The post-international challenge to foreign policy: signposting 'plus non-state' politics

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Abstract. To scholars researching the connections between international relations and globalisation, such as those in the five books reviewed here, 'foreign policy' is becoming functionally and descriptively rivalled in a globalising context. Foreign policy, once the theoretically exclusive prerogative of the nation-state, is violated daily by new developments in non-state actorness arising from transnational technical and welfare issues such as trade, finance, labour standards and environmentalism. These books under review introduce the displacement lexicon of transnational politics, global civil society, non-state resistance and complexity into policymaking consciousness; in short, the post-international era. The conclusion proposes to tease out the preliminary outlines of the post-international challenge to foreign policy on the basis of 'plus non-state' actor-interest considerations.

Heidi H. Hobbs (ed.), *Pondering Postinternationalism: A Paradigm for the Twenty-First Century* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2000).
Richard Falk, *Predatory Globalization: A Critique* (Oxford: Polity Press, 1999).
Barry K. Gills (ed.), foreword John Kenneth Galbraith, *Globalization and the Politics of Resistance* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000).
Robert O'Brien, Anne Marie Goetz, Jan Aart Scholte, Marc Williams, *Contesting Global Governance: Multilateral Economic Institutions and Global Social Movements* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
Daphné Josselin and William Wallace (eds.), *Non-State Actors in World Politics* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001).

As a description of change born of the last decade of the twentieth century, globalisation continues to be a rich puzzle for policymaking. Most of all, since globalisation refers to the diminution of political boundaries through the operation of technologies of communication, mass media and war, the spread of capitalism, social protest and the environmental problematic, as it is widely conceded,[2] then where domestic politics travel beyond water's edges and borders must surely become the chief concern of the foreign policy participant. To some authors, as those of *Pondering Postinternationalism*

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[1] The author wishes to thank Peter Weinberger and the anonymous reviewers of this Journal for constructive comments on earlier drafts of this article.
[2] For a roundup of definitions, refer to Evan Luard, *The Globalisation of Politics: The Changed Focus of Political Action in the Modern World* (London: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 168–9; Malcolm Waters, *Globalisation* (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 3; David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton, *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture* (Oxford: Polity Press, 1999), p. 16.

suggest, 'foreign policy' is becoming functionally and descriptively challenged in a globalising context. It is violated daily by developments in rival actorness in international relations arising from transnational welfare and technical issues such as trade, finance, labour standards and environmentalism. Ironically, at this moment in time, one cannot confidently predict a unified global polity, particularly since globalisation is still in the making as both process and geographic capitalist condition. In the meantime, with the exception of the passing and retrospective references to 'foreign policy' in the Heidi Hobbs *et al.* volume, the other four introduce the displacement terminology of 'predatory globalisation', non-state advocacy, 'resistance' and 'globalisation-from-below', 'humane capitalism', grassroots empowerment and the complex interplay of global social movements and multilateral economic institutions. While these are imprecise signposts of transition in world order, they are diverse threads that should compel rethinking of the boundaries of policy considerations in foreign ministries.

What the following review suggests is that these challenges to state-centric foreign policy in a globalisation context will appear as an amorphous form of cross-border and omni-directional politicisation of policymaking by political players of all shapes and competences. Assuming that politics, following political theorists Aristotle, Carl Schmitt and Bernard Crick, is a process of ordering a normative social existence through redistribution, competition, principle or constructing adversaries,[3] it is reasonable to couch this entire review in terms of pondering the 'post-international' political challenge to foreign policy.[4] The post-international, as Hobbs and her inspiration, James Rosenau, both suggest, is a category of transition describing the fading dominance of nation-states and the concomitant rise of problem-solving rivalries with non-state actors in matters that can be construed to be transcendental of borders. In this regard, three broad ideas link these five books. Firstly, they introduce the transnational multi-actor reality of politics into the globalisation debate. The term 'transnational' is employed here using the mainstream definition of Nye and Keohane that describes 'movement of tangible or intangible items (including ideas) across state boundaries when at least one actor is not an agent of a government or an intergovernmental organisation'.[5] Foreign policy conducted by states is increasingly less *primus inter pares* as multi-

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[3] Aristotle, *The Politics* trans. T.A. Sinclair, revised by Trevor J. Saunders (London: Penguin Books, 1992), Book I; Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, translation, introduction and notes by George Schwab, with Leo Strauss' notes on Schmitt's essay; trans. J. Harvey Lomax, foreword by Tracy B. Strong (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press 1996[1932]); and Bernard Crick, *In Defence of Politics* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1964).

