Managing Migration: The Role of Economic Instruments

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ABSTRACT

This paper reviews economic policies and instruments available to the developed countries to reduce unwanted migration from developing countries, not all of which is irregular migration. Countries generally welcome legal immigrants and visitors, try to make it unnecessary for people to become refugees and asylum seekers, and try to discourage, detect, and remove irregular foreigners.

There are three major themes:

1. There are as many reasons for migration as there are migrants, and the distinction between migrants motivated by economic and non-economic considerations is often blurred. Perhaps the best analogy is to a river – what begins as one channel that can be managed with a dam can become a series of rivulets forming a delta, making migration far more difficult to manage.

2. The keys to reducing unwanted migration lie mostly in emigration countries, but trade and investment fostered by immigration countries can accelerate economic and job growth in both emigration and immigration countries, and make trading in goods a substitute for economically motivated migration. Trade and economic integration had the effect of slowing emigration from Europe to the Americas, between southern Europe and northern Europe, and in Asian Tiger countries such as South Korea and Malaysia. However, the process of moving toward freer trade and economic integration can also increase migration in the short term, producing a migration hump, and requiring cooperation between emigration and

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immigration destinations so that the threat of more migration does not slow economic integration and growth.

3. Aid, intervention, and remittances can help reduce unwanted migration, but experience shows that there are no assurances that such aid, intervention, and remittances would, in fact, lead migrants to stay at home. The better use of remittances to promote development, which at US$65 billion in 1999 exceeded the US$56 billion in official development assistance (ODA), is a promising area for cooperation between migrants and their areas of origin, as well as emigration and immigration countries.

There are two ways that differences between countries can be narrowed: migration alone in a world without free trade, or migration and trade in an open economy. Migration will eventually diminish in both cases, but there is an important difference between reducing migration pressures in a closed or open world economy. In a closed economy, economic differences can narrow as wages fall in the immigration country, a sure recipe for an anti-immigrant backlash. By contrast, in an open economy, economic differences can be narrowed as wages rise faster in the emigration country.

Areas for additional research and exploration of policy options include: (1) how to phase in freer trade, investment, and economic integration to minimize unwanted migration; (2) strategies to increase the job-creating impacts of remittances, perhaps by using aid to match remittances that are invested in job-creating ways.

INTRODUCTION AND THEMES

Most of the world's 6.1 billion people never cross a national border – most people will live and die within the country in which they were born. Most of those who do cross national borders will move only a short distance. More than 80 per cent of the world's population live in less developed countries, which means that most international migrants move from one less developed nation to another.[1]

The UN estimated the number of international migrants – persons outside their country of birth or citizenship for 12 months or more – to be 160 million in 2000. There is no regional or country breakdown, but in 1990, when the UN estimated 120 million migrants, 66 million or 55 per cent, were in developing countries, and 54 million or 45 per cent, were in developed countries. If these same percentages apply to the 2000 migrant total, there would be 72 million migrants in developed countries and 88 million in developing countries.

Migration determinants and factors

International migration is usually a major individual or family decision that is carefully considered – crossing national borders to settle or work in another country is not a decision made lightly. There are two broad categories of migrants: those who migrate to another country for primarily economic reasons, and those who move primarily for non-economic reasons (see Table 1). The factors that encourage a migrant to actually move are grouped into three categories: demand-pull, supply-push, and network. Economic migrants might, for example, be encouraged to migrate by demand-pull guest worker recruitment; non-economic migrants might be motivated to cross borders to join family members settled abroad.

TABLE 1
DETERMINANTS OF MIGRATION: FACTORS ENCOURAGING AN INDIVIDUAL TO MIGRATE

Type of migrant	Demand-pull	Supply-push	Network/other
Economic	Labour recruitment (e.g., guest workers)	Un- or under-employment; low wages (e.g., farmers whose crops fail)	Jobs and wage information flows (e.g., sons following fathers)
Non-economic	Family unification (e.g., family members join spouse)	Flee war and persecution (e.g., displaced persons and refugees/asylum seekers)	Communications; transportation; assistance organizations; desire for new experience/ adventure

Note: These examples are illustrative. Individuals contemplating migration may be encouraged to move by all three factors. The importance of pull, push, and network factors can change over time.

