired status as elder statesman and called to mind the PDC's complicity with the right in pressuring for the 1973 coup (Godoy-Anativia, 1998).

Further weakening the legislative capacity of members of Congress is the exaggerated strength granted to the executive branch by the 1980 Constitution. In particular, Article 62 of the constitution marginalizes the legislature from policy making in the areas of "social security of both the public and private sector," "collective bargaining and determining the cases where bargaining is not permitted," and "establishing, amending, granting or increasing remunerations, retirement payments, and pensions" (Siavelis, 1997: 327–328). As Siavelis points out, the powers of the president to set priorities in the legislative agenda, the areas of exclusive initiative, and decree powers place legislators in a difficult position with regard to their constituents. "Almost all significant legislation involves some type of expenditure or deals with social or economic questions of the type described in Article 62. When combined with the president's ability to set the legislative agenda, these features make it difficult for legislators to propose bills of any significance" (Siavelis, 1997: 328). Given Chilean lawmakers' long history of personalism and the continuing expectation among constituents of satisfaction of their particularistic demands, legislators' inability to propose bills with meaningful social impact undermines the legislature's representational capabilities and diminishes the credibility of individual legislators and their promises for change.[15]

These institutional restrictions debilitate political parties and render elected officials impotent in many ways. As PPD deputy Fanny Pollarolo points out, "The feeling that one's vote is worthless . . . and that politics is unable to realize the tasks that the people propose, that has to do with the electoral system and the designated senators. People are interested in change; they want changes, but they see that it is not possible to make them. That is why they repudiate politicians" (quoted in Correa, 1998). Senator Jorge Lavandero (PDC) adds (interview, Santiago, July 27, 1998),

> The political system is perverse because it destroys political parties and leads to a situation where the people are frustrated. They realize they do not have the power to decide. . . . The economic model is absolutely unjust, and it cannot be changed without changing the political system. The political system cannot be changed without approval of two-thirds or three-fifths of the lower house and the Senate. Given the binomial electoral system and the designated senators, this is impossible, so we have started the Movement for National Dignity calling for a plebiscite.

As of September 1998, Lavandero's movement had collected 200,000 signatures to do away with the authoritarian features of the constitution. Concertación presidents, however, have insisted that constitutional reforms must go through the Congress.

The comments of Lavandero and Pollarolo are examples of the growing awareness among elites of the crisis of legitimacy affecting the party system. These politicians question the legitimacy of the electoral system and parties, and one of Mainwaring and Scully's criteria for party system institutionalization holds that elites must consider these to be legitimate institutions (1995: 5). Pollarolo left the Communist party to work from within the structure of the PS/PPD for radical forms of change. Similarly, Lavandero believes that to change the system one has to join it and press for change from within. The institutional constraints are one reason political elites are reluctant to open party structures to participation and renew connections with their social bases. Yet this is one area where it is also necessary to question the political will of the political class and the low levels of intraparty democracy that they are willing to accept.

QUESTIONING THE POLITICAL WILL OF ELITES

The organization of party structures and their willingness to accommodate citizen participation constitute a major difference in party dynamics between the pre-1973 period and the present. In the case of the PDC, after an

initial attempt to democratize party organizations at the beginning of the transition by increasing the number of militants and giving them the right to vote for national directors by direct vote, the registration of new militants abruptly came to a halt 18 months later.[16] According to Arriagada, party elites ordered that registries be closed to prevent erosion of their power and limit the number of militants to make them easier to control. The result is what Arriagada and Moulian refer to as "parties of cliques," in which the reduced number of militants means that power rests in a small number of local caudillos. For example, when I asked a councilperson of the PPD representing of José María Caro (in the municipality of Lo Espejo) what it was about the PPD's program that had attracted him to join the party, he replied, "More than a program, it's about knowing people. I knew many people in the party, former Socialists, and they asked me to join" (interview with Alfredo Bruna, October 1997). Using the example of his party, the PDC, Arriagada provides telling figures. Militants made up 10 percent of the voters in 1973 and only 5 percent in 1994 (1997: 70). According to Arriagada, the smaller the number of militants, the easier it is to manipulate them. He also points out that this outcome translates into less transparency in party processes, greater irregularities and suspicions of corruption.

