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CARFAX

The Tanzanian peasant and Ujamaa: a study in contradictions

NANCY SPALDING

Tanzania, more than most countries, has been shaped by the vision of one man, the country's first President, Julius Nyerere. He is revered and respected there and abroad for his intelligence, his integrity and his devotion to his people. He was unusual among African leaders, and personal respect has persisted since he left office. However, Tanzania has made little economic progress since independence, many of Nyerere's policies were failures, and the country is still desperately poor, despite high levels of aid. It has been suggested that 'never was there a more noble social experiment, and never was there a more miserable failure.'[1] Nyerere's programme stemmed from his specific vision of what Tanzania could and should become, which was based in part on his perception of the nature of pre-colonial Tanzanian society. Did his vision reflect Tanzanian society and historical reality? What was the political culture of Tanzania, and how did it fit with Nyerere's policy agenda? How much can or should political agendas and rhetoric be measured against historical reality? I will use culture theory, as developed by Mary Douglas,[2] to address these questions. While Tanzania's failure has been analysed extensively, culture theory provides a new way of seeing the data which can add to an understanding of the cultural bases of policies and of policy failures. Cultural analysis suggests that, while ways of life varied, many Tanzanian communities were quite individualist, relatively unconstrained by prescriptions, and equality of condition seems to have been the result of the limits imposed by technology, environment and the vagaries of subsistence agriculture rather than a philosophical preference.

The social forms of pre-colonial Tanzania

Tanzania is ethnically varied and fractionalised, without dominant groups. Little can be said in an overarching manner concerning the pre-colonial social and political forms in the area which comprises present day Tanzania, except that there has been little tradition of centralised rule or authority, even in the more hierarchical systems.[3] Overall, the economy was predominantly subsistence, with wide variation in rainfall and land productivity. The family was the primary focus of loyalty and economic activity.[4] Social forms varied widely, as did local geographical and climatic conditions. Even the more hierarchical societies (eg Wahaya and Wachagga) had numerous cross-cutting cleavages, reducing leaders' ability to command obedience.

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Material Context

The subsistence economy was based on rain-fed agriculture, characterised by small scale production using family labour and rudimentary technology—which was simple, including hoes and digging sticks—with no draft animals.[5] Erratic rainfall and the possibility of famine led to a variety of adaptations, based on local conditions, and different crops would be grown to ensure that some crops would survive in case the rains failed. In addition to subsistence agriculture, there were crafts (often with regional specialties), providing a basis for economic specialisation and regional trade. Pastoral peoples who ranged across the territory added to the economic and cultural variety. Tanzanian peoples were not isolated, or in a state of tribal war; especially in the well watered eastern highlands, there were lively exchanges between contrasting environments and cultures, and antagonism coexisted with lively exchanges of goods. The Swahili language and culture also facilitated exchange. The language began as a coastal language and became a lingua franca, lowering barriers to travel, interaction and trade, and eventually facilitating nationalist organisation.[6]

The varieties of pre-colonial political organisation ranged from complete statelessness to chiefdoms. Tanzania was a colonising society.[7] Until recently, land had been freely available for the effort of clearing it. Groups and individuals could independently begin or join new communities, suggesting limited control over members, or a viable 'exit' option. In these colonising efforts, survival depended on individual effort as well as cooperation.[8]

The east consisted of well-watered, fertile, cool, densely populated highlands alternating with dryer, warmer lowlands. These communities had minimal tribal or ethnic identity, in part because of the dynamic interactions, movements and colonising activities; people identified themselves with their geographical location (eg from the hills, or the lowlands) rather than with any ethnic group.[9] There were highly articulated political systems, fairly well organised to resist incursions from the plains. Varying authority systems facilitated interactions and arbitrated disputes among the mix of peoples with different customs.

The west was a more undifferentiated plateau, with low population density and small political units. Chiefs were often ritual, with minimal executive or judicial power,[10] power being vested in councils. However, there was a variety of social forms, including states such as the Fipa.[11]

The 19th century brought with it tremendous economic and social shocks, which accelerated social and economic change. The major changes were the rise of commerce between the coast and the interior, the invasions of the Ngoni from southern Africa, and the shift from traditional, religious or ritual bases to military bases for rule.[12] Intense social disruption, dynamic economic changes and greater attempts to centralise governments resulted.

