Revolution and integration in Soviet international diplomacy, 1917–1991

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Abstract. In spite of its initial rejection of the international system, the USSR became increasingly involved in diplomatic relations with the other—largely capitalist—powers. The intensity of diplomatic activity increased from the Khrushchev years, not only in relation to other states but also to international bodies and conventions. There was a comparable change, in the later wartime years and under Khrushchev, in the proportion of foreign states with which the USSR sustained relations; by the end of the Soviet period, in 1991, there were diplomatic relations with 85 per cent of the members of the international community. This evidence supports the thesis that outcast states will tend to become ‘socialised’ into a more cooperative relationship with their counterparts; it also suggests that the USSR had become a largely ‘normal’ participant in the international system before the end of communist rule.

The USSR was a classic ‘outsider state’ in global politics. It began by rejecting the international system itself, when Trotsky was appointed commissar for foreign relations and announced that he would ‘issue a few revolutionary appeals to the peoples and then shut up shop’. It was not a party to the Versailles peace settlement, and it rejected bodies like the League of Nations, describing it in 1919 as a ‘Holy Alliance of capitalists for the suppression of the workers’ revolution’. Moreover, the USSR was not simply a state, it was also a revolutionary regime that sponsored an organised network of parties dedicated—at least in principle—to the forcible overthrow of the states within which they operated. There were of course periods in which the USSR, for tactical reasons, found itself appealing for collective security, or allied with the Western nations in the struggle against Nazi Germany. But fundamentally, on this reading, there could be no lasting compromise between capitalism and socialism; the USSR was the centre of the world socialist system; and its demise in the early 1990s was the ultimate victory of capitalist democracy in the Cold War, perhaps the end of history itself.

We suggest, in this article, that this is a shallow and historically myopic view: in particular, that it obscures the extent to which the USSR had become a ‘normal’ participant in the international system even before the end of communist rule. The Bolsheviks’ isolation in the early years was a result of the reluctance of Western governments to recognise their regime, not simply of their own commitment to revolutionary politics. And even before they had been generally recognised, the new regime had begun to establish relations with the outside world, first of all to deal with prisoners and the legacy of war, and then with shipping, trade and communications. These led to full diplomatic relations, first of all with Britain and Italy, and

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2 Pervyi kongress Kominterna (Moscow: Partiinoe izdatelstvo, 1933), p. 199.
eventually with the United States (in 1933). A year later the USSR joined the League of Nations, and it was a founding member of the United Nations and a permanent member of its Security Council. By the end of the Gorbachev years the USSR had entered the international economy, ‘de-ideologised’ its relationship with Cuba, exchanged ambassadors with Israel, South Africa, Arab monarchies and the Vatican, and supported the Western powers in military action against a former ally in Iraq. We do not need extravagant theories about the end of history to explain these developments; it was an extended process rather than a discrete event in the early 1990s, and it was not specific to Soviet socialism but an example of the much larger process by which outsider regimes are ‘socialised’ by the international system that they—at least initially—repudiate.3

In this article we explore the theme of integration—which was not an inevitable or unilinear process, or one that left the international system itself unchanged—through the prism of Soviet treaty relations from 1917 to 1991. Drawing upon a computer-based analysis of the Soviet official treaty series over the entire post-revolutionary period, we examine the changing place of the first socialist state to establish itself within the international system as it moved between repudiation and incorporation (for a fuller discussion of the treaty series and other data sources, see the Appendix). We focus, in this discussion, upon four key issues. We are concerned, first of all, with the rate at which the newly-established regime concluded treaties and conventions: was it increasingly active in its dealings with other states and with international organisations? We consider, secondly, the share of all available partners with which the USSR had concluded treaties or conventions over the post-revolutionary period: was it increasingly active with the international community in general, or just with the states that shared its ideology? Thirdly, we go on to consider the use that was made of that network of relationships over the same period. Finally, using additional sources, we consider the performance of the USSR in these respects as compared with other members of the world community from 1945 onwards: if the USSR was an increasingly active participant in international diplomacy, did it reflect or diverge from the patterns of other states?

