THE SIXTEENTH CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

Hu Gets What?

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Abstract

This essay offers data about China's Central Committee, Politburo, and Standing Committee, e.g., turnover rates, generations, birthplaces, educations, occupations, ethnicities, genders, experiences, and factions. Past statistics demonstrate trends over time. Norms of elite selection can be induced from such data, which allow a broad-based analysis of changes in China's technocracy. New findings include evidence of cooperation among factions and swift promotions of province administrators.

Did November of 2002 begin a new era of Chinese politics? Was the Sixteenth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) the first institutionalized transfer of power in the People's Republic of China (PRC)? Younger leaders, the "fourth generation" headed by Hu Jintao, seemed to replace the old guard. Gerontocracy seemed moribund. Yet, this

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Asian Survey, 43:4, pp. 553–597. ISSN: 0004–4687

prospect was dimmed when Jiang Zemin bequeathed to Hu the post of party general secretary, but kept the chair of the Central Military Commission. Succession in the party, but not yet in the army, was combined with Jiang's ability to place his cronies in two-thirds of the seats on the nine-member Standing Committee, the highest decision-making body in the land.

Was it misleading to stress the importance of political institutionalization within the CCP, which bans any other political party that might challenge its power? On the other hand, in view of past ebbs of authoritarianism in Russia or Eastern Europe, might not evidence of peaceful succession or factional compromise in China's ruling party be important? Personalism did not, however, disappear from China in November 2002. Were Jiang's colleagues in his own generation, who all retired at the Congress, surprised by the apparent success of his political ploys? Since Hu is shadowed by Jiang and surrounded by Jiang's protégés, is Hu still a figurehead? Does the 2002 Congress follow an old pattern in which the paramount leader can change rules to determine outcomes? How does this succession affect CCP legitimacy, and what does the new leadership portend for China's future?

Full answers will take time to emerge. Yet, immediately after the Congress, many analysts made varying assessments, especially about Jiang. Andrew Nathan argued that the Party Congress showed institutional development. Jiang formally retired, some power went to fresh leaders, no military general was paramount, and new Politburo members were partly chosen on their merits.[1] By contrast, Joseph Fewsmith and others noted that Jiang emerged from the Congress more powerful than ever. Jiang made the personnel decisions, according to Fewsmith, so transition was incomplete.[2]

Jiang was able to appoint friends to the new Standing Committee, but some of his confidants fared poorly in elections at the Congress. Jiang's bodyguard, You Xigui, received the lowest number of votes for election as an alternate on the Central Committee (CC). Jiang's former personal secretary and current party secretary in Shenzhen, Huang Liman, received the third-lowest number of votes.[3] Jiang's close ally, former Shanghai deputy party secretary and then Minister of Education Chen Zhili, failed to obtain a seat on the Politburo.[4] The evidence suggests Jiang's influence was limited.[5] Con-

1. Andrew J. Nathan, "Authoritarian Resilience," *Journal of Democracy* 14:1 (January 2003). Also see his remarks at the online conference, "The Sixteenth Party Congress and China's Future," January 8, 2003, <http://www.Chinesenewsnet.com>.

2. Joseph Fewsmith, "The Sixteenth Party Congress: Implications for Understanding Chinese Politics," *China Leadership Monitor* 5 (Winter 2003). See <http://www.chinaleadershipmonitor.org/default.htm>.

3. As standard practice, alternate members of the Central Committee are listed in order of the number of votes they received. See <http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/48817.htm>.

4. Chen was later elected as state councilor at the 10th NPC. But she received, embarrassingly, the lowest number of confirmation votes in the State Council (240 "no" votes and 118

gress votes implied that the outgoing party chief had both strengths and weaknesses.

China watchers have arguably spent too much time speculating about Jiang and his relationship with a handful of top leaders. Rumors and hearsay, rather than data, have become overused sources in Chinese-elite studies. Analysts were unable to predict much that had not already been officially announced about decisions either before or during the Congress, or even the date when it would be convened. Bureaucrats, journalists, and even academics frequently refer to officials as authoritative sources, and they tend to concentrate on just one or a very few high-placed people arguably more often than is optimal for understanding Chinese politics. A habit of tolerating guesswork has become usual, but it does not assure critical searches for patterns of power redistribution among types of leaders, for long-term trends in the elite, or for possible links among political factions. This habit shows the questions that external politicians and businesspeople have about China, but it answers many of them without benefit of facts. Elite studies, especially of authoritarian states, are all subject to epistemological problems. Writers about China should do more to try to minimize these. Many analysts fixate on gossip about power struggles among leaders, without much contemporary evidence and without paying enough attention to the political forces and regional interests these leaders represent, or the apparent constraints faced by them all, including Jiang.

This study addresses the issue of Jiang's semi-retirement but goes beyond it by searching many statistics about elite formation. We have assembled a database on the biographical traits of all 356 CC members (198 full members and 158 alternates).[6] We have paid particular attention to these leaders' generations, bureaucratic affiliations, birthplaces, educations, career paths, and

abstentions from 2,935 delegates). The results of the election were available to journalists who covered the 10th NPC in March 2003. See <http://www.chinesenewsnet.com>, March 17, 2003.

5. Jiang perhaps used foreign visits, especially a Texas summit with George W. Bush just before the Congress, to enhance his bargaining power in personnel decisions back home. It may or may not be a coincidence that the announcement of promotions for Jia Qinglin and Huang Ju, the party chiefs of Beijing and Shanghai, came while Jiang was visiting the United States.

6. The sources are: Liao Gailong and Fan Yuan, comp., *Zhongguo renmin da cidian: Xiandai dangzhengjun lingdao renwu juan* [Who's who in China: Current party, government, and military leaders], 1994 edition (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1994); Shen Xueming et al., comp., *Zhonggong di shiwujie zhongyang weiyuanhui zhongyang jilü jiancha weiyuanhui weiyuan minglu* [Who's who among the members of the Fifteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the Fifteenth Central Discipline Inspection Commission] (Beijing: Zhonggong wenxian chubanshe, 1999); Ho Szu-yin, comp., *Zhonggong renmin lu* [Who's who in communist China] (Taipei: Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, 1999); and *China Directory* (Tokyo: Rapiopress, various years from 1985 to 2002). In addition, we have collected biographic information, often through search engines, from online websites such as <http://www.xinhuanet.com>, <http://www.China.com>, <http://www.Chinesenewsnet

early political socializations. To assess trends, we compare this CC with its predecessors, especially the Fifteenth CC. Analysis of such data should make discourse about the Chinese political elite more firmly based.

Not all CC members are created equal, and compiling information about individuals does not show everything about their networks or the contexts in which they act. We will therefore also try to shed light on the main factions of the late-Jiang/early-Hu era, which are now latent, especially on their mutual tension or cooperation. Crucial to any assessment of Chinese elite politics, during this period when succession may be still incomplete, is an understanding of Hu Jintao's power: where it is based, how it differs from Jiang's, what relationship is most likely between Hu and Jiang's apparent protégé Zeng Qinghong, and how Hu's leadership may shape China's future. Hu now holds the most important position in the CCP and the presidency of the PRC. Will he and his team be effective politically?

Characterizing Hu's Leadership

Hu's rise in the CCP was heralded by extensive publicity about him as the "fourth generation" leader, and by a stress on the need for "institutionalized succession." Each of these two notions is highly political. Jiang Zemin promoted them, at least until the summer of 2002. By identifying Deng Xiaoping as the core of the second generation and himself as the core of the third, Jiang consolidated his own legitimacy in the mid-1990s.[7] By identifying Hu as a leading figure of the fourth generation, Jiang apparently diminished pressure on his own position from other potential leaders in his age group such as Qiao Shi, Li Peng, Zhu Rongji, and Li Ruihuan.

"Generation," combined with mechanisms such as "term limits" and "retirement age," was among Jiang's tools for consolidating his power—and these are now perforce integral parts of Hu's mandate. Hu may be a weak player in comparison to Jiang at present, but time is on Hu's side. Hu is "famous for being unknown," and his personality is less transparent than the frequency with which he discusses institutionalization. He often speaks of "political civilization," which might be a code phrase for the habit of compromise.[8] Many in China hope that Hu will take full charge soon, because he

.com>, <http://www.sina.com>, <http://www.yahoo.com>, and <http://www.sohu.com>. A source that appeared after the data collection is <http://www.16congress.org.cn>.

7. Most China scholars have attributed these two concepts to Deng Xiaoping. While this is valid, Jiang also enthusiastically promoted these ideas at least until the summer of 2002. For more, see Cheng Li, *China's Leaders: The New Generation* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), pp. 6–10; and Cheng Li, "Jiang's Game and Hu's Advantages," *Foreign Policy in Focus*, <http://www.fpif.org>, November 21, 2002.

8. Joseph Kahn, "A Chinese Write-in Candidate Tests the Official Winds," *International Herald Tribune*, March 3, 2003, p. 4.

personifies the country's quest for political institutionalization. Hu got the highest number of votes in elections to the Sixteenth CC (all but one of the 2,132 delegates voted for him).[9]

In addition to generational differences, Jiang and Hu represent two dissimilar sociopolitical and geographical constituencies. These divergences are reflected in their personal careers and political associations. In contrast to Jiang, who advanced from a base in Shanghai and through an advantageous "princeling" (*gaogan zidi*) background, Hu comes from a non-official family. Hu's political links have largely been with the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL). Hu has spent most of his adult life in poor inland provinces, including 14 years in Gansu, three years in Guizhou, and four years in Tibet. Also, in contrast to Jiang, who has reigned over a flow of economic resources to Shanghai and other coastal areas during the past decade, Hu has been sensitive to inland needs. In the months both before and after the Congress, Hu frequently visited provinces such as Yunnan, Guangxi, Heilongjiang, Qinghai, Sichuan, and Inner Mongolia. The agenda of the first Politburo meeting at which Hu was chair included economic development plans for China's western region. Hu has often portrayed himself as deeply concerned about fairness, social justice, and growing economic disparities.

In contrast to Jiang, who has cultivated a web of patron-client ties largely based on his Shanghai connections, Hu thus far enjoys a public image of having avoided an obsession with factional favoritism. Hu has associates, but nobody on the new Politburo is seen as his protégé. Instead, Hu is known for his skills in coalition-building and consensus-making, which may be a collective characteristic of the fourth generation. His low-profile personality and his reputation for refraining from building his own patron-client network might allow him to aid China's institutional development.

Of course, Hu has nonetheless been skilled at political networking. He has expedited his political career through *guanxi* (political connections), and has established remarkably broad political linkages. Hu is prominent in the so-called Qinghua University clique; he headed the CCYL in the early 1980s, and served during the past decade as president of the Central Party School (CPS). Many members of the 2002 CC have been associated with at least one of these three institutions.[10] Most of them concurrently hold top provincial leadership posts, especially in China's inland provinces.[11]

Evidence suggests that Hu did not need, at the Congress, to promote his own people to the Politburo. Three possible explanations all relate to the

9. *Shijie Ribao* [World Journal], November 15, 2002, p. A3.

10. On Hu's association with these three political networks, see Cheng Li, "Hu's Followers: Provincial Leaders with Backgrounds in the Communist Youth League," *China Leadership Monitor* 3 (Summer 2002).

11. Cheng Li, "A Landslide Victory for Provincial Leaders," ibid., 5 (Winter 2003).

norms under which successors are selected by party elders in clandestine councils, but are now promoted together in regular generations. First, Hu may have no need to challenge Jiang's power at present because Jiang's own legitimacy as a leader was earlier established, similarly, in Deng Xiaoping's councils, and Jiang has shown no interest in naming another successor to replace Hu. Unless something drastic develops, Jiang has neither the incentive nor the political might to change his successor. Second, though Hu is surrounded by Jiang's protégés on the Politburo Standing Committee, these men may be vulnerable because of the more recent political favoritism through which they obtained their seats. Third, since Hu now holds the posts of general secretary of the party and president of the PRC, leaders who were previously tied to Jiang or other factions may tend to jump on the bandwagon, shifting their loyalty to Hu and thus preserving party stability. The elite of Mexico's Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) chose the presidents of that country for many decades using similar norms, until the PRI lost a national election.

Quantitative Findings and Discussion

The Fluidity of Elite Turnover

A main reason why the CCP has been able to stay in power for over half a century, especially during the past two decades, apparently lies in the adaptability of its elite. Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca described the "circulation of elites" as key to the survival of any ruling group. In Mosca's view, governing leaderships decline when they cease to find an arena for the talents through which they rose to power, if they can no longer render the services they once rendered, or if their strengths become less relevant to a changing socioeconomic context.[12] By ceasing to be truly communist, the CCP has adapted in this way. Pareto explains that a revolution (or in his words, a "wholesale circulation of elites") becomes likely when the "piecemeal circulation of elites" is too slow. Channels of enrollment may be clogged by an old elite that prevents "new blood" from entering the power structure.[13] Any enduring regime will try to maintain its internal integrity by defining what types of people can rule, but it will also adapt to its external environment by recruiting fresh talent.