A man living in rural Turkey, for example, may be offered a job in Germany by a recruiter, or hear about German jobs from friends and relatives abroad, which is a demand-pull factor. This potential migrant may not have a job at home, or he may face crop failures, which makes him willing to move, a supply-push factor. After paying the recruiter/smuggler to get him to Germany – a network factor – he decides to migrate.

The three factors encouraging an individual to migrate do not have equal weights, and the weight of each factor can change over time. Generally, demand-pull and supply-push factors are strongest at the beginning of a migration flow, and network factors become more important as the migration stream matures. Thus, the first guest workers are recruited, often in rural areas where jobs are scarce. But after migrants return with information about job opportunities abroad, network factors may become more important in sustaining migration, so that even employed workers in Turkey may migrate to Germany for higher wages.

Migration motivations

One of the most important non-economic motivations for crossing national borders is family unification. A father working abroad wants to have his wife and children join him, for example. In such cases, the anchor immigrant is a demand-pull factor for family chain migration. The migrant's immediate family may be followed by brothers and sisters, and then their families.[2] Family considerations can play important roles in migration decisions, an insight that is at the core of the so-called new economics of labour migration (NELM), which recognizes a variety of reasons for migration (Taylor and Martin, 2001):

- migration may represent an effort to "keep up with the neighbours"– if migrant families have better homes and TVs, then non-migrant families may be motivated to send a migrant abroad to earn money to overcome their relative deprivation;

- missing services and markets – many migrants are from farm families. There is typically no crop insurance available to provide an income if the rains do not come and crops fail, so a foreign labour market can serve as a means of reducing the risk of having no income when crops fail;

- migration can overcome a local credit obstacle to development, such as when banks are reluctant to lend money to farmers who own land communally rather than individually. In some cases, farmers who want to buy new machines migrate to earn wages so they can purchase machinery.

Some migrants are impelled to cross national borders by war and political persecution at home, and might qualify as refugees according to the 1951 Geneva Convention which defines a refugee as a person residing outside his or her country of citizenship and who is unwilling or unable to return because of "a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion". Countries that signed the Geneva Convention pledged not to "refoul" or return persons to places where they could be persecuted.

Most nations are committed to reducing the root causes of unwanted migration, which means reducing the demographic and economic differences that promote economic migration, and increasing political stability, respect for democracy, and human rights in order to minimize the number of refugees and asylum seekers. Most of the changes that would reduce unwanted migration lie within the developing countries that are the source of most migrants. Trade, investment, and aid policies of the industrial nations can accelerate demographic and economic changes as well as ensure respect for human rights. In the extreme, industrial nations can use military force for "humanitarian intervention" to prevent unwanted migration.

MAJOR APPROACHES

Trade and investment

Trade means that a good is produced in one country, taken over borders, and used in another. Economic theory suggests that, if countries specialize in producing those goods in which the country has a comparative advantage, the residents of all countries that trade or exchange goods will be better off. Trade affects the location and cost of producing goods. Trade policies affect the competitiveness of an emigration country's products, and employment in the export and import sectors of *both* sending and receiving countries. This means that if Poland can produce agricultural commodities cheaper than France, and France can produce cars cheaper than Poland, then Poland should produce pork, and send it to France in exchange for cars. This way, the French have lower food costs, and the Poles have cheaper cars. With trade accelerating economic and job growth in both countries, there is less Polish emigration.

Economically motivated migration should decrease in a free trade world because of factor price equalization, the tendency of wages to equalize as workers move from poorer to richer countries. In the terms of economic theory, this means that trade and migration are substitutes – countries that have relatively cheaper labour can export labour-intensive goods *or* workers. Over time, differences in the prices of goods and the wages of workers should converge with freer trade, reducing emigration pressures.

Migration and trade were *substitutes* across the Atlantic and within Europe, as economic theory suggests. For more than a century, Europeans migrated to North America, until restrictive legislation in the 1920s almost stopped the flow across the Atlantic. In the 1950s and 1960s, European economic growth rates rose above US growth rates, the gaps in wages and incomes across the Atlantic narrowed, and migration across the Atlantic was minimal even after the United States reopened opportunities for European immigration in the 1950s and 1960s. A similar story of narrowing wage and income gaps due to freer trade and economic integration helps explain why labour migration between southern European nations such as Italy and Spain and northern Europe practically stopped in the 1970s and 1980s despite the right of Italians and Spaniards to live and work anywhere in the European Union (EU).