Materialist explanations spring easily from the preceding discussion; peculiarities of geography, the requirements of rain-fed subsistence agriculture, diffusion, or migration patterns might have created a need for certain social forms.[13] These explanations are logical and certainly important, but inadequate. If we could demonstrate that each rain-fed subsistence agriculture system developed similar social structures, then an agriculturally or climate determined explanation

would be sufficient. That is clearly not the case. Even the migration does not explain varied social forms, except insofar as the original migrants who populated eastern Africa brought with them their own social forms.[14] Once the broader migrations had ended, migration and colonisation were choices made within specific ways of life and social structures. While shifting cultivation and poor soils led to migration, they did not require it; migration was a social choice, not a necessity of the environment, or inevitable because of marginal land. Though these material influences or variables were important, I argue that they interacted with cultural factors, and that cultural factors are fundamental determinants of the varied forms that societies take, even within similar environments. These cultural factors are the focus of this study.

Culture theory

Culture theory suggests that preferences (eg for policies, goals) are consistent, and stem from a way of life which is a congruent combination of social relationships with the values which reinforce, reproduce and explain those relationships.[15] A coherent way of life requires that the people's belief system and social relations support each other, so a way of life is morally coherent and internally consistent, with a world-view which outlines morality, the good life, and the good society. 'These distinctive ways of life have systematic frames of reference for interpreting similar facts and moral issues in different ways,'[16] so the meaning of behaviours, values and events will vary across cultures, as will perception of problems, risks and threats. Adherents believe that theirs is the correct way to see the world, not a matter of convenience or ideology. Therefore, culture is not easily malleable.[17]

Culture theory organises and explains varied social constructions of reality, making them comparable and comprehensible across societies and contexts. This model can be used to understand societies, and learn something useful concerning their functions and the natures of their cultures quickly and comparatively. Geertz's 'thick description' is valuable but 'a methodology which requires its users to be brilliantly perspicacious was not a method that had much to recommend it to most of the rest of us'.[18] Collection of ethnographic data is a long, slow meticulous process, beset by many obstacles, and these data are often not used for any analytical purpose beyond that of the original researcher. While this process provides essential data, is there a way to use those data more fully? Furthermore, 'can one learn something useful about cultures more quickly?'[19] For policy analysis and development planning, models which can provide readily usable and sound indications of social realities, based on available ethnographic and historical data, would be beneficial.

Culture theory categorises ways of life along two dimensions, as shown in Figure 1: 'the extent to which the individual is incorporated into bounded units' (or 'group'), and 'the degree to which an individual's life is circumscribed by externally imposed prescriptions. The more binding and extensive the scope of the prescriptions, the less of life that is open to individual negotiation' (or 'grid').[20] High group suggests strong inclusion into groups which sustain the individual's life and provide purpose and identity; low group suggests weak

		Group	
		Low	High
Grid	High	FATALISM/ DESPOTISM	HIERARCHY
	Low	INDIVIDUALISM	EGALITARIANISM

FIGURE 1. Dimensions of group and grid categories.

boundaries or exclusion from group membership, so life is not defined by strong group ties and supports. High grid is heavily prescribed or regulated; low grid suggests few external prescriptions, so the individual self-prescribes behaviour.

There are four viable ways of life based on these dimensions: hierarchy (high grid/high group) supports order against social deviance; egalitarian (high group/ low grid) pursues equality and opposes stratification and authority; individualist (low grid/low group) fits into the Rational Choice model, and pursues freedom through competition and individual achievement; fatalism/despotism (high grid/ low group) which is heavily prescribed and excludes the majority from decision making; its adherents see life as a lottery, unpredictable and uncontrollable. These ways of life have analogues in other social sciences; anthropology's 'acephalous' societies might fall into either the individualist or the egalitarian category, since their essence is low grid, or few rules and prescriptions. Weber's legal–rational category is reflected in hierarchy, which would include elitist, monarchical, caste and 'authoritarian' societies, where rules distinguish between behaviour appropriate to different members, based on position and role. It also fits many definitions of 'traditional' society and attitudes. Generally, traditional societies are high group, thus maintaining high boundaries and rejecting outside influences. Of the low group ways of life, modern or market society is predominantly individualist. Individualism can also include 'charismatic' societies, because of the development of networks of followers based on personal ability and qualities. Fatalism/despotism corresponds to the society described in Banfield's *Moral Basis of a Backward Society*,[21] as well as those