JAPAN'S RESPONSE TO TERROR

Dispatching the SDF to the Arabian Sea

Paul Midford

Abstract

This paper asks why it was much easier for Japan to dispatch its military overseas after 9–11 than it had been during the 1990 Gulf crisis, when similar plans failed due to overwhelming opposition. While several factors in Japanese domestic politics, including the astronomical popularity and hawkishness of Prime Minister Koizumi, played an important role, a significant reduction in Asian *gaiatsu* on Japan to not send its military overseas played a bigger role. This reduction in Asian *gaiatsu* resulted from Japan's decade-long effort to build up a reassuring track record of benign overseas deployments for non-combat missions. While Japan must continue to pursue historical reassurance regarding its Pacific War role, the demonstration effect of continued benign overseas deployments is likely to be of greater importance for encouraging Asian acceptance of a larger Japanese military role.

History rarely repeats itself. Nonetheless, one can hardly fault Japanese leaders, in the days after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, for getting that déjà vu feeling all over again. And not only because the president sitting in the White House this time was also named Bush. Although in many ways different, the situation facing Japan following the September 11 attacks displayed striking similari-

Paul Midford is Associate Professor in the Department of Public Policy, Kwansei Gakuin University, Sanda, Japan. The author would like to thank Lauren Frese and Won Jun Lee for invaluable research assistance, and Lafayette College for research funding. He would also like to thank Ma Xiaohua and the members of the G-13 Study Group, including Verena Blechinger, Noguchi Kazuhiko, Toya Minae, Wada Shuichi, as well as an anonymous reviewer, for insightful comments. Email: <midfordp@ksc.kwansei.ac.jp>.

Asian Survey, 43:2, pp. 329–351. ISSN: 0004–4687
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ties to the Gulf crisis of 11 years earlier. So it is perhaps not surprising that Japanese leaders defined the meaning of the crisis, and even more important, an appropriate Japanese response, in much the same way as before. For those leaders who were embarrassed by Japan's performance in the Gulf War, here was an opportunity to make up for the past.

Despite important differences, both crises emanated from the Middle East and provoked the U.S. to seek a global coalition for the sake of supporting combat operations there. Both crises produced American requests for assistance. More striking was the similarity of the policy responses crafted by the Japanese government. In both crises, the government planned to provide financial assistance to the U.S., to assist local parties victimized by the conflict, to dispatch Air Self-Defense Forces (ASDF) transport planes to support humanitarian relief efforts, and most important, to dispatch the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) for non-combat support operations for the U.S.-led coalition. So whereas the two crises were merely *somewhat* similar, the policy responses crafted by the Japanese government were in fact *remarkably* similar (although not entirely identical, as discussed below).

The key difference in Japan's response to two crises is that while the plans of the bureaucracy and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) were strikingly similar, their respective ability to bring these plans to fruition varied markedly. The puzzle this article addresses is this: given Japan's failure to smoothly dispatch the SDF to the Middle Eastern region to provide non-combat support for a U.S.-led multilateral military operation in 1990, how was it able to do so with such relative ease, in 2001? Diverse factors such as American pressure, the sense of shame many policymakers felt about Japan's "checkbook diplomacy" in the Gulf War, the legislative position of the LDP, and the popularity of Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro were undoubtedly important. Nonetheless, this article focuses on a less-appreciated factor and result: the demonstration effect of Japan's move to send the SDF overseas to participate in non-combat "humanitarian" operations in the 1990s—often within a U.N. framework—combined with Japan's promotion of, and active participation in, regional security dialogues, has reassured Asian nations and Japan's own public. The reassurance effect of these earlier deployments eased the way for the dispatch of MSDF (Maritime Self-Defense Force) destroyers to the Arabian Sea after September 11.

Japan's Post 9–11 Response

While Japan reacted with shock to the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and to the loss of more than 20 of its nationals in the Twin Towers, the Tokyo government immediately focused on the implications of the attacks for Japanese security and the U.S.-Japan alliance. Setting up an emergency task force in the prime minister's office within 45

minutes of the attacks, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro quickly decided upon a series of responses. Japan contributed $10 million directly to victims' families, and another $10 million to rescue and cleanup efforts in the United States. Emergency economic aid was earmarked for Pakistan and India, in an effort to ensure their cooperation in the looming war on terrorism.[1] Koizumi announced a plan to amend the Self-Defense Forces Law to authorize the SDF to defend U.S. bases in Japan against any unexpected terrorist attacks. The law had previously only permitted SDF involvement after an attack on a U.S. base had begun, and only when the police could not handle the situation. Finally, Koizumi ordered the dispatch of six ASDF transport aircraft to deliver relief supplies to Afghan refugees in Pakistan.[2]

The centerpiece of Koizumi's response to 9–11 was the decision to dispatch the SDF, notably ships of the MSDF, to the Arabian Sea to provide rear-area logistical support for U.S. military operations against al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Dispatch of the SDF had also been the major provision of the United Nations Peace Cooperation Corps (UNPCC) bill, which was debated, but ultimately discarded, in fall 1990. The UNPCC bill differed from the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures bill that Koizumi proposed in that the former did not permit logistical support for combat operations. Rather, it envisaged the withdrawal of the SDF should fighting break out.[3] In this sense, the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures bill represented a half-precedent, because it extended the definition of permissible non-combat operations for the SDF. The bill was enacted into law in October 2001.

However, we should not exaggerate the size of this precedent, as the 1999 Surrounding Areas Emergency Measures Law permitted Japan to provide

1. See "Statement by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi at the Press Conference," September 12, 2001, at <http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2001/0912kaiken_e.html>; Tomohito Shinoda, "Japan's Response to Terrorism," paper presented at "Japan Sets Out: Japan's Role in the Fight Against Terrorism," October 16, 2001 workshop, Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars, p. 1, available at <http://wwics.si.edu/asia/reports/2001/jpnterr.htm>. Also see David Leheny, "Tokyo Confronts Terror," *Policy Review*, no. 110 (December 2001/January 2002), at <http://www.policyreview.org/DEC01/leheny.html>; and Go Ito, "Redefining Security Roles: Japan's Response to the September 11 Terrorism," *Journal of East Asian Studies* 2:1 (2002), pp. 285–305. For a pre-September 11 view of U.S.-Japan counterterrorism cooperation, see Michael Green, *Terrorism Prevention and Preparedness: New Approaches to U.S.-Japan Security Cooperation* (New York: Japan Society, 2001).

2. Shinoda, "Japan's Response to Terrorism," p. 3; Ito, "Redefining Security Roles," p. 297; and Hideki Uemura, *Jieitai wa Dare no Monoka?* [To whom do the self defense forces belong?] (Tokyo: Kodansha, 2002), pp. 195–206.

