

‘Neither God Nor Monster’: Antonio Maura and the Failure of Conservative Reformism in Restoration Spain (1893–1923)

‘Would you please tell me which way I ought to go from here?’, said Alice. ‘That depends on where you want to get to’, said the cat. (*Alice in Wonderland*, London, The Nonesuch Press, 1939, p. 64)

During the summer of 1903, a Spanish republican deputy and journalist, Luis Morote, visited the summer watering-holes of a number of eminent Spanish politicians. Of the resulting interviews — published as *El pulso de España*¹ — two have assumed a symbolic value of special significance.

When Morote interviewed the Conservative politician Eduardo Dato, Dato was on the terrace of a luxury hotel in San Sebastián, talking with his friends, the cream of the aristocracy. It was in that idyllic place that Dato declared his great interest in social reforms as the best way to avoid any threat to the stability of the political system. He was convinced that nobody would find the necessary support for political revolution in Spain. The real danger lay in social revolution.²

Morote wrote that Antonio Maura, who was at his Santander residence, went into a sort of ‘mystic monologue’, talking enthusiastically about democracy, the treasure of national energy that was hidden in the people, the absence of middle classes and the mission of politicians: that the people should participate, and that every field in politics should be worked at and dignified.³

Two Conservative politicians, two different approaches, two different paths towards an uncertain destination: one of them patching up holes in the system and the liberal parliamentary monarchic regime in its most pressing social requirements, the

other attempting to reinforce the system itself with solid consensus and a strengthening of its institutions.

The political system of Restoration Spain was based on the alternation in power of two (artificially created and oligarchic) dynastic parties: the Liberals and Conservatives. Although universal male suffrage existed from 1891, elections were entirely managed. The key figure here was the Minister of the Interior who used his so-called 'moral influence' to deliver election results as previously agreed between the two parties. The object was to ensure a stable majority for the incoming government, while also delivering enough seats to the opposition party to keep it in the game. In Spain, unlike in Britain or France, there were strong anti-system forces (anti-liberal and anti-monarchical) which also obtained a small number of seats; these included socialists, republicans, Carlists, and Catalanists. But this tokenism only served to highlight the greater political exclusivity and high centralization of the Spanish system. This was made possible by the existence of the *caciques*, a national network of provincial political 'bosses' linking each locality to the central government in Madrid, who were mobilized at election time to deliver the vote. The Minister of the Interior's influence, the *caciques*' webs of patronage, administrative and judicial corruption and also the apathy of the population all joined forces to make a mockery of the electoral process.⁴ There was a widespread popular alienation that perpetuated the Restoration's lack of any solid social base. The strength of anti-system forces also grew commensurately. Some dynastic politicians were aware of these flaws and some attempted to implement corrective reforms. But most were uninterested in reform or even viewed it as a threat to the survival of the system as a whole.

Although there were several tentative reform projects during the reign of Alfonso XIII, this article deals with just one of them: that of Antonio Maura. If not necessarily the best, his was perhaps the most ambitious and most complete programme, covering many different fields: social, administrative, political and economic. It occurred during the period of Maura's most important premiership, 1907–9 — the so-called *gobierno largo* ('long government') — and it is on this period that the article is mainly focused. Given the short life and great instability of the governments of the Liberal Monarchy, Maura's project was also the only one that stood a chance of being realized. The project

had precedents in Maura's previous cabinets, as well as echoes in subsequent isolated (and somehow desperate) attempts at the end of his career. Maura's first ministerial portfolio was in 1893 (*Ultramar* (the Colonies)), while 1923 marked the beginning of Primo de Rivera's fateful military dictatorship and, therefore, the end of active political parliamentary life for a Liberal deputy such as Maura.

Maura was deeply hostile to the militarization of political life and was radically opposed to the dictator. Primo de Rivera considered himself the incarnation of the 'regenerationist iron surgeon' saviour of Spain, and almost imprisoned Maura for his bitter public declarations against the dictatorship. 'This man is crazy', Maura told his son Miguel in 1924, 'This is the beginning of the end. This is the end of Monarchy. Next will come a republic. Then chaos and then, of course, the military.'⁵ The Second Republic, civil war and Franco's dictatorship: this was the chilling prophecy of a statesman who was personally convinced that the true path lay in gradual progress from liberalism to democracy, full of laws, rules and 'filters', as inconvenient in its detail for the Left as for the Right. It constituted a middle way, a common ground that was far from the extremes and in which political groups of Left and Right might work together under a legal system and a constitution that allowed itself to be transformed from within.⁶

Paradoxically, the image that Maura projected at the time was far from this neutral middle way. In the popular perception, in his political heritage and even in subsequent historiography, he became both 'God and Monster'.

The reflections that follow here are grouped in three related sections. Maura's biography, and particularly certain aspects of his psychology and of his personal and professional career, help to explain his political agenda. I use this biographical material to frame a more detailed discussion of his political project, explaining how it was conceived and articulated as a coherent whole. This includes, of course, the 'black holes' and contradictions which caused it to be considered dangerous by both progressives and rightists, and ultimately led to its failure. Be that as it may, it could be argued that despite its faults, the project was a coherent conception of transition from an oligarchic, clientelist system to one of representative liberal democracy. It aimed to integrate a broader range of Spain's political and social constituencies into

the system, but without breaking the rules of the established constitutional 'game' — and that was the main problem. It was designed to promote and mobilize citizens ('citizenship' was one of Maura's key words). But it obviously had a conservative varnish. That is why the term 'conservative socialization' is useful to define Maura's reformist programme.⁷

Finally, I shall outline certain hypotheses regarding the failure of Maura's reform project, and conclude with some observations on the difficulties of the reform from within the system in Restoration Spain.

Antonio Maura was Prime Minister five times and twice a minister in both Liberal or Conservative governments. Born in Mallorca in 1853, Maura was one of eight children in a lower middle-class family. His father ran a small leather workshop and died when Antonio was thirteen. Maura went to the University of Madrid in 1868, intending to become a science teacher, but he opted to study law instead. That choice is not merely of anecdotal interest because in nineteenth-century Spain, being a lawyer was frequently a first step in the *cursus honorum* to becoming a politician. At the university, he also met the young brothers of German Gamazo, a well-established lawyer and an important figure in Praxedes Sagasta's Liberal Party. In the event, it was to be Gamazo who brought Maura into politics.

