

“Shape or Fight?”: New York’s Black Longshoremen, 1945–1961

Colin J. Davis

University of Alabama at Birmingham

Abstract

The purpose of this essay is to examine the working world of African-American longshoremen in New York and how they came to terms with racist hiring practices. Some African-American longshoremen retained a degree of institutional freedom with their Jim Crow Local #968, but their inability to control a pier, and thereby guarantee steady work, resulted in a precarious situation of constantly searching for work. Nonetheless, Local 968 acted as a catalyst for direct attacks on their representative trade union and discriminatory employers. As will be seen, not all black longshoremen followed a path of confrontation; some attempted to find an alternative method of obtaining regular work. These longshoremen paid kickbacks, eagerly volunteered to work at a moment’s notice, or consistently made themselves available for overtime. For all of these black longshoremen the record was a mixed one: at times successful in changing some hiring policies and union attitudes, at others painfully ignored or chastised for their efforts.

In 1961 a black longshoremen explained to journalist Pete Hamill his position on New York City’s docks: “The way it is now is not good, but I think it’s getting better. The white guys think we’re trying to take their jobs away from them. We’re not. But if we can do the work, we ask that we be considered fairly. I want to work. I want to put money in the bank. For me the only way to do it is with hook-down here on the waterfront. All I want is a chance to do that work and still have some kind of dignity-even if it means doing business with the boys.” The “boys” in question encompassed white longshoremen, their union leaders, and employers. While black longshoremen experienced both entrenched racism, and understood the necessity of working with white coworkers and union officials, those same officials saw a different picture. For white union leader Teddy Gleason, it was a not a question of race but of getting in line for the available work: “The newcomers believe when they come down [to the docks], the [white] old-timers on the waterfront should share . . . their work opportunities with these people whether they be Puerto Rican or whether they are colored. And if they are not put to work, they go back to the NAACP (National Association of Colored Persons) or State Division Against Discrimination [sic] and the first thing you know we are up on charges.”¹

Such differing interpretations highlighted the complexity of life on New York City’s waterfront between 1950–1961. While black longshoremen wanted

equal access to jobs, whites saw these claims as trying to jump the queue. What white union leaders and longshoremen failed to acknowledge was that black longshoremen had always been a presence on the docks, thus it was not necessarily getting in line; rather, black longshoremen were demanding what was their due. Black longshoremen attempted to maneuver their way through these treacherous waters, while confronting an array of barriers that precluded them from regular employment. A fortunate few enjoyed somewhat frequent work, while the majority were confined to fluctuating employment or handling odious cargoes. Just as restrictive was access to easier dock jobs, such as checkers and drivers, which remained the domain of white ethnics. Black longshoremen used two specific agencies to challenge discrimination on the job: a Jim Crow union local in Brooklyn and the New York State Commission Against Discrimination.

Biracial unionism had allowed African-American workers the ability to navigate through the shoals of racist hiring practices and hostile trade union structures. As Eric Arnesen has shown, New Orleans' African-American longshoremen retained power over hiring and promotion through the institution of biracial union locals. Such locals provided a semblance of protection, while simultaneously ensuring a black voice at both the port and regional levels. For black New York longshoremen in the post-WWII era, the picture was not as sanguine. Although retaining a degree of institutional freedom with their Jim Crow Local #968, their inability to control a pier, and thereby guarantee steady work, resulted in a precarious situation of constantly searching for work. Nonetheless, Local 968 acted as a catalyst for direct attacks on their representative trade union and discriminatory employers. Additionally, black longshoremen throughout the port, and from Local 968, looked to the New York State Commission Against Discrimination for redress of their grievances. Black longshoremen used the Commission as a vehicle to at least publicize discrimination and, at times, win some limited victories. While some black longshoremen challenged blatant discrimination on the docks, others followed a path of accommodation.

The purpose of this essay is to examine the working world of African-American longshoremen in New York and how they came to terms with racist hiring practices. As will be seen, not all black longshoremen followed a path of confrontation; some attempted to find an alternative method of obtaining regular work. These longshoremen paid kickbacks, eagerly volunteered to work at a moment's notice, or consistently made themselves available for overtime. For all of these black longshoremen the record was a mixed one: at times successful in changing some hiring policies and union attitudes, at others, painfully ignored or chastised for their efforts.

New York's black longshoremen chartered rough waters. Their experience was as varied as it was turbulent. From the colonial period to the present, black longshoremen had been a constant presence along the 700 miles of New York's waterfront, which stretched along the shores of Manhattan, Brooklyn, Staten Island and Newark, Jersey City, and Hoboken in New Jersey. They had always been an active component of the longshore work force. Their employment fluctuated depending on local or national circumstances. Between 1840–1850,

African Americans were reported to have constituted a majority of the work force. Thereafter they suffered a decline, but rose again in and during World War I and World War II.² In the late 1940s, they numbered from 4,000–5,000 or fifteen percent of the work force. Representing a significant minority of the work force did not guarantee union power. Blacks were barely integrated into the union structure; there were no black union representatives at the New York District level. The only African Americans who served as representatives to the international union came from Southern and Southwestern ports.³ Although always a presence along the waterfront, black New York longshoremen have for the most part been ignored by historians. Thus far labor economists and sociologists have tended to dominate the investigation of New York longshoremen, concentrating on union structure and corruption, and community construction and development along the Brooklyn piers.⁴

An examination of black longshoremen comes at a most exciting time. The dynamic of race continues to enjoy a vibrant life among labor historians. As Eric Arnesen has argued, "the subject itself has become one of the most dynamic within labor history."⁵ The relationship between race and the trade union is a topic that has attracted the attention of social, urban, and labor historians, and recently it has been energized by new approaches that utilize notions of social construction and group interdependence.⁶ Much of the discussion regarding exclusionary trade union practices and African Americans has revolved around the argument by Herbert Hill that such organizations became white fiefdoms.⁷ In reaction to Hill's contention, a large number of studies have argued that the picture is not so simply configured. The authors of these studies have shown that the trade union experience of blacks has been both multidimensional and changing over time. Just as complex as the differing experiences of black workers is the role played employers in excluding blacks from the workplace. Too often the union or white worker is seen as the primary activist in excluding blacks from employment.⁸ Black New York longshoremen fit the pattern of multiple experiences on the job (although more often than not working in a racist environment) and adopting different strategies to survive. Black longshoremen labored in an enigmatic labor pool, where an array of ethnic and racial groups contended for work and power. A common characteristic was the constant battle for acceptance and dignity. Above all, they shared with white longshoremen the intense desire to put food on their families' table. But separating them was entrenched and virulent attitudes that saw work in strictly racial terms. Work rejected by white longshoremen was then considered the domain of black workers. Black workers in turn either directly confronted such definitions or grudgingly accepted it to guarantee a vestige of employment in a job market that was far from stable.

Just as vital were the divisions within the black labor force. Some fought a civil rights battle in their union, the International Longshoremen's Association. In this struggle, black longshoremen looked to labor movement allies such as A. Philip Randolph or middle-class reformers such as the Urban League, the NAACP, or the New York State Commission Against Discrimination for sup-

port. But other black longshoremen took a different tack. They disregarded formal opposition within the union and instead opted to obtain employment on any terms possible. Thus there was a separation between those black longshoremen who actively challenged discrimination on the New York waterfront, while others tried to work within the racist circumstances hoping to get enough work to feed themselves and their families.