The US Commission for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic Development searched for the best mutually beneficial way to reduce unwanted migration, and concluded that "expanded trade between the sending countries and the United States is the single most important remedy" (1990: xv). Many countries have embraced freer trade as a route to faster economic growth. In 1998, trade in goods and services totalled $6.5 trillion, almost one-fourth of the world's $29 trillion GNP. As trade continues to expand, economic growth should speed up, and in the long run trade in goods should replace the migration of people.

However, when countries that once discouraged free trade suddenly embrace freer trade, there can be severe adjustments. For example, electronics and garment factories in Western Europe may close and relocate to Eastern Europe for lower wages. Many developing countries have 25 to 50 per cent of their workforces in agriculture, and opening developing country agriculture to freer trade may displace farmers, as farms become fewer and larger. The displaced farmers, often older men, may not be able to find factory jobs, since young women are often preferred, and some may migrate abroad for jobs. The US Commission warned that "the economic development process itself tends in the short to medium term to stimulate migration", the so-called migration hump (1990: xvi).

The migration hump can be smaller and shorter lived if immigration and emigration countries cooperate to accelerate the pace of job creation in emigration countries. For example, instead of emigrating, displaced farmers may not emigrate if foreign investment creates jobs for them near their homes. There are many types of investments, but foreign direct investment (FDI) that leads to factories and other job-creating workplaces is most likely to spur economic and productivity growth and reduce emigration. FDI flows to countries where entrepreneurs think they are most likely to make profits, not necessarily to emigration areas most in need of jobs. In 1998, China received the most FDI among developing countries, $44 billion, while the Philippines received less than $2 billion. Each $10,000 of FDI is typically associated with the creation of one job in a developing country.

The same FDI that increases jobs and trade, and reduces migration in the long term, may increase migration in the short term. Three examples are illustrative. First, foreigners investing in developing countries usually send managers and other professionals to help operate the factory, which means that FDI is often marked by more migration of professional expatriates. Second, some countries receiving FDI may serve as production platforms, attracting FDI because they are stable economically and politically, and then permitting the entry of foreign workers to staff the factories. For example, Hungary attracts more FDI than Romania, and new factories in Hungary staffed by Hungarians may encourage migration from Romania to Hungary to fill jobs in agriculture, construction, and services that are shunned by Hungarians.

Third, FDI may increase internal migration and emigration. Much of the FDI in developing countries goes into free-trade zones, which often have foreignowned assembly plants that import components and turn them into cars and consumer goods to be exported. As farmers and other workers are displaced in the interior of the country, they may migrate to seek jobs in border-area FTZs. Those not hired may emigrate, as they come into contact with the international migration infrastructure in more dynamic economic areas. For example, much of the FDI in China goes into the same coastal provinces that send the most migrants abroad; these coastal provinces also attract migrants from the interior of China to fill jobs shunned by local workers.

Aid and intervention

Official development assistance (ODA) are funds given or lent to developing nations to speed their economic and job growth. In 1970, the UN recommended that donor countries contribute aid equivalent to 0.7 per cent of their GDP. The Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway are among the only countries that consistently meet the UN's aid target. In 1999, the OECD nations that were members of the Development Assistance Committee provided $56 billion in ODA. Five countries provided almost two-thirds of ODA: Japan ($15 billion, or 0.4 per cent of its GDP), the United States ($9 billion or 0.1 per cent), Germany ($6 billion or 0.3 per cent), France ($6 billion or 0.4 per cent), and the United Kingdom ($4 billion or 0.2 per cent).

The ILO and UNHCR in 1992 undertook a major project to investigate whether more ODA, or ODA delivered in a different way, could reduce unwanted emigration (Böhning and Schloeter-Paredes, 1993). Since donor nations already make ODA conditional, meaning that they require recipient countries to respect human rights and so forth, experts were asked how ODA should be provided if its goal is to reduce emigration pressures.