3. L. William Heinrich, Jr., *Seeking an Honored Place: The Japanese Self-Defense Forces and the Use of Armed Force Abroad* (Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, Columbia University, 1997), pp. 160–79. More generally, see Takashi Inoguchi, "Japan's Response to the Gulf Crisis: An Analytic Overview," *Journal of Japanese Studies* 17:2 (1991), pp. 257–73.

non-combat logistical support to U.S. forces in areas "surrounding" Japan. Since "surrounding areas" was defined situationally rather than geographically (thereby avoiding the thorny question of whether this included Taiwan), the Indian Ocean could theoretically be included. Indeed, the Japanese Defense Agency initially proposed that the Koizumi cabinet extend this law to apply to the Arabian Sea and Southwest Asia, instead of passing new legislation.[4] However, because the late Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo, during Diet debate on the Surrounding Areas bill, had excluded the Indian Ocean, and because that law did not allow for cooperation with any country other than the United States, the Foreign Ministry view that new legislation was needed eventually prevailed. Because logistical support for the U.S. military would involve the presence of Japanese SDF members on the British island territory of Diego Garcia, and potentially that of other countries such as Pakistan, the need for a bill permitting cooperation with nations besides the U.S. appeared particularly pressing.[5]

Although it permits non-combat logistical support of combat operations, the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures law nonetheless substantially limits this support. First, the bill limits support to areas far removed from actual combat. Second, it forbade the SDF from supplying weapons and ammunition, from transporting weapons and ammunition on foreign territory, and from fueling or performing maintenance on aircraft preparing for combat missions.[6] In other words, the SDF is allowed to supply fuel and other material, excepting weapons and ammunition, and may transport supplies, including weapons and ammunition on the high seas and in international air space. In practice, however, the SDF has avoided transporting weapons or ammunition for the U.S.; items such as blankets and tents have been the primary cargo carried by the Japanese military.[7]

Like earlier laws covering Japan's participation in U.N. peacekeeping and emergency situations surrounding Japan, the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures law permits SDF members to fire their weapons only in self-defense. However, the definition of self-defense is expanded from previous precedents to include not only SDF members, but also others accompanying them or those who have come under their control in the course of conducting duties. The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures law is limited in applicability to U.S.

4. Shuichi Wada, "Tero Taisaku Tokubetsu Sochi hou wo meguru Seiji Katei" [The political process surrounding the anti-terrorism special measures act], in *Kaikakusha* [Reformer] (January 2002), p. 32.

5. Ibid. Also based on the author's interview with an MSDF officer, January 17, 2002.

6. See Part 4, section 2, subsection iii of "The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law." For the full text, see <http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/2001/anti-terrorism/1029terohougaiyou_e.html>.

7. Based on the author's interview with an MSDF officer, Tokyo, January 17, 2002.

military actions taken in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, and to two years from the time of enactment in October 2001 (i.e., till October 2003), with one two-year extension permitted if approved by the Diet. Diet approval is also required when the SDF is dispatched for a discrete mission covered by the ambit of the law. The prime minister must seek Diet approval within 20 days after a dispatch, or at the next scheduled Diet session, if the Diet is adjourned.[8]

Introduced in early October 2001, the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures bill was swiftly debated and enacted into law on October 29. The main points of contention in the debate concerned attempts by the opposition Democratic Party of Japan to forbid the SDF from transporting weapons or ammunition under any circumstances, and to require Diet approval *before* dispatching SDF personnel. The ruling coalition negotiated over these demands, but ultimately chose not to compromise at all.[9] However, as noted above, the Koizumi cabinet bowed to the position of the Democrats by not allowing the transportation of weapons or ammunition *in actuality.* These controversies not withstanding, the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures law stands out for the swiftness with which it was enacted. In Japan, laws of any kind are rarely enacted in less than a month. In the case of bills covering sensitive military and constitutional issues, such rapid passage is unprecedented.[10] This returns us to the main puzzle of this article, namely, how and why was it so easy for Prime Minister Koizumi to turn the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures bill into law? Moreover, how can we explain the almost immediate dispatch of the SDF to the Arabian Sea following the law's enactment?

American Gaiatsu *and a Tale of Two Crises*

Although American *gaiatsu* [foreign pressure] on Japan for support in both crises has been widely cited as an important factor contributing to the desire of the Japanese government to dispatch troops,[11] a closer look reveals that American pressure in the wake of September 11 was actually much weaker than it had been 11 years earlier. Substantial changes in the international

8. "The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law," at <http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/2001/anti-terrorism/1029terohougaiyou_e.html> This law would not apply to a U.S. attack on Iraq. See *Asahi Shimbun*, August 25, 2002.

9. Wada, "Tero Taisaku," p. 33.

10. While the Anti-Terrorism Law was enacted with a mere 62 hours of debate, the U.S.-Japan revised security guidelines legislation (e.g., the Surrounding Areas Emergency Measures Law) took 154 hours of debate to enact, and the 1992 Peacekeeping Law required 179 hours. See Go, "Redefining Security Roles," p. 296.

11. See, for example, Ito, "Redefining Security Roles."

positions of the two countries during the intervening decade reduced the American demand for Japanese support.

In 1990, because of American fiscal and economic woes, "burden-sharing" was a high priority in Washington. The United States was heading into a recession and the federal government was bumping along from shutdown to shutdown, as deficit-spending ceilings were continually breached. Highly salient bilateral trade frictions would have made Japan a prime target for retaliation, if it had abstained from supporting the U.S. war effort. Indeed, in September 1990, the House of Representatives voted 370 to 53 to start withdrawing troops from Japan unless Tokyo increased its "burden-sharing" contributions to the U.S.-Japan alliance. Congressional action was a reflection of popular sentiment; 70% of American poll respondents said Japan was not providing satisfactory support for the Gulf War effort.[12] Japan, still at the peak of its "bubble economy," appeared, in the words of one Washington commentator, to be economically "flush."[13] Bubble envy, as later exemplified by Michael Crichton's novel *Rising Sun*, was rife, as was resentment about Japan's perceived free ride in defense.

These factors pointed toward U.S. pressure for a large financial contribution from Japan. Beyond that, there was a sense in Washington that Japan should share in the risk and toil by making a human contribution as well. One factor driving this desire was the belief that the U.S. would suffer several thousand battle deaths in a war against Iraq,[14] and that a failure by Japan to make any personnel contribution might provoke a wave of resentment in the U.S. that would put the alliance at risk. For all these reasons, Japanese officials were made to understand that a Japanese failure to contribute would have grave consequences for the alliance. As a top Japanese diplomat warned early in the crisis, "The gap between what the Americans want and what the Japanese are willing to do is simply enormous."[15]

By 2001, this enormous gap seemed to have largely closed, primarily because U.S. expectations about a post-September 11 Japanese contribution to U.S. military operations had greatly diminished. There was nothing in the way of overt congressional pressure on Japan, as was the case in 1990. Although the Bush administration expected Tokyo to support rhetorically its

12. R. W. Apple, "Bonn and Tokyo Are Criticized for Not Bearing More of Gulf Cost," *New York Times*, September 13, 1990.

13. Hobart Rowen, "Japan, Germany Owe Hard Cash to Gulf Effort," *Washington Post*, September 30, 1990, p. H1.

14. See Stephen Van Evera, *Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), p. 31; and Joel Achenbach, "The Experts, in Retreat: After-the-Fact Explanations for the Gloomy Predictions," *Washington Post*, February 28, 1991, p. D1.

15. The diplomat was Tamba Minoru. See T. R. Reid and John Burgess, "U.S. Critics Not Satisfied with Japan's $4 Billion Gulf Contribution," *Washington Post*, October 6, 1990, p. A24.

crusade against international terrorism, and to provide extensive policing and intelligence support, expectations for a military contribution were relatively modest. Although Washington had assembled a broad coalition of diverse military forces against Iraq in 1990, it has been much keener to "go it alone" in post-September 11 military operations.