In the two-party system of alternating power (the so called *turno pacífico*) which was introduced following the 1874 restoration of the Spanish Bourbon monarchy, Gamazo was a man with his own faction who represented something different, a sort of ethical dissidence inside the main Liberal Party. His deep religiosity and protectionism (as against the Liberal free-trade line) brought him close to Conservative thought. But his progressivism in taxation matters and in relation to large landowning interests transcended the goals of the Liberal Party. Thus he was neither a typical Liberal, nor a typical Conservative. As we shall see, Maura inherited this stance. Maura found in Gamazo a mentor in matters both legal and political. By marrying Gamazo's youngest sister and thereby entering his family, Maura fulfilled all the usual requirements for becoming a member of the political system. Here he was: a promising young lawyer, married to the sister of a prominent politician. In his professional field he soon won a considerable reputation. And what is perhaps crucial to understanding his political style, he developed an idiosyn-

cratically profound, and almost religious faith in the law. It was said ironically that Maura had read 'only two books: the Civil Code and the catechism . . .'⁸

Obsessed with distancing himself from the image of the typical opportunist, Maura repeatedly said that he had no desire to become a politician. The image he was trying to avoid was that of the professional politicians of the day who felt no real concern for the national interest, but only with profit for themselves and their clients. While in this sense he shared the popular perception of politicians as villains, at the same time he wanted to dignify politics. He spoke of an obligation to enter politics which sprang from his duty to the *Patria*, and explained that there was 'something' outside of himself (whether it was his party, his electors, the king or that idealized *Patria*) that was always 'pushing him' to enter political life, to 'save' Spain. This was a perception of himself that Maura carefully cultivated from the very beginning of his political life. He constructed his own myth.

Maura's ambiguous attitude had a double effect as well as a double meaning. On the one hand, in theory and in his public manifestations, he was hostile to any kind of personalism or factionalism that could interfere with parliamentary life. In 1913 he was reluctant to lead even the *mauristas*, the fervent movement that bore his own name, stating that he did not want to add another political faction to the fragmenting party system. He also felt real respect and concern for liberal democratic institutions and their representatives: the Cortes (Spanish parliament) and the deputies. Furthermore, he maintained this even in the most critical moments: for example, after his great defeat in October 1909, when the Catholic extreme Right called on him to lead a 'bloc of the Right' that would act against the new Liberal government with the same hostility as the 'bloc of the Left' had directed against him. He refused, declaring that it was anti-constitutional. In the Cortes he explained to the representative of the Catholic extreme Right:

In my opinion Señor Senante confuses two things; he confuses the constitutional forms — which must be neutral, and remain at the disposition of all Spaniards, of all opinions, of all interests — with the substantive content of politics. In terms of that content, I can be with my respected colleague and against them [pointing at the left]. But in the defence of judicial forms and liberal democratic institutions I am with those gentlemen [once more pointing at the left] against anybody. And that is the Constitution.⁹

This attitude is what the cynical republican Alejandro Lerroux mocked as Maura's 'democratic fetish': 'He sincerely supports democracy . . . He wants conservative social order, but associated with democratic constitutional forms.'¹⁰

On the other hand, Maura deeply despised all those who were in politics in order to profit from the 'spoils system'. And although his cruellest comments occur mainly in his private correspondence, his arrogance and disdain towards these people were obvious. In a letter to his friend Ramón Bergé, he wrote that politicians were 'villains, frogs in the mud, hypocritical actors, crazy people, oafs, scoundrels or greedy bastards who seek their own profit like myopic pigs that dig up potatoes instead of truffles'. As for the Congress (the lower house of the Cortes), it was a sort of 'penitentiary, lunatic asylum or brothel'.¹¹

This critical spirit was inherited and taken to extremes by one of the branches of *maurismo*, which followed anti-parliamentary paths in support of Primo de Rivera's dictatorship.¹² Yet however critical his stance, Maura was, in truth, devoted to parliamentary politics and from the outset was developing a reforming agenda for the Spanish state.

As a Liberal deputy from 1881, Maura sought to introduce democratic measures such as trial by jury and civil marriage — although this last proposal never reached the statute books. His first ministerial post, at the Colonial Office in Sagasta's cabinet of 1893, gave him responsibility for Cuba and the Philippines. He tried to establish an administrative organization for the Philippines to replace the 'centralism of friars' (the Church's control over administrative as well as religious affairs). The Church never forgave him for this. However, some years later when the Nozaleda affair occurred, progressive opinion seemed to have forgotten this 'anti-clerical' effort on Maura's part.¹³

But it was to be Cuba that occupied most of Maura's early ministerial energies. Although in 1893 Cuba was still Spanish, the movement towards independence had by now reached an advanced stage. It was in this situation that Maura put forward a series of measures to improve Spain's relations with the colony. First, he limited the Spanish governor's powers, and proposed to unify Cuba's six provinces under one autonomous administration (composed of local inhabitants) that would deal with health, education and public works. In this way, Maura strengthened the local councils, which would now depend on the island's own

administration rather than the Madrid government. He also proposed a modest electoral reform by widening Cuba's restricted electorate.¹⁴

Maura's reforms were directed mainly towards autonomy and were all well received in Cuba, where he was acclaimed as 'the Spanish Gladstone': '¡Viva el Gladstone español!' was a battlecry heard during independence campaigns.¹⁵ However, the most radical elements in Cuba remained wary, suspecting (quite rightly) that if the reforms were successful they would halt any impulse towards independence. In general, reforming measures were regarded by those outside the system as a snare to prevent genuine change. When Maura began to enact social reforms during his most important premiership, the Liberals opportunistically repeated this criticism, likening his measures to traps: 'little mirrors to catch silly birds'.¹⁶

On the Cuban question, Maura's worst enemies at this time were not to be found among supporters of independence, or the Spanish political and economic intelligentsia in Cuba, but in the Cortes, where he was widely considered a fool, a suicidal and anti-patriotic pirate. There were even those who thought that the influence of, and the new hopes raised by, Maura's proposals had provoked the definitive outbreak of revolt (in the event, these were never accepted by the Cortes). On the other hand there were also those, Maura himself naturally among them, who believed that the war might have been avoided through the implementation of his decentralizing reforms.

Neither of these suggestions seems to me to be valid. Perhaps it was already too late for such reforms. The background was very complicated, and speculation is pointless. What, in any case, is important here is to reach some conclusions about the political philosophy that inspired the reforms.

First, decentralization was for Maura a way of constructing citizenship. By encouraging local loyalties and dispelling old feelings of resentment or helplessness before a remote central state, making the people participate in politics would allow them to feel closer to the administration. Maura likened the population's feelings towards the central administration to 'a bunch of stinging nettles in the face'.¹⁷

Secondly, allowing the people limited and fair concessions to their demands for autonomy would act as a disincentive to the growth of radical feelings. In this way, there might always be

some 'allies' among the malcontents who would deflect the most radical impulses for independence. This is what Maura meant when he said (some have suggested naively): 'our best ally is the Cuban people, we must win the hearts of the Cubans and install there the sovereignty of Spain'.¹⁸ But this is a typical feature of Maura's philosophy of conservative socialization. He understood citizenship as a means of making vital, practical and emotional connections (as yet lacking) between ordinary Spaniards and the system.

Finally and most importantly, this connection could only come about by eradicating corruption and praetorian politics. Spain had to gain a reputation as a trustworthy state. In fact, Maura attempted to put this belief into practice between 1907 and 1909 in Ceuta and Melilla, by substituting the military governor with a civil post. However, the proposal was defeated by the opposition of the colonial army in Morocco.