[4] My notion of a post-international challenge to foreign policy is different from Wolfgang H. Reinicke's 'global public policy'. The latter conceives of realising national public policy through limited cession of territorial sovereignty to non-state actors and international organisations, and with a heavy emphasis on all parties' joint co-operation towards building a just and transparent globally-integrated economy. See Reinicke's 'Global Public Policy' *Foreign Affairs* 76:6 (November/December 1997), pp. 127–38, and also his book *Global Public Policy: Governance without Government?* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1998). The post-international challenge treats co-operation as only one *modus operandi* of securing goals; it can also be adversarial through moral exposé and sanctions; or mean non-state actors bargaining with states for outcomes that may significantly alter original national public policy aims. Technically, 'global public policy' is one subset of post-international politics.

[5] Joseph S. Nye Jr. and Robert O. Keohane, 'Transnational Relations and World Politics: An Introduction' in *Transnational Relations and World Politics*, eds. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), pp.xii–xiii.

level interactions and agencies outstrip state capacities, and this is logically a constitutive aspect of globalisation. Secondly, all five books highlight and attempt to theorise non-state actors' attempts to amend or exploit dominant ordering ideology in a transitional era, namely the neoliberal capitalism from Western centres. Third and last, these works explore discursive contestations as policy-making, or at least policy-influencing, strategies for and against state-dominated global governance in forms such as the various UN conferences, International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Indeed as Louise Amoore *et al*. put it in Barry Gills' edited volume, globalisation is political as states, *along with* and *against* other actors, struggle to shape a benign future for nationalist and cosmopolitan alike.[6]

Where states have a territorial-legal monopoly of coercive force, other actors have at their disposal, ideas, exposé, grit and volunteers who ply their causes on the information-carrying blood-and-oxygen networks of electronic communications and commercial interdependence. These broad features suggest contemporary research on transnational interactions and non-state actors are set to build upon the premises of Nye and Keohane's 'world politics paradigm' which had set a modest tone of examining the limited category of nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) from the perspective of adjunction and degrees of subservience to and from the state.[7] This review proposes to tease out the preliminary outlines of the post-international challenge to foreign policy on the basis of 'plus non-state' actor-interest considerations, where the sheer pluralism of non-state actorness marks a distinct independence of initiative inadequately treated in Nye and Keohane's pioneering volume in the 1970s. For convenience, the term 'non-state actors' will be understood to encompass NGOs, which are non-state actors advocating causes of conscience and normative ideals. Non-state actors, as Daphné Josselin and William Wallace appropriately define them, are transnational entities 'largely or entirely autonomous from central government funding and control', but inclusive of multinational companies and criminal networks.[8]

Multi-player transnational politics

Envisioning the broad impact of globalisation politics upon policy is the specific focus of the Hobbs volume and Richard Falk's *Predatory Globalisation*. Hobbs *et al*. are by turns celebrating and developing the potential of James Rosenau's 1990-

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[6] Louise Amoore, Richard Dodgson, Barry Gills, Paul Langley, Don Marshall and Iain Watson, 'Overturning "Globalisation": Resisting Teleology, Reclaiming Politics', in Gills (ed.), *Globalisation and the Politics of Resistance*, pp. 12–28.

[7] See various contributions in Keohane and Nye Jr. (eds.), *Transnational Relations*, especially those by James Field, Robert Gilpin, Kjell Skjelsbaek, Robert Cox, as well as Nye and Keohane's own conclusion. This line of argument about how non-state actors' international political presence follows from amendments to state authority is reiterated by another recently edited compilation by Richard A. Higgott, Geoffrey R.D. Underhill and Andreas Bieler (eds.), *Non-State Actors and Authority in the Global System* (London: Routledge, 2000).

[8] Daphné Josselin and William Wallace, 'Non-State Actors in World Politics: A Framework', in Josselin and Wallace (eds.), *Non-State Actors in World Politics*, pp. 3–4.

premiered hypothesis of 'post-internationalism'.[9] Chapters by Hobbs, Mansbach, and DiMuccio and Cooper provide detailed write-ups of Rosenau's intellectual contributions to pre-theorising and theorising foreign policy and its connection with domestic-external causalities. These support the central argument of *Post-internationalism*'s authors that statehood is caught in the gap between the ideal of sovereign control and the reality of border-penetrating transactional interdependence.[10] Post-internationalism is the midpoint towards a paradigm shift in rethinking international relations through the loosely amalgamated vocabulary of multi-level change that rejects state-centric solutions. In short it comprises 'bifurcation' (sovereignty-bound and sovereignty-free actors), 'fragmegration' (simultaneous fragmentation and integration trends) and 'parametric change' at the micro (individual and domestic spheres), micro-macro (domestic-external interface) and macro (international) levels. Rosenau's work identifies dynamics and causes in terms of economic shifts to post-industrial techniques, the rise of transnational problems in finance, health and terrorism, weakening state capacities, the corresponding privileging of units below the state and the revolution in individual skills. He then derives from these the generic hypothesis of the uneasy coexistence of continuity and unpredictable change in place of an orthodox speculation of future international order. To Rosenau, the present represents global political 'turbulence'.[11]

