

# THE RISE OF A GLOBAL PARTY?

## American Party Organizations Abroad

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### ABSTRACT

In discussions of party organization, scholars have generally assumed that such organizations operate exclusively on the domestic level, seeking to alter electoral results by raising votes and money from constituencies at home. This research note shows that this assumption is outdated, because the US Democratic and Republican parties now maintain overseas branches in dozens of different countries. These branches seek through a variety of means to mobilize the votes and financial resources of Americans abroad in an attempt to change domestic political outcomes. An analysis of the rise of these groups demonstrates the value of the concept of globalization in an area where it is usually not considered relevant, and raises new normative and practical questions about how to regulate overseas political activity by US citizens and parties.

KEY WORDS ■ American politics ■ globalization ■ party organization

One of the oldest and most resilient ways of conceptualizing political party activity has been to divide it into three components: the party in the electorate, the party in government and the party as an organization. The last of these components was, of course, defined in reference to the leaders and activists who worked through the party apparatus to gain members, financial contributions and votes on behalf of party nominees. Naturally enough, this activity was assumed to take place entirely within the territorial boundaries of the country where the party contested elections – American party organizations mobilized within the USA, British parties within Britain, and so on. The claim of this article is that this assumption is now outdated, and that in the current age of globalization American party organizations have taken the first steps to become ‘global’ organizations themselves. While the extent of this development should not be exaggerated, it is of sufficient

importance to merit the attention of scholars of American and party politics. The point was underscored in dramatic fashion during the 2000 presidential election, when votes from American citizens overseas became a crucial factor in the final determination of who won the electoral votes of Florida, and thus the presidency itself (Barstow and Van Natta, 2001). As that episode revealed, the assumption that American electoral politics can be understood simply by examining domestic party activity is no longer tenable.

This article focuses on the origins and programmes of the two main party organizations overseas, Democrats Abroad (DA) and Republicans Abroad (RA), and locates their activities within the larger context of the contemporary process of globalization. DA is the older and larger of the two groups, dating back to the early 1960s, while RA is smaller but better financed, with origins dating to the late 1970s. Both party organizations have similar aims: to help overseas citizens register to vote, to ensure that these citizens vote for the party's candidates and to raise money for party activity both at home and abroad. Each party maintains separate branches in some 30 different countries, and these branches solicit members locally in order to carry out party functions. DA reported a membership list of some 10,000 members in 2000. While RA does not maintain a central membership roster, it also claimed many thousands of members and activists around the globe. Together, the two party organizations abroad spent at least \$500,000 in the 2000 presidential election on various efforts to mobilize voters and promote the party ticket.

In pursuing these aims, the parties take advantage of federal legislation that protects the rights of US citizens to vote while living overseas (General Accounting Office, 2001; Michaux, 1996). The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Voting Rights Act (OCVR), passed into law by Congress in 1975 and amended in 1986, guarantees all Americans abroad the right to vote via absentee ballot in *federal* elections in the state and congressional district in which they last resided. The act encourages use of a common federal postcard application (now adopted in 45 states) that can be sent to local authorities to simultaneously register to vote and request an absentee ballot. While protecting the rights of voters in federal elections, the act leaves the issue of whether overseas residents can vote in state and local elections entirely up to each state (with widely varying results). As was revealed in the dispute over the 2000 election results in Florida, the act also allows for the use of a back-up ballot known as the Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot. This ballot is for use when a citizen overseas has registered properly (i.e. 30 days prior to the election), but has not received an absentee ballot from the USA on time due to mailing delays, administrative errors by state governments or other problems. Given the complexity of the rules regulating voting from abroad, one of the main functions of the overseas party organizations is to help sympathetic voters negotiate this procedural minefield so that they can receive their ballots and return them to the USA by the required deadlines.

The precise number of Americans living overseas is unknown, as are their demographic characteristics and partisan preferences (Mills, 1993). Since neither the US Census Bureau nor the US State Department collects reliable data on the size of the overseas population, claims by either party that the overseas constituency tilts in its direction must be viewed sceptically. The only hard data compiled by the Census Bureau are on the number of federal employees living overseas, either in the US military or working for the State Department and other federal agencies; in 2000, this figure was 338,000 (Davis and Jaffe, 2000). The total number of *civilians* living abroad is without question much larger, but there are no scientifically acceptable data on its exact size. The closest we have are State Department figures released in 1999 indicating that 3,163,006 Americans were living abroad among the top 15 countries by American population (see Table 1). However, since this tally leaves out all Americans living in dozens of other countries, the total number of Americans abroad is undoubtedly much larger; indeed, some have estimated that the true figure is over six million. If this is accurate, the size of the American population abroad is larger than the separate populations of 24 of the 50 states, and the total constituency is comparable in size to the state of Massachusetts. By any measure, then, it is evident that we are not dealing with a negligible constituency. The potential clearly exists for a major impact on electoral results – it is not surprising, therefore, that both parties have expanded their overseas activity in recent decades. They may, in fact, be encouraged in their efforts by the lack of any polling data