What I have said so far about Maura's philosophy of reform could also be applied to his views on the electorate, nationalist movements in Spain and social policy. He was especially concerned about political-administrative problems, juridical foundations and political culture as the basis of any possible reform. Above all, he was obsessed with the idea of constitutional legitimacy: 'the value of any measure', he said, 'is inseparable from the form in which it is delivered'.¹⁹

Maura's experience as a member of the Liberal cabinet in 1893 was a disappointing one. He was attacked, not only by the Conservatives, but also by members of his own party. Paradoxically, his only support came from republicans. Still as a Liberal, he was a member of the cabinet again in 1894, in Sagasta's government. As Minister of Justice, his only remarkable achievements were his defence of trial by jury and his suppression of public executions. Between 1895 and 1901, Maura gradually felt more and more distant from the Liberal Party. The key moment came with Gamazo's death in 1901. Maura's decision to leave the Liberal Party was probably triggered by the conflict between clericalism and anti-clericalism, which exploded at the beginning of the century and polarized opinion. It was a subject that touched the heart of society, and radicalized the politicians' position. No politician could escape the problem, even if many were reluctant to convert private religious feelings into a political agenda, which of course applied in the case of the extremely pious Maura.

At the time, in political bets made by journalists, there were still many doubts about Maura's position. He himself seemed unsure which party to choose. In the words of one journalist: 'Maura goes neither to the Conservative Party nor the Liberal Party: Maura goes to higher destinations. He is going to do a Canovas', elevating himself to the level of the statesman who had built the Restoration system.²⁰

It was in 1902 that Maura definitively solved 'the mystery'. He addressed a meeting in which he first employed the concept of the 'revolution from above' which is absolutely central to his political thought. Maura acknowledged that this particular revolution could best be achieved from inside the Conservative Party — a strategic rather than an ideological decision — because he had no real chance inside the Liberal Party. It was a revolution that must be accomplished, in his own words, 'quickly, radically, brutally'. It would rebuild the system on a more democratic basis in order to discourage revolution from below. The truth belied his fashionable rhetoric. In fact, this so-called revolution was envisaged as a long-term programme of reform. It sought to change the main structures of an artificial and corrupt system that was likely to collapse, sooner or later. The solution was not a quick fix, especially if implemented by parliamentary means, as Maura wanted. This quality deserves emphasis, because it contrasts so completely with the regenerationist dreams nursed by many of his contemporaries, of a man of providence, a dictator or 'iron surgeon'.

Maura's political liberalism can be measured by his respect for the Cortes and for parliamentary procedures, and his wish to have Spain's parliament open, working and publicly accountable.²¹ But Maura's arrogance and his authoritarian manners, 'my intransigence, my pedantry, my tempestuous and violent character', worked against him. So did the idealistic energy that earned him the epithet of '*caballo loco en una caharrería*' (bull in a china shop). All of this made him look suspicious and even dangerous to certain sectors both inside and outside the system.²²

A confidential report of 1902 to the Queen Regent described Maura as:

A convinced monarchist, who thinks of the country as identified with Monarchy, he is not very enthusiastic about the queen and judges her very severely. His attitude is very clear and he is convinced about what he says. His bitterness reflects his state of mind. He is against the political establishment,

feels doubts about the future of Spain and knows that he could fail in his aims. Unlike other politicians he does not talk very much about people, but a lot about ideas and solutions. He wants to change everything: army, navy, administrative regime and taxes and, above all, the electoral system. He seriously wants to see these things through, or else to abandon political life forever.²³

Or, as he said to his friend Bergé: 'It doesn't matter to me. Either I end up forgotten, like the spinster ladies who dress up the statues in church, or I die a martyr, in pursuit of chivalric ideals.'²⁴ So what became of these Quixotic sentiments?

In 1902, now as a Conservative, Maura became Minister of the Interior in Silvela's cabinet. He kept his radical promises and instigated, for the first time in the history of the Restoration, 'clean' elections which would respect the will of the electorate rather than that of the Minister of the Interior, who usually dealt with electoral manipulation. Maura was convinced that there would be prompt reaction among the people who might feel 'liberated from the chains of *caciques*' and feel free to vote. In this respect, he shared regenerationists' view — only partly accurate — of a *pueblo* anxious to vote, but prisoner of the *caciques*. Of course, Maura knew that republicans or socialists would take advantage, but the main vote would be, or so he optimistically believed, pro-system.

With this in mind, he introduced key measures accordingly to neutralize the networks of influence and privilege that had become entrenched in the existing system. First, he appointed civil governors to provinces with which they were not familiar. Secondly, he refrained from imposing governmental candidates on constituencies (the so-called *encasillado*). Finally, he announced a radical programme of administrative reform to eliminate corruption. These measures earned praise and recognition from all progressive sectors.

But what happened after the elections? The republicans' electoral success was striking enough for the Queen Regent to feel that the monarchy had been put at risk, all for boosting the reputation of a moralizing minister. She mocked Maura as 'Cato'. The consequences were, first, that the Palace engineered the government's fall, and, second, that Maura was left to realize that he had not gained the support he had hoped for from the 'neutral masses' or, as he termed them, 'citizenry'. In fact, all he had succeeded in doing was to endanger the monarchical regime.²⁵

The question now might be: if opening the floodgates meant having a republic, and since Maura was, as he said, sincerely committed to real democracy, what was there to fear? The answer was that he feared two things. One was that, given the extent of electoral abstentions, it could never be said that the result represented the popular will. The second and more important was that Maura did not see a republic as synonymous with democracy. He had passed through the republican experience of 1873 and, from his point of view, apart from a few truly democratic ideas, the prevalent political culture had been a pot pourri of praetorianism, conspiracy, clientelism, the apathy of the voters, radicalism and even fanaticism: 'armed people, cantonalism and the military conspiring in the taverns',²⁶ as he had written when he was twenty.

Of course, Maura did not want a republic. At least, he was wont to say that for as long as the people were not educated in politically liberal principles (respect for parliament, the law and the end of praetorian politics) then the republic remained for him synonymous with chaos. Following the republican experience of 1873, in fact, this impression was widespread among middle-class Spaniards. Children were educated in the idea; when their houses were untidy, their mothers would cry: 'This looks like a republic!'²⁷ Therefore, Maura decided that from this moment on, before making any other 'suicidal' attempt against the Liberal Monarchy, the parties should be strengthened, certain defences established, and progressive reforms enacted to contain the radical Left (as well as the intransigent Right). In his eyes it remained necessary to educate the idealized citizenry. The system had to be made legitimate, progressive and open, but without taking excessive risks.

It was in 1902 that Maura put in order all the ideas he had in mind and decided to go ahead with them, but cautiously. He remained a man of the system, a monarchist. While he wanted to improve things, and especially to integrate the far Right (as the liberals should do with the Left) into the system, he was no longer going to be the radical revolutionary he had once promised to be. His politics would be gradual and measured.