### Treaties and Soviet foreign relations

An international treaty, in Soviet as well as in more general usage, was an ‘agreement between states and other subjects of international law on various questions of their mutual and international relations, establishing for its participants international rights and duties’. They could be political in character (such as friendship treaties, or treaties on borders or mutual non-aggression), or commercial (dealing with trade, credits and such matters), or on more specialised matters such as transport and communications, health and science, or consular relations. An international treaty, in Soviet usage, could be labelled a treaty or agreement, a convention or pact, a statute or protocol, or simply an exchange of notes. Under the 1978 Law on the Procedure

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for the Conclusion, Execution and Denunciation of the International Treaties of the USSR, which was modelled on the 1969 Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, international treaties could be concluded with other states, and also with international organisations. The most important, such as friendship or peace treaties, had subsequently to be ratified by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.4

The 1977 Soviet Constitution provided that relations with other states should be 'built on the basis of . . . good faith fulfilment of obligations arising from generally recognised principles and norms of international law and from international treaties concluded by the USSR'. From 1917 onwards, in fact, Soviet international legal doctrine had given priority to treaties as the principal source of international law. Treaties, for most of the period with which we are concerned, were usually formal, written documents; but there were also oral agreements such as the Soviet-Mongolian mutual assistance pact, concluded in 1934 and defined as a 'gentleman's agreement', or the Soviet agreement with Britain and America on the entry of troops into Berlin in June 1945.5 As well as published agreements of this kind, which could also be known as pacts, conventions, or covenants, there were secret treaties: the most celebrated case was the protocol attached to the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939, first published in the USSR in the late 1980s, but there were other secret agreements with the Germans between 1939 and 1941 and other instances dating from as early as 1918.6

Treaties were one among a large number of ways in which the newly established Soviet state interacted with the wider international system. There was foreign trade, for instance: but this was a relatively small share of national income, and went predominantly to the countries of Eastern Europe and (after the Second World War) to member states of Comecon in particular. The USSR, admittedly, had an increasing number of foreign trade partners: in 1920 there were just seven, but by 1923 there were 28, by 1950 there were 44, and by the 1980s the USSR had over 140, with most of whom there was a formal trade and payment agreement.7 Foreign trade was also a growing share of national income: after 1945 it grew at an average rate of 13 per cent a year, as compared with a growth in total output of 10 per cent.8 In spite of these developments foreign trade was still a very modest constituent of Soviet national income (in the early 1980s just four per cent, of which more than half was with other communist-ruled countries), and the USSR itself accounted for no more than four per cent of world trade as a whole.9 The USSR's share of international

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6 Ibid., pp. 372–6.
communications was even less: just 1 per cent of world postal traffic, for instance, during the interwar period, with a telephone for every eleven inhabitants as late as 1980.10

Formal agreements, in fact, held a place of particular importance in the repertoire of Soviet foreign relations. They were, for instance, one of the ways in which particularly favoured regimes were identified. The first such ‘friendship’ agreement was as early as 1921, with Turkey; there were further agreements with North Yemen in 1928, with Italy in 1933, with Germany in September 1939, with Yugoslavia in 1941, and with Czechoslovakia in 1943. Friendship treaties of a more distinctively ‘Soviet’ character were signed during the early postwar years with Yugoslavia, Poland, Mongolia, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Finland, and in 1950 a Soviet-Chinese friendship and alliance treaty was concluded for a period of thirty years (it lapsed in 1980). The East European states, in turn, concluded friendship and mutual assistance agreements among each other, as part of what were known as ‘international relations of a new type’.11 A further friendship treaty, with North Korea, was concluded in 1961, and there was a treaty with the GDR in 1964; then, during the 1970s and 1980s, friendship treaties of a rather different character were concluded with a range of fraternal but for the most part not communist-led states, including Egypt, India, Iraq, Somalia, Angola, Mozambique, Syria and the Congo, as well as with Ethiopia, Vietnam, Afghanistan, South Yemen and Cuba.12 It was through formal treaties that the post-war settlement was concluded, and through Soviet-West German treaties that Ostpolitik was conducted in the early 1970s; it was treaties, again, that advanced arms control from the test ban and non-proliferation treaties of the 1960s to the SALT agreements of the 1970s. Treaties, throughout, were a ‘relatively lasting and stabilizing component of Soviet foreign policy’, and the Soviet government ‘generally complied’ with the obligations that they imposed.13

Soviet treaty relations with the outside world have been extensively catalogued and inventoried, but little studied. A project at Stanford University in the 1950s led to a calendar of Soviet treaties covering the period from 1917 to 1957, and to a com-


prehensive study of their ‘theory, law and policy’.