This unilateral impulse also reflects very different beliefs about the nature of the battle and the role of potential allied contributions. Massive casualties had been anticipated in the Gulf War; such expectations were largely absent in the war against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Although President George W. Bush warned that there would be American casualties in Afghanistan, this comment appears to be have been motivated by an implied comparison to the war in Kosovo, where there were no U.S. battle deaths. Moreover, there has been a perception in Washington that U.S. military capabilities are now so far beyond those of even allied nations, that allied contributions are of diminished importance. In this environment, it is not surprising that the U.S. has chosen to limit allied contributions in order to maximize unilateral flexibility.

Consequently, all allied contributions, with the partial exception of those provided by America's closest ally, Britain, have been limited to mostly non-essential areas. Arguably, the MSDF's non-combat logistical support role in the Arabian Sea is being seen as less important to Washington in this war than was a promised non-combat logistical SDF role during Operation Desert Shield. Perhaps it is therefore not surprising that during a press conference in February 2002 highlighting the contributions of U.S. allies to the war on terrorism, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld forgot to mention Japan's deployment of naval vessels to the Arabian Sea.[16]

More generally, the emergence of fiscal surpluses in the late 1990s and the perception of an American economic renaissance, combined with Japan's "lost decade" of economic stagnation, soaring public debt, and the lack of any significant trade disputes, drastically reduced the expectation that Tokyo could find itself targeted for American retaliation if it sat out the post-September 11 campaign. To be sure, there have been reported American requests to Japan to participate. The best known was a remark attributed to Assistant Secretary of State Richard Armitage that Japan should "show the flag" by sending its military to the Middle East. Although Armitage had earlier stated his personal preference for Japan playing a larger military role in alliance with the U.S., there is first-hand evidence that the "show the flag" remark—allegedly made during a meeting with a Japanese diplomat—was in fact manufactured by the Foreign Ministry.[17] In other words, this may have

16. Pauline Jelinek, "Pentagon Praises Japan after Blunder," Associated Press, as carried by *Washington Post*, March 1, 2002.

17. See *Shukan Bunshun* [Weekly Literary Spring], Tokyo, December 6, 2001, pp. 26–30. A Japanese diplomat who was present at the meeting where Armitage allegedly made the "show the

been a case of "manufactured *gaiatsu*," a time-honored practice whereby the Japanese government requests foreign pressure in order to give it an excuse to do what it wants to do anyway.

This does not appear to have been the only case of "manufactured *gaiatsu*." Just after the September 11 attacks, MSDF officers reportedly approached American naval officers to request American *gaiatsu* for dispatching MSDF ships to the Arabian Sea. Japanese naval officers presented the commander of U.S. Naval Forces in Japan with a list of five measures they were prepared to provide, including the escort of U.S. battle fleets to the Indian Ocean, intelligence gathering, and other support for U.S. ships on the open seas. At approximately the same time, a document advocating similar measures was distributed to the defense lobby (*bouei zoku*) in the Diet, with instructions to lobby high-ranking officials in the U.S. State Department and National Security Council. Again, in April 2002, MSDF officers visited a top U.S. naval officer to request U.S. pressure on Japan to dispatch advanced air-defense Aegis destroyers and P3C anti-submarine patrol aircraft to the Indian Ocean. The U.S. side subsequently obliged by requesting such an action, although Japan's political leadership turned down the request.[18] This evidence of "manufactured *gaiatsu*," combined with the Pentagon's forgetfulness about thanking Japan, suggests that Japan's contribution was not a high priority for American officials.

Domestic Factors: Coalitions, Leadership, and Shame

Thus, America's improved economic and fiscal state (at least before 9–11), and growing penchant for unilateralism, combined with Japan's prolonged economic stagnation and the absence of notable trade disputes, suggests that American pressure was not a very important factor in Japan's decision to dispatch the MSDF. If this was the case, could domestic factors better explain the ease with which Japan was able to dispatch its forces, in sharp contrast to 11 years previously?

A shift in the balance of power in the Diet would seem to offer the best proximate reason for the government's ability to enact the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law authorizing, among other things, the dispatch of the MSDF to the Arabian Sea. In 1990, the ruling LDP did not enjoy a majority in the House of Councilors, the upper chamber in Japan's bicameral legisla-

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flag" remark told the author he does not recall such a comment by Armitage nor does he remember seeing it in the initial meeting transcript. Interview of August 6, 2002, Tokyo.

18. See *Asahi Shimbun*, May 6 and July 4, 2002; Yoshitaka Sasaki, "Prod from Japan Raises Eyebrows in Tokyo," *International Herald Tribune* (hereafter IHT)/*Asahi Shimbun*, May 6, 2002; and "MSDF Lobbied for U.S. Aegis Request," *IHT/Asahi Shimbun*, May 7, 2002. For an official denial by the Director of the Japanese Defense Agency, see *Asahi Shimbun*, May 7, 2002.

ture. To enact any law except for budget acts or treaty ratification, the approval of the upper house is, in practice, necessary.[19] In 1990, the LDP attempted to woo the opposition centrist party, the Koumei [Clean Government] Party, along with the smaller (and now defunct) Democratic Socialist Party, into supporting the UNPCC bill, which permitted the overseas dispatch of the SDF to provide non-combat support for the U.S.-led multilateral coalition. However, both parties decided to oppose the UNPCC bill, thus sealing its fate.[20] In 2001, by contrast, the LDP-led coalition government enjoyed majorities in both houses of the Diet. In part as a result of this UNPCC debacle, the LDP began building a long-term relationship with the Koumei Party (now sometimes referred to as New Koumei). After a decade of turbulent and often shifting party alignments, the end of the 1990s saw the emergence of a reasonably stable coalition between the Koumei and the LDP.

Leadership counts as another factor that might explain the ease with which the government was able to win approval for dispatching the SDF in 2001. In no small part, Prime Minister Koizumi's astronomically high approval ratings (then averaging around 80%) gave him the political capital to boldly push the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures bill through the Diet. There is certainly reason to doubt that Koizumi's immediate predecessor, Yoshiro Mori, who enjoyed public support in the range of 15% (almost the inverse of Koizumi's ratings), would have been able to do so. In 1990, Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki, although reasonably popular, was far more dependent on the whim of the party's factions; coming from a small faction himself, Kaifu's ability to exercise strong leadership was severely limited. Of equal importance, Kaifu was not particularly enthusiastic about dispatching the SDF to the Middle East, and supported the measure largely because of pressure from the hawkish then-Secretary-General of the LDP, Ozawa Ichirou.[21] By contrast, Koizumi is himself a hawk on security issues, one who appears to be following in the footsteps of former Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro. So it comes as no surprise that Koizumi would enthusiastically promote the dispatch of the MSDF to the Arabian Sea.

Shame might be a third factor. In essence, participation in the post-September 11 coalition can be seen as a way for Japan to recover from the shame

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19. The Japanese Constitution allows the lower house to override an upper house rejection of a bill by a two-thirds vote. However, since no party or coalition has ever enjoyed a clear two-thirds' majority in the lower house, and since it is unlikely that a party or coalition would control two-thirds of the lower house without simultaneously controlling at least a simple majority in the upper house, this provision, in practice, appears irrelevant. See Articles 59, 60, 61. For reference, see *The Constitution of Japan* (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1997), pp. 85–89.