Throughout the late 1940s and 1950s the job of the longshoremen experienced little change. Manual work remained the bedrock of the labor process. Beyond the constant danger of accidents and their disabling potential, the most prominent fear of the men was the exploitative and inequitable method of obtaining work. New York longshoremen continued to shape-up for work by standing in a semi-circle around the hiring boss/foreman. The continuation of the practice can be laid at the door of the International Longshoremen's Association (ILA), the union representing dock workers on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts. The ILA controlled the system by choosing the hiring boss or having a union official present at the shape-up. This system encouraged extortion. Although by the late 1940s, particular work gangs established control over specific docks or cargoes, the casual hiring at the shape-up provided up to forty percent of the daily work force.⁹

In addition to deterring criticism of union officials, the shape-up also encouraged rampant discrimination against African-American workers. Appearing every day along side white longshoremen for the shape-up exposed black longshoremen to the racism of the hiring boss and attendant union official. One black longshoreman described the humiliating experience: "Sometimes standing on the pier with my union button and my union book, the hiring boss acts like he hates me . . . It happens all the time."¹⁰ The "hate," of course, culminated in not obtaining a job for the shift. Communist organizer Audrey West described a shape-up of black longshoremen in Brooklyn as "a slave market." After being rejected for work, "most of them would just be turning around and going back home . . . There might be a little grumbling . . . but never anything that sounded like they were ready to do anything about it."¹¹ Such exclusionary practices imbued a fatalistic attitude in some black longshoremen, as one remarked: "You know what it is to be a Negro on these docks? It's to be a nigger again. To the boss, you're a nigger. To the guy next to you, you're a nigger. And to yourself, you're a nigger. That's the worst part of being a Negro on the docks."¹²

The New York waterfront then was a cauldron of competing ethnic and racial groups. African-American longshoremen endeavored to obtain work at complex sites of racial interdependence and exclusion. At the top of the pecking order were ethnically Irish longshoremen. Their main power base was along the west side of Manhattan where Irish-Americans controlled the docks and the representative trade union. As one-time Manhattan longshoreman Larry Sullivan explained, "The dock gangs were mostly all Irish."¹³ Along the west side of Manhattan the Irish congregated in specific neighborhoods including Chelsea and Hells Kitchen. As Cal Winslow argues, "The Irish lived there, cramped in

between streets and warehouses, in neighborhoods known for big families and saloons."¹⁴ Up until the early 1890s the Irish were by far the predominant group on the New York waterfront. After a series of strikes when employers brought in Italian and African-American strikebreakers, Irish control of the docks was first challenged. The Irish longshoremen tried to counter the increasing numbers of Italians and Blacks by refusing to work on the same ships. As Charles Barnes observed in 1912, "If a gang of 'Ginnies,' or 'Dagoes,' as they were called was put in the hold with the Irish, the latter would quit."¹⁵ Such tactics, however, failed and soon Italians came to control the dirtier jobs of handling coal and working the piers in Brooklyn.

Although unable to stop the rapid influx of Italians and other ethnic groups, the Irish reserved for themselves the better jobs in and around the docks. By the turn of the century, Irish-Americans controlled the easier dock and deck jobs, leaving the more strenuous and dangerous hold jobs to new arrivals from Ireland or other immigrant groups. The Irish-American longshoremen held onto a more ethnicized class identity simply as a response to ethnic succession and the extraordinarily ethnic character of New York working class life.¹⁶ Thus the struggle for economic and political power on the waterfront was translated into a racialized design. Correspondingly, much of the Irish cohesion was predicated on keeping other ethnic and racial groups out of their areas of operation. Such a strategy re-affirmed their Irishness. Along the west side of Manhattan, then, Irish work gangs dominated the waterfront. From as far north as Hell's Kitchen to the southern tip of Manhattan, the piers became a series of Irish fiefdoms. Such control continued up through the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s.

Although dominating the port in the early twentieth century, Irish-Americans were eventually forced to share power with Italian-Americans. The arrangement was based upon numbers and raw power. Italians came to control the piers and union locals in Brooklyn, Staten Island, the Lower East Side, and on the New Jersey shore. To a certain extent such an arrangement reflected the changing political complexion of the city. As the Irish grip on City Hall was loosened, such was also the case in the city's labor movement.¹⁷ But as power shifted from the established Irish groups to others vying for control, it did not necessarily lead to the loosening of Irishness or Italian identity; indeed, it led to the strengthening of such an identification.

Elsewhere in Manhattan, especially along the East River, the work force was far more mixed but nonetheless rigidly divided by race. The Standard Fruit and Steamship Company dominated the East River and used Pier 13 to unload bananas. Ten gangs worked Pier 13. While some were "mixed," five were Puerto Rican and one was "colored." The Puerto Rican and Black gangs worked exclusively the banana shipments. The Puerto Rican gangs were recent arrivals on the New York waterfront. A sample of one gang showed that most had started work on the waterfront between 1945–1952. Of the twenty man gang, sixteen were born in Puerto Rico, two in Cuba, and one each from Venezuela and Santo Domingo. This East River gang had to travel far to work. While the pier was below East Fourteenth Street, the majority of the gang lived in East or West

Harlem or further north in the Bronx. Only one member of the gang lived close by on Delancey Street.¹⁸

The interplay of race, ethnicity, and family was the deciding factor in obtaining a job on the New York waterfront. In Brooklyn, Staten Island, and the Jersey shore, Italian-Americans were the predominant group, although large numbers of other racial and ethnic groups were clustered along the piers. In Brooklyn, longshoreman Sebastian DeFazio remembers, "we were strictly Italian, a few Irishmen, a few black guys, we made friends. . . ." Familial relations determined entry onto the docks. Sebastian DeFazio relates how he got his first job: "So being my father was a deckman . . . he knew people there, and I got in." Sebastian's older brother, Leonard, followed a cousin onto the docks. Fortunately within days Leonard abandoned shaping-up after obtaining a slot within a regular gang. "My uncle . . . introduced me right into the gang."¹⁹

There were also relatively large numbers of blacks working on the Brooklyn docks. Without access to union and company records it is impossible to accurately count the numbers in Brooklyn, but approximately 2,500 labored on the docks. There were, however, specific "colored" gangs in existence. Large numbers of these black longshoremen were Southern-born. Migrating to New York around World War II they gravitated to the Brooklyn waterfront as casual laborers. The shape-up was a system they could use to get at least a few days work as extras. Of one twenty-six member gang, nineteen were born in the Southern states of Alabama, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia. The remaining members originated from Arizona, Washington, New York, and New Jersey. One other came from the West Indies.²⁰ Of those from outside the New York area, eight had arrived between 1924–1941, and eleven between 1945–1950. Although technically a Brooklyn gang, just like the Puerto Rican gang in Manhattan, they traveled far and wide to get to work: fifteen were from Brooklyn, but three were from Queens, two from the Bronx, and five from Manhattan.²¹

The influx of southern blacks during World War II was part of general phenomenon of migration. Longshoremen Arthur McMillon was representative of this migration. Born in 1923 in Lee County, South Carolina, he was drafted into the army in 1943 but "got out because" he "had flat feet." His limited army experience and that of growing up in South Carolina convinced him to move north. As McMillon explained, "the white folks down there, I don't care how big you was you had tell them Mr., their children too, Mr. so and so . . . I was always a boy or a nigger." In the army for nine months, McMillon learned two important lessons: one, an alternative to the oppressive southern experience, and two, a commitment not to stay in South Carolina. Although not happy about military discipline, he was determined not to address white men and boys as "Mr." again. As he declared, "Weren't going to do that no more . . . [especially] After I found out what living was." McMillon pledged to himself, "When I got out [of the army] I wasn't going to stay there [South Carolina] no more." After a three day stay in South Carolina to bid farewell to relatives, McMillon headed to New York City in 1944.²²

Joining a brother and sister in New York, McMillon got a job in the Brook-

lyn Navy Yard. Occasionally after finishing work he would shape-up for jobs on the waterfront. While working at the Navy Yard he had a disagreement with a white foreman and walked off the job. McMillon blamed his southern experience for the incident: "I thought he was like people down South but he wasn't . . . but too late I [had] quit." He then regularly shaped on Fulton Street in downtown Brooklyn for longshore work. The men shaping with him, "all of them from the south, figured they'd do better . . . mostly from Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, got a few from Barbados." There were New York born blacks who had more regular opportunities on the Brooklyn docks. As McMillon explained, "there were some black people who had a good job and even blacks as foremen, but I didn't know these people, I was from down South, I was new."

