

Migration, Return, and Development: An Institutional Perspective

Henrik Olesen*

ABSTRACT

The development community has been rather reluctant in the past to integrate migration as a parameter for development policies, as often advocated by politicians and the migration community. The following analysis demonstrates that the position of development institutions on this matter has evolved, e.g., in the direction of increased interest among development practitioners to look at remittances as a tool for development. The article discusses the importance of brain drain and possibilities for using return migration as a brain gain. It introduces the concept “migration band” as an aggregate expression of Martin’s “migration hump” for individual countries. Furthermore, it suggests policy options for a foreign input policy mix to developing countries composed of foreign direct investment, trade liberalizations, aid, remittances, return migration, and improved governance.

INTRODUCTION

This paper has three overall objectives: (1) to describe the specific role of institutions in the policy development debate, regarding the issue of migration and development; (2) to describe which role *return migration* can play in the development of a country, together with the other parameters relevant for development – namely foreign direct investment (FDI), trade liberalization, aid,

* The author is a former development assistance practitioner representing UN/UNDP in Mauritania, Poland, Switzerland, and Ethiopia. From May 1993 to December 1996, he headed IGC (Inter-governmental Consultations on Asylum, Refugee and Migration Policies in Europe, North America, and Australia) when it actively promoted discussion of migration and development linkages.

migrants' remittances, and improved governance; and (3) to reflect on policy options available to the European Union (EU) in the area of migration and development.

To facilitate the general understanding of correlations, the term "migration band" is introduced as an aggregate expression of Martin's "migration hump" on the national level.

MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT

The "development community"

When development assistance began in the 1960s, large international funds were transferred to the former colonies, and national and international bureaucracies were created. This period also saw the creation of a new profession: development specialist. These bureaucracies and specialists became what are now known as the "development community". At the time, most believed that after a maximum of 30-40 years, the majority of developing countries would have reached acceptable levels of development for human existence.

Initially, ambitions were high and resources comparatively important. Now, 40 years later, there is a general acceptance of the fact that development assistance can be useful in attaining sustainable human development in Less Developed Countries (LDCs), but only if it is combined with other external inputs like FDI, trade liberalization, and improved governance (World Bank, 2002).

Like other "communities", the "development community" is conservative. It only reluctantly adopts new ideas, changes course, and agrees to work with other specialized communities like the "migration community". It has therefore taken a long time for the "development community" to accept that migration is an important parameter to be taken into consideration when planning development programmes in LDCs. How far this acceptance has come today will be described below.

The European background

Europe was an emigration region from 1880-1930, when 45 million Europeans moved overseas. During the turbulent period from 1930-1950, Europe changed and became an immigration region. Migration inflows from LDCs to Europe started in the late 1950s with its rapidly expanding economies and demand for imported labour. As "development creates migration" (Massey, 1998) the supply of labour easily came about through the economic transformations in LDCs with improvements in agricultural practices, consequent rural-urban migration, and rapidly developing education systems (Faini, 2001). This system worked

smoothly until 1973 when European economies went into recession because of the oil crisis. But once a migratory system has started, it is virtually impossible for democratic developed nations with respect for human rights and international law to stop it (Massey, 1998). The migration networks and links had been created, and important diasporas established, which exerted a migration pressure on Europe. As the immigration door was closed, immigrants used the available windows, namely family reunification, asylum applications, and illegal entry. Europe had no well-established immigration system to cope with this, therefore each country developed widely different policies to control inflows. These control mechanisms, while gradually synchronized and strengthened, never managed to have a major impact on the total number of non-Europeans arriving in Europe. This coincided with rapidly increasing unemployment, which consequently created drastically increased unemployment levels among immigrants, leading to higher public social costs for this group. This again caused political pressure to diminish the arrivals. Logically, if this could not happen through the closure of frontiers, one could contemplate to diminish the interest for emigration in the sending countries. One answer for many was: why not use development assistance to improve living conditions in sending countries and over time see less “pressure” on European borders? Thus, the linkage of the two words *migration* and *development*.

MIGRATION: AN ORPHAN ISSUE

After World War II, the winners decided to try to make a better and more just world based on international rules and regulations through the creation of the United Nations (UN) and its many affiliated agencies. Among these were the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for economic and monetary discussion and regulation. They also tried to create an instrument for trade and international exchange: The International Trade Organization (ITO). Its draft charter had three objectives: (1) to regulate the flow of merchandise; (2) to regulate the flow of services; and (3) to regulate the flow of international migrant workers.

The charter of ITO adopted in Havana, Cuba, in 1947, was never ratified by the United States because of US Senate opposition. Thus, the international community had to adopt *ad hoc* and partial solutions. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was established in 1948 as an international agreement supported by a small secretariat in Geneva. From 1948 to 1994 it had a major impact on the liberalization and regulation of international trade in merchandise. When the international community was ready to deal with trade in services it adopted the charter for the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Marrakech in 1994. Two of the original three themes were then given their own organization. The remaining one – migration – was mentioned in Marrakech and

was mainly supported by developing countries as a future goal to regulate international migration based on rules and regulations.

The Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) was created in 1951 and was renamed the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in 1989. The main objective of ICEM was operational. It has not played a major role in the international *regulation* or *management* of migration. Even to this day, IOM, in spite of a rather wide mandate, has had limited success in getting a large enough role in policy development in the migration area, despite the continued efforts of its leadership.

As such, migration as a policy development area is an orphan. But it has many stepfathers, stepmothers, aunts, and well wishers.

International institutions

One of the first times an international development institution looked into migration issues was in 1981. Sharon Stanton Russell, in her seminal article of 1986 (Stanton Russell, 1986), raised attention for the issue of remittances. But, only within the last 5 years, have development institutions like the World Bank, IMF, and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) started to look into how to create improved synergies between remittances and the other elements in the development equation (FDI, trade liberalization, aid, and improved governance). These attempts have mainly been directed toward Latin America by the IMF (Inter-American Foundation, 2001), the World Bank (Inter-American Foundation, 2001), and the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (Serrano, 2001; Teitelbaum and Stanton Russell, 1997).

International Organization for Migration (IOM)

Despite its limited financial and human resources, IOM works to remain centrally placed in all research and discussions on migration. One of the first references to the subject of migration and development was in 1964 when IOM (then ICEM) launched a recruitment effort to Latin America of highly skilled labour among immigrants under its Migration for Development programmes. The IOM journal *International Migration* has, over the years, become one of the most important and serious forums for migration and development discussions (IOM, 2001a). Recent joint exercises between IOM and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (1996), and IOM's participation in the conference of the Least Developed Countries in Brussels (IOM, 2001c), shows its willingness to aggressively pursue this topic (IOM, 2001d).

The African conference on brain drain organized jointly in 1998 with the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) in Dakar, was the first step

of the process to draw attention to this subject in Africa and take steps to reverse it (Ammassar and Black, 2001). Several useful initiatives for better understanding have been undertaken in terms of research, directly or indirectly supported by IOM (Ghosh, 2000a, 2000b; Arowolo, 2000), and its support to the establishment of regional consultative processes (IOM, 2001b). IOM would be well placed to undertake international consultations between “sending” and “receiving” countries if only the necessary resources and political mandate could be obtained. Its attempts in the Caucasus with the so-called Cluster process may be a useful beginning. The Cluster process includes consultations among a group of sending, transit, and receiving countries on how to best coordinate the information collection and management of international migration from a specific region.

World Trade Organization (WTO)

As mentioned above, WTO’s predecessor was supposed to deal with the regulation of labour migration. It was and is still too touchy an issue. The only hints of any interest within WTO on this subject are vague dispositions in the so-called General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). It will probably be a long time before – if ever – WTO assumes the regulatory role it exerts in merchandise and services to the area of general labour migration. However, according to Martin, “...it seems naïve to suggest that migration can continue to be excluded from trade negotiations” (Martin, 2000; Rodrik, 2002).

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)

Since 1991, OECD has been looking seriously at the subject of migration and development, and has been very much encouraged by Canada and the previous chairman of its Working Party on Migration, Demetrios Papademetriou. A first conference was held on the subject in Rome in 1991. A second one was held in Madrid in 1993, jointly organized by the OECD, Spain, and Canada. This was followed by regional conferences in Vienna (1996), Athens (1996), and Mexico (1998). This cycle of meetings ended with a conference in Lisbon in 1998 with a final document titled *Globalisation, Migration and Development* (OECD, 2000). Much useful research has been financed by this important exercise, and there is now increased knowledge about what works (Papademetriou, 2000). But the lack of interest *from* the development community in the process, and the lack of concrete policy proposals *to* the development community, emanating from this process, put limits on this otherwise very useful exercise.

The annual SOPEMI reports should also be mentioned as a continued valuable contribution to all studies on migration (OECD, 2001).

OECD has continued to pursue research on this topic, mainly carried out by economists and trade specialists, while the policy oriented development practitioners have mainly been absent from the debate (OECD, 2002). And, it

is typical of the lack of interest about this topic in the development community that the OECD DAC paper, “Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of the Development Community” (OECD, 1996), almost considered a bible by the development community, does not include any reference to migration and development or the results of this exercise.

World Bank

One of its first forays into migration issues was by Gurushri Swamy, “International Migrant Workers’ Remittances: Issues and Prospects” from August 1981, and Serageldin, et al., “Manpower and International Labour Migration in the Middle East and North Africa” from June 1981. The studies on remittances by Stanton Russell, Jacobsen, and Deane Stanley, titled “International Migration and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa” from 1990, and Stanton Russell and Teitelbaum’s 1992 “International Migration and International Trade”, both commissioned by the World Bank, saw for the first time a quantified and practical assessment of the importance of this previously neglected issue.¹ Recently the increased international attention to the importance of remittances has been reflected in the World Bank’s support of the 2001 conference in Washington together with UNECLAC and the Inter-American Foundation (Martin, 2001). With the report, “Globalization, Growth, and Poverty” (2002), the World Bank seems to have taken a decisive step in placing migration as a key parameter of globalization. It introduces the term “globalized country” and finds that GDP per capita growth is considerably higher in *more* globalized developing countries, with high emigration rates, compared to *less* globalized countries (Venturini, 2000). It thus implicitly urges its fellow development assistance institutions to concentrate more efforts on the migration-development nexus (see also Borjas, 1999). Research however is one thing, operations quite another. It does not appear clear whether the World Bank has as yet taken steps to include migration as a parameter in its decisions, programmes, and loan agreements.