**Table 1.** Private US citizens residing abroad (estimated): top 15 countries by American population, July 1999

1. Mexico	1,036,300
2. Canada	687,700
3. United Kingdom	224,000
4. Germany	210,880
5. Italy	168,967
6. Philippines	105,000
7. Australia	102,800
8. France	101,750
9. Spain	94,513
10. Israel	94,195
11. Dominican Republic	82,000
12. Greece	72,500
13. Japan	70,350
14. China	65,157
15. Ireland	46,984
Total	3,163,006

*Note:* This list does not include US government (military and non-military) employees and their dependants, nor does it provide a full count of all US citizens living in each country.

*Source:* Bureau of Consular Affairs, US Department of State.

whatsoever to indicate the preferences of this constituency – in the absence of data, hope springs eternal.

The development of this overseas party activity clearly raises issues that are connected to the larger debates over the meaning and nature of ‘globalization’ at the present time in world history. If we define globalization as ‘a process in which geographic distance becomes a factor of diminishing importance in the establishment and maintenance of cross-border economic, political and socio-cultural relations’ (Lubbers and Koorevaar, 1999), then this concept would seem to have direct relevance for understanding the phenomenon of overseas activism by US parties. This is not to say that American parties have achieved the full mobilization of the overseas constituency – far from it – or that Americans abroad have gained a great deal of power in domestic politics. Indeed, the unusual role of overseas voters in the 2000 presidential election can legitimately be seen as a fluke – an artifact of an extremely close election combined with the late counting of last-minute ballots from abroad. Nonetheless, the phenomenon of overseas party activism is very likely to grow in importance. This prospect raises some interesting questions.

Are these new forms of party organization simply instances of the expansion of pre-existing organizational patterns over a larger geographical area? In other words, is this just a *quantitative* change in the scope of party activity? Or does it constitute a *qualitative* change that amounts to the emergence of a new form of globalized political activity capable of altering our traditional understandings of the links between territoriality and citizenship?

### Democrats Abroad

DA traces its inception to the election of 1960, when Americans living in Paris and London organized informally in support of John F. Kennedy’s presidential campaign. These activists later established a formal organization of American Democrats living in Europe, and this group went on to work intensively on Lyndon Johnson’s behalf in the presidential campaign of 1964. After this demonstration of the organization’s dedication, the Democratic National Committee (DNC) granted it official recognition, and in 1972 the DNC gave it further legitimacy by allowing the group nine non-voting delegates to the party’s national convention in the United States. In 1976, shortly after the original passage of the OCVR, DA secured the status of a full-fledged state committee, allowing it to elect members to the DNC and to send accredited voting delegates to the national convention. By 2000, DA had 21 established country committees, and 10 other country committees in various stages of formation (Democrats Abroad, 2001). The group maintained a membership list of more than 10,000 (up 35 percent during the year 2000), with core activists

numbering around four or five hundred, according to DA leaders (Fina, 2000, 2001). After years of relying on the full-time volunteer work of an executive director based in Washington, D.C., DA was able in 2001 to hire a new part-time executive director who utilized office space provided by the Democratic National Committee.

DA is organized in similar fashion to state parties in the USA, with the base of the organization consisting of 'country committees' comparable to the county-level committees typically set up in each American state. Each country committee elects its own officers, recruits local members, raises funds, sponsors voter registration and get-out-the-vote campaigns, and organizes educational campaigns aimed at the community of overseas Americans. In addition to the country committees are three regional groupings, composed of the country committees in the Asia/Pacific area, Europe/Middle East/Africa and North and South America, each with its own elected regional chair. The goal of the regional-level organization is to help in the process of organizing new chapters and to improve the coordination of activities and the exchange of information among nearby chapters. The highest authority in DA is the Democratic Party Committee Abroad (DPCA), composed of the chair and vice-chair of each country committee, the elected officers of the global party and the organization's DNC members. DPCA is the legal equivalent of a state committee in the USA, and is responsible for chartering new country committees and overseeing a global strategy for mobilizing Democratic voters and raising funds.