At the PDC's internal elections in April 1997, the election results were disputed, giving rise to charges of irregularities. Leaders denounced each other in public amidst the disorder of the final results and calls for a run-off vote (Namuncura Serrano, 1997). Senator Gabriel Valdés (PDC), who received the most votes in the 1997 parliamentary elections (43 percent), provided another example of the declining legitimacy of party organizations among elites. He resigned as a presidential precandidate and sharply criticized his party for its "machinations" in naming a single candidate, Andrés Zaldivar, before internal elections were even held: "I lament with profound pain the loss of nobility in some political styles; the predominance of mediocrity, in which the quality of ideas is not appreciated; the replacement of loyalty among friends and comrades for the cold logic of power machines that persist like sects within the parties" (*La Época*, May 6, 1998).

Grassroots activists noted this lack of probity in party practices. As the president of a network of women's handicraft cooperatives (one of the few popular organizations to survive the transition) in La Pintana said, "[Politicians] have no ideals, you have to work for an ideal . . . politics has turned into a business and they are using you. That's why I vote for the *nulo*, at least it allows us a measure of dignity" (interview, October 1996). Critical of politicians who do not come to the neighborhood, of parties that only hold preelection meetings, and of intraparty divisiveness and elite bickering, party militants in these poor neighborhoods are reluctant to participate in official

party activities. Interviewed before the 1997 parliamentary election, one Christian Democrat (and former Communist party militant) who had served two terms as president of one of the two elected neighborhood councils in Villa La Reina said:

> [Party leaders] are people who really don't know what it is to be a *poblador.* I don't know what is going to happen with this election because the leadership called a meeting to work for the campaign and only eight militants showed up. And in this sector we are about 300, in the municipality about 800. They called a second meeting and only three militants came—there was the leadership, the candidates, and three people. This is just like the Catholics: the bishop says one thing and the Catholic sometimes goes to mass or doesn't.

The PDC was not the only party experiencing internal strife. The PPD elections in various communities were subject to fraud, and the PS imposed a "questionable" process for designating congressional candidates that excluded the rank-and-file members in the internal primaries. On the right, the RN attracted no more than 9,000 voters out of a total of 100,000 registered members in its 1997 regional elections (Namuncura Serrano, 1997). Such turmoil in party organizations is another reason to question the institutionalization of Chile's party system. According to Mainwaring and Scully's criteria, regularity in patterns of party competition and organization is a measure of political institutionalization, and they consider Chile to have such regularity. As this evidence shows, however, the degree of institutionalization attributed to Chilean parties by U.S. analysts is questionable.

Another factor that brings Chilean parties closer to being cartel parties and separates them from civil society is the huge ideological void caused by the crisis of the left and its failure to develop an alternative political vision. Party elites on the left have adopted the technocratic approach of the right, avoiding debates over significant issues. Party members may no longer be motivated to involve themselves in party dynamics because of the banality of party discourse and the lack of opportunity for meaningful participation. As a former MAPU militant who is a current militant of the PS and president of a neighborhood council in José María Caro said (interview, October 1997),

> I decided to join the Socialist party more than anything out of a need to discuss politics, discuss projects and ideas—like what is the role of the party within the Concertación. But the truth is that I have been very frustrated by that because I haven't found the space for that; it doesn't happen, no ideological discussion, no theoretical discussion, no discussion of projects, nothing happens. That sort of discussion only happens in very small groups, "grupos de poder" . . . militants are only called for electoral projects, "How are we going to get this guy or

> that guy elected senator or deputy?" In the days of the UP you could discuss the problems of pobladores; not today. If they see that a militant has more of a position of struggle, they put on the brakes and create all kinds of restrictions.