The CCP's institutionalization, during China's reforms, of both technocratic rule and age criteria for leadership, shows a clear effort to find this balance. Under Deng Xiaoping in the early 1980s, the party began to recruit new members from different social and occupational backgrounds into lead-

12. Gaetano Mosca, *The Ruling Class* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1936).

13. Vilfredo Pareto, *The Rise and Fall of Elites: An Application of Theoretical Sociology* (Totowa, N.J.: Bedminster, 1968).

ership. The CCP, in its earlier, revolutionary period, was largely led by ex-peasants whose educations, for the most part, had been acquired in war. Now it is led by engineers. This "technocratic turnover" mainly occurred during the 1992 and 1997 Party Congresses.[14] The nine members of the newly formed Standing Committee are *all* engineers. They have spent most of their careers as party functionaries.

While engineering technocrats overwhelmingly predominate at the top leadership of the current CC, other groups are increasingly found just below that level, especially economists. For the first time in the history of the CCP, the Central Enterprise Work Commission and the Central Financial Work Commission had delegations at the Congress. A handful of CEOs from big state-owned enterprises, joint ventures, and banks now serve on the CC as full or alternate members. Jiang Zemin's "theory of three represents" legitimizes the recruitment of private entrepreneurs into the party. A majority of these CC entrepreneurs or bankers are from state firms, but a few are from collective or share-holding companies. For the first time, private entrepreneurs (capitalists, by any other name) were also delegates at the Communist Party Congress.[15]

Measurement of circulation. Table 1 shows that the proportion of fresh members on the CC exceeds 50%, ever since 1982. At the Sixteenth CC in November 2002, 107 full members (54%) and 113 alternate members (72%) were new to those posts. The combined number of newcomers in both categories is 61%. But if we reduce this by the number (40) of new full members who were promoted from alternate status on the previous CC, 180 leaders (including 67 new full members and 113 new alternates) are first-timers, who account for 50.6% of the Sixteenth CC. Along with other data, this suggests that although party personnel cadres could not absolutely control the votes of Congress delegates, perhaps their prior goal was to make half of the CC wholly new. Only time will tell whether a similar result may be normalized at future congresses. The Politburo (PB) and its Standing Committee (SC)

14. On "technocratic turnover" in the 1992 and 1997 Party Congresses, see Li Cheng and Lynn White, "The Army in the Succession to Deng Xiaoping: Familiar Fealties and Technocratic Trends," *Asian Survey* 33:8 (August 1993), pp. 757–86; and Li Cheng and Lynn White, "The Fifteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: Full-Fledged Technocratic Leadership with Partial Control by Jiang Zemin," *Asian Survey* 38:3 (March 1998), pp. 245–47.

15. Jiang's slogan asserted that the Party should represent "the development needs of China's advanced social productive forces," "the onward direction of China's advanced culture," and "the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people." The Sixteenth Congress included 38 delegations. In addition to the two new delegations from enterprises and financial firms, there were 31 provincial and municipal delegations, one from the People's Liberation Army, one from the central party, one from the central government, one from Hong Kong and Macao, and one representing Taiwan.

TABLE 1 *Overview of Elite Turnover on CCP Central Committees and Politburos (1956–2002)*

		Central Committee									*Politburo*					
		Full Member			*Alternate Member*			*Total Central Committee*								
CC	*Year Held*	*No.*	*New*	*%*	*No.*	*New*	*%*	*No.*	*New*	*%*	*No.*	*New*	*%*	*Re-elected*	*%*	*% of Re-elected Who Remain from the Previous Politburo*
8th	1956	97	32	(33)	73	70	(95)	170	102	(60)	23	13	(43)	10	(57)	(83)
9th	1969	170	122	(71)	109	104	(95)	279	226	(81)	25	15	(60)	10	(40)	(43)
10th	1973	195	55	(28)	124	58	(46)	319	113	(35)	25	9	(36)	16	(64)	(64)
11th	1977	201	71	(35)	132	75	(56)	333	146	(43)	26	11	(46)	15	(54)	(60)
12th	1982	210	96	(45)	138	114	(82)	348	210	(60)	28	14	(50)	14	(50)	(54)
13th	1987	175	114	(65)	110	79	(72)	285	193	(68)	18	12	(66)	6	(34)	(21)
14th	1992	189	84	(44)	130	97	(75)	319	181	(57)	22	15	(68)	7	(32)	(39)
15th	1997	193	109	(57)	151	106	(70)	344	215	(63)	24	8	(33)	16	(67)	(73)
16th	2002	198	107	(54)	158	113	(72)	356	220	(61)	25	15	(60)	10	(40)	(42)

SOURCES: Certain tables in this article update the authors' work on previous party congresses; see Li Cheng and Lynn White, "The Thirteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: From Mobilizers to Managers," *Asian Survey* 28:4 (April 1988), pp. 371–99; Li Cheng and Lynn White, "The Army in the Succession to Deng Xiaoping: Familiar Fealties and Technocratic Trends," *Asian Survey* 33:8 (August 1993), pp. 757–86; and Li Cheng and Lynn White, "The Fifteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: Full-Fledged Technocratic Leadership with Partial Control by Jiang Zemin," *Asian Survey* 38:3 (March 1998), pp. 231–64. New sources of data, including the information of the Sixteenth CC, are identified in footnote 3. Other tables in the article do not repeat these sources unless data came from elsewhere.

NOTE: The "new" column under Full Member counts those promoted from alternate to full membership. The "new" column under Alternate Member excludes those demoted from full to alternate membership. The "new" column under the Total Central Committee includes new full plus new alternate members. The increase in the total number of the new Central Committee members can be reduced by the number promoted from alternate to full membership. On the Sixteenth Central Committee, 40 full members were promoted from alternate status, so the wholly fresh list is 180 (including 67 new full members and 113 new alternate members). This is 50.6% of the committee, suggesting the party may have set a goal to make at least half of the CC new.

show higher levels of circulation. Among the 25 full and alternate members of the PB, three-fifths are first-timers. Except for Hu Jintao, the other eight men on the SC are all new. Six of the seven previous SC members stepped down from this supreme decision-making body. They were Jiang Zemin (CCP general secretary), Li Peng (National People's Congress head), Zhu Rongji (premier of the State Council), Li Ruihuan (Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference head), Wei Jianxing (secretary of the Central Discipline Inspection Commission), and Li Lanqing (executive vice-premier). This was the largest SC turnover ever.[16]

Biographical backgrounds. Table 2 shows full data on the ages, provincial origins, jobs, vocations, and educations of the 25 top party politicians, the Politburo members. Fifteen were first-timers in 2002. In fact, all members of the PB, except its SC members, are newcomers (Wu Yi was promoted from alternate to full member). Among the nine SC members, six entered the PB in 1997. Hu Jintao, Wu Bangguo, and Wen Jiabao have had the longest tenures; each has served for about 10 years. These three leaders, tapped for future glory long ago, in March 2003 became the PRC president, the National People's Congress chair, and the premier. Almost half of the PB members gained CC seats in the 1980s (when most were alternates). The other half joined in the 1990s. Shanghai Party Secretary Chen Liangyu and CC General Office Director Wang Gang first served as CC alternate members as late as 1997. So the turnover of leaders remains high, but so does party elders' self-confidence that they can detect political talent early. The new PB members, like the retirees who chose or agreed on them, are overwhelmingly engineers. Table 3 compares the tenures of full members of the current and preceding Central Committees. All four full members of the 1997 CC whose tenures stretch back to the Cultural Revolution have retired; they are Hua Guofeng (Mao's successor as CCP chairman), Ni Zhifu and Hao Jianxiu (model Maoist workers), and Lin Liyun (a Taiwanese and vice chairwoman of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee). Their retirements symbolize how sharply China's leadership has changed, but their retention until 2002 also shows some patience within this party. The longest-tenured member on the Sixteenth CC is now Ismail Amat, a Uighur and vice chair of the 10th National People's Congress (NPC), who first served as a full member in 1973. The second longest-tenured CC full member is Raidi, a Tibetan and regional deputy party secretary who has advised Han Chinese officials (including Hu Jintao) about the high plateau, and for years has dictated appointments of other Tibetans there. These representatives are trusted by Han Chinese leaders because of perceived long-term loyalty in potentially rebellious areas.

16. The second-largest turnover occurred at the 1987 Party Congress when, out of the previous six-man Standing Committee, only Zhao Ziyang remained.

TABLE 2 *Backgrounds of All Members of the Sixteenth Politburo (2003)*

Name	*Age*	*Native Province*	*Current Position*	*Occupational Title*	*Educational Background*	*Year Graduated*	*Year Joined CCP*	*Year Entered CC*	*Year Entered PB*
Hu Jintao	60	Anhui	Secretary-general, PRC president	Engineer	Qinghua University	1965	1964	1982 (AM)	1992
Wu Bangguo	61	Anhui	Chair, NPC, PB SC member	Engineer	Qinghua University	1966	1964	1982 (AM)	1992
Wen Jiabao	60	Tianjin	Premier, PB SC member	Engineer	Beijing Institute of Geology	1967 (G)	1965	1987	1992 (AM)
Jia Qinglin	62	Hebei	Chair, CPPCC, PB SC member	Senior Engineer	Hebei Engineering College	1962	1959	1987	1997
Zeng Qinghong	63	Jiangxi	PRC vice president, PB SC member	Engineer	Beijing Institute of Tech.	1963	1960	1997	1997 (AM)
Huang Ju	64	Zhejiang	Exe. vice premier, PB SC member	Engineer	Qinghua University	1963	1966	1987 (AM)	1994
Wu Guanzheng	64	Jiangxi	Secretary of CCDI, PB SC member	Engineer	Qinghua University	1968 (G)	1962	1982 (AM)	1997
Li Changchun	58	Liaoning	PB SC member	Engineer	Harbin Institute of Tech.	1966	1965	1982 (AM)	1997
Luo Gan	67	Shandong	PB SC member	Senior Engineer	Freiburg Ins. of Metallurgy	1962	1960	1982 (AM)	1997
Wang Lequan	58	Shandong	Party secretary of Xinjiang		Central Party School	1986 (G)	1966	1992 (AM)	2002
Wang Zhaoguo	61	Hebei	Vice chair, NPC	Engineer	Harbin Institute of Tech.	1966	1965	1982	2002
Hui Liangyu	58	Jilin	Vice premier	Economist	Jilin Provincial Party School	1964	1966	1992 (AM)	2002
Liu Qi	60	Jiangsu	Party secretary of Beijing	Senior Engineer	Beijing Institute of Iron/Steel	1968 (G)	1975	1992 (AM)	2002
Liu Yunshan	55	Shanxi	Head, CCP Propaganda Dept.		Jining Normal School	1966	1971	1982 (AM)	2002
Wu Yi	64	Hubei	Vice premier	Senior Engineer	Beijing Petroleum Institute	1964	1964	1987 (AM)	1997 (AM)
Zhang Lichang	63	Hebei	Party secretary of Tianjin		Beijing Economics Cor. Uni.	1959	1966	1982 (AM)	2002
Zhang Dejiang	56	Liaoning	Party secretary of Guangdong		Kim Il Sung University	1968	1971	1992 (AM)	2002
Chen Liangyu	56	Zhejiang	Party secretary of Shanghai	Engineer	PLA Institute of Engineering	1963	1980	1997 (AM)	2002
Zhou Yongkang	60	Jiangsu	Minister, Ministry of Public Security	Senior Engineer	Beijing Petroleum Institute	1966	1964	1992 (AM)	2002
Yu Zhengsheng	57	Zhejiang	Party secretary of Hubei	Engineer	Harbin Mil. Engineering Ins.	1963	1964	1992 (AM)	2002
He Guoqiang	59	Hunan	Head, CCP Organization Dept.	Senior Engineer	Beijing Ins. Chem. Eng.	1966	1966	1982 (AM)	2002
Guo Boxiong	60	Shaanxi	Vice chair, CMC		PLA Military Academy	1983	1963	1997	2002
Cao Gangchuan	67	Henan	Vice chair, CMC	Engineer	Military Eng. School, USSR	1963	1956	1997	2002
Zeng Peiyan	64	Zhejiang	Vice premier	Senior Engineer	Qinghua University	1962	1978	1992 (AM)	2002
Wang Gang (AM)	60	Jilin	Director, CCP General Office		Jilin University	1967	1971	1997 (AM)	2002 (AM)

NOTE: AM = Alternate Member, CCDI = Central Commission of Discipline Inspection, Chem. = Chemical, CMC = Central Military Commission, Com. = Commission, Cor. = Correspondence, CPPCC = Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, Dev. = Development, Eng. = Engineering, Exe. = Executive, G = Graduate school, Ins. = Institute, Mil. = Military, PB = Politburo, PRC = People's Republic of China, SC = Standing Committee, Sco = State Council. Standing Committee members' names are in italic.

TABLE 3 *Full Members Retained or New on the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Central Committees*

Year First Elected to the CC as Full Member	*15th CC*		*16th CC*	
	Members	*%*	*Members*	*%*
1969 (9th CC)	2	1.0	0	0
1973 (10th CC)	2	1.0	1	0.5
1977 (11th CC)	1	0.5	0	0
1982 (12th CC)	7	3.6	1	0.5
1985 (Enlarged 12th CC)	15	7.8	8	4.0
1987 (13th CC)	17	8.8	10	5.1
1992 (14th CC)	40	20.7	8	4.0
1997 (15th CC)	109	56.5	63	31.8
2002 (16th CC)	—	—	107	54.0
Total	193	100.0	198	99.9

NOTE: Percentages do not add to 100 because of rounding.

They keep their CC seats, and younger minority leaders receive promotions more slowly.