In the same year, Maura was elected president of the Conservative Party, and in 1903 he became prime minister with a Conservative cabinet. 'Je veux gouverner par la parole', he said to the French ambassador.²⁸ That statement showed his con-

fidence in parliament and in himself. Accordingly, during that government, as almost all his governments, parliament remained open continuously except for one month in summer, provoking complaints from its members about 'hot weather' and 'hard work'. If this sounds ridiculous to modern ears, it must be remembered how exceptional such practices were at a time when the majority of ministers issued *Reales Decretos* (Royal Decrees) with the Cortes closed. This was, indeed, one reason for the lack of respect for parliamentary legislation among the population and, sometimes, among the politicians themselves. The practice contributed to the perception of illegitimacy that so tarnished the image of the system.

Maura's 1903 government, which lasted only a year, was a kind of rehearsal for his 'long government'. The Conservative leader was able to sound out public opinion, and also test the strength of the press; the most important opposition newspapers joined in a common enterprise called 'The Trust'. The debate about the Archbishop Nozaleda affair, even though this was more political in origin than religious, detonated the longstanding fight between clericalism and anti-clericalism.²⁹ The opposition was shaken by the strength and impetuosity of Maura, the new statesman who began to work on dozens of bills. This government was finally putting to the test a multifaceted reform project whose success needed the support of the entire Conservative Party, a widespread respect for the law and, most importantly, the consensus of the majority. Above all, perhaps, it required *time*: something that was not easy to achieve given the prevalent political instability.

Maura's 1903 government pursued two main lines of policy. The first consisted of the popularization of Alfonso XIII, an attempt to connect the young king with the people, to promote the idea of a monarchy that was 'above classes and in the heart of citizens', and to identify nation with monarchy. This was Maura's main purpose in taking Alfonso on a trip to Catalonia that was dangerous and controversial, given the extreme hostility towards the king in Catalonia, especially in Barcelona. But at the same time, Maura was very concerned to 'demilitarize' the king's education, so as to foster in him a greater respect for his ministers and parliament, and to establish a shared identity among monarchy, nation and the Liberal system.

Maura's second policy line was his feverish legislative activity

in social, administrative and economic fields. In the first of these, the law of Sunday rest was passed with the support of the Instituto de Reformas Sociales, whose president, the republican Gumersindo de Azcárate, was a close friend of Maura. The law also had the rare support of the socialists. In the administrative area, Maura introduced legislation which began the professionalization of the civil service: a genuine attempt to break with the network of clientelism and to modernize the Spanish state by creating a stable, politically neutral bureaucracy. Maura also presented to parliament measures designed to unify the national economy. These constituted a really important part of his overall reform project at both a practical and symbolic level. And at the same time, the first steps were taken towards a gradual reform of the regressive tax system. Finally, discussion began on both a new electoral law and a law of administrative decentralization which Maura described as the 'lethal law' that would sweep away *caciquismo*.

But there also was a dark side to Maura's reformist programme: his authoritarian style. This embraced his determination to limit abuses of parliamentary immunity; his overt lack of respect for the press; and his repression of social unrest. Although this dark side may have shown itself more through attitude than action, it had the effect of creating the 'monster' face for some people, the 'god' face for others. Maura's impetuosity readily lent itself to caricature. A liberal newspaper mocked: 'Supermaura, superminister, supermallorquin, superstellar . . .'³⁰ Meanwhile, for the Rightists and Catholics he was 'The pillar of honesty and virility'. In periods of intense debate, the newspapers of 'The Trust' toiled unremittingly. The campaign against Maura was ferocious, yet he remained indifferent to it. 'The *Diario de Sesiones de las Cortes*', he declared, 'is my newspaper.'³¹ This was a grave mistake.

The government fell when Maura and the entire cabinet, resigned after the king supported his own candidate as the Chief of the General Staff, ignoring the government's candidate. Maura's resignation on principle was unanimously approved by the progressives, who hailed him as the defender of civil parliamentary rights.³² Such clashes with Alfonso XIII over infringement of parliamentary prerogatives lasted all Maura's political life.

From December 1904 to December 1906, years spent in oppo-

sition, Maura tried to reorganize the Conservative Party so as to consolidate his leadership. It should not be forgotten that he was still newly arrived in the party and that, as soon as problems arose, he found himself surrounded by hostile factions. During these years, several events occurred that would have consequences for future political attitudes and realignments. One of the most important was the rebirth of militarism (evidence of the weakness of civil power), in the angry response of the army to a satirical newspaper, *Cu-Cut*, in Barcelona. This led to the *Ley de jurisdicciones* (Law of Jurisdictions), entitling the army to try and judge civil 'offences' against the motherland. It was considered a severe intrusion into the civil sphere, and was very controversial (with painful consequences).³³ Another very important issue was the rebirth of the ever-latent clerical/anti-clerical problem, which gave rise to violent demonstrations. Finally, there was the evident weakness of the Liberal Party, which had split into five different factions. All three of these developments nourished a chaotic image of the system and stimulated radical attitudes.

Maura's activity during this period in opposition was intense. It was said that whatever happened in Spanish politics happened: 'with Maura, against Maura or around Maura'. But it was after these years that his opportunity arrived, and it is from this point that we can discuss the maturity of a reforming programme which he sought to implement between January 1907 and October 1909. This was the famous *gobierno largo*, the longest of the Restoration.

This government began with a paradox. Maura, the man who stood for clean elections and an end to *caciquismo*, appointed La Cierva as his Minister of the Interior with the intention of running 'dirty' elections. It was clear that the Conservative leader wanted a strong majority to enable him to push through his project. The Liberals' share of seats was thus significantly curtailed, although some anti-system forces (Catalanists, republicans and Carlists) were allowed to gain seats. This also had the effect of breaking Liberal/Conservative bipolarity. In any case, Maura's principles of absolute and unswerving righteousness contrasted with his practices of expediency, opportunism and compromise. This contradiction indicates the problem which even the most sincere reformer had to face when in power, and demonstrates the perversity of the system, the vicious circle of corruption and apathy that could only be broken, if not by a revolution, by com-

binning the use of established rules of the system with a sincere intention to change it.

In reality, this was one of the most vibrant governments of Alfonso XIII's reign. It was alive with controversy and extraordinarily rich in parliamentary debates and bills (*The Times* reported no fewer than 280 bills between October 1908 and June 1909³⁴). But the government ended badly, with the war in Morocco which provoked the *Semana Trágica* (Tragic Week) in Barcelona. From this moment everything changed for Maura. The politician who had tried to find an area of consensus, now found himself facing public opinion that was more divided than it had ever been. And his own public image was more clearly split in two: half-god, half-monster.

So how may we summarize the principal features of Maura's conservative reformist project, as it was developed between 1907 and 1909? First, Maura wanted to make the political system legitimate in the eyes of the people. He was convinced that progress towards a liberal democratic system was possible within the constitution, and that the main institutions and laws were perfect on paper, but corrupted by the combined manipulation of the Minister of the Interior and the *caciques*, and ineffectual because they lacked 'the vitalizing contact with the people'. He therefore proposed what he called his 'trilogy to dynamite the system', namely the law of local administration, the new electoral law and the law to reform the administration of municipal justice.