Within this discourse, the other contributors to *Postinternationalism* situate their calls to forge 'conceptual jailbreaks' from the prison/prism of state-centrism. Dario Moreno draws attention to viewing the future of international relations through the lens of 'sites of authority crises' where sovereignty is no longer as respectable or capable as in the past, hence privileging non-state actors.[12] Within interdependence logic, overlapping domestic and external spheres of competence struggle for ascendance where skills (including information technology), professionalism or other forms of expertise possession might ensure that actors other than states solve problems. This understanding is amplified by Ronnie Lipschutz's account of the potential of realising global civil society in the grey zones of overlapping and clashing authorities.[13] No less than Nicholas Onuf, representing the constructivist comment, commends the 'simple grandeur' of Rosenau's account of individual-level initiated change through his behaviouralist streak. However, Onuf argues that Rosenau needs a Humean modification to explain why people wish to change norms and rules governing social structures – that is, man's sense of the normative in rule-making.[14]

[9] See James N. Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); and *Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

[10] Heidi H. Hobbs, 'Introduction. Pondering Postinternationalism'; Richard W. Mansbach, 'Changing Understandings of Global Politics: Preinternationalism, Internationalism, and Postinternationalism'; and Ralph DiMuccio and Eric Drew Cooper, 'Turbulence and Tradition in International Relations Theory: Prospects for a Postinternational Revolution' in Hobbs (ed.), *Pondering Postinternationalism*, pp. 1–4, 7–24, 169–196 respectively.

[11] Mansbach, 'Changing Understandings of Global Politics', pp.11–18; DiMuccio and Cooper, 'Turbulence and Tradition', pp. 170–2.

[12] Dario Moreno, 'The Limits of Sovereignty in a Bifurcated World', in Hobbs (ed.), *Pondering Postinternationalism*, pp. 25–36.

[13] Ronnie D. Lipschutz, 'Politics Among People: Global Civil Society Reconsidered', in Hobbs (ed.), *Pondering Postinternationalism*, pp. 83–98.

[14] Nicholas Onuf 'Writing Large: Habit, Skill and Grandiose Theory', in Hobbs (ed.), *Pondering Postinternationalism*, pp. 99–115.

Feminist scholar V. Spike Peterson argues in the same vein that micro-level change allows for 'adding women' to actorness in transnational politics as a critique of masculine state-centric international relations.[15] Ole Holsti also adds that the dynamics of post-internationalism, especially in skills and communications technology advances, will compel fresh investigation of increasingly empowered roles played by 'the general public'. This occurs through sub-groups, or individuals, which articulate and mobilise political inputs and outputs on global issues on the bases of intertwining domestic spheres *via* electronic media.[16]

Admittedly, Rosenauian post-internationalism gives the impression of an umbrella stretched wide to accommodate every stripe of theoretical variety in explaining the impact of global change. But such generality should not be an objection to analysing a visibly displaced and rapidly disjunctive post-Cold War landscape. This is a constructive advance in theorising the multiplicity of global actorness, in so far as the initial grand order theories of Huntington and Fukuyama are today only a few voices among many, and also insofar as Rosenau himself admits to its status of passage towards more rigour and more prescience in the discipline.[17] Indeed it would not be stretching credibility to place Richard Falk's *Predatory Globalisation* under the post-international umbrella.

Marking a modest departure from his world order modelling reputation, Falk's objective is not merely to critique the dominance of neoliberal globalisation, but 'rather to call positive attention to a series of countermoves to neoliberalism, especially those whose source is situated within civil society'.[18] Like the Hobbs volume, the basic premise is that globalisation produces actors other than states in catering to human needs. Neoliberal globalisation, by operating through the 'instrumentalisation' of the nation-state, violates the 'former social contract forged between state and society in the last century or so'.[19] In effect, the 'discipline of global capital' has become the superior of Leviathan and the General Will. Development, social and economic, is no longer serving the people since it creates large-scale misery and inequalities by constraining labour rights and factory wages, benefiting the information-haves and consumerist elite. Current development policies are equally to be despised for playing down environmental degradation for the ends of profit-seeking, globe-spanning corporations, and perpetuates rigidities in a Wallersteinian world system. Accordingly, these transnational pressures are generating a corresponding counterpolitics Falk calls 'globalisation-from-below'. It is