Unable to obtain steady work McMillon drove cabs to supplement his meager income. But like other casual workers, McMillon paid a kickback to ensure some form of waterfront work. After collecting his pay "through the window," he handed over his contribution: "I don't know whether you had to do it or not, I figured he would give me a job in a day or so, so I gave him ten dollars. He'd take it and thank me . . . I thought it was what you were supposed to do if you wanted to get hired." The system was a lucrative one for the hiring foreman. McMillon was not alone in kicking back, creating a cycle of obligation and insecurity. As McMillon explained, "maybe for a day or so he would shape me but he would have other people . . . he'd work you one day and work the other guy another day, that mean he'd get money from me and the other guy."²³

Kickbacks were a common form of exploitation on the New York docks. Unlike in other US ports, criminal gangs in New York and New Jersey had institutionalized illegal behavior. Using the structural need for quick turnaround of cargoes and the predominately causal work force, these gangs simultaneously extorted both employers and workers. As the 1951–1952 New York State Crime hearings proved, kickbacks, loan sharking, and pilferage of union funds was a common, everyday phenomenon. So McMillon was not alone in having to "pay" for his job.

What separated McMillon, and other recent arrivals from the South, from more established blacks was they shaped-up not on the docks, but in downtown Brooklyn or in Harlem. Nonetheless, even experienced black longshoremen were forced by entrenched racism to hire on as extras. Italian-Americans in Brooklyn invariably reserved the good (better paying) jobs for themselves whether it be cargoes or the center holds of the ships. Additionally, while Italian-American union locals dominated certain piers, the Jim Crow Local 968 did not enjoy such a privilege. Thus blacks had to shape-up as extras and only rarely as gangs. Working as an extra generally meant you filled in a spare place in a gang, or worked on those cargoes that "white" longshoremen avoided. As I. Philip Sipser, a lawyer who represented black Local 968, put it, they "got the worse piece of shit . . . every lousy job that had to be filled because white workers wouldn't do it." Banana shipments, for example, were generally considered black cargo because, as Sipser explained, in the banana boats there were "rats as big as cats down there . . . stink was terrible . . . dirty work."²⁴

In some rare cases some white gang or hatch bosses would hire black longshoremen. Brooklyn hatch-boss Leonard DeFazio brought blacks into his gang after older, white members retired. "I had a lot of old guys in my gang, they retired, so I was approached by some black fellas. 'Hey, Lenny could I come in your gang?' So I said, 'Yeah, sure, come in tomorrow' . . . I had about four or five." DeFazio was criticized for his action, "That made the other hatch bosses resent what I was doing, why I was [sic] hiring the blacks?" But for DeFazio it was the need for reliable workers that was the determining issue: "I wanted a worker. I didn't want him because he's white, black, or pink. And that was that." DeFazio also had to endure criticism from the white crew of a South African ship. The ship's mate, he explained, "was trying to pick on me because he resented I had black working with white." A black gang member witnessing the confrontation from the hold of the ship, yelled up to the ship's mate, "Hey, you leave my hatch boss alone. I'll come up there and throw you in the river."²⁵

Brooklyn longshoreman Frank Barbaro worked with black longshoremen: "We had three African-Americans, three or four Puerto Ricans, two Cubans and a Norwegian, and the rest Italian." Such a mixed gang, however, "got the hardest work." As Barbaro explained it, "You got to understand, my gang was reflective of the work." White longshoreman Pete Bell also worked in a black gang in Brooklyn. The gang was the "Eighth gang, meaning it was the third extra gang [and] most of the time we did not have work." So when the black hatch boss, Tommy Howard, had a "short" gang he invited Bell to join the gang: "I was the only white guy in the gang . . . didn't make any difference to me, at least I was getting somewhere on the pier . . . on the foot of Joralemon Street."²⁶

For the most part, Leonard DeFazio's, Frank Barbaro's, and Pete Bell's gangs were exceptional. The Brooklyn waterfront was an Italian fiefdom. Other ethnic and racial groups worked there but only as extras and sometimes in mixed gangs. As Barbaro pointed out, "The gang that was integrated like ours, was an oddity."²⁷ Black longshoremen worked the dirtier cargoes or least desirable hatches, while a lucky few joined an Italian gang. So in Brooklyn, Italians dominated the ethnic and racial hierarchy on the docks.

Jersey City was also controlled by Italians, but the ethnic and racial mix was far more diverse. According to longshoreman "Eddie," a range of groups labored on the city's docks. "When I started [1946] we had everybody, Blacks, Italian, Polacks, Irish, Czech. . . . In one gang we had a Black deckman, Jew in the hold, Polack on the dock." Elsewhere on the Jersey shore ethnics predominated. In "Hoboken [the] Sullivan brothers were running the waterfront . . . if you didn't have an in you didn't work."²⁸ Hoboken gangs periodically migrated to Newark. The Hoboken men were then hired as extra gangs. As in Jersey City these extra gangs were mixed, where there could be "four Yugos[lavians], four Cubans, couple of colored guys."²⁹

The Newark work force reflected well the racial and ethnic divide. Italians dominated, while Puerto Ricans and African Americans constituted the other principal sub-groups. Just like in Brooklyn, blacks had their own "colored" union Local 1233. As with Brooklyn the bulk of the black longshoremen were

from the South. According to Arthur McMillon who worked in Newark from 1960, "all the blacks was . . . from down South," although "two or three were born here in Jersey."³⁰ Local 1235 on the other hand was a combination of Italian and Puerto Rican. According to longshoreman Jose Villa, there were eleven gangs in Local 1235, "four or five were Spanish and the rest Italians, we used to get along good." If regular gang members of Local 1235 were absent, particularly "around the holidays, when people [were] on vacation," blacks came in from Local 1233 "as extra, not steady, [but] on a day by day basis." At least black Local 1233 enjoyed certain pier privileges, unlike Brooklyn Local 968.³¹

So, throughout the port, black longshoremen experienced different job experiences. The divisions encapsulated birthplace and union local strength based upon pier jurisdiction or lack of it. Some black longshoremen in Brooklyn had been working on the waterfront prior to World War II, while men like McMillon were recent arrivals. More established blacks then had to compete for work with the new arrivals from the South. Placing themselves for hire on a daily basis on the streets of Brooklyn and Harlem, the more casual black longshoremen undermined the position of their brothers throughout the port. For casual longshoremen like McMillon, their readiness to take any work offered was a stratagem for more permanent status. McMillon had a union card that enabled him to search for work along the waterfront from Brooklyn, Manhattan and eventually Newark, New Jersey. He always made himself available for work, particularly overtime. For his persistence he acquired the nickname, "Standby." Such a tactic did not mean McMillon was willing to accept second-class status. In a telling exchange with an Italian-American longshoreman, McMillon made clear his need to be respected. Walking down the street with a "white guy," his companion turned around and "kicked me, playing with me." After making sure no other black longshoremen witnessed the kick, McMillon informed the white longshoreman: "I believe you like me, but don't do that no more, [I'm] not mad with you, [but] black people say white people got their foot up their ass for a long time." McMillon warned the man he was lucky no other black longshoremen were present because he would have got "a stick and knock your ass right out here." The white longshoremen "never did it no more." The point had been made; it was one thing to horse around, but certain rules of behavior had to be observed.³²