The answers were surprising. The experts who focused on refugee-producing conflicts emphasized that aid provided during the Cold War often intensified and sustained the conflict, increasing the number of refugees. While they did not urge less aid, they did recommend that the aid provided to assist refugees change its focus, from only *relief and resettlement* of refugees to also homeland reconstruction to encourage *repatriation or returns*. They also recommended that aid was needed to attack the *root causes* of refugee-producing conflicts, which often lie in poverty and environmental degradation that lead to competition for scarce resources.

The experts studying the role of aid to reduce economically motivated migration also called for more aid, but they emphasized the need to link additional aid to economic policy reforms in emigration countries. For example, instead of using aid to build a dam to provide poor farmers with irrigation water, it might be better to use ODA to change agricultural policies and prices, so that farmers can earn a profit from farming. Several experts concluded that the most important "aid" that could be provided to stem emigration would be for industrial countries to open their borders to the goods produced in emigration countries. Too often, they noted, the industrial democracies restrict imports of labour-intensive goods such as farm commodities, garments, and shoes, which may be produced in the industrial countries by migrants. If emigration countries were allowed to export these commodities, jobs would be created in the migrants' countries of origin, and there would be a reduced demand-pull for migrants in the industrial countries.

Can ODA be increased and redirected? The UN's Social Summit in Copenhagen in March 1995 heard an appeal from the Group of 77 – 130 developing nations – for more aid and a new 20-20 distribution formula. Under the Group of 77 proposal, 20 per cent of ODA would be earmarked to meet basic human needs, such as building and staffing schools and hospitals, and aid recipients would also dedicate at least 20 per cent of their government expenditures to satisfying basic human needs.[3] However, instead of implementing the 20-20 formula, most aid discussions have focused on debt relief, which means that the rich countries write off the debts run up by the most indebted developing nations.

Case: intervention in Haiti

The alternative to slow but steady economic progress is humanitarian intervention, which occurs when a country intervenes militarily to head off emigration. The US experience in Haiti since 1994 highlights the fact that trade, investment, and aid are often cheaper and surer ways to reduce emigration pressure than humanitarian intervention. Dictatorship and corruption led to a people power revolt and the election of Jean-Bertrand Aristide as President in 1991, but he was soon removed from the presidency by a military coup.

Under US policies in effect until 1994, boats determined to be carrying Haitians to the US were forced to return to Haiti without individuals having the opportunity to present their claims for asylum. On 16 June 1994, the US announced that Haitians picked up at sea by US ships would be eligible to present to US asylum officers on-board evidence that they face persecution in Haiti. The US Coast Guard picked up more than 11,627 Haitians during the next three weeks, and 30 per cent were granted asylum and taken to the US; the others were returned to Haiti. After 5 July 1994, Haitians picked up at sea were sent to the US base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and, if they were deemed in need of safe haven, they were kept in safe haven camps, but not taken to the US. By mid-July 1994, there were 16,500 Haitians at Guantanamo, and a few hundred began to trickle back to Haiti after they learned that, even if they could prove they needed safe haven, they would not be going to the US.

On 31 July 1994, the UN Security Council approved the use of force to restore President Aristide to power. On 18 September 1994, with American planes in the air as part of Operation Restore Democracy, Haitian military coup leaders resigned, and Aristide resumed his presidency. US intervention to restore democracy and stem migration from Haiti was costly. The US military presence in Haiti cost about $140 million a month. Since Haiti's GDP was only $1.5 billion in 1994, the 11 months that US troops were in Haiti cost more than Haiti's GDP. Between 1994 and 2000, the US spent a total $2.4 billion in Haiti, which prompted the State Department's special Haiti coordinator, Donald Steinberg, in 2000 to conclude for a Senate committee that "the record [of US intervention] has been decidedly mixed". Haitians continue to try to leave their country in small boats for the Bahamas and Florida.

CONCLUSIONS

Lessons learned and policy options

Countries seeking to manage the migration of people across their borders should keep in mind three basic migration facts: most people never cross national borders to live or work in another country; more than half of the world's migrants move from one less developed country to another; and a diverse group of countries – from Italy and Spain to South Korea – have successfully made the migration transition from net emigration to net immigration areas.