Other scholars have taken the inventory up to 1980, and the Soviet experience was incorporated in the World Treaty Index (which was based, for the USSR, upon the English-language calendars rather than the official Soviet treaty series). Soviet scholarship, for its part, was overwhelmingly descriptive, and largely concerned with legal formalities even after it had been required to remain within the boundaries of political orthodoxy. More analytic work is relatively recent, and it has given particular attention to Soviet treaties with the third world and friendship treaties more generally, as well as to the inter-republican treaties of the late Soviet period. The friendship treaties of the 1970s and 1980s, it emerged, had a number of common features, including their identification of a legitimate regional interest on the part of the USSR, and they represented a ‘more formalized, longer-term relationship’ with the states concerned.

These, however, are for the most part studies of particular agreements, or of the history of Soviet relations with the countries concerned; they do not by themselves provide a picture of the pattern of Soviet relations with the international system of a kind that is made available by a study of treaty behaviour over the entire postrevolutionary period.

Making Soviet treaties 1917–1991

As the earlier literature established, Soviet treaty-making was voluminous but highly variable across time. The great majority of Soviet treaties considered by Triska and Slusser between 1917 and 1957 were bilateral (2,086 out of 2,516). Of these, the greatest number had been concluded in 1957 (188 items); in terms of multilateral treaties the busiest years had been 1945, 1946 and 1956. The ‘best Soviet treaty years’, Triska and Slusser found, ‘were the World War II and the post-World War II periods and the post-Stalin era; as a matter of fact, in the four-year period from 1953 to 1957 the USSR concluded between one-fourth and one-third of all its treaties and agreements—702 in all’. They also found that, over the whole period,
there was some tendency for the Soviet Union to ‘increase its treaty obligations and relationships’. It was certainly true that, for instance, the wartime years had seen the first diplomatic contacts with African states (South Africa in 1942, and Ethiopia and Egypt in 1943); the late 1950s, for their part, saw the first relations with black African states such as Liberia (1956), Ghana and Guinea (both 1958). The World Treaty Series, similarly, recorded 249 treaties or agreements in the late 1940s but over 400 in the late 1960s and early 1970s, with a peak of 655 in the late 1950s.

Our own evidence, based upon a longer span of years and upon the more selective official treaty series, suggests a more complex picture (see Figure 1). It is clear, first of all, that Soviet treaty-making increased over time in the manner that other scholars have suggested. The mid-1950s appear to be a watershed, not only in the volume of treaty activity but also in its global distribution, as Khrushchev’s policy of opening up to the outside world coincided with the onset of extensive decolonialisation which increased the number of independent states, particularly in Africa. From 1918 to 1955 the USSR signed some 747 bilateral treaties and agreements, an average of nearly 20 per annum. The period from 1956 to 1989, by contrast, produced 3,506 bilateral agreements and an annual average of 97. There was a greater readiness, during this latter period, to take part in the work of international organisations and to ratify their conventions; the USSR entered UNESCO and the International Labour Organisation in 1954, and the ILO in particular accounted for a large proportion (about 43 per cent) of the multilateral agreements that the USSR concluded from 1956 onwards. Multilateral agreements, as Figure 1 shows, were however a relatively minor component of the USSR’s diplomatic activity, and one that tended to diminish rather than increase in relative importance.

If the secular trend is towards a greater number of treaties, at least with other states rather than international organisations, there are phases of activity associated with changing internal and external conditions, and within these there are further

18 Triska and Slusser, Theory, Law and Policy, p. 4.
short-term variations. The early 1920s were a particularly busy time, as first the wartime legacy was addressed and then a pattern of trade and commercial agreements began to be established, followed by a network of formal diplomatic relations. This general pattern continued through to the mid-1930s and was consolidated by the USSR’s entry into the League of Nations in 1934. The lowest point for the whole period, however, was reached in 1938 when the aggressive stance of Nazi Germany followed the Spanish Civil War and the Italian occupation of Abyssinia in undermining Soviet efforts to develop collective security in the international community, whether or not the USSR had engaged in them with genuine commitment. At this point the political leadership of the USSR was in any case in some disorder, including the foreign ministry itself, as a result of the purges (which particularly affected those who had an ‘international’ background). The latter stages of the war, however, offered renewed scope for engagement, in this instance in the form of agreements that were intended to maximise support for the Allied cause.

