

# GENERATING REFORMS AND REFORMING GENERATIONS

## Military Politics in Indonesia's Democratic Transition and Consolidation

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### INTRODUCTION

OVER the course of thirty-two years, Suharto's Indonesia occupied different positions on a spectrum of nondemocratic regimes ranging from authoritarian (Brazil, 1964–74 and Uruguay, 1973–85) to “sultanistic” (Idi Amin's Uganda, 1971–79 and Rafael Trujillo's Dominican Republic, 1930–61).<sup>1</sup> Suharto's New Order began as a typical hierarchical military regime (1965–74), took on additional characteristics of bureaucratic authoritarianism (1975–88), and during its last decade came increasingly to resemble a sultanistic regime (1989–98). As the nature of the regime changed, so too did the political position of the military. While Suharto was careful to maintain control over the appointment of senior officers and sought to prevent the military from becoming an independent political actor, the military nonetheless enjoyed a reasonable degree of administrative freedom, particularly in the appointment and promotion of lower- and middle-ranking officers.<sup>2</sup>

In 1997–98, as protests intensified over Suharto's handling of the

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<sup>1</sup> See Barbara Geddes, “What Do We Know about Democratization after Twenty Years?” *Annual Reviews of Political Science* 2 (1999), 124, for a classification of regimes in which the military plays a role; and Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), Table 3.1, 44–45, for a classification of nondemocratic regimes. See also Harold Crouch, “Patrimonialism and Military Rule in Indonesia,” *World Politics* 31 (July 1979), 587, in which the author describes Suharto's New Order Indonesia as a patrimonial regime “built on nonpatrimonial foundations.”

<sup>2</sup> See, for example, Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1978); and David Jenkins, *Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics, 1975–83* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984).

Asian economic crisis and his reselection to the presidency, students and intellectuals demanded his resignation and an end to the military's self-proclaimed "dual function"—the doctrine under which it claimed the right to add a role in sociopolitical affairs to its traditional defense function. Politicians and scholars supporting democratization argued that civilian control over the military was essential for the establishment of an operative democracy. Members of the military elite acknowledged the need for reform to extend to the armed forces (some even claimed that the armed forces were at the forefront of national reform) yet were reluctant to provide details about what this might entail or when it would occur. All agreed that *reformasi* (reform)—the contemporary Indonesian keyword for a political transition from nondemocratic rule—required redefinition of civil-military relations.

Facing economic collapse, elite defections, and widespread protest, Suharto resigned from office on May 21, 1998, making possible a long-awaited transition from nondemocratic rule and democratic consolidation. His resignation and the events thereafter raise a series of questions that thus far have been inadequately addressed. Why did the Indonesian military not attempt to defend the embattled president and regime? Over the course of the following four years, why did the military refrain from openly intervening in the political process? Finally, and most troubling, at a time when many are celebrating Indonesia's successful consolidation of democracy, why is the Indonesian military in a stronger political position than it was during the late Suharto period?

#### FROM NONDEMOCRATIC RULE TO DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION

There is now an extensive literature on transitions from authoritarian rule and democratic consolidation,<sup>3</sup> one in which most scholars agree that the military can be crucial in both processes.<sup>4</sup> Agüero, for example,

<sup>3</sup> The distinction between transition and consolidation can be traced back to Dankwart Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model," *Comparative Politics* 2 (April 1970), 357-63. We use the broad definition of transition found in Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986) as an interval between two regimes. A transition begins with the process of termination of an authoritarian regime, and ends with the establishment of an alternative regime—be it democratic, authoritarian, or some alternative form. For a classification of nondemocratic regimes and the types of agendas that must be accomplished for a successful transition to democracy to take place, see Linz and Stepan (fn. 1).

<sup>4</sup> See Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), and Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999). This is, of course, not always the case. In the transitions of the former Warsaw Pact states, for example, the role of the military was generally small.

argues that “the role played by the military is the single most important factor distinguishing the transition and consolidation experiences of Southern European democracies from those of South America.”<sup>5</sup> There is, however, a surprising and unfortunate lack of research assigning due importance to the role of the military as an organization in these processes.

At a theoretical level, this article will argue that the analysis of individual and group incentives, varying systematically across structural cleavages, is important to the understanding of how a military acts during a transition and consolidation. In other words, the power of individual rationality, which includes considerations of altruism and loyalty and is channeled through organizational structures, can provide compelling insights.<sup>6</sup> In the case of Indonesia, existing methods of analysis have ignored the differential career prospects of those sections of the officer corps that held strong views on reform, interpreting the nonintervention of the military entirely as an indicator of either weakness or prodemocratic sentiment.<sup>7</sup> In fact, as we will show, the nonintervention of the military in Indonesia’s transition and democratic consolidation can be attributed (at least in part) to internal organizational factors—the effects of historical recruitment patterns, their consequences for career prospects, and adjustments that compensated those seniormost officers who stood to lose the most from a redefinition of civil-military relations. While the views of the military leadership and its relationship with the civilian leadership of Indonesia do represent explanatory variables, their analysis alone cannot completely explain the politics of the Indonesian military between 1998 and 2001.

The maintenance of nondemocratic rule is dependent on the state’s coercive apparatus; any transition to democracy is premised in the first instance on the military extricating itself from politics. This may occur for any number of reasons—the military may believe it cannot maintain nondemocratic rule, it may recognize that the continuation of nondemocratic rule is detrimental to its interests, or the military elite can come to actively favor democratization.<sup>8</sup> Transitions to democratic rule

<sup>5</sup> Felipe Agüero, “Democratic Consolidation and the Military in Southern Europe and South America,” in Richard Gunther, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, and Hans-Jürgen Puhle, eds., *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 165.

<sup>6</sup> For work in the social sciences that harmonizes individual rationality with altruism and loyalty, see, for example, Gary S. Becker, “Altruism in the Family and Selfishness in the Market Place,” *Economica* 48 (February 1981).

<sup>7</sup> While these may no doubt have been factors in the transition, as will be shown, they complemented important structural forces.

<sup>8</sup> See Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); and Geddes (fn. 1).

are also likely to take place more smoothly in instances in which the officer corps believes that the prospect of regime change does not threaten the organizational integrity of the military.<sup>9</sup>

This analytical approach may be criticized as lacking necessary depth. In particular, authors writing on democratization commonly treat the military in highly aggregated terms. In some works the military is modeled as a single actor, which, depending on regime type, may or may not coincide with the nondemocratic ruler(s). In others, the military is treated as part of a larger single actor termed "the Defender" that supports nondemocratic rule and opposes a political transition.<sup>10</sup> Scholars typically claim that for a successful transition the military must be in a weak position, in agreement with the need for a transition, and/or suffering from internal divisions that render it incapable of preventing political change; for democratization to fail the military or a faction within the military must act to prevent change. Such reasoning, however, fails to account for the conditions under which the military is either divided or united and how this is translated either into support or into rejection of such a political transition. To do so, as we will argue, it is crucial to identify and consider the individual interests of the members of the military.<sup>11</sup>

While transition from nondemocratic rule depends on military non-intervention, democratic consolidation is premised on establishing civilian control over the military.<sup>12</sup> This involves both restricting the role of the military in the formulation and implementation of policy and ensuring that the military accept and abide by civilian decisions.<sup>13</sup> Developing civilian control may require addressing problems of professionalization of the officer corps, redefining the military's mission, reorganizing military structures, and adjusting the size and equipment of the military. Despite the scholarly consensus on the necessity of establishing civilian control over the military, the literature on transitions from nondemocratic rule is characterized by ambivalence toward the

<sup>9</sup> See, for example, Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1960); Jacques van Doorn, ed., *Armed Forces and Society: Sociological Essays* (The Hague: Mouton, 1968); and Henry Bienen, ed., *The Military and Modernization* (Chicago and New York: Aldine and Atherton, 1971), 4.

<sup>10</sup> See Gretchen Casper and Michelle M. Taylor, *Negotiating Democracy: Transitions from Authoritarian Rule* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996), 19.

<sup>11</sup> The importance of incentives operating at the individual level has been observed in the context of a number of militaries, including those of Bolivia, Panama, Nigeria, and Thailand. See, for example, Geddes (fn. 1), 126. To this list must be added the case of Indonesia, where, in the Suharto era, the military was considered a safe means of individual enrichment and accrual of power.

<sup>12</sup> This is now made explicit in definitions of democracy. See, for example, Terry Lynn Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America," *Comparative Politics* 23 (October 1990), 2.

<sup>13</sup> See Agüero (fn. 5), 127.

military itself, which Stepan refers to as the “stunning neglect of the military.” “Part of the explanation for neglect,” he argues, “would seem therefore to be normative disdain for the military as a topic (the obverse of the normative attraction to new groups in civil society). This is a longstanding problem, often referred to as the ‘liberal bias.’”<sup>14</sup> Building on Stepan’s contention, Agüero argues that “the extent of vertical and horizontal unity of the armed forces” is critical to the prospects for establishing civilian supremacy:

A military strongly unified around a well-defined counter-democratization scheme will enhance its ability to influence the transition agenda and will impede the work of civilian democratizers. In most cases, however, the military is likely to be riven by various vertical or horizontal fissures, which, depending on their nature and depth, may favorably or negatively affect the chances of promoting civilian supremacy.<sup>15</sup>

Unfortunately, few authors writing on transitions from authoritarian rule or on democratic consolidation have engaged this issue. In general, analysis of the internal dynamics and politics of military institutions is largely limited to the field of military studies.<sup>16</sup> Even here, however, there are surprisingly few studies of the internal dynamics of the officer corps,<sup>17</sup> and even fewer on how appointment and promotional patterns, career paths, and cohort solidarity affect military intervention and involvement in politics. A rare exception is the attention paid to the transition in Portugal in 1974,<sup>18</sup> in which the structure of the officer corps and changes therein precipitated the coup d’état and subsequent democratic transition. Scholars commonly attribute this lacuna in the analysis of factors endogenous to the military to lack of data, though individual case studies have demonstrated that this is not always the case.<sup>19</sup> A key contribution of this article will be to fill this gap in the literature with a detailed analysis of the case of Indonesia.

<sup>14</sup> Alfred Stepan, *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), 9.

<sup>15</sup> Agüero (fn. 5), 139.

<sup>16</sup> See Talukder Maniruzzaman, *Military Withdrawal from Politics* (Cambridge: Ballinger Press, 1987).

<sup>17</sup> See Mitchell B. Peck, “Assessing the Career Mobility of U.S. Army Officers: 1950–1974,” *Armed Forces & Society* 20 (Winter 1994).

<sup>18</sup> See Douglas Porch, *The Portuguese Armed Forces and the Revolution* (London: Croom Helm, 1977); and Kenneth Maxwell, “Regime Overthrow and the Prospects for Democratic Transition in Portugal,” in Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

<sup>19</sup> See Simon Baynam, *The Military and Politics in Nkrumah’s Ghana* (Boulder, Colo. and London: Westview Press, 1988); Douglas Kammen and Siddharth Chandra, *A Tour of Duty: Changing Patterns of Military Politics in Indonesia in the 1990s*, Monograph No. 75 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1999); Robin Luckham, *The Nigerian Military: A Sociological Analysis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971 and 1980); Porch (fn. 18); and Stepan (fn. 14).

This article explores military politics during Indonesia's transition from nondemocratic rule and in the first stage of democratic consolidation.<sup>20</sup> The first part of this article is a detailed case study of the Indonesian military from the end of Suharto's rule in May 1998 until the election of Megawati Sukarnoputri in July 2001. While acknowledging the ongoing interaction between civilians and the military, it argues that the nonintervention of the Indonesian military can be attributed at least in part to the internal dynamics of the military, independent of changes in the political process. The second part of this article is a comparative analysis of Indonesia, Ghana, Nigeria, Portugal, and Thailand, highlighting the role of internal organizational factors in determining military behavior during regime change. The article concludes with a discussion of the impact of this important but long-neglected factor on Indonesia's transition and democratic consolidation and of its implications for the study of transitions and consolidations.

