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Winkling out Taylor

Negotiators in Accra have been working out the details of a government to succeed Charles Taylor but first they had to get the warlord president out of the Executive Mansion. For all the euphoria that greeted the first Nigerian peacekeepers in Monrovia, West Africa's war is far from over.

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CONGO-KINSHASA

Deals in the West, war in the East Continuing slaughter in the east reveals the faultlines of the Kinshasa regime

Congo's civil war was five years old on 2 August and the country's politicians claim it is all over (AC Vol 44 No 14). Few believe them. Bloody chaos in the east threatens the fragile political deal signed in the west. In Kinshasa, politicians and generals congratulate each other (nervously glancing over their shoulders) on the power-sharing government formed on 17 July.

Dignitaries such as, **Javier Solana**, the European Union's foreign affairs and security supremo, and the **French** and **Belgian** Defence ministers, **Michèle Alliot-Marie** and **André Flahaut**, praise the new order. Mandarins of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank say Kinshasa's economic management is 'broadly satisfactory', enough to persuade them to write off some US\$10 billion of debt.

Yet fighting continues along the eastern axis, from Bukavu north to Ituri, where over 200 people were massacred in the past month. In South Kivu in the past week, hundreds of civilians have been killed or chased from their homes as soldiers from the *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie* fight Mai-Mai militias. Everywhere, the stage is dominated by the same politicians and patrons, battling for power and resources behind the screen of Congo's new respectability. At the apex stand President **Joseph Kabila** and the old Kinshasa cabal, close to **Angola** and **Zimbabwe**.

Too busy to plunder?

Then come the four vice-presidents. **Yerodia Abdoulaye Ndombasi**, Kabila's appointee, was once indicted for hate-speech in Belgium. **Azarias Ruberwa** leads the RCD-Goma, the main rebel faction in the east, backed by **Rwanda**. **Jean-Pierre Bemba** leads the *Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo*, backed by **Uganda**. **Arthur Zahidi N'goma** emerged as representative of the unarmed opposition after a controversial selection process. The unwieldy regime, with its legions of ministers, deputy ministers, commissions and committees restructured to reflect power-sharing formulas, was meant to keep the political class too busy to plunder resources or sell arms. However, the factions show signs of falling apart, as private businesses in league with regional powers stoke up the war again.

The godfathers' militias in Ituri and the Kivus fight to the death, as officials and agents in Kinshasa, Kigali and Kampala ship in the weapons. Last week, Uganda faced accusations from a former ally, **Mbusa Nyamiwisi** (who leads the RCD-*Mouvement de Libération*) that it was supplying arms to militias in Ituri. A Congolese-registered Antonov aeroplane had been seized in Beni with 68 mortar-bombs and 21,000 rounds of ammunition aboard. Nyamiwisi's officials claimed the consignment had been destined for Commandant **Jérôme Kakwavu's** *Forces Armées du Peuple Congolais* (FAPC) which seeks power in Mongbwalu, gateway to the Kilo-moto goldfields.

Uganda's intelligence director for Congo, Colonel **Peter Kerim**, has insisted Uganda has no planes there. In apparent retaliation, FAPC militants promptly seized two aircraft in Aru, one of them said to have belonged to Nyamiwisi. Clearly, enough arms are flowing in to keep eastern Congo's wars running for years; a Kalashnikov assault rifle can be bought in Bunia market for about \$35. Seizures such as that at Beni usually happen by accident, this time because bad weather forced the crew to land where their aircraft was searched.

It took the United Nations Security Council five years to declare an arms embargo in eastern Congo and it did so on 28 July without setting up any mechanism to monitor or intercept shipments. The overstretched *Mission d'Observation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo* (Monuc) will apparently have to monitor deliveries to Ituri, which is bigger than Belgium and has about a dozen airstrips and eight access routes across Lake Albert from Uganda; in May, two Monuc military observers were abducted at Mongbwalu, then killed and mutilated after they had in vain radioed headquarters for help.

Ituri's crisis, and the fear of genocide there, spurred the Security Council into action. In May, it approved a tough peace-enforcement mandate (under Chapter VII) for a French-led Interim Emergency Multinational Force to try to stabilise the province or at least its main town, Bunia. On

28 July, the Monuc force was further expanded to 10,800, with a brigade-size Task Force II of about 3,600 to take over when the French troops ship out on 1 September. These **Bangladeshi**, **Nepalese** and **Pakistani** soldiers are supposed to pacify the entire Ituri district. In Bunia in mid-July, Solana pledged sustained EU commitments on finance and security.

Even in Bunia, almost everyone is nervous about what happens when the business-like French-led force leaves. There are still fire-fights at night in town and last week, five men were stoned to death in an apparent vengeance killing. The UN force may have trouble maintaining even the present uneasy security regime, let alone bringing peace to all Ituri, whose factions have unfinished business.

Thomas Lubanga's *Union des Patriotes Congolais* is predominantly from the Hema people, **Ndjabu Ngabu's** *Front des Nationalistes et Intégrationistes* (FNI) predominantly Lendu. They deny it but they are ethnic militias whose main purpose is their leaders' advancement. Lendu farmers and Hema pastoralists have been sporadically at odds over the past century; the clashes of the past five years have been the bloodiest, mainly because outsiders stirred them up. The UPC, backed first by Uganda then by Rwanda, controlled Bunia for much of the past year; an exceptionally detailed Human Rights Watch report⁽¹⁾ describes how hundreds of the UPC's opponents were abducted and killed. Uganda's withdrawal unseated Lubanga, leaving many of his supporters to be massacred by the FNI.

The UPC, following its Rwandan godfathers, is an organised military force with an identifiable command structure (though more than half its fighters are children, see Box page 4). It favours abductions and targeted assassinations. The FNI has no effective chain of command. Its fighters are fuelled by local drugs, home-brewed liquor and ethnic hatred; a preferred tactic is to fire mortars into enemy villages, then rush in and butcher those people unable to flee.