For African Americans, rampant discrimination by the hiring bosses and the ILA made for an insecure existence. Unable to dominate a pier, blacks had to shape-up as extras and only rarely as gangs. To some extent the ILA's relative acceptance of blacks was tactical to protect against strikebreakers. As one black union official testified in the late 1920s, "We are in the union today because the white man had to take us in for his own protection. Outside the organization the Negro could scab on the white man. Inside he can't. For this we get a share of work, the protection of the union contract and organization support."³³ In other ports, the relative acceptance of black longshoremen was based upon different factors. According to Howard Kimeldorf, in San Francisco during the 1930s and early 1940s the union local was controlled by left-wing elements who

fought hard to retain a vibrant black membership; while in Portland, Oregon a hostile white work force succeeded in barring entry even through World War II. The deciding factors that enabled black longshoremen to work in New Orleans, included enhanced trade union principles of brotherhood and raw numbers thus ensuring strong job and union control.³⁴

In New York, a reluctant acceptance of African Americans was based upon a combination of factors that included their relatively high numbers and the refusal by white ethnics to handle certain disagreeable cargoes. Such factors created a combination of biracial unionism, and free-floating black and Hispanic members. Mirroring the creation of ethnic locals by Italians and Irish, blacks were either forced to organize or accept what work was available. What separated black locals from their white neighbors, however, was embedded racism and their inability to control a pier to ensure regular employment.³⁵

In the post war period African-American longshoremen actively challenged their second-class status. To a large extent such confrontations were contextualized by general anger and frustration with the union leadership. Long dominated by gangsters, the union had traditionally negotiated sweetheart contracts with employers. Consequently the New York longshoremen were paid less than their counterparts on the West Coast. Beginning in 1945 a series of wildcat strikes broke out along the waterfront, rejecting wage and conditions negotiated by the union leadership. There were strikes in 1945, 1948, and 1951. Each time New York's longshoremen walked out en masse.³⁶ Local 968 also joined this insurgency. As well as attaching itself to the wildcat strike wave of the late 1940s and early 1950s, Local 968 concentrated its energies on obtaining steady work and combating discrimination. It waged its battle on two fronts: within the union corridors of power and before a New York state agency, the State Commission Against Discrimination.

Local 968 fought hard for control of a pier in Brooklyn to guarantee a modicum of regular employment. Cleophas Jacobs, President of Local 968, charged in 1949 that the "shipping companies . . . in collaboration with various local union officials and the hiring bosses, have an agreement whereby the available work is given to the other nine [white] locals in Brooklyn, to the exclusion of our men." Accentuating the problem was the lack of representation in the ILA, where not a single African American had been appointed organizer even though Local 968 had a membership of 1,000 men. Jacobs often complained bitterly to President Joseph Ryan. Ryan "promised to alleviate conditions" but, according to Jacobs, "absolutely nothing" had been done "in this direction."³⁷ Jacobs was also concerned with the loss of members to other Brooklyn locals, charging that these same locals, controlled by Anthony (Tough Tony) Anastasia, were simultaneously creating an "employment pool" for all Brooklyn piers, while "inducing" black members to leave 968 and join the white locals. Those black members who joined white locals either worked in mixed gangs, or gambled that it might ensure more steady work. Jacobs attempted to pressure Ryan to redress the situation by getting Local 968 members to picket the ILA's Manhattan's headquarters for thirteen weeks in 1949. Ryan unleashed white ethnic members who

violently dispersed the picket line. Ryan also took Jacobs to court and ordered a "special election" of Local 968's officers. The 1950 election returned Jacobs and his supporters to the leadership of Local 968, however.³⁸

By 1952 Jacobs had become so frustrated with the increasing loss of his members to other ILA locals he encouraged his men to appeal to Governor Thomas E. Dewey for help. In turn Dewey handed over the request to the New York State Commission Against Discrimination (SCAD). Modeled on Franklin Roosevelt's wartime Fair Employment Practice Committee, SCAD was created to administer the 1945 New York State Ives-Quinn law combating employment discrimination. SCAD was empowered to investigate discrimination by both employers, employment agencies, and trade unions. If SCAD found "probable cause" then cease and desist orders could theoretically be issued. In fact, though, SCAD relied overwhelmingly on conciliation to correct proven wrongs. Rather than waiting for complainants, however, SCAD went a step further and initiated actions of its own.³⁹ In 1952, SCAD organized a series of meetings between the officers of Local 968 and Joe Ryan and other top ILA officials. Although careful not to make an official or "verified complaint" to SCAD, Jacobs nonetheless used the meetings to highlight his anger and resentment toward the ILA hierarchy. He particularly protested the use of hiring clubs on Lenox Avenue, Harlem, and Fulton Street, Brooklyn, which employed casual, "nonunion Negro labor." Such activity, Jacobs charged, was "a subtle type of discrimination" because the clubs bypassed union members from Local 968. "The unorganized Negro is thus pitted against the organized Negro for the purpose of driving the organized Negro out of existence," Jacobs argued. Thus by destroying Local 968, the ILA would "deal with the Negro as an individual and not as an organized entity."⁴⁰

Although Local 968 was unable to gain control of a pier, events beyond internal union politics had the potential for rectifying the problem of discrimination at the shape-up. A series of New York State Crime Commission Hearings in 1952 exposed widespread and systemic corruption within the ILA. Spurring on the hearings were series of explosive events along the New York waterfront. Wildcat strikes broke out in 1945, 1948, and 1951, pitting an angry rank-and-file against their union leaders. Correspondingly, journalists and reformers turned their attention to the longshoremen's plight.⁴¹ Encouraged by the public glamour for ridding the docks of gangsters, New York Governor Thomas E. Dewey set up the Commission Hearings. The linkage was clearly made between union officials and underworld figures. Highlighted was the criminal control of some union locals and thereby the lucrative monopolization of loading and hiring on the docks. A litany of corrupt practices were exposed including kickbacks, loan sharking, and organized theft.⁴² The revelations forced state authorities in New York and New Jersey to eradicate the shape-up and to attempt to remove the ILA's criminal elements. Employment centers were created throughout the port to eliminate criminal control. A bi-state agency, the Waterfront Commission, was established to oversee the general running of the centers and the registration of longshoremen. Unlike those on the West Coast, however, these centers

were not controlled by the union, nor was work rotated among the work gangs or individuals.⁴³ The public revelations of corruption also forced the American Federation of Labor to eject the ILA from its organization. What followed was inter-cine warfare pitting those who continued to support the ILA and the AFL-backed, International Brotherhood of Longshoremen (IBL).⁴⁴

Throughout this period many black longshoremen believed that their situation would improve. Employment discrimination, however, remained the norm. Discrimination in hiring, and the use of hiring clubs that employed causal black labor persisted. The thirteen employment centers scattered throughout the port had been established to do away with the evils of the open-air shape-up. In effect, though, discrimination had been driven inside. As one black longshoreman lamented, "This just took the shape-up off the piers and put it indoors." The calls for work in the employment centers continued to be driven by either familial connections or kickbacks. Correspondingly, black longshoremen were frequently ignored.⁴⁵

Local 968 fought hard to end discrimination in the employment centers. In their battle they gained a new ally in the form of Reginald Ingram, Industrial Secretary for New York's Urban League. During the mid-1950s, Ingram had begun canvassing the port's black longshoremen. By 1956, Ingram had completed an investigation detailing the working lives of the port's black longshoremen. These longshoremen were scattered across the port with regular gangs working in Newark and Jersey City, the "Breakwater" piers in Brooklyn, the Grace Line piers in Chelsea, Manhattan, and the east-side banana piers. But the majority of the longshoremen were relegated to working as "extras" or casual labor. The more plum jobs of watchmen, checkers, forklift drivers, and carpenters, continued to be closed to Blacks.⁴⁶