20. See Heinrich, *Seeking an Honored Place*, pp. 160–79, and more generally, Ito Kenichi, "The Japanese State of the Mind: Deliberations on the Gulf Crisis," *Journal of Japanese Studies* 17:2 (1991), pp. 275–90.

21. See Heinrich, *Seeking an Honored Place*, pp. 148–49.

it felt in the face of charges that the country had engaged in "checkbook diplomacy" during the Gulf War. Probably the bitterest memory for many Japanese was Kuwait's failure to include Japan in a list of allied countries it thanked for liberating the emirate, despite Tokyo's $13 billion contribution to the war effort.[22] According to this argument, the sense of shame resulting from this experience created a "never again" reflex, producing strong support for dispatching the SDF in 2001.

To be sure, some high-ranking Japanese policymakers felt an acute sense of national, and even personal shame, over Japan's inability to make a "human" contribution to the Gulf War effort and its concomitant need to compensate by making an unusually large financial contribution. A former Japanese diplomat who held a senior position in the North American Bureau of the Foreign Ministry during the Gulf War recently went public with his sense of shame and frustration. Okamoto Yukio said that Japan was laughed off by the rest of the world as little more than a "cash dispenser."[23] Soon after Okamoto's article was published, Koizumi appointed him as a top foreign policy advisor, apparently because Koizumi shared Okamoto's desire to prevent a repeat of the Gulf War debacle. Since his appointment, Okamoto has played a pivotal role in Koizumi's post-September-11 foreign policy.[24]

Nonetheless, these domestic factors do not tell the whole story either. Although the coalition has created an institutionalized process of cooperation between the two parties, this does not ensure carte blanche Koumei support for LDP proposals, especially regarding defense. Since the LDP-Koumei coalition was consummated under the late Prime Minister Obuchi, Koumei has repeatedly blocked or watered down defense initiatives originating from the LDP, often by citing Asian opposition, especially from China and Korea. Proposals shot down or diluted by Koumei include those to lift the ban on mainline peacekeeping operations (PKO) involving so-called Peacekeeping Forces (PKF). These include peacekeeping roles such as separating combat-

22. Yukio Okamoto, "Mata Onaji koto ni naranai ka—Moshi Wangan Sensou ga mo ichido Okottara?" [Might the same thing happen again? What if the Gulf War breaks out again?], *Gaiko Forum*, no. 158 (September 2001), pp. 12–20, especially p. 15.

23. Ibid., pp. 14–15. For another, if less outspoken, expression of shame over Japan's reaction, see Matsuura Kouichirou, "Sono toki, Gaimushou wa dou Taiou shitaka? [How did the Foreign Ministry react at that time?]" *Gaiko Forum*, no. 158 (September 2001), pp. 21–27, especially p. 26. Matsuura was then chief of the North American Bureau in the Foreign Ministry, and thus Okamoto's boss. Both articles appeared in a special collection published in *Gaiko Forum* entitled "Ten Years after the Gulf War," published on the eve of the September 11 attacks. By contrast, the author heard Okamoto give an impassioned defense of Japan's response to the Gulf War against charges of "checkbook diplomacy," during a talk at a private American think tank in May 1991.

24. Okamoto chairs a special Foreign Relations Task Force that advises Koizumi on foreign policy related to the war on terrorism. See *Asahi Shimbun*, August 25, 2002.

ants, which run a high risk of becoming embroiled in combat.[25] Koumei similarly targeted other proposals, including the acquisition of in-air refueling tankers for the ASDF, and also legislation passed in 1999 enabling Japan to fulfill commitments made under the revised 1997 U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines. Moreover, as was true during the Gulf crisis, Koumei's resistance has repeatedly encouraged foes of these security initiatives within the LDP to voice opposition as well.[26] Although this dynamic did not reappear before the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Act, following its passage Koumei and two senior leaders of the LDP with close ties to China, Nonaka Hiromu and Katou Koichi, expressed reservations about sending Aegis destroyers to the Indian Ocean. Consequently, the Aegis plan was dropped.[27] In defense, if not in other areas as well, Koumei has thus been able to parlay its "swing role" in the upper house into leverage over legislation. Despite the coalition, the relationship between the LDP and Koumei has not changed radically since the Gulf War. As was the case 11 years earlier, pivotal actors in Japanese domestic politics continued to be sensitive to the potential for an Asian backlash in response to an expansion in Japan's overseas military role.

On the other hand, there is little doubt that Koizumi's astronomical popularity during his first nine months in office, consequent degree of independence from the LDP's Diet factions, and strong support for Japan's playing a larger military role were undeniably important reasons for the quick and easy passage of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law. However, a larger underlying reason is an apparent shift of public opinion in favor of overseas non-combat missions for the SDF. Some observers credit this shift to the results of the Gulf War itself, and even claim that Japanese mass opinion shared the sense of shame that elites felt for failing to dispatch the SDF to the Middle East in 1990. Although the passage of a law authorizing the overseas dispatch of the SDF to participate in U.N. peacekeeping in 1992 in Cambodia has been cited as evidence signifying this shift in Japanese public opinion,[28] in fact this bill lacked solid public support at the time of enactment, and stable support for SDF participation in actual U.N. peacekeeping missions

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25. The so-called PKF freeze was finally lifted in December 2002. The PKF acronym, and the distinction within peacekeeping roles that it denotes, is unique to Japanese debates about peacekeeping. See Christopher A. McNally and Charles E. Morrison, eds., *Asia Pacific Security Outlook 2002* (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2002), p. 96.

26. For example, see *Hokkoku Shimbun* (North Country News), Kanazawa, December 14, 2000, p. 1; ibid., December 16, 2000, p. 5. In English, see "Air Tanker Plans to Be Shelved Again," *Daily Asahi*, December 14, 2000.

27. *Asahi Shimbun*, November 16, 17, 2002.

28. Matsuura, "Gaimushou wa dou Taiou shitaka?" p. 24; and Glenn D. Hook, *Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan* (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), pp. 114–18.

and humanitarian operations did not solidify until after SDF troops were sent to participate in the operations.[29]

Moreover, the PKO legislation differed substantially from the UNPCC bill of 1990, as it did not permit support for prospective combat operations. Indeed, the PKO law enacted in 1992 essentially limited SDF participation to humanitarian relief and economic development assistance such as providing medical services, building roads, bridges, etc.—roles not altogether dissimilar from those the SDF has long played domestically as a de facto disaster relief corps. Strikingly, even during the Gulf crisis, a plurality of Japanese favored the overseas dispatch of the SDF for non-combat missions such as disaster and humanitarian relief.[30] Consequently, the PKO law represented less a shift in Japanese public opinion than a watering down of the more ambitious UNPCC bill, to bring it closer to the rather stable preferences of Japanese voters. Nonetheless, public support vacillated until the SDF demonstrated that it could honorably and professionally carry out the Cambodia mission without evoking memories of the pre-war Imperial Japanese Army.