Nyamwisi and his new friends in Kabila's circle provide at least some of the FNI's armoury, although FNI fighters complained to *Africa Confidential* that they had run short of weapons and were desperately short of non-military supplies. Nevertheless, in recent weeks the FNI and other Lendu militias have attacked Hema and UPC-supporting areas, such as Tchomia and Kaseni south of Bunia and Nizi to the north. They may want to encircle Bunia in preparation for the exit of the French-led force.

Meanwhile the UPC has cached its arms around Bunia since it lost about a dozen fighters there in shoot-outs with French troops, who captured valuable weaponry and equipment in a raid on a UPC camp nearby at Miala. It has since avoided military confrontations and lost the military and political initiative, although it organised a mass protest during the Belgian and French Defence ministers' visit on 1 August, claiming discrimination by the French force.

The French force and Monuc have indeed beefed up their support for the *Administration Spéciale Intérimaire de l'Ituri* (ASII), the all-party body which is meant to start running the district. With members indirectly elected from a range of community organisations, it has an executive, an assembly and commissions to deal with reconstruction and ceasefire negotiations with militias. So far, though, it has little money and little impact. **Emmanuel Leko** heads the executive and former Assembly President **Pétronille Vaweka** represents Ituri in the new National Assembly.

A month ago, the international forces seized control of Bunia town hall, exiling the UPC's rival Mayor to an office in the central market; in mid-July, the ASII moved into its offices to start disbursing some of the \$350,000 start-up funds from the EU and the

United States, held in a Monuc-controlled trust. Monuc and the ASII say that tens of millions of dollars are in the pipeline, for rehabilitating derelict clinics and hospitals, roads and bridges. That would earn the ASII a popular base but, without security, one that spreads not far beyond Bunia town. Its best hope would be to promote rapid political progress, which may have started when a meeting with some militia leaders in late July agreed on a joint mission to recent battlegrounds.

Like the national power-sharing government in Kinshasa, Ituri's multi-party order is fragile and venal. The FNI is supported by the Kabila clique and allies, the UPC by Rwanda; Uganda spreads its largesse across various militias including Cdt. Jérôme's FAPC and Chief **Kahwa Mandro's** *Parti pour l'Unité et la Sauvegarde de l'Intégrité du Congo* (PUSIC). They all pledge allegiance to the ASII while striving to undermine it and confine it to Bunia. An effective ASII backed by a UN force would put the militias out of business and bring their fiefdoms up-country under control.

There's plenty to fight for. Last year, Chief Kahwa wrote to Heritage Oil, whose board includes the military-business entrepreneur **Tony Buckingham** (AC Vol 39 No 11) explaining that he controlled the area surrounding the company's exploration sites and would collect the appropriate taxes. Heritage's response has not been made public but may have been unsatisfactory; Kahwa has since been courting **Libya's** Tamoil, which is trying to persuade the Kinshasa government to award it Heritage's concession. Kahwa recently visited Tripoli and Bunia is buzzing with rumours of Libyan arms shipments.

Heritage, in intensive talks with Kinshasa to retain its concession, has naturally played down its value. However, there is talk of a Lake Albert field stretching down as far as Beni, which would make it one Africa's biggest onshore oil resources. Ituri's gold reserves are impressive, too, but none of the interested companies (which include Anglo American, Ashanti and Barrick) have been able to start industrial-scale production. Congo's *scandale géologique* still tempts some companies; first, they must negotiate its *scandale politique*, where most fall by the wayside.

(1) *Ituri: Covered in Blood*, Human Rights Watch, Washington, DC, July 2003.

LIBERIA

Winkling out Taylor

A post-war era may have begun to take shape in Accra as Taylor dug his heels in

While delegates to the **Ghana** peace talks wrangled about how many vice presidents Liberia should have in a new interim government, President **Charles Taylor** still remained in Monrovia on 6 August. Despite his repeated promises to go, he didn't appear to be packing his bags, though **Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf**, his likely successor, was confident after talks in Washington that the necessary pressure would be brought to bear.

Taylor initially refused to meet a high-level Ecowas delegation on 1 August, with officials claiming unconvincingly that he was leading the fight to recapture the port of Buchanan. When he finally met them the following day, his offer to step down on 11 August was no more convincing. According to Taylor, the parliament must meet first in emergency session, and he has not yet made arrangements to leave for exile in Nigeria. 'At, 11.59 am

Monday I'll step down and the new guy might be sworn in by midday on that Monday,' he said blithely after the talks, fully aware that selecting a new leader would take a little longer than that. Optimists say Vice President **Moses Blah** could take over in the meanwhile, but realistically, while Taylor remains in the country, nothing will change. Officials of the Special Court in **Sierra Leone** have been hoping to try him for his role in his neighbours' civil war but Taylor's government filed a complaint against Sierra Leone before the International Court of Justice in The Hague, challenging the Special Court's authority. Ironically, as well as offering Taylor sanctuary, **Nigeria** is a member of the Special Court management committee. 'It's politics now and justice later, hopefully,' said a Special Court source.

This being Liberia, the Accra peace talks are bogged down in procedure. Johnson-Sirleaf, 64, describes herself as torn between putting herself forward as a candidate to head the interim government and waiting for elections. The key to her decision is the length of the interim government's mandate; she is not interested in a short-lived caretaker role but would agree to head the two-year administration currently being talked about. She has a lot of credibility internationally, but could suffer from having spent so long outside Liberia pursuing her international banking career.

A vetting committee has been established to examine candidates for the vice presidency. The Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the mainly Krahn Movement for Democracy in Liberia (Model) would like one each, plus one from the political parties, but they may just get to nominate a candidate for a short list. A single-chamber parliament is also planned, with representatives of political parties, warring factions, the present government and civil society, but Liberia's past interim governments have no great record of effectiveness.