A valuable mobilizing tool for DA has been its right to elect delegates to the Democratic National Convention. To fulfil this function, in 1992 the group adopted a caucus system (to replace a global primary used from 1976 to 1988) that is similar in structure to that used by caucus states in the USA. At the base of the system are meetings held in each country and open to all US citizens residing abroad who sign a statement affirming their support for the Democratic Party. These gatherings in turn elect delegates to caucuses at the regional level (such as Europe/Middle East or Asia/Pacific), and these latter meetings officially select delegates to the Democratic Convention in the USA (see Table 2). In addition to the regional caucuses, DA also holds a Global Convention every four years, which generates its own party platform proposals and elects three at-large delegates to the national convention. In 2000, the regional caucuses and global convention were both held in Paris, France, and drew about 100 participants from Europe, Asia, the Middle East and South and North America. DA was entitled to nine delegate votes at the national convention in 2000, but by fractionating these votes the organization was able to send 22 delegates and two alternates to the Los Angeles convention – a delegation equal to or larger in size than that of the six smallest states and territories. The group also elected members to the national party's Rules, Platform and Credentials committees, and selected six members to serve on the Democratic National Committee (along with the DPCA chair and vice-chair).

**Table 2.** Breakdown of Democrats Abroad membership March 2000

<i>Region</i>	<i>Country committee</i>	<i>Certified membership</i>	<i>Delegate votes at regional caucus</i>	<i>National convention delegates elected by region</i>
Asia/Pacific	Hong Kong	196	1	
	Japan	318	2	
	Philippines	53	1	
	TOTAL	567	4	1
Americas	Canada	811	3	
	Costa Rica	53	1	
	Mexico	104	1	
	TOTAL	968	5	1
Europe/Middle East/Africa	France	1328	6	
	Germany	1015	5	
	Greece	1297	6	
	Ireland	60	1	
	Israel	509	3	
	Italy	284	2	
	Luxembourg	41	0.5	
	Netherlands	55	1	
	Portugal	114	1	
	Switzerland	316	2	
	United Kingdom	1289	6	
	Hungary	n/a	0.25	
	TOTAL	6308	33.75	7
	GRAND TOTAL	7843	41.75	9

*Source:* Democrats Abroad.

DA has effectively used these various positions as selective incentives to draw in new members and reward long-time activists (Smallhoover, 2000). A Democrat living in a foreign country can, through participation in DA, attend stateside Democratic conventions and even serve on the party's National Committee; as a result, the development of a career within American party politics is not foreclosed by residence abroad. The ensuing opportunities for personal satisfaction and individual political advancement have helped DA in organizing well-attended country caucuses and in luring Democrats from around the world to its global convention. In this manner, DA has developed new forms of representation that will be familiar to those who have studied the election of Mexicans abroad to that country's national assembly and other examples of transnational citizenship around the world (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Schain, 1999). The rapid

growth of the World Wide Web and the Internet – even in less developed countries – has made this kind of activism more viable than ever before, and greatly aided both DA and RA in their internal communications and recruitment activities.

In its efforts to mobilize the overseas constituency, DA has developed a variety of initiatives to promote voter participation and fundraising. A central task of each country committee is to distribute the postcard registration application prepared by the federal government. These forms are mailed to US citizens, or distributed at local events that draw large numbers of Americans (such as Fourth of July parties, lectures by American visitors, university study abroad programmes, overseas college alumni meetings, etc.). Country committees have also contacted US citizens by obtaining ‘free media’ coverage by local radio, TV and newspapers (including non-English language publications) interested in the activities of Americans abroad. DA has placed advertisements about voter registration in the *International Herald Tribune* and *Stars and Stripes*, overseas versions of the *Wall Street Journal* and *USA Today*, and in the local English-language newspapers commonly found in most non-English speaking countries (including Israel’s *Jerusalem Post*).

In contrast to RA, which is largely funded by the Republican National Committee, DA has received little financial support from the DNC, instead being mainly self-funded through monies raised abroad, either through the occasional large donation from a single individual or, more commonly, extensive direct mail solicitations. In 2000, for example, DA sent several fundraising letters to its membership list of 10,000, as well as establishing a procedure for credit card donations from its web site. In both the 1996 and 2000 elections, the global headquarters of DA spent about \$100,000 each year on advertising and other projects (although DA officers estimate that the separate country committees collectively spent considerably more than that amount) (Fina, 2000).