Eight senior current leaders first joined the CC as full members at a special meeting in 1985. They are Hu Jintao, Wu Guanzheng (head of the Central Discipline Inspection Commission), Wang Zhaoguo (vice chair of the National People's Congress), Song Defu (Fujian party secretary), Jia Chunwang (prosecutor general), Liao Hui (director of the State Council's Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office), Li Guixian (Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference vice chair), and Yang Zhengwu (Hunan party secretary). Just one-tenth of the full CC members, as Table 3 shows, have been on the committee for more than a decade. The other 90% are fairly new. Most became prominent national leaders during the 1990s. Overall, CC circulation has been rapid. Turnover has been even faster on the more important PB and SC.

Transition to the Fourth Generation

Each generation has characteristics attributable to a major event that affected its members during the most formative era of their maturation as political adults (often when they were roughly 17 to 25 years old).[17] The literature on

17. William Strauss and Neil Howe, *Generations: The History of America's Future, 1582–2069* (New York: William Morrow, 1992), pp. 60–61. For a theoretical discussion of the concept of political generation, see Karl Mannheim, "Consciousness of Class and Consciousness of Generation," in Karl Mannheim, *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge* (London: RKP, 1952). Many scholars define the formative years of personal growth as between ages 17 and 25. See Michael Yahuda, "Political Generations in China," *China Quarterly* 80 (December 1979), p. 795; Marvin Rintala, "Generations: Political Generations" in *The International Encyclopedia of*

generational studies of contemporary China usually depicts cohort breaks at intervals of about 15 years.[18] The PRC concept of political generation has often been based on distinctive historical experiences of elites, epitomized by a defining event.[19] Four widely recognized cohorts are the "Long March Generation," the "Anti-Japanese War Generation," the "Socialist Transformation Generation," and the "Cultural Revolution Generation." Public parlance has assigned to each of them a legitimate top leader, respectively Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao.

Presuming that the CCP will form future elites, by now the fifth and sixth generations are coming into view. It is easier to analyze these generations statistically, than to be sure about their top leaders—or the continuance of this sort of succession. Any definition of a political generation must, in any case, be somewhat arbitrary. Like other social categories—ethnicity, class, income, or ideology—generations "can be imprecise at the boundaries."[20] It is difficult to say exactly "where one generation begins and another ends."[21] Nevertheless, we can try to base generational demarcations on specific years. Writers define the fourth, or Cultural Revolution (CR), generation as the group born between 1941 and 1956. Its members were 10 to 25 years old when the CR began in 1966. So, they were between 46 and 61 by 2002.[22]

Rapid turnover on the CC and PB required retirements by third-generation leaders, in accord with age-limit norms.[23] The CCP Organization Department, when nominating candidates for CC election, has followed three guidelines: (1) with few exceptions, full and alternate members on the old CC who

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the Social Sciences (New York: Macmillan and Free Press, 1968); and Rodolfo Garza and David Vaughan, "The Political Socialization of Chicano Elites: A Generational Approach," *Social Science Quarterly* 65 (June 1984), pp. 290–307. The importance of early adulthood may also be explored psychologically, as in Erik H. Erickson, *Young Man Luther: A Study in Psychoanalysis and History* (New York: Norton, 1958).

18. Carol Lee Hamrin, "Perspectives on Generational Change in China," unpublished paper for workshop organized by the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, June 1993, p. 1.

19. Earlier studies based on generational analysis include Yahuda, "Political Generations in China," p. 795, and W. William Whitson, "The Concept of Military Generation," *Asian Survey* 11:11 (November 1968).

20. Strauss and Howe, *Generations,* p. 59.

21. Ruth Cherrington, "A Case Study of the 1980s Generation of Young Intellectuals," *British Journal of Sociology* 48:2 (June 1997), p. 304.

22. David M. Finkelstein and Maryanne Kivlehan, eds., *Chinese Leadership in the Twenty-first Century: The Rise of the Fourth Generation* (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 2002); and Cheng Li, *China's Leaders.*

23. For a detailed discussion of age limits for high-level leaders, see H. Lyman Miller, "The Sixteenth Party Congress and China's Political Processes," in Gang Lin and Susan Shirk, eds., *The Sixteenth CCP Congress and Leadership Transition in China*, Asia Program Special Report, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, no. 105 (September 2002), pp. 10–14.

are nominated for reelection should be less than 64 years old; (2) full ministers and provincial chiefs nominated for new memberships should be less than 62; and (3) the nominated vice ministers and deputy province chiefs should be less than 57.[24]

The 2002 CC is mainly fourth-generation; this cohort covers 72% (129) of the 179 full members, and 87% (111) of the 129 alternate members, insofar as ages can be identified. The oldest full members are Luo Gan, Cao Gangchun (Central Military Commission vice chair), and Ismail Amat, all born in 1935. The youngest full CC member is Zhang Qingwei (China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation vice president), born in 1961. The youngest alternate members are Liu Shiquan (Sanjiang Space Group deputy director) and Su Shulin (China National Petroleum Corporation vice president), both born in 1963.

Table 4 shows the average ages of those elected to all the CCs from 1956 to 2002. The new CC has the second-youngest average age (55.4 years), only a couple of months older than on the 13th CC of 1987. Seventy-two full and alternate members of the new 2002 CC are less than 50 years old, compared with 51 under that age on the previous 1997 CC.[25] The number of those under 45, however, decreased from 21 on the previous CC to 15 on the new one.[26] The rather sharp narrowing of age cohorts at top levels of the party underlines an ardent attempt to normalize legitimacy for rulers chosen from successive, officially defined generations. These are periodic elections, albeit not open or liberal ones, controlled by norms that partially constrain groups of leaders as well as individual leaders. Above the CC are the Secretariat, PB, and SC. Table 5 shows average-age changes at those levels since 1982. These core leaderships are progressively younger in most transitions. They also now show a rational "echelon structure": age 62 on the SC, 60.4 on the PB, and 59.4 on the Secretariat. This contrasts with the previous CC, during which the Politburo and Secretariat had the same average age. Another way of estimating cohorts is to look not at birth years but at the dates on which current leaders first joined the Party. Table 6 shows these for the two most recent CCs. None of the members of the new CC joined the Party before 1949; but on the previous CC, 21 members (11%) had joined before 1949. Revolutionary veterans are now almost completely off the political stage. Thirteen full CC members joined as recently as the 1980s and are in very important posts, including Chen Liangyu (Politburo member and Shanghai party secretary), Huang Zhengdong (Chongqing party secretary), Bo Xilai (Liaoning Province governor), Wang Qishan (new Beijing mayor), Li

24. *Wenhui Bao* [Wenhui Daily News], Hong Kong, November 15, 2002.

25. Li Feng, *Shiwuda zhonggong gaoceng xin dang'an* (New profiles of the leadership of the Fifteenth Central Committee of the CCP) (Hong Kong: Wenhua chuanbo, 1997), p. 158.

26. Ibid.

TABLE 4 *Average Age of Election to the Central Committee*

CC	*Year Held*	*Average Age*	*DA/DY*
8th	1956	56.4	
9th	1969	59	+0.20
10th	1973	62	+0.75
11th	1977	64.6	+0.65
12th	1982	62	−0.52
13th	1987	55.2	−1.36
14th	1992	56.3	+0.22
15th	1997	55.9	−0.08
16th	2002	55.4	−0.10

NOTE: DA = Difference of age, DY = difference of year. A positive ratio indicates an aging leadership, relative to the previous CC; the negative shows a shift to younger leaders. Ratio numbers suggest the extent of such change.

TABLE 5 *Average Ages of CC Core Leadership Groups (1982–2002)*

CC	*Year Held*	*PB Standing Committee*	*Politburo*	*Secretariat*
12th	1982	73.8	71.8	63.7
13th	1987	63.6	64	56.2
14th	1992	63.4	61.9	59.3
15th	1997	65.1	62.9	62.9
16th	2002	62	60.4	59.4

TABLE 6 *Periods When Full Members of the Fifteenth and Sixteenth CCs Joined the Party*

	15th CC (1997)		*16th CC (2002)*	
Year (& Generation Name)	*Members*	*%*	*Members*	*%*
1930–1939 Long March/First	1	0.5	0	0
1940–1949 War/Second	20	10.4	0	0
1950–1959 Socialism/Third	52	26.9	7	3.5
1960–1969 CulturalRevolution/Fourth	56	29.0	94	47.5
1970–1979 Reform/Fifth	31	16.1	56	28.3
1980–1989 _____/Sixth	5	2.6	13	6.6
Unknown	28	14.5	28	14.1
Total	193	100.0	198	100.0

NOTE: A common parlance, helping to legitimate the last three successions, is that Mao Zedong led the CCP's first generation, Deng Xiaoping the second, Jiang Zemin the third, and Hu Jintao the fourth. Later generations are not mooted in official documents.

Rongrong (State Assets Regulatory and Management Commission chair), Xu Guanhua (Science and Technology minister), Xiang Huaicheng (former Finance minister), Wang Guangtao (Construction minister), and Li Tielin (CCP Organization Department executive deputy head). Zhou Xiaochun, the new governor of the People's Bank, joined the party as late as 1986. The "fifth generation," however, does not yet occupy a high portion of top posts. The age-group distribution of civilian CC members shows that their representatives account for just 2% of the full members and 8% of the alternates. The fifth generation (born after 1957) experienced Deng's economic reforms in their crucible years of political life, and they may be called the "Reform Generation"—but no rising star has yet emerged from this group to serve on the Politburo or Secretariat. The youngest PB member is 55-year-old Liu Yunshan (CCP Propaganda Department director). The age span between the oldest and the youngest on the PB is 12 years. The span between General Secretary Hu Jintao and his youngest colleague on the Politburo is just five years.

The term "fifth generation" is not used in official Chinese media. Since the summer of 2002, the phrase "fourth generation of leaders" is also no longer used in government publications. Hu Jintao and his colleagues may at this time be more concerned about how to fulfill their mandate than how to choose their successors. The CCP's norm that leaders are promoted in batches, according to somewhat narrow age limits, seems to have allowed power transition without political crisis, but this practice still allows much play for patron-client ties to affect promotions. It provides no institutional rule for finding *which* leader in a generation rises to the top. It suggests collective compromise and restraint by the old guard when choosing new elites, but it no longer specifies who should succeed.

The stress on rather narrow age cohorts is highly political, and CCP cadres define them in different ways that lead to different results. Joseph Fewsmith makes an interesting argument that the so-called "Cultural Revolution Generation" may in fact include two quite different subgroups[27]—those who graduated from college when the Cultural Revolution began (e.g., Hu Jintao or Li Changchun) and those who lost the opportunity to get an education because they were sent down to rural areas, working as farmers (e.g., Li Keqiang or Xi Jinping). On the new Central Committee, 24 members went to "May 7th Cadre Schools" (labor camps for intellectuals and bureaucrats). Another 26 younger members were "sent-down youths" who lost the chance to complete their middle school educations, and worked as peasants for some years. The younger CR group was mostly in college by the time Deng's reform began,

27. Joseph Fewsmith, "Generational Transition in China," *Washington Quarterly* 25:4 (Autumn 2002), p. 23.

often majoring in economics and management rather than engineering. It is debatable whether these two groups should be considered parts of the same generation. Yet, their collective memories of the Cultural Revolution are so strong that they may be called the CR Generation.

The sub-grouping in the fourth generation suggests this cohort might stay in power long enough to have a transition of power from the older sub-group to the younger one. Many in the slightly younger cohort have now emerged as ministers, provincial party secretaries, or governors. This later half of the fourth generation experienced the Cultural Revolution, but their educational and occupational backgrounds are more like those of the putative fifth generation than like those of the older fourth generation sub-group. A sharp boundary between the fourth and fifth generations is hard to find, in comparison with the differences between earlier CCP cohorts.

Will the CCP continue its absorption of new kinds of leaders, taking in more entrepreneurs, lawyers, bankers, and other needed talent, as it has done over the past quarter century? If that happens, a generational transition of power may not be as important as an accommodating distribution of power among political factions, interest groups, social forces, and regions.

Demographic Distribution of Leaders: Gender, National Minority, Birthplace

Women and minorities. Since 1949, and especially during the Cultural Revolution, Chinese authorities have often proclaimed that the CCP would especially aid women. But women's representation has been nearly negligible; except in 1973, it has never exceeded 10% of the CC. Only a handful of female leaders have ever been on the PB or Secretariat. Most were wives of leaders such as Mao (Jiang Qing); Lin Biao (Ye Qun); Zhou Enlai (Deng Yingchao), or symbolic model workers such as Wu Guixian and Hao Jianxiu. After the 1997 and 2002 congresses, no woman sat on the PB (as a full member) or the Secretariat. In the years since 1949, the female proportion of CC full members has never been lower than it is now (see detailed analysis, below).