The LURD lost credibility with the shelling of civilian areas of Monrovia and an unseemly row in Accra over who was leading their delegation. Chairman **Sekou Damate Conneh** said in Rome that LURD forces would withdraw as soon as peacekeepers arrived, but **Alhaji Sekou Fofana**, Deputy Secretary General for Civil Affairs, said in Monrovia that this wasn't Conneh's decision.

Tangled web of armaments

Even if Taylor takes up Nigeria's offer of sanctuary, there will be no lasting peace unless his militia allies around the region can be disarmed. The **United States** is belatedly putting pressure on Liberia's neighbours, sending Deputy Assistant Secretary of State **Pamela Bridgewater** to **Guinea** on 26/27 July, followed by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs **Walter J. Kansteiner III** on 30 July, with what was described as a 'tough message' on weapons shipments to the LURD. Guinea has supported the LURD since 1999, and the UN Panel of Experts on Liberia in April described the role of Conakry-based mining and trading company Société Katex Mine Guinée. In the run-up to LURD offensives inside Liberia, a pattern of flights for Katex Mine carry 'special cargo', 'technical equipment' or 'hazardous materials'.

There were a number of flights by a Kiev-owned IL-76 cargo plane in late June from **Ukraine** with brief stops in **Iran** and **Libya**. These flights follow the LURD running out of ammunition and pulling back from Monrovia's Bushrod Island, prior to a July offensive once resupplied. Diplomats have told *Africa Confidential* that the charterer of these flights was Katex Mine. Ammunition was transported by sea from Conakry to Robertsport in Liberia, in violation of UN sanctions, enabling the LURD to cut out the lengthy truck journey to Macenta and Nzerekore and proceed

See you in court?

The death in custody of Revolutionary United Front leader **Foday Sankoh** on 29 July is the latest blow to the United Nations-backed Special Court's efforts to bring those most responsible for the **Sierra Leone** conflict to justice. The court arrested him on 10 March and also indicted former RUF commander **Sam Bockarie** and **Johnny Paul Koroma**, who led the 1997 coup that brought the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) to power. The Liberian government announced Bockarie's death on 5 May, while Koroma was reported to have been killed in Liberia in June. Despite early scepticism (AC Vol 44 No 11), Court sources say they are pretty confident the body delivered to Freetown is that of Bockarie but they are rather less convinced of the demise of Koroma, who is more likely to be alive and well somewhere in Liberia.

Liberian President **Charles Taylor** has been indicted for his support for the RUF but may avoid appearing before the Court as part of a deal to get him out of Monrovia. It's hard to imagine him living quietly in a government villa in **Nigeria** but the threat of being brought to justice in the Freetown Court or by a future Liberian war crimes tribunal may act as a deterrent.

Sankoh, too, spent some years as a guest of Nigeria, which extracted him from Sierra Leone as part of efforts to end the conflict. The court is continuing proceedings against its eight detainees, drawn from the three main groups in the civil war, the RUF, AFRC and the pro-government Civil Defence Forces militia. The best known is President **Ahmad Tejan Kabbah's** former Deputy Defence Minister **Sam Hinga Norman**, who commanded the CDF and is credited by his supporters with saving Sierra Leone from the rebels.

The other indictees are: three RUF commanders, **Issa Hassan Sesay**, **Morris Kallon** and **Augustine Gbao**; two AFRC commanders, **Alex Tamba Brima** and **Ibrahim 'Bazzy' Kamara**; and two CDF members, **Moinina Fofana** and **Allieu Kondewa**. Trials are likely to begin in November.

through its headquarters in Voinjama to the front line.

Katex retains a close relationship with Ukraine through its managing director **Hadji Fouzi**. It imports military equipment in addition to operating mines and quarries, and is also involved in construction and cement production. In 2002, the Guinea government authorised Katex to import 58mm, 60mm and 82mm mortar munitions to help replenish stocks lost when the Conakry arsenal exploded in May (AC Vol 43 No 10). These imports do not stay in Conakry for long but are transported to other locations including Camp Koumandian.

In the past, Guinean support for the LURD resulted in only mild criticism. With its key position on the UN Security Council during the run-up to the war with **Iraq** and a clear-cut US, **British** and recently **French** policy for regime change in Monrovia, Guinea largely escaped public exposure until the LURD offensives on Monrovia in July and August. Indiscriminate mortar shelling of central Monrovia has resulted in widespread condemnation. Monrovia's Roman Catholic Archbishop **Michael Francis** at a recent meeting at London's Royal Institute of International Affairs said they had 'eroded any sympathy there was for LURD in Monrovia' by 'indiscriminate mortar fire and deaths of civilians'.

In an effort to manage the conflict, local officials and elders on both sides of the Liberian border around Mount Nimba arranged their own peace pact last year. Since then the Guinean authorities and pro-Taylor militias have had to tread with care. In April following a violation of this understanding at Ganta, combatants

Abandoned children

As **Nigerian** units redeploy to Liberia from United Nations' peacekeeping duties in Freetown, child protection agencies are warning that severe funding shortfalls for long-term rehabilitation of child soldiers mean that thousands of **Sierra Leonean** children risk being drawn back into the cycle of violence. The UN estimates one in ten children in the region has seen combat and large numbers of under-18s are fighting in all of Liberia's factions.

This is hardly a coincidence: thousands of under-age combatants from earlier conflicts joined rebel units following the collapse of Liberia's own demobilisation programme in the mid-1990s. **Charles Taylor**'s innovative use of Small Boy Units was a key factor in his grab for the presidency. His export of the tactic was a main cause for his indictment by the Special Court for Sierra Leone.

A failure to appreciate the need for long-term rehabilitation risks breeding another generation of disaffected youths – fertile recruiting ground for future insurgencies. The UN Children's Fund fears the imminent collapse of funding for some 100,000 war-affected children in Sierra Leone: 'If we can't show proof of the dividends of peace to children, how can we prove the dividends of peace to adults?' asked Executive Director **Carol Bellamy**.

from both sides were lynched by local vigilante groups and peace has returned to the area.

