WARTIME ECONOMIES AND THE MOBILIZATION OF LABOR

World War Two and Labor: A Lost Cause?

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What is America but millionaires, beauty queens, stupid records, and Hollywood?
Adolf Hitler

The war will be won by industrial production.
Joseph Stalin

War is father of all and king of all; and some he made gods and some men, some slaves and some free.
Heraclitus

Abstract

Recent interpretations of World War Two have stressed the decisive role of economics in the success of the Allies and especially in the failure of the Axis. Yet the place of labor in the war remains under-appreciated. ILWCH commissioned several essays for a special issue on wartime labor mobilization, forced and free. This introduction briefly compares Nazi Germany, Japan, the Soviet Union, and the United States, and highlights the implications of the differing wartime labor regimes for the postwar period.

Even though “we are still discovering the meaning of World War II,” according to the editor of a handy anthology, the war can already be called the “crucible for the contemporary world”—although evidently not when it comes to labor, which receives little more than a paragraph coverage.1 Similarly, the older, still very useful volume by Gordon Wright, which like most overviews is limited to Europe, contains breakthrough chapters on various dimensions of the war from the psychological to the scientific, but almost nothing on labor.2 Gerhard Weinberg’s effort to encompass World War Two globally, a book that reflects more recent scholarship, has a chapter surveying the home front, but it, too, has little to
say about labor. Unlike weapons systems and intelligence, foreign occupation and mass murder, collaboration and resistance, decolonization and the onset of the Cold War, labor has been mostly an afterthought, mentioned, if at all, in discussions of trade unions or the war’s social “impact.” Even the International Labor Organization (ILO)—preoccupied during the war with its own survival and afterwards with the welfare state—failed to investigate labor as an active force in World War Two.

Labor’s virtual absence from war accounts cannot be justified on analytical grounds. At first, military strategy and weaponry may have seemed decisive, as the Axis military failures, combined with the strong will to resist in Moscow, London, and Washington, transformed the war into a long-term battle of economic mobilization. “Superior military qualities came to count for less than superior GDP [gross domestic product] and population numbers,” writes Mark Harrison. “Ultimately, economics determined the outcome.” Harrison stresses the overall level of development and GDP per capita, rather than just size or resources. Others, countering the sense of inevitability that comes with hindsight, have stressed the extraordinary adaptive powers of the Allies, their organizational achievements, and their military might. After all, to defeat the colossal Nazi land army and the Japanese combined sea and land forces required vast mechanized armies and advanced tactics. Yet behind that effective fighting power stood highly productive economies and armies of skilled and semiskilled laborers. Tens of millions of soldiers fought at the front; scores of millions worked long hours at factories, mines, railroads, and farms.

One guise in which labor’s wartime role has received considerable attention is female factory work, studied either through the propagandist invention Rosie the Riveter—“protecting Charlie,” her boyfriend, by “working overtime on the riveting machine”—or through a broad set of gender issues. Another area of great interest has been forced labor, such as the so-called comfort women pressed into sexual service by the Japanese. Even more attention has been focused on forced labor under the Nazis, a topic that grew out of everyday life studies of the German working class that probed its relationship to the regime and racism. In 1985, Ulrich Herbert’s magisterial study of foreign forced laborers radically expanded and redefined the problem of workers under the Nazis. Its appearance in translation inspired the editors at ILWCH to devote a special issue to World War Two and labor mobilization. We commissioned five papers, including one by Herbert, to cover Nazi Germany, Japan, the Soviet Union, the United States, and the British colonial empire. Four are printed below. Even without coverage of Britain, its colonies and the dominions, these essays present a survey of wartime labor regimes and their postwar consequences.

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Ulrich Herbert reprises his argument that the Nazi wartime economy would have collapsed by 1942 at the latest without large numbers of foreign workers, who were forced into Germany from the occupied lands. More than twelve mil-
lion foreign laborers were brought to Germany over the course of the war. The monthly peak—close to eight million people, including nearly two million prisoners of war (POWs)—was reached in August 1944, when one-quarter of the work force inside Germany was non-German (one-third of which was in armaments). These workers were not allowed to leave of their own accord, received lower wages (or none at all), and lived in conditions more deprived than the German population, which was subject to a labor draft rather than forced labor. Herbert includes here a discussion of Jews outside Germany who were forced to work at concentration camps, and examines the postwar problem of compensation, which after 1989 entered a new phase such that an agreement seems within reach. His work has been particularly important because it addresses the reactions (or as he argues, the nonreactions) of Germans to the masses of foreign forced laborers who lived in their midst. One wonders about the postwar period and the extent to which West German firms and their successors have hired, in Germany or abroad, non-German wage laborers and what the social consequences have been, if any.