Before the 2002 Congress, the CCP Organization Department convened a special meeting to encourage women leaders, proposing that there should be at least one or two women on the PB and that the number of woman ministers in the State Council should also increase.[28] The Organization Department also required that lower levels make a greater effort to recruit women cadres. According to an official report, the percentage of women in the CCP increased from 16% in 1997 to 18% in 2002, the percentage of female cadres increased from 34% to 38%, and the proportion of women who served as

28. <http://www.Chinesenewsnet.com>, August 8, 2001.

county or prefecture or province leaders rose from 7.7% to 9% in the same period.[29]

These generally low figures might become larger in the future, even though the November 2002 meetings showed an opposite trend. China has recently seen a rapid growth of college-educated women. The percentage of female college students increased from 24% in 1978 to 34% in 1990, and to 38% in 1998.[30] At the postgraduate level, the proportion of women increased from 10% in 1980 to 23% in 1990. Some PRC women now receive educations abroad, especially at the graduate level. According to a survey recently released by the CCP Organization Department, the college-educated proportion of female leaders at all of China's government and party levels is 59%, 3% higher than for all leaders.[31] A 2001 "open competition" (*gongkai zhaokao*) for deputy bureau chief posts in Beijing chose 30 leaders from 581 candidates. Four-fifths of the winners had postgraduate educations, and three-tenths were women.[32]

The new CC nonetheless shows a decline in the proportion of full members who are women. Table 7 indicates that just five women (2.5%) hold such posts. These are Wu Yi (vice premier), Chen Zhili (state councilor), Liu Yandong (CCP United Front Department director), Huang Jingyi (CCP Organization Department deputy director), and Uyunqimg (vice chair of the National People's Congress). Wu Yi was promoted from alternate status on the 1997 PB and is the first woman member since 1982, when Deng Yingchao also held a full seat on the Politburo. But no woman serves on the Secretariat. The Chinese leadership is male-dominated. Ethnic minority members also constitute a lower proportion of the CC than at any time since 1982, as Table 8 shows. The CC now has 35 full and alternate members (10%) from national minorities. They are seven Huis, six Tibetans, three Manchus, three Uighurs, two Koreans, two Miaos, two Mongols, two Tujias, two Zhuangs, one Buyi, one Dai, one Kazak, one Li, one Yao, and one Yi. Among these, 15 are full members and 20 are alternates. Hui Liangyu, a Chinese Muslim (Hui), serves on the Politburo. He is the first ethnic minority member on the PB since 1985, when Wei Guoqing (a Zhuang) and Ulanhu (a Mongol) retired. Hui has actually not spent much of his career in minority regions. He has been a provincial leader in Jilin, Hubei, Anhui, and Jiangsu.

29. <http://www.xinhuanet.com>, March 7, 2002.

30. Xu Meide (Ruth Hayhoe), *Zhongguo daxue 1895–1995: Yi ge wenhua chongtu de shiji* [China's universities 1895–1995: A century of cultural conflict], trans. Xu Jiemei (Beijing: Jiaoyu chubanshe, 2000), p. 165; and National Bureau of Statistics, comp., *China Statistical Yearbook, 1999* (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 1999), p. 651.

31. <http://www.chinesenews.net.com>, March 7, 2002.

32. Ibid., November 23, 2001.

TABLE 7 *Female Representation on CCP Central Committees (1956–2002)*

		Full Members		*Alternates*		*Total*	
CC	*Year*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*Members*	*%*
8th	1956	44	4	3	4	7	4
9th	1969	13	7.6	10	9.1	23	8
10th	1973	20	10.2	17	13.7	37	11.5
11th	1977	14	6.9	24	18.1	38	11.4
12th	1982	11	5.2	13	9.4	24	6.9
13th	1987	10	5.7	12	10.9	22	7.7
14th	1992	12	6.3	12	9.2	24	7.5
15th	1997	8	4.1	17	11.3	25	7.3
16th	2002	5	2.5	22	13.9	27	7.6

TABLE 8 *National Minorities' Representation on Central Committees*

CC	*Number*	*%*
8th	9	5.2
9th	13	4.6
10th	18	5.6
11th	19	5.7
12th	31	8.0
13th	32	11.2
14th	33	10.3
15th	38	11.0
16th	35	9.8

Regions. Leaders from rich eastern provinces, especially Jiangsu and Shandong, have been extremely important in China's post-Mao elite.[33] On the 1997 CC, 45% of the full members were born in eastern China.[34] During the early 1990s, Shandong alone accounted for over one-quarter of China's senior military officers.[35] On the State Council formed at the 1998 NPC, 16 of 29 ministers (55%) were natives of eastern provinces, including eight born in Jiangsu.[36] Among the 28 ministers selected at the recent 10th NPC, eight were born in Jiangsu (29%) and five (18%) were Shanghaiese.

Table 9 shows the birthplaces by province of full members of the new CC, as compared with the two previous CCs. East China origins predominate, and thus the weight of allegiance to that region is heavy. This skewing comes at the expense of south China, especially Guangdong, if one takes the

33. For more details, see Cheng Li, *China's Leaders*, pp. 59–62.

34. Li and White, "The Fifteenth Central Committee," pp. 246–47. Previously unkown figures are updated based on recently released official biographical information.

35. Li and White, "The Army in the Succession to Deng Xiaoping," pp. 766–67.

36. *China News Analysis*, April 1, 1998, pp. 4–6.

TABLE 9 *Distribution of Birthplaces, by Provinces, of Full Members of the 1992, 1997, and 2002 CCs*

Native Province	*14th CC (N = 189)* *No.*	*%*	*15th CC (N = 193)* *No.*	*%*	*16th CC (N = 198)* *No.*	*%*	*Population (2000)* *%*	*GDP (1999)* *%*
North								
Beijing	4	2.1	5	2.6	6	3.0	1.1	2.5
Tianjin	4	2.1	3	1.6	3	1.5	0.8	1.7
Hebei	22	11.6	10	5.2	8	4.0	5.3	5.2
Shanxi	7	3.7	7	3.6	3	1.5	2.6	1.7
Neimenggu	1	0.5	2	1.0	1	0.5	1.9	1.5
Subtotal	*38*	*20.0*	*27*	*14.0*	*21*	*10.5*	*11.7*	*12.6*
Northeast								
Liaoning	7	3.7	14	7.3	9	4.6	3.4	4.8
Jilin	8	4.2	10	5.2	7	3.5	2.2	1.9
Heilongjiang	2	1.1	2	1.0	5	2.5	2.9	3.3
Subtotal	*17*	*9.0*	*26*	*13.5*	*21*	*10.6*	*8.5*	*10.0*
East								
Shanghai	3	1.6	2	1.0	6	3.0	1.3	4.6
Jiangsu	25	13.2	33	17.1	29	14.7	5.9	8.8
Shandong	24	12.7	25	13.0	17	8.6	7.2	8.7
Zhejiang	14	7.4	11	5.7	13	6.6	3.7	6.1
Anhui	5	2.6	10	5.2	8	4.0	4.7	3.3
Fujian	2	1.1	4	2.1	2	1.0	2.7	4.1
Taiwan	1	0.5	1	0.5	0	0	—	—
Subtotal	*74*	*39.1*	*86*	*44.6*	*75*	*37.9*	*25.5*	*35.6*
Central								
Henan	5	2.6	5	2.6	8	4.0	7.3	5.2
Hubei	10	5.3	5	2.6	6	3.0	4.8	4.4
Hunan	8	4.2	12	6.2	10	5.1	5.1	3.8
Jiangxi	2	1.1	6	3.1	2	1.0	3.3	2.2
Subtotal	*25*	*13.2*	*28*	*14.5*	*26*	*13.1*	*20.5*	*15.6*
South								
Guangdong	4	2.1	6	3.1	4	2.0	6.8	9.7
Guangxi	1	0.5	1	0.5	1	0.5	3.6	2.2
Hainan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.6	0.5
Subtotal	*5*	*2.6*	*7*	*3.6*	*5*	*2.5*	*11.0*	*12.4*
Southwest								
Sichuan (inc. Chongqing)	9	4.8	7	3.6	7	3.5	9.0	5.9
Guizhou	1	0.5	2	1.0	2	1.0	2.8	1.0
Yunnan	2	1.1	0	0	2	1.0	3.4	2.1
Xizang (Tibet)	1	0.5	2	1.0	2	1.0	0.2	0.1
Subtotal	*13*	*6.9*	*11*	*5.6*	*13*	*6.5*	*15.4*	*9.1*
Northwest								
Shaanxi	3	1.6	4	2.1	9	4.6	2.9	1.7
Gansu	1	0.5	1	0.5	2	1.0	2.0	1.1
Qinghai	0	0	0	0	1	0.5	0.4	0.3
Ningxia	0	0	0	0	1	0.5	0.4	0.3
Xinjiang	2	1.1	3	1.6	2	1.0	1.5	1.3
Subtotal	*6*	*3.2*	*8*	*4.2*	*15*	*7.6*	*7.2*	*4.7*
Unknown	8.7	5.8			22	11.1	0.2*	
Total	189	100.0	193	100.0	198	100.0	100.0	100.0

SOURCES: For the 14th CC, see *China News Analysis*, nos. 1588–9 (July 1–15, 1997), pp. 15–20; Zang Xiaowei, "The Fourteenth Central Committee of the CCP, Technocracy or Political Technocracy," *Asian Survey* 33:8 (August 1993), p. 795. For the 15th CC, see Li Cheng and Lynn White, "The Fifteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party," p. 246; some previously incomplete figures are updated. For populations, see National Bureau of Statistics of China, *Diwuci quanguo renkou pucha gongbao* [The fifth national census of the population of the People's Republic of China], no. 2 (May 15, 2001). For GDP data, see <http://www.stats.gov.cn/ndsj/zgnj/2000/C08c.htm>.
* This population is registered in the People's Liberation Army.

view that the leadership should reflect regional economic contributions. It comes at the expense of southwest China, notably Sichuan, if one argues that people should be equally represented. Natives of the southeast on the CC are scarce (with 15% of the national population, but only 7% of the full membership). Guangdong, with 7% of China's people and 10% of the national product, has just 2% of the full seats. No Politburo member was born in the south or southwest (see Table 2), which together have more than a quarter of China's people. Jiangsu natives are now 15% of the CC. On the PB, 10 of 24 full members (42%) were born in east China. The portion of eastern natives, however, has declined by almost 7% from the previous CC. The Shandong natives went from 13% in 1997 to 8.6% now. Representation of the northwest on the CC has increased from 3% in 1992 to 8% now. (For 11% of full members, however, birthplaces still have not been identified.) The party congress is more representative than the CC or higher organs, and its members apparently bargained and voted for somewhat less disproportionate delegations at upper levels.

Rise of Top Elites with Backgrounds in Administering Provincial Economies

Province leadership posts have become, during the past decade, the most important stepping stones to national leadership. Most such leaders, however, do not serve where they were born. China's province-level administrations now have more autonomy than at any time during the past half century to advance their local economic interests. They often do so with support from representatives in the national leadership.[37] Shanghai's rapid development during the past decade, for example, has been closely linked to the enormous power of Jiang Zemin and the so-called Shanghai Gang, whose members rose to the top in part because they taxed the city heavily through the 1980s. They then became the foremost promoters of its halcyon growth in the 1990s.

Inland leaders understandably rue the growing economic gap between the coast and their own provinces. They can, of course, see the overrepresentation of easterners in the central government. Party Congress deputies from inland often use their votes to block the elections of nominees favored by top leaders, especially princelings and officials who have advanced their careers from Shanghai.[38] Table 10 compares the fraction of current Politburo members who have been provincial leaders (deputy party secretaries and vice governors, or above) with the two previous PBs. This provincial proportion

37. For more, see Cheng Li, "After Hu, Who? China's Provincial Leaders Await Promotion," *China Leadership Monitor* 1 (Winter 2002).

38. Li and White, "The Fifteenth Central Committee," p. 247; Cheng Li, *China's Leaders*, pp. 164–68.

TABLE 10 *Provincial Leadership Experiences of Full Members of the 1992, 1997, and 2002 Politburos*

	*As High Provincial Leaders**		*As Top Provincial Chiefs***	
	No.	*%*	*No.*	*%*
14th Politburo (20 Members)	11	55.0	10	50.0
15th Politburo (22 Members)	15	68.2	13	59.1
16th Politburo (24 Members)	20	83.3	16	66.7

* High province-level leaders are the deputy party secretaries, vice governors, or above.
** Top provincial chiefs refer to the party secretaries and governors only.

began high and rose sharply over the decade: 55% in 1992, 68% in 1997, and 83% by 2002. The ratio of PB members who were province chiefs (party secretaries and governors) increased from 50% in 1992 to 59% in 1997, and again to 67% by 2002. All four provincial party secretaries who were previously on 1997 PB were promoted to serve on the nine-member 2002 SC. They now hold top national posts in Beijing. Wu Bangguo and Jia Qinglin head the NPC and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. Huang Ju is executive vice premier of the State Council. Wu Guanzheng serves as secretary of the CCP Central Discipline Inspection Commission.

In addition, He Guoqiang (former Chongqing party secretary), Liu Yunshan (former Inner Mongolia deputy party secretary), and Zhou Yongkang (former Sichuan party secretary) not only received seats on the new Politburo, they also took charge of the CCP Organization Department, the CCP Propaganda Department, and the Public Security Ministry, respectively. All three also serve on the Secretariat, which handles the daily affairs of the Politburo. Never in the history of the PRC have so many provincial leaders been so quickly promoted to posts at the top.

Former provincial leaders now hold two-thirds of the Politburo seats—and most received these promotions while they were actually serving in provinces. Table 11 shows the main jobs of members of the latest three PBs. Ten on the new Politburo were serving in provinces when elected, doubling that number compared to the previous two PBs. Central party organizations' representation has also increased somewhat: 23% in 1992, 25% in 1997, and 32% now. The main trend, however, favors provincial administrators.