Hopes now are for a wider peace. The Nigerians are supplying an initial force of 1,500 troops assembling at Robertsfield airport, 50 km from the capital. Ghana, **Senegal**, **Togo**, **Benin**, **Mali** and **Gambia** have all promised troops for the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) Mission in Liberia, to be known as Ecomil, under the command of Nigerian General **Festus Okonkwo**, which will have an eventual strength of 5,000. From October, they are due to be replaced by a UN force on the lines of the 17,000-strong mission in **Sierra Leone**, with troops potentially drawn from **India**, **Pakistan**, **Bangladesh** and **South Africa**, as well as West Africa. The Americans introduced the UN resolution, which authorises the peacekeepers to use force, and have promised cash and logistical support to the UN force, but their own naval task force is staying safely offshore.

SOMALIA

Arta I, Arta II

As the warlords talk on in Nairobi, their credibility gap is growing

Somalia is no longer a country at war. However, fighting and killing continue, and it is not yet a country at peace. Its reconciliation conference has entered its final phase, said its **Kenyan** mediator, **Bethwel Kiplagat**, last month. Others are not so sure, though the mandate of the Transitional National Government (TNG) runs out this month and something is supposed to replace it.

The jamboree has been going on since 15 October 2002 without achieving very much, except its relocation from Eldoret, stronghold of the formerly ruling Kenya African National Union, to the Nairobi suburb of Mbagathi. Somaliland, the unrecognised state that rules most of the north of the country (AC Vol 44 No 10), is not present; the faction leaders (who were excluded from 2000's conference in Arta, **Djibouti**, which set up the TNG) are, which at

least keeps them from waging war.

International diplomats involved in the conference argue that the first need is for a 'federal' settlement in the south, after which things could go national quickly by adding in as federal states Somaliland and President **Abdullahi Yusef**'s Puntland. This is based on the assumption that Somaliland is far more advanced than the south and that no southern leader can contest the concept of Somaliland. In fact the main reason why the Somaliland 'government' in Hargeisa did not send a delegation was for fear that its members might do deals with southern politicians for cabinet places in Mogadishu.

Somalia's faction leaders, though, are present and the list of warlords reads like a litany of Somalia's civil wars: **Hussein Farah 'Aydeed'**, **Hassan Mohamed Nur 'Shatigadud'**, **Muse Sudi Yalahow** (Mogadishu's real strongman, if any), **Mohamed Dhere**, **Mohamed Qanyere**, **Abdullahi Sheikh Ismael** and **Osman Ato**. Ethiopia gives most of them political and financial backing, either opportunistically or more regularly.

An accord on cessation of hostilities was signed last October, although no agreement existed: it was a supportive gesture to Kenya's then President, **Daniel arap Moi**, then starting his failed election campaign. Frequent breaches of the non-existent accord have since reinforced the faction leaders' position as the strongmen behind the delegates; there are officially 360 of these but a system rapidly developed for including, and perhaps claiming allowances for, friends, relatives and ghost delegates. Little attention is paid to even the official delegates, who are often sent home if they try to make their voices heard, which adds to the confusion over numbers and allowances.

The ceasefire was followed by an attempted mediation among the factions in Mogadishu. The conference failed to support this, since **Ethiopia** opposed it, mainly to avoid granting credibility to its critics, notably Muse Sudi. Addis Ababa's favourite presidential candidate is Abdullahi Yusef.

Don't upset the African Union

On 5 July the conference adopted a second document, mainly to show the African Union, then holding its summit in **Mozambique**, that progress was being made. This was a bid to counter criticisms of Ethiopian involvement (including its breaking of the United Nations' arms embargo, AC Vol 44 No 5), voiced at the Maputo summit by the TNG President, **Abdiqassem Salad Hassan**. It prescribed a form of federalism so obscure that the international observers, uncharacteristically, intervened. 'The mere act of discussing this draft, let alone considering its adoption, would be a bitter insult to those involved...', said the usually supportive **Netherlands'** aid agency Novib.

The conference's tasks in this 'final' phase are to adopt a transitional constitution and nominate a parliament, which should pick a national president from over 40 candidates. The proposal scheme is to have 351 parliamentarians plus over 80 ministers, senior and junior. This has revived interest in the conference as the hunt for jobs is unleashed, even if the rules haven't yet been agreed. The 5 July accord stipulates that members of parliament must be chosen by faction leaders after consultation with the elders – which puts the warlords effectively in charge. Alternatively, various traditional chiefs, 'civil society' personalities and anti-Ethiopian faction leaders want MPs to be chosen by clan authorities.

Ethiopia's influence over the gathering has grown since it was established under the first Kenyan mediator, **Elijah Mwangale**, one of Arap Moi's veteran ministers, who lost the job when his boss

lost the election last December. Kiplagat is also a Moi veteran and some of his staff are equally controversial. Participants also grumble that the mediators, who represent the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, are close to Ethiopia and more interested in Somali reconstruction than in the details of peace. Djibouti strongly but discreetly supports the TNG. The League of Arab States is worried that, since the conference decided that Arabic would be only Somalia's second language, the country will have to leave the LAS.

When the TNG emerged in 2000, Ethiopia promptly set about weakening it, supporting selected warlords such as Hussein Aydeed. It now backs some faction leaders who are almost powerless and certainly unreliable, as some Ethiopian officials privately admit. The effects of this policy may well be the failure of the peace settlement and a return to armed conflict; it also allows a fragile unity to develop among the anti-Ethiopian factions and undermines pro-Ethiopians such as Abdullahi Yussef, **Abdullahi Addow** (a former Finance Minister and Ambassador to Washington under the late President **Mohamed Siad Barre**) and even **Farah Weheliye Addo 'Sindiko'**, once Mogadishu Mayor ('*Sindaco*' in Italian).