One might argue that significant changes in Japan's threat environment in the 1990s, especially the shock of a North Korean test missile flying over northern Honshu in August 1999 and the March 1999 discovery and unsuccessful interception of two North Korean spy ships in Japanese waters by Japan's Coast Guard and MSDF, should have substantially increased domestic Japanese receptivity to SDF participation in overseas combat operations.[31] However, as was true before the Gulf War, after September 11 there was very little public support for SDF participation in overseas combat operations. A Nippon Television poll in mid-September 2001 found that only 8% of respondents supported such participation, while 48.3% were willing to countenance rear-area logistical support.[32] A poll at the end of the month found that 46% opposed Koizumi's plan for sending the SDF to the Arabian Sea, versus 42% who supported it; by comparison, almost two-thirds of Japanese voters had opposed the UNPCC bill in October 1990.[33] However, once it

29. See Paul Midford, *Making the Best of a Bad Reputation: Japanese and Russian Grand Strategies in East Asia* (Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, Columbia University, 2001), chapter 5.

30. *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* [Japan Economic News], March 29, 1991.

31. I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this argument. The amending of Japan's 1992 PKO law in December 2001 to allow the SDF to participate in more dangerous "front-line" U.N. peacekeeping activities, such as cease-fire monitoring, arguably represents a very modest step toward greater tolerance of SDF participation in overseas combat. See McNally & Morrison, *Asia Pacific Security Outlook 2002*, p. 96. For a broader claim that Japan is pursuing a more proactive diplomacy, see Takashi Inoguchi, ed., *Japan's Asian Policy: Revival and Response* (New York: Palgrave, 2002).

32. Shinoda, "Japan's Response to Terrorism," p. 4.

33. "46% Oppose Plan for SDF," *Asahi Shimbun*, October 4, 2001.

became clear that the SDF would not be deployed anywhere near a combat zone and would indeed only engage in non-combat operations, support increased. A poll in late January 2002 revealed that 64% of Japanese supported the non-combat dispatch of the SDF to the Indian Ocean, versus 23% who were opposed.[34]

Asian Gaiatsu

The demonstration effect of the SDF performing honorably and with discipline in Cambodia not only reassured Japanese domestic opinion, it also reassured other Asian nations. This points to a last factor that can explain why it was so much easier for the Japanese government to dispatch the SDF overseas in 2001 than it had been in 1990: reduced Asian *gaiatsu* on Japan. Although Western observers have frequently pointed to Japan's failure to contribute troops to the U.S.-led coalition as evidence that Tokyo is unable to respond to security threats because of supposedly inward-looking pacifist norms and political culture,[35] in fact Japan's failure to deploy troops revealed an acute sensitivity to the security environment it faces in Asia. While Japan did respond rationally to the anarchical security environment it faced, many in the West simply failed to understand this environment. In 1990, conflicting foreign pressures whipsawed Japan: American pressure on Japan to dispatch the SDF to Saudi Arabia and intense Asian pressure to keep the SDF at home. Countries that had suffered most at the hands of the Japanese Imperial Army during the Pacific War, especially China, South Korea, the Philippines, and Singapore, reacted most negatively to the proposed dispatch of the SDF to Saudi Arabia. Typical was the reaction of South Korean Foreign Minister Choi Ho Joong: "As a people who were victimized by Japan's past militarism, we are deeply concerned that the dispatch overseas of Japan's Self-Defense Forces might lead to Japan's becoming a military power."[36] On the other hand, Thailand, which had a much less brutal experience, was notably absent from the ranks of Asian nations opposing this action.

Within the Japanese government, these conflicting sources of *gaiatsu* led to a showdown between Ozawa Ichirou and Kuriyama Takakazu, then administrative vice foreign minister. Ozawa argued for giving priority to alliance solidarity with Washington, whereas Kuriyama argued for giving higher priority to reassuring East Asia. Ozawa won this battle within the govern-

34. See *Chosun Ilbo* [Korea Daily News], Seoul, February 3, 2002.

35. For leading examples, see Thomas Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); and Peter J. Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996).

36. Sandra Burton, "Prisoners of Memory: Despite Japan's Yen Diplomacy, Its Neighbors Remain Uneasy," *Time*, October 29, 1990, p. 12.

ment,[37] but was ultimately defeated when the Japanese Diet bowed to Asian and parallel domestic opposition and refused to consider legislation authorizing the SDF's dispatch to Saudi Arabia.

The same pattern of Asian reactions persisted beyond the Gulf War, when Japan debated its PKO bill in 1991 and 1992. On the eve of this bill's passage in June 1992, the Japanese Foreign Ministry, analyzing Asian reactions to a bill allowing the SDF to participate in overseas U.N. peacekeeping operations, reached the following conclusions: "Thailand shows the most favorable attitude toward the bill, while Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia are alarmed to a greater or lesser extent. . . . More alarming to Japan, China and South Korea are strongly opposed to the bill. The order coincides with the varying degrees of suffering by those countries under Japanese military rule during World War II."[38] On the eve of the bill's enactment, a June 1992 Korea Gallup Poll revealed that 83% of Koreans believed that Japan's participation in U.N. peacekeeping would pose a very serious or serious threat to Korea's security in the long run; only 10% saw it as no threat.[39]

Much as was the case with Japanese public opinion, the actual dispatch of the Japanese military to Cambodia to join in U.N. peacekeeping operations had a reassuring demonstration effect, displacing disturbing images of the Imperial Japanese Army's conduct in Asia with more benign images of the SDF providing humanitarian assistance and building roads and bridges. Thus, in sharp contrast to the intense debates over the Gulf War, the peacekeeping law, and the Cambodian mission, the deployment of Japanese troops for non-combat missions since Cambodia has generated no significant controversy in Asia.[40] During a visit to Tokyo in June 1993, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen signaled a change in view: "China understands Japanese peacekeeping activity to have been a positive thing."[41] Moreover, a 1995 South Korean poll suggested a significant reversal of public opinion on SDF participation in peacekeeping: 42% of Koreans supported "Japan's future par-

37. "Wangan Kiki to Nihon" [The Gulf crisis and Japan], installment no. 38, *Asahi Shimbun*, December 18, 1990, p. 2.

38. Minoru Hirano, "Asia's Response to UN Bill," *Daily Yomiuri*, Tokyo, June 5, 1992, p. 3.

39. For the Gallup Poll, see Young Koo Cha, "Security Threat Perceptions: A Korean View" (paper prepared for a workshop on Real Threat Perceptions in Asian States, East-West Center, Honolulu, August 24–25, 1992).