Once the group of partner states was extended in the postwar period to include a broad range of states with a variety of political orientations, a change in the level of activity was more likely to result from developments in domestic political processes than from concerted action on the part of the international community. The international environment of the Cold War appears at first sight to have neither fostered nor impeded Soviet engagement, as the increase in the signature of bilateral agreements took place during the 1950s and was sustained during the 1960s when confrontation was at its height. A negative response from Western-oriented states would in any case have had a limited effect, as they were a minority among the USSR’s treaty partners by this time (and indeed in the world community) and not necessarily the most diplomatically active. Crises also stimulated agreements, such as on the need to establish direct inter-governmental links (or ‘hot lines’). Equally, opposition to a closer relationship with the USSR, when it was expressed, tended to be short-lived; the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, for instance, led to a dip in activity the following year, but did not inhibit Willy Brandt from pursuing Ostpolitik. The USSR’s military intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 evoked a stronger and more sustained response, but it is difficult to distinguish this from domestic political considerations (such as Brezhnev’s and Andropov’s grave illnesses and then the accession of Chernenko) or from economic circumstances such as the declining rate of economic growth, which had an effect of its own upon the USSR’s ability to conclude new agreements on development aid.

**Soviet participation in the international community**

Soviet treaty-making activity was bound to increase as the number of potential partners grew larger, and as did also the number of international organisations that could sponsor multilateral agreements of which the USSR could become a signatory. In 1945, when its Charter was signed, the United Nations had 51 members. By 1990, the last full year in which the USSR itself could be a party to an international agreement, there were 159. Equally, we need to know what use was made by the USSR of its international relations. In 1914, for instance, the Russian Empire had 47 foreign partners: there were 9 embassies abroad, 37 diplomatic missions and a
'political agency'. Before the start of World War II the Soviet Union had just 26 foreign partners; but by the end of the war there were already 52, and by the end of the 1980s there were over 140.20 This was certainly a widening network of foreign relations, but did it reflect an increasing degree of diplomatic interaction between the USSR and other states? Was there greater level of activity for each bilateral relationship, or simply a greater number of such relationships?

In Figure 2 we have set out, first of all, the number of independent states in the international system over the whole Soviet period. We have based ourselves in this calculation on the Statesman's Yearbook and defined an 'independent state' as one that was capable of concluding inter-state agreements, excluding 'statelets' such as Andorra, Danzig and Trieste. The number obviously fluctuated as states were created or ceased to exist; some were absorbed by the USSR itself, such as the Baltic republics, or by other states, as when Zanzibar was incorporated into Tanzania in 1964, and there were more numerous instances of secession, not only as a result of decolonisation, but also the separation of Bangladesh from Pakistan. The number of diplomatic partners also fluctuated with the discontinuation of diplomatic relations for political or other reasons, and their resumption. There were many such instances of breaks in relations: with Britain from May 1927 to November 1929, with South Africa (where relations were at a consular level) from February 1956 to November 1991, with Israel in 1953 and 1967, and with Chile in 1973. There were interruptions to relations with the Ivory Coast from 1969 to 1986, with Liberia from 1985 to 1986, and with Uganda for a few days in 1975 during Idi Amin's tenure.21 Over the whole period, according to official sources, no fewer than 49 states experienced some interruption in their formal relations with the USSR for various periods of time, and

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for a variety of reasons; the wartime years saw a particular concentration of breaks of this kind, as states were either occupied or drawn into hostilities. 22

There is, once again, a clear change of direction at several points, particularly during the later stages of the Second World War and from the mid-1950s. The underlying trend, however, is towards an increasingly large number of diplomatic partners, accounting for a growing proportion of the total membership of the global community. In 1920, for instance, the newly established Russian republic maintained formal relations with just seven states (Afghanistan, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, Persia and Turkey); this was clearly a very small proportion of the 72 states that were members of the international system at that time. Even after the ‘year of recognition’ in 1924 (which brought the number of current partners to 26), and further diplomatic exchanges in the 1930s, the USSR maintained relations with fewer than half of the members of the international community (35 out of a possible 74 in 1935); and the war saw the temporary suspension of relations with many European states while they were under military occupation, at least for a brief period until relations were established with governments in exile. But by the end of hostilities in 1945, the number of partner states had risen to 52 out a possible 73, or 71 per cent; this reflected the consolidation of wartime alliances and client regimes in Eastern Europe, and during the war years the extension of relations to 23 new partners, including ten states in Central and South America and the four British Dominions. By 1959 the USSR had established formal relations with 68 out of 96 states, still 71 per cent of the membership of the international community; the proportion then rose gradually to a peak of 81 per cent in 1977, shortly after the emancipation of the Portuguese colonies in Africa, when relations were maintained with 128 out of the 158 partners that were available at that time. It took the transformation of Soviet foreign policy in 1990–91, with the extension of relations to new partners and the resumption of partnerships long in abeyance, to carry the proportion much beyond this level: by the end of 1991 there were diplomatic relations with 144 out of 170 states, or 85 per cent of the global total. 23