As Garretón points out, the worldwide collapse of the socialist revolutionary model in both theory and practice has led to the demise of the "heroic" political subject that constituted its principal agent, leading to a generalized avoidance of conflicts over macrostructures that has, in turn, produced a complicated ideological vacuum on the left (1993: 21).[17] Fanny Pollarolo shares this critique of politicians' evasive attitude and ideological repositioning: "We have feared ideas and the people. That is the great problem: fear of opening up opportunities for people to express themselves. The product was *cosismo*: all the politicians speaking about concrete problems, as if the solution to concrete problems could be separated from ideas, from the vision of the country, and from political analysis" (quoted in Correa, 1998). This technocratization of discourse has been a common target of criticism among party militants at the grass roots, some of whom have retained their socialist ideals.

Changes in the political landscape such as institutional constraints, change in party structures, authoritarian political styles, the identity crisis of the left, and the crisis of party politics have opened the way for a crucial change in political culture. Many people no longer look to institutional politics to solve their problems. Indicative of this negative view of the political class held by many citizens, a 1995 poll revealed that 58 percent of respondents reported no allegiance to any political party and that this tendency was greater among the poor.[18] Hagopian provides figures showing the drop in party identification in Chile from 88 percent in 1967 to 50 percent in 1996 (1998: 116). Weakening party identification is also extensive among the younger generation, many of whom have declined to register to vote at 18 as the law requires (nonregistration is not subject to fines, but abstention is [US$170 in 1997]). Six hundred thousand youths over 18 had not registered to vote in time for the 1996 municipal elections, and the number of unregistered 18- to 24-year-olds had risen to 1 million by the 1997 parliamentary election.[19] The electoral participation of voters in the 18-to-24 age-group declined from 20 percent of the total in 1988 to 9 percent in 1996 (see Table 2).

The rejection of formal politics is strongest among young pobladores, who view it as something that they put time and energy into without getting anything in return: "Young people no longer participate in politics . . . because the old guys used us, they really used us. Because we did all the work and the old guys got all the applause. Politics is very dirty" (José, quoted in

TABLE 2
Percentage Distribution of Registered Voters by Age, 1988–1996

	1988 Plebiscite	*1989 Plebiscite*	*1989 Presidential/ Parliamentary*	*1992 Municipal*	*1993 Presidential/ Parliamentary*	*1996 Municipal*
18–24	21.2	19.5	18.3	14.9	14.0	9.1
25–39	37.5	38.3	38.8	40.2	40.2	40.6
40–59	27.9	28.3	28.6	29.4	30.0	32.9
60+	13.5	14.0	14.4	15.5	15.8	17.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Servicio Electoral, Santiago, Chile.

Salazar, 1994: 105). Poblador youth who participated in the national protests of 1983–1986 felt that they had played a major role in the defeat of Pinochet but their lives had not improved significantly with the return to electoral politics. For example, unemployment among youth averaged 17 percent nationally in 1996 (Instituto Nacional de Estadístícas, Compendio Estadistico, 1997: 102) but it was substantially higher in the poblaciones (Urmeneta, 1993: 181). In addition, young men in these neighborhoods continue to be the target of police repression.

Abstention is also on the rise (see Table 3); this and the casting of blank and void ballots combined reached 31.5 percent in the 1997 parliamentary election. This is a high percentage when contrasted with the data available from presidential elections between 1952 and 1970: 13.9 percent in 1952; 16.8 percent in 1958; 14.1 percent in 1964; and 17.1 percent in 1970 (A. Valenzuela, 1994: 118, Table 6.1). These figures showing low electoral participation may not seem unusual by U.S. standards, but in Chile, with its turbulent history of polarization and politicization, it must be interpreted as a rejection of political institutions rather than as apathy or ignorance.