#### INDONESIA'S TRANSITION AND THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY

Indonesia's transition from nondemocratic rule was precipitated by the onset of the Asian economic crisis in July 1997. By early 1998, the crisis had caused the Indonesian rupiah to fall in value from Rp. 2,400/1U.S. \$ to Rp. 17,000/1U.S. \$, widespread defaults on loan payments, massive layoffs, and steep increases in the prices of basic goods. The crisis also led to extensive price riots throughout the archipelago and a rising tide of student protest that first demanded the government address the crisis and later called for Suharto's resignation, the end of the military's "dual function," and full-fledged democratization.<sup>21</sup> Despite this pressure, at no point did Suharto declare martial law or call on the military to defend the regime, and the military itself seemed reluctant to take action on its own. On May 21, 1998, Suharto resigned from the presidency.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>20</sup> The "transition" is broadly defined as the period between the last months of Suharto's presidency and the months following the election of Abdurrahman Wahid and it includes the interim government of Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie from May 1998 to October 1999. The "consolidation" begins with the selection of Abdurrahman Wahid as president; the end of the "transition," therefore, overlaps with the beginning of the "consolidation."

<sup>21</sup> See Kees van Dijk, *A Country in Despair: Indonesia between 1997 and 2000* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2001).

<sup>22</sup> Indonesia's experience is entirely in keeping with the emerging consensus, based on comparative study of dozens of transitions, that poor economic performance raises the probability of a transition from authoritarian regimes. For research on this, see Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour Lipset, *Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1989); Nancy Bermeo, "Rethinking Regime Change," *Comparative Politics* 22 (April 1990); and Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, "Modernization: Theories and Facts," *World Politics* 49 (January 1997).

At the time of his resignation, the Indonesian military (ABRI)<sup>23</sup> found itself facing crosscutting currents of public opinion. On the one hand, in May and June 1998 the military received a surprising degree of public approval for its refusal to use sustained force against popular protest, and ABRI Commander in Chief General Wiranto enjoyed considerable personal popularity for his cautious handling of the presidential transition and his guarantee of military neutrality.<sup>24</sup> On the other hand, most Indonesians were still outraged by the history of atrocities committed by the armed forces throughout much of the vast archipelago and resented the military's deeply entrenched positions in the state apparatus and in the economy. This ambivalence toward the military played an important role in shaping the position of the military during Indonesia's transition and consolidation.

The ascendancy of B. J. Habibie, Suharto's chosen successor, to the presidency further complicated the military's political position. Members of the military high command had long resented Habibie's control over the country's armaments production, his involvement in the procurement of foreign hardware, and his political patronage.<sup>25</sup> The military's greatest concern, however, was Habibie's January 1999 threat to "release" East Timor from Indonesia if the population rejected his proposal for broad autonomy; over the course of several months, his offer snowballed into a UN-sponsored referendum and independence for Indonesia's colonial possession. Habibie's government, however, was short lived. Under fierce pressure, he agreed to hold new national elections in June 1999. After a brief period of intense politicking, Abdurrahman Wahid—a nearly blind fifty-eight-year-old Muslim cleric and head of the newly formed National Unity Party (PKB)—beat out Megawati Sukarnoputri as president.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>23</sup> Between 1964 and 1999 the Indonesian military was called Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia), abbreviated ABRI. On April 1, 1999, this was changed to Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Army, TNI), a name dating from the Indonesian Revolution (1945–49). We will employ these as appropriate for the period under discussion.

<sup>24</sup> This sentiment prevailed despite the kidnapping of political activists in early 1998 by Special Forces (Kopassus), the shooting of four student protesters at Trisakti University in Jakarta on May 12, and the instigation of massive riots in Jakarta and several provincial cities on May 13–14.

<sup>25</sup> For example, while the military wished to buy the latest military equipment from international suppliers, it was stuck with the inferior goods produced by the state munitions manufacturer, directly under Habibie's control. When the military wished to purchase new naval craft, Habibie brokered a deal for thirty-nine used East German warships that the navy had no choice but to accept.

<sup>26</sup> Habibie agreed to hold new national elections in June 1999 and to allow the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR RI) to meet late that year to select a president. The election saw the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) come in first with 34 percent of the vote, followed by Golkar (the old ruling party) and two Islamic parties, the National Unity Party (PKB) and the National Mandate Party (PAN). Most observers believed that PDI-P's victory would be translated into the selection of party chairwoman Megawati Sukarnoputri, daughter of Indonesia's first president, as the

Though a surprise, Wahid's election was greeted by many Indonesians as a long-awaited victory of democracy over the country's nondemocratic past. At the time, Wahid's selection was seen as particularly important in the field of civil-military relations, where his strong Islamic credentials, political savvy, and wit were expected to tame the military beast. During his first ten months in office, President Wahid secured a number of crucial victories in this area. Following his inauguration, he appointed Juwono Sudarsono, a professor of political science and deputy head of the military's National Resiliency Institute (Lemhanas), as the country's first civilian minister of defense. In late 1999 Wahid established a human rights tribunal to investigate abuses committed by the military in East Timor surrounding the August 30 referendum. After a protracted and highly public debate, he successfully forced General Wiranto to resign from his post as commander in chief in May 2000. Throughout his presidency, Wahid also encouraged a number of progressive senior officers to discuss institutional reorganization and to reassess the military's dual function. Taken together, this was an impressive record for his first ten months in office, leading many observers to conclude that the president had cleverly outmaneuvered the military and secured a degree of civilian control over the very institution that had guaranteed General Suharto's dictatorial rule for more than three decades.

At the same time, however, there were indications of trouble brewing below the surface. During late 1999 tensions arose between the military elite and the government over the aforementioned investigations into alleged human rights abuses in East Timor. In early 2000 rumors spread about a military coup, and soon thereafter President Wahid complained about "disloyal" officers in the powerful regional territorial commands and warned that he would crush any move against his authority. During this period the press was filled with stories and scholarly analysis about deep divisions in the military between officers still loyal to Suharto and the authoritarian status quo, on the one hand, and the so-called "reformers," on the other.

In the year after Abdurrahman Wahid's election in October 1999, there were four reshuffles of senior military personnel.<sup>27</sup> These person-

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country's fourth president. When the MPR RI met in October 1999, however, political maneuvering by PAN chairperson Amien Rais and several of the smaller Islamic parties secured the selection of Wahid as president.

<sup>27</sup> In November 1999, more than one hundred officers were rotated, including the appointment of a number of officers who had supported reforming the military's political role. In February 2000, another reshuffle was announced involving seventy-four senior personnel, including the replacement of outspoken commander of the Army Strategic Reserve (Kostrad)—Major General Djamari Chaniago—

nel moves were remarkable for three reasons. First, although not unprecedented, four reshuffles within nine months represented an extremely high turnover of senior personnel. Second, despite much public discussion and rumors about potential coups and civilian interference in military appointments, there was in fact no visible reaction or counterreaction by the military to these moves. Finally, as we will discuss in the following two sections, despite the high rate of personnel turnover, "regeneration"—the orderly passing of staff and command posts from senior to more junior officers—had stalled by the end of Wahid's first year in office.

#### REGENERATION OF THE OFFICER CORPS

Large-scale rotations of military personnel are not new in Indonesia.<sup>28</sup> During Suharto's rule, these reshuffles traditionally were announced twice a year, typically in June and October. During the early 1990s, however, these reshuffles took place with increasing frequency. Most scholars and observers interpreted these changes in highly political and personalistic terms, seeing them as an attempt to purge officers loyal to particular figures, to install officers with direct connections to the president, to improve military-Islamic relations, or simply to prepare for the country's quinquennial electoral exercises. While presidential intervention and personal loyalties can account for the spectacular careers of a few officers and the appointment of a small number of senior officers, they cannot explain the increasing frequency of large-scale reshuffles affecting scores and in some instances hundreds of officers at a time.

Instead, the increasing frequency of personnel changes during the 1990s is best understood in terms of the burgeoning size of the officer corps that resulted from the induction and graduation of increasingly larger classes at the National Military Academy (Akademi Nasional Militer, or AMN) between the mid-1960s and the mid-1970s.<sup>29</sup> Estab-

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by the reform-minded Major General Agus Wirahadikusumah. In June 2000 there was another rotation of 122 officers. On August 1 yet another reshuffle was announced, which, though somewhat smaller, included changes in a number of strategic posts.

<sup>28</sup> Recent reshuffles and promotional patterns among the Indonesian military elite have been analyzed in detail in the journal *Indonesia*. See Editors, "The Indonesian Military in the 1990s: Political Maneuvering or Structural Change?," *Indonesia* 63 (April 1997); idem, "Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite: October 1, 1995 to December 31, 1997," *Indonesia* 65 (April 1998); idem, "Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite: January 1, 1998 to January 31, 1999," *Indonesia* 67 (April 1999); idem, "Changes in Civil-Military Relations since the Fall of Suharto," *Indonesia* 70 (October 2000); and idem, "Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite: January 1, 1999 to January 31, 2001," *Indonesia* 71 (April 2001). The data used in this paper draw in part on the data published in these articles.

<sup>29</sup> See Kammen and Chandra (fn. 19), 30–36.

TABLE 1  
DATA ON SUBREGIONAL AND REGIONAL MILITARY COMMANDERS BY  
ACADEMY CLASS

| Year | Class    | Class<br>Size | 5 yr.<br>Average   | Subregional Military<br>Commanders |                      |                | Regional Military<br>Commanders |                     |                |
|------|----------|---------------|--------------------|------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------|---------------------------------|---------------------|----------------|
|      |          |               |                    | Total                              | Per<br>Class<br>(%)s | Mean<br>Tenure | Total                           | Per<br>Class<br>(%) | Mean<br>Tenure |
| 1960 | 1        | 59            |                    | n/a                                | —                    | —              | 10                              | 16.9                | 723            |
| 1961 | 2        | 151           |                    | n/a                                | —                    | —              | 13                              | 8.6                 | 846            |
| 1962 | 3        | 112           | 143                | 16                                 | 14.2                 | 809            | 12                              | 10.7                | 652            |
| 1963 | 4        | 113           |                    | 17                                 | 15.0                 | 705            | 5                               | 4.4                 | 755            |
| 1964 | 5        | 280           |                    | 12                                 | 4.2                  | 588            | 3                               | 1.0                 | 320            |
| 1965 | 6        | 433           |                    | 59                                 | 13.6                 | 697            | 14                              | 3.2                 | 521            |
| 1966 | 7        | 243           |                    | 21                                 | 8.6                  | 549            | 6                               | 2.4                 | 552            |
| 1967 | 8        | 203           | 269                | 30                                 | 14.7                 | 581            | 3                               | 1.4                 | 528            |
| 1968 | 9        | 465           | (336) <sup>a</sup> | 21                                 | 4.5                  | 517            | 3                               | 0.6                 | 554            |
| 1969 | no class |               |                    |                                    |                      |                |                                 |                     |                |
| 1970 | 10       | 437           |                    | 20                                 | 4.5                  | 482            | 13                              | 2.9                 | ?              |
| 1971 | 11       | 329           |                    | 27                                 | 8.2                  | 507            | 15                              | 4.5                 | ?              |
| 1972 | 12       | 389           | 405                | 27                                 | 6.9                  | ?              | 12                              | 3.0                 | ?              |
| 1973 | 13       | 436           |                    | 38                                 | 8.7                  | ?              | 5 <sup>b</sup>                  | 1.1                 | —              |
| 1974 | 14       | 434           |                    | 44 <sup>b</sup>                    | 10.1                 | ?              | 4 <sup>c</sup>                  | —                   | —              |
| 1975 | 15       | 304           |                    | 24 <sup>c</sup>                    | 7.9                  | —              | —                               | —                   | —              |
| 1976 | 16       | 85            |                    | 7 <sup>c</sup>                     | 8.2                  | —              | —                               | —                   | —              |
| 1977 | 17       | 79            | 112                | —                                  | —                    | —              | —                               | —                   | —              |
| 1978 | 18       | 93            | (140) <sup>a</sup> | —                                  | —                    | —              | —                               | —                   | —              |
| 1979 | no class |               |                    |                                    |                      |                |                                 |                     |                |

SOURCE: Akademi Militer, *Daftar Alumni Akademi Militer, 1948–1996* (no publisher or date)

<sup>a</sup> = four-year average, excluding the year in which there was no graduating class.