Unlike 'Arta I', the Kenya conference has inspired little interest among Somalis. Boggled down in its own mediocrity and surrounded by indifference and cynicism, 'Arta II' has triggered no political dynamic among Somalis. The most visible need is for security but the faction leaders do not even fully control their own militias. The clans are fragmenting fast but conference is failing to recognise this: the debate in Nairobi takes place at clan family level. There is trouble among the Abgal, for instance: clashes between the Daud/Wabudhan/Abgal and the Warsengeli/Harti Abgal are traditional but have revived and there are feuds between the Ali Gal and Moallam Diblawe, two important Waisle/Abgal sub-clans. Among the Habr Gidir, the Saleban militias are again active in kidnapping and on roadblocks. As tension grows within clans, alliances form between different clans. Meanwhile, new arrangements bypassing clan affiliations can be seen in the bustling markets and the profitable import-export and telecommunications enterprises. To many, this looks a positive development but conference is ignoring it.

Gathering the clans

Tactical alliances forged in Nairobi cannot produce real power in Somalia. If Abdullahi Yussef became President, he would be supported in Mogadishu only by Mohamed Dhere (Warsengeli/Harti Abgal) and Saleban politicians such as **Mohamed Sheikh Mohamud Gouled 'Ga'madhere'**. Mohamed Dhere, even with his arms from Ethiopia, has not even won the hearts of his own sub-clan. That would make it hard for him to negotiate with **Bashir Rage** and **Abukar Adane**, respectively managers of the thriving Esalay airstrip near Mogadishu and the busy port of Eel Mahan. Before operating in northern Mogadishu, Dhere would need to sort out the problems of the Abgal. The Saleban politicians who support him cannot rely on their own clan militiamen, whose loyalty cannot be bought for US\$60 a month, the expected salary of a soldier in the envisaged national army.

The Nairobi organisers accepted Somaliland's absence from the conference and managed to reduce the number of representatives of the Isaq (dominant in Somaliland) counterbalancing them with Dir. (The Ethiopian Ambassador to the conference is also Dir.) There would be trouble if Abdullahi Yussef became President of Somalia, on a federal model or otherwise, since he claims two Darod regions east of Somaliland, Sol and Sanag, for Puntland.

This encourages Hargeisa politicians to make inflammatory speeches about independence and to emphasise past massacres 'by southerners' rather than by Siad Barre's government (in which Abdullahi Yussef was a security officer till 1991).

U dashay, Ku dashay

Fixing borders for a federation's states would be a tough job, not to mention allocating federal resources. Many Somalis fear federalism means a region would 'belong' to one clan, so that others would be second-class citizens. The formula is '*U dashay, Ku dashay*': 'Born for, born in' (the region).

International interest in Somalia is anyway fading. The top **United States**' diplomat at the reconciliation talks, **Glenn Warren**, has been transferred. European donors, no longer anxious about rash US interference in the name of the 'war on terrorism', lost their urge to sort out Somalia. Their present involvement has less to do with Somalia itself than with regional affairs – supporting IGAD (Djibouti, **Eritrea**, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, **Sudan** and **Uganda**) in its conflict resolution role as part of backing African peace initiatives elsewhere in the continent, too (**Angola, Burundi, Congo-Kinshasa, Liberia**); and avoidance of confrontation between the Arab League (notably **Egypt**) and Ethiopia: As with Sudan, Cairo insists on an 'Arab' state remaining united; it fears Ethiopia wants to destroy Somali 'unity' through federalism.

Senior Western diplomats now leave their involvement in the Somalia peace process to 'experts' and do not press Kenya (which they regard as a more important country) to keep it moving. The European Union, **Germany, Italy**, Scandinavia, the USA and a few others settle the bills (now some \$4 million) but do not strive for more democratic debate, more transparent procedures or more realistic outcomes – except that nobody wants to be blamed for 'making the conference fail'. Arta II may be the continuation of Arta I but as with many a film, many are already wondering why.

BURUNDI/SOUTH AFRICA

Zuma's other hotspot

Two rebel factions hold the SA-backed peace process to ransom

Hopes that the installation in late April of President **Domitien Ndayizeye**, a Hutu, would hasten an end to the fighting have not been realised. Instead, the conflict has worsened and the South African government, which is facilitating ceasefire negotiations, is struggling to preserve the credibility of the process.

Ndayizeye's late-July visit to Pretoria failed to move things forward and was heavily overshadowed by domestic South African matters: investigations into the financial affairs of Deputy President **Jacob Zuma**, the man most associated with keeping the Burundi peace process alive. It was Zuma who facilitated the December 2002 ceasefire between the Burundi government and the *Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie-Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie* (CNDD-FDD), led by **Pierre Nkurunziza**. The agreement provided for Nkurunziza's fighters to be cantoned in special camps with their weapons under the protection of a South African-led force called the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB), until the integration of the militia into a new national defence force. Although the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) component of AMIB has now mostly arrived, the cantonment of

Nkurunziza's CNDD-FDD has not materialised. Instead, the Burundian armed forces (*Forces Armées du Burundi*, FAB) and CNDD-FDD continue to battle it out for supremacy. The CNDD-FDD is receiving weapons via supply lines from Kamina in **Congo-Kinshasa**, suggesting that, despite denials, forces loyal to Congolese President **Joseph Kabila** are still assisting the militia.

A cantonment camp has been set up at Muyange in Bubanza, at which some ill equipped members of a rival faction of the CNDD-FDD, led by **Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye**, and a tiny faction of the other main rebel group, the *Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu-Forces Nationales pour la Libération* (Palipehutu-FNL), led by **Alain Mugabarobana**, have been stationed under AMIB's protection. The camp was attacked, apparently by CNDD-FDD units loyal to Nkurunziza, in late June, but AMIB fought back hard. There were reportedly many CNDD-FDD casualties and the camp has not been attacked since. However, the cantonment process has since ground to a halt, amid increasingly ill-tempered complaints and threats to pull out from both Mugabarobana and Ndayikengurukiye. Only 178 rebels have been demobilised so far.