. . . an aggregate designation for the overall efforts of global civil society to restore the various social and political gains made during the latter stages of the industrial era, as well as to move consistently forward to establish the constitutive elements of cosmopolitan democracy as the political template for an inevitably globalizing world.[20]

'Global civil society' is an ambiguous progeny of the bifurcated world referred to by Rosenau and Hobbs *et al*. Falk regards it as a spawn of 'the information-dis-

[15] V. Spike Peterson, 'Justified Jailbreaks', in Hobbs (ed.), *Pondering Postinternationalism*, pp. 66–7.
[16] Ole R. Holsti, 'Pondering the Postinternational Perspective on the Public: A Prescient or Peripheral Paradigm?' in Hobbs (ed.), *Pondering Postinternationalism*, pp. 127–30.
[17] James N. Rosenau, 'Beyond Postinternationalism' in Hobbs (ed.), *Pondering Postinternationalism*, pp. 219–37.
[18] Falk, *Predatory Globalisation*, p. 2.
[19] Ibid., p. 3.
[20] Ibid., p. 3.

seminating and consciousness-raising activism of the transnational environmental movement that has pushed governments in the leading states as far as they have gone and that has put environmental policy on the mainstream political agenda'.[21] The adequacy of this definition is set against Falk's overt purpose in siting an imputed movement towards challenging neoliberalism on a comparable global scale.

To Falk, the state and its foreign policy are not apparatuses of oppression to be eliminated, but objects to be co-opted into transnational movements for the humane goals of mitigating armed antagonisms between peoples, the global co-operative policing of human rights, extending the rule of law, and the protection of the environment and indigenous cultures everywhere.[22] Notably, these are unconventional concerns of foreign policy and they suggest that state bureaucracies unburden themselves of the policy-parameters of defining the 'foreign' as particularistic and hostile to human community. The index of *Predatory Globalisation* did not even list 'foreign policy'. Falk advocates a normative vision of 'postmodern compassionate states' which 'align themselves with progressive social forces in various specific settings and refuse to endorse the discipline of global capital if the results were to produce social, environmental, and spiritual harm'.[23] This theoretically judicious prescription neglects the specific consequences upon the foreign policies it presumes to obsolesce. A key unanswered question is how would the state implement any form of welfare policy if it no longer can or should categorise the foreign?

Hobbs *et al.* and Falk describe the problematic facing foreign policy as authority and boundary crises, but the former does not elaborate the problematic in detail, while Falk hints at a larger field for research without leaving clues as to what remains for foreign policy to validate itself upon. In stark terms, what does globalisation-from-below as counterpolitics imply for nationally bounded foreign policy? Surely, policymaking and implementation demand boundaries for enforcement and welfare delivery. As it will be apparent through the remaining sections, all five books under review do not address themselves to the pragmatics of obsolescing states by supporting non-state initiatives. Typical of globalisation and global civil society discourse to date are the questions of defining actorness: how must the foreign policy portfolio reorganise in the face of post-internationalism? Essentially, how do non-state actors function in a milieu that has hitherto been described as anarchic among states? Elements of a definition of non-state agency in a post-international era are available through explaining their flexibility of political actorness. For instance, do or should non-state actors organise around the equivalents of embassies and neo-military coercive instruments? In the next two sections, we move to consider the possibility of 'resistance' and 'complex multilateralism' as tentative explorations of these questions.

Organising resistance: the politics of legitimacy

That global civil society has or should possess, the attributes of transnational protest, rivalry against states, and alternative imaginings, form the main concerns in

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[21] Ibid., p. 29.
[22] Ibid., pp. 170–82.
[23] Ibid., p. 6.

the remaining three books under review. The Barry Gills volume approaches globalisation from the angle of 'politics of resistance' and in this endeavour, Antonio Gramsci and Karl Polanyi are widely invoked for explaining global occurrences. Amoore *et al.*'s call for examining counter-hegemony cites Gramscian civil society as 'the sphere in which a dominant social group organises consent and hegemony' but also one 'where the subordinate social groups may organize their opposition and construct an alternative hegemony'.[24] Peter Waterman, a one-time activist himself, claims global civil society as the space of normative value creation born out of 'conflict with the capitalist and (inter-)state spheres'.[25] Robert O'Brien, Anne Marie Goetz, Jan Aart Scholte and Marc Williams in *Contesting Global Governance* also agree broadly with the transformative spirit of global civil society. The latter is defined negatively from state elites, businesses and interest groups in that they lack coercive power and the leverage of capital ownership, but instead possess an agenda of 'large scale social change' of a mass mobilising 'anti-systemic' kind. Similarly, Josselin and Wallace's thesis in *Non-State Actors in World Politics* account for non-state actors' emergence in terms of the substitution of state incapacities in transnational welfare and normative issues, and the corresponding shifts in state-society relations. In short, for non-state actors to conceive of global campaigning is to *be* post-international, and *vice versa*, in strategy and normative goals. Global civil society comes into its own as an epistemological alliance and a counterpolitics all at once. This frustrates conventional notions of exclusive state-to-state foreign policy dealing.