Notwithstanding the various efforts at outreach, the activist cohort within DA appears to represent a relatively elite segment of the overseas community. Based on a survey administered to delegates at the 2000 Global Convention of DA, overseas Democratic activists are, in comparison with domestic party delegates, more likely to be wealthy, white, well-educated and over 50 years of age, while being less likely to be a member of a labour union (see Table 3).<sup>1</sup> They are also disproportionately composed of long-term residents abroad, with the vast majority having lived at least eight years out of the United States (evidently reflecting the likelihood that those who will take the time to become involved in overseas party activity are those who have settled into a long-term life abroad). While perhaps predictable, this statistic reveals the failure of the organization to draw support from the large number of young people (presumably a more Democratic constituency) who live abroad temporarily either as students or recent college graduates.

**Table 3.** Survey of attendees at the Democrats Abroad Global Convention Paris, France 1 April 2000 (total responses: 76)

	<i>Respondents</i>	<i>Percentages</i>
1. Age		
18–29	2	3
30–39	14	18
40–49	14	18
50–59	27	36
60+	19	25
2. Sex		
M	46	60
F	30	40
3. Race/ethnicity		
White	67	88
Black or African-American	4	5
Asian	3	4
Hispanic or Latino	2	3
American Indian or Alaska Native	0	0
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander	0	0
4. Education		
High school or less	1	1
Some college	5	7
College graduate	17	22
Master's or law degree	42	55
PhD	11	14
5. Family income (non-responses: 3)		
Less than \$15,000	4	5
\$15,000 to \$29,999	6	8
\$30,000 to \$49,999	10	14
\$50,000 to \$69,999	12	16
\$70,000 to \$89,999	17	22
\$90,000 and over	24	33
6. Occupation		
Education	22	29
Journalism/Media	13	17
Business	12	16
Law	11	13
Retired	9	12
Government	5	7
Architect	1	1
Military	1	1
Clergy	1	1
Medicine	1	1
7. Member of a labour union		
Yes	9	12
No	67	88

**Table 3.** (continued)

	<i>Respondents</i>	<i>Percentages</i>
8. Total number of years living abroad		
>2	4	1
2-4	6	8
5-7	5	7
8-15	21	28
16-25	20	26
26-40	18	24
41<	2	3

*Source:* Author survey.

Like its Republican counterpart, DA has sought to identify key issues of concern to the overseas population. The 2000 Democrats Abroad Platform calls for the inclusion of overseas Americans in the census (which would begin to address some of the aforementioned mysteries regarding the demographics of the overseas population), increased funding for diplomatic and consular facilities, maintenance of the income tax exclusion for American citizens paying taxes to a foreign government and the expansion of Social Security and Medicare coverage for eligible Americans abroad. In the past, DA has successfully supported legislation to facilitate the transmission of US citizenship to children born abroad and to expand the voting rights of overseas citizens. An issue of some contention within the group has been whether it should support federal legislation that would create a non-voting delegate in Congress to represent Americans abroad (similar to the delegates that now represent Guam and the District of Columbia). DA activists ultimately decided that such proposals would undercut their influence with other members of Congress and possibly jeopardize their right to vote in regular elections from abroad (Fina, 2000). For now, overseas Democrats have decided that acting through existing institutions and procedures is more desirable than forging entirely new representational forms for citizens who are not living on US territory. In this sense, at least, Democrats have turned away from the more radical changes that might seem to be required by a full commitment to the idea of a globalized politics.

### **Republicans Abroad**

RA was formed in 1978 in response to the passage of the OCVR and the increasingly visible activities of DA. As with its Democratic rival, RA is organized around individual country committees, regional groupings (for the areas of Europe, the Middle East/Africa, the Asia/Pacific region and the Western Hemisphere), and an international committee composed of the chairs of each country committee. A smaller executive committee is charged

with hiring a full-time, paid executive director and selecting the global chair and other officers. Although RA claims to have chapters in 56 foreign countries, considerably more than DA's 31 chapters, this would appear to largely reflect the fact that DA uses more stringent criteria for recognizing new chapters (especially since each chapter has an eventual say in the selection of delegates to the quadrennial national convention). Comparisons of RA and DA suggest that the former is better-funded and better supported by US party operatives and politicians, although smaller in total membership (RA informally claims around 3,600) and in the intensity of grassroots support abroad. In these respects, as in many others, the differences between the overseas branches trace similar differences between the parties at home.