For the Nazi regime, the use of mass forced foreign labor may seem logical, and so it was. But Herbert has argued that prior to launching World War Two, the Nazi authorities did not plan for the use of foreign labor on any scale. The concept of *Blitzkrieg* (lightning war) presupposed a brief war after which conscripted German workers would be returned to factories. When wartime labor demand exceeded supply, the regime, rejecting the option of mobilizing more women to work outside the home, reluctantly began to move workers from Poland, then France, and finally the Soviet Union into the Reich despite deep fears of racial contamination. More than half of the Polish and Soviet workers were women, who were thought to pose a special threat to racial purity. Herbert notes that no one has uncovered a single large firm that failed to take advantage of foreign forced labor during the war, adding that the initiative came from the firms (in some cases, foreign forced laborers comprised half their work force). What Herbert’s essay does not discuss, but what he shows in his book, is that in 1945 surviving foreign forced laborers suddenly became displaced persons. They formed part of the great flux that clogged roads in all directions, and became associated in the West German imagination with marauding and criminality. In the German Democratic Republic (GDR), historians began in the late 1950s to study foreign forced laborers, especially those from Poland and the Soviet Union, as Nazi victims.

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Japan’s Pacific war was also dependent upon foreign labor, most of it coerced. W. Donald Smith observes that nearly fifteen million Asians worked for long or short periods directly for the Japanese war effort, inside and outside Japan. Japanese civilians were also conscripted into labor, especially as the war progressed, but for their own people the government and industry tended to rely on incentives, patriotic appeals, and “reallocations.” Smith focuses on the approximately 700,000 Koreans who, along with 40,000 Chinese and others, were
shipped to Japan, many for work in mines (which supplied most of wartime Japan’s energy). Another 365,000 Koreans were conscripted either as soldiers or as civilian laborers for the Japanese military outside either Korea or Japan proper, while up to 200,000 young women, most but not all from Korea, were mobilized through coercion or deception as “comfort women.” Up to four million Koreans were drafted for work in their own country for various lengths of time. About ten million Javanese were conscripted for seasonal agricultural work or limited-period reclamation projects. Some 200,000 Javanese as well as tens of thousands of other Southeast Asians were dispatched elsewhere around the “East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere” to build supply routes, grow rubber and sugar, drill oil, clear forests, and drain swamps. Probably the most visible and extensive use of forced labor was on the Thai-Burma railroad. Smith, emphasizing that millions of uprooted Asians were separated from their families, died, or were disabled for life, argues that their efforts were largely wasted. He also details how in the postwar period their plight has been denied or ignored by the culpable Japanese authorities and companies. To his picture we could add that in Korea as in much of the rest of Asia, the descendants of wartime forced laborers have often worked for Japanese owned or financed companies.

Smith’s rightfully indignant picture of Koreans’ place in the Japanese wartime economy can be further complicated. Carter Eckert, for example, has observed that the Korean companies eagerly cooperated with the Japanese colonial administration set up in Manchuria after 1932, and that the full-scale invasion of China from 1937 provided a second and even greater boost to Korean industrialization. The industrial labor force expanded and skill levels rose. Despite the discrimination of the colonial regime, exigencies of war forced the development of tens of thousands of Korean technicians, Korean entrepreneurs, and white-collar employees. Koreans were adept at the imperial language, Eckert explains, and whatever their own motivations, they proved indispensable to their Japanese masters throughout the empire, including in Japan itself, where Koreans worked not only in dangerous mines but in skilled positions vacated by Japanese who were conscripted into the army. The war “reshaped Korea’s economy and society,” Eckert concludes. Of course, Koreans would have preferred to undergo this transformation without Japanese colonialism, from which the country suffered enormous damage.