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

Starting to show interest for the subject, the IMF commissioned the very interesting study on brain drain (Carrington, 1998) and a useful overview, *Development, Trade and Migration* (Faini, 2001). But the migration/development linkage does not yet seem important to the concerns of the IMF.

United Nations (UN)

UN Secretariat. With departments in research on population and economic and social development, the UN Secretariat would seem an obvious place for promoting a multidisciplinary discussion on a subject like migration and development. The Population Division stands out by its rigorous and solid population statistics and narrowly defined migration studies, but it has not

ventured into the politically charged topic of migration and development (Zlotnik, 1999). It has to a certain degree left this to the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), which enjoys somewhat more political freedom than the UN Secretariat. In a recent evaluation of the operational development activities of the UN, this issue could have been touched upon, but wasn't (UNDESA, 1999). Migration, however, was addressed indirectly, as the evaluation clearly indicates the need for the UN and other donors to rethink their own capacity building programmes. The UN Commission on Population and Development, set up after the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo, would seem to be the right place for a global consideration of the issue of migration and development links, but that has not taken place yet.

UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (UNECLAC). The Regional Economic Commission for Latin America has always been the first and foremost intellectual force among the five UN Regional Commissions. It has not only commissioned research, but also carried out pilot projects to measure the efficiency of the linkage between remittances and microcredit.²

UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). The only other UN Regional Commission involved in some interesting and forward-looking research on migration/development is UNECA. It sponsored a conference with IOM in Dakar, Senegal, on the brain drain (IOM/ECA/AAU, 1998). Although the conference did not bring much new knowledge forward it did stress the importance of discussing migration and development linkages in Africa.

UN Population Fund (UNFPA). This agency has long played the catalyst role in the discussion on migration in the UN. It has been done somewhat half-heartedly because UNFPA did not consider itself to have a mandate in this area. The leadership, however, felt obliged to do something on migration, as little was done elsewhere in the UN. This was seen during the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo (1994), which became a greater success than expected, largely thanks to UNFPA's dynamic support. The chapter on migration is rather comprehensive and detailed, and deals for the first time in a global conference with this issue (Shenstone, 1997). This was followed up five years later in the Technical Symposium on International Migration and Development in The Hague, Netherlands (UNECOSOC, 1999).

UN Development Programme (UNDP). *The Human Development Report*, which under the leadership of Mahboub Ul Haq put UNDP on the forefront in development thinking, dealt with migration in its 1992 report. It was postulated that opening up migration access to the North from the South would increase income for developing countries by US\$200 billion per year (UNDP, 1992).³ It is difficult to imagine adoption of such a major change in immigration policies, especially in Europe, in view of the prevailing strength of xenophobic attitudes in most EU countries. Apart from a fleeting reference to migration in *The Human*

Development Report 2001 (UNDP, 1999, 2001), UNDP as an organization does not seem to have seized the opportunity to place itself in the forefront on an issue many expect the development community will be compelled to seriously address in the future (UNDP, 1997).

UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The nomination of Rubens Ricupero as Secretary General has considerably sharpened UNCTAD's focus and increased respect for its work, not only among its traditional supporters in developing countries, but also in the international business community. Although migration is somewhat peripheral to UNCTAD's main concerns, it addressed this through its collaboration with IOM on *Foreign Direct Investment, Trade and Aid: An Alternative to Migration* (UNCTAD, 1996) and their collaboration on the same topic during the Third Conference on the Least Developed Countries in the Netherlands (UN, 2001). This opens perspectives for a substantial input to international discussions on the migration-development link, especially on linkages between FDI, trade, and migration.

UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). There is a clear understanding in UNHCR that the root causes of migration or refugee movements should be addressed. Now and then initiatives are taken in this respect, as in 1994 when a conference on migration and development was held in cooperation with IOM and the International Labour Organization (ILO). But the organization rightly points out that it is perhaps its role to attract attention, but that other more development-oriented organizations would be better placed to deal with it.

UN Research Institute on Social Development (UNRISD). UNRISD has at different stages of its history dealt with migration. The small size of the organization and its limited capacity does not seem to give it the necessary critical mass to play any important role on this topic (van Hear, 1994).

International Labour Organization (ILO)

ILO, with its strong research tradition, rules-based working methods, and very extensive global network through its tripartite structure (employers, employees, and governments) has for many years made a major contribution to the regulation of labour movements, including the treatment of migrant workers. One of the first attempts at linking migration and development in scientific terms was by ILO's W.R. Boehning and M.L. Shloter-Paredes (1994) in *Aid in Place of Migration* (Stalker, 1994). Since then, numerous articles and seminars touching on the migration/development link have been either organized by ILO or have had contributions from the organization (Abella, 1991, 1999; ILO, 1999).