Although getting jobs on the "Breakwater," Local 968 continued to hemorrhage members. Thomas Fauntleroy, Business Agent of Local 968, testified in 1958 that the membership had dropped to 750 from 1,000 in just a few years. Fauntleroy estimated that while there were eighteen regular gangs (414 men) and three extra-regular gangs (69 men), the majority of the men never worked on a regular basis; many of these men often looked elsewhere throughout the port for work: "some of them drift to the Westside (Manhattan) . . . or at Greenpoint (Brooklyn) . . . some of them go to Staten Island, and we have quite a few who go to Port Newark." Fauntleroy further testified that "numerous times" Brooklyn employers would "call gangs from other parts of the port before they call our gangs." Correcting the problem proved difficult. Although "we have had hundreds of complaints," when a grievance was made, "it didn't get too far. It would stop at the pier." That is, the white union delegate would be brought in and the company superintendent would promise that it "wouldn't happen again."⁴⁷

Later in 1958, Fauntleroy and Local 968's attorney presented a "formal resolution of grievances" to William Bradley, the newly-elected president of the ILA, stating that Local 968 was "having its life sapped by a concerted plan of raiding and stealing of its members." Blamed was Anastasia's Brooklyn Local

1814, which was accused of telling Local 968 members that Local 1814 was the "only group that could guarantee work." Anastasia was also accused of conspiring to "malign, slander, and ridicule the officers and leadership of 968."⁴⁸

Local 968 continued to use SCAD as an ally in its fight to remain alive. After prodding by Reginald Ingram, Thomas Fauntleroy met with SCAD officials on August 23, 1957 to outline again Local 968's issue with Local 1814 and general discrimination on the waterfront. The meeting focused on a plan to encourage black applicants to the Checker's Local No. 1. Led by Thomas Gleason, Local 1 had a membership of over 5,000 members, not one of whom was black. The case went to the heart of discrimination on the waterfront. A checker's job was relatively easy because it entailed no heavy lifting and was paid more than the regular longshoremen's rate. SCAD informed Fauntleroy they were supporting two longshoremen, James Bey and Albert Miller, in their challenge to gain entry into Local 1. Fauntleroy was not impressed by Bey's application. He explained that Local 968 was "not interested" in Bey, but would go along with Miller who was "loyal to 968."⁴⁹

Bey's candidacy was problematic because he was not a member of 968, but of Anastasia's Local 1814. Fauntleroy therefore perceived Bey as disloyal. Once again a division was evident within the black longshoremen, this time based upon local union allegiance. Making Bey an even more discomfiting figure was a recent history of confrontation with the ILA. Bey had angered ILA officials with his successful 1955 suit for back pay totaling \$10,600 as a temporary organizer. Bey's religion was also considered problematic. In 1939, "he had embraced the Islam religion" and enthusiastically encouraged other black longshoremen to "seek Allah."⁵⁰

After investigation, SCAD "found probable cause" that both Bey and Miller had been denied entry into Local 1 "because of their race and color." On January 16, 1958, SCAD Commissioner Elmer Carter met with Thomas Gleason to settle the issue. In a candid exchange, Gleason forcefully pointed out that he considered Bey "a troublemaker and an undesirable person" and was "no credit to his people and was just a bad sort." On the candidacy of Miller, Gleason agreed that the "local could not be possibly hurt by Miller if he is admitted." Gleason did argue that his white members were fearful that Miller could be the wedge that other blacks would follow and "take over" the union. Elmer Carter convinced Gleason that SCAD would try to issue a cease and desist order forcing Local 1 to take Miller. Gleason finally agreed to convince the members "to take in" Miller because SCAD would "force them to take him anyway." By April, 1959 Miller was accepted in Local 1; Bey, however, was not.⁵¹

Emboldened by SCAD's interest, Local 968 encouraged its members to press charges against discriminatory employers. In September, 1958, a group of twenty-six Brooklyn black longshoremen brought a case against the hiring boss at the Waterfront Commission Employment Center No. 8. They charged that they were not called for work as extra regulars, while whites with less seniority were employed. SCAD subsequently discovered that eleven white longshoremen hired as extras that day had less claim to the work than the black long-

shoremen who were present. The stevedoring company, Universal Terminal, although agreeing that some irregularity had occurred, attempted to smear one of the black longshoremen, by charging that Nathaniel Evans "suffered from a disturbance . . . He is an unstable worker in the sense that he absents himself without warning or advanced notice." Not for the first time, nor the last, were 'irritating' longshoremen labeled as "troublemakers." SCAD was not convinced by Universal's personal attack on Evans and ordered the company to desist from discriminating again and to provide the complainants with monetary compensation.⁵²

In the same year a similar case of discrimination was brought by five black longshoremen in Manhattan. It was another case of being overlooked for employment even though seniority should have guaranteed them a job. The five black longshoremen insisted they were generally ignored for work and "only on occasions when white longshoremen were not available" were they employed.⁵³ The company in question was the Transoceanic Terminal Corporation. The particular case revolved around the hiring of eighty-eight "casual" longshoremen on October 9, 1958. Five black longshoremen alleged they had been ignored for employment. After investigation by a SCAD investigator, it was discovered that these five men had more seniority than twenty-three of the white men hired. A clear case of discrimination was evident therefore. The employer responded by arguing that the job "required special training" and that they wanted to "retain" their "prerogative to judge who is best qualified to do this work."⁵⁴

In a meeting with company officials, SCAD investigators were informed of the daily, almost traditional exclusion of blacks from regular or skilled jobs. Believing his discussion was off-the-record, Pier Superintendent Clyde Walters acknowledged "the only jobs available to Negroes . . . are mule jobs in the hold of the ship." That "Negroes are never selected as dockmen, drivers or checkers." The "hiring agents select 'neighborhood children' in filling all categories of work except for the back-breaking hold jobs." That is the "immediate residential community of white, primarily Irish and Italian" longshoremen. Walters added that to "buck the 'system'" was to invite "all types of reprisals" by the men. These "reprisals" included "slow-downs, quickie strikes, damaging of equipment, physical violence, etc." SCAD ordered the company to pay the men for the time lost on the job, "to offer to complainants the next regular vacancies that occur," and to provide a "daily record of all casuals" on the affected pier.⁵⁵ Again the employer was forced to pay for time lost.

These cases could be construed as successful attacks on employer discrimination in cahoots with white union members. However, SCAD was generally reluctant to act aggressively. It took on individual cases, but did not seriously challenge systemic racism. SCAD Commissioner Elmer A. Carter justified the tentative approach by arguing that, "Discrimination is pandemic in the United States. The only hope for its permanent elimination lies in the extent to which voluntary compliance with the provisions of the law can be achieved." Many cases were also dismissed leading the *Harvard Law Review* to claim SCAD was "unduly cautious" and its "high rate of dismissal discourages the filing of com-

plaints."⁵⁶ SCAD certainly had powerful weapons to fight discrimination on the waterfront; it could issue cease-and-desist orders, and subpoena witnesses and records. Its reluctance to act aggressively can be laid at the door of officials, especially Elmer Carter, who felt more comfortable trying to persuade employers and ILA officials to adhere to the Ives-Quinn law. Such timid action could do nothing but encourage men like Arthur McMillon to take what was given.