Meanwhile, the main faction of Palipehutu-FNL, led by **Agathon Rwasa**, has publicly stated that it will never negotiate with Ndayizeye, whom it calls an irrelevant puppet of the Tutsi. Rwasa also says he has no confidence in Zuma and has requested the urgent intervention of South African former President **Nelson Mandela**, who facilitated Burundi's peace process during 2000-02. Unable to make any headway with Rwasa, Zuma and the regional heads of state seem to have given up trying but Rwasa proved in early July that some kind of accommodation with him will be essential. His fighters launched a massive week-long attack on Bujumbura, with mortars landing in the city centre and most of the roads into the capital cut. The fighting caused hundreds of casualties and forced thousands of people from their homes.

Frodebu plots

Ndayizeye was away at the time on tour in Europe and indeed has spent much of his short tenure in office thus far away from home, evidently enjoying the role of visiting head of state rather more than the nitty-gritty of directing the military campaign against Palipehutu-FNL and the CNDD-FDD, which was a speciality of **Pierre Buyoya**, his predecessor. Buyoya has meanwhile taken up his seat in the Senate and spends most of his time up country, telling friends that Zuma was wrong to ignore his advice that he, Buyoya, should stay on as head of state and negotiate peace and that now only more trouble can result.

Since becoming President, Ndayizeye has taken a hard line with the CNDD-FDD and with Palipehutu-FNL, telling them that he is willing to talk but, if they do not respond, they will be crushed. He assures the FAB of his full support in their military operations. Ndayizeye's stance has disappointed ordinary Hutu, and many in his *Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi* (Frodebu) are concerned that support is shifting away from the party and towards the CNDD-FDD. Bujumbura is awash with rumours of Frodebu plots against Ndayizeye and though none have yet materialised, he will face serious challengers to secure the party's nomination as its presidential candidate should there be elections, as scheduled, before November 2004.

Ndayizeye and Nkurunziza talked peace at a summit of regional heads of state chaired by **Ugandan** President **Yoweri Kaguta Museveni** in Dar es Salaam on 20 July. The meeting was one of many brokered by Zuma since the ceasefire agreement of December 2002 and a further summit could follow. The CNDD-FDD is still

pushing for concessions. Just like Rwasa's, Nkurunziza's war seems far from over.

While maintaining a united front in public, Zuma and his team have been increasingly wary of the **Tanzanian** and Ugandan governments' different roles in Burundi. Zuma has long been aware of the link between Nkurunziza and Tanzanian Foreign Minister **Jakaya Kikwete**. The latter is now more widely thought to be encouraging Nkurunziza to be tough and keep fighting in order to secure more concessions from the predominantly Tutsi FAB. The Tanzanian government as a whole, including President **Benjamin Mkapa**, is also thought to believe that Ndayizeye and Frodebu, under South African direction, have conceded too much to both the FAB and the Tutsi political elite. There is also a feeling that Museveni exercises some influence over Nkurunziza. For these and other reasons, Zuma has been keen to ensure that no Tanzanian or Ugandan forces are allowed to join the AMIB. However, the promised contingents from **Ethiopia** and **Mozambique** have not materialised either.

After the Dar es Salaam summit, Zuma declared that a strengthened mandate for AMIB was being considered, even before it has assembled its full complement of 2,800 troops. The FAB high command says it will support this, apparently reckoning that a new mandate would mean AMIB could help it fight its war against the rebel militia. AMIB insists it is and will remain neutral but there remains a high risk that it could be drawn into clashes with Nkurunziza's CNDD-FDD and Rwasa's Palipehutu-FNL. Members of these militias appear convinced that Pretoria is pro-Tutsi and that it secretly supplies weapons to the FAB as well as to **Rwanda's** army. SA, which openly sold 'non-lethal' *matériel* to Kigali in the late 1990s, denies both charges.

Public confidence in the peace process at home and abroad is at a low ebb and Kigali and Pretoria need good news soon to reverse this. If Nkurunziza's faction of the CNDD-FDD were to stop fighting and join the government, this would have a major impact, not just for the long-suffering population but on international donors, too. Zuma has his own political career in South Africa to worry about and Burundi will probably have to take a back seat.

SA's elite Scorpions police unit is investigating Zuma's contacts with Thales of **France** during negotiations for a multibillion rand arms deal. Late last month, South Africa's *Sunday Times* published a list of questions the Scorpions have for Zuma regarding Thales, resulting in a public clash between the Deputy President and the head of the National Prosecuting Authority, **Bulelani Ngcuka**.

CAMEROON

Money in the pipeline

Biya still looks like the only show in town but critics keep the loyalists on their toes

With first oil from the **Chad**-Cameroon pipeline set to reach Kribi port in September, this new source of revenue will come at a perfect time for President **Paul Biya** to seek re-election in October 2004. He has not yet made his intentions clear but the disarray of the opposition appears to leave the way open for him to sweep the board once again though even the ruling *Rassemblement Démocratique du Peuple Camerounais* (RDPC) is not immune to dissent (AC Vol 43 No 17). Biya owes his hold on power to a north-south (or Peul-Béti) alliance of the same kind used by the country's

first President, **Ahmadou Ahidjo** and the northern vote is key to giving him another seven-year term as President. There has been speculation that Biya, now 70, may not serve a full term, though.