40. For a similar observation, see Wada, "Tero Taisaku," p. 31.

41. Foreign Broadcast Information Service East Asia (hereafter *FBIS East Asia)*, June 1, 1993, as cited by Robert Manning, "Burdens of the Past, Dilemmas of the Future: Sino-Japanese Relations in the Emerging International System," *Washington Quarterly* 17:1 (Winter 1994), p. 54, and note 19. By the time of Qian's statement, China's sharp invective against SDF participation in U.N. peacekeeping had long since vanished. Subsequent SDF deployments to U.N. peacekeeping missions generated no observable criticism.

ticipation in PKO in every region of the world," versus 40% who were opposed.[42]

Sending Japanese troops to provide transportation, construction, medical services, and other rear-support operations for U.N. peacekeeping missions in Mozambique, the Golan Heights, and elsewhere not only has failed to generate controversy[43] but has gone almost unnoticed. Similarly, the dispatch of ASDF planes and MSDF ships to Southeast Asia in anticipation of non-combat evacuations of Japanese civilians from Cambodia in 1997 and Indonesia in 1998 provoked no significant negative reactions from neighboring nations.[44] In retrospect, the Cambodia mission appears to have been a turning point that broke the taboo against Japanese overseas military deployments for non-combat purposes. According to a senior Japanese diplomat, "Japan's involvement in the Cambodian peace-keeping operation proved that the Self-Defense Forces are not the Imperial Army."[45]

Another factor that appears to have further enhanced the Cambodia mission's demonstration effect has been Japan's promotion of multilateral and bilateral security dialogues. Beginning with a proposal in 1991 by then-Foreign Minister Nakayama Taro, Japan has used these dialogues as a means to hear Asian concerns about Tokyo's defense policies and intentions, and to give Japan an opportunity to respond to these concerns and explain its policies. Japan initiated these dialogues in response to the intense Asian opposition it encountered during the Gulf crisis.[46]

A "non-event" on September 5, 2001, strongly implies the continuation of this pattern. On that date, the Japanese government announced the largest overseas deployment of SDF personnel since the Cambodia mission of nine years earlier, and the first deployment since then in Asia. Tokyo said 300 to 400 troops would be deployed to East Timor to participate in the U.N. Transitional Authority for East Timor (UNTAET).[47] Although an important step in expanding Japan's participation in U.N. peacekeeping, this announcement nevertheless proved to be a "non-event" for Asian nations, whose reactions were deafening only by their silence. This is particularly significant, since the September 5 announcement came shortly after fresh, exceptionally sharp controversies had broken out involving Japan versus China and Korea over

42. Regarding the 1995 poll, see *Yomiuri Shimbun*, Tokyo, May 23, 1995.

43. See Japanese Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 1999* (Tokyo: Urban Connections, 1999), pp. 99–105.

44. See *Chunichi Shinbun*, Nagoya, May 19, 1998, and *Defense of Japan 1999*, p. 96.

45. Charles Smith, "A New Beginning," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 9, 1994, p. 46.

46. Paul Midford, "Japan's Leadership Role in East Asian Security Multilateralism: The Nakayama Proposal and the Logic of Reassurance," *Pacific Review* 13:3 (September 2000), pp. 367–97.

47. "SDF Troops to Join East Timor Mission," *Asahi Shimbun*, September 6, 2001.

the ongoing history textbook dispute and an August 2001 visit to Yasukuni Shrine by Prime Minister Koizumi. These controversies led China and even South Korea to suspend a whole series of diplomatic and military contacts (the canceled military cooperation between Seoul and Tokyo was especially significant).[48]

In this context, it is perhaps not surprising that Asian nations by and large chose not to oppose Japan's most important response to September 11, namely, the dispatch of the MSDF to the Arabian Sea to provide non-combat logistical support. Although no Asian nation stepped forward to actively endorse and encourage this deployment, opposition was muted. While the drama of September 11 itself was probably one reason for this muted response, the drama of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait eleven years earlier failed to have the same impact because Japan had yet to displace pre-1945 memories of its overseas military deployments with more reassuring images of benign non-combat deployments.

In contrast to 1992, Southeast Asian opposition was almost invisible. Former Philippine President Fidel Ramos summed up the general regional view when he suggested that "[i]t is fine to see the past but more important to see the future. . . . We have already allowed Japanese troops in the Philippines and in international airports."[49] In other words, the Philippines and other Southeast Asian countries have become comfortable with, and accepting of, Japanese troops sent overseas for non-combat missions. At an ASEAN summit in early November 2001, Koizumi's reiteration of Japan's Fukuda Doctrine of reassurance—a policy of "not becoming a military superpower even though [Japan] became an economic superpower"—was enough to persuade ASEAN members to curb any public opposition to deployment.[50]

Even China, a nation with geostrategic as well as historical reasons to oppose a larger Japanese military role, largely avoided criticizing Japan's plan to send its military to the Arabian Sea. To be sure, the prime minister had to

48. Mari Yamaguchi, "Around Asia, Anger over War Shrine Visit," *Boston Globe*, Boston, August 15, 2001, p. A15; Ren Min, "Koizumi's Visit to Yasukuni Shrine," *Beijing Review*, August 30, 2001, pp. 8–9; "Filipino Women Protest Koizumi Visit to Yasukuni Shrine," Kyodo News Agency, Tokyo, August 13, 2001; and more generally, Gilbert Rozman, "Japan and Korea: Should the U.S. Be Worried about Their New Spat in 2001?" *Pacific Review* 15:1 (January 2002), pp. 1–28.

49. Interview with Fidel Ramos, as carried by BBC, *East Asia Today*, November 14, 2001, as transcribed by Lauren Frese. An audio file can be found at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldsevice/asiapacific/eastasiatoday/index.shtml>. Philippines Vice President Teofisto Guingona also expressed support for the dispatch of the SDF to the Indian Ocean. See "Philippines Reassured by New Japan Antiterror Law," *Jiji Press*, November 26, 2001.

50. "Koizumi Says ASEAN Leaders Back Dispatch of SDF Abroad," *Mainichi Daily News*, November 6, 2001, p. 8. Also see Bhubhindar Singh, "ASEAN's Perceptions of Japan: Change and Continuity," *Asian Survey* 42:2 (March/April 2002), pp. 276–96, especially pp. 294–95.

offer a grand gesture of historical reassurance to Beijing. To this end, Koizumi repeated the "strong" apology by former Socialist Prime Minister Murayama Tomi'ichi in 1995. Like Murayama, Koizumi expressed "heartfelt remorse and apology" for "those Chinese people who were victims of aggression," repeating the clearest and most unambiguous apology ever issued by a Japanese premier. Koizumi reinforced his apology with "museum diplomacy," becoming the first LDP prime minister to visit a museum commemorating China's "War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression" near the Marco Polo Bridge.[51]

In the wake of this gesture, Chinese leaders appeared to tacitly endorse Japan's decision to send the SDF to the Arabian Sea to support U.S. military operations in Afghanistan. Although urging him to "remember the wariness of Asian countries," President Jiang Zemin reportedly told Koizumi that Japan's desire to participate in the American-led campaign was "easy to understand." Koizumi asserted that Jiang's attitude toward the Japanese deployment was "less severe" than expected. The press quoted Koizumi as saying, "I sought understanding over our plan to take as firm an attitude as possible without the use of military force . . . and I obtained that understanding."[52] The *Beijing Review*, an English-language mouthpiece for the Chinese leadership, also presented sympathetically Japan's desire to join in, although it conditioned Chinese and Asian acceptance of this move upon genuine Japanese reflection on the lessons of history.[53] Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji did not go beyond mildly warning Koizumi to be "prudent" about playing a supporting role in U.S. operations in Afghanistan. Overall, the reaction by Jiang, Zhu, and the Chinese media suggests tacit acceptance of a non-combat, rear-support role for the SDF in America's war against terrorism, combined with a warning not to breach the taboo against combat operations.