The SCAD cases, though, provided the backdrop for an extraordinary rapprochement between Local 968 and the dominant Local 1814. Throughout 1958–1959 as the SCAD cases progressed, the respective leaderships sparred over the issues of pier jurisdiction and raiding.⁵⁷ In an attempt to silence the calls for change and the SCAD investigations, "Tough Tony" Anastasia tried to argue that to give Local 968 a pier "would be immoral because it would only serve to foster and perpetuate segregation." Clifford Robinson, the new President of Local 968, gave a stinging public reply to Anastasia in March, 1959: "Your remarks about Negroes reveal a hypocrisy equaled by only your own dedication to keeping the Negro in a position apart, with diminished rights and responsibilities." Robinson charged that Anastasia's Local 1814 treated its black longshoremen with "second class membership," and that "Local 968 will survive to demonstrate that you will not do the same to its men."⁵⁸

The jousting between Locals 968 and 1814 came to an abrupt end in the same year. In May, 1959, discussions began about merging Local 968 with the much larger Local 1814. Spurring on these talks were two important factors: continuing loss of Local 968 members to Local 1814, and Anastasia's presidential attempt of the ILA. By June, negotiations had hammered out a tentative agreement. Local 968 officers would be given leadership positions within Local 1814 and in the New York District, ILA; in return they would provide support for Anastasia's presidential hopes. Prior to the merger vote, Clifford Robinson spelled out his reasoning for supporting the merger. Robinson recognized that "Tough Tony" was "the big man in Brooklyn" and that there was "no support [for 968] from the international." To forestall further defections from Local 968 to Local 1814 was also another important reason: "We figure that if we merge now, before we lose any more of our members, we can get the best possible deal for our people." For their support of the merger, Robinson and Fauntleroy would "become organizers and delegates of Local 1814." Other Local 968 officers were guaranteed official positions in Local 1814 and on the District Council; while the remaining would sit on the "international's wage-scale committee, the first New York Negroes to serve in that capacity." In all twelve officers of Local 968 would be rewarded with union positions.⁵⁹

Bringing in Local 968, Anastasia hoped to attract support from southern ILA locals that had large black memberships and leaders. As the *New York Times* reported, by attracting "the support of southern delegates, would make him politically the strongest single man in the union." Even if he failed to win the presidency, Anastasia would rule the Brooklyn docks, the "busiest freight dock of the port."⁶⁰ The agreement, as well as guaranteeing positions for Local 968 officers, also provided something for the members. An organization was to

be established within Local 1814 “to insure and promote the rights and interests of Negro longshoremen.” Local 1814 also promised to create positions for blacks as shop stewards (two), dock bosses (five), maintenance men, and safety men. If a new pier were opened up, black gangs would be given work “to overcome the present inequality of employment.” On June 27, Local 968 members voted to accept the agreement by a margin of 2:1. “This will give us about 2,000 Negro members,” Anastasia gleefully remarked, “we already have 1,400 or 1,500 in [our] 9,000 member unit.”⁶¹

Livingston Wingate, the black attorney representing Local 968 in the agreement negotiations, was happy with the new arrangement. The merger ensured “complete equality of Negro longshoremen in all categories on the Brooklyn waterfront,” he concluded. Some New York City civil rights leaders were also satisfied with the merger. Joe Overton, president of the NYC-NAACP, joyfully described the merger “as a step forward in the labor movement that places Anastasia in the forefront of labor leaders who recognize the practicality of one for all and all for one.”⁶² But the *New York Times* was more cautious in its appraisal. It stated that the merger “rules out any serious danger of new complaints of anti-Negro job discrimination, which is illegal in New York State.”⁶³

For all the celebration and self-congratulatory accolades, the merger did not end discrimination on the New York docks. The extinguishing of Local 968 had removed “any serious” internal or institutional threat to the ILA. Indeed, Local 1814 never ratified the agreement, leaving black longshoremen in Brooklyn rudderless. In effect, Local 968 leaders had given away what little power they had on the promise of future protection. After joining Local 1814, black longshoremen were leaderless. Once again, they were left to pick up the crumbs given to them by white hiring bosses and their union allies.

Black longshoremen continued to protest discriminatory treatment on the docks, however, appealing to SCAD for redress. In the early 1960s, new alliances within and outside the ILA confronted entrenched power that reserved plum jobs for whites. A. Philip Randolph joined the cause when he attacked the decision of the American Federation of Labor–Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) to re-admit the ILA into the fold in 1959.⁶⁴ For his actions Randolph was rewarded with the infamous response by George Meany, “Who the Hell hired you as guardian of all Negro members in America?” In a telling rebuke, *The Amsterdam News* editorialized: “Nobody has appointed Mr. A. Philip Randolph as the ‘guardian’ of all Negroes in America . . . But we would like Mr. Meany to understand that A. Philip Randolph speaks for a damn sight more Negroes on this issue than anyone else in America.”⁶⁵

Randolph also came to the defense of rank-and-file longshoremen who formed a Unity Ticket within Local 1814. The Unity Ticket appealed to Randolph’s newly-formed Negro American Labor Council for support in October, 1959. The Unity Ticket came under violent attack. Tony Anastasia with “25 other men” had attempted to break up a Unity meeting at the home of longshoreman Clyde Blue. After hearing their charges and complaints, Randolph insisted to reporters, “The crisis has reached a head and is subject to explode” unless re-

sponsible parties eradicate discrimination on the waterfront.⁶⁶ The Unity Ticket of black and white longshoremen continued to run its slate of candidates and enjoyed the active support of the Negro American Labor Council (NALC) throughout the 1960s. Randolph allowed the NALC to be a springboard by longshoremen for agitation purposes, while simultaneously using his vice-presidency in the AFL-CIO to appeal to Meany and the AFL-CIO Executive Council to force the recently re-admitted ILA to clean up its act.⁶⁷

In Brooklyn battles would continue over job sharing and political control of Local 1814. Local 968 was gone, however. One of the oldest in the New York port, its inability to control a pier and staunch a flow of members to the larger 1814, made for an agreement that sounded its death knell. Using the services of SCAD, it could at least be recognized as a voice for black longshoremen in Brooklyn and throughout the port. The fight for equal rights would then take place within one giant local. The general failure of Local 968 to obtain permanent work also influenced strategy during the 1960s. As one black activist longshoreman stated in 1962: "We don't need [a] black local-We need work-We need jobs."⁶⁸

This study highlighted the shifting postures and experiences of black longshoremen on the expansive waterfront of New York harbor. Daily experiencing discrimination, black longshoremen adopted different but complementary tactics to survive. When institutional power was available, especially in the guise of Local 968, open confrontation was adopted. Correspondingly, alliances were made with sympathetic allies, whether the New York Urban League or SCAD. If isolated, then some longshoremen employed the stance of making themselves readily available for work, hoping that such action would lead to acceptance and, ultimately, regular work. Thus the experiences and tactics, although different to some degree, were nonetheless joined by a common desire for acknowledgment and putting bread on the table. The demands were for acceptance on the waterfront, equal opportunity for steady work, and access to better paying jobs. The struggle pitted the black longshoremen against both employers and trade union officials. Only when strategically necessary were these longshoremen courted by union officers. Such qualified acceptance was fleeting, dependent upon pressure from below or outside forces. Black longshoremen then took different paths to guarantee a semblance of control. The results were mixed, but not entirely framed by the bitter feelings of defeat.

NOTES

1. *New York Post*, September 20, 1961, 23.

2. Lester Rubin, *The Negro in the Longshore Industry-The Racial Policies of American Industry*, Report No. 29 (Philadelphia, 1974), 51–70. Other studies that have examined black longshoremen include, Herbert Northrup, *Organized Labor and the Negro* (New York, 1971), 137–44; Sterling D. Spero and Abram L. Harris, *The Black Worker: The Negro and the Labor Movement* (Port Washington, NY, 1931), 198–205; Cal Winslow, "On the Waterfront: Black, Italian and Irish Longshoremen in the New York Harbour Strike of 1919," in *Protest and Survival: Essays for E. P. Thompson*, ed., John Rule & Robert Malcolmson.

3. "Urban League of Greater New York Memorandum on the Status of Minority Group

Workers on the New York-New Jersey Waterfront, 1956," *Vernon Jensen Papers, Box 1, 4067, Kheel Center, Cornell University*. There were five African-American international vice presidents but they all represented Southern ports.