With the first, Maura's aim was the awakening and development of a sense of citizenship. He felt sure that, by removing the gap in local government between the people and the administration, he would increase popular participation and a sense of identification and loyalty towards the government. He wanted to promote municipal self-government so that the regions too would be recognized (which would be a way of satisfying current Catalan demands). Decentralization would also consolidate the nation: by channelling local nationalisms and allegiances upwards, Maura hoped to create a sense of connection with the great mother-Spain. Moreover, this idea had another advantage: it built bridges between very different political groups. Albeit with different agendas, decentralization was also the aim of republicans such as Azcárate, liberals like Segismundo Moret, Catholics, and Catalanists. At all events, it represented broad common ground on which to move.³⁵

The most conservative aspect of Maura's bill was the intention to introduce corporate suffrage for the election of one-third of town councillors. This was an idea beloved of Catholics and also of Spanish republicans (the great influence here deriving from the theories of the German philosopher Ahrens, who conceived the perfect society as an 'organism' and corporate suffrage as an ideal complement to universal suffrage). It is important to stress here the distinctness of the corporate vote as a *complement to* rather than as a *substitute for* universal suffrage, which is what distinguishes it from the corporate vote in fascist thought.

It is not surprising that the idea was bitterly attacked by Liberals, republicans and socialists (although in the event some attacks were mainly for strategic motives). The respected and honourable republican, Azcárate, wondered why the socialists were reacting in such a drastic way, given that they had a relatively dense net of organizations throughout the villages (so that with the new law they would have even more representatives in the municipal councils).³⁶ The answer was that they would lose their revolutionary momentum — and this was precisely Maura's purpose. 'Citizens' meant neither *caciques* nor revolutionaries. Parliamentary discussion of this law was lengthier and more intense than that on universal suffrage in the 1890s. Maura had said that he wanted a 'national law'. There were literally hundreds of speeches, amendments and sub-committees, with representatives of all parties debating the question even after the parliamentary sessions were closed. Maura's interest in the law was so profound that he told the French ambassador that it would probably take ten or twelve years to realise, and might well mean the death of his political career. 'But I don't mind that at all,' he said, 'it is necessary that a man is sacrificed to an ideal.' The ambassador naturally reached his own conclusions: 'this man was half-politician half-apostle, and the main difference between him and his political colleagues lay in his patience and tenacity. That was the secret of his strength and authority . . .'³⁷ In the end, the law was not approved, even though it had been through so many amendments that it could really be said to embrace the opinion of the entire parliament.

The second law that was supposed to put an end to *caciquismo* was the electoral law, dealing as it did with the whole system of elections and electoral mechanics. Its aim was to stop corruption, but not necessarily to make it easier for anti-system candidates

to enter parliament. The census was to be carried out by the Geographical and Statistical Institute. The electoral commissions, which supervised the conduct of elections at constituency level, would be composed by drawing lots. There would be independent observers, and disputed cases would be arbitrated not by parliament but by the Supreme Constitutional Court, in order to distance politicians from any position of influence. It is clear from internal correspondence that Maura was not playing to the gallery, but intended a real change to the corrupt system. However, in practice his own party both criticized and disobeyed him since its members considered his attitude suicidal for party interests.³⁸

Azcárate made another proposal to abolish something that seriously damaged the image of democratic forms. He put forward that an unopposed candidate should be elected automatically, thus avoiding the fraudulent electoral processes that had previously occurred in such cases. This was the famous Article 29 of the Electoral Law, that paradoxically became an incentive for a sort of institutionalized bribery, even though some socialists were elected by this system.

The electoral law had many flaws. There were loopholes that tended to eliminate the anti-system forces, unless they were really representative. It was a law designed more to improve ethical standards than truly to democratize. However, this was considered an indispensable first step towards democracy. Its effects are even now the subject of passionate discussion among historians.³⁹

The third law dealt with the reform of municipal justice, a nest of fraud and venality and another bastion of *caciquismo*. Magistrates were elected by the party in power, and thus were another link in the corrupt chain. With the law in mind, Maura announced: 'The orgy is finished!!'⁴⁰

However, all three of Maura's proposed reforms failed because they were never completed despite hundreds of hours of parliamentary discussion. For example, the bill for decentralization was so constantly disrupted, and in such an exaggerated fashion, that in an Italian juridical dictionary the example of this Spanish law is used to illustrate the term *ostruzionismo*.⁴¹

Discussion of a reforming agenda leads inevitably to the subject of laws as instruments, but also as juridical goals in themselves. As well as telling us much about the idiosyncrasies of

their creators, they are also a barometer of the system's political efficiency. And, in this case, they reflect the effort to reaffirm a Liberal political culture with Conservative 'brakes'. This becomes clearer if we turn to another important group of bills: those dealing with economic matters. These had a long-term goal which was to foment a sense of economic nationalism and self-reliance. One example concerned the shipbuilding industry, and the construction of both merchant ships and warships (the famous *escuadra*) which provided the nation with a sense of strength — especially following the defeat in Cuba and the Philippines. When this was proposed in parliament, it provoked enthusiastic applause from all the deputies. The protection and strengthening of industry was another item on the agenda, one of its objectives being the encouragement of an industrial middle class. That would bring the hypothetical benefits of more employment and generally higher living standards, and would therefore consolidate broader social support for the system. A further point was the promotion of internal and external trade, for which purpose several agencies were created. Most important among these were the International Trade Association and the National Council for Production and Trade — the latter intended to coordinate the concerns and demands of all economic sectors.⁴²

The nationalist agenda of Maura's government led it to propose some measures of state interventionism which scarcely fitted its conservative profile. These political measures were sometimes extremely controversial, because of the widely-perceived and undue influence of powerful industrial and agricultural lobbies on Conservative politicians. In fact this influence was so strong that it damaged party discipline, and reached the heart of the cabinet itself. Stormy debates in parliament were echoed in a huge popular demonstration against the so-called immorality of the government. This demonstration, tolerated by the government and promoted by certain newspapers, was not supported by the main leaders of the opposition (from the socialist Pablo Iglesias to the Liberal Moret, or the republicans Melquíades Alvarez or Azcárate). At all events, the episode brought to the fore that recurring image of the premier's ambivalence: Maura as victim/hangman or god/monster.