<sup>b</sup> May receive more appointments.

<sup>c</sup> Will receive more appointments.

lished in 1957, the AMN graduated its first class (fifty-nine cadets) in 1960. During the early 1960s the number of graduates rose steadily, peaking in 1965, then dropping to more modest levels in 1966 and 1967 before again peaking in 1968 and remaining at high levels during the early 1970s. For present purposes we can take five-year averages as indicative of the overall shift in the number of officers graduated (see Table 1).

This sharp increase in the number of cadets graduated from the AMN did not pose any immediate problems. With mandatory retirement at only age 55, however, the Indonesian military lacked a mechanism to

weed out middle- and upper-ranking officers.<sup>30</sup> As the large classes that graduated from 1965 to 1975 reached the middle ranks, more officers began competing for a limited number of posts. The military responded by reducing the mean tenure of military officers in order to maximize the number of officers who could be given command opportunities and promotions.<sup>31</sup> Though not the only possible response, this strategy was clearly intended to minimize discontent within the officer corps. To do so, of course, required more frequent personnel change, hence the increase in large-scale reshuffles that most observers have mistakenly interpreted in highly politicized and personalized ways. The reshuffles of military personnel announced in November 1999 and in February, June, and August 2000 were therefore merely a continuation of an earlier trend necessitated by the large number of middle- and senior-ranking officers.<sup>32</sup> This dynamic would indicate a healthy process of re-

<sup>30</sup> The only institutional outlet for excess officers was secondment (*kekaryaan*) to positions as local and regional executives and as legislators, and to posts in the civil service, even though this was only common for officers in their mid-forties and older. See Douglas Kammen, "Military Politics and Kekaryaan in Post-Suharto Indonesia," in Chris Tremewan, comp., *Indonesia after Suharto* (Auckland: New Zealand Asia Institute, University of Auckland, 1999).

<sup>31</sup> See Appendix 1 for details.

<sup>32</sup> The finding that the overall decrease in command tenure is best explained by the changing size of the officer corps suggests two related hypotheses. First, if command tenure is a function of the size of the officer corps, it would seem likely that variation in tenure would be observable between classes of different sizes, with officers from large classes enjoying short tours of duty while officers from small classes receiving comparatively longer tours of duty. Surprisingly, however, there is no direct correspondence between class size and tenure per class in a given position. Officers from large academy classes do not necessarily serve for shorter lengths of time than do officers from smaller classes; the data in Table 1 suggest that tenure is inversely related to the size of five-year cohorts. Classes 1–4, who commanded the various Kodam during the second half of the 1980s, had an average tenure of 650–850 days. The larger Class 5 1965 that followed these small and highly successful classes suffered in terms of both total number of officers appointed as well as mean tenure. The second cohort of graduates, Classes 6–9, had nearly identical tenures—at roughly 525 days per officer—despite considerable differences in class size. The third cohort, Classes 10–14, is larger still, and here we see a further decline in overall tenure as well as in rough parity between classes, with mean tenure 250–450 days. It is important to note that there are officers from Classes 10, 11, and 12 currently serving as Kodam commanders who have not been included in these calculations, and that Classes 13 and 14 are likely to receive additional appointments.

The second corollary hypothesis is that there is a correlation between class size and the relative success of each class in terms of the total number of appointments received. In other words, with no change in the total number of available billets, the percentage of officers appointed to command a particular type of unit should be higher for small classes and lower for large classes. Once again, however, there is no direct correspondence between class size and the relative success of a particular academy class. Rather than showing an even distribution of command billets by class, Table 1 shows three "peaks." The first peak represents the combination of Classes 1, 2 and 3, which received 10, 13, and 12 Kodam commands, respectively, and which saw over 10 percent of their officers appointed to these posts. The success of these three classes served to block the promotion of officers from Classes 4 and 5, accounting for the sharp decrease in the total number of Korem (for Class 5) and Kodam (for both classes) commands received. The second peak represents Class 6 1965, which received an extraordinary fifty-nine Korem commands (13.6 percent of all officers) and fourteen Kodam commands (for a more modest 3.2 percent of all officers). Again, the exceptional success of Class 6 1965 prevented the collective promotion of officers from the next three graduating classes. The third peak occurs for

generation were it not for the accompanying phenomenon of “monopolization” of top positions by a particular cohort of officers.

#### CLASS SOLIDARITY AND MONOPOLIZATION— QUANTITATIVE EVIDENCE

Scholars of military politics frequently note the strong solidarity among military classes and the often stiff competition and rivalry between different classes. This solidarity may provide the basis for military intervention in politics and play a crucial role in maintaining nondemocratic rule, with military leaders appointing their classmates to top military as well as civilian positions. Analyses of the Indonesian military, however, have largely ignored the significance of class solidarity, focusing instead on familial and personal connections to President Suharto and certain cliques.<sup>33</sup> Nevertheless, the Indonesian press frequently comments when a senior officer is replaced by one of his classmates from the military academy, suggesting that it represents a form of nepotism. While the mean tenure for officers belonging to a particular class may decrease in instances of classmates succeeding one another, the succession pattern suggests to members of the officer corps that the billet is being monopolized at the expense of more junior officers; this feeling is justified to the extent that the total length of time for which a billet is held by a particular class increases as the result of monopolization.

Analysis of class solidarity and monopolization of staff and command positions must be able to relate three key variables simultaneously. These variables are graduating class from the military academy, the number of officers from a given class to be appointed to a specified billet or set of billets, and the difference in graduating class between outgoing and newly appointed officers in a particular billet. The contour plots in Figures 1 and 2 capture this relationship for subregional military commanders (Danrem), who are colonels, and for regional military commanders (Pangdam), who are usually major generals. In each figure, the  $x$ -axis, labeled “AMN Class,” shows the graduating class of officers from the National Military Academy. The  $y$ -axis, labeled “Class Difference with Predecessor (in years),” represents the difference between successors and predecessors in each command position. If, for example, the outgoing officer was a member of Class 6 1965 and was

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Kodam appointments for Classes 10 1970 and 11 1971, and for Korem appointments for Classes 13 1973 and 14 1974.

<sup>33</sup> See, for example, Crouch (fn. 1); Takashi Shiraishi, “The Indonesian Military in Politics,” in Adam Schwarz and Jonathan Paris, eds., *The Politics of Post-Suharto Indonesia* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999); and Jun Honna, “Military Ideology in Response to Democratic Pressure During the Late Suharto Era: Political and Institutional Contexts,” *Indonesia* 67 (April 1999).




FIGURE 1  
CONTOUR PLOT OF PREDECESSOR PATTERNS OF SUBREGIONAL (KOREM)  
COMMANDERS BY AMN CLASS<sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup> The plot represents frequencies (Number of Danrem,  $z$ -axis) of successions by members of a particular AMN Class (AMN Class,  $x$ -axis) to members of classes at varying levels of seniority or juniority (Class Difference with Predecessor,  $y$ -axis). The peak at AMN Class 7 and Class Difference 1, for example, should be read as follows: "There were more than ten instances of officers from AMN Class 7 succeeding officers from AMN Class 6 as Danrem."

<sup>b</sup> Areas in white have frequencies above 10. They are AMN 6, 0 difference (23); AMN 7, 1 difference (16); AMN 13, 1 difference (11); AMN 14, 1 difference (11); and AMN 14, 0 difference (12).

replaced by an officer from Class 7 1966, the difference would be 1 ( $y$ -axis), at Class 7 ( $x$ -axis); if replaced by an officer from Class 5 1964, the difference would be  $-1$ , at Class 5; and if replaced by a classmate, the difference would be 0, at Class 6. Finally, the vertical  $z$ -axis, labeled "Number of Danrem" (or "Number of Pangdam"), provides a topographic representation of the total number of officers from each class to serve in a particular billet, plotted according to class difference with their predecessors; the total number of commanders per class is the sum along the  $y$ -axis of officers on each vertical ( $z$ -axis) line. These figures enable us to visualize the succession patterns for command billets and to identify when and for which classes monopolization occurs.<sup>34</sup>

Figure 1, the succession pattern for Danrem, shows a number of interesting phenomena. For Classes 3 1962 to 5 1964 the succession pat-

<sup>34</sup> Theoretically, it is possible to employ this method to analyze all staff and command positions in the army and armed forces headquarters, though differences in rank and in the significance of billets makes such an exercise impractical. For present purposes it is sufficient to limit the analysis to the two largest units in the Army's territorial structure by analyzing the forty subregional military commands and then moving up the chain of command to the eleven regional military commands.




FIGURE 2  
CONTOUR PLOT OF PREDECESSOR PATTERNS OF KODAM COMMANDERS BY  
AMN CLASS<sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup> The plot represents frequencies (Number of Pangdam, *z*-axis) of successions by members of a particular AMN Class (AMN Class, *x*-axis) to members of classes at varying levels of seniority or juniority (Class Difference with Predecessor, *y*-axis). The peak at AMN Class 3 and Class Difference 1, for example, should be read as follows: "There were six instances of officers from AMN Class 3 succeeding officers from AMN Class 2 as Pangdam."

tern is smooth, with the average difference between appointees being about one class, as would be expected. With Class 6 1965, however, there are striking anomalies. First, a large number of officers from this class received their billets from officers two years their senior. Second, and more noticeably, many of these officers were succeeded by their own classmates—hence the peak at class difference 0 (*y*-axis) and Class 6 (*x*-axis). In other words, officers from Class 6 1965 enjoyed remarkable monopolization over the subregional military commands (Korem) between 1988 and 1993. Almost all officers from Class 7 1966 received their billets from the monopolistic Class 6—hence the peak at class difference 1 and Class 7. Between 1993 and the recent transition, the contour plot reveals a remarkable degree of standardization in the succession pattern; the mean difference between outgoing and newly appointed officers is between one and two years which, again, is what one would expect. By all appearances, military leaders recognized that the monopolization of command billets by a single class was problem-

atic and took action to prevent this from recurring. During the transition and early consolidation years, however, we see a new anomaly—monopolization by Classes 13 1973 and 14 1974. Among officers belonging to Class 14 1974, this involved same-class successions. Among their senior Class 13 1973 colleagues, however, monopolization has involved replacing junior Class 14 1974 officers in a number of Danrem positions.

Figure 2, the succession pattern for Pangdam, reveals an even more dramatic degree of monopolization by particular academy classes. The first peak, at Class 3 and class difference 1, indicates that many of the Pangdam from Class 3 inherited their positions from members of Class 2, while Classes 4 and 5 received significantly fewer posts. Once again, for Class 6 1965 there are two dramatic peaks. The upper peak indicates that officers from this class received their appointments from officers three years their senior, that is, from Class 3 1962. Members of this first large class, rather than being succeeded by officers from more junior classes, were succeeded by their Class 6 1965 classmates during the mid-1990s, accounting for the second peak at Class 6 1965 and the class difference of 0. Here again we see a striking illustration of monopolization of command posts by a single class; this resulted in relatively few members of the succeeding three classes being appointed as Pangdam.<sup>35</sup>

During the transition and consolidation period, there occurred a second round of monopolization of Pangdam positions, involving Classes 10 1970 and 11 1971. These classes first replaced officers who were three and in some cases four years their senior, which is represented by the broad shaded expanse in the top right-hand portion of Figure 2. As was the case with the monopolistic Class 6 1965, a number of these officers were succeeded by their classmates. Some officers from Class 10 actually replaced officers two and even three years their junior; in other words, the few Pangdam positions attained by Classes 13 1973 and 14 1974 were handed not to their classmates or to more junior officers, but rather back to their seniors.