Government and army members. Military representation in the top party leadership has remained constant and small. The 2002 Politburo has an all-time low proportion of military officers (8%), down from 40% in 1969, 31% in 1977, 11% in 1987, and 8.3% in 1997.[39] No military officer serves on the

39. Ibid., p. 256.

TABLE 11 *Politburo Members' Principal Bureaucratic Affiliations, 1992, 1997, and 2002*

Principal Current Position	*14th Politburo* No.	%	*15th Politburo* No.	%	*16th Politburo* No.	%
Central party organization	5	22.7	6	25.0	8	32.0
Central gov't. organization	10	45.5	11	45.8	5	20.0
Provincial administration	5	22.7	5	20.8	10	40.0
Military	2	9.1	2	8.3	2	8.0
Total (includes alternates)	22	100.0	24	99.9	25	100.0

NOTE: Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding.

current, or previous, SC. No marshal or general (like the strongmen of yore, Lin Biao, Xu Shiyou, Ye Jianying, Yang Baibing, or Zhang Zhen) are among the politicians whom the party now ranks highest. Of nine generals who served on the Central Military Commission in 1997, six retired in 2002, including two vice chairs, Zhang Wannian and Chi Haotian.

The rise of province chiefs and central party chiefs has come largely at the expense of leaders in the central government. Only five from China's outgoing State Council (Vice Premiers Wen Jiabao and Wu Bangguo, Councilors Luo Gan and Wu Yi, and Minister Zeng Peiyan) got seats on the 2002 Politburo. This contrasts with the two previous PBs, to which 10 and 11 members, respectively, were elected from the State Council. In the newly elected State Council, seven members have seats in the Politburo, and three were recently promoted from provincial party chief (Huang Ju, Hui Liangyu, and Zhou Yongkang). China's leaders have been trying to consolidate what they have called "the function of the ruling party." So the Secretariat, departments under the CC, and provincial party chiefs are more fully represented.

Coast and inland. Maritime-province leaders (not just leaders in any organization who happen to have been born near the coast) are now very strongly represented. Nine PB members have advanced their careers exclusively from coastal provinces, in comparison to four from inland provinces. Thirteen members (65% of the Politburo) concurrently hold or recently held coastal province leadership posts. Seven (35%) did so inland. Dominance of the coast in the PB is even more evident when one considers that of all China's 31 provinces, only 11 are by the sea.[40]

40. The term "province" includes "directly ruled municipalities" and "autonomous regions." The 11 coastal units at this level are Liaoning, Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shandong, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, and Hainan. See Wang Shaoguang and Hu Angang, *The Political Economy of Uneven Development: The Case of China* (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), p. 48.

TABLE 12 *CC Full Members' Principal Bureaucratic Affiliations, 1992, 1997, and 2002*

Principal Current Position	*14th CC (N = 189) 1992*		*15th CC (N = 193) 1997*		*16th CC (N = 198) 2002*	
	No.	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
Central party organization	17	9	14	7	20	10
Central gov't organization	75	40	68	35	58	29
Provincial administration	49	26	61	32	65	33
Military	43	23	42	22	43	22
Other institutions (including mass organization)	5	3	8	4	12	6
Total	189	101	193	100	198	100

NOTE: Percentages do not add to 100 because of rounding.

Provincial leaders do not, because of their limited number, constitute so much of the Central Committee as they do on the higher-level Politburo. Table 12 shows the jobs of full members elected to the past three CCs. The increase in presence of provincial leaders on the CC is not as dramatic as on the PB: 26% of the CC in 1992, 32% in 1997, and 33% in 2002. Military full-member CC representation has been steady (22–23%). Central government representation has dropped: 40% in 1992, 35% in 1997, and 29% in 2002. Members from "other institutions" have risen in status; more entrepreneurs and bankers now sit on the CC. Governors of banks and CEOs of large companies were previously classed as employees of the central government, but now many are no longer called central state cadres. This factor contributed to the central government's decline in representation at all levels.

An equality norm. Table 12 shows that for the first time at least since 1992, province leaders are the largest group of CC full members. Table 13 shows the distribution of province leaders holding full and alternate memberships on the latest two CCs. An institutional norm that each province holds two full seats, first implemented in 1997, has now been reinforced. Although coastal regions are overrepresented on the PB, full memberships on the CC are evenly distributed, with almost absolute strictness, across the board among province leaderships. Each American state gets two senators, and each Chinese province administration gets two CC full members, albeit the powers of these bodies are dissimilar. The CC members are usually the governor (or mayor of a province-level city) and the party secretary.

Jia Qinling and Huang Ju were transferred to Beijing a few weeks before the Sixteenth Party Congress. With their departures, Executive Vice Mayor of Beijing Meng Xuenong (a protégé of Hu) and Executive Vice Mayor of Shanghai Han Zhen (a "Shanghai Gang" member) could receive full CC

TABLE 13 *Provincial Leaders Holding Full and Alternate Memberships on the 15th and 16th CCs*

	15th CC (1997)			*16th CC (2002)*		
	FM	*AM*	*Total*	*FM*	*AM*	*Total*
Beijing	2	3	5	2	3	5
Tianjin	2	3	5	2	3	5
Hebei	2	3	5	2	2	4
Shanxi	2	3	5	2	3	5
Neimenggu	2	3	5	2	3	5
Liaoning	2	1	3	2	3	5
Jilin	2	3	5	2	2	4
Heilongjiang	2	3	5	2	3	5
Shanghai	2	2	4	2	2	4
Jiangsu	2	3	5	2	2	4
Shandong	2	4	6	2	5	7
Zhejiang	2	3	5	2	3	5
Anhui	2	2	4	2	3	5
Fujian	2	2	4	2	3	5
Henan	2	3	5	2	2	4
Hubei	2	2	4	2	2	4
Hunan	2	3	5	2	2	4
Jiangxi	2	2	4	2	3	5
Guangdong	2	5	7	2	6	8
Guangxi	2	3	5	2	4	6
Hainan	2	2	4	2	2	4
Sichuan	2	3	5	2	3	5
Chongqing	2	2	4	2	2	4
Guizhou	2	3	5	2	3	5
Yunnan	1	4	5	2	3	5
Xizang (Tibet)	2	2	4	3	2	5
Shaanxi	2	3	5	2	3	5
Gansu	2	2	4	2	3	5
Qinghai	2	2	4	2	2	4
Ningxia	2	2	4	2	2	4
Xinjiang	2	3	5	4	3	7
Total	61	84	145	65	87	152

NOTE: FM = full member; AM = Alternate member.

seats. Otherwise, Meng and Han would probably not have been elected to full membership because of the "one province administration, two full seats" quota that has become a norm in CC elections. Yunnan in 1997 and Xinjiang and Tibet in 2002 are the only exceptions to this standard. The Xinjiang and Tibet aberration may arise from affirmative action by the CCP Organization Department. It is unclear how nominees for CC alternates are chosen for

Congress approval. Some provinces, notably Shandong and Guangdong, have more alternates than others.

The equal distribution among province governments of full CC seats does not remain static. Top province leaders are very often reshuffled among regions or promoted to the central administration. Almost immediately after the November 2002 Congress, Wu Guanzheng (Shandong party secretary), Li Changchun (Guangdong party secretary), Zhang Dejiang (Zhejiang party secretary), Zhou Yongkang (Sichuan party secretary), Hui Liangyu (Jiangsu party secretary), Ji Yunshi (Jiangsu governor), and Bai Keming (Hainan party secretary) were transferred to Beijing or to other provinces. This allowed top leaders such as Hu Jintao and Zeng Qinghong to appoint their protégés to important provincial posts, apparently to prepare them for further promotions in the future. For example, Hu's confidant Zhang Xuezhong now is Sichuan party secretary, and Li Yuanchao, an alternate CC member who has ties with both the Chinese Communist Youth League and the "Shanghai Gang," now serves as Jiangsu party secretary. As chiefs in two of China's most important provinces, Zhang and Li are now in place to be leading contenders for seats on the next Politburo.

The even distribution of full memberships among province administrations at the times of elections for the two most recent CCs is nonetheless an institutional development. Top leaders can still try to manipulate outcomes just before or after balloting, but they are now somewhat constrained by rules. If the CC were to vote on an issue that divided the leadership, representatives from inland provinces have a majority there, although leaders from wealthy coastal provinces now dominate the PB and, especially, the powerful SC.

New Trends in Educational and Occupational Backgrounds

Three developments can be found in data about the schooling and vocations of China's leaders, although even larger changes on these dimensions were evident in the 1980s. First, the fraction of leaders with college educations has now reached an all-time high, and the news is that now some have postgraduate degrees. Second, although the nine members of the SC are all engineers (see Table 2), the overall percentage of technocrats defined this way in the CC has started to decline. Economists and lawyers, and a very few who were trained in humanities and social sciences, are present on the CC. Third, more of the leaders have studied abroad, as degree candidates or visiting scholars.

Education. Table 14 shows that 99% of the full and alternate members of the Sixteenth CC went to university. In the whole Congress, the proportion of delegates with junior college degrees or better also rose: 71% in 1992,

TABLE 14 *Percentage of College-Educated CC Members (1956–2002)*

CC	*Year of CC*	*%*
8th	1956	44.3
9th	1969	23.8
10th	1973	NA
11th	1977	25.7
12th	1982	55.4
13th	1987	73.3
14th	1992	83.7
15th	1997	92.4
16th	2002	98.6

TABLE 15 *Years of Graduation, Full and Alternate Members, 16th CC (2002)*

	Undergraduate (N = 252)*		*Graduate School* (N = 78)*	
Year	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
Before 1965	69	27.4	2	2.6
Between 1966–70	84	33.3	6	7.7
Between 1971–80	37	14.7	0	0
After 1981**	62	24.6	70	89.7
Total	252	100.0	78	100.0

*This table is based on members whose graduation years have been found. Of the 358 members, information is lacking for 106. Similarly, among those (at least 91) who attended graduate schools, only 78 have identified the years in which they received graduate degrees.
** Since graduate schools often have two- or three-year programs, those who entered after the Cultural Revolution in some cases received degrees one or two years earlier than 1981.

84% in 1997, and 92% in 2002.[41] This was a larger trend, too, because by that year, among all 66.3 million CCP members, 15.4 million had obtained at least junior college degrees. This is 23% of the whole party.[42] Two decades earlier, in 1982, that proportion of CCP members was about 4%. Table 15 measures the proportion of CC members who received undergraduate and graduate degrees in various eras of PRC history. About one-quarter (27%) finished college before the Cultural Revolution began in 1966. Another third (33%) entered before 1966 but were interrupted by the political turmoil. Fifteen percent enrolled during the Cultural Revolution as so-called "worker-peasant-soldier students," spending most of their college time on campaigns rather than academics. Seventeen of this group of 37, however, took graduate degrees thereafter. About one-quarter of those who had undergraduate stud-

41. <http://www.China.com.cn>, November 6, 2002.
42. <http://www.xinhuanet.com>, September 11, 2002.

ies, and nine-tenths of those in graduate studies, received their education after the Cultural Revolution.

Higher degrees. Politburo members' educational levels since 1956 are shown in Table 16. In 2002, for the first time in PRC history, the whole Politburo had gone to college. The number of those with advanced post-graduate degrees has risen: one (5%) in 1992, two (8%) in 1997, and now four (16%). They are Wen Jiabao, Wu Guanzheng, Liu Qi, and Wang Lequan (see Table 2). Many on the CC have also pursued advanced studies. Among the 321 full and alternate members whose educational backgrounds can be identified, 91 (28%) hold post-graduate degrees, and 14 have doctorates—a small proportion, but these officials are in important posts. Ph.Ds on the CC include Li Keqiang (Henan party secretary), Xi Jinping (Zhejiang party secretary), Li Yuanchao (Jiangsu party secretary), Liu Yandong (CCP United Front Department director), Zhou Xiaochuan (People's Bank governor), Wang Jiarui (CCP International Liaison Department director), Bai Chunli (Chinese Academy of Sciences vice president), and Wang Zhengwei (Yinchuan City party secretary). Li Yuanchao got his Ph.D in law from the Central Party School in 1998. Li Keqiang and Xi Jinping took Ph.D. programs in economics and law on a part-time basis from Beijing University and Qinghua University, respectively.

Many promoted leaders have attended mid-career courses at the Central Party School (CPS). Wang Lequan, a new Politburo member, attended the CPS to study party affairs and economic management, from 1983 to 1986. Between 1997 and 2002, nearly 3,000 provincial- and ministerial-level leaders attended training programs at the CPS, the State Administration Institute, or the National Defense University.[43] In Guangxi Province, for example, among the top 15 current leaders (party secretary, governor, and deputies), 14 attended the CPS.[44] Based on incomplete data, at least 52 (15%) of the full and alternate CC members have attended the CPS for degree programs or year-long training. It would be inaccurate, however, to conclude that most leaders with college experience have gone only to Party schools. Most have also studied at China's elite universities. As Table 2 shows, five of the 24 full PB members attended Qinghua University (sometimes called "China's MIT") before the Cultural Revolution. Three studied at the Harbin Institute of Technology and the Harbin Military Engineering Institute, and six attended other elite universities in Beijing. Most of the Ph.D. holders received their degrees from prestigious universities in China or abroad.

43. <http://www.chinesenewsnet.com>, September 24, 2002.
44. <http://gxi.gov.cn>, December 7, 2001.