Indeed, given large and widening economic differences between nations, the surprise may be how little, not how much, international migration occurs.

In thinking about how to manage migration, it is important to remember that most migration is analogous to water dripping, not floods, and durable solutions to "drip migration" lie in economic growth and peace. Policies that promote trade, investment, aid, as well as respect for human rights do not eliminate the need for border controls overnight, but they do keep countries on the path toward sustained reductions in migration pressure. Abandoning or neglecting those policies because they work slowly, on the other hand, may invite the very mass and unpredictable migration some industrial countries fear.

Even though most developing countries have embraced freer trade and investment, migration is likely to increase rather than to decrease in the next 25 years because of demographic and economic differences and ever-stronger networks. The recommended policy instruments available to prevent unwanted migration may actually increase migration in the short term, as freer trade, for example, can allow imports to increase before exports rise, leading to a currency crisis, devaluation, recession, rising unemployment, and emigration, as in Mexico in 1995. Multinationals often use imported components when producing in developing countries, so that breaking up local monopolies and replacing their production with factories created by FDI can increase imports, the use of capitalintensive production techniques, and a country's exports – without increasing the number of jobs immediately. Finally, aid in the form of infrastructure improvements can have the short-term effect of stimulating emigration, as when better roads meant to help farmers to market their crops also permit cheap imported food to reach the countryside, destroying jobs and stimulating emigration.

The prospect of short-term migration humps as emigration countries get on the faster development road should not deter immigration countries from recommending such policies to emigration countries. Immigration countries anticipating migration humps should be comforted by how little – not how much – wage and job gaps must be narrowed to deter economically motivated migration. Experience suggests that, after wage gaps are narrowed to 1:4 or 1:5, and more rapid economic and job growth in the emigration area creates the widespread expectation that economic differences will continue to narrow, economically motivated migration practically ceases (Martin, 1993; Straubhaar, 1988).

There are now some 150-160 million migrants, and they remit at least $65 billion a year to their countries of origin. Is there the possibility of negotiating a grand bargain to better manage migration? Grand bargains are agreements in which each party does something it would not otherwise do that have a desired and mutually beneficial long-run impact. A grand bargain may be:

- To get the industrial democracies to do more to integrate currently resident foreigners, so that they are more capable of investing in their countries of origin. Better integration would also raise immigrant incomes and reduce inequality.[4]

- To get developing countries to see their nationals abroad as a source of capital and ideas to get development moving, encouraging the investment of money earned abroad by those who know the language, laws, and customs of the country. In this case, facilitating remittance investments may upset some local monopolies, but accelerate economic growth.

There are three sources of funds that can be used to accelerate economic growth and reduce migration pressure: private FDI, aid, and remittances. Of the three, remittances have perhaps the greatest potential, but their nature must be considered carefully. During the 1960s, it was often assumed that remittances and the return of workers with skills acquired abroad would turn emigration areas into boom areas that no longer exported workers, with no government involvement. However, remittances and returns rarely led to an economic take off, and the remittance-development literature of the 1970s that anticipated such an outcome has a negative tone, with migrants accused of spending remittances nonproductively, such as on imported consumer durables and cars rather than local goods. Remittances were sometimes used to speculate on and inflate land and housing as well as bride prices, which critics said simply shuffled funds from one person to another without creating jobs (Abadan-Unat et al., 1976; Penninx, 1982).

The major lesson is that remittances are not an external pump that primes every area for an economic take-off. Indeed, remittances flowing to emigration areas often wind up producing what John Kenneth Galbraith called "private affluence and public squalor", or new homes reachable only over dirt roads. What is clearly needed is some way of harnessing some fraction of the remittances in order to develop the infrastructure that can help a region develop economically. Cooperation to increase remittances, reduce the cost of transferring money, and matching that share of remittances that are invested could open a new era in cooperative economic development. The funding base for such cooperation is not trivial – the volume of remittances sent to developing countries doubled in the 1990s to $65 billion (Table 2), and the Mexican godfather programme demonstrates how governments can work with migrants to increase the development impact of remittances.