As this evidence suggests, political parties are rendered impotent in the context of "protected democracy." The loss of legitimacy cannot, however, be attributed to institutional factors alone. Political elites must also accept the responsibility for their lack of the political will to renew and strengthen their ties to the grass roots. It is difficult to separate the issue of what the institutional order allows from politicians' fear that reconnection with their social bases may lead to escalating social demands. While political elites of the center and left tend to blame the impediments to getting things done on the institutional system, many at the grass roots blame the "political class," whether parties or politicians in general, for lack of initiative.

TABLE 3

Percentage of Abstentions, Void, and Blank Ballots (Registered Voters) 1988–1997

	1988 Plebiscite	*1989 Plebiscite*	*1989 Presidential/ Parliamentary*	*1992 Municipal*	*1993 Presidential/ Parliamentary*	*1996 Municipal*	*1997 Presidential/ Parliamentary*
Abstentions	2.5	6.3	5.3	10.2	8.7	12.2	13.7
Void	1.3	6.1[a]	1.5	3.1	3.7	7.9	13.5
Blank	1.0		1.2	5.9	1.8	3.0	4.2
Total	4.8	12.4	8.0	19.2	14.2	23.1	31.4

Sources: Servicio Electoral, Santiago, Chile; Ministerio del Interior, Chile, http://www. elecciones.gov.cl.
a. Total of void and blank ballots (Riquelme, 1999: 32).

THE PARTY IN THE POBLACIÓN

Disaffection with formal politics is even more pronounced among the poor. In the poblaciones, where crime and drug abuse have risen sharply, there is a tendency to charge the central government with neglect. It was these neighborhoods that bore the brunt of repression during the dictatorship. Fiscally overburdened municipalities, moreover, cannot provide adequate social services to residents. Pobladores expected democracy to resolve the cases of human rights abuses and the "social debt" amassed during the dictatorship. Political elites' concern not to provoke the military, their failure to bring justice in the majority of the cases of human rights crimes (it took judicial action outside Chile to impel Pinochet's prosecution in Chile), and their inability to deepen democracy and develop an alternative economic model to bring about a more equitable distribution of wealth are all factors that have strengthened the impression of their inefficacy.

My interviews suggest that few people become party militants today.[20] As the president of the Unión Comunal (union of all neighborhood councils in a municipality) of Lo Espejo and PC militant said, "Very few people at the base understand what political militancy is, what it is to be affiliated. Most of the time people don't even want to sign anything, thinking it will implicate them politically" (interview, November 1997). At the same time, parties are limiting who can become a militant.

In addition, party leaders hold neighborhood meetings only at election time, one of the only times candidates and politicians come to the communities they seek to represent. The pobladores I spoke with expressed concern that their communities had become disillusioned after the realization that democracy would not fulfill the promises parties had made. People still cared about the serious problems confronting their community, but they were less motivated to organize collectively or work through official channels because they did not expect it to lead to a solution. As a former militant of the Movímiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (Movement of the Revolutionary Left – MIR) who had organized 19 committees of homeless families for a successful land invasion in Peñalolen in 1992 explained, autonomy from political parties has become imperative to social organization (interview, August 1998):

> We are convinced that when they [parties] become involved in an organization it falls apart; that's why we don't work with political parties. We are not apolitical, I want to make that clear, because everyone has his own ideology, but we do not impose it on anyone. I think people don't have real knowledge of the economic model, and they fault politicians for not bettering their daily lives. They

> put all politicians in the same package. Pinochet is guilty of all that has happened, of the depoliticization of the people. But I think there has been a lack of political will with respect to what the old man left tied up.

Another leader of the same land invasion asserted, "The political world is so, so far from the social world—so, so detached—that without the existence of political parties that effectively represent popular interests (that not only refer to them in their theoretical positions and discourse but represent them from the point of view of complete and concrete actions), in the absence of that, what we have is autonomy" (interview, August 1998).

Reflective of the appropriation of this discourse of autonomy, the interviewees expressed a sharp division between the social and the political. "I spent two years not being active in a party, being a social activist and not a political activist," said a former MAPU militant. "They [local activists] use the social work in the neighborhood associations to be a candidate in the municipal elections. So people marginalize themselves, and you get this small group that represents particular parties. It's not like during the dictatorship, when we all dedicated ourselves to the social because we didn't have a political mission" (interview with Lo Espejo Councilperson Alfredo Bruna, November 1997).