What, however, about activity? To what extent was this a formal network of relationships, and to what extent did it reflect a greater degree of interaction with the global community? In Figure 3 we have taken the analysis a stage further by considering, first of all, the proportion of all diplomatic relationships that were ‘active’ (defined as states that concluded agreements with the USSR in any year other than those that concerned diplomatic relations). We have expressed this number in terms of all the states that were in existence in a given year, whether diplomatic relations with the USSR existed or not. The result is a measure of the USSR’s integration into the international community: its treaty activity with all

23 As of the end of 1991, there were no relations with these 18 members of the United Nations: El Salvador, Haiti, Paraguay, Central African Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, Malawi, Barbados, Swaziland, Bhutan, Bahamas, Solomon Islands, Dominica, St Lucia, St Vincent and Grenadines, Belize, Antigua and Barbuda, St Christopher and Nevis, Brunei. There were no relations with five other states: Liechtenstein, Monaco, Nauru, Tuvalu, and Taiwan. As of the end of 1991, previous relations with the Central African Republic and Cote d’Ivoire had not been resumed, there had been no relations with 16 further members of the UN and five other states. By 1 January 1994 diplomatic relations had been established with 172 states in all (Argumenty i fakty, no. 28, 1994, p. 16); diplomatic relations were established with Dominica in June 1995, the 179th state to do so (Izvestiya, 2 June 1995, p. 3).
other states, excluding agreements that were simply concerned to establish diplomatic relations. As Figure 3 indicates, there is a clear long-term trend. After a sharp increase in the early 1920s the rate of engagement fluctuates around 12 per cent to the end of the interwar period, and then moves sharply upwards in the 1950s to fluctuate thereafter around 28 per cent. There was no sudden change in the number of states in the international system at this time, and a change of this kind reflects a sharp increase in the Soviet Union’s formal interaction with the outside world: a change that was also marked in tourism, foreign translations, government visits abroad and other measures.24

We have separately calculated the ‘active’ states as a proportion, not of all states in existence, but of all the states with which the USSR at any time maintained formal relations. After an anomalous period in the early 1920s, when the newly established Soviet republic had only a few diplomatic partners with nearly all of which there were other forms of interaction, the proportion falls sharply to average about 20 per cent over the entire interwar period. There is again a sharp change in the 1950s, after which the rate increases to about 40 per cent, falling off towards 30 per cent in the 1980s. There had, of course, been a considerable increase in the number of states with which diplomatic relations were maintained over the same period and this change did not reflect a fall in the total volume of diplomatic activity. Over the whole period there was, in fact, a slow but steady increase in both relevant measures (these calculations have not been separately reported): there were more agreements in an average year with all the states with which diplomatic relations existed, and there was a still greater increase in the number of agreements with all the states that were active rather than nominal diplomatic partners. The USSR’s greater integration into the international community, in other words,

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reflected not simply a greater number of treaty partners but a greater use of those relations, particularly from the 1950s.

Soviet treaty patterns and international norms

Had the USSR, by the late 1980s, become not just a more frequent participant in international diplomacy, but a more frequent participant as compared with other states? The evidence suggests a less clearly defined change in this respect, although a varying one depending upon the indicator that is chosen. The USSR, as we have seen, had become a more regular participant in international political institutions. Unrepresented at Versailles, the USSR entered the world of conference diplomacy when its top-hatted representatives arrived at Genoa in 1922 and immediately showed itself single-minded in the pursuit of bilateral advantage, in this instance by concluding the Rapallo Treaty with Germany. Initially hostile to the League of Nations, as we have seen, the USSR became a member in 1934, and was one of the states that agreed to establish the United Nations in 1945 together with its various agencies. The USSR at the same time took part in a widening network of international conventions, from the Universal Postal Union (in 1924) to the Inter-Parliamentary Union (in 1955), the Universal Copyright Convention (concluded at Geneva in 1952, and acceded to by the USSR in 1973), Interpol (in 1990) and the International Customs Union, in 1991.25