Other reform measures caused less furore: for example, the law of 'conservative' agrarian reform. This allocated public wood-

lands or previously unproductive land to poor families in receipt of economic aid from the government. The intention was to increase the amount of land under cultivation, thus creating a 'rural democracy' or, in Lord Salisbury's words, a 'property owning democracy'. It would anchor the loyalty of a new class of peasant smallholders to the regime. Achieving this kind of patriotic peasantry was a key aspect of the project of conservative socialization.⁴³

Equally important was the gradual recasting of the tax system. Some reforms were carried out in order to eliminate indirect taxes, known as *consumos*, the taxes on food collected by the municipalities, which mainly affected the poor. Several items were removed from the hated tax's list, but this was not enough and in the end not much was achieved; paradoxically, the Liberal government that followed Maura's would reintroduce them again. It was not merely an ideological question, for if the *consumos* were suppressed too radically, municipal councils would become impoverished. It was a problem with no easy solution, and only after many years were the principles of progressive taxation introduced.⁴⁴

As far as social policy is concerned, one point needs special emphasis. Especially after 1909, Maura adopted a more defensive attitude, anxious as he was about the possibility of revolution. Nevertheless, the Conservative leader was always committed to the need for social reform. His motivation sprang, not only from a concern for social justice, but also from his conservative pragmatism: 'remove grievances before they fester'. In Maura's diaries and letters to friends there are many criticisms of the egoism and greed of the possessing classes. But as we have already seen, his approach in this matter was not the same as that of his Conservative rival Dato. While Dato was exclusively focused on social problems, Maura believed — quite rightly as it turned out — that nothing could be achieved without consolidating and dignifying Spain's political institutions, administration and system of justice. It would also be vital to inculcate popular respect (and ensure political support) for the law and, by extension, for a liberal-democratic political culture. It is the failure of these political objectives, compounded by important budgetary constraints, that explains the relative ineffectiveness of the main established social laws.⁴⁵

Maura's 1907–09 government passed a significant number of

bills related to social issues. To employ a metaphor based on contemporary organic models, these might be said to have been divided into those affecting the 'body' of society and those affecting its 'soul'. A complementary classification includes those measures related to reform and and those to repression (public order).⁴⁶

Those bills affecting the 'soul' were clearly conservative or moralistic: for example, the censorship of pornography; the prohibition of night-waitresses and the regulation of prostitution; the early closing of shows, coffeehouses and restaurants at night; and vain attempts to ban amateur and professional bullfighting. The reforms directed at the 'body' or the physical health of society, were more meaningful. The fight against tuberculosis and alcoholism, support for a form of public health service, and campaigns to improve public sanitation were quite effective. This government spent more on health (ten times the usual budget) than any other up until the Second Republic in 1931.

Apart from this, social reforms included the creation of a body charged with child welfare, a prohibition on children or women working at night or in dangerous industries, obligatory school attendance, prohibition of the 'truck system' (paying wages in kind) and bills protecting immigrants. Finally, and especially important, was the creation of a series of bodies with the responsibility for social welfare, labour regulation and the settlement of industrial disputes. Another law accepted and established, for the first time, a legal framework for strikes. These bills tell us much about the inspiration that lay behind them: they aimed at conciliation by defusing labour conflict or containing it within legal channels.

As regards public order, Maura's government dealt with the armed services (especially with the navy), in a first step to reduce and delimit the functions of the military. The entire army should, in Maura's words, be 'melted down in the furnace'.⁴⁷ The reform and strengthening of the police formed part of a policy to reduce the presence of the army in social conflicts. However, a darker side was represented by the proposed Law for the Repression of Terrorism. This truly repressive bill provoked huge hostile demonstrations and prompted the birth of the Liberal-republican 'bloc of the Left' in which, for the first time, monarchists and republicans combined against a monarchic party. The law had been conceived as a civilian alternative to the military Law of

Jurisdictions, but due to strong opposition it was finally rejected by Maura himself.

One of the most important (and least known) of the bills drafted by Maura's government was that concerning recruitment into the army. This introduced universal military service, eliminating the usual practice whereby the rich were able to buy out their sons. The bill had been approved in the lower house and was before the Senate when the crisis of October 1909 paralysed parliamentary work.

Maura's enormously ambitious campaign was ended by a single dramatic turn of events: the outbreak of war in Morocco and its sequel, the Tragic Week in Barcelona, which led in turn to the execution of five people including the anarchist Francisco Ferrer, founder of the city's rationalist school, the Escuela Moderna. Neither the war nor Ferrer's execution were any part of Maura's agenda. Actually, Maura spent much of his time and energy in government opposing the army's presence in Morocco as anything other than as a peacekeeping mission. Whereas the king supported the army's offensive spirit, Maura was against conflict at all costs, until it was too late. But the state's reaction to the Tragic Week in Barcelona was heavyhanded. The Liberal José Canalejas claimed later that 'the legal proceedings against Ferrer were strictly in accordance with the law'.⁴⁸ (That is, of course, with a very unjust law.) Maura's great error was not to ask for Ferrer's reprieve. Maura even consulted Moret, the leader of the Liberal opposition, whose view was that granting a reprieve would constitute a 'lack of virility'. Although the final responsibility was undeniably Maura's, he did not deserve all the insults that were heaped upon him: 'reactionary', 'cruel and bloodthirsty', 'monster', 'bloody mad dog who will be hounded by our scorn until his death' (in the words of the newspaper *El Socialista*). The scale of the international outcry over Ferrer's execution and the broad participation of intellectuals in it, reached the level of the Dreyfus affair.⁴⁹

The events of the Tragic Week were a watershed, not only for Maura (who thereby finally attained his Janus image), but also for the entire political system. Maura's project of reform was forgotten, buried beneath a tide of highly personalized anti-Maura invective. The cry 'Maura no!' became a catch-all, obscuring many very important structural issues: Morocco, the growing political influence of the army, weakness and factional-

ism within the political parties and the growing political intervention of the king, who had become a powerbroker in a fragmented system. But Maura contributed to the personal nature of the campaign through his own inflexibility. After his defeat he adopted either a sphinx-like attitude or an obsession with predicting disasters worthy of Cassandra.

There would be few opportunities in the future for further reforms. The fragmentation of the main political parties into competing personal factions, the effects of the First World War, increasing social conflict, and an increasingly discredited political system, all weakened the reforming impulse. Those reforms that were achieved perished rapidly in the face of such difficulties.

Maura attempted to make some progress during his last three premierships. Each time he was literally urgently called back to power. In 1918, following the major crisis of 1917, he returned as a champion of constitutional politics against the army and was acclaimed by the Left. He proclaimed a political amnesty to release the socialists and republicans who were in prison after the 1917 general strike. He also attempted to reform parliament to increase its efficiency, and he managed to obtain approval for the budget (frozen since 1914). In 1919, he came back again, this time as the Catholic Rightist. Consecrating Spain to the Sacred Heart of Jesus and taking drastic measures against the prevailing social protest, he thus regained his 'monster' face. Finally, in 1921, the old 'fireman of the Monarchy' was recalled yet again in the face of social and military unrest and the threat of a *coup d'état* after the military disaster of Anual. Even this late, some important electoral, social or economic reforms were attempted. But now there was increasing instability, governments were even more shortlived, and the pressure from the extremes was ever more threatening.⁵⁰ Nevertheless, the parliamentary system was still alive, and it was Primo de Rivera, supported by the king, who finally killed off the Liberal system.

The frustrating career of one of the most significant statesman of the Restoration reflects, somehow, the tortuous path of political reform in Restoration Spain. Why then was it so difficult an undertaking?