To civil society theorists and activists, neoliberal globalisation can only be conceptualised as a tangible opponent provided, again following Gramsci, it can be represented as a historical bloc shrewdly legitimised by a particular ideology that serves to subjectify the mass societies[26] which are needed to serve a cosmopolitan project of market ascendance. This point is worth comparing against Falk's *Predatory Globalisation*, which does not make explicit his probable Gramscian assumptions. But Falk's analyses of the possibilities of recast cross-boundary and dialogical citizenship, revitalised and democratised United Nations, the quest for human rights observance, and the creation of global civil society to campaign for them, are equally axes of a counter-ideology he calls 'humane governance'. This is a

'. . . people-driven globalism [that] subordinates the part (states and markets) to the whole (humankind) on the basis of human values, including such goals as ecological sustainability, alleviation of suffering caused by changing patterns of production and consumption, establishment of communities that uphold the security and economic and social rights of all their inhabitants, and a reduction of violence at home and abroad'.[27]

Contained within this counter-ideology is a ready agenda for action by global civil society, as that strategic 'field of action and thought occupied by individual and

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[24] Amoore *et al.*, 'Overturning "Globalisation"', in Gills (ed.), *Globalisation and the Politics of Resistance*, p. 23.

[25] Peter Waterman, 'Social Movements, Local Places and Globalized Spaces: Implications for "Globalisation from Below"' in Gills (ed.), *Globalisation and the Politics of Resistance*, p. 138. For an introduction to Waterman's background and in-depth scholarship see his earlier work, *Globalisation, Social Movements and the New Internationalisms* (London: Mansell, 1998).

[26] See excerpts from Antonio Gramsci's writings in David Forgacs (ed.), *An Antonio Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings 1916–1935* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1988), pp. 192–200.

[27] Falk, *Predatory Globalisation*, p. 52.

collective citizen initiatives of a voluntary, nonprofit character',[28] located nationally and transnationally.

Normative resistance in its myriad forms needs just such a unifying agenda as Christine Chin and James Mittelman, Richard Falk (too), R.J. Barry Jones and Robert Latham[29] in the Gills volume attest. Chin and Mittelman suggest that taxonomy of global resistance can be developed in reference to forms, agents, sites and strategies.[30] What is new is that involvement is not necessarily class-based in the Marxian sense, but subject to issue empathy and expedience where a motley crew of blue- and white-collar workers, clerics, homemakers, middle-managers and state proponents of cultural exceptionalism (such as Asian and Islamic values) act in unison. Symbolic and passive resistance such as the wearing of indigenous fashions and informal boycotts can be as solidarist as *Chiapas*-style revolts, or transnational strikes by occupational category, as was demonstrated in late summer 2000 across Western Europe. The strategies and sites of struggle must concomitantly be global to match neoliberalism's reach, intertwining local, regional and inter-regional campaigns and objectives, as the campaign against the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) showed in the late 1990s. In this multi-locational sense, organising 'global resistance' takes on a geographically disorienting aspect for the foreign policymaker. Ian Douglas' reading of how globalisation affects the exercise of governing power brings an important lesson to foreign policies: the state is 'retreating' under globalisation because its orthodox command of bodies in space is constantly being eclipsed by the imperatives of time as a factor in managing complex, decentralised, equalised and hierarchised social relations.[31] One need not read Foucault or Virilio to understand that the multinational corporation thrives upon time-space co-ordination round-the-clock to ensure that profit and savings are gained by spreading assembly, processing and sourcing operations to where skill advantages in place A complement cost and transhipment conveniences at places B, C and D within flexible 'just-in-time' production chains. States pander to creating local efficiencies while conscientious social networks oppose.