Not every scholar feels comfortable with Eckert’s commonsensical project. But to attempt an Eckert-like analysis of “modernization” alongside devastation—in colonies that Japan also controlled before the war—might raise even greater moral outrage if tried for an area that fell under Nazi domination (e.g., France or Czechoslovakia). In fact, scholars on Japan, reacting to the war crimes trial, have since the 1950s sought to distinguish wartime Japan from Nazi Germany. They have pointed to the wartime election under Prime Minister Hideki Tojo of independent candidates to the Diet, or simply to the continued functioning of the Diet. Even historians who have noted the efforts of Japanese bureaucrats to study and adapt Nazi practices and institutions, such as the German Labor Front, usually conclude that the Japanese imitations failed.
Wartime Japan certainly was not Nazi Germany, if only because it never descended into complete “autocratic chaos.” But in Japan as in Germany, foreign labor became necessary because of the grandiose scale of the war effort, and because Japanese officials, like their German counterparts, were reluctant to remove significantly more Japanese women from the home. Toward the end of the war, the government shortened the school year to release pupils and university students for work, but their contribution was limited. Instead, it was foreign labor, much of it slave labor, that helped sustain the enormous Japanese wartime economy until its collapse in 1945.

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The Soviet Gulag of prisons and labor colonies, on the eve of the Nazi invasion, held some 3.5 million inmates, including about a million exiles living not in camps, but in remote yet usually unguarded special labor settlements. Another 1.2 million people were serving sentences of forced labor without deprivation of freedom, meaning that they remained at their place of employment with reduced wages. But, as Steven Barnes notes in his essay, during the first years of the war the Gulag population declined by at least half, owing to higher mortality, fewer arrests, and more releases (often into the army). Not until 1944 did the Soviet Union’s forced labor population again grow, as a result of the deportation of entire nationalities to special labor settlements and the founding of new camps for POWs and the repatriated. Barnes makes clear that the Gulag did make a major contribution to the war effort in manpower for munitions and other factories, construction work, and many other tasks. It also served as what Barnes calls a pillar of the Soviet system, a source of intimidation and severe punishment. Yet what is perhaps no less striking in Barnes’s multisided account are the extensive resources expended to maintain the Gulag and to recreate Soviet values inside it. Soviet forced labor was never merely an economic pursuit.

The fact that in the motherland of forced labor, World War Two brought a notable decline in the size and economic role of the Gulag—to just 1.9 percent of GDP for 1941–1943 by the Gulag’s own (possibly inflated) estimates—seems a great irony. This decline took place, moreover, alongside a massive loss of productive territory and people. Only one year into the war, the working population of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) shrank from eighty-five million to fifty-three million. To survive into 1942, the country immediately needed at least thirteen million new workers and soldiers. Yet, whereas in Britain and the United States there was still mass unemployment when the war began, in the Soviet Union, as in the German economy, there was something approaching full employment before hostilities. Moreover, Soviet women, who made up around forty percent of the work force, were already comparatively well represented in the work force outside the home. For these and other reasons, John Barber and Mark Harrison have argued that of the many constraints on the Soviet war effort—capital assets, strategic materials, engineering and managerial skills—the one that stood out as “the ultimate bottleneck limiting the capacity to make war” was labor.
Some gains could be achieved by enforcing longer hours and by campaigns attacking waste, turnover, or idle time. But the main method was to recruit millions more women to work outside the home, hundreds of thousands of school children fifteen years old or younger, and tens of thousands of university students, pensioners, and veterans to the work force. Barber and Harrison enjoin us “to picture the typical Soviet workplace collective in wartime as schoolchildren, grandparents, mothers and aunts.” That was especially true of rural employment, which lost almost its entire adult male population to the front or to industry. Strategic factories and railways, by contrast, held on to most of their skilled male personnel. The new war workers, like the new soldiers, came chiefly from among people already employed in other areas of the economy. Wartime employment in civilian goods and services declined by sixty percent. Workers were redeployed and retrained, bootstrapping skills in modern industries. Mass training for industry, as much as front-line combat, stamped the memories of the war generation, although as the front moved workers often took up rifles or spades.18 The Gulag, too, “loaned” many of its remaining inmates to the war economy.