It is important to emphasize that the reformist stream, the compromise solution that could bring consensus and conciliate different political groups was in the end unsuccessful. Some of

the most important of the many factors influencing the failure of reformism were as follows.

(1) The short life of governments was the first great obstacle: '34 governments between 1902 and 1923 made any consistent effort of reform an impossibility'.⁵¹

(2) Reformers were dependent on a discredited legal system and therefore any alternative anti-system was bound to appear more attractive to people. Nor does there seem to have been a significant liberal-democratic political culture rooted in the population at large, not even sometimes in the *élite*.

(3) Within the political system itself, there were certain elements who tended to boycott reform — among others, the army and the king himself, who was not averse to cutting the ground from under the feet of his own politicians. For example, Alfonso XIII supported and made monthly payments to an association of furious landowners who fought against even the most timid agrarian reform measures attempted by some ministers.⁵²

(4) The supposed beneficiaries of the system, in other words, the economic *élites* ('comfortable classes'), were fearful of the consequences of social and political reform. They seemed to prefer 'more army' and more repression. This is what we might call one of the perverse effects of reformism, that frequently weakened the party that designed the reforms. Their 'clients' felt unsafe: they saw no benefit in the reform for themselves.

(5) Finally, because the working classes experienced no real benefit from any of the reform measures, they also tended to become more radical. Non-revolutionary voices within the unions, who still spoke of pacts with the parties in power, were ignored.

In the final analysis, political legitimacy is the necessary basis of all reform.⁵³ Let us remember that sentence of Maura: 'the value of any measure is inseparable from the form in which it is delivered'.⁵⁴

But let us finish with another image that demonstrates both the importance of institutional political legitimacy and the lost opportunity for reform within the system.

In July 1917, there was great political turbulence in Spain: military unrest, important political demonstrations (such as the assembly in Barcelona demanding constitutional changes) and violent strikes were taking place. A very worried Alfonso XIII

asked advice of the republican Azcárate. Azcárate told the king that the monarchic regime had lost a crucial opportunity to initiate governmental reform from within and to combat the systemic corruption by collaborating with those reformers — including some republicans — who were prepared to work from inside the existing political system. But the king failed to avail himself of this opportunity. The British ambassador reported this conversation.

The king said:

‘In politics, D. Gumersindo, one cannot always do as one would wish.’

To which Azcárate replied:

‘The king, acting within his constitutional rights could have corrected and prevented a great deal of the abuses that have produced this unrest and discontent in all classes of Spanish society.’

The king asked whether it was possible even now to utilize the assistance of the reformists to initiate a series of reforms, and Azcárate replied:

‘It is already too late sir, for this and for everything. The reformist party has now joined the other republican organizations with the radicals of Lerroux and with socialists to work for the fall of the Monarchy, and it’s impossible now to go back.’

The king asked for the attitude of the unions, and Azcárate said that they were the great sufferers, and were disposed to support a political movement, not so much for selfish motives, as with the object of obtaining some guarantee that the national life shall be regulated according to principles of morality and honesty practised by authorities.

The king asked whether it would not be possible to satisfy the unions, and cause them to desist from their intentions, by means of decrees granting reforms beneficial to the workers such as old age pensions for the incapacitated.

Azcárate replied in the negative. In his opinion, measures of so great importance, should not be taken by decree. A decree without force of law, would not avail to overcome the resistance which these interests would offer. Laws of such a nature, should only be made by the full authority of Parliament.

‘It is too late sir’, repeated Azcárate, ‘it is too late for this and for everything
...’²⁵⁵

Notes

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1. L. Morote, *El pulso de España* (Madrid 1903).
2. *Ibid.*, 34.

3. Ibid., 37.

4. For an understanding of the political system of Restoration Spain, the best sources are by José Varela Ortega, *Los amigos políticos. Partidos, elecciones y caciquismo en la Restauración 1875–1900* (Madrid 1977) and Raymond Carr, *Spain 1808–1975* (Oxford 1982). The term 'moral influence' is used by Carr in his chapter 'Liberalism and Reaction 1833–1931', in Raymond Carr, ed., *Spain: A History* (Oxford 2000), 205–43. See also Joaquín Romero Maura, 'El caciquismo', *Historia general de España y América*, Vol. XVI (Madrid 1981), 71–88 and the special issue on the subject in *Revista de Occidente* No. 127 (Madrid 1973).

5. Quoted by Varela Ortega, *Los amigos políticos*, 455.

6. Far from the old interpretation of this period as a cul de sac in which *caciquismo* and parliamentary ineffectiveness made it impossible to arrive at democracy, recent new approaches highlight the liberal values, the positive work of certain politicians and the effective modernization and efforts on democratization in parliamentary life. See, for example, M. Cabrera, ed., *Con luz y taquígrafos. El parlamento en la Restauración (1913–1923)* (Madrid 1998); J. Moreno, *Romanones. Caciquismo y política liberal* (Madrid 1998); M. Suárez Cortina, ed., *La Restauración, entre el liberalismo y la democracia* (Madrid 1997); M.J. González, *Ciudadanía y Acción. El conservadurismo maurista 1907–1923* (Madrid 1990) and *El Universo conservador de Antonio Maura. Biografía y proyecto de Estado* (Madrid 1997). A recent penetrating analysis can be found in J. Varela Ortega and L. Medina Peña, *Elecciones, alternancia y democracia. España–México, una reflexión comparada* (Madrid 2000).

7. For an analysis of this term see M.J. González, "'Las manchas del leopardo": la difícil reforma desde el sistema y las estrategias de la "socialización conservadora"', in Suárez Cortina, op. cit., 157–99.

8. Azcárate, as quoted in R. Pérez Delgado, *Antonio Maura* (Madrid 1974), 201. Biographical references (and also Gamazo's) are fully detailed in M.J. González, *El Universo*. See also D. Sevilla Andrés, *Antonio Maura. La revolución desde arriba* (Barcelona 1953), and J. Tusell, *Antonio Maura* (Madrid 1994).

9. See the Spanish parliamentary reports, *Diario de Sesiones de las Cortes*, 29 May 1913.

10. Quoted by Duque de Maura and M. Fernández Almagro, *Por qué cayó Alfonso XIII* (Madrid 1948), 528.

11. Letters from Maura to Bergé from 1896 to 1910 in *Archivo Maura* (AM), leg. 115.

12. On Maurism, see González, *Ciudadanía*, op. cit.; and J. Tusell and J. Avilés, *La derecha española contemporánea. Sus orígenes: el maurismo* (Madrid 1986). See also Martin Blinkhorn, 'Conservatism, traditionalism and fascism in Spain, 1898–1937', in Martin Blinkhorn, ed., *Fascists and Conservatives* (London 1990), 118–37.

13. See page 318 and note 29.

14. On Maura's work in Cuba see J. Durnerin, *Maura et Cuba. Politique coloniale d'un ministre libérale* (Paris 1977); A. Marimón, *La política colonial d'Antoni Maura* (Palma de Mallorca 1994). See also the chapter in González, *El Universo*; Tusell, op. cit.; and J. Varela Ortega, 'Aftermath of a Splendid Disaster: Spanish Politics Before and After The American War of 1898', *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 15 (1980), 317–44.