The imperative of autonomy for social organizations—the separation of the social and the political expressed by pobladores—could result in growing complexity, differentiation, and more space for various kinds of social forces to take shape and make their voices heard. However, in Chile the result has been a widespread demobilization of grassroots organizations, and the nongovernmental organizations that used to offer them technical support have also been disappearing because of the reduction of the foreign funding that made their work possible during the dictatorship. The problematic of the technocratization of politics at the local level, which in practice means taking social problems out of the scope of politics in the attempt to solve specific problems rather than mobilizing collective social demands, has led to the realization among organized pobladores that autonomy from political parties is prerequisite to claiming social rights. In effect, pobladores are pushed to autonomy and to acceptance of the social/political divide. Responding to the change in content of the category "political," which no longer includes substantive social components, they no longer see institutional politics as a viable means to get their demands met. Their position of autonomy, in turn, can become functional to the system in the end because of its demobilizing effects.

As these interviews strongly suggest, various degrees of class consciousness and critical political awareness are still present among sectors of

pobladores. It cannot be said that they are apolitical or depoliticized. There is a clear, precise, and acute consciousness of the shift in formal politics, the limitations of the transition, and the decline in participation since 1990 as a consequence. As one poblador from La Pintana eloquently sums up the situation (interview, January 1998):

> The change has been practically null, if Pinochet left and they are governing with the constitution of Pinochet. The problem is that this is Pinochetismo without Pinochet, and the worst thing is that these people that raised the people's expectations for change are better administrators of Pinochet's constitution than he was. So the disillusion and disconcert that exists is terrible. It started with 5 percent voided votes and abstention. Today we are over 20 percent and about 40 percent who don't participate . . . and this is because they know that nothing will change because people thought that there would be real democracy and that is not the case. The ones who are guilty that the young people do not want anything to do with politics are the politicians.

The rejection of formal politics apparent in these communities has been mounting since the early 1990s as a result of a process of realization of the difficulties of working within the system to bring about change. Citizens' perception that political will gets you nowhere is antithetical to a democracy but perhaps not to "protected democracy," a democracy in which representation is constrained, meaningful participation discouraged, and mobilization feared. Political parties in this context—their technocratic orientation and the banality of their discourse aside—cannot help but lose their relevance, especially in communities where the quality of life leaves much to be desired. Everyday life in the poblaciones is filled with uncertainty and ambiguity, and promises of "growth with equity" are no longer believed. Here, cynicism arises, for example, from the contradictions of watching President Frei on television speaking about democracy and social justice on the evening of Independence Day 1997 and seeing him the next day joking with Pinochet as they watch the military parade go by.

CONCLUSION

In Chile, where "protected democracy" falls short of even formal democracy, parties that were once representative of popular and working-class interests and are now supporting neoliberal policies have undermined their own mobilizing and representative capacities. The legitimacy at the grass roots that these parties once elicited has eroded, especially among youth and the urban poor. This delegitimization stems in part from parties' being embedded

in a network of political institutions inherited from the military regime. This type of institutionalization negatively affects a party's rooting in society and its relevance to citizens. The vestiges of the dictatorship limit opportunities for substantive social change. Political parties operating in this context of restricted democracy have moderated their appeals to the electorate and changed their political styles, and these changes have impacted political culture at the grass roots. At the same time, party elites lack the political will to open their parties up to meaningful participation from their bases and to democratize party structures. They are also reluctant to mobilize their constituents to demand a plebiscite to put an end to the authoritarian enclaves.

Chile's parties are different from those of the pre-1973 democracy. No longer mobilizing agencies, they are more like catch-all parties that are failing to "catch" significant portions of the electorate, above all youth and the urban poor. In this context, parties are moving closer to the state and farther from society, being viewed in many communities more as institutions of social control and representatives of an authoritarian institutional order than as representative of constituent interests.