Waterman's view of social resistance, informed by his 1998 study of new labour internationalisms,[32] is especially interesting in advocating 'complex solidarity' as a response to the time-space challenge: it is a community which

. . . descend[s] from, selectively re-articulate[s], allow[s] for, but surpass[es], religious, liberal and socialist universalisms . . . [and additionally,] allow[s] for and require[s] a dialogue of civilizations and ages, a solidarity with both past and future.[33]

This is premised on global civil society participants recognising that they are involved in a 'communications internationalism' using Internet, satellite television, mobile

[28] Ibid., p. 138.
[29] Christine B.N. Chin and James H. Mittelman, 'Conceptualizing Resistance to Globalisation', Richard Falk, 'Resisting "Globalisation-from-Above" through "Globalisation-from-Below"', R.J. Barry Jones, 'Globalisation versus Community: Stakeholding, Communitarianism and the Challenge of Globalisation', and Robert Latham, 'Globalisation and the Transformation of Economic Rights', in Gills (ed.), *Globalisation and the Politics of Resistance*, pp. 29–45, 46–56, 57–75, 76–90 respectively.
[30] Chin and Mittelman, 'Conceptualizing Resistance to Globalisation', pp. 40–44.
[31] Ian R. Douglas, 'Globalisation and the Retreat of the State', in Gills (ed.), *Globalisation and the Politics of Resistance*, pp. 121–6.
[32] Waterman, *Globalisation, Social Movements and the New Internationalisms* (see fn. 25).
[33] Waterman, 'Social Movements, Local Places and Globalized Spaces', p. 140.

phones, and the unprecedented global proliferation of social knowledge to forge activist ties. They 'think globally, act locally; think locally, act globally . . . [and also] think dialectically: act self-reflexively'.[34] This neat summary appears a suspiciously tall order, a rehash of neoliberal globalisation enthusiasts such as Alvin Toffler and Kenichi Ohmae, as well as a means of epistemologically forming the still-inchoate global civil society. But this charge weakens when one considers the ground-level analyses and case studies within the same volume, all of which support Waterman's argument for a normative solidarity for effectiveness. Whether the globalisation-disadvantaged is a disgruntled First World autoworker, moderate-income anti-corporate welfare protestor, competition-disciplined Southeast Asian trade unionist, a Muslim in search of spiritual meaning in a modernising state, a *Zapatista* discriminated by World Bank-prescribed structural adjustments administered through a centralised Mexican state, or a Nigerian *Ogoni* angered by the corrupting alliance between oil companies and Lagos politicians, there is always a danger of local failure or partial successes due to isolation and the inadequacy of comprehension of the neoliberal opponent.

This tension between transnationally co-ordinated strategy and geographic diversity of roots and interests is identified repeatedly by Josselin and Wallace *et al*. In the activities of moral entrepreneurs (such as the Catholic Church's affiliates and the World Jewish Congress), transnational European political parties and think-tanks, the advocacy of norms across cultural and historical circumstances often stretch the unity of a central vision between local activists and their remote co-ordinators. Trade union co-ordination and anti-MAI political economy alliances face equally the need to convince local memberships to collaborate against a target transcending borders. As the less idealistic among non-state actors, transnational *mafias* and corporatised armed mercenaries are shown to exploit global neo-liberalism's market failures by replacing state services wherever elites demand them in situations without recourse to global governance.

Clearly, the basic ingredients of the post-international challenge of organising resistance against, and subversion from within, neoliberal hegemony manifest through transnational co-ordination, creating ideational blocs, the dialogical management of global goals and local diversities, and the awakening to a sense of global connectedness of humane and alternative agendas. The contributors to Gills' volume, Josselin and Wallace's volume, along with Falk's *Predatory Globalisation* agenda, allude strongly to a nascent global society without boundaries united around a conscientious set of principles. However, they do little to inform the foreign policy perspective of normative improvement, if the latter is at all advocated. On principle alone, it makes good sense to 'bash the state' as being sold to the interests of capital and other undemocratic elites. Yet, one wonders what the implications are of displacing the pre-existing foreign policy mandate of states, grounded in domestic systems of legality, however determined, as opposed to self-appointed transnational crusaders of conscience. With the exception of Fred Halliday[35] in Josselin and Wallace's volume, and the latter's conclusion, most analysts of global resistance are

[34] Ibid., p. 148.
[35] Halliday, 'The Romance of Non-State Actors', in Josselin and Wallace (eds.), *Non-State Actors in World Politics*, pp. 21–37.

conspicuously silent on the procedural legitimacy deficit of social movements articulating unifying ideas: where is the democracy, utilitarianism, commun-itarianism, or virtue of representativeness? At least the foreign policy, even of a totalitarian state, to take an extreme example, claims legitimacy from a monopoly of control within demarcated spatio-temporal existence. One is left presuming that the legitimacy of transnational social movements comes together around the spon-taneous and premeditated agency of politicising ideas among like-minded and suggestible human beings. To respond, foreign policies are challenged to articulate identities of interests with non-state actors, or to counter rival ideas with ideas of their own. Such is the implication of the studies of Islamist movements and diasporas in Josselin and Wallace's volume. To date, it seems the Anti-MAI and ICBL campaigns have demonstrated such a proposition at work in favour of non-state actions. Meanwhile, some non-state campaigns towards the WTO and World Bank highlight a differentiated sort of resistance through interjecting alternative expertise.