Group of Eight Most Industrialized Countries (G8)

The G8 seems concerned mainly with the control aspects of migration, although there is a recognizable attempt on the part of the Canadian Government to

introduce the issue of migration more forcefully into this forum. Several OECD studies either originated from or were encouraged by the G8.

European Union (EU)

Migration into Europe has caused considerable difficulty for the collaboration between EU member countries (Niessen, 2001). Even if it became a community issue with the Maastricht Treaty, a coherent EU policy is far away (EU Commission, 2000; EU Council, 2000). This is even more so the case for Denmark with its reserve to the Treaty on Justice and Home Affairs (Kornoe, 1997, 2000). At the level of Heads of Government and Justice and Home Affairs Minister, there is a clear interest in looking into the linkage between migration and development. This was expressed at the Special Summit of the EU Council held in Tampere, Finland (EU Council, 1999a). The conclusion includes a clear understanding of the close link between migration to Europe and conditions prevailing in the migrants' countries of origin. It states, "The European Union needs a comprehensive approach to migration addressing political, human rights and development issues in countries and regions of origin and transit." To this end, the High Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration was created, and has selected six target countries for special EU attention (Afghanistan, Morocco, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Iraq, and Albania) (EU Council, 1999b). In the extension of the Lomé convention signed in Cotonou in 2001, chapter 13 deals extensively with relations between the ACP group of countries (Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific) and the EU, in terms of migration (EU, 2001). It is worth noting that the speech given by the EU Development Commissioner at the signature in Cotonou did not mention the migration issue. This seems to reflect a general aversion among development professionals in the EU to discuss the migration/development link in concrete terms and the possibilities for operationalizing research and knowledge into concrete action and financial agreements.

Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)

It seems that Latin America is one of the regions that has most extensively looked into the transformation of knowledge into action, in terms of using migrants' remittances. The UNECLAC has played a large role in this; the World Bank has also been involved; and IDB has ventured into this in a very public and aggressive way. Its president, Enrique Iglesias, made a forceful proposal in the *International Herald Tribune* (13 July 2001) to include remittances in the overall financial planning and development in Latin America. According to Iglesias, during the next decade, this region could expect US\$300 billion in remittances, almost quadrupling in size over the last decade. He invited other development institutions to look into how they could ensure that these important resources are used in an optimal way for the benefit not only of migrants and their families, but also of their countries as a whole (Iglesias, 2001).

Inter-governmental Consultations on Asylum, Refugee and Migration Policies in Europe, North America and Australia (IGC)

From 1993 to 1996, with encouragement from the Canadian Government, the organization attempted to deal seriously with the issue of migration and development (IGC, 1993, 1994; Olesen, 1995a, 1995b, 1995c, 1995d). As Shenstone points out, “the attempts ... to stimulate serious discussion of ‘root causes’, including development, were met with polite apathy....” (Shenstone, 1997). It has not been taken up later in IGC as it has since re-centred its focus on migration control.

GOVERNMENTS SHOWING SPECIFIC INTEREST

Canada

Canada has by far been the country promoting discussion of migration and development the most. This can be noted in its interventions in the UN (ICPD in Cairo, 1994), G8, OECD, ILO, IOM, and the creation of the Metropolis programme. Canada seems to have a clearer view of its attitude toward migration and as such can look beyond the narrow confines of the migration discussion generally undertaken in Europe (Shenstone, 1997; Samuel, 1998).

United Kingdom

While the UK is struggling with the immigration issue, the Department for International Development of the Foreign Office (DFID) is promoting and financing discussions on this. It is worth mentioning the support given to Project Brain Drain by the Sussex Migration Policy Institute (de Haan, 1999; McDowell and de Haan, 1997).

Sweden

By creating the post of State Secretary Responsible for Development Cooperation, Migration and Asylum Policy, Sweden has shown Europe a new way of dealing with migration issues. By recognizing that migration is mainly happening outside Sweden and not leaving these issues to the Ministry of the Interior (as is the case in most EU countries), Sweden opens possibilities for treating migration together with other international issues like development, trade, globalization, and so forth.

In 1999, Sweden hosted a conference titled, *International Migration, Development and Integration: Towards a Comprehensive Approach*. The conference was instrumental in focusing EU attention on this subject, and facilitated the adoption of the comparatively detailed work programme in this area at the EU Tampere Summit in 1999 (see also Papademetriou, 1999).

Sweden is pursuing its efforts to shape both its own policies and EU foreign policies. At the conference, *The External Action of the EU in an Era of Globalization* (4-5 Dec. 2001) in Stockholm, the issues of migration and return migration were touched on (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2001a and 2001b). The proceedings clearly stated the linkages between migration and development, although it did not reach the stage where it defined what should be done.

France

Based on diaspora experiences, France is encouraging the so-called co-development in its relations with certain regions and states in West Africa. Although the principle is interesting – to support local initiatives through the persons involved and especially the diaspora – it would seem that the modest means involved do not warrant large expectations in terms of diminished emigration and, even as suggested, important return migration (Weil, 1997). The word co-development is now increasingly present in EU documentation.