15. González, *El Universo*, 21.

16. *El Heraldo de Madrid*, 3 December 1904.
17. Many authors have pointed decentralization as a way to promote citizenship, see H.S. Jones, *The French State in Question. Public Law and Political Agreement in the Third Republic* (Cambridge 1993); B.S. Turner, *Citizenship and Capitalism. The Debate over Reformism* (London 1986); J. Leca, 'Questions of Citizenship', in C. Mouffe, ed., *Dimensions of Radical Democracy. Pluralism, Citizenship, Community* (London 1994, 17–32); and S. Hazaaresingh, *From Subject to Citizen: the Second Empire and the Emergence of Modern French Democracy* (Princeton 1998).
18. Diario de Sesiones de las Cortes, 14 July 1896.
19. Maura's reflections are in AM, leg. 391/3.
20. See the newspaper *El Liberal*, 7 December 1901.
21. In his own words again, the parliament should work with 'luz y taquígrafos' (bright light and stenographers).
22. Discourse of the revolution from above in *El Español*, 19 January 1902. The features of his personality by himself in his manuscript 'Mi conversación con Sagasta', AM, leg. 341/3.
23. Report sent to Queen María Cristina in 1902, *Archivo General de Palacio*, (AGP), Cajón 9/17.
24. The 'activity' of 'spinster ladies' was typical in Spanish Catholic culture. Letter to Bergé, 23 January 1902, AM, leg. 115.
25. All the details are contained in González, *El Universo*, 47–57.
26. See Maura's manuscript 'Notas para la historia de 1873' in AM, leg. 403/9.
27. *Ibid.*, AM, leg. 403/9. On mothers' responses to domestic chaos, see A. Ossorio y Gallardo, *Mis memorias* (Madrid 1975), 55. On the First Republic, see C.A.M. Hennessy, *The Federal Republic in Spain* (Oxford 1962).
28. 'Il me l'a dit a moi-même, il veut gouverner par la parole. Le parti conservateur s'en inquiète', Report from Théophile Cambon to Paul Delcassé, 15 December, *NS Espagne*, Vol. 2 (Ministère des Affaires Étrangères (MAE) 1903).
29. Nozaleda had been in the Philippines, where he was accused of collaborating with the Americans. To most Spanish eyes he cut an antipathetic figure, a living symbol of the loss of empire. He was appointed Archbishop of Valencia by Maura as prime minister, and the affair turned inevitably into a political trial of strength between Maura and public opinion. This opinion was inflamed by radical republican leaders, and by certain sections of the press such as 'The Trust'. The complex political roots of the affair were 'simplified', condensing everything into an issue of clericalism/anti-clericalism.
30. *El Heraldo de Madrid*, 14 January 1904. *El Heraldo de Madrid* was a liberal newspaper.
31. F. Soldevilla, *El año político, 1903* (Madrid 1904), 216.
32. See again, for full details and all the quotations in González, *El Universo*, 61–100.
33. See J. Romero Maura, 'The Spanish Army and Catalonia: The 'Cu-cut' Incident and the Law of Jurisdictions 1905–1906', *Sage Research Papers in the Social Sciences* (Contemporary European Studies Series, 90–93), (Beverly Hills 1976).
34. *The Times*, June 1909, in AM, leg. 153.
35. On decentralization as a way of making citizenship see note 16. On the

different agendas and coincidences of the groups demanding decentralization see González, *El Universo*, 153–4. See also J. Tusell and D. Chacón, *La reforma de la administración local en España (1900–1936)* (Madrid 1987).

36. See Azcárate's speech in *Diario de Sesiones de las Cortes*, 26 February 1908.

37. Report of Revoil, 30 April, *NS Espagne*, Vol. 4 (MAE 1908).

38. González, *El Universo*, 145–50. There are clear instructions (internal correspondence) to the members of the Conservative Party, and also instructions from the president of the Tribunal Supremo in AM, leg. 107.

39. See especially S. Forner, *Cuneros y caciques* (Alicante 1990); J. Tusell, 'Para la sociología política de la España contemporánea: el impacto de la ley electoral de 1907 en el comportamiento electoral', *Hispania*, No. 115 (Madrid 1970), 571–631; and T. Carnero, 'Elite gobernante dinástica e igualdad política en España 1898–1914', *Historia Contemporánea*, Vol. 8 (Madrid 1991), 35–73.

40. See his speech in *Diario de Sesiones de las Cortes*, 24 July 1907. On the importance of the Justicia Municipal in the 'chain' of corruption see also Varela Ortega and Medina Peña, *Elecciones*.

41. Quoted by T. Villaroya, 'La reforma del reglamento del Congreso de los Diputados en 1918', in *Revista del Instituto de Ciencias Sociales*, Vol. 21, (Barcelona 1973), note 86.

42. On economic policy see Gonzalez, *El Universo*, 225–81.

43. *Ibid.*

44. *Ibid.*

45. F. del Rey Reguillo, *Proprietarios y patronos. La política de las organizaciones económicas en la España de la Restauración* (Madrid 1992). On the ineffectiveness of social legislation see especially 318–20.

46. From now on, the details on social policy come from González, *El Universo*, 177–225.

47. In a letter from Maura to Segismundo Moret, (no date) year 1883, *Archivo Natalio Rivas (Real Academia de la Historia)*, leg. 11/8937 ANR (RAH).

48. These words said by Canalejas, 8 January 1911, are in notes in manuscripts written by the republican Natalio Rivas. *Ibid.*, leg. 11/8899 ANR (RAH).

49. Quoted in *El Socialista* (Madrid), 12 January 1913. Among the European intellectuals involved in the protest campaign were Anatole France, Haeckel, Brentano, Hauptman, Russell, Wells, etc. On the events of the Tragic Week and its consequences, the best study is J. Connelly Ullman, *The Tragic Week: A Study of Anticlericalism in Spain 1875–1912* (Cambridge 1968).

50. On the crisis and the evolution of his last three governments see González, *Ciudadanía*.

51. Quoted by Carr, 'Liberalism', 235.

52. Monthly payments of the king to the landowners, in Letter to Alfonso XIII, 21 September 1919, *Archivo General de Palacio*, ref. 15 601/10.

53. On the importance of the perception of legitimacy in the maintenance (or making) of democratic regimes, see J.J. Linz, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes* (London 1978).

54. Maura, manuscript notes, 1882 to 1894, leg. 391/3 AM.

55. Memorandum from the British Ambassador, Sir Arthur Hardinge, 3 July 1917, PRO FO 371/3033.

María Jesús González is Lecturer in History at the University of Cantabria. Her most important publications are *Ciudadanía y Acción. El conservadurismo maurista 1907-1923* (Madrid 1990) and *El universo conservador de Antonio Maura. Biografía y proyecto de estado* (Madrid 1997).