Contestation *via* complex multilateralism: influence through alternative expertise

As resistance is often associated with pugilistic actions ranging from symbolic hindrance to destructive behaviour, the concept of implementing change through 'complex multilateralism', as posited by O'Brien *et al.* as a mixed *modus operandi* of 'contesting' global governance, stands out as a variation. As its authors explain it, complex multilateralism goes beyond the multilateral pattern of co-operative relations among three or more states. It includes decision-making inputs at global level from civil society actors and in tandem, the recognition by states and non-state actors alike that political 'constituencies within and across states must be appeased or, at the very least, their opposition must be diluted and diverted'.[36] Notions of public policymaking systems of inputs, outputs and feedback are clearly allied to the understanding that global civil society aspires to have a seat in global governing, even though the latter is imperfectly exercised by the IMF, WTO and World Bank. O'Brien *et al.* define governance as 'the sum of the many ways that individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs'.[37] This amorphous frame of global rule-making is a direct culmination of the way the three global governance institutions have evolved since the Bretton Woods agreements of 1944. The IMF has been compelled by debt and currency crises to go from lending to solving balance of payments crises, and to conditioning 'structural adjustment' and liberalisation programmes in national economies. The World Bank has gone from loaning money for development to supporting IMF-style structural adjustment and privatisation. The WTO too, in its comprehensive pursuit of freeing-up trade across borders, has progressively undermined domestic prerogatives in labour welfare, industrial protections and technology-use.[38]

Global civil society, alternatively labelled 'global social movements' by O'Brien *et al.*, gets involved with these three state-dominated multilateral economic institu-

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[36] O'Brien *et al.*, *Contesting Global Governance*, p. 208.
[37] Ibid., p. 2.
[38] Ibid., pp. 10–11.

tions on the grounds that their implementation and monitoring goals favour neoliberal agendas to the exclusion of the often harsh side-effects of those policies on real populations, minorities, and the natural environment. For amelioration, the latter require the policy feedback and representation which the IMF, World Bank and WTO do not factor into their elite-focused discourses. The interactive momentum towards policy change begins when conscientious leading personalities within, for example, the World Bank, commission internal evaluations of policy effects and failures. This coincides with, say, women's welfare NGOs holding parallel forums and demonstrations outside Bank meetings, while also seeking dialogue with the Bank armed with 'alternative' development ideas. Labour movements lobbying the WTO at its first meeting in Singapore encountered more difficulties as the North-South development divide put the Northern-dominated but high-profile International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) at odds with its Southern counterparts, who were politically sympathetic to developing country positions. The ICFTU had the 'ears' of many American and European governments who pushed their agenda as adjuncts of national positions, and so managed to achieve a discursive linkage between trade and labour standards in the final declaration.[39] O'Brien *et al.* single out environmental NGOs' strategies towards the World Bank as the most successful, albeit in an indirect sense. They mobilise national and global public opinion through mass media against specific Bank-approved projects such as dam-construction in China and India. They cultivate allies within and across the Bank's bureaucratic sections; and also disseminate independent and network-supplied research to global publics, national politicians, and the Bank in an effort to shape 'epistemic communities' favourable to their causes.[40]

The results of such myriad strategies have had to be further qualified. While the IMF and World Bank have climbed down on specific projects where NGOs have publicised contradictions involving the former's internal regulations and criteria, the WTO has yet to establish such a precedent. The World Bank and IMF have provisioned themselves with dialogue channels to NGOs and these have helped precipitate, directly and indirectly, discursive changes to officially documented global governance criteria such as 'poverty eradication', 'ecological sustainability', 'good governance', '[local] ownership', 'debt relief', 'transparency' and more recently 'corruption'.[41] Consistent implementation of agreed projects has, however, proven less satisfactory to NGO aims. O'Brien *et al.* also identify change retarding factors on both sides such as hierarchical bureaucracies, technical language as communication barriers, resource constraints, and democratic and accountability deficits.[42]

These are modest results that might justify the tenor of global civil society protest from Seattle, to Bangkok and Barcelona in 1999–2002. Nevertheless, these modest gains in changing discourse at global levels reinforce the principal justification of

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[39] Ibid., pp. 85–92.
[40] Ibid., pp. 128–131. O'Brien *et al.* are not the first to attempt academic documentation of NGO 'successes' in amending the language of the World Bank and IMF, although it must be said that their treatment is comprehensive. For a survey of pre-existing research see Paul J. Nelson, 'Internationalising Economic and Environmental Policy: Transnational NGO Networks and the World Bank's Expanding Influence', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 25:3 (1996), pp. 605–33.
[41] Ibid., pp. 164–71, 177–87.
[42] Ibid., pp. 189–205.