After Koizumi's visit, Chinese officials and the state-run media issued somewhat more negative comments about the SDF mission.[54] This suggests,

51. See Erik Eckholm, "Japanese Leader, Visiting China, Is Mildly Rebuked on Army Role," *New York Times*, October 9, 2001, p. 7; Philip P. Pan, "Japan Soothes China: Koizumi Apologizes for WWII Aggression," *Washington Post*, October 8, 2001; and "Koizumi Apologizes to Chinese," *Beijing Review*, October 18, 2001, p. 4. According to the latter two articles, Koizumi became the first Japanese prime minister to apologize on Chinese soil.

52. Naoko Aoki, "China Understands SDF Role, Shrine Visit," Bernama News Agency, Malaysia, October 8, 2001; Michael Judge, "Japan Finally Shoulders Its Security Burden," *Wall Street Journal*, New York, October 11, 2001, p. A22; and Pan, "Japan Soothes China."

53. See Xiao Ding, "Koizumi's Visit to China," *Beijing Review*, October 25, 2001, pp. 10–1.

54. See, for example, "Beijing, Seoul Keep Tabs on New SDF Law," *Asahi Shimbun*, September 22, 2002; Zan Jifang, "Japan Overseas Military Action Arouses Concern," *Beijing Review*, November 22, 2001, p. 10; Ding Bangquan, "Anti-Terrorism: New Highlight of Japan-U.S. Military Cooperation," ibid., February 14, 2002, and Jiang Ye, "Japan's Strategy to Become a Political Power," pp. 11–13, ibid.

if not continued unease over an augmented role for the Japanese military, at least the difficult task Beijing faces to sell the issue domestically. The fact that the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law broke new ground by authorizing the SDF's first overseas non-combat mission *in support of a combat operation* may in part explain the cautious reaction by the Chinese media and leadership relative to the East Timor deployment. One Chinese commentator expressed concern that the new law "actually lifts the restrictions of the Japanese Constitution and defense policy."[55] This suggests some anxiety that the Arabian Sea deployment could lead to the breakdown of the taboo on overseas SDF combat operations. Nonetheless, despite a clear geostrategic interest in constraining Japan's international security role, China's overall reaction was far less negative than it had been 11 years earlier.

Spotlight on South Korea

If China stands out as a nation with a strategic incentive for hamstringing Japanese attempts to play a larger security role, South Korea stands out as a nation with the opposite strategic incentive. As a de facto ally,[56] South Korea has reason to support a larger Japanese security role, especially in conjunction with their common ally, the United States. Seoul's strong opposition to Tokyo's dispatching non-combatants to aid Operation Desert Shield stands in striking contrast to this strategic interest, suggesting the influence of historically based suspicions about Japan's intentions. Indeed, South Korea's opposition was ironic, given that Seoul eventually dispatched a small military contingent to provide non-combat medical and transportation support during the Gulf War.[57] Korea's deployment closely resembles the contribution Japan would have made, had it been able to overcome opposition from Korea and other Asian nations.

In reaction to Japan's post-September 11 plan to dispatch the SDF to the Arabian Sea, Seoul argued from the outset that it would be illogical to presuppose that Tokyo would again become a military threat simply through its provision of logistical support for U.S. forces.[58] Whereas the logic of this statement is unexceptional, it stands in striking contrast to 1992, when Ko-

55. Ibid., p. 13.

56. On Japan and South Korea as de facto allies, see Victor D. Cha, *Alignment Despite Antagonism: The U.S.-Korea-Japan Security Triangle* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999).

57. Brian Bridges, "South Korea and the Gulf Crisis," *Pacific Review* 5:2 (April 1995), p. 147. The only significant difference is that Japan's UNPCC bill mandated that the Japanese military evacuate in the event of hostilities, thus rendering Japan's dispatch plan even more innocuous.

58. "Beijing, Seoul, Keep Tabs on New SDF Law," *Asahi Shimbun*, September 22, 2001.

rean officials emphasized again and again that this fear was very much on their minds.

As with China, Koizumi made a grand gesture of historical reassurance in order to secure Seoul's non-opposition. Here, he repeated the strong apology language used by his predecessor seven years earlier: "I sincerely apologize for the pain and sorrow Japan inflicted on the Korean people under Japanese colonial rule."[59] He combined this with another round of museum diplomacy, visiting the Sodaemun Prison Museum, where Korean independence fighters were tortured and executed during Japanese rule. Consistent with Seoul's initial response, President Kim Dae Jung told the visiting Japanese prime minister that he approved of Japan's plans to dispatch the MSDF to the Arabian Sea. Overall, according to a Koizumi spokesman, "[T]he prime minister was able to reassure President Kim and others of his intentions."[60]

Again, the post-Cambodia consensus accepting SDF overseas deployments for non-combat purposes appeared to hold in Seoul, although it was shaken by concerns that the new precedent set by the current deployment (i.e., non-combat support for a combat mission) would lead to a breakdown of all post-war constraints on the Japanese military. Thus, Kim pointedly warned Koizumi to stay within the confines of Japan's pacifist Constitution.[61] This stance was echoed by an anonymous Korean official, who was quoted as saying, "As long as [Japanese] support for the United States complies with their pacifist constitution, we will not take issue with the matter."[62]

Acceptance of the SDF's logistical mission in the Arabian Sea appeared to be stronger within the South Korean government than among opposition leaders and the general public. The opposition Grand National Party (GNP) managed to prevent a Koizumi address to the National Assembly by threatening a sit-in. Strikingly, several months after the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law was enacted, a poll of 32 Korean legislators conducted by a Japanese-Korean inter-parliamentary group found that more than 80% opposed enactment of this law. More generally, nearly two-thirds of responding Korean legislators said that recent Japanese moves to expand its military role pose the greatest threat to East Asian security. According to GNP Representative Lee Seung-cheol, "Capitalizing on the Sept. 11 terror strikes, Tokyo is moving for regional hegemony."[63]

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59. "Japan Apologizes to South Korea," BBC News, London, October 15, 2001.

60. Doug Struck, "Koizumi Greeted with Protests in S. Korea," *Washington Post*, October 15, 2001; "Japan Apologizes to South Korea," BBC News, October 15, 2001.

61. Struck, "Koizumi Greeted."

62. Shin Yong-bae, "Japan's Move to Expand Military Role Overseas Draws Mixed Reactions from South Korea, *Korea Herald*, Seoul, October 4, 2001.

63. Kim Hyung-jin, "S. Korean Lawmakers See Japan as No. 1 Threat to Regional Security," ibid., February 25, 2002.

Although mass public opinion proved to be somewhat more supportive of the SDF deployment, a large majority nonetheless opposed this move. According to a Korean Gallup Poll commissioned by the Korean daily *Chosun Ilbo* in late January 2001, approximately 26% of Koreans supported the dispatch of the SDF, versus 55% who were opposed, and 20% who were unsure.[64] Although these poll results clearly mark a step back from the growing public support that Japanese SDF participation in U.N. peacekeeping had appeared to be enjoying in Korea, they nonetheless suggest greater support for the anti-terrorism mission than was the case in advance of the Cambodia mission. The heated pre-September 11 historical controversies perhaps had a larger influence on popular opinion than upon governmental opinion.[65] The half-precedent set by the post 9–11 dispatch also probably contributed to this rather mixed result.