Changes of this type—from mass parties to nonideological parties detached from society—took place with the consolidation of economic liberalism in the first half of the twentieth century in Europe and the United States. However, in Chile, with its historically high level of politicization, unresolved issues in human rights linked to the dictatorship, and inequality of income distribution (which is even more regressive than that in less industrialized Latin American countries), there is a need for parties to play their traditional role as interpreters of societal interests, providing channels for the resolution of conflicts within the political system. The neoliberalization of the state and the technocratization of political mediation that accompanies it have led to a bifurcation between party militants and social activists at the grass roots, where ideology is still strong in some communities. The consequences of this phenomenon can be seen all over Latin America, where strong currents of "antipolitics" prevail.

With four retired military officers appointed to the Chilean Senate by the National Security Council, the legislature continues to serve as an avenue for direct military intervention. This may further weaken the legitimacy of party politicians and the confidence that they can (or want to) minimize military influence, complete the transition to full democracy, and approach the subject of redistribution through a more humane model of economic development. Without these reforms, parties cannot strengthen their representative capacity and may continue to lose relevance and credibility at the grass roots. Excluded from the neoliberal-based institutional model, the popular sectors may yet draw on the historical memory of the dynamism of the left in

twentieth-century Chile and renew its historic project, this time foregoing the institutional channels of articulation that parties once provided.

NOTES

1. Figures from "Cuatro millones de votos perdidos en esta eleccion" (*La Tercera*, December 13, 1997).

2. By the standards of Western democracies, these figures are by no means alarming. However, voting is obligatory in Chile, and electoral participation stood at 98 percent at the beginning of the transition to democracy.

3. "Protected democracy" is the term used by the military, political elites, and the media when referring to the institutional order inherited from the dictatorship. The term was first used by Pinochet in his 1979 "Chacarillas speech." It was in Chacarillas that the 1980 Constitution was crafted by Pinochet and his legal team. The constitution was ratified in a plebiscite under repressive conditions with soldiers at the polls and no voter registry rolls, a plebiscite that elicited widespread allegations of fraud (see Constable and Valenzuela, 1991: 71–72).

4. Originally a coalition of 17 parties, the Concertación consists of four parties: the Partido Demócrata Cristiana (Christian Democrats – PDC), the Partido Socialista (the Socialist party–PS), the Partido por la Democracia (PPD), and the Partido Radical Socialdemócrata (Radical Social Democratic Party – PRSD). The PS and the PPD are known as the "renovated left," and their inclusion in the Concertación has led them to a more centrist position and caused tensions between those who remain closer to the party's historical socialist position and those who are critical of that position. The PDC's alliance with the moderate left has also caused tensions within the right and left sectors of the party.

5. Alfredo Riquelme agrees with the conclusion that the growth of the nonvoting population is due to the authoritarian enclaves that act as a counterweight to democratic institutions, agents, and processes and that the insufficiently representative political system helps explain declining political participation: "more convincing explanations to these growing phenomena may be found by examining the connection between changing political behavior—the growing withdrawal of the right to vote—and the political characteristics of Chile's democratization process. This means inquiring about those experiences which have affected people during the transition, and how this has led to changes in their electoral behavior" (1999: 33).

6. Poor communities overwhelmingly supported the parties of the center and left, parties opposed to the dictatorship, while wealthy communities supported the right in the 1989 elections (see Baño, 1990: 7–18).

7. According to World Bank figures for proportion of the income of the highest to the lowest population quintile for selected Latin American countries, only Brazil (32.1), Panama (29.9), and Guatemala (30) had greater inequality in income distribution than Chile (17.4). Nicaragua (13.1), Dominican Republic (13.3), and Honduras (15.1) among others, fared better than Chile (Korzeniewicz, 1997: 227, Table 6).

8. The "Washington consensus" refers to the policy prescriptions of international lending and development agencies such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund that make access to loans contingent on adherence to neoliberal economic policies.