Large swaths of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union—the latter technically a victor—were leveled during the war. No battles were fought on American soil, but the United States experienced an upheaval all the same. Fifteen million Americans underwent military training, and three-quarters of them spent time overseas. Another fifteen million moved within the United States, including eight million who moved permanently to different states. “As if an entire continent had been tilted westward,” writes David Kennedy, “people spilled out of the South and the Great Plains into the Pacific coastal states, especially California.”19 Between 1940 and 1944, the US labor force increased by an astounding seventeen million people.20 Sources of the new labor varied. Feeling a labor shortage in 1942, American authorities contracted with the Mexican government for nearly a quarter million manual laborers or braceros. More than three million native-born Americans or immigrants came of working age during the war, while another 7.5 million who would not normally have sought work found employment, including women, teenagers, rural migrants, and Dust Bowl refugees. Civilian consumption rose. Coming after the Great Depression, the war years must have seemed a consumer paradise. Among all other belligerents, consumption shrank by at least one-fifth.21

Nelson Lichtenstein’s semiconfessional essay explores, in the context of World War Two’s effects, the thirty-year historiography on the fate of labor organizing and New Left politics. He notes that despite greater state and corporate coercion during the war, resistance to unionization declined substantially and that the government’s War Labor Board implemented much of the prewar union agenda. Business interests, however, hesitated to embrace wartime corporatism, which meant accepting the New Deal, whose proponents had been on
the defensive since 1938. Lichtenstein sees, therefore, a leftward drift among increasingly organized labor wielding the power of wartime demand, paralleled by a rightward shift among policymakers and corporations pursuing depoliticization. Corporatist structures in a few industries—trucking, railroads, airlines—did not signify a wartime corporatist settlement, the absence of which could not, therefore, have provided a basis for a postwar social compact. Rather, during World War Two boom times, business strengthened its position, while the labor movement became, as Alan Brinkley has argued, “a ward of the state.”

Lichtenstein’s self-critical argument about class politics and the state during World War Two is, then, a response to the debates—to which he has contributed elsewhere—on the rise and fall of the New Deal order.

In a dialogue with Gary Gerstle, Lichtenstein touches on the far-reaching effects of “wartime patriotism” (nationalism). The war, he notes, acknowledging Gerstle, placed far higher social value on factory labor, which became work in the “Arsenal of Democracy.” Ethnic distinctions among workers, the bane of organizers for decades, were celebrated as the pluralist basis of American strength, and this seemed to have some effect on worker self-perceptions. Wartime full employment and rising wages were also matters of pride—and more than that. African-American visibility and aspirations expanded, and partly in response whites became “ethnics,” with a sense of entitlement and a political agenda. The army became first a lightning rod and then a vehicle for desegregation. Women received greater public attention, even if the messages were often mixed. Lichtenstein, alluding to these and other insights on the social history of the war, appears to be directing research away from a laborist identity or union-dominated agenda toward questions of citizenship, national identity, gender, and possibly consumerism. But in conclusion he upholds the “syndicalist” militancy of “rebels” outside the wartime corporatist game who supposedly kept alive the “labor question.”

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Germany and Japan, as Alan Milward, has explained, pursued wartime strategies predicated on economies of occupation. Conquest, it was thought, could be profitable, and not just in the short term. For the Germans, that proved true with France, whose “yield” was substantial, and Czechoslovakia. Farther east, however, where Germany’s bonanza supposedly lay, the more strongly racialist occupation proved an economic disaster. The Japanese, unlike the Germans, never came to control developed economies or to exert the same degree of control over the countries they occupied. Korea was the only country within the “Co-Prosperity Sphere” whose industrial output exceeded five percent of Japan’s. True, the occupied territories supplied otherwise unavailable strategic raw materials, but this was far from a model of sustained economic growth that could feed Japanese interests over the longer term. The Co-Prosperity Sphere, like the Grossraumwirtschaft, became a means for ad hoc plunder and acquisition of forced laborers, allowing greater mobilization of Germans and Japanese for the
military. Built upon occupation regimes and forced foreign labor, these economies were defeated and discredited.

The United States, which had a tiny defense industry in 1941, by 1942 already produced more military equipment than all the Axis states combined. Henry Ford's Willow Run Factory, ground for which was broken in March 1941, opened in 1942 and by 1944 was turning out B-24 “Liberators,” with 1.5 million parts, at the rate of one bomber per hour. The Ford Motor Company alone produced more military goods during the war than Italy. During the war, American workers worked longer hours, especially in munitions factories. Productivity per worker was much higher, owing to scientific advance, improvements in plant layout, and further mastery of assembly lines. Output per hour of American workers was double that of Germany and five times that of Japan. As the likelihood of victory became more apparent, labor leaders tried to claim worker credit for wartime production. But the doubling of American GDP between 1938 and 1944 has most often been seen as an achievement of American business and American civilization, particularly American-style mass production and a private-sector-dominated economy built around “free trade.” The world's preeminent economic power oversaw an occupation that gave way to the postwar “economic miracles” of Germany and Japan, both of which eventually regained a major economic role in territories they had occupied during the war. Compensation claims have now hit US companies, whose foreign subsidiaries profited from wartime forced labor.