Research Institutions and Think Tanks

Some hubs for research on the of issue migration and development include:⁴ Sussex Migration Research Centre, Sussex; Migration Policy Institute, Washington DC; Comparative Immigration and Integration Program at the University of California at Davis; The Inter-University Committee on International Migration, Boston; Institute for the Study of International Migration, Georgetown University, Washington DC; Centre for Peace Action and Migration Research, Carleton University, Canada; and the Center for International and European Law on Immigration and Asylum, University of Konstanz, Germany.

The Current Trend

When comparing the current situation with the situation six to eight years ago (IGC, 1994; Widgren, 1994; Stoett, 1996), it is quite clear that this topic is given more attention than before. More organizations are involved, many more research papers are written, and more conferences are held. This, however, does not seem to have had much impact in terms of changed policies in the institutions concerned.

RETURN MIGRATION OR THE POTENTIAL FOR BRAIN GAIN

“Return migration is the great unwritten chapter in the history of migration”(Ghosh, 2000a).⁵

This section will look at the potential development effect of the return of highly skilled migrants to developing countries. It will, therefore, on purpose, exclude

categories of return migrants like rejected asylum seekers, short-term seasonal workers, most irregular migrants, and returning short-term refugees, even if these groups can contribute significantly to the development of their countries by bringing back human and social capital (categories from Ghosh et al., 2000a).

The magnitude of the brain drain

The term brain drain was first coined in the early 1960s after the first graduates of the newly independent developing countries started to leave their home country (Reichling, 2001). In Carrington and Detragiache's recent study, *How Big is the Brain Drain?* (1998), the authors show how serious it is when developing countries lose their best and brightest. Some of their findings include: the total brain drain from LDCs to OECD countries is an estimated stock figure of 12.9 million (7 million to the US and 5.9 million to the rest of OECD including Europe). In most developing countries, the migration rate is highest among university graduates. For Ghana, Egypt, and South Africa, 60 per cent of all migrants were graduates.

Out of 128,000 African migrants in the US in 1990, 95,000 were graduates. In many developing countries the loss of graduates to migration is 30 per cent, with some even higher. In Guyana more than 70 per cent of graduates are in the US; Iran has lost 25-34 per cent of its graduates; Ghana has lost 26-35 per cent; and so forth. The World Bank estimates that Africa lost one-third of its executives between 1960 and 1987 (Khan, 2001; Stalker, 1994).

Every year 23,000 graduates leave Africa, mainly for Europe, but also for North America (Khan, 2001). The number of foreign students in the US rose from 145,000 in 1970 to more than 450,000 in 1994. Half of all foreign students in the US indicated in a survey in 1987 that they did not intend to return home after completing their studies (Massey, 1998).

Some general statements from Carrington and Detragiache may facilitate the understanding of this phenomenon (1998):

“... a majority of LDC migrants have a secondary education.”

“... flows of migrants with primary education or less are small.”

“... migrants tend to be much better educated than the rest of the population...”

“The very well educated tend to be the most internationally mobile group.”

Brain gain's contribution to countries' development

Migration is rarely only one way. More often than not, the dream or conscious intention of a migrant is to return to the home country after a shorter or longer period of time abroad. Thirty per cent of the migrants who came to the US between 1908 and 1957 went home again (Ghosh, 2000a). The reasons for return

can be manifold. Cerase has established four categories of reasons: (a) *Return of failure*: migrants who could not find the job necessary to survive and send back remittances; (b) *Return of conservatism*: migrants who realized early on that they could not thrive in a different culture away from family and friends; (c) *Return of retirement*: many migrants, after earning enough money, want to retire comfortably in the home country; and (d) *Return of innovation*: the group most interesting to development practitioners (Cerese, 1974).

The term *return of innovation* was first coined in 1974, and is the equivalent of what we today call the brain gain. What can be done to promote return migration or brain gain? First, one needs to understand that the reasons for leaving have changed, and therefore the return incentives need to change as well. This can vary from improvement in living conditions (governance) in the home country to a positive change in income differential between emigration and immigration countries.

Bad governance

An element, which is not often mentioned in migration literature, is the role *bad governance* plays in the migration of highly skilled persons. When explaining reasons for migrating, all scholars agree that the equation is very complex and only on the aggregate level is it possible to see some linkages. While not fulfilling the criteria for refugee protection under the UN conventions, it seems clear that especially highly skilled people are very sensitive to the migration option when they find the human rights/governance situation in their home country unacceptable. This can have many forms: honest civil servants refusing to be corrupted; lack of freedom to speak one's mind, especially for civil servants; and promotions based on un-professional criteria. Governments are often pleased to see potential critics leave rather than having them as a source of local criticism. The proof of the bad governance argument is that when the human rights situation improves, return migration starts, regardless of the fact that the economic situation in the home country may be unchanged (Sethi, 1998).