In January, party reformists published a manifesto, the *Livre blanc du groupe pour la modernisation du RDPC*. Its authors include Central Committee (CC) luminaries Chief **Mila Assoute**, **Samuel Ze Bembe**, **Samuel Efoua Mbozo'o** and **Mve Elemva**. Their spokesperson, **Christian Penda Ekoka**, insists they are loyal to the RDPC and to Biya but want democratic debate on the party's future. These 'modernists' got an angry reaction from the RDPC old guard, notably the Deputy Secretary General and Minister for Relations with Parliament, **Grégoire Owona**, Prime Minister **Peter Mafani Musonge** and the head of the RDPC women's organisation, **Yaou Aissatou**. Training seminars for party officials have been held to try to improve their observance of the party line.

Another source of concern for the party leadership is the *Mémorandum sur les problèmes du Grand Nord* published last September, which complained about the marginalisation of the Adamaoua, North and Extreme North provinces. The document was the work of a group of former ministers: **Antar Gassagay** of the *Union pour la République* (once Secretary of State for Territorial Administration), **Issa Tchiroma Bakary** of **Bello Bouba Maïgari's** *Union Nationale pour la Démocratie et le Progrès* (Transport), **Hamadou Moustapha** of the *Alliance Démocratique pour la Démocratie et le Progrès* (Town Planning and Housing), **Garga Haman Adji** of the *Alliance pour la Démocratie et le Développement* (Civil Service) and **Dakolé Daïssala** of the *Mouvement des Républicains* (Posts and Telecommunications). The government has taken seriously their complaints about lack of infrastructure and of representation in state institutions and has sent missions of senior RPDC northerners to refute the Memorandum's claims.

On 10 May, police detained Bakary, Gassagay and Daïssala, as well as **Maidadi Saidou Yaya**, former Vice-President of **John Fru Ndi's** Social Democratic Front (SDF) and now President of the *Alliance des Forces Progressistes* (AFP), in Maroua, where they had hoped to hold a meeting on forming a political party. The SDF, damaged by successive election defeats, is now in disarray. Leading party officials who quit in August 2002 to form the AFP include Maidadi, former spokesperson **Evariste Fopoussi Fotso** and two former National Executive members, **Samuel Tchwenko** and **Yves Epacka**. The AFP was finally legalised in April and announced at its debut news conference that it was making contacts with like-minded parties including, intriguingly, the *Rassemblement du Peuple Gabonais* of President **Omar Bongo**, as well as the governing *Parti Démocratique Sénégalais* and the *Front Populaire Ivoirien* of President **Laurent Gbagbo**. The AFP wants to form a coalition to oppose Biya and the RDPC but has met with little success.

In June, the government announced it was seeking 2,500 new recruits aged 17 to 23 for the armed forces: 1,300 gendarmes, including 300 officer cadets, and 1,200 for the army, navy and air force. A show of military force seems unlikely while talks continue on a peaceful settlement to the dispute over the Bakassi peninsula, now under discussion by a joint commission with **Nigeria** following the International Court's October 2002 ruling awarding the bulk of the territory to Cameroon. There is speculation, therefore, that the government is taking precautions in case of social unrest. Biya is not especially interested in the kind of active regional role that might be expected of a country of Cameroon's size. Cameroon has not, for example, sent troops to the peacekeeping force in **Central African Republic** established by the regional *Communauté Economique et Monétaire de l'Afrique Centrale* (CEMAC).

Another factor that will help the government in the run-up to elections is the prospect of reaching the completion point for debt relief under the World Bank and International Monetary Fund's Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. This should relieve public finances by bringing forgiveness of US\$2 billion of debt. Debt service costs currently vary between 10 bn. CFA francs (\$18 million) and CFA F 40 bn. a month, compared to monthly income of about CFA F 80 bn.

The pipeline from Chad has added between half and one percentage point to the annual growth in gross domestic product since 2000 and GDP is forecast to grow by 4.8 per cent in 2003. A prime beneficiary of the pipeline project has been cement producer Cimencam, whose exports to Chad rose by 24 per cent in 2001-2. This effect will be short-lived now that construction of the pipeline and the infrastructure at Chad's Doba oilfields is complete.

Economically, Cameroon is hampered by its dependence on a small range of commodity exports. Some 78 per cent of export income comes from cotton, oil, timber, cocoa and aluminium. Lacking the big oil reserves that have brought wealth but also trouble to its neighbours, the government is seeking to attract investors to develop its natural gas, especially since recent electricity shortages have proved so damaging to large industrial users such as Cimencam and especially aluminium producer Alucam.

The potentially negative impact for Chad of the oil pipeline has attracted more attention than for Cameroon. Yet monitors in the independent International Advisory Group remain concerned that with the operations phase beginning, the government and the World Bank will not do enough to ensure that the well intentioned commitments to environmental and social monitoring in the design of the project are actually fulfilled. As well as the IAG, Cameroon has an independent pipeline monitoring project of its own set up by local pressure groups, which has won recognition by the government and attends meetings as part of the consultation process.

The oil is being pumped to Limbe port, from where it will be loaded on to a Floating Storage and Offloading vessel. The government has won donor support for plans to develop a wider role for Limbe as a regional oil service centre. This has political implications, though, as Limbe lies in the Anglophone part of the country and the prospect of development is providing a new focus for federalists such as the Southern Cameroons National Council. The SCNC's leader, **Fred Alobwede Ebong**, lives in exile between **Britain** and **Nigeria**. The SCNC opposes the 1972 constitution and would like a return to the original federal framework that would give South-West Province greater autonomy and more control over its new-found wealth.

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LIBYA

Opening the books

It did not take long for new head of government **Shukri Ghanem**, a leading liberal by the standards of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya ('State of the Masses'), to signal his intentions. Following on from a string of grandiose statements by Revolutionary Leader **Moammar el Gaddafi** that Libya would now encourage private investment, the new government agreed to abide by Article VIII of the International Monetary Fund's Articles of Agreement. This means Tripoli has agreed to current account convertibility for the dinar on the Fund's terms. Some restrictions remain on transfers but these are to be scrapped.