The Soviet Union surprised everyone, including its own leaders, with its muscular wartime economy, which made use of significant forced labor, although less than had been characteristic of the prewar economy. In 1942, at a time when the Soviet Union had lost approximately half its prewar industrial base, Soviet workers managed to produce more weapons than they had the previous year, and more than Germany in 1942. That stunning result followed a chaotic evacuation and resettlement of more than 1,500 enterprises, mostly steel and engineering plants, and some sixteen million people, many skilled laborers, from areas subject to Nazi invasion. In 1943, Germany, beset by Allied bombing and pursuing technological perfection, turned 340 million tons of coal and thirty million tons of steel into 17,000 tanks and 27,000 heavy guns. That same year the Soviet Union, freed up in some areas by Lend-Lease and focusing on scale and quantity, turned ninety million tons of coal and eight million tons of steel into 24,000 comparable tanks and 48,000 big guns. “The Soviet economy,” Richard Overy has concluded, “outproduced the German economy throughout the war from a resource base a good deal smaller and with a work force far less skilled” while its workers consumed less food. Primary credit for that collective feat of production, no less impressive than Stalingrad, was assigned not to workers but to the Communist party and central planning. Reconstruction of the country, which had lost much of its able-bodied male population, required exertion and sacrifices on a par with the war effort. The postwar Gulag, which absorbed large numbers of German and Japanese POWs as well as returning Soviet POWs and displaced persons, substantially surpassed its prewar total of forced laborers.
To some extent, the sharp contrasts between these four wartime economies can be understood by looking backwards. Nazi Germany entered the war with an already overheated economy, and many Nazi officials could not imagine further development without plundering their neighbors. Japan, in confronting the Depression, discovered the apparent benefits of drawing upon its political control over the economies of Korea, Taiwan, and Manchukuo (Manchuria). For the Axis, therefore, the war extended patterns begun in the early 1930s. The influence of the 1930s, in different ways, also can be seen among the Allies. The United States, whose experience of the Great Depression was especially shattering, entered World War Two with vast unused capacities, especially of labor, such that the war became a belated answer to the Depression. The Soviet Union, which bypassed the Great Depression, suffered nearly overwhelming economic losses early in the war, but the conversion of 1930s internal mobilization to a war footing, difficult as it was, took advantage of learned prewar behavior. Yet the Soviet experience during the war seems the most difficult to explain. Forced labor was extensive, but not decisive. The absence of private property and the practice of planning, replete with colossal waste and often brutal inefficiency, made many coordinating tasks easier but should not be viewed as a panacea. Perhaps the Soviet Union showcases best what are the generally under-appreciated international achievements and sacrifices of workers at war.

Germany and Japan proved to be superlative fighting machines—cohesion was remarkable in their armies to the bitter end. But they were comparatively less impressive as war economies, perhaps because the same racial nationalism which underpinned military solidarity constrained their ability to appeal to, and therefore exploit, labor and other economic resources. The Soviet Union and, to a far lesser extent, the United States, competed successfully on the battlefield, but their greater relative strength was in long-haul wartime production. Part of the Allies’ success derived from cooperation and even the partial integration of two very different kinds of economies. Part of that success also derived from the ways the United States and the Soviet Union defined and used “labor power.” Their valuations of labor, including female labor—for all the fundamental political differences between the two systems—probably had more in common with each other than with the understandings operative in Germany and Japan. But these remarks cannot be taken as much more than preliminary given the lack of serious comparative investigation. Much work needs to be done to analyze the story of wartime labor, forced and contractual, and its fundamental role in shaping military outcomes and the postwar world.

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NOTES


2. Gordon Wright, *The Ordeal of Total War, 1939–1945* (New York, 1968). The index has no entry for labor or work.


25. Alvin Hansen et al., eds., The United States After War (Ithaca, 1945), 72–73.