While Figure 2 is suggestive of monopolization of regional military command (Kodam) positions by members of Classes 10 and 11, it does not constitute rigorous proof of this phenomenon. As has been established, officers belonging to large cohorts have experienced short tenures and high turnover in command positions. High turnover in

<sup>35</sup> This was partially compensated for by the appointment of several of these officers to the most senior military posts, as seen, for example, in the appointment of General Wiranto, a Class 9 1968 graduate, to the post of ABRI commander in chief.

large cohorts implies a higher likelihood of same-class successions; that is, the high incidence in Figure 2 of same-class successions for Classes 10 and 11 could be due not to monopolization, but rather to the simple structural outcome of large cohorts of officers. For this reason, it is crucial to control for this structural phenomenon when testing for monopolization. To test the hypothesis that Classes 10 and 11 engaged in a higher than normal level of monopolization of Pangdam positions, four probit models of succession were estimated.<sup>36</sup> The results of these tests, shown in Appendix 2, confirm the hypothesis of monopolization by officers from Classes 10 and 11.

In sum, comparison of succession patterns at the two command levels is revealing. Class 6 1965 enjoyed monopolization at both the Danrem and Pangdam levels. By contrast, monopolization of command billets by officers from Classes 10 1970 and 11 1971 occurred only at the Pangdam and not at the lower, Danrem level. Given that these officers were first appointed to command Kodam in 1997 and that the majority received their billets between 1998 and 2000, it would seem that monopolization by these classes was specific to the period of Indonesia's transition from authoritarian rule and the early phase of the consolidation. With more senior command positions repeatedly being filled by members of the monopolistic Classes 10 and 11, members of Classes 13 and 14 wound up monopolizing the subregional military commands by default.

#### CLASS SOLIDARITY, MONOPOLIZATION, AND THE POLITICS OF REFORM

It remains to translate this statistical analysis into the language of military politics, to compare this with the explanations of personnel changes provided by the military itself, and to consider the impact of class solidarity and monopolization on the transition from Suharto's New Order and the ongoing consolidation of democracy.

During the mid-1990s there was considerable discussion by members of the military elite about ensuring the smooth transfer of posts from one class to the next, commonly referred to as "regeneration."<sup>37</sup> In June 1996, for example, ABRI Chief of Staff for General Affairs Lieutenant General Soeyono warned that if officers from Class 10 1970 were not appointed to senior posts by the following year, "our regener-

<sup>36</sup> These models are presented and discussed in Appendix 2.

<sup>37</sup> "ABRI, Perombakan di Luar Dugaan" (Unexpected shake-up), *Forum Keadilan*, September 1, 1994.

ation will be late and officers will be slow to mature.”<sup>38</sup> The unstated reason for this concern was that members of Class 6 1965 had monopolized many of the top staff and command positions during the mid-1990s, delaying the appointment and promotion of the large classes that graduated from the military academy during the early 1970s. Recognizing this backlog of promotions, officers from Classes 10 1970 and 11 1971 were in fact appointed to command the Kodam and to senior staff positions in Army headquarters beginning in 1997.

The spectacular rise of several relatively junior officers during the mid-1990s further exacerbated the need to promote officers from Classes 10 1970 to 12 1972.<sup>39</sup> The publicity surrounding these officers had conveyed the impression that military appointments and promotions were motivated more by familial and personal connections than by merit. While in itself this was not a new phenomenon, the supersession by these relatively junior officers of more senior officers, particularly those in Classes 10 1970 to 12 1972, was unusual and created deep resentment within the officer corps precisely at the time of Indonesia’s transition. Suharto’s abdication in May 1998 redirected discussion about military politics in Indonesia from the question of “regeneration” to that of “reform” (*reformasi*). ABRI Commander in Chief General Wiranto’s first move was to purge Suharto’s son-in-law Lieutenant General Prabowo Subianto (Class 14 1974) and to sideline his classmate Major General Sjafrie Syamsudin for their involvement in the abduction of activists earlier in the year and in the May riots.<sup>40</sup> In July 1998 General Wiranto announced the adoption of a “New Paradigm” involving the gradual reduction of the military’s role in politics.<sup>41</sup> The New Paradigm remained vague, however, and any expectation of a pull-back was dampened by new plans to create additional regional commands in response to the growing violence in various provinces.

<sup>38</sup> “Perwira angkatan 70 harus berperan sesudah Pemilu nanti” (Class ’70 officers must have a role after the next election), *Angkatan Bersenjata*, June 16, 1996.

<sup>39</sup> The most notable of these were Bambang Yudhoyono (son-in-law of General Sarwo Edie), who was appointed to command the Sriwijaya Kodam in 1997, replacing an officer seven classes his senior; Prabowo Subianto (son-in-law of Suharto and a Class 14 1974 graduate), who was appointed commander of Special Forces in 1995—replacing an officer four classes his senior—and made commander of the Army Strategic Command in April 1998—replacing an officer three classes his senior; Sjafrie Syamsudin (a Class 14 1974 graduate with close ties to Prabowo) who was appointed commander of the Jakarta Kodam, replacing an officer five classes his senior; and Ryamizard Ryacudu (son of General Ryacudu) who was appointed commander of the First Infantry Division (Army Strategic Reserve) in April 1998, replacing an officer three years his senior.

<sup>40</sup> Shiraiishi (fn. 33).

<sup>41</sup> See Harold Crouch, “Wiranto and Habibie: Military-civilian relations since May 1998,” in Arief Budiman, Barbara Hatley, and Damien Kingsbury, *Reformasi: Crisis and Change in Indonesia* (Clayton, Victoria: Monash Asia Institute, 1999), 137–39.

Officers from Classes 10 1970 and 11 1971 were the immediate beneficiaries of these moves, receiving new appointments to both staff and command positions. This represented a restoration of class-based seniority within the military, but not monopolization per se.

Abdurrahman Wahid's selection as president in October 1999 marked a major turning point in Indonesia's democratic consolidation and therefore was an equally important milestone for the military. Wahid appointed five generals to his cabinet;<sup>42</sup> while the appointment of TNI officers was seen as a concession to the military, it also removed several prominent officers from active duty and opened senior posts to newcomers. Under the leadership of the new TNI Commander in Chief Admiral Widodo AS, the military announced the reshuffle of more than one hundred senior officers in early November. Most observers viewed the appointment of a naval officer to head TNI and the personnel reshuffle as a sign of the president's new ascendancy over the military and as proof that the military was serious about reform. This reshuffle, however, involved the monopolization of top command positions by officers from Classes 10 and 11, a development that went largely unnoted at the time.

By mid-1999 the cause of military reform was being championed by Major General Agus Wirahadikusumah, a member of Class 13 1973 and nephew of former vice president Umar Wirahadikusumah.<sup>43</sup> An opponent of the plans to reestablish the old system of seventeen regional military commands, Agus called for the outright abolition of the Army's territorial structure. At a seminar in Jakarta in May 1999, he presented a remarkably forthright paper about the military's past abuses and the pressing need for internal reform.<sup>44</sup> Later that year, Agus wrote the lead piece in an edited collection of his classmates' essays, published under the provocative title, *The New Indonesia and the Military's Challenge: Thoughts about the Future*.<sup>45</sup> In his campaign for reform Agus received considerable support from his Class 13 1973 classmates.

<sup>42</sup> These included former TNI Commander in Chief General Wiranto (coordinating minister for politics and security), Lieutenant General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (minister of mines and energy), Lieutenant General Agum Gumelar (minister for transportation), Rear Admiral Freddy Numberi (minister of administrative reforms), and Lieutenant General Surjadi Soedirdja (minister of home affairs).

<sup>43</sup> In 1999 Agus held the powerful post of assistant for general planning and in early 2000 was appointed commander of Kodam VII Wirabuana (covering the island of Sulawesi). As of June 2000 he was the commander of the powerful Army Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad).

<sup>44</sup> See Agus Wirahadikusumah, "Hubungan Sipil-Militer: Visi, Misi dan Aksi" (Civil-military relations: Vision, mission and action) (Manuscript, May 1999).

<sup>45</sup> See Wirahadikusumah, *Indonesia Baru dan Tantangan TNI: Pemikiran Masa Depan* (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1999).

It is no accident that Class 13 1973 backed reform; their support is best understood in relation to the surrounding cohorts graduated from the military academy during the early 1970s. On the one hand, in 1998 and 1999 members of the very large Classes 10 1970 and 11 1971 monopolized top staff and command posts in military and Army headquarters, as well as the regional military commands. The members of Classes 10 and 11 generally opposed calls for reform, and individual officers waged bitter counterattacks against Agus Wirahadikusumah.<sup>46</sup> Most observers of Indonesian politics and the military argued that officers from these classes opposed reform because they remained loyal to President Suharto or to General Wiranto.<sup>47</sup> While some officers did indeed have close connections to these two figures, personal loyalty to a disgraced dictator and/or to one retired general cannot account entirely for their hostility to reform. In actuality, these classes' hostility toward reform was largely a reflection of their unwillingness to cede their dominance in the TNI and in army high commands. Although reform itself has much broader implications for the military as an institution, for these officers, reform would have meant the loss of jobs and led to retirement. Furthermore, to the extent that reform is intended to abolish the secondment (*kekaryaan*) of military personnel to civilian posts, it also would close the access of effectively retired officers to positions of power and prestige in the civilian administration. In contrast with the outspoken stance of members of Class 13 1973, Class 14 1974 remained relatively quiet. Although the purge of Prabowo Subianto and his clique directly affected only a small number of its officers, other members of Class 14 1974 became cautious out of fear of being scapegoated by association.

The Class 13 1973 "reformers" thus found themselves caught between two competing dynamics. The monopolization of top posts by Classes 10 1970 and 11 1971 and the emergence of officers from Class 12 1972 meant that the members of Class 13 1973 were (at least temporarily) blocked from further promotion. Insofar as reform would mean passing the leadership to officers not contaminated by association with President Suharto or his henchmen, however, the purge of Lieu-

<sup>46</sup> This is particularly true of Major General Djaja Suparman, who served as commander of Kodam Jaya Jakarta from July 1998–November 1999, then as commander of the Army Strategic Reserve from November 1999–March 2000, only to be replaced by his nemesis Agus Wirahadikusumah and shuffled off to the unimportant post of commander of the Military Staff and Command School (Sesko TNI).

<sup>47</sup> See, for example, TNI Watch!, "Orang Dekat Suharto Masih Dapat Tempat di TNI-AD" (Officers close to Suharto still have a place in the army), posted on [SiaR@minihub.org](mailto:SiaR@minihub.org), dated June 21, 2000.

tenant General Prabowo and his colleagues meant that Class 13 1973 was well positioned to benefit from change.

The three reshuffles in 2000—in February, June, and August—were also hailed by most observers as signaling further civilian control over the armed forces. Yet in each of these reshuffles, members of Class 13 1973 were conspicuously held back. In fact, the June and August reshuffles saw a continued conservative rollback, with members of Classes 10–12 maintaining domination not only over TNI and army headquarters but also over the eleven territorial regional commands. Again, this is graphically illustrated by Figure 2—the succession plot for regional military commanders—showing that the Class 10–11 monopolization of key posts came at the expense of more junior officers, particularly those from Class 13 1973. Does this mean that there was a real struggle within the military between officers who remained loyal to Suharto, Wiranto, or the political status quo, on the one hand, and reformers, on the other? Perhaps, but more importantly, divisions within the officer corps reflected differential career prospects and solidarity among class cohorts from the military academy.