9. The electoral law imposed by the military creates two-member districts in which voters vote for individuals within a party or coalition list. The candidate with the highest number of votes gets the first seat, but for the same slate to win both seats that list would have to get twice the

vote of the second-place slate. The system thus allows the runner-up to win the second seat with only 33 percent, whereas the majority slate would have to obtain 67 percent of the vote to win both seats. This system has allowed the right to gain enough seats to constitute, together with the designated senators and the lifetime senator, a majority in the Senate.

10. Although this literature refers to Western democracies, I believe it offers insight into the current Chilean party system. Giovanni Sartori (1976) compared the pre-1973 Chilean party system to the Italian.

11. In calling it a "developing" country, I mean to emphasize the fact that, lacking an industrial base, Chile's economy is still reliant on the export of primary products and the neoliberal state is restricted in the areas of planning and redistribution.

12. Linz and Stepan (1996: 205–218) hold that Chile has not completed the transition to democracy for this reason.

13. There is a precedent for plebiscites in contemporary Chilean history. In the 1988 plebiscite that ousted Pinochet, voters could vote yes to continue Pinochet's rule until 1998 or no to hold elections. In 1989, another plebiscite was held to approve constitutional reforms negotiated between the Concertación and the military.

14. In contrast to the 1960s, when Frei Montalva received US$10 million from the CIA to finance his 1964 presidential campaign, today's campaigns are funded by domestic "grupos," huge business empires owned by the few who have amassed fortunes in the privatization of state-owned enterprises. Indicative of the concentration of income in contemporary Chile, six grupos controlled assets equivalent to 56 percent of the total GDP in 1996 (Rosenfeld and Marre, 1997: 20). Chilean grupos are becoming increasingly transnational, buying up the formerly state-owned industries of their Latin American neighbors.

15. Constitutional reforms barred particularistic legislation in 1970, but constituents continue to expect legislators to provide "pork." As Siavelis points out, one deputy he interviewed claimed that 95 percent of the correspondence he received from constituents consisted of requests for solutions to local problems or increases in social benefits (1997: 329).

16. Militants are party members who have the right to vote for party leaders. As noted by Arriagada, historically, militants of parties of the center and the left were persons who were extremely devoted to politics and closely followed party leaders' speeches and platforms. They avidly participated in marches, rallies, and *frentes* that united youth, neighbors, or workers under the same party banner. Before 1973, party militants had the right to vote for local directors, who in turn chose the provincial leaders, who then named the national directives and chose election candidates. Before the 1989 presidential election, most parties decided to extend the right to vote for national leaders to all militants as well as increase the number of militants. According to Arriagada, party leaders closed registration to new militants after the resumption of electoral politics to preserve their power over their bases, resulting in small regional and local oligarchies (1997: 69–72). In an off-the-record interview, a PDC militant confided that the power holders within the PDC had feared a loss of influence over local and regional party networks and therefore closed party registries.

17. The demise of the socialist model referred to by Garretón and its consequences are particularly relevant to Chile, the first country to elect a socialist president. President Allende's attempt to build socialism through democratic means remains a contested area in the historical memory of Chilean society.

18. DESUC-COPESA poll cited in *Latin American Weekly Report*, January 1996, 30–31.

19. "600,000 jovenes que podrian estar inscritos no lo estan," interview with Juan Ignacio García, director of Servicio Electoral, *La Tercera*, October 14, 1996. The 1997 figure is from "Preocupante evaluacion," interview with Garcia in *La Tercera*, December 13, 1997.

20. I had intended to conduct interviews with political party coordinating committees which mobilized in the poblaciones in the 1980s. These were the: Metropolitana Pobladores (PC), Libertad (PDC), Pobladores Unidos (PS), COAPO-Pobladores (MIR), and Movimiento Poblacional Solidaridad (IC and Catholic Church). However, it is indicative of the present discouragement of mobilization that, with the exception of Solidaridad, these organizations no longer exist.

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