In notable contrast to DA, RA has not been granted legal status as a state party, and instead functions as an 'auxiliary' of the Republican National Committee (RNC). In this limited capacity, it can neither elect members to the RNC nor send official delegates to the RNC. The reason for this policy, according to RA officials, is that party leaders feel that individual Republicans abroad already receive representation by voting in primary elections via absentee ballots (although how voters from caucus states are to receive representation is left unclear) (Trueheart, 2000). Republicans also assert that the more reformed structure of the Democratic Party, with its emphasis on group representation for historically disenfranchised minorities, and the larger size of its convention (about 4,000 delegates versus 2,000 for the Republicans) makes it easier to add special representation for overseas voters. Whatever the reasons, the absence of the selective incentives offered by a more official integration into the party structure appears to have reduced the amount of volunteer activity within RA (judging both from first-hand exposure to RA activities and internal DA reports on the scale of their rival organization's activities) (Democrats Abroad, 1992, 1996). Moreover, the resulting attenuation of grassroots activity has encouraged a more centralized, corporate board-like organizational structure than is the case with the Democrats, a development frankly acknowledged by RA officials (Jones, 2000).

There are differences as well in how each party raises and spends money. Democrats claim that, as a result of their grassroots organization, DA has a much stronger fundraising operation abroad. While it is hard to fully appraise the claim, it is true that DA maintains a mailing list of more than 10,000 people for direct mail purposes, from which it raised \$81,000 in 2000, while RA eschews direct mail fundraising altogether. RA, on the other hand, claims that direct mail is an inefficient and outmoded way of raising funds, and that the RNC provides it with financial support that the Democrats would envy. Regardless of these disputes, in terms of overall fundraising there is no question that RA is in far the superior position. With help from the RNC, RA has long been able to hire a full-time, paid executive officer as well as several part-time staff assistants, and to procure its own

office in Washington, D.C. (while DA, prior to 2001, survived with volunteer labour while operating out of private homes and offices). In 2000, RA spent more than \$400,000 provided by the RNC on television advertising on *CNN International* and print advertisements in the *International Herald Tribune*, *Wall Street Journal*, and *USA Today*. The conviction among RA leaders that overseas military personnel are likely to vote Republican was reflected in extensive additional advertising in *Stars & Stripes*, *Marine Corp Times*, *Air Force Times*, *Army Times* and *Navy Times* (advertising that RA officials believe was crucial in helping them to secure key overseas votes in Florida's close presidential contest).

As the RNC financial support suggests, national Republican officials appear to attach greater importance to the overseas electorate than do their Democratic counterparts. Republican party leaders are, for example, far more likely than their Democratic counterparts to travel abroad for RA fundraising receptions sponsored by local chapters. In the spring of 1999, Republican Party Chairman Jim Nicholson and RA Executive Director Michael Jones flew to Europe to attend RA receptions in Italy, Switzerland and the UK. Jones also visited chapters in Costa Rica, United Arab Emirates, Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, Philippines and Japan, frequently accompanied by Republican Party Co-Chairman Patricia Harrison. Congressman John C. Cooksey (R-LA) spoke at a RA event in Paris and presidential candidate Steve Forbes was the featured speaker at a reception in the UK. In contrast, while apparently more active in grassroots voter registration and outreach, DA chapters have hosted far fewer visitors from the Democratic Party hierarchy. RA has also set up an advisory committee that includes such well-known figures as Senators Trent Lott and Connie Mack, Congressman Cooksey and Congresswoman Kay Granger, and former party chairs Haley Barbour and Frank J. Fahrenkopf, Jr.

Perhaps in lieu of the kind of selective incentives (in the form of office-holding) used by the Democrats, RA has emphasized special access to politicians and policymakers for those who make large financial contributions to party activities. RA especially stresses the advantages of the 'Ambassador' class of membership, provided to those who contribute \$1,000 or more to RA on an annual basis. These contributors receive a personal invitation to attend the Republicans Abroad Annual Meeting in Washington, D.C., where they meet with and are briefed by prominent Republican leaders. During presidential election years, Ambassador members are hosted at a hospitality suite at the RNC (with speakers such as Henry Kissinger, George Schultz and Steve Forbes) and are granted guest credentials for the floor. RA also promises to 'assist Ambassador members in arranging visits with Members of Congress and party leaders when they travel to Washington' (Republicans Abroad, 1999).