There are numerous historic examples of this:

- Spain, after the death of Franco in 1975;
- Armenia, after 1990 and the collapse of the Soviet Union;
- Eritrea, after independence in 1991;
- Chile, after the departure of General Pinochet in 1991; and
- Most recently, Afghanistan after the departure of the Taliban regime.

Improved economic situation

One other cause of migration of highly skilled people is the income differential between the home country and a "richer" country. When this income differential becomes smaller the reason for the migratory move diminishes. Less people

want to leave and some want to return. Notable cases are South Korea in the 1970s, Taiwan, Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal (combined with improvements in governance), and Ireland.

How to profit from brain gain

As stated above the fact that remittances have very beneficial impacts on growth and economic development is slowly gaining ground among development practitioners and much operational research is now undertaken.

But the fact that return migration can bring a similarly important contribution to LDCs is less recognized. It appears that the maximum benefit to the sending country is obtained when highly skilled migrants leave for relatively short periods of 10-15 years, remit while they are away, and return with financial and human and social capital. It happens all the time, and passes unrecognized, but could be promoted more strongly through various mechanisms.

Return migration has many variants. King (in Ghosh, 2000a) mentions four: occasional returns, seasonal returns, temporary returns, and permanent returns. All can be beneficial to the home country. In the literature on transnational practices this is well described (Nyberg-Sørensen, 2002; Oestergaard-Nielsen, 2001). Many governments in LDCs understand the importance of the brain drain. But on one hand, they depend to a large degree on remittances of their migrants abroad; on the other hand, they need the skills of many of these migrants for their national development. Many countries would not be able to cope without remittances, but to try to attract a small portion of migrants back may be the best of all worlds. They continue to receive remittances, but they benefit from some of those who want to return. Abella of ILO (1991) made a rough estimate for five Asian labour-sending countries. He concluded that it would require US\$55 billion in capital inflows to maintain the same level of income as before if labour migration stopped. In 1989 FDI to these countries was US\$4.2 billion (Teitelbaum and Stanton Russell, 1997).

Since 1960 the policy of attracting some migrants back home has been tried by diverse countries such as, Columbia, Ghana, India, Iraq, Pakistan, Philippines, South Korea, Sri Lanka, and Turkey (Ghosh, 2000a). One interesting example cited by Ghosh (2000a) is South Korea, which in 1980 sent a talent search mission to 21 cities in the US and Japan. This led 400 specialists, mostly in science and technology, to pledge to go back for longer or shorter periods of time.

Several international organizations have tried to set up programmes to facilitate the brain gain. Ghosh (2000a) gives a comprehensive description of programmes called Assisted Return for Development. This has been tried by IOM (by far the longest tradition and experience), often funded by the EU, UNDP (the Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) programme), and

bilateral programmes from Germany and France. There are many examples like these, but as yet there is no comprehensive system for receiving countries to use this pool of goodwill from expatriate nationals in a systematic way.

There are many potential cases where large return migration could be expected if the governance situation would change: Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, Algeria, Sudan, and most of Africa. However, that may not be for the immediate future.

How to promote brain gain in the international community

In the early years of Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) and FDI, the personnel component was important. The number of expatriates, experts, and others was considerable from the 1960s to the late 1980s. Most developing countries have since achieved tremendous success in educating highly skilled personnel needed for the development of their countries. Unfortunately, many of them are living abroad for various reasons, including better wages, easier lives, and apprehension about the governance situation in their homeland. Technical assistance (TA) or capacity development is estimated to cost US\$14 billion out of total Development Assistance of \$54 billion (UNDESA, 1999; OECD, 2001). In a recent report to the Earth Summit in South Africa, Chris Buckley claimed that 100,000 expatriates are employed in Africa at a cost of US\$4 billion or 35 per cent of Development Assistance to the continent. There is no doubt that a part of those could be replaced by well-planned return migration. The option is to hire a European expert for a development job in, say Mozambique, or hiring an equally qualified Mozambican from the diaspora living in Europe for the same job. The cost for the Mozambican would probably be lower in the medium term and the efficiency much higher (UNDESA, 1999).

A few development agencies have dared to lead the way. When the World Bank recruited TA staff for Palestine some years ago, they insisted on recruiting expatriate Palestinians. When the Aga Khan Foundation recently recruited staff for Afghanistan, they were looking for expatriate Afghans. If this could become the rule, development assistance could reallocate resources and set in motion a return migration more efficient than any foreign intervention.

Through peer pressure in OECD and DAC, developed countries are trying to diminish tied aid, that is, aid tied in one or the other to procurement from the donor country in question. The last item to untie is the provision of human resources, although this has started to happen.

MIGRATION HUMP AND MIGRATION BAND

For rapid economic and social development to happen in LDCs, and as a consequence cause less migration over the medium term, the policy mix and

synergy among elements must be right (US Commission, 1990). The relevant external parameters are:

- Foreign direct investment. In 2000 around \$208 billion to developing countries (UNCTAD, 2000).
- Trade liberalizations (difficult to quantify).
- Development assistance (ODA). \$54 billion in 2001 (OECD, 2001).
- Remittances. In recent years, development practitioners have realized that migrant workers' remittances also play a major role (the part going through official channels alone is estimated at >\$65 billion to developing countries per year, more than the \$54 billion of ODA) (Faini, 2001).
- Return migration (brain gain). The recognition that reverse brain drain can be an important factor as well is rather new, although it is not easily quantifiable.
- Governance. If the other five parameters are not combined with tangible improvements in governance in the country in question, most sustainable human development efforts are in vain.