The relatively relaxed government reaction, therefore, masked a rather negative public reaction. The government's reaction, like that of China, reflects a decision dating from the Cambodia mission not to oppose SDF noncombat deployments. In the case of Seoul, one could point to two additional factors that might account for the rather benign response to Japan's overseas deployment. The first has to do with growing security contacts between Seoul and Tokyo. The initiation of an annual bilateral security dialogue, plus regular military-to-military exchanges, including educational exchanges, ship visits, and even joint search-and-rescue naval exercises in the 1990s, are the most prominent examples of these growing ties.[66] These security ties, like the demonstration effect of the SDF serving honorably overseas, may create a reassurance effect, reassuring Koreans, and especially the Korean military, about Japan's intentions and political disposition. Although security ties—most notably, reciprocal naval visits and exercises—were partially severed

64. The question read, "Japan recently dispatched the SDF in order to support America as well as the afflicted people in Afghanistan and to transport goods. Do you support or not support this?" Regarding this poll, see <http://panel.gallup.co.kr>. Other questions in the same poll raised further reason for concern about a gap between the Korean government standpoint and public opinion. When asked how much they liked Japan, 33.7% of Korean respondents answered "very much" or "somewhat," versus 56.9% who answered "dislike" or "dislike very much." Strikingly, the results for China were almost the inverse: 59.5% of Korean respondents answered they liked China "very much" or "somewhat," versus 27.8% who said they disliked China "somewhat" or "very much." Polling results were translated from the Korean by Won Jun Lee. These results suggest that President Kim's policy of building political and security links with Japan might lack popular support.

65. A joint poll conducted by *Chosun Ilbo* and *Mainichi Shimbun* found that 55% of Korean respondents believed the 2001 textbook incident and Koizumi's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine would negatively affect bilateral relations, versus 26% who did not think so. See *Chosun Ilbo*, February 3, 2002. Polling results were translated from the Korean by Won Jun Lee.

66. Jason U. Manosevitz, "Japan-South Korea 21st Century Security Relations" (unpublished manuscript, February 2002).

by the textbook and Yasukuni controversies of 2001, some exchanges, including educational ones, continued through the tempest.[67] Moreover, full security ties were restored in spring 2002.[68] The growth and robustness of these ties may help to stabilize overall security relations, and, even more important, reduce mistrust of Japan among Korean military and foreign policy makers. Another possible reason for the benign reaction of the Korean government may have to do with the presidency of Kim Dae-jung. Besides his famous "sunshine" policy of rapprochement with North Korea, Kim also staked his presidency on a sunshine-like policy toward Japan that was predicated on settling bilateral disputes over history, ending the Korean ban on Japanese cultural imports, and forging ahead with much closer relations. This policy may, in part, reflect Kim's relatively benign view of Japan, a view apparently influenced by his time spent in Japan as a political exile in the 1970s. A test of these competing conjectures is at hand with President Kim having left office. Newly elected President Roh Moo Hyun's policies toward Japan, and the ability of the opposition GNP party to influence those policies, should show whether, and to what extent, Korea's friendly response to Japan's deployment of its military to the Arabian Sea reflects the demonstration effect of past non-combat SDF deployments overseas and the institutionalization of bilateral security ties, or whether these have depended upon the policies and proclivities of the occupant of the Blue House.[69]

Conclusions

Overall, a more benign Asian reaction to Japan's decision to dispatch its military to the Indian Ocean appears to be the most significant difference between the situation Tokyo faced in 1990 versus in 2001. To be sure, Japanese domestic opinion was more supportive in 2001 than in 1990. However, the seemingly parallel movement of opinion in Asia and Japan on this issue, that is, the fact that opposition to SDF overseas non-combat deployments faded in both Asia and Japan in the wake of the initial SDF deployment in Cambodia, suggests that Asian and domestic reactions tend to be complementary rather than competing factors in explaining Japan's far more pro-active response in 2001.

Although historical reassurance, in the form of apologies, self-critical textbooks, and the eschewing of militarist symbols such as the Yasukuni Shrine, is often regarded as the sine qua non basis for Japan to play a larger political

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67. Ibid.; and Don Kirk, "South Korea Scraps Military Exercise with Japan," *New York Times*, May 8, 2001.

68. "2 Japanese Warships to Visit Pusan Monday," *Korea Times*, Seoul, April 26, 2002. This resumption came despite another controversial visit to the Yasukuni Shrine by Koizumi in April 2002.

69. Emphasizing Kim's role is Rozman, "Japan and Korea," pp. 8, 10–11.

and security role in Asia, the findings of this paper suggest some qualifications to this claim. The present case suggests that building a nonaggressive military track record has been equally or more important. In particular, once the SDF establishes such a track record while fulfilling a new security role, the continuation of this role becomes largely delinked from historical controversies.

After the SDF's 1992–93 participation in the U.N. Transitional Authority for Cambodia mission, subsequent non-combat overseas dispatches of the SDF failed to generate any significant Asian opposition. Indeed, in stark contrast to the Gulf War and the Cambodia mission itself, these dispatches went almost unnoticed. Even Japan's announcement of its first Asian deployment since Cambodia, to East Timor, failed to generate any measurable opposition. This occurred despite exceptionally sharp historical controversies regarding Japanese textbooks and Koizumi's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine.

Although China and Korea did express some concern about the dispatch of the Japanese military to the Arabian Sea, in contrast to the East Timor decision, this reaction was much softer than had been the case during the Gulf crisis or before the deployment to Cambodia. The half-precedent set by the post-September 11 dispatch, namely the SDF's use in support of a combat mission, largely explains this somewhat greater concern. Moreover, most reservations centered around the fear that any change in SDF policy might lead to a breakdown of all post-war constraints on the Japanese military, thus paving the way for the Japanese military to again spin out of control as it did in the 1930s. In Southeast Asia, there was no significant voiced opposition to the Arabian Sea deployment, suggesting not only greater acceptance of the SDF role but also a greater willingness to look beyond historical controversies and focus on the SDF's contemporary performance.

South Korean public opinion appears to pose a partial exception to the claim that the benign track record of non-combat military dispatches has become delinked from historical controversies about Japanese militarism. Although somewhat more supportive of Japan's military deployment to the Arabian Sea in the wake of September 11, South Koreans polled nonetheless opposed this measure by more than two to one. Beyond the issue of a "half-precedent" in the post-September 11 deployment, the textbook and Yasukuni Shrine controversies undoubtedly contributed to this lopsided margin.

Japanese failure to pursue historical reassurance, even more the appearance of backsliding on these issues, can make it much more difficult to establish new roles and missions for the SDF. Even if Yasukuni visits by prime ministers were to cease, and history textbooks objectionable to Japan's neighbors

were to vanish,[70] any attempt by Tokyo to break the taboo against SDF overseas combat deployments, even outside of East Asia or within the context of the U.N. or U.S. alliance, would likely provoke strong Asian opposition. This could be much sharper if the Japanese government backslides and fails to provide historical reassurance. A fiercely negative reaction could lead to Japan's diplomatic isolation, or might provoke Asian countries to ally and balance against Japan. If Japan desires to emerge as a "normal" military power, it will ease the way by taking very seriously any Asian concerns about how it deals with its own history. Nevertheless, the single best way to reassure Asian nations that Japan can be a trustworthy military power is through the demonstration effect of behaving like one.

70. The Koizumi cabinet appears to support the construction of a separate monument to Japan's war dead that prime ministers could visit in place of the Yasukuni Shrine. See *Yomiuri Shimbun*, May 7, 2002.