TABLE 16 *Change in Educational Level of the Politburo (1956–2002)*

Educational Level	*8th (1956)*		*9th (1969)*		*10th (1973)*		*11th (1977)*		*12th (1982)*		*13th (1987)*		*14th (1992)*		*15th (1997)*		*16th (2002)*		*Ratio of % in 16th PB to Average in Earlier PBs*	*Ratio of % on PBs Since 1987 to the Pre-1987 PBs*
	No.	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*		
No schooling	1	4.4	5	20.0	4	16.0	4	15.4	3	10.7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Primary school	3	13.0	3	12.0	4	16.0	5	19.2	10	35.7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Middle school	3	13.0	8	32.0	9	36.0	6	23.0	3	10.7	5	27.7	3	13.6	2	8.3	0	0	0	0
Military school	4	17.4	2	8.0	1	4.0	5	19.2	3	10.7	1	5.6	1	4.5	2	8.3	2	8.0	0.82	0.25
University	12	52.2	7	28.0	7	28.0	6	23.0	9	32.1	12	66.6	17	77.2	18	75.0	19	76.0	1.59	2.25
Post-graduate	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	4.5	2	8.3	4	16.0	—	—
Total	23	100.0	25	100.0	25	100.0	26	99.8	28	99.9	18	100.0	22	99.8	24	99.9	25	100	—	—

NOTE: Percentages do not add to 100 because of rounding.

Diversified academic fields, including law. Table 17 shows the academic majors of full members in the last two CCs who went to college.[45] Although engineers-turned-politicians dominate the new Politburo and its Standing Committee (by 75% and 100%, respectively), engineers on the CC have actually declined. The percentage of CC members who majored in that field dropped from 43% in 1997 to 34% now. The proportion of those who studied either engineering or natural science dropped by 10%. The variability of these technocrats' representation in different leadership posts over the past two decades is the topic of Table 18. Technocrats (engineers or natural scientists who become politicians) increased dramatically from 1982 to 1997. Thereafter, they declined significantly in several major leadership categories: ministers, provincial party secretaries, governors, and full CC members.

Leaders trained in social sciences, including law, have now increased in numbers on the CC. This is striking because throughout the history of the PRC, social scientists have usually been marginalized and occasionally despised. Jiang Zemin's well-publicized 2002 visit to People's University in Beijing, famous for philosophy, economics, and social sciences, suggested that experts in social subjects might play a greater role in government. During his visit, Jiang said that in the future, "Chinese social scientists should be valued as highly as natural scientists."[46]

The number of lawyers in China has risen rapidly. Top politicians now speak very often of the need to strengthen the country's legal system. In the early 1980s, only 3,000 lawyers served China's one billion people. China now has roughly 150,000 lawyers. The number of applicants for master's degrees in law increased from about 18,000 in 2001 to about 27,000 in 2002.[47] Receiving a law degree has become a valuable credential for party leadership. On the Sixteenth CC, several new full and alternate members hold law diplomas. The number of full members with law degrees rose from three (2%) to eight (4%) between the last two CCs. Most were born in the 1950s, and are seen as rising stars in the Chinese leadership. They include Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang, Li Yuanchao, Cao Jianming (Supreme Court vice president), Zhan Xuan (Higher People's Court president), Yin Yicui (Shanghai deputy party secretary), and Yuan Chunqing (Shaanxi Province deputy party secretary). Some did undergraduate work in engineering or science but studied law at the graduate level. Xi Jinping, for example, majored in engineering at Qinghua University in 1979 but recently received a Ph.D. in law there too. Xie Zhenhua (State Environmental Protection Administration director)

45. If a leader's undergraduate major differs from the graduate field, this study counts the latter only.

46. <http://sina.com>, April 24, 2002.

47. *Shijie Ribao*, January 13, 2002, p. A8.

TABLE 17 *Academic Majors of Full Members of the 15th and 16th CCs Who Have College Degrees*

Majors	*15th CC (N = 180)* *No.*	*%*	*16th CC (N = 195)* *No.*	*%*
Engineering and Science				
Engineering	78	43.3	67	34.4
Geology	3	1.7	1	0.5
Meteorology	1	0.6	0	0
Agronomy	5	2.8	4	2.1
Biology	3	1.7	0	0
Physics	7	3.9	9	4.6
Chemistry	2	1.1	2	1.0
Mathematics	0	0	2	1.0
Architecture	0	0	3	1.5
Medical science	1	0.6	1	0.5
Subtotal	*100*	*55.6*	*89*	*45.6*
Economics and Management				
Economics and finance	7	3.9	10	5.1
Management	3	1.7	1	0.5
Accounting and statistics	0	0	2	1.0
Foreign trade	1	0.6	0	0
Subtotal	*10*	*5.6*	*13*	*6.7*
Social Sciences and Law				
Politics	2	1.1	6	3.1
Sociology	1	0.6	0	0
Party history and party affairs	4	2.2	7	3.6
Journalism	0	0	2	1.0
Law	3	1.7	8	4.1
Subtotal	*10*	*5.6*	*23*	*11.8*
Humanities				
History	1	0.6	4	2.1
Philosophy	2	1.1	4	2.1
Education	1	0.6	3	1.5
Chinese language and literature	5	2.8	6	3.1
Foreign language	7	3.9	6	3.1
Subtotal	*16*	*8.9*	*23*	*11.8*
Military Education, Military Engineering	*31*	*17.2*	*38*	*19.5*
Unknown	*12*	*6.7*	*9*	*4.6*
Total	180	100.4	195	100.0

SOURCES: Information on the 15th CC is based on Shen Xueming et al., comp., *Zhonggong di shiwujie zhongyang weiyuanhui zhongyang jilü jiancha weiyuanhui weiyuan minglu* [Who's who among the members of the Fifteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the Fifteenth Central Commission for Discipline Inspection] (Beijing: Zhonggong wenxian chubanshe, 1999). Calculated by Cheng Li.

NOTE: Percentages do not add to 100 because of rounding.

TABLE 18 *Technocrats' Representation in High Leadership, 1982–2002*

Year	Ministers		Provincial Party Secretaries		Governors		Full CC Members	
	No.	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
1982	1	2	0	0	0	0	4	2
1987	17	45	7	25	8	33	34	26
1997	28	70	23	74	24	77	100	52
2002	15	52	13	42	16	52	89	46

SOURCES: Hong Yung Lee, *From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats: The Changing Cadre System in Socialist China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), p. 268; Kenneth Lieberthal, *Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1995), p. 236; Li and White, "The Fifteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party," p. 251; and <http://www.xinhuanet.com>, accessed December 31, 2002.

studied physics at Qinghua in 1977, and received a graduate degree in environmental law at Wuhan University in 1993.

Jiang's work report to the 2002 Party Congress specified that the nation should establish a new Chinese-style legal system by 2010. More recently, Hu Jintao has made widely publicized speeches in which he stressed the rule of law. This suggests that lawyers may become an important elite group in the near future. Wry Americans may conclude that China's prospects are therefore dim, but this analysis might be wrong.

Entrepreneurs. The upward social mobility of business people in reform China is a major historical change. Traditional Chinese society, dominated by gentry-scholar rentiers, devalued merchants (who are now called entrepreneurs). Traders in Mao's time were also strictly restrained, and industrialists became state cadres then. The four million private firms and stores that had existed in China before 1949 disappeared by the mid-1950s.[48] But by 2000, China had about 1,700,000 fully private enterprises, employing at least 75 million employees, and about 25 million other people ran their own small businesses without hiring anybody.[49] More than 100 million people, therefore, now work in private firms—far more than in the state-owned enterprises (SOEs), whose labor force shrank from 72 million in 1992 to 39 million in 2001.[50]

At the 2002 Party Congress, for the first time in history, private business people attended as a distinct group. Seventeen such entrepreneurs became

48. *China News Analysis*, January 1, 1994, p. 2.

49. *Dongfang Ribao* [Oriental Daily News], Hong Kong, November 6, 2002, p. 1.

50. Barry Naughton, "The Chinese Economy: WTO, Trade, and U.S.-China Relations." Unpublished paper, November 2002.

members of the presidium of the Congress,[51] and a few were voted onto the CC. State and non-state entrepreneurs who serve on the new CC include Li Yizhong (China Petroleum & Chemical Group chair), Zhang Qingwei (China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation deputy president), Liu Shiquan (Sanjiang Space Group deputy director), Zhu Yanfeng (China First Auto Corporation president), Xi Guohua (China Netcom chair), Zhang Ruimin (Haier Group chair), Tao Jianxing (Chunlan Group general manager), Wang Mingquan (Everbright Holding Company president), and Lin Zuoming (Shenyang Liming Company CEO). The last nine are alternates on the current CC. Most of them head state enterprises, but others lead collectives, joint ventures, and/or stockholding companies.

Many of these entrepreneurs received their educations in engineering, and some majored in economics. This raises an issue of how to distinguish engineers-turned-entrepreneurs in the political leadership from technocrats. Entrepreneurs are characteristically engaged in risk-taking on markets, while technocrats are primarily defined by three criteria: technical education, professional experience, and leadership position.[52] Because an increasing number of engineers now work as CEOs in businesses, and because some of these "technical entrepreneurs" hold leadership posts, the distinction between business people and technocrats has become blurred. An example is Jiang Mianheng, Jiang Zemin's son and a delegate to the 2002 Party Congress. He earned a Ph.D. in natural science in America and is now a vice president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. He has also served as CEO of Shanghai Alliance Investment, Ltd., which is a major business partner of a large Taiwanese firm. Jiang Mianheng could be seen as both a technocrat and an entrepreneur (as well as a princeling).

The percentage of entrepreneurs, especially private ones, in the Chinese leadership is still very small. It remains to be seen whether they will increase their numbers on future CCs, especially at higher levels. Their growing wealth and influence on Chinese society, and their complicated relations with other elite groups such as technocrats, will rightly merit more study in the future.

Returned Students. Another important trend in the educational backgrounds of CC members is the emergence of returnees from study abroad. By the end of 2002, Chinese who had gone overseas as degree candidates or visiting

51. *Shijie Ribao*, November 12, 2002, p. A3.

52. For more on the definition of entrepreneurs and the contrast with technocrats, see Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1975), p. 132; and Cheng Li, "'Credentialism' versus 'Entrepreneurism': The Interplay and Tensions between Technocrats and Entrepreneurs in the Reform Era," in Chan Kwok Bun, ed., *Chinese Business Networks: State, Economy and Culture* (New York: Prentice Hall, 1999), pp. 86–111.

scholars numbered 450,000.[53] One-third (approximately 150,000) had returned to China. Because of attractive policies, a booming economy, and other factors, the return rate has gone up and keeps rising. Although many in this emerging elite group returned only recently, some already have acquired important leadership posts.

Among the 356 full and alternate members of the latest CC, 32 had study or work experience abroad lasting a year or more. Several served in Chinese embassies abroad. For example, Zeng Peiyan, a new Politburo member, was in China's Washington embassy from 1982 to 1984. Xiong Guangkai, a PLA General Staff Headquarters deputy chief and CC alternate member, worked in Chinese embassies in Germany for more than two decades. Some members have studied in communist countries. SC member Luo Gan and PB members Cao Gangchuan and Zhang Dejiang studied in East Germany, Russia, and North Korea, respectively. On the previous Politburo, seven members (29%) studied in the Soviet Union or other East European countries, and many other members of the third generation also had Soviet experience. Among the 11,000 Chinese who studied abroad between 1949 and early 1960, an overwhelming majority went to the U.S.S.R.[54] Now, many have retired.

By 2002, those in high posts who had studied in communist countries outside China were fewer, and the number of returnees from the West or Japan had increased. Table 19 lists the latter group on the current CC. Six received advanced degrees, and 14 studied or worked as visiting scholars. Although the number of returnees rose in the 2002 CC, as compared with 1997, their overall presence remains small, 6% of all CC members. Most returnees (75%) serve as leaders in education, academic research, finance, or foreign affairs. Very few have advanced their careers through provincial leadership, which has been the surest launching pad to really high posts. A majority (80%) was born in east China, and more than half were born in Shanghai or its adjacent provinces, Zhejiang and Jiangsu. Except for Yang Jiechi and Liu Jie, most of these leaders studied abroad after Deng's groundbreaking decision to send students to the West, especially to the United States, in 1978. Finally, these returnees are unlike the 1950s Chinese students who went to the Soviet Union solely to study engineering or the natural sciences. The academic fields of the returnees from the West are more diversified.

These patterns might eventually bode new tensions in Chinese elite politics, if the technocratic criterion for legitimate rule becomes weaker. The returnees may differ from PRC-educated leaders in multiple ways. Returnees can generally advance their careers through sectors that are important for

53. *Shijie Ribao*, January 6, 2003, p. A7.