Migration hump

In 1994, Martin introduced the term “migration hump” (Martin, 1994). When economic and social development improves rapidly in a developing country through a successful combination of internal policies and the above-mentioned factors, international migration increases. Massey says: “... international migrants do not come from poor, isolated places that are disconnected from world markets, but from regions and nations that are undergoing rapid change and development as a result of their incorporation into global trade, information, and production networks. In the short run, *international migration does not stem from a lack of economic development, but from development itself.*” (Massey, 1998: 277, added italics; Martin and Olmstead, 1985; Martin, 1993).

Most researchers credit this with successful improvements in agricultural productivity, pushing surplus labour toward urban areas, from where a portion of the population acquires the means to emigrate (Massey, 1998).

Population growth also plays an important role. The situation in Europe in the nineteenth century, with the doubling of its population and the ensuing important emigration (48 million left Europe for overseas from 1800 to 1925) (Massey, 1998), seems to be repeated in LDCs since the 1960s (World Bank, 2002).⁶ This process, “the migration hump”, only stops when the advantage of migrating is too small in terms of income differential between traditional pairs of sending and receiving countries. It is quite obvious that income differential does not need to disappear completely for migration to stop. It is often unpleasant to be a migrant: absence from loved ones, familiar culture, climate, and religion, combined with the usual conditions for migrant labour, namely racial, ethnic, and other forms of

discrimination, and xenophobic attitudes in receiving countries all add to the disadvantages of migration.

In simple terms, the question is, at which level of economic development can sufficient numbers afford to migrate? And conversely, at which stage of economic development does it become less attractive to migrate?

Looking at statistics of GDP/capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms and migration figures, the migration hump seems to have some critical values (World Bank, 2002; IOM, 2001d; Abella, 1999): Where does the hump begin and when it does it end?

Migration band

From the poorest countries (US\$ 0-1,500/capita in PPP terms) we see few migration movements, and if any, it is mostly refugee movements. From middle-income countries (US\$ 1,500-8,000/capita in PPP terms), we see large migration movements. From richer countries (>\$8000/capita in PPP terms) we see fewer movements. Faini and Venturini put the upper limit at \$4000/capita in 1985 prices (Faini and Venturini, 1993, 1994).

One could perhaps use the term “migration band” for the countries of large emigration (in the income bracket \$1,500-8,000/cap. PPP) (Olesen, 1995b). Below you are too poor to move and above you are rich enough not to desperately need to move, except for the small percentage of people who become migrants, regardless of income.

A potential refinement in the upper limit of the *migration band* seems to be that, when the difference in income differential between traditional sending and receiving countries reaches approximately 1:3, migration stops or diminishes radically (Mamadou, 1995). Different values can be found with Martin (1994) 1:4, and Faini and Venturini (1994) 1:4.5 (see also Dustman, 2001).

The term *migration band* is only a gross generalization of a phenomenon and reflects more an attempt to pedagogically present a paradox in simple terms, rather than scientifically proving a relationship. Going through the World Bank’s list of 207 countries, however, reflects rather adequately the situation as of today (World Bank, 2002).

From a policy perspective the following conclusions can therefore be drawn:

- Successful economic and social development depends on an optimal combination of FDI, trade liberalization, aid, remittances, return migration, and improvements in governance (Bonaglia, Braga de Macedo, and Bussolo, 2001; Djajic, 2001; Faini, de Melo, and Zimmerman, 1999; Taylor, 1999).

- Development doctrine today puts emphasis on assistance to the poorest countries. If the external inputs for development as mentioned above coincide with improved governance – including peace – there is every reason to believe the country will enter the “economic take-off phase” reflected by higher growth rates. This is the same moment where emigration kicks off. Increased emigration is, therefore, an externality of successful economic development. This is the beginning of the migration hump. Over a few years the country moves into the migration band with approximately \$1,500/capita in PPP terms. For the foreseeable future the poorest countries will either, as today, continue producing refugees, or if peace and better governance prevails, the external input package is right, and economic development accelerates, start producing migrants.

As it is inconceivable to imagine that the development package to the poorest countries will diminish (and it would be highly immoral to do so for fear of increasing migration), receiving countries must address this issue seriously. One can only imagine that this can happen in a dialogue between the two parties – the rich and the poor countries. Just closing borders in receiving countries is not an option, as all evidence proves (Massey, 1998).

- When the development combination is applied to countries finding themselves in the migration band (\$1,500 PPP-\$8,000 PPP), the diminished propensity to emigrate will eventually be the consequence. The crucial questions are: *how* to find the right balance inside the external input combination, and *when* the country will reach the end of the migration band. Martin’s comment on Mexico, “the migration hump associated with gradual economic integration may be coming into view” (knowing that Mexico is at \$8,810/capita PPP) seems to confirm this (Martin, 2000).
- Persons wanting to emigrate from countries above the migration band (>\$8,000/capita PPP) will follow the already well-established rules for international migration like visas, work permits, and so forth, but the movements are not much impeded.