TABLE 2
REMITTANCES TO LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, 1988-1999

	Total remittances ($millions)	% change
1988	28,340	
1989	32,136	13
1990	39,052	22
1991	33,050	-15
1992	37,196	13
1993	38,872	5
1994	44,134	14
1995	50,632	15
1996	54,851	8
1997	65,021	19
1998	60,895	-6
1999	65,325	7
Total	549,504	

Note: Remittances include worker remittances, monetary transfers sent home from workers abroad more than one year, and compensation of employees (previously labour income), the earnings of foreigners abroad less than 12 months.

Source: IMF, various years.

Case: Mexican 3-1 and godfather programmes

One of the world's largest migration flows is between Mexico and the US: about 9 million Mexican-born persons live in the US, and half arrived in the 1990s. Mexicans in the US have formed more than 500 hometown clubs or associations, and they play an important role in sending about $8 billion a year in remittances to Mexico.

Many of Mexico's 31 state governments that have large numbers of migrants in the US have launched programmes to match remittances that are invested to create jobs. For example, there are believed to be as many Zacatecans in the US as in the central Mexican state, 600,000 to 1 million. Under the 3-for-1 programme, each dollar remitted by migrants or hometown clubs in the US for projects such as paving streets or improving infrastructure in Zacatecas is matched with three additional dollars, one each from the federal, state, and local governments. The Zacatecas State Government and the Inter-American Development Bank provide infrastructure support and financing for returned migrants who invest their remittances in job-creating enterprises.

The Mexican Government also has a "godfather programme" that encourages Mexican-Americans to invest in Mexico. In July 2001, President Fox showcased a planned $21 million sewing operation about 90 miles east of Mexico City in San Salvador El Seco, in the state of Puebla, which is planned to grow into 21 maquiladoras with 7,000 employees. The owner of the first maquiladora, Jaime Lucero, emigrated to New York City and became a millionaire. He opened the first sewing factory in El Seco in 2000; it employs 750 workers who earn between $7.50 and $11 a day.

Case: French co-development in Mali

Increasing the flow and development impact of remittances is not the only option. The French co-development model aims to link migration and development policies in source countries of immigrants, and to facilitate and promote the circulation of migrants between their country of origin and destination. The Mali-France Consultation Agreement on Migration of 21 December 2000 calls on the governments to meet at least once a year at the ministerial level to deal with three issues: the integration of Malians who want to remain in France, co-management of migration flows, and cooperative development.

Malians figured prominently in mid-1990s protests in France during which migrants trying to avoid deportation occupied churches.[5] When France sent a charter plane with deported Malians to Bamako on 25 August 1996, President Alpha Omar Konare complained that "Some people have been expelled with absolutely nothing."

In response, France developed a policy of assisted returns. Malians not allowed to remain in France could return "voluntarily" and receive CFA 2.5 million ($3,600) to open businesses in Mali to support themselves and their families – the cost of deportation is about $3,500 per person because two immigration-officials accompany each deportee. Instead of paying for police to enforce deportations, the same funds are used to help the returnee earn a living in Mali. The returned migrants also receive technical assistance, and by some measures, 80 per cent of those who participate are still in business after two years, so that the programme helps to re-integrate migrants who "failed" in France.

NOTES

1. PRB 2001 data sheet shows 6,137 million world total; 4,944 million (or 81 per cent) in less developed countries.
2. Some migration streams reflect traditional flows between former colonies and their colonizers, long after colonies gained independence: migration between India and Pakistan and the United Kingdom, or between Africa and France.
3. The threat of immigration was used by ex-Prime Minister Rasmussen of Denmark as a "very concrete" argument for more foreign aid: "if you don't help the third world...then you will have these poor people in our society." He continued, "Europe has now lived through a period where thousands and thousands and thousands of refugees are coming from various parts of the world...ordinary people now recognize ...the global situation" making "ordinary people" more receptive to the need for aid to reduce emigration pressures (*Migration News*, April 1995). President Bush used the argument that poverty can breed terrorism in recommending increased US foreign aid in 2002: "persistent poverty and oppression can lead to hopelessness and despair. And when governments fail to meet the most basic needs of their people, these failed states can become havens for terror." The US now provides about $17 billion a year in foreign aid; Bush proposed a $6 billion increase.
4. Industrial democracies are being transformed by immigration and other factors that are increasing inequality within them. One way to visualize this transformation is to remember that, throughout human history, most societies had pyramid shapes: a king or royal family on top, a small middle class, and the poor masses filling out the bottom. The great achievement of the industrial democracies in the twentieth century was the development of diamond-shaped societies: The number of rich people at the top was limited by taxes; the number of poor people at the bottom was reduced with a social safety net. The result was a large group of people at the widest band of the diamond: the middle class. However, current immigrants tend to add to the top or the bottom of this diamond distribution, not to the middle, which increases inequality. When arrayed by the best single predictor of economic success – years of education – immigrants to the United States, for example, are more likely than native-born adults to have a graduate degree or higher, and immigrants are also less likely than non-immigrants to have a high school education.
5. There were an estimated 10,000 sub-Saharan Blacks in France in the 1960s, 80,000 in 1975, and 320,000 in 1992.