54. Cheng Li, *China's Leaders*, pp. 17–18.

TABLE 19 *Full and Alternate Members in the Sixteenth CC Who Had Educational Experiences in the West and Japan*

Name	*Born*	*Native Province*	*Current Position*	*Country*	*Foreign School/Firm*	*Years*	*Degree/Visiting Scholar (VS)*	*Academic Field*
Chen Liangyu	1946	Zhejiang	Party secretary of Shanghai	England	Birmingham University	1992	VS	Public Administration
Chen Zhili	1942	Fujian	State councillor	U.S.	Penn State University	1980–82	VS	Material Science
Xu Guanhua	1941	Shanghai	Minister of Science and Technology	Sweden	Stockholm University	1979–81	VS	Information Technology
Lu Fuyuan	1945	Heilongjiang	Minister of Commerce	Canada	Montréal University	1981–83	VS	Engineering
Zhou Xiaochuan	1948	Jiangsu	Governor, People's Bank	U.S.	Univ. of California at Santa Cruz	1987–88	VS	Finance and Economics
Xu Kuangdi	1937	Zhejiang	President, Chinese Academy of Engineering	Sweden	Industrial firm	1984–85	VS	Metallurgy Research
Lu Yongxiang	1942	Zhejiang	President of Chinese Academy of Sciences	Germany	Aachen Industrial University	1978–81	Ph.D.	Engineering
Liu Mingkang	1945	Fujian	Governor, Bank of China	England	London University	1984–87	MBA	Finance
Zhai Huqu	1950	Jiangsu	President, China Academy of Agriculture	England	Birmingham University	1984–87	Ph.D.	Biology
Yang Jiechi	1950	Shanghai	Ambassador to the U.S.	England	Bath Univ.; London School of Eco. and Pol. Sciences	1973–75	VS	International Affairs
Cao Jianming	1955	Shanghai	Vice president, Supreme People's Court	U.S. and Belgium	San Francisco State Univ.; Belgium	1990–91 1988–89	VS	Law
Liu Jie	1943	Anhui	President, Anshan Iron and Steel Group Corp.	Japan	Toshiba Co.	1974–76	VS	Engineering
Huang Jiefu	1946	Jiangxi	President of Zhongshan Medical School	Australia	Sydney University	1984–87	VS	Medicine
Wu Qidi	1947	Zhejiang	President of Tongji Univ.	Switzerland	Sulies Institute of Technology	1981–85	Ph.D.	Engineering
Bai Chunli	1953	Liaoning	Vice president, Chinese Academy of Sciences	U.S. and Japan	Cal Tech; Northeastern University	1985–87 1991–92	Post-Doctoral Fellow, Visiting Professor	Chemistry
Wang Huning	1955	Shanghai	Dep. director, Central Policy Research Center	U.S.	Univ. of Iowa; Univ. of Michigan	1988–89	VS	Political Science
Min Weifang	1950	Beijing	Party secretary and VP of Beijing Univ.	U.S.	Stanford University; Univ. Texas, Austin	1982–86, 1986–88	Ph.D. Post-Doctoral Fellow	Education Administration
Lin Mingyue	1947	Taiwan	VP All China Federation of Taiwan Compatriots	U.S.	Unknown	1980s	MA	Engineering
Pan Yunhe	1946	Zhejiang	President, Zhejiang Univ.	U.S.	Carnegie-Mellon University	1986–88	VS	Computer Science
Li Hongzhong	1956	Shandong	Vice governor, Guangdong	U.S.	Harvard University (Kennedy School)	1996–97	VS	Public Administration

education and the economy, although these may not give them strong regional constituencies. The returnees are a talented group, but most high current leaders have moved up by slower advancement, in a step-by-step manner through county, city, and province levels of administration. It remains to be seen whether the returnees will significantly increase their numbers in future Chinese leaderships, whether China-educated elites and foreign-trained elites will cooperate well, and whether the differences in speed along their career paths will affect norms in future Chinese successions.

Diverging Career Paths and Complex Interdependences of Factions

Analysis of the careers of the new Chinese leaders reveals a paradox. Formal channels for career development have affected elite selection, but so have nepotistic, informal political networks (e.g., school ties, blood ties, regional affiliations, and patron-client ties). Institutional mechanisms are increasingly effective (e.g., age limits for retirement, term limits, intra-Party elections, and regional representation). The new heavyweights in Chinese elite politics have all expedited their political careers through personal *guanxi* connections. This is true of Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao, Zeng Qinghong, and Wu Bangguo. Yet, they also give evidence of being more interested than their predecessors in seeking legitimacy through institutional norms. Even informally, politicians help their careers most when they make links with more than one actual or latent faction. The new leaders have often spanned different geographic and bureaucratic units. Their ties, when most successful, have crossed more than one power network. This pattern makes factions interdependent. It creates incentives to build coalitions.

Occupations. Table 20 categorizes primary career paths for civilian members of the 2002 CC: industrial enterprises, rural administrations, party organs, *mishu* (personal secretary), the CCYL, schools and research institutions, financial institutions, foreign service, and others. The table omits military leaders who may deserve a separate study; and it does not show career moves such as the reshuffling of province leaders, whose circulation has been dramatic. Among the 65 full members of the CC who serve as province leaders, 34 (52%) had previous leadership experience in other provinces, and 20 (31%) previously worked in the national government. This topic is also important enough for a separate study.

The nine occupations listed in the table are somewhat arbitrary, but the longest period a leader has spent in one sector reflects the main career. In some cases, a leader's past work experiences have been in two or more sectors, so the table includes a category, "mixed career paths." Fifty-eight mem-

TABLE 20 *Primary Career Experiences of Civilian Full and Alternate Members, 16th CC*

Primary Career Experience	*Full Members*		*Alternate Members*		*Total*	
	No.	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
Party functionary organs	34	21.8	17	12.6	51	17.5
Industrial enterprises	29	18.6	22	16.3	51	17.5
Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL)	15	9.6	20	14.8	35	12.0
Mishu (*Mishuzhang* and office director)	15	9.6	8	5.9	23	7.9
Rural administration	4	2.6	13	9.6	17	5.8
Education and research institutes	6	3.8	9	6.7	15	5.2
Financial and banking institutions	3	1.9	6	4.4	9	3.1
Foreign service	4	2.6	1	0.7	5	1.7
Other (legal affairs, women's federation, sport, etc.)	4	2.6	8	5.9	12	4.1
Mixed	42	26.9	16	11.9	58	19.9
Unknown	0	0	15	11.1	15	5.2
Total	156	100.0	135	99.9	291	99.9

NOTE: Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding.

bers (20%) of the current CC, including 42 full members, have mixed occupational experience.

Economic work managing an urban industry is now a normal path for career advancement (18% of the CC). The proportion of such occupations among full members is higher than among alternates, especially when those with "mixed" backgrounds are counted. Most have advanced their political careers by serving (often step by step) as director of a factory, head of an industrial bureau, mayor of a city, or minister of the State Council. For example, new SC member Wu Bangguo, after graduating from Qinghua University in 1967, began his career as a technician and served successively as deputy chief and then chief of the technical section, then deputy director and director of Shanghai No. 3 Electric Tube Factory. From 1978 to 1991, he rose gradually to be deputy manager of Shanghai Electronics, and later, to deputy secretary of the CCP Shanghai Municipal Committee. His job was to develop industrial enterprises. By the early 1990s, he was Shanghai party chief. Then he became vice premier in charge of all of China's urban industries, trying to guide the reform of state-owned enterprises.

By contrast, 17 members (6%) had careers primarily in rural areas. Hui Liangyu, a new PB member, for example, began his career as an official with the Agricultural Bureau of Yushu County in Jilin Province, after graduating from the provincial School of Agronomy in 1964. From the 1970s through the late 1980s, Hui worked his way up as party secretary of a people's commune, party secretary of a county, deputy head of his province's Bureau of Agriculture, and then vice governor in charge of agriculture, all in Jilin. By

1990, he was deputy director of the Policy Research Office of the CCP Central Committee, focusing on agricultural reform throughout China. During the past decade, he has served successively as party secretary of three provinces. He now serves as vice premier in the State Council in charge of agriculture.

Table 20 shows that 18% of civilian CC members have advanced their careers as party cadres in charge of administration, personnel, propaganda, and the like. New SC member Wu Guanzheng is an example. After graduating from Qinghua in 1968, he worked as a technician and party official in a Wuhan factory for most of the Cultural Revolution. During the past two decades, Wu has been municipal party secretary and mayor in Wuhan, and then party secretary in three different provinces. Such party functionaries are heavily involved in administration and economic development. Few now exclusively do personnel or propaganda work. Seweryn Bialer, studying the U.S.S.R. of the late Brezhnev period, found very similar patterns: leaders increasingly advanced their careers in regions rather than in Moscow, and in management rather than in mobilization.[55] Bialer's suggestions about the Soviet future proved later to be more accurate than those of other Russianists at that time.

During the past two decades, the posts of *mishu* (personal secretary) and *mishuzhang* (chief of staff) have also become important springboards into leadership. While some leaders have worked as *mishu* only at certain career stages, others have been *mishu* for most of their political lives.[56] A study of the fourth-generation leaders who served on the 1997 CC and the Central Discipline Inspection Commission shows that approximately 41% have worked as *mishu*, *mishuzhang*, or office directors.[57] On the 2002 CC, 88 full members (44%) have done this kind of staff work. In the 25-member Politburo, 14 (56%) previously have been *mishu* or *mishuzhang* at various levels. They include no fewer than seven of the nine SC members. Zeng Qinghong served as a *mishu* during several periods, and each such position led to other important appointments for him. Table 20 shows that 23 members (8%) of the CC have advanced their careers primarily through *mishu* work, and the proportion at higher levels is greater. Li Jianguo, now Shaanxi party secretary, has spent most of his adult life (23 years) as *mishu* or *mishuzhang* in Tianjin, including many years as secretary to Li Ruihuan, a third-generation heavyweight.

55. Seweryn Bialer, *Stalin's Successors* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980).

56. On the prevalence of *mishu* among Chinese leaders, see Cheng Li, "The *Mishu* Phenomenon: Patron-Client Ties and Coalition-Building Tactics," *China Leadership Monitor* 4 (Fall 2002).

57. Cheng Li, *China's Leaders,* pp. 150–51.

Table 20 also shows that some members could move to CC membership exclusively through work in any of three other sectors: educational administration, finance/banking, or foreign service. For example, Bai Chunli (Chinese Academy of Sciences, vice president); Zhou Xiaochuan (new People's Bank, governor); and Yang Jiechi (ambassador, the United States) have always served in their current fields. Representation from each of these three sectors is small but together runs about 10% of the CC. They demonstrate that there is some occupational diversity in China's elites below the very top level.

Leaders who attained high office through the Youth League also are an important group (12%, or more, if mixed careers are included) in the whole CC. CCYL cadres have long been seen as natural successors to party leadership. Many have specific previous political associations with Hu Jintao. These are the so-called *tuanpai* (Youth League faction) leaders, who readily see Hu as their role model. Most now serve as inland province elites. *Tuanpai* members are probably one of the most solid, informal political groups on the CC. If infighting were to break out among the top leaders, they would almost surely become Hu's political allies.

Factions. Table 21 shows the distribution between *tuanpai* leaders and the "Shanghai Gang" on the 1997 and 2002 CCs and PBs.[58] *Tuanpai* leaders are identified as such if they are members of the CC who served as CCYL officials at the province level or above, and if their tenures as high CCYL bureaucrats occurred at least partly in 1982–85, when Hu Jintao was in the Youth League Secretariat, except that former CCYL leaders who are also members of the "Shanghai Gang" are excluded (e.g., new Shanghai Mayor Han Zhen or new Jiangsu Party Secretary Li Yuanchao). It is difficult to trace each leader's exact past association with Hu Jintao, but it is reasonable to assume that Hu and these leaders have known each other through CCYL work for a couple of decades or so. Many *tuanpai* officials used to serve on the Youth League national committee. Some, such as Wang Lequan (Politburo member and Xinjiang party secretary) and Liu Yandong (new head of CCP United Front Department), are probably Hu's close friends.

Identification of the members of the "Shanghai Gang" can also be based on three criteria: they advanced their careers during their political associations with Jiang or Zeng in Shanghai; a majority, but not all, were born in Shanghai, Jiangsu, or Zhejiang; and those who are apparently closer to Zhu Rongji

58. For a complete list of these *tuanpai* leaders and the members of the "Shanghai Gang," see Cheng Li, "Zhonggong di shiliujie zhongyang weiyuanhui renshi goucheng jiqi quanli junheng" [The Sixteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: Paths to membership and balance of power], in Ding Shufan, ed., *Hu Jintao shidai de tiaozhan* [Challenges for the Hu Jintao Era] (Taipei: Xinxinwen Publishing, 2002), pp. 16–52.

TABLE 21 *Power Distribution between the Tuanpai and the Shanghai Gang*

	(Tuanpai) CCYL Officials	*Shanghai Gang*
15th Central Committee (CC)		
PB Members (total N = 24)	1	29
CC Members (N = 344)	4	11
16th Central Committee (CC)		
PB Members (N = 25)	4	5
CC Members (N = 356)	47	20

than to Jiang and Zeng are excluded (e.g., former Shanghai Mayor Xu Kuandi and former People's Bank Governor Dai Xianglong). During the 1990s, most provincial leaders were regularly—in some cases, frequently—reshuffled. The CCP Organization Department's "Regulations on Cadre Exchange" include the old law of avoidance, decreeing that local leaders should not serve in their home regions.[59] But in Shanghai, since Jiang became general secretary in 1989, almost no high-ranking officers (full or deputy party secretaries and full or vice mayors) have been transferred from other regions to that city's party committee or government.[60] Jiang and Zeng have firmly controlled the choices of Shanghai leaders and have continuously promoted members of this "Shanghai Gang" into the central government.