How then were these decisions made? Theoretically, the Board for the Appointment and Rank of Senior Officers (Dewan Jabatan dan Kepangkatan Perwira Tinggi), consisting of two- and three-star generals, makes decisions about the appointment and promotion of senior military officers. During the New Order, however, President Suharto vetted all decisions regarding senior officers. Under President Habibie, the military gained greater autonomy over the decision-making process and continued to keep it under his successor, President Abdurrahman Wahid, despite passage of a new bill in August 2000 that granted the vice president the right to play a role in military appointments.<sup>48</sup> While the office of the commander in chief took responsibility for appointments within military headquarters, the office of the army chief of staff was given significant leeway in selections within the military. Between February 1998 and June 2002 officers from Classes 10 1970 and 11 1971 held the positions of TNI chief of staff, army chief of staff, and deputy army chief of staff *exclusively*.<sup>49</sup> The monopolistic successions of

<sup>48</sup> Editors (fn. 28, 2000), 133.

<sup>49</sup> During this period the post of TNI chief of staff was held by Lieutenant General Fachrul Razi (10 1970), Lieutenant General Sugiono (10 1970), Lieutenant General S. Marabessy (11 1971), and Djamar Chaniago (11 1971); that of army chief of staff was held by General Subagyo Hadisiswoyo (10 1970), General Tyasno Sudarto (10 1970), and General Endriartono Sutarto (11 1971); and that of deputy army chief of staff was held by Lieutenant General Sugiono (10 1970), Lieutenant General Johnny Lumintang (10 1970), Lieutenant General Djamar Chaniago (11 1971), Lieutenant General Endriartono Sutarto (11 1971), and Lieutenant General Kiki Syahnakri (11 1971).

regional military commanders also took place during this time. Although we do not know what was discussed during these meetings, it is abundantly evident that the officers who oversaw the appointment process ensured that their classmates maintained control of these posts, hence the “monopolistic” succession phenomenon within the military so peculiar to Indonesia’s transition and consolidation of democracy.

These curious developments within the Indonesian military, from frequent reshuffles of senior officers to monopolistic control over senior staff and command positions to the increasingly vocal hostility between different academy cohorts, are best understood as part of a negotiated compromise between the civilian elite and the military. While the president, minister of defense, and parliament needed to demonstrate that action was being taken to reform the military, they did not want to (nor could they) meddle in TNI’s internal affairs. They therefore allowed the military to control personnel changes, and in return, the military elite refrained from taking a more active—even interventionist—role in national politics. Ironically, despite refraining from meddling in the appointment process, when President Wahid came under increasing political pressure in 2001, he asked the military to intervene on his behalf. Its refusal to do so cost him the presidency and resulted in an alliance between newly installed President Megawati Sukarnoputri and TNI, the very institution that had backed Suharto’s dictatorship. Indonesia had both weathered the transition from nondemocratic rule and come full circle.

Finally, it is worth pausing to look ahead to the near future. While reform-minded officers lost out in the short run, the mandatory retirement of the current military elite at age fifty-five will soon force officers from Classes 10 1970, 11 1971, and 12 1972 to retire, opening the way for officers from junior classes. More importantly, officers from the extremely small classes graduated from the military academy during the late 1970s and the early 1980s are now reaching senior ranks. Smaller class size means that as a whole these officers have superb career prospects. Because of this, these officers are likely to be cautious—simply keeping a clean record will virtually assure that they will rise to the rank of brigadier general, and a high percentage are bound to make the rank of major and even that of lieutenant general.<sup>50</sup> For this reason, the small cohorts that graduated from the military academy during the sec-

<sup>50</sup> Note, however, that this may not be possible for particular cohorts of officers. A large number of officers from Classes 16–20 (1976–81) are tainted by their involvement in East Timor, particularly during 1999, and officers from Classes 21–23 (1982–84) are now deeply implicated in the ongoing violence in Aceh.

ond half of the 1970s are likely to refrain from intervening in the political process and accordingly will contribute to Indonesia's democratic consolidation. This is neither because they support democratization nor because they are too weak or divided to intervene—as scholars of democratic consolidation often argue—but rather because structural shifts in the class size of the officer corps create a particular set of incentives that favor nonintervention. In other words, the Indonesian military may act in ways that support democratization for reasons that have little or nothing to do with political or even professional values.

#### PEER-GROUP SOLIDARITY AND TRANSITIONS AND CONSOLIDATIONS: SOME COMPARISONS

The detailed case study of Indonesia reveals that the internal dynamics of the officer corps—including class size, cohort solidarity, and promotion patterns (especially the monopolization of top staff and command posts by officers from particular classes) were important determinants of military behavior in Indonesia's transition and consolidation. It is only with reference to other transitions, however, that generalizations from Indonesia's experience can be made and tested. For this reason, we now turn to other cases in which the structural features of peer-group solidarity and recruitment and promotion patterns played an important role in military politics. Because of the extremely limited amount of such research, we will consider transitions in the broadest of terms (see the definition in fn. 3), including both transitions from nondemocratic rule and transitions to military rule. These cases are scattered across three continents and three decades. They are the Majors' Coup of January 1966 in Nigeria, which was successfully countered soon after its execution; the February 1966 coup in Ghana; the abortive April 1981 Young Turks coup in Thailand, which in spite of being a failure in terms of regime change, nevertheless contributed to the movement for democratization in Thailand; and the April 1974 coup in Portugal, which was explicitly intended to open the way for a transition from nondemocratic rule.<sup>51</sup> The comparison shows that, while there are sig-

<sup>51</sup> These cases reflect a broader pattern in which attention is paid to the structure of the military only when the military stages a coup. A unique aspect of the current study is the detailed analysis of structure in a case in which the military did not intervene decisively in national politics even when, by all accounts, it had the means to do so. In terms of the choice of cases, Alfred McCoy's excellent account of the role of the Philippine military in the transition of 1986, with its unique methodology and emphasis on military socialization and class solidarity, also makes for an interesting comparison with the Indonesian case; see Alfred McCoy, *Closer than Brothers: Manhood at the Philippine Military Academy* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1999).

nificant similarities between these cases and the Indonesian case, the differences and by extension the uniqueness of the Indonesian case have simple but important implications for the study of transitions and consolidations.

In a sociological analysis of the Nigerian military that is rare in its detail, Luckham examines various hypotheses about the cleavages that drove a faction of the military to carry out the coup of January 1966.<sup>52</sup> He concludes that peer associations were and are an important source of interest-group formation in militaries. They are caused in part by “strongly enforced rituals of deference and avoidance between officers of different rank, which tends to turn the officer corps into a set of vertically divided fraternities.”<sup>53</sup> Luckham further notes that “Majors and Captains involved in the January 1966 coups all fall in the 1957 to 1961 cohorts; the Majors alone all within the 1957 to 1959 cohorts,”<sup>54</sup> which demonstrates the importance of the structural feature of cohort solidarity in the Nigerian case.

Baynham’s analysis of the February 1966 coup in Ghana emphasizes “shared training and career experiences” as having played an important role in the formation of the inner group of officers who plotted and executed the coup.<sup>55</sup> While this peer group also had a distinct ethnic motivation to it, with the majority of the members belonging to the same (Ewe) ethnic group, Baynham writes “[t]he labyrinthine criss-crossing of careers at school, in the ranks, as officer cadets and, subsequently, as commanding officers in Ghana and on active service in the Congo, acted as a powerful bond in uniting the collaborators.”<sup>56</sup>

In a less detailed but still revealing account of the Thai Young Turks coup in Thailand in 1981, Chai-Anan reinforces Luckham’s observation.<sup>57</sup> First, he notes that the abortive coup showed strong elements of class solidarity and, more broadly, peer group solidarity. The core group of eleven officers consisted exclusively of graduates of Class 7 of the military academy; all were colonels stationed in and around Bangkok at the time, and all were senators.<sup>58</sup> To quote Chai-Anan, “[t]he composi-

<sup>52</sup> Luckham (fn. 19).

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., 132, also chap. 5 (“Peer Groups: Solidarity and Cleavage”), in particular, sections in that chapter titled “Cohesion: ‘Friends and Class-mates’” and “Cleavage: The Differentiation of Peer Groups.”

<sup>54</sup> Ibid., 36–37.

<sup>55</sup> Baynham (fn. 19), 158, Table 8.1, 161 and Table 8.2, 162.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., 163.

<sup>57</sup> Chai-Anan Samudavanija, *The Thai Young Turks* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982).

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., 46–47. Similarly, senior officers from Class 5 staged the subsequent coup in 1991. See Bunbongkarun Suchit, *State of the Nation: Thailand* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1996).

tion and location of an informal group is largely determined by the formal structure of the organization. Informal groups in the army usually develop where the formal organizational structure facilitates frequent contact."<sup>59</sup> The importance of common training experiences is further supported by distinguishing the Young Turks, who had been trained in five-year courses modeled on West Point in the U.S., from their superiors, who they believed had received inferior and outdated training.<sup>60</sup>

In his account of the April 1974 coup in Portugal, Porch relies on a broader definition of solidarity of the officer corps, focusing on entire generations rather than on individual classes of military academy graduates.<sup>61</sup> The coup, he notes, was effected by "the middle generation of officers in their thirties and early forties . . . who regarded themselves as . . . superior to the newcomers."<sup>62</sup> Similarly, Maxwell writes "the MFA was composed exclusively of regular captains and majors."<sup>63</sup> As will be discussed later in more detail, the formation of this peer group was intricately tied to recruitment and promotional patterns in the Portuguese military.

While the formation of tightly knit peer groups, a common development to military organizations, provides the informal structures through which intramilitary cleavages develop, these cleavages must develop in conjunction with individual and group incentives that vary systematically across them in order for one or more groups to take a decisive stand on an issue as important as a transition or consolidation. The motivations of the key groups of actors in the recently discussed cases are therefore the next logical area to examine.

#### THE IMPORTANCE OF RECRUITMENT AND CAREER PROSPECTS: SOME COMPARISONS

Our detailed study of Indonesia reveals that career prospects stemming from historical patterns of recruitment and the changing size of the officer corps played an important role in determining the stance of different classes in the military on Indonesia's consolidation and reforms.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, 47. A quotation from a statement by the chief spokesman of the "Young Turks" group runs "we are the Class of 1960 . . . we went to fight in Laos . . . in the jungle with the Communist terrorists. . . . We were closely united, all of us determined in our pursuit of the same objective" (p. 35).

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, 41. On the related subject of intercohort dynamics, the author also points out the importance of "elder-younger brother relationships," such as those between the members of Class 7 and those of Classes 12, 13, and 14 (pp. 64-65).

<sup>61</sup> Porch (fn. 18).

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, 73.

<sup>63</sup> Maxwell (fn. 18), 111. The MFA (Movimento das Forças Armadas or Armed Forces Movement) was the group that these officers formed.

On the one hand, the postretirement prospects for the seniormost classes in the era of *reformasi* are not as bright as they seemed before the transition. The career prospects for officers in the small military academy classes that graduated in the late 1970s and early 1980s, on the other hand, are superb, and therefore have predisposed those classes toward nonintervention. The cases of Ghana, Nigeria, Thailand, and Portugal have elements of similarity to and difference from the Indonesian case in the incentives that motivated different elements of their respective militaries to act as they did. While in all cases the actions of the military were publicly explained as protecting the interests of the country and/or the military, it is important to examine the structure of individual and group incentives in these cases—if not to identify other possible motivations, then at least to rule them out. Such an examination shows that promotion and career prospects were important in three of these cases—namely, the Nigerian case and, more graphically, the Ghanaian and Portuguese cases. In the fourth case—that of Thailand in 1981—it is inconclusive.

Luckham's analysis clearly argues that promotion patterns played a role in shaping the incentives for middle-ranking Nigerian officers to stage a coup in late 1965. Part of his thesis about the motivations of these officers hinges on the speed with which they moved from lower to middle ranks; the faster they had risen, the more they were disappointed and compelled to action when it became apparent they would not advance much further. As Luckham explains, the 1957–59 batches “had enjoyed faster rates of promotion through to captain and major than any of the preceding cohorts,”<sup>64</sup> but “there was little prospect for further promotion, a fact that was made galling by the high expectations arising from their earlier advancement.”<sup>65</sup> Luckham's argument is a “relative deprivation” argument in the original sense of the term—the value expectation of these middle-ranking officers far exceeded their value capability, imposed on them by the prevailing structural conditions in the officer corps.<sup>66</sup> The resulting discontent manifested itself in the January 1966 coup.