As with its Democratic counterpart, a major goal of RA is voter registration and get-out-the-vote drives. In contrast to the Democrats, RA places more emphasis on contacting military personnel, and its 2000 Campaign

Plan called for chapters in countries with a large US military presence to appoint a special liaison to 'disseminate GOP talking points and candidate information' to US troops (Republicans Abroad, 2000b). The Republicans also placed major emphasis on recruiting among members of the American Chambers of Commerce Overseas – a constituency which, unsurprisingly, they perceive as Republican-leaning. In contrast to the Democrats' focus on professors, teachers and students, RA is closer to business elites in the overseas community, and often organizes through the social networks created and maintained in exclusive social clubs and corporate offices (Jones, 2000). For RA, black-tie receptions with honored Republican dignitaries are a common fundraising event, rather different from DA's reliance on large numbers of individual direct mail contributions.

With neither convention delegates nor RNC members, it seems reasonable to conclude that RA has frequently served more as an organization for wealthy activists abroad to achieve informal access at stateside GOP events than as a vehicle for the autonomous representation of large numbers of overseas Republicans. To a much greater extent than DA, RA is organized and controlled from its Washington headquarters – a development that has caused significant internal conflict within RA on more than one occasion, even as it has facilitated fundraising, global advertising campaigns and inter-country coordination.<sup>2</sup> While RA clearly provides various opportunities for participation for overseas Republicans, it does not provide as many avenues for maintaining an overseas political career as its Democratic counterpart; in this respect it is less developed as a form of globalized political action.

## Conclusion

Political scientists have largely ignored the emergence of political activity by American citizens outside of the borders of the United States. They have therefore overlooked the birth of a new form of American party organization: in addition to the party in the electorate, in government and as a domestic organization, we must now acknowledge the emergence of the American political party as – in part – a global organization. Clearly, any analysis of American elections that does not include some consideration of the potential role of the overseas population in affecting outcomes will be incomplete – perhaps radically so, as the recent presidential election illustrated. Our party textbooks, one may suggest, should be adjusted accordingly. Similarly, studies of party politics in other countries may want to give greater consideration to the activities – if any – of political parties outside their nation's territorial boundaries.

Globalized political action also raises new questions for students of public policy and political theory. How should campaign finance law and voting procedures be adjusted in response to these new conditions? What is the proper role within American politics for those citizens who have lived many

years – even decades – abroad, yet can still vote and make financial contributions to homeland campaigns? More generally, what are the most appropriate representative forms for Americans (and other nationalities) in a world where more and more people are living in countries where they possess neither citizenship nor voting rights? Should the USA and other nations develop new forms of ‘transnational’ citizenship to address the increasing mobility of the world’s population?

Lastly, we must return to a question posed at the beginning of this article: does this phenomenon constitute a qualitative leap in the nature of American party organization, one that breaks or alters the links between territoriality and citizenship? The answer has to be an ambiguous one. On the one hand, we clearly see the intensification of cross-border political activity (part of the very definition of globalization), the emergence of new issues for partisan competition (overseas taxation, voting rights, citizenship transmission, etc.), and the creation of new possibilities for split loyalties (voting in one country while living in another). The most interesting revelation is that a US citizen living abroad, perhaps for many decades, and perhaps while even holding citizenship in another country, can serve on the highest decision-making body of the Democratic Party. While considerable controversy has been attached to the idea that Mexican-Americans with dual citizenship are residing in the USA while voting in Mexican elections and even serving in Mexican offices, few have noticed that some American citizens who have lived abroad – including in Mexico – are doing much the same thing. Nevertheless, such developments do not constitute the definitive creation of a ‘global party’ – rather, they imply the globalization of what are still mostly traditional American party activities. A truly global party, of course, would require a global state with which to interact; for the moment, we have only national political parties with global arms dedicated to accomplishing strictly delimited tasks. Where these organizational forms may eventually lead remains as interesting and as unknown as the future of globalization itself.

### Notes

- 1 These conclusions are based on a comparison with the *New York Times* survey of the delegates at the 2000 Democratic National Convention; see Clymer and Connelly (2000).
- 2 This judgment is based on internal RA documents describing a split within the organization during 1995–6 (copies in possession of author). The conflict was generated in part by disagreements over the power of the country committees in relation to the international executive committee and the executive director in Washington.

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