struggle that Falk, Hobbs *et al.*, Gills *et al.*, and Josselin and Wallace *et al.* broadly share—that globalisation is about germinating desirable rules for all humanity, and that these are within the control and purview of affected individuals, groups and national authorities. It is in this sense of humane, normative, self-claiming mandates for lobbying that NGOs across the wide spectrum of agendas agitate for a voice at global bargaining tables and executive offices, with or without the acquiescence of foreign policies. In spite of the intra- and inter-organisational obstacles to unfettered NGO influence, the latter call attention to their expertise through systematic culti-vation of eminent scientists and their reports, as well as consistently monitoring local disaffection and conditions. Finally, they disseminate such knowledge as truth claims rivalling official positions. At this point, O'Brien *et al.* fail to analyse further if the complex multilateralism practised by NGOs implies that state-centric foreign policies can no longer monopolise regimes of knowledge. In the practices elaborated in *Contesting Global Governance*, states and NGOs certainly appear informationally on par even though their relative efficiencies in producing results differ. Through further case-specific research, it might also be delineated where non-state resistance shifts gear towards 'complex multilateralism' for efficacy.

Conclusion: 'plus non-state' as reference for foreign policy

Making policy in the milieu of globalisation is politics liberated *par excellence* in its conflation of boundaries and hierarchies, as these five books show. Despite their diverse angles, the common elephant they are sketching is the question of 'whose global society, whose rules?'. In doing so, they challenge the normative credibility of foreign policies as claimants to knowledge about global issues. Post-internationalism inspires a comprehensive epistemology for rethinking 'foreign policy' in terms of political policies of global relations with non-state actors. With nascent concepts like 'global civil society', and the operationalisation of 'resistance' and 'complex multi-lateralism' at work, an adept foreign policy might engage other actors that participate in transnational politics independently, discursively and counter-hegemonically. This development might be coined the actor consideration framework of 'plus non-state', where non-state actors include NGOs, domestic labour, conscientious individuals, corporations and multilateral institutions. A tentative description of 'plus non-state' is possible through condensing the strengths and criticisms offered by this review as follows:

1. *Post-international borders of actorness include any constituency with interest and ability to demonstrate distinct preferences simultaneously across time-space bound-aries.* As a 'state-in-being', the NGO enjoys the latitude of championing the concerns of the marginalised without the encumbrances of electoral and legislative beholdenness, while skilful individuals can reinvigorate the democratic spirit of Greco-Roman forums within global governance. Corporate capital too could be accommodated in global forums, while strategic, issue-dependent global civil society functions as a spontaneous check-and-balance alliance against political and expert primacy of foreign policy positions.
2. *Post-international conditions question anew actor legitimacy in global politics.* As indicated in (1), non-state actors can claim legitimacy in terms of local and

particularistic subjects on the basis of their idealistic, professional or long-term devotion. Most non-state actors lack the trappings of procedural legitimacy but still challenge constitutionally sovereign foreign policies by sheer vociferousness and tenacity in campaigning. In short, legitimacies are pitted against each other in global politics. Whose coalition is louder and more convincing of important sectors of 'global opinion' wins.

3. *Post-international conditions allow non-state discursive resources to constitute alternative expertise against foreign policy claims on almost any issue.* 'Information instruments' ranging from scientific and monitoring reports, consultancy networks, e-mail campaigns and websites, to physical protests are available to non-state actors to transcend borders in pursuing co-ordinated political mobilisation. The next logical step might be to form epistemic communities for long-term issue activism, shifting from resistance to complex multilateralism.

The 'plus non-state' framework informs foreign policy in the post-international era by re-energising the element of political struggle in contesting the dimensions of globalisation. For efficacy, foreign policy must work upon the subjectivity of global opinion and so play in the informational realm of jointly negotiating or refuting knowledge claims. This is one modest suggestion for focusing a field increasingly marked out by scholarship on NGOs treating global governance in anti-landmine, climate and bio-diversity, investment capital, labour and transnational advocacy networks.[43]

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[43] For a sample see Maxwell A. Cameron, Robert J. Lawson and Brain W. Tomlin, *To Walk Without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998); James Goodman and Patricia Ranald, *Stopping the Juggernaut: Public Interest versus the Multilateral Agreement on Investment* (Annandale, Australia: Pluto Press, 2000); Bas Arts, *The Political Influence of Global NGOs: Case Studies on the Climate and Biodiversity Conventions* (Utrecht: International Books, 1998); Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998); and Waterman, *Globalisation, Social Movements and the New Internationalisms.*