The official treaty series is clearly an incomplete measure of the extent to which the USSR engaged in diplomatic interaction with other states, as it can record only agreements to which the USSR was itself a party. We have accordingly made use of the World Treaty Index to provide totals of all international agreements from 1945 to 1975, with which our Soviet figures can be compared (see Table 1). The Soviet Union, on this evidence, accounts for a modest but increasing share of world treaties

<table>
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<th>Period</th>
<th>No. of world treaties</th>
<th>No. of Soviet treaties</th>
<th>As % of world treaties</th>
<th>No. of states (mean)</th>
<th>Soviet treaties as % of world treaties per state</th>
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<tr>
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<td>5,598</td>
<td>152</td>
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<td>1951–55</td>
<td>7,104</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>2.2</td>
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<td>9,772</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>98</td>
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<tr>
<td>1961–65</td>
<td>11,140</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>481</td>
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<td>12,548</td>
<td>486</td>
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<td>136</td>
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<td>1971–75</td>
<td>15,574</td>
<td>618</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>587</td>
</tr>
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Sources: Based upon Peter Rohn (ed.), World Treaty Index, 5 vols (Santa Monica, CA: ABC-Clio, 1983–84; global totals) and the Soviet official treaty series (Soviet totals); there are rather larger Soviet totals in the Calendar of Soviet Treaties but they reflect the same tendencies.

25 For the last two see Pravda, 29 September 1990, pp. 1, 4, and ibid., 15 August 1991, p. 5.
over the whole period, although the proportion stabilised and then declined slightly during the 1960s. The Soviet share of world treaties, however, is a misleading indicator if it is considered without reference to the increase in the number of independent states over the same period, each of which could make a contribution to the global total. Taking account of this additional variable, we can then compare the Soviet propensity to conclude international agreements over the postwar period with the propensity to do so of all other members of the world community. The trend, on this basis, is a still greater Soviet tendency to engage in interaction with other states: its propensity to do so increases from just over twice to nearly six times the global average over the whole postwar period.

**The socialisation of a superpower?**

The end of the Cold War has normally been presented as a consequence of the demise of the USSR itself at the start of the 1990s. An alternative interpretation, of the kind we have sought to advance in this article, suggests that the end of the Cold War may better be seen as the outcome of a process of ‘socialisation’ within the international system, a process that affects all outsider regimes whether or not they claim to be socialist. The Russian revolution, in this sense, showed many similarities with the diplomacy of revolutionary France, or later of China, Iran or Libya.26 The first cycle to be completed is normally one of repudiation: in the French case, for instance, through a Propaganda Decree of 1792 which accorded ‘fraternity and aid to all peoples who wish[ed] to recover their liberty’. The French, like the Russians more than a century later, appealed to peoples against their governments, and called for a permanent revolution to overthrow (in their case) ‘all thrones, crush all kings and render universal the triumph of liberty and reason’. There were tentative moves to constitute the French Assembly as an international parliament of free peoples. Existing treaties, as in Russia much later, were repudiated, and the worldwide revolution was encouraged by direct intervention in the form of financial assistance and revolutionary agents (just as the Bolsheviks had subsidised foreign revolutionaries and formed ‘red brigades’ for action in foreign lands27). And as in Russia, the old order had combined against threat of insurgency by a variety of forms of counter-revolutionary combination.28

With the passage of time, however, relationships between revolutionary regimes and the outside world become increasingly similar to those among other members of the world community. The process begins with the limited agreements that are necessary for the exchange of prisoners of war. As commercial activity revives, it becomes necessary to provide for post and communications, and for reciprocal landing rights. There are common frontiers and waterways to be regulated. Once diplomatic relations are established a further series of agreements is necessary to cover consular rights, the use of the diplomatic pouch and the extra-territoriality of embassy buildings. There are wider agreements to cover the rules of military engagement and the work of the Red Cross. Beyond this, if foreign investment and not

26 See particularly Armstrong, *Revolution and World Order*.
simply trade is to take place, a congenial legal and economic framework must be created. The post-revolutionary government in the USSR, for instance, was keen to attract foreign ‘concessions’, operating mines or waterways on a long-term basis without formal rights of ownership. It may be necessary to provide for the expatriation of profits, and to subscribe to international norms on labour and working conditions. More generally, post-revolutionary states begin to seek allies abroad as they maximise their influence over matters that concern them; and they seek representation at the gatherings that affect their spheres of interest, such as (in the Soviet case) Spitzbergen or the Straits. In other words: ‘From the moment a revolution assumes the form of statehood, it encounters strong pressures to conform to the conventions of the society of states: to become “socialised”.’