In contrast, Chai-Anan's analysis of the Thai military is almost devoid of any discussion of the promotion patterns and career prospects of the so-called Young Turks. The main motivation of the officers who

<sup>64</sup> Luckham (fn. 19), 174. The author's argument is based in part on his Table 32 (Ibid., 175), which shows clearly the unusual speed with which the 1957–59 cohort advanced through the lower ranks.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid., 174.

<sup>66</sup> See Ted R. Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).

staged the coup, according to the author, was “national survival.”<sup>67</sup> While he attempts to analyze possible personal motivations that went beyond patriotism,<sup>68</sup> he is handicapped by lack of data and ultimately falls back on the group’s public pronouncements of its own motives, which naturally emphasize exclusively patriotic themes. In sum, the Thai case as analyzed by Chai-Anan provides no evidence that career prospects resulting from recruitment or promotion patterns played a direct role in the coup. While this may well be an accurate representation of the case, it also could be inaccurate because of the lack of data. The Thai study nonetheless does illustrate a key argument of this article—there exist cases of transitions or attempted transitions in which the military played an important role, but in which, for lack of data or for other reasons, individual incentives perhaps related to the structural dynamics of the officer corps are neither identified nor eliminated as an important variable. Studies of this nature should be viewed as potentially having omitted variable bias.<sup>69</sup>

Porch’s analysis of Portugal, developed further in the context of the transitions literature in Maxwell, presents detailed and striking evidence of the role of recruitment and promotion patterns on career prospects of officers and of the connection between this structural dynamic and the coup and transition of 1974.<sup>70</sup> The well-documented transition in Portugal resulted from the development of a faction of officers, who believed both that their position within the military and in society at large was under threat and that their organization was being forced to fight futile and expensive wars to maintain anachronistic colonial possessions. By the time Portugal was fighting wars in its African colonies, including Angola, Guinea Bissau, and Mozambique, military service had ceased to be an attractive career for most young Portuguese men. As a consequence, recruitment to the military academy plummeted (see Figure 3), forcing the short-handed military to hire a large number of *milicianos* to perform functions normally reserved for commissioned officers. The military subsequently attempted to regularize these *milicianos* by granting them commissioned status after a drasti-

<sup>67</sup> Chai-Anan (fn. 57), 69.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, chap. 5.

<sup>69</sup> This term, adopted from statistical methodology, is the bias of coefficient estimates in a regression in which a possibly important variable has not been included among the independent variables. If that variable is truly unimportant and it is included in the analysis, it will not affect the estimates. If it is truly important, however, its omission renders the results of the incompletely specified regression invalid.

<sup>70</sup> See Porch (fn. 18); and Maxwell (fn. 18).




FIGURE 3  
 APPLICANTS AND ADMISSIONS TO THE PORTUGUESE MILITARY  
 ACADEMY BEFORE 1974

SOURCE: Douglas Porch, *The Portuguese Armed Forces and the Revolution* (London: Croom Helm, 1977), 72.

cally abbreviated period of formal training; this was perceived as a loss of prestige for the regular officer corps and as a threat to the otherwise robust career prospects of the small cohorts of career army regulars by whose sides these *milicianos* had served.<sup>71</sup> A burgeoning cohort of officers would have meant higher attrition rates and perhaps, as has been established in the Indonesian case,<sup>72</sup> shorter tours of duty. This was compounded by the earlier opening of the military academy to cadets from socioeconomically underprivileged classes, a move that made “low pay, slow promotion, and the ‘degradation of the army’” (or loss of prestige) increasingly important concerns.<sup>73</sup> These structural changes in the officer corps led to the formation of an organization of regular, middle-ranking officers, the MFA, who sought to extricate the military from unwinnable colonial wars and to reform the military from within; their subsequent actions paved the way for a democratic transition.

Finally, the case of Ghana in 1966 presents yet another striking ex-

<sup>71</sup> This was the famous Decree Law 353–73. See Porch (fn. 18), 64–66.

<sup>72</sup> See Kammen and Chandra (fn. 19).

<sup>73</sup> Porch (fn. 18), 68, 74.

ample of the role of promotion patterns and career prospects in the motivations of individual officers, in the formation of peer groups, and in the structure of the military organization as a whole. A pattern of rapid promotion for a cohort of Ghanaian officers (to fill a vacuum created by the elimination of expatriate officers from the military in 1961 as part of then-President Kwame Nkrumah's program of Africanization) led to "major convulsions in the army's internal structure," including "distorted bunching of age groups, narrow and overlapping skill margins between the ranks," and "exceptionally high rates of promotional and horizontal mobility."<sup>74</sup> Baynham's analysis reveals how these patterns facilitated the formation of the peer group that led the 1966 coup and created an environment particularly conducive to "armed adventurism in the political sphere."<sup>75</sup> A number of officers involved in the 1966 coup also had reasons relating to individual career prospects to plot the coup, though these reasons appear not to have had any systematic underlying cause.<sup>76</sup>

The similarity between the Nigerian, Portuguese, Ghanaian, and Indonesian cases is obvious—recruitment and promotion patterns had consequences that extended well beyond the boundaries of the military as an organization; they affected the destinies of nation-states by shaping the course of transitions or consolidations. Furthermore, for the two most similar cases—Portugal and Indonesia—variations in the size of the officer corps played a key role. In Portugal, the elevation of irregular militia men to the level of commissioned officers would have created resentment not only among those career officers who had to earn their commission in the traditional manner, but also among larger cohorts of regulars vying for coveted positions at the highest levels of the military.

In Indonesia, however, recruitment and promotion patterns played a very different role. Variations in the size of military academy classes placed pressure on the military to carry out frequent large-scale personnel reshuffles and to reduce the mean tenure of senior staff and command officers. These variations also resulted in differential career prospects within the officer corps and consequently patterned attitudes toward reform of the military. Officers from the large classes that dominated the military elite during the transition and consolidation have strongly opposed reform because its success would force them to relinquish their posts and allow more junior officers to rise to top staff and command positions. More junior officers have generally been more re-

<sup>74</sup> Baynham (fn. 19), Table 6.1, 114.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, 260.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, 176.

ceptive to military reform, including the redefinition of civil-military relations, because they are well positioned to benefit from these changes. These competing interests, however, have not precipitated open conflict between different cohorts, but rather have fostered a short-term compromise between the senior military officers and the civilian elite, whereby civilians have refrained from interfering in the appointment process, allowing monopolization of the high command by particular cohorts in return for military noninterference in the political process. At a broader level, the comparison of the Indonesian and Portuguese cases illustrates that promotion and recruitment patterns—in particular, the differences between large and small cohorts of officers—created career prospects that differed systematically across cohorts of officers at different levels of seniority. In both cases, the actions of the different groups of officers involved can be attributed in part to the impact that these recruitment and promotion patterns were expected to have on the career prospects of those sections of the officer corps.

Most of the literature on transitions from nondemocratic rule and consolidations of democracy involving the military appear not to have taken the two proximate implications of this case very seriously. The first implication is that career prospects in particular, and individual and group incentives of officers in general, play a key role in determining their actions. When these incentives vary systematically among cohorts or other identifiable peer groups of officers, factions may develop—their actions may have profound consequences for transitions and consolidations. The second implication is that the analysis of structural features of the military that create variations in career prospects, such as recruitment and promotion patterns, is not merely a desirable feature of the study of such events—it is necessary, if not to identify a role for such features in the case at hand, then at least to eliminate it.<sup>77</sup>

The differences between the Nigerian, Portuguese, Ghanaian, and Indonesian cases illustrate the variety of manifestations that structural features of the military can have in the context of transitions and consolidations. In the Nigerian case, promotion patterns provided a framework within which one faction in the military—middle-ranking officers who perceived themselves as more deserving of promotions than was structurally feasible—took action, resulting in the January 1966 coup. In the Portuguese case, recruitment and promotion patterns

<sup>77</sup> The analysis of the Thai case should, for this reason, be considered incomplete. This is perhaps justifiable on the grounds of scarcity of data, a common problem when it comes to analyzing the structure of a corps of military officers.

precipitated a transition; the threat to the career prospects of middle-ranking career officers of the MFA, in combination with their fatigue from fighting unwinnable colonial wars, led to the coup and ultimately the Revolution of the Carnations. In Ghana, accelerated but uneven promotion patterns and peer group solidarity led to the creation of the group that plotted and executed the coup. In Indonesia, by contrast, recruitment and promotion patterns in the military have contributed to the continuation of the consolidation process. Of course, they have proven to be divisive in that the midlevel officers who belonged to small cohorts and therefore enjoyed excellent career prospects were more open to reform than were their senior counterparts, who opposed reform. Members of the senior active classes 1970–72 sought to prevent regeneration because they did not want to relinquish their posts, and accordingly, they monopolized senior posts. To some degree, this compensated them for the inevitable loss of postretirement opportunities that they would have faced as the result of democratic reform and establishment of civilian supremacy over the military. This appears to have been sufficient to ensure orderly transition within the military from the senior officers to their reform-minded juniors. The comparison of these cases illustrates that promotion and recruitment patterns in the military can spark regime change (coups/transitions) through intervention as much as they can promote regime change and its subsequent maintenance (consolidation) through nonintervention.

#### CONCLUSION

General Suharto's thirty-two-year dictatorial rule depended on the support of the Indonesian military; for this reason, the nonintervention of the military was crucial to the country's transition from nondemocratic rule and the subsequent consolidation of democracy under Presidents Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Sukarnoputri. It would be a mistake, however, to premise the successful transition from nondemocratic rule upon the existence of any weakness, crippling internal division, or support for democratization within the military.

This article has argued, first, that two different sets of incentives affecting the highest echelons of the military are essential for understanding the political role of the military in Indonesia's transition from nondemocratic rule and in its democratization. First, the seniormost Classes 10 1970 to 12 1972 had a disincentive for reform because of decisions to end the secondment of officers to the civil service, administrative posts, and the legislative branch. Facing the loss of opportuni-

ties long enjoyed by the officer corps, they responded with a transitory monopolization of the senior posts in the territorial structure, the Army, and TNI headquarters. Second, the more junior classes found an incentive for reform, with Classes 13 1973 and those junior to them particularly well situated to benefit from reform and the country's political transition.

More generally, this article has argued that, following Agüero,<sup>78</sup> analysis of political transitions must treat the internal dynamics of the military as a variable in its own right and, in many cases, a very important one. Furthermore, it would be a mistake to interpret the internal politics of the military simply or strictly in terms of divisions between those officers who continue to support the old nondemocratic order and those who favor a transition to democracy. While discussion of national politics may be couched in these terms and officers may employ this language, such divides are likely to be undergirded by distinct structural features of the military itself. In the case of Indonesia, the division between those who favored the status quo and those who supported reform was premised on the differential career prospects of more senior officers reluctant to relinquish their posts and influence and those of more junior officers who stood to benefit from leading reform and redefining civil-military relations. These differences were in part a function of the changing size of the officer corps and in part a function of class solidarity and the monopolization of key billets.

The comparison between Nigeria, Portugal, Ghana, Indonesia, and to a lesser degree Thailand suggests that both individual and group incentives often drive group behavior. Additionally, to the extent that structural variables cause systematic variations in individual and group incentives, effort must be invested in determining the nature and implications of these incentives. This effort must go deeper than the traditional emphasis on militaries as single, aggregated actors—it must illuminate the very microfoundations of macromilitary behavior. These two factors—structure and incentives—can manifest themselves both in regime change (through a coup, for example) and in regime maintenance (through nonintervention in a consolidation, for example)—an outcome that the early literature on civil-military relations has almost entirely ignored.