Ghanem's team includes new Trade and Economy Secretary **Abdelkader Omar Belkheir** and **Taher Jehaimi** in the new post of Planning Secretary, both identified as reformists. The move followed mid-June's unification of the exchange rate, a key condition of IMF policy, only one week after Ghanem was promoted from Economy and Trade Secretary to Premier. Greater transparency will follow in the country with arguably the world's worst record of reporting economic data. Economists might finally get a glimpse of where the US\$7 billion-plus annual oil income goes.

Libya will use the change as further evidence to the **United States** that it is serious about liberalising and re-integrating into the global economy (AC Vol 44 No 11). Colonel El Gaddafi is using economic reform talk to entice President **George W. Bush's** government into normalising relations. This may reduce pressure over such tricky issues as allegations Libya still dabbles in weapons of mass destruction (AC Vol 44 No 8). Pressing home the globalisation theme, Ghanem, a former economist at the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries, is accelerating plans to join the World Trade Organisation. Libya's inner circle has debated WTO membership for a year but only now is it in the public domain (AC Vol 43 No 23).

AFRICA

Lions and hyenas

Botswana, South Africa, Mauritius, Namibia and **Tunisia** emerge as Africa's top five countries in the latest 'policy stance index' published by the Addis Ababa-based Economic Commission for Africa. The index evaluates each country's macro-economic and poverty

reduction policies and its performance in institution-building, including assessments of the legal structure, transaction costs, central bank independence, public enterprises and the civil service.

If these are Africa's young lions, then the hyenas are **Congo-Brazzaville, Zimbabwe, Chad, Guinea** and **Nigeria**, castigated for their frequent policy reversals, ineffective targeting of the poor, weak legal systems, lack of transparency and predictability in laws and regulations, bad public services and political tensions.

Probably more revealing are those coming just below the top rankings – countries generally seen as making progress against difficult odds, such as **Uganda, Morocco, Ghana, Niger** and **Lesotho**. Most in this group are being rescued from serious economic hardship only by sustained and substantial aid. Several are running high fiscal deficits and face enormous difficulties in reforming public services.

'If foreign aid crowds out private investment, the prospects for greater prosperity in aid-dependent countries are slim,' says the ECA. 'Nowhere is this more evident than in Ghana, which has undertaken significant reforms over the past 20 years but has little to show in tangible benefits for the majority of its people.' Despite years of international initiatives, the most indebted countries, such as Uganda, are not really benefiting from the debt relief provided.

It adds there is a need for 'strong institutions' to help maintain fiscal and monetary discipline, mobilise resources and set priorities among the competing demands for scarce resources.

Africa's overall economic growth was officially 3.2 per cent in 2002, down from 4.3 per cent in 2001, with only southern Africa showing an improvement. The five countries recording the highest growth in 2002 were **Equatorial Guinea, Mozambique, Angola, Chad** and **Rwanda**.

UGANDA

Father and son

The death of **Idi Amin Dada**, prematurely reported several times by Kampala newspapers in recent weeks, may indeed be imminent. 'He is alive but remains in a near-death condition – in a coma... Should he encounter further life-threatening problems, resuscitation will not be attempted,' medical staff at King Faisal Hospital in Jeddah, **Saudi Arabia**, said on 3 August.

Amin, who was the military leader of Uganda in 1971-79, is held responsible for the death of 400,000 Ugandans. President **Yoweri Museveni** said that if the former dictator returned to Uganda alive, he would immediately be charged with

crimes against humanity. He conceded however that Amin's family was welcome to bring his corpse back home for a private burial.

Bizarrely, Amin still has sympathisers – some of whom are serving in Museveni's government. Deputy Prime Minister **Moses Ali** announced he was grieving for Amin. Former Vice-President General **Mustafa Adrisi** openly wept at the news of Amin's reported death. Even former President **Milton Obote**, who was ousted by Amin in 1971 but also succeeded him in the (heavily rigged) 1980 elections, has equivocated, as have some more radical opposition groups, such as the Reform Agenda.

Uganda People's Defence Force Brigadier **Kale Kayihura** accuses Idi Amin's son, **Taban**, of training a rebel force to attack Uganda from eastern **Congo-Kinshasa**. So does **Bitara Kisebo** of the *Parti pour l'Unité et la Sauvegarde de l'Intégrité du Congo*, a militia backed by Uganda (see Feature). Kisebo also claimed that Taban's group was working closely with Kinshasa's army, the *Forces Armées Congolaises*, to set up bases at Getti, Bado and Nyacucu, with 6,000 fighters near the Uganda border.

WESTERN SAHARA

A line in the sand

Morocco has been outmanoeuvred in the United Nations. **Algeria** persuaded the Polisario Front it should accept the plan drawn up by UN Special Envoy **James Baker III** for a solution to the protracted Western Sahara dispute. Having consistently rejected a deal offering a referendum in five years but autonomy before then, Polisario's decision to accept Baker's terms has placed the onus on Rabat to be a good international citizen after the UN Security Council on 31 July voted unanimously for all parties to push ahead with the plan.

Feeling let down by key allies including the **United States** and **France**, Morocco is uncomfortable about a deal many thought would give it permanent control of the former **Spanish** colony. Washington wants Republican grandee Baker to succeed and the resolution's original US-sponsored draft threatened to impose a solution on the belligerents. France has pushed a more Morocco-friendly agenda but keen to mend fences after the **Iraq** crisis, Prime Minister **Jean-Pierre Raffarin** visited Morocco – meeting **King Mohammed VI** in his Tetouan palace – and then agreed to fall into line behind the Baker plan. A face-saving clause was inserted saying it should be based on agreement between the two parties; Morocco's UN Ambassador **Mohamed Bennouna** repeated that 'Morocco's sovereignty' was not under discussion and Foreign Minister **Mohamed Benaïssa** said everything could hinge on talks with Algeria.