Our study of post-revolutionary Russia offers at least partial confirmation of this general tendency and further reason to dissent from conceptualisations of the end of the Cold War as an event that took place in the early 1990s rather than a more extended process. After an initial phase, in which existing ties and obligations are repudiated, there is a slow but steady resumption of inter-state relations, and a slow convergence with global norms (this was apparent even in nomenclature, as the Commissariat for Foreign Relations became a Ministry in 1946 and its representatives abroad assumed the title and status of ambassador in the late 1930s and early 1940s). The USSR became an increasingly active diplomatic partner in the world community, although with considerable short-term variations. Its network of diplomatic relations became broader and more inclusive. It began to use its diplomatic network more actively, with the most active partners showing the most rapid increase in the volume of transactions. And its diplomatic activity increased, even after the Second World War, at a more rapid rate than was the case within the world community as a whole. The end of communist rule has been followed by moves towards a still closer association between Russia and its former Cold War adversaries, including membership of the Group of Seven and a wider framework of cooperation with an expanding NATO. The lesson of Soviet treatymaking is that by the late 1980s the USSR had been almost entirely reintegrated into the world community and that there was no need for communism to be ‘defeated’ for that reintegration to take place.

Appendix

The Soviet Treaty Series

Data for this study are drawn almost entirely from the official Soviet treaty series, published from 1921 as Sbornik deistvuyushchikh dogovorov, soglashenii i konventsii, zaklyuchennykh RSFSR s inostrannymi gosudarstvami (with a title change to reflect the formation of the

29 Ibid., p. 1. Halliday has also noted the process by which ‘revolutionary states begin with an internationalist commitment to promoting change and then, over time, accept the constraints of the international system and the permanence of other, initially contested, political regimes’. Fred Halliday, Revolution and Foreign Policy: the case of South Yemen 1967–1987 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 2.

USSR) and known after 1982 as *Sbornik mezhdunarodnykh dogovorov*. A parallel source for earlier years is available in the diplomatic documents series, *Dokumenty vneshei politiki*, vols 1–21 (Moscow, 1957–77; further volumes, for 1939 onwards, have been published since 1992). A complete bibliography of the *Sbornik*, including dates of publication and details of the period to which individual volumes refer, appears in D. I. Fel’dman (ed.), *Mezhdunarodnoe pravo: bibliografiya 1917–1972 gg.* (Moscow: Yuridicheskaya literatura, 1976), pp. 29–31.

The *Sbornik* is not an ideal source. For a start, it leaves out secret treaties. There was a lengthy hiatus during the wartime years, and volume 10 covering the period 1937–41 did not appear until 1955; it excluded some treaties concluded during the period but which had already been rescinded (notably with Nazi Germany); most but not all of these were covered in a series of retrospective listings. The scope of the Series varies over time, including (for instance) ‘international agreements of an interdepartmental nature’ after 1980. There is a continuous numerical sequence, reaching (in the volume for 1989) up to 4,633; but there are some duplicated or unnumbered items (the numbering of vol. 33 was entirely a duplication of the previous volume), there is an unexplained gap in volume 39 between 3,100 and 3,999, and volume 34 ends with document 2,694 but volume 35 begins with 2,696. Taking these and other discrepancies into account, the Series contains about 3,800 individual items.

In a separate analysis, a sample of the *Calendar of Soviet Treaties* (which is more inclusive in scope and includes a greater number of items) was compared with the *Sbornik* (which was the source for about a third of the entries in the *Calendar*). The *Sbornik*, it emerged, did not significantly diverge from the *Calendar* in terms of the distribution of agreements between signatories. There was a greater degree of variation in terms of the distribution of agreements over time: the *Sbornik* included about 65 per cent of items in the *Calendar* for the 1920s, but the proportion declines during the 1930s and thereafter stabilises at about a third of the total. The *Calendar* shows a similar pattern of peaks and troughs; but there are relatively greater bursts of activity in the early 1920s and especially in the years following World War II, and the general contrast between the periods before and after the mid-1950s is even more distinct. An analysis based upon the *Calendar* would therefore be consistent with the discussion that has been presented in the body of the article, although the contrast between the earlier and later periods would be greater.