As a final implication of this study for the many cases of transitions and consolidations,<sup>79</sup> successful or failed, involving the military, it is tempting to speculate as to why the Nigerian, Ghanaian, and Por-

<sup>78</sup> Agüero (fn. 5).

<sup>79</sup> See, for example, O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead (fn. 4); and Diamond (fn. 4).

tuguese cases are among a relatively small number of cases in which recruitment and promotion patterns and career prospects for military officers have been found to play a key role. While this could be because the structure of the military is unimportant in other cases, and it surely is in at least a few, it could just as well be because of the bias against analyzing military organizations in detail, as was discussed in the introduction, or because of a lack of data to do so, as was illustrated in the Thai case. Viewed another way, this study raises the methodological question of whether structural patterns, as was seen in the case in Portugal, must be linked to a momentous event like the Revolution of the Carnations, in order for them to be acknowledged. This was clearly the bias in the early literature on civil-military relations, as emphasized in Bienen.<sup>80</sup> As this study demonstrates, the literature on transitions and consolidations should accord these patterns their due even if, as is the case with Indonesia, their effects while profound are not manifested in dramatic upheaval. In such cases, to use the words of Finer, we should ask not why the army “rebels against its civilian masters, but why it ever obeys them.”<sup>81</sup>

#### EPILOGUE: INDONESIA SINCE THE EARLY STAGE OF CONSOLIDATION

Since this article was first written, many changes have occurred in Indonesia. In July 2001, Megawati Sukarnoputri succeeded President Abdurrahman Wahid in a peaceful transition. Indonesia is no longer in the early stage of its democratic consolidation, on which the case study in this paper focused—the then-nascent civilian political forces have since organized to create institutions and to form political organizations whose development had long been kept in check by Suharto. Consequently, the military has ceded some political ground, agreeing to end the secondment of active-duty officers to positions in the state apparatus and to abolish the military faction in parliament. In many respects, however, the Indonesian military is in an even stronger political position than it was under Suharto during the 1980s and 1990s. The military derives important political power from its role as a defender of property rights in the far-flung islands of the archipelago; elites therefore continue to seek the support of TNI, paradoxically ensuring that the military retains its central role in politics precisely at a time when segments of civil society are calling for civilian supremacy and demilita-

<sup>80</sup> Bienen (fn. 9).

<sup>81</sup> Finer, as quoted in McCoy (fn. 51), 5.




FIGURE 4  
MEAN TENURE FOR REGIONAL (KODAM) AND SUBREGIONAL (KOREM)  
MILITARY COMMANDERS (1985–2000)

rization. The combination of increasing independence from civilian interference in its internal affairs and legitimacy with elites will ensure that the Indonesian military remains an important political player long after democracy is fully consolidated. It also will ensure that, in order to understand the role of the military in Indonesian politics, knowledge of the structure of the military as an organization remains an important part of the research agenda.

#### APPENDIX 1

The relationship between the size of classes graduated from the military academy and the length of tours of duty is observable at all levels of the Indonesian army.<sup>82</sup> The experience of commanders of the ten territorial regional military commands (Kodam), who hold the rank of major general—in 1999 an eleventh Kodam was created to cover the Molucca Islands, wracked by serious communal violence, and plans were announced for a return to the pre-1985 system of seventeen territorial commands—is illustrative of this point. Between 1985 and 1990 the Kodam were commanded by officers from the relatively small classes that graduated from the AMN between 1960–63, during which

<sup>82</sup> For statistical evidence of the relationship, see Siddharth Chandra, “Regional Commanders in the Indonesian Army: An Analysis of Promotional Logjam in the 1990s” (Manuscript, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, June 2000).

time command tenure averaged 800–1000 days. Between 1993 and 1996 the Kodam were held by officers from the large classes that graduated between 1965 and 1968, during which time mean tenure dropped drastically to an average of 550–650 days per officer. With the entry of the even larger classes that graduated from the renamed Military Academy (Akademi Militer, Akmil) in the early 1970s, mean tenure was driven down further to an average of 380–480 days. Four relatively recent reshuffles of senior military personnel in late 1999 and 2000 resulted in a further decline in command tenure, with Kodam commanders now averaging a mere 350 days per tour of duty. The same pattern is observable for the colonels who command the subregional military commands (see Figure 4). Furthermore, lagging the two tenure trends by 4.5 years—the average time that it takes for an officer to make it from Korem to Kodam commander—makes the two figures virtually identical.

#### APPENDIX 2

The goal of the estimation was to control for those available structural variables that could affect succession patterns and then to test for an AMN class-specific effect in the presence of these controls. Table 2 contains statistics describing the variables used in the analysis. The probit models were:<sup>83</sup>

—Model 1

$$MONOP_i = b0 + b1*CLASSIZE_i + b2*LTENURE_i + b3*LAGE_i + b4*LAMN_i + e_i$$

—Model 2

$$MONOP_i = b0 + b1*CLASSIZE_i + b2*LTENURE_i + b3*LAGE_i + b4*LAMN_i + b5*KODAM_i + e_i$$

—Model 3

$$MONOP_i = b0 + b1*LCLASSIZE_i + b2*LTENURE_i + b3*LAGE_i + b4*LAMN_i + e_i$$

—Model 4

$$MONOP_i = b0 + b1*LCLASSIZE_i + b2*LTENURE_i + b3*LAGE_i + b4*LAMN_i + b5*KODAM_i + e_i$$

<sup>83</sup> The models are written in the standard linear form. The dependent variable is modeled as follows:

$$p_i = P_i + e_i = F(\mathbf{x}_i' \boldsymbol{\beta}) + e_i,$$

where  $p_i$  is the estimator of the true probability  $P_i$ ,  $e_i$  is a random error,  $F(\cdot)$  is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution, and  $\mathbf{x}_i' \boldsymbol{\beta}$  is the scalar product of the vector of independent variables for observation  $i$  and the parameters to be estimated.

TABLE 2  
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR DATA IN THE PROBIT MODELS OF CLASS MONOPOLIZATION OF KODAM COMMANDER POSITIONS  
(N = 81)

| <i>Variable Type</i> | <i>Description</i>   | <i>Mean</i> | <i>Standard<br/>Deviation</i> | <i>Minimum</i> | <i>Maximum</i> |
|----------------------|--|-------------|-------------------------------|----------------|----------------|
| Class Size 1         | AMN Class Size of Successor Officer in Succession Event<br>(Natural logarithm CLASSIZE used) <sup>a</sup>    | 328         | 123                           | 59             | 465            |
| Class Size 2         | AMN Class Size of Predecessor Officer in Succession Event<br>(Natural logarithm LCLASSIZE used) <sup>a</sup> | 325         | 124                           | 59             | 465            |
| Tenure               | Tenure in Days of Predecessor Officer in Succession Event<br>(Natural logarithm LTENURE used) <sup>a</sup>   | 544         | 288                           | 10             | 1263           |
| Age                  | Age in Years of Predecessor Officer in Succession Event<br>(Natural logarithm LAGE used) <sup>a</sup>        | 50          | 1.80                          | 45             | 53             |
| AMN Class 1          | Dummy Variable for Predecessor in AMN Class 1, LAMN1 (1 if<br>Predecessor in Class 1, 0 otherwise)           | 0.04        | 0.19                          | 0              | 1              |
| AMN Class 3          | Dummy Variable for Predecessor in AMN Class 3, LAMN3 (1 if<br>Predecessor in Class 3, 0 otherwise)           | 0.11        | 0.32                          | 0              | 1              |
| AMN Class 4          | Dummy Variable for Predecessor in AMN Class 4, LAMN4 (1 if<br>Predecessor in Class 4, 0 otherwise)           | 0.05        | 0.22                          | 0              | 1              |
| AMN Class 6          | Dummy Variable for Predecessor in AMN Class 6, LAMN6 (1 if<br>Predecessor in Class 6, 0 otherwise)           | 0.17        | 0.38                          | 0              | 1              |

|              |  |      |      |   |   |
|--------------|--|------|------|---|---|
| AMN Class 7  | Dummy Variable for Predecessor in AMN Class 7, LAMN7 (1 if Predecessor in Class 7, 0 otherwise)    | 0.07 | 0.26 | 0 | 1 |
| AMN Class 9  | Dummy Variable for Predecessor in AMN Class 9, LAMN9 (1 if Predecessor in Class 9, 0 otherwise)    | 0.04 | 0.19 | 0 | 1 |
| AMN Class 10 | Dummy Variable for Predecessor in AMN Class 10, LAMN10 (1 if Predecessor in Class 10, 0 otherwise) | 0.11 | 0.32 | 0 | 1 |
| AMN Class 11 | Dummy Variable for Predecessor in AMN Class 11, LAMN11 (1 if Predecessor in Class 11, 0 otherwise) | 0.11 | 0.32 | 0 | 1 |
| KODAM I      | Dummy Variable for Succession Event in Kodam I   | 0.11 | 0.32 | 0 | 1 |
| KODAM II     | Dummy Variable for Succession Event in Kodam II  | 0.11 | 0.32 | 0 | 1 |
| KODAM J      | Dummy Variable for Succession Event in Kodam Jaya  | 0.07 | 0.26 | 0 | 1 |
| KODAM III    | Dummy Variable for Succession Event in Kodam III   | 0.09 | 0.28 | 0 | 1 |
| KODAM IV     | Dummy Variable for Succession Event in Kodam IV  | 0.12 | 0.33 | 0 | 1 |
| KODAM V      | Dummy Variable for Succession Event in Kodam V   | 0.07 | 0.26 | 0 | 1 |
| KODAM VI     | Dummy Variable for Succession Event in Kodam VI  | 0.10 | 0.30 | 0 | 1 |
| KODAM VII    | Dummy Variable for Succession Event in Kodam VII   | 0.11 | 0.32 | 0 | 1 |
| KODAM VIII   | Dummy Variable for Succession Event in Kodam VIII  | 0.09 | 0.28 | 0 | 1 |

<sup>a</sup> Natural logarithms were taken of all the nondummy variables in the model. This is customary practice when there is high variation among observations, as is the case with CLASSIZE, LCLASSIZE, and LTENURE. Analogous probit models in which the age variable was measured in years (as opposed to the natural logarithm of years) produced very similar results.

In these models, the subscript  $i$  denotes one observation of a succession event involving two officers, a predecessor and a successor. The parameters to be estimated are  $b0$ ,  $b1$ ,  $b2$ ,  $b3$ ,  $\mathbf{b4}$  (a vector) and, in Models 2 and 4,  $\mathbf{b5}$  (also a vector). The variable  $MONOP_i$  is an indicator variable, where

$$MONOP_i = \begin{cases} 0, & AMN_i \neq LAMN_i \\ 1, & AMN_i = LAMN_i. \end{cases}$$

Here,  $i$  is the subscript for the  $i$ th observation in the set of succession events,  $AMN_i$  is the AMN class for the successor in succession  $i$ , and  $LAMN_i$  is the AMN class for the predecessor in succession  $i$ . In other words, if an officer succeeded his classmate, then the variable  $MONOP_i$  takes on the value 1; otherwise, it is equal to 0. For the purpose of the model, this defines class monopolization—the transfer of Kodam command from an officer to his former classmate from the National Military Academy.

The variable  $LCLASSIZE_i$  is the natural logarithm of the size of the class of the preceding officer in succession event  $i$ ; the variable  $CLAS-SIZE_i$  is the natural logarithm of the size of the class of the succeeding officer in succession event  $i$ . The inclusion of these variables is crucial to the tests, because one would expect a greater number of officers from larger classes to make Pangdam than would officers from smaller classes.<sup>84</sup> A logical consequence of this would also be the occurrence of a larger number of same-class succession events for those larger classes. In any test of monopolization for reasons other than structure, therefore, one must control for the class size of the predecessor or successor officer, or for both.