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GERER LES MIGRATIONS: ROLE DES INSTRUMENTS ECONOMIQUES

Cet article passe en revue les politiques et instruments économiques dont disposent les pays développés pour restreindre l'immigration indésirée – mais pas forcément irrégulière – en provenance des pays en développement. En général, les pays accueillent convenablement les immigrants déclarés et les visiteurs, essaient de faire en sorte qu'ils ne deviennent pas réfugiés ou demandeurs d'asile, tentent de décourager les séjours clandestins, s'efforcent de découvrir et de faire partir les étrangers en situation irrégulière.

Les auteurs soulèvent trois grands problèmes.

1. Il existe autant de raisons de migrer qu'il existe de migrants, cependant qu'il est souvent difficile de distinguer les migrants dont les motivations sont économiques de ceux chez qui elles ne le sont pas. C'est l'image du fleuve qui l'illustre le mieux : le cours d'eau, suivant initialement un lit unique, laisse facilement réguler son débit par un barrage ; par la suite, il lui arrive de diverger en de multiples bras qui formeront un delta défiant la domestication.

2. Ce sont avant tout les pays d'émigration qui sont en position de freiner les migrations indésirées. Toutefois, le commerce et les investissements stimulés par les pays d'immigration ont le pouvoir d'une part d'accélérer la croissance de l'économie et de l'emploi aussi bien dans les pays d'émigration que dans les pays d'immigration, et d'autre part d'encourager au commerce des biens plutôt qu'à l'émigration. Le commerce et l'intégration économique ont abouti par exemple à ralentir l'émigration européenne vers les États-Unis d'Amérique, ainsi que les mouvements, au sein de l'Europe même, du sud vers le nord de l'Europe, ou, en Asie, vers des pays très dynamiques tels que la Malaisie ou la Corée du Sud. Mais le processus de libéralisation du commerce et d'intégration économique peut aussi entraîner à court terme une augmentation des migrations, caractérisée par une crête migratoire et imposant aux pays d'émigration et aux pays d'immigration de coopérer afin d'écarter la menace d'une migration effrénée qui ralentirait la croissance et l'intégration.

3. L'aide, les interventions et les envois d'argent peuvent contribuer à réduire les mouvements migratoires indésirés, encore qu'on sache par expérience que ni les unes ni les autres ne sont une garantie absolue contre le désir d'émigrer. On pourrait faire en sorte que les envois d'argent – qui, en 1999, se sont montés à 65 milliards de dollars des États-Unis, contre 56 milliards pour toute l'aide publique au développement – servent davantage au développement. Il y a là un domaine de coopération prometteur entre les migrants et leurs régions d'origine, et aussi entre les pays d'émigration et les pays d'immigration.

Pour réduire les différences entre les pays, deux voies s'offrent : les migrations dans un monde où le commerce n'est pas libre; les migrations et le commerce au sein d'une économie ouverte. Quelle que soit celle qu'on retient, le rythme des

migrations finira par ralentir. L'allègement des pressions migratoires est pourtant une affaire bien différente selon qu'elle a pour cadre une économie mondiale ouverte ou fermée. Dans ce cas-ci, les différences économiques peuvent s'atténuer quand, dans le pays d'immigration, il se produit une baisse des salaires – et, à coup sûr, un choc en retour contre les immigrants. En revanche, dans ce cas-là, les différences économiques peuvent s'atténuer quand les salaires progressent plus vite dans le pays d'émigration.