CONCLUSION

If the theories of migration hump and migration band are applied to the six countries selected by the EU-HLWG for special attention (Afghanistan, Albania, Iraq, Morocco, Somalia, and Sri Lanka), a new picture appears. The current action plans elaborated for the HLWG are descriptive and do not attempt to look at the whole external input to the countries as mentioned above. Nor do they address the issue of how decreased migration should come about thanks to the application of these external measures. For each of the six countries, the current situation should be established in terms of the six elements and proposals

to increase or change each of them, and the possibilities for synergy among them. Furthermore, the issue of migration should become a parameter in decisions relevant for the economic and social development in each country under consideration. The policy consequences for external inputs to developing countries would thus be reasonably clear.

An increase of the foreign input mix (FDI, trade liberalization, aid, remittances, return migration, and improved governance) would have opposite effects in different groups of countries. To Somalia, Burkina Faso, Uganda, and Mozambique, it would increase migration in the medium term. It would probably also decrease outflow of refugees, if any.

To increase the same foreign input mix to Morocco, Turkey, Viet Nam, and Albania would in the medium term bring these countries out of the migration band and thus decrease mass international migration. Remittances would play an important part in this. An optimal solution for developing countries would be to continue to export highly skilled migrants for shorter periods and thus get remittances while planning/hoping for a certain return migration (brain gain) as this will be needed in the further development of these countries. Foreign aid and FDI could promote this vigorously by recruiting staff among the diaspora for deployment for longer or shorter periods in sending countries, on internationally competitive conditions of course.

Then, econometric scenarios could be developed on the prospective 10-20 years in terms of the relevant parameters. Only by looking from the macro perspective, can long-term solutions be found. The question can be asked, can sufficient political support be found to ensure the preconditions for rapid economic and social development, and the consequent decrease in migration in the medium and long term? These preconditions are:

- Vastly improved trading access to markets in the North;
- Vastly increased aid;
- Better utilization of remittances; and
- Consequently, increased foreign direct investment.

In other words, is immigration considered such a big problem in the North (by the population and politicians alike), that the North is willing to spend the enormous resources necessary to diminish it in the medium to long term?

NOTES

1. Interesting studies related in various ways to migration are Schiff (1994, 1996, and 1999), and Solimano (2001).

2. For description of this in detail, see Serrano (2001).
3. For a recent return to this idea see Rodrik (2002).
4. The list below is by no means exhaustive.
5. For a more elaborate and thorough review of linkages between migration, return, and development, see Ammassar and Black (2001).
6. For questions to the causality of the linkage between population growth and migration see Kritiz and Zlotnik (1992).

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MIGRATION, RETOUR ET DEVELOPPEMENT : POINT DE VUE INSTITUTIONNEL

S'agissant, comme l'ont souvent prôné les politiciens et le milieu des migrations, de considérer celles-ci comme une composante à part entière des politiques de développement, les milieux du développement se sont montrés par le passé plutôt réticents. L'analyse proposée ici des positions correspondantes des organismes de développement conclut à une évolution se manifestant notamment par un intérêt accru de la part des praticiens du développement pour les envois d'argent en tant que facteur de développement. L'auteur s'interroge par ailleurs sur l'importance de l'exode des cerveaux et sur les possibilités d'exploitation des compétences des migrants de retour. Il propose un nouveau concept, la « tranche migratoire », inspirée de la notion de « crête migratoire » appliquée par Martin aux pays considérés séparément. Il suggère en outre un panachage de diverses options politiques à l'intention des pays en développement, comprenant investissements directs étrangers, libéralisation du commerce, aide, envois d'argent, retour des migrants et amélioration de la gestion publique.

MIGRACIÓN, RETORNO Y DESARROLLO: UNA PERSPECTIVA INSTITUCIONAL

Hasta ahora, la comunidad interesada por el desarrollo se ha resistido a integrar la migración como parámetro de las políticas de desarrollo, idea que con frecuencia han defendido tanto políticos como miembros de la comunidad interesada por las migraciones. El siguiente análisis demuestra cómo ha evolucionado a este respecto la posición de las instituciones de desarrollo, por ejemplo al haber aumentado el interés de los agentes de desarrollo por ocuparse de las remesas de fondos como instrumento para el desarrollo. El artículo se ocupa de la importancia que tiene la pérdida de personal capacitado y las posibilidades de utilizar la migración de retorno como ganancia de calificaciones. Introduce el concepto de la “banda de migración” como expresión de conjunto del concepto de “alza de migración” de Martin referido a países individuales. Además propone diversas opciones políticas para que países en desarrollo puedan aprovechar un conjunto de aportaciones políticas exteriores constituido por inversiones directas extrajeras, liberalizaciones comerciales, ayuda, remesas, migración de retorno y mejor gobernanza.