The variable  $LTENURE_i$  is the natural logarithm of the tenure in days of the preceding officer in succession event  $i$ . We include this variable because, all else being equal, a predecessor with a shorter command tenure could be more likely to be succeeded by a classmate, who is still young enough to be eligible for appointment as Kodam commander. Conversely, an officer who serves a very long term as Pangdam will have aged substantially, along with his classmates, making it less likely that a classmate would be appointed as Pangdam. In addition, as has been discussed and statistically established in related work, the size of AMN class is negatively correlated with command tenure, suggesting higher turnover among larger classes. The logical outcome of this

<sup>84</sup> Recall that larger cohort size leads to shorter command tenure and higher turnover, which, in turn, leads to higher numbers of appointees from larger classes.

should, of course, be the occurrence of a greater number of same-class succession events.<sup>85</sup>

The variable  $LAGE_i$  is the natural logarithm of the age at appointment of the preceding officer. In addition to the effect of the length of tenure of a predecessor officer, which would affect the age of the succeeding officer, this variable also provides an indication of the point in time in the eligibility age-band when an officer was appointed and, consequently, the likelihood of a same-class succession.<sup>86</sup>

The remaining variables are written as two vectors,  $KODAM_i$  and  $LAMN_i$ .  $KODAM_i$  is a vector of dummy variables for each of the Kodam.<sup>87</sup> For each observation  $i$ , one of these variables takes on the value 1, and the rest, 0. Similarly,  $LAMN_i$  is a vector of dummy variables for each of the AMN classes for the predecessor in the succession event  $i$ .<sup>88</sup>

In these essentially structural models, it is implicitly assumed that systematic AMN class-based differences—such as combat experience and valor, which might make more officers from a particular class worthy of appointment to a Kodam command position—will be captured in the AMN class dummy variables. In other words, monopolization could be caused by unmeasured structural (such a decrease in external opportunities) or political (such as class loyalty) factors, or by other systematic phenomena, such as an exceptionally talented class. In interpreting the AMN dummy variable, the reader should keep in mind that the unmeasured class-specific political and performance-based phenomena are both likely to affect the estimates.

Table 3 contains the results of the four probit models defined above. For each model, the parameter estimates, their standard errors, and the estimated impact of each variable on the probability of a same-class succession are presented. The Pearson  $\chi^2$  and likelihood ratio  $\chi^2$  tests indicate that there is no problem with the fit of the models—the high

<sup>85</sup> This latter effect is a function of class size, suggesting that the variables  $LCLASSIZE_i$  and  $CLAS-SIZE_i$  may be correlated with  $LTENURE_i$ . Note that if two independent variables are correlated, the parameter estimates are still unbiased, though the standard errors may be large. In any case, since the phenomenon of interest is the effect of being in a particular class after controlling for the effects of class size and tenure, the specific testing of hypotheses with respect to these variables is of secondary interest.

<sup>86</sup> Because the age variable is a discrete number of years and therefore inexact in terms of number of days, it was not added to predecessor tenure to yield age at exit for the predecessor, which would have been a more robust structural variable.

<sup>87</sup> These include Kodam I, II, Jaya, III, IV, V, VI, VII, and VIII. In order to eliminate the linear dependence of the  $KODAM_i$  vector with the intercept, Kodam IX was treated as the default Kodam. Insufficient data on the recently created Kodam XVI precluded the use of Pangdam data for that Kodam.

<sup>88</sup> For reasons of linear dependence, dummy variables for AMN classes 2, 5, and 8 were excluded from the estimation. The substance of the results remained the same if alternative AMN class dummies were dropped.

TABLE 3  
ESTIMATES FROM PROBIT MODELS 1–4 OF CLASS MONOPOLIZATION OF KODAM COMMAND POSITIONS<sup>a</sup>

| <i>Variable</i>                 | <i>Model 1</i>            |  | <i>Model 2</i>            |  | <i>Model 3</i>            |  | <i>Model 4</i>            |  |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------|--|---------------------------|--|---------------------------|--|---------------------------|--|
|                                 | <i>Parameter Estimate</i> | <i>Contribution to Probability<sup>b</sup></i> | <i>Parameter Estimate</i> | <i>Contribution to Probability<sup>b</sup></i> | <i>Parameter Estimate</i> | <i>Contribution to Probability<sup>b</sup></i> | <i>Parameter Estimate</i> | <i>Contribution to Probability<sup>b</sup></i> |
| Intercept                       | 69.41**<br>(23.05)        | —  | 83.82**<br>(27.20)        | —  | 69.79**<br>(23.07)        | —  | 84.77**<br>(27.14)        | —  |
| CLASSIZE<br>Succes. Class Size  | -0.43<br>(0.43)           | -0.04  | -0.48<br>(0.53)           | -0.04  | —                         | —  | —                         | —  |
| LCLASSIZE<br>Predec. Class Size | —                         | —  | —                         | —  | -0.33<br>(0.43)           | -0.03  | -0.21<br>(0.51)           | -0.02  |
| LTENURE<br>Predec. Tenure       | 0.03<br>(0.26)            | 0.00   | 0.09<br>(0.31)            | 0.00   | 0.03<br>(0.26)            | 0.00   | 0.11<br>(0.31)            | 0.01   |
| LAGE<br>Predec. Age             | -17.64**<br>(6.01)        | -0.11  | -21.40**<br>(7.11)        | -0.12  | -17.89**<br>(6.03)        | -0.11  | -22.03**<br>(7.13)        | -0.13  |
| LAMN1<br>Predec. in AMN 1       | 0.46<br>(0.99)            | 0.16   | 0.77<br>(1.20)            | 0.27   | 0.59<br>(0.98)            | 0.21   | 1.06<br>(1.16)            | 0.38   |
| LAMN3<br>Predec. in AMN 3       | 1.24<br>(0.73)            | 0.46   | 1.51<br>(0.79)            | 0.54   | 1.25<br>(0.73)            | 0.46   | 1.50<br>(0.80)            | 0.53   |
| LAMN4<br>Predec. in AMN 4       | 0.48<br>(0.85)            | 0.17   | 0.29<br>(0.93)            | 0.09   | 0.57<br>(0.85)            | 0.21   | 0.39<br>(0.91)            | 0.13   |

|   |        |      |        |      |        |      |        |      |
|---|--------|------|--------|------|--------|------|--------|------|
| LAMN6   | 2.02** | 0.69 | 2.27** | 0.74 | 2.00** | 0.68 | 2.20** | 0.73 |
| Predec. in AMN 6                              | (0.60) |      | (0.68) |      | (0.60) |      | (0.67) |      |
| LAMN7   | 1.17   | 0.44 | 1.64   | 0.59 | 1.18   | 0.44 | 1.53   | 0.55 |
| Predec. in AMN 7                              | (0.85) |      | (0.97) |      | (0.85) |      | (0.95) |      |
| LAMN9   | 1.33   | 0.49 | 2.11   | 0.70 | 1.29   | 0.48 | 2.10   | 0.70 |
| Predec. in AMN 9                              | (1.00) |      | (1.26) |      | (1.01) |      | (1.26) |      |
| LAMN10  | 2.13** | 0.71 | 2.17** | 0.72 | 2.09** | 0.70 | 2.05** | 0.70 |
| Predec. in AMN 10                             | (0.64) |      | (0.74) |      | (0.63) |      | (0.72) |      |
| LAMN11  | 1.89** | 0.65 | 2.32** | 0.75 | 1.86** | 0.65 | 2.15** | 0.72 |
| Predec. in AMN 11                             | (0.66) |      | (0.84) |      | (0.65) |      | (0.79) |      |
| Pearson $\chi^2$ with                         | 75.59  | —    | 66.04  | —    | 75.42  | —    | 65.90  | —    |
| [ <i>p</i> -value] <sup>c</sup>               | [0.27] |      | [0.28] |      | [0.28] |      | [0.28] |      |
| Likelihood Ratio                              | 76.10  | —    | 70.57  | —    | 76.53  | —    | 71.22  | —    |
| $\chi^2$ with [ <i>p</i> -value] <sup>c</sup> | [0.26] |      | [0.17] |      | [0.25] |      | [0.15] |      |
| $R^{2,d}$                                     | 0.26   | —    | 0.31   | —    | 0.26   | —    | 0.30   | —    |
| Number Correct <sup>e</sup>                   | 60     | —    | 63     | —    | 61     | —    | 62     | —    |
| Number of Obs.                                | 81     | —    | 81     | —    | 81     | —    | 81     | —    |

\*\* significant at the 1% level

<sup>a</sup> Standard errors of estimates are in parentheses. The  $\chi^2$  test was used to determine statistical significance.

<sup>b</sup> For CLASSIZE and LCLASSIZE, the contribution was calculated as 100 times the contribution of a one-officer increase in the size of the AMN class of the successor (for CLASSIZE) or predecessor (for LCLASSIZE). For LTENURE, the contribution was calculated as 100 times the contribution of a one-day increase in the tenure of the predecessor. For the LAMN variables, the contribution is the effect of the membership of the predecessor in the specific class on the probability of a monopoly succession.

<sup>c</sup> A high *p*-value (over 0.05, for the 5% level of significance) indicates absence of lack-of-fit.

<sup>d</sup> This is the traditional measure of fit applied to OLS models—the quotient of the explained sum of squares (ESS) and the total sum of squares (TSS).

<sup>e</sup> Number of successions for which the model correctly predicts the succession outcome (i.e. monopoly or nonmonopoly). This is based on a cut-off predicted probability of 0.5. If the predicted probability of a monopoly succession was greater than 0.5, then the prediction was the monopoly outcome. Otherwise, the prediction was the nonmonopoly outcome.

*p*-values indicate that the fit of the models is not significantly different from the fit of the saturated model.<sup>89</sup> Because the Kodam dummy variables were not statistically significant in the two models (models 2 and 4) for which they were included, they are not presented in the tables. The parameter estimate for the age variable was statistically significant and negative in all four models—this indicates that the higher the age of the predecessor at appointment, the lower the likelihood that his successor will have been his classmate. The contribution of age to the probability of same-class succession was computed as the value of the product of the normal probability density function evaluated at the scalar product of the vector of independent variable means and the corresponding parameter estimates, and the parameter estimate for the age variable. Because the age variable was a logarithm, the above product was then normalized by the mean age for predecessors in the sample to give the contribution of a one-year increase in the age of the predecessor to the likelihood of a same-class succession. Similar computations were done for the class size variables and the predecessor tenure variable.

The other significant estimates are the AMN 6, 10, and 11 dummies. They are all positive, indicating that membership in these classes raises the probability of an officer succeeding his classmate, after controlling for the effects of age, class size, and tenure.<sup>90</sup> Note further that the contribution to the probability of a same-class succession of these three AMN class variables is high, independently of the specific model used. Unlike the contribution of the age variable, which was evaluated using the concept of a derivative for a continuous variable, the contributions of the discontinuous AMN dummy variable cannot—strictly speaking—be computed in this manner. To compute these contributions, the predicted values of the probability of same-class succession were computed at the means of all variables except for the AMN dummy in question. For this variable, the values of 0 and 1 were successively used. The contribution of the class effect was the difference in the predicted probability between the two observations. In the cases of both AMN 10 and AMN 11, the contributions and their significance provide statistical support for the hypothesis of monopolization of Pangdam positions by members of AMN classes 10 and 11.<sup>91</sup>

<sup>89</sup> For details of the computation of these statistics, see SAS Institute, Inc., *SAS/STAT User's Guide*, vol. 3 (Raleigh: SAS Institute, Inc., 2000).

<sup>90</sup> For a discussion of the AMN 6 monopoly phenomenon, see Kammen and Chandra (fn. 19), 48. While the contribution of membership in AMN 9 is high, it is statistically insignificant.

<sup>91</sup> Similar analysis of succession patterns for Korem commanders revealed a monopoly effect for Class 6. For lack of space, however, the Korem commander results are not presented.