The "Shanghai Gang" occupied more seats on the 1997 PB than the *tuanpai* did, but the *tuanpai* held more seats on the 1997 CC. This pattern continues on the 2002 Politburo and CC, as Table 21 shows. Between these years, the number of *tuanpai* leaders increased on both the PB (from one to four) and the CC (from 29 to 47). Neither the *tuanpai* nor the "Shanghai Gang" can control both the CC and the Politburo, however, and in case of votes, both would have to bargain with other groups—or each other.

Table 22 details the most likely factional links of all members of the 2002 Politburo. Major political networks such as the "Shanghai Gang," "*tuanpai* officials," "princelings' party," "Qinghua Clique," "Petroleum Faction," and others, are represented on the new PB. These groups have all generated scions for many years. Leaders of the petroleum industry, for example, played an influential role in elite recruitment during the 1970s and early 1980s.[61]

59. *Liaowang* [Outlook] (Beijing), June 7,1999, pp. 15–16; also see Cheng Li, "After Hu, Who?"

60. The only exception is Yang Xiaodu, newly appointed vice mayor of Shanghai—but even Yang has substantial experience in the city. Yang was born there in 1953 and was "sent down" to Anhui in 1970. By 1973, he had returned to his birthplace to study at the Shanghai Chinese Traditional Medicine Institute. He later went to Tibet, where he became vice governor.

61. David M. Lampton, *Paths to Power: Elite Mobility in Contemporary China* (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1986).

TABLE 22 *Factional Affiliations of the Members of the 16th Politburo*

Name	*Shanghai Municipal Leadership*	*CCYL Central or Provincial Leadership*	*Qinghua University Network*	*Ministry Petroleum Industry*	*Ministries of 1st Machine Building & Electronics*	*Long-term Association with Inland Region**	*Long-term Association with Coastal Region**	*Princeling Background*	*Total No. of Affiliations*
Hu Jintao		1982–85	1959–68			1985–92			3
Wu Bangguo	1983–92		1960–67				1985–92		3
Wen Jiabao						1981–82			1
Qia Qinglin					1962–78		1985–02		2
Zeng Qinghong	1984–89			1981–84			1986–89	X	4
Huang Ju	1983–02		1956–63				1985–02		3
Wu Guanzheng			1959–68			1986–97	1997–02		3
Li Changchun						1990–98	1985–90, 1998–02		2
Luo Gan					1962–80	1981–83			2
Wang Lequan		1982–86				1991–	1989–91		3
Wang Zhaoguo		1982–84					1987–90		2
Hui Liangyu						1987–99	1999–03		2
Liu Qi							1998–		1
Liu Yunshan		1982–84				1992–93			2
Wu Yi				1965–88			1988–91		2
Zhang Lichang							1985–		1
Zhang Dejiang						1990–98	1998–		2
Chen Liangyu	1985–02						1992–		2
Zhou Yongkang				1970–98		1999–03			2
Yu Zhengsheng					1982–84	2001–	1992–94	X	4
He Guoqiang				1980–86		1999–02	1996–99		3
Guo Boxiong (M)									0
Cao Gangchun (M)									0
Zeng Peiyan			1956–62		1962–82, 1984–92				2
Wang Gang						1977–81			1
Total Number	4	4	5	4	4	13	16	2	

NOTE: M = Military. SC members names are in italic.
* These columns record years of tenure as a provincial/municipal leader.

Now four Politburo members, including Zeng Qinghong, new Organization Department head He Guoqiang, and new Public Security Minister Zhou Yongkang, come from China's oil patch. Four other Politburo members had worked at the First Ministry of Machine Building and Electronic Industries, overlapping with Jiang, who worked in that ministry for almost two decades.

Two current Politburo members have princeling backgrounds. The number of these CCP aristocrats on the previous PB was four (Jiang, Li Peng, Li Tieying, and Zeng). The princeling number on the whole CC is now 18, the same level as on the 1997 CC.[62] As new leaders move to the highest levels of authority, however, princeling or patron-client ties that previously enabled them to succeed may become a liability. Delegates to the Congress, as the ballot tallies show, have increasingly prevented princelings and others very close to top leaders from receiving many votes.

Interdependences. The coexistence of varied political networks suggests a dispersion of influence and balance of power. The increases in the types of regional and professional channels through which new leaders can advance their careers create important kinds of diversification. Political networks also have overlapping memberships. For example, prominent members of either the "Shanghai Gang" or the *tuanpai* may also belong to the "Qinghua Clique," if graduation from that university allows them to make connections in that way, too. This interdependence among factions means that political compromise can or must occur more frequently than before. More PB members are affiliated with Jiang and Zeng than with Hu, but the power distribution may not be as disparate as it seems, because princeling backgrounds and the "Shanghai Gang" are unpopular among many Chinese leaders who have other loyalties.

No individual, no faction, no institution, and no region can now dominate China. Everyone has to negotiate, and those who are skillful in coalition building are most likely to succeed. This explains why all three new top leaders (Hu, Zeng, and Wen) are capable political tacticians, why the *mishu* career that breeds both personal and administrative skills has become an important ladder to high office, and why the Party Congress featured power sharing rather than vicious factional fighting.

62. The princelings on the Sixteenth CC are Zeng Qinghong (PB), Yu Zhengsheng (PB), Dai Bingguo, Liu Yandong, Liao Hui, Zhou Xiaochuan, Hong Hu, Bo Xilai, Xi Jinping, Ma Kai, Li Yuanchao, Wang Qishan, Tian Chengping, Bai Keming, Deng Pufang, Chen Yuan, Wang Ruolin, annd Li Tielin. For a list of the princelings on the 1997 CC, see Li and White, "The Fifteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party," p. 259.

Hu-Zeng Dynamics and the Future Trajectory of the Chinese Elite

Although CCP politicians have often tried to change succession rules to their own advantage, during the past decade, more rules have been normalized. These include term limits, retirement ages, and now, somewhat more balanced regional representation. This context has prompted Hu and Zeng to expand their power bases beyond the "*tuanpai* officials" and the "Shanghai Gang," respectively. Their "spheres of influence" may still be geographical: Hu is more popular in inland provinces, and Zeng can present himself as a leader who represents the interests of coastal provinces. Competition between Hu and Zeng need not, however, be zero-sum. Their differences in personal experience, career backgrounds, political associations, leadership styles, and regional loyalties could breed distrust, but Hu and Zeng may also cooperate in consolidating the rule of their CCP and sharing the benefits of power.

Chinese political institutionalization in the medium term depends on the relationship between these two most powerful figures of the post-Jiang era.[63] As Jiang Zemin's chief strategist for more than 15 years, Zeng is second only to Jiang in the so-called "Shanghai Gang," and he will likely "inherit" this powerful network after Jiang's full retirement. Like Jiang, Zeng comes from a princeling family. Also like him, Zeng is known for his skill at political favoritism. From 1999 to 2002, Zeng took advantage of his post as head of the CCP Organization Department to expand his power base by building a broad coalition of all coastal provinces, from Liaoning in the north to Hainan in the south.

Zeng is well-placed to form alliances with two elite groups: his fellow princelings and the "returnees from study overseas" (the so-called *haiguipai*).[64] A majority of princelings work in coastal provinces. Leaders with princeling backgrounds can expedite their careers by working, especially, in coastal cities. Bo Xilai (Liaoning governor), Xi Jinping (Zhejiang party secretary), and Li Yuanchao (Jiangsu party secretary) previously served as municipal chiefs of Dalian, Fuzhou, and Nanjing. Economic achievements can be scored with relative ease in the rich coastal places where these men have been chiefs. Most returnees from study overseas, as well, were born or have worked in coastal areas, usually Shanghai or Beijing.[65] According to a re-

63. For more about the relationship between Hu and Zeng, see Cheng Li, "Emerging Patterns of Power Sharing: Inland Hu vs. Coastal Zeng?" Asia Program Special Report, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, no. 105 (September 2002), pp. 28–34.

64. For a detailed discussion, see Cheng Li, "The 'Shanghai Gang': Force for Stability or Cause for Conflict?" *China Leadership Monitor* 1, Part II (Winter 2002).

65. For more about overseas study returnees and their regional distribution, see Cheng Li, "Zhonggong di shiliujie zhongyang weiyuanhui," pp. 16–52.

cently released report by the Shanghai municipal government, by the autumn of 2002, Shanghai had over 30,000 returnees of whom 90% held master's or Ph.D. degrees.[66] Returnees who settled in Shanghai constituted one-fifth of all China's returnees in 2002.[67]

Differences between "inland Hu" and "coastal Zeng" are obvious, but they may well not lead to a vicious power struggle. In the past few years, Hu and Zeng have formed a good working relationship. This is especially evident in their joint effort to promote political reform programs at the Central Party School. Zeng's relationship to Jiang is also subject to change; it may not be in Zeng's own interest to allow Jiang to play a behind-the-curtain role for long. If Zeng lacks a willingness to share power and resources with inland interests, however, the potential backlash against him, against the "Shanghai Gang," and against the rich coast, could be strong. It is revealing that while Hu lost only one vote in the first election at the 2002 Party Congress, Zeng lost 85.[68]

Evidence suggests that Zeng has been frankly concerned about growing resentment against himself and the "Shanghai Gang." Recently, he has made efforts to change his negative public image. For example, in fall 2002, Zeng attended a widely publicized ceremonial meeting to salute the so-called "Service Team of Ph.D.s Sent to the Western Region." The CCP Organization Department at that time selected 114 doctorate-holders from the coast and sent them to serve for a year in China's 10 western provinces (and Jiangxi).[69] Shanghai and other coastal places have supported development in China's western region. This plan, now called the "Go West Strategy," also provides new business opportunities for coastal and central manufacturers.

Hu's challenge is to maintain his popular image as a leader who relies on institutional power rather than factional networking. At the same time, though, he would lose too much if he alienated himself from his own longtime associates. Soon after the Congress, several of Hu's close allies were promoted to important national and provincial posts. These include Liu Yandong (new head of the CCP United Front Work Department), Zhang Xuezhong (new Sichuan party secretary), Li Zhilun (new minister of Supervision), Li Keqiang (new Henan party secretary), Huang Huahua (new Guangdong governor), and Shen Yueyue (new deputy head of the CCP Organization Department). They all sit on the CC. Because of their relatively young ages, these people are in line for seats on the Politburo at the next

66. *Shijie Ribao*, October 31, 2002, p. A7.

67. According to Shu Huiguo, vice minister of personnel of the PRC, from 1978 to the end of 2002, China sent 450,000 students to study abroad as degree candidates or visiting scholars. Of these, 150,000 returned to China. See *Shijie Ribao*, January 6, 2003, p. A7.

68. The total number of votes is 2,132. *Shijie Ribao*, November 15, 2002, p. A3.

69. <http://www2.chinesenewsnet.com>, September 27, 2002.

party congress five years hence, presuming that the current succession norms continue.

Hu and Zeng may have to share power in order to maintain sufficiently diverse talents in the CCP. Hu's *tuanpai* leaders, especially those who work in inland provinces, generally have less expertise in foreign trade, finance, technology, and urban construction than their counterparts from the coast, especially those from Beijing, Shanghai, Jiangsu, and Guangdong. On the other hand, Zeng and his associates can see that coastal success in the future depends largely on the inland China market. The power of the "Shanghai Gang" has been restrained by more equal regional representation and by Congress ballots. The CC votes of inland province leaders, on both personnel and policies, are potentially decisive.

Clear cooperation between Hu and Zeng in the Central Party School reforms deserves special attention. During the past decade under Hu's presidency, the CPS has broadened its mid-career training programs and has become a leading think tank for the study of both domestic and international policies. Zeng has been heavily involved in these developments, so it is no surprise that he has now succeeded Hu as president of the school. The CPS has become not just a place for theoretical brainstorming about China's political reform but also a venue for Hu and Zeng to experiment with political compromise. In a highly publicized CPS commencement ceremony, Hu and Zeng personally granted diplomas to over 800 graduates of the Class of 2002. In another recent televised meeting of heads of provincial party organization departments, Hu constantly referred to Jiang's theory of the "Three Represents," and Zeng returned the compliment by repeatedly quoting Hu's remarks.[70] Hu and Zeng have formed a relationship that is probably both competitive and cooperative.

Conflict scenarios could nonetheless occur. Cleavages within the new leadership, especially on social and economic policies, are potentially so fundamental that compromise might become difficult if not impossible. China's top leaders must deal with a long list of daunting sociopolitical challenges: economic disparities, the negative impact (especially on Chinese farmers) of entry into the World Trade Organization, urban unemployment, rampant official corruption, ethnic tensions, industrial accidents, major health crises, and environmental scandals. On the international front, while the September 11 terrorist attack reduced tensions in U.S.–China relations, an unpredictable external environment surrounds China, e.g., in Central Asia, Indonesia, and Korea. The issue of Taiwan and other problems in U.S.-China relations, though not imminently dangerous, remain unsolved.

70. <http://www6.chinesenewsnet.com>, August 8, 2002.

As China faces these daunting challenges at home and abroad, however, the new leaders may well unite rather than divide. Fear of chaos or regime collapse, as experienced by many authoritarian parties in other countries during the past decade, can be a critical factor that pressures political rivals to parley. Hu and Zeng may be willing to cooperate not because either is motivated by liberal ideals, but because they recognize their own limitations in their quickly changing country, and therefore the need to share power. Only time will tell whether this process eventually leads to a system in which factional politics becomes more transparent and legitimated, so that various parts of the public have their interests protected and voices heard.