En matière d'options politiques, il faut procéder à des études et recherches supplémentaires portant, entre autres, sur: les modalités d'une bonne synchronisation de la libéralisation du commerce, des investissements et de l'immigration permettant de réduire au minimum les migrations indésirées; les stratégies d'optimisation de la création d'emplois par le truchement des envois d'argent (lesdites stratégies prévoyant éventuellement l'octroi d'une aide proportionnelle aux envois d'argent servant cette fin).

GESTIÓN DE LAS MIGRACIONES: IMPORTANCIA DE LOS INSTRUMENTOS ECONÓMICOS

Este artículo examina las políticas y los instrumentos de que disponen los países desarrollados para reducir la migración indeseable a partir de países en desarrollo, que no siempre es migración irregular. En general los países acogen favorablemente a los inmigrantes legales y a los visitantes; tratan de evitar a los refugiados y a los demandantes de asilo, y procuran disuadir, detectar y expulsar a los extranjeros irregulares.

Contiene tres temas principales:

1. Existen tantas razones para emigrar como migrantes, y con frecuencia es difícil distinguir entre migrantes motivados por consideraciones económicas o no económicas. Podría, por ejemplo compararse con un río, que comienza con un canal que se puede encauzar con una presa o que puede transformarse en una serie de brazos que constituyan un delta difícil de organizar, es decir que en este caso la migración será mucho más difícil de encauzar.

2. Las claves para reducir la migración indeseable se encuentran sobre todo en los países de emigración, pero si los países de inmigración favorecen el comercio y las inversiones se acelerará el crecimiento económico y del empleo tanto en los países de emigración como en los de inmigración, de manera que el comercio de bienes vendrá a sustituir a la migración por motivos económicos. El comercio y la integración económica han tenido como efecto la reducción de la emigración desde Europa a las Américas, entre Europa meridional y septentrional, y en los países llamados tigres asiáticos, como Corea del Sur y Malasia. Pero, por otra parte, la liberalización del comercio y la integración

económica también pueden a corto plazo incrementar la migración, con una ascenso de la curva migratoria que requerirá una cooperación entre lugares de emigración y de inmigración de manera que la perspectiva de una mayor migración no vaya a detener la integración económica y el crecimiento.

3. Ayuda, intervenciones y remesas de fondos pueden contribuir a reducir la migración no deseada pero la experiencia muestra que en realidad no es seguro que esa ayuda, intervenciones y remesas vayan a convencer a los migrantes de que permanezcan en sus lugares de origen. Una mejor utilización de las remesas para fomentar el desarrollo, remesas que en 1999 ascendieron a 65.000 millones de dólares EE.UU., frente a los 56.000 millones de dólares EE.UU. de la Ayuda Oficial al Desarrollo (AOD), constituye un prometedor sector de cooperación entre los migrantes y sus regiones de origen, así como entre países de emigración y de inmigración.

Las diferencias entre los países pueden reducirse de dos maneras: sólo migración en un mundo sin libre comercio o migración y comercio en una economía abierta. De todas formas, en ambos casos la migración terminará disminuyendo pero hay una diferencia importante entre que se reduzcan las presiones migratorias en una economía mundial cerrada o en una economía mundial abierta. Si es cerrada, las diferencias económicas pueden disminuir a medida que los salarios disminuyen en el país de inmigración, con lo cual es seguro que se suscitará una reacción contra los inmigrantes. En cambio, en una economía abierta las diferencias económicas pueden reducirse en el momento en que los salarios empiecen a aumentar más rápidamente en el país de emigración.

Entre los nuevos sectores de investigación y exploración de opciones políticas figuran: (1) cómo sincronizar la liberación del comercio, las inversiones y la integración económica de manera que se reduzca al mínimo la migración no deseada; (2) estrategias que permitan multiplicar el efecto creador de empleos de las remesas de fondos, utilizando en ciertos casos una ayuda equivalente a las remesas que se inviertan de formas que se creen empleos.