4. William DiFazio's, *Longshoremen: Community and resistance on the Brooklyn Waterfront* (South Hadley, MA, 1985), provides a sociological study of Brooklyn longshoremen and how the guaranteed income transformed employment relations. Labor economist Vernon Jensen provided a slew of studies of New York longshoremen. Additionally, as a faculty member of the Industrial and Labor Relations School, Cornell University, he acted as arbitrator regarding wage judgements. His relevant publications include: Vernon H. Jensen, *Strife on the Waterfront: The Port of New York Since 1945* (Ithaca, NY, 1974); *Hiring of Dockers and Employment Practices in the Ports of New York, Liverpool, Rotterdam, and Marseilles* (Cambridge, MA, 1964); "Hiring Practices and Employment Experience of Longshoremen in the port of New York," *International Labor Review* 77 (April, 1958): 342–369. A further study that follows more the labor economist path is Charles Larrowe, *Shape-Up and Hiring Hall: A Comparison of Hiring Methods on the New York and Seattle Waterfronts* (Westport, CT, 1976). Recent studies that have incorporated social and political history are Howard Kimeldorf's, *Reds or Rackets?: The Making of radical and Conservative Unions on the Waterfront* (Berkeley, 1988), and Cal Winslow, "'Men of the Lumber Camps Come to Town': New York Longshoremen in the Strike of 1907," *Waterfront Workers: New Perspectives on Race and Class* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1998), ed., Cal Winslow.

5. Eric Arnesen, "Up From Exclusion: Black and White Workers, Race, and the State of Labor History," *Reviews in American History*, (March, 1998), 147.

6. For literature on construction see, David Roediger, *The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class*, (New York, 1991); Kenneth Durr, "When Southern Politics Came North: The Roots of White Working Class Conservatism in Baltimore, 1940–1964," *Labor History* 37 (Summer, 1996): 309–31; Noel Ignatiev, *How the Irish Became White*, (New York, 1995); Theodore W. Allen, *The Invention of the White Race, Vol. 1, Racial Oppression and Social Control* (New York, 1994).

7. Herbert Hill, "The Importance of Race in American Labor History," *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society* 9 (1995): 317–43; "The Problem of Race in American Labor History," *Reviews in American History* 24 (1996): 180–208. Such a position of labeling trade unions as exclusionary is highlighted by Bruce Nelson, "Organized Labor and the Struggle for Black Equality in Mobile during World war II," *Journal of American History* 80 (December, 1993): 952–88; Henry M. McKiven, *Iron and Steel: Class, race, and Community in Birmingham, Alabama, 1875–1920* (Chapel Hill, 1995); Robert J. Norrell, "Caste in Steel: Jim Crow Careers in Birmingham, Alabama," *Journal of American History* 73 (December, 1986): 669–94.

8. Rick Halpern, *Down on the Killing Floor: Black and White Workers in Chicago's Packinghouses, 1904–1954* (Urbana, Ill., 1997); Dan Letwin, *The Challenge of Interracial Unionism: Alabama Coal Miners, 1878–1921* (Chapel Hill, 1998); Eric Arnesen, *Waterfront Workers of New Orleans: Race, Class, and Politics, 1863–1923* (Urbana, 1991); Arnesen, "'Like Banquo's Ghost, It Will Not Down': The Race Question and the American Railroad Brotherhoods, 1880–1920," *American Historical Review* 99 (December, 1994): 1601–33; Alex Lichtenstein, "Racial Conflict and racial Solidarity in the Alabama Coal Strike in 1894: New Evidence in the Gutman-Hill Debate," *Labor History* 36 (Winter, 1995): 63–76; Brian Kelly, "Policing the 'Negro Eden': Racial Paternalism in the Alabama Coalfields, 1906–1922," *Alabama Review*. For studies that factor in employer action see, Venus Green, "The 'Lady' Telephone Operator: Gendering Whiteness in the Bell System," *Racializing Class, Classifying Race: Labor and Difference in Britain, the USA and Africa* (New York, 2000), eds., Peter Alexander and Rick Halpern; Thomas J. Sugrue, "Segmented Work, Race-Conscious Workers: Structure, Agency and Division in the CIO Era," *International Review of Social History* 41 (December, 1996).

9. "Testimony of Louis Waldman, attorney representing International Longshoremen's Association, in Arbitration Proceedings Before William H. Davis, November 21, 1945," *International Longshoremen's Association, Box 3, Folder Hiring Hall, 1942–54, Tamiment Library, New York University*. Hereafter cited as ILA-TAM.

10. Malcolm Johnson, *Crime on the Labor Front*, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950), 116.

11. Author's interview with Audrey West, June 22, 1995.

12. *New York Post*, September 20, 1961, 23.

13. Author's interview with Larry Sullivan, July 13, 1995.

14. Calvin Winslow, "On the Waterfront: Black, Italian and Irish Longshoremen in the

New York Harbour Strike of 1919," in *Protest and Survival: Essays for E. P. Thompson*, ed., John Rule & Robert Malcolmson, 369.

15. Charles Barnes, *The Longshoremen*, (New York: Arno Press, 1977), 8.

16. Colin J. Davis, "The Elusive Irishman: Ethnicity and the Postwar World of New York City and London Dockers," *Racializing Class, Classifying Race: Labor and Difference in Britain, the USA and Africa* (New York, 2000).

17. Stephen P. Erie, *Rainbow's End: Irish-Americans and the Dilemmas of Machine Politics, 1840–1985*, (Berkeley, 1988); Roy Peel, *The Political Clubs of New York City*, (Port Washington, NY, 1935); Theodore J. Lowi, *At the Pleasure of the Mayor: Patronage and Power in New York City, 1898–1958*, (London, 1964). For connection between the Irish and the US labor movement see, David Montgomery, "The Irish and the American Labor Movement," *America and Ireland, 1776–1976: The American Identity and the Irish Connection*, eds., David Noel Doyle & Owen Dudley Edwards, (Westport, 1980).

18. "Inter-Office Memorandum, Executive Department, State Commission Against Discrimination," March 2, 1956, *State Commission Against Discrimination, State of New York, New York State Archives, Series 10409–83, Box 13*.

19. Author's interview with Sebastian DeFazio, July 10, 1995; Author's interview with Leonard DeFazio, July 12, 1995.

20. Applegate et al. vs. Universal Terminal & Stevedoring Co., Inter-Office Memorandum, Executive Department, State Commission Against Discrimination, September 10, 1958, *State Commission Against Discrimination, State of New York, New York State Archives, Series 10409–83, Box 22*.

21. Applegate et al. vs. Universal Terminal & Stevedoring Co., Inter-Office Memorandum, Executive Department, State Commission Against Discrimination, September 10, 1958, *State Commission Against Discrimination, State of New York, New York State Archives, Series 10409–83, Box 22*; Complaint No. C-5550–58. State Commission Against Discrimination on the Complaints of Applegate et al. vs Universal Terminal & Stevedoring Co., *State Commission Against Discrimination, State of New York, New York State Archives, Series 10409–83, Box 22*. (Hereinafter cited as SCAD-NYSA).

22. Author's interview with Arthur McMillon, March 12, 1999.

23. Author's interview with Arthur McMillon, March 12, 1999.

24. Author's interview with I. Philip Sipser, June 29, 1995.

25. Author's interview with Leonard DeFazio, July 12, 1995.

26. Author's interview with Frank Barbaro, July 6, 1995; Author's interview with Pete Bell, July 7, 1995.

27. Author's interview with Frank Barbaro, July 6, 1995.

28. Author's interview with "Eddie," July 9, 1995.

29. Author's interview with "Eddie," July 9, 1995.

30. Author's interview with Arthur McMillon, March 12, 1999.

31. Author's interview with Jose Villa, December 16, 1996.

32. Author's interview with Arthur McMillon, March 12, 1999.

33. Sterling Spero and Abraham L. Harris, *The Black Worker: The Negro and the Labor Movement*, (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1931), 199.

34. Howard Kimeldorf, *Reds or Rackets: The Making of Radical and Conservative Unions on the Waterfront*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 144–148; Eric Arnesen, *Waterfront Workers of New Orleans: Race, Class and Politics, 1863–1923*, (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1996).

35. For excellent discussion of biracialism among longshoremen see, of course, Eric Arnesen, *Waterfront Workers of New Orleans: Race, Class and Politics, 1863–1923*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). For the mix of ethnic and racial groups see, Cal Winslow, "On the Waterfront: Black, Italian and Irish Longshoremen in the New York Harbour Strike of 1919," *Protest and Survival*.

36. Howard Kimeldorf, *Reds or Rackets: The Making of Radical and Conservative Unions on the Waterfront* (Berkeley, CA, 1992), 154–55; Colin J. Davis, "'All I Got's a Hook': New York Longshoremen and the 1948 Dock Strike," *Waterfront Workers: New Perspectives on Race and Class* (Urbana, 1998), ed., Cal Winslow.

37. "Testimony of Cleophas Jacobs," Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, *To Clarify the Overtime Provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, As Amended*, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 1949, pp. 488–491.

38. *New York Times*, January 19, 1952.

39. Morroe Berger, "The New York State Law Against Discrimination: Operation and Administration," *The Cornell Law Quarterly* 35 (Summer, 1950): 747–796; Elmer A. Carter, "Practical Considerations of Anti-Discrimination Legislation-Experience Under the New York Law Against Discrimination," *The Cornell Law Quarterly* 40 (Fall, 1954): 40–59.

40. "Report of Conference with the Officers of the International Longshoremen's Association and the Officers of Local No. 968, ILA, March 19, 1952," *Vernon Jensen Papers, Box 1, 4067, Kheel Center, Cornell University*; For Local 968's overtures to Governor Dewey and SCAD see, *New York Times*, January 28, 1952, 37, and, *New York Times*, February 7, 1952, 55.

41. Colin J. Davis, "'All I Got's A Hook': New York Longshoremen and the 1948 Dock Strike," *Waterfront Workers: New Perspectives on Race and Class* (Urbana, 1998); Jensen, *Strife on the Waterfront*; Malcolm Johnson, *Crime on the Labor Front*, (New York, 1950); Jesuit priests from the Xavier Institute in Manhattan played a major role in galvanizing public opinion to clean up the ILA. See, Colin J. Davis, "'Launch Out Into the Deep and Let Down Your Nets': Father John Corridan, S.J., and the New York Longshoremen in the Post-World War II Era," *The Catholic Historical Review*, (January, 2000): 66–84.

42. Malcolm Johnson, *Crime on the Labor Front*, (New York, 1950); The multi-volume set *New York State Crime Commission Hearings* is an invaluable source for highlighting the criminal control of the ILA, and how gangsters manipulated the shape-up to maintain control over their members.

43. Peter B. Levy, "The Waterfront Commission of the Port of New York: A History and Appraisal," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review* 42 (July, 1989): 508–23; Larowe, *Shape-Up and Hiring Hall*, 41–8; Jensen, "Hiring Practices and Employment Experience of Longshoremen in the Port of New York," *International Labor Review* 77 (April, 1958), 342–53.

44. Larowe, *Shape-Up and Hiring Hall*, 46–8; One of the principal IBL leaders who challenged the ILA was John O'Dwyer, Interview, November 21, 1980, *New Yorkers At Work Series, Tamiment Archive, Bobst Library, New York University*.

45. "Jim Crow Stalks the Waterfront," *Our World*, August, 1955, 21.

46. "Urban League of Greater New York Memorandum on the Status of Minority Group Workers on the New York-New Jersey Waterfront, 1956," *Vernon Jensen Papers, Box 1, 4067, Kheel Center, Cornell University*.

47. "Testimony of Thomas Fauntleroy, in the matter of Arbitration between ILA-Independent, and its Affiliated Locals in the Port of New York, and the New York Shipping Association," September 29, 1958, *Vernon Jensen Papers, Box 5, 4096, Kheel Center, Cornell University*.

48. *New York Amsterdam News*, November 22, 1958, 11.

49. "Memorandum of Meeting with Thomas Fauntleroy, Business Agent, Local 968, August 23, 1957," *SCAD-NYSA, 10409–83, Box 17*.

50. "Memorandum to Philip Partnow, Director of Investigations from Jean D. Brown, Field Representative, April 10, 1957," *SCAD-NYSA, 10409–83, Box 17*.

51. Memorandum of Meeting, Elmer Carter, Commissioner, SCAD, and Thomas Gleason, President, Local 1, ILA, January 16, 1958, *SCAD-NYSA, 10409–83, Box 17*; Letter to Elmer Carter from Thomas Gleason, April 27, 1959, *SCAD-NYSA, 10409–83, Box 17*.

52. "Memorandum to Philip Partnow from Mathew Foner, Field Representative, September 10, 1958," *SCAD-NYSA, 10409–83, Box 22*; "Letter to Harry G. Liese, Attorney representing Universal Terminal and Stevedoring Corporation, from Elmer Carter, March 26, 1959," *SCAD-NYSA, 10409–83, Box 22*; "Letter to Elmer Carter from Harry G. Liese, April 7, 1959," *SCAD-NYSA, 10409–83, Box 22*.

53. "Memorandum to Philip Partnow from I. R. Kornbliet, Field Representative, October 10, 1958," *SCAD-NYSA, 10409–83, Box 22*.

54. Letter to Elmer A. Carter from J. J. Marbler, Treasurer, Transoceanic Terminal Corporation, October 2, 1959, *SCAD-NYSA, 10409–83, Box 22*.

55. "Memorandum to Elmer A. Carter from Reginald K. Ingram, February 4, 1959," *SCAD-NYSA, 10409–83, Box 22*; Letter to J. J. Marbler from Elmer A. Carter, February 26, 1960, *SCAD-NYSA, 10409–83, Box 22*.

56. "The Operation of State Fair Employment Practices Commissions," *Harvard Law Review* 68 (February, 1955), 694. For a more sympathetic appraisal of SCAD see, Frieda Wundelich, "New York's Anti-Discrimination Law," *Social Research* 17 (June, 1950): 219–47.

57. For increasing pressure on the ILA to end discrimination on the waterfront in this period see, *New York Amsterdam News*, October, 1958, 29; *New York Amsterdam News*, November 22, 1958, 1 & 11; *New York Amsterdam News*, May 2, 1959; *New York World Telegram*, Jan-

uary 30, 1959, 4; *New York World Telegram*, February 4, 1959, 3; *New York World Telegram*, February 5, 1959, 4.

58. *New York Times*, March 26, 1959.

59. *New York Times*, June 23, 1959, 1 & 20.

60. *New York Times*, June 23, 1959, 1 & 20.

61. “Agreement made this 25th day of June, 1959 by and between Local 968 and Local 1814,” *James Haughton Papers*, Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture, New York Public Library, Box 3, Folder 12; *New York Times*, June 28, 1959, 52.

62. *New York Amsterdam News*, July 4, 1959, 2; *Pittsburgh Courier*, July 11, 1959, 3.

63. *New York Times*, June 28, 1959, 52.

64. The AFL-CIO did not give the ILA a complete bill of health, only that it enjoyed “substantial compliance with the directives of the AFL.” “Report and Recommendations of AFL-CIO Executive Council Committee Respecting Application of the International Longshoremen’s Association (Independent) for Affiliation with the AFL-CIO,” *Philip Taft Papers*, Kheel Archive, Cornell, Series 5541, Box 8.

65. *New York Amsterdam News*, October 3, 1959, 10.

66. *Pittsburgh Courier*, October 14, 1959, 3.

67. Letter to George Meany, president AFL-CIO, from A. Philip Randolph, vice-president, AFL-CIO, October 9, 1961, *James Haughton Papers*, Schomburg Center for Research Black Culture, Box 3; *New York Amsterdam News*, October 7, 1961, 30.

68. “Minutes of Meeting, Longshore Committee for Equal Opportunity,” August 26, 1962, *James Haughton Papers*, Schomburg Center for Research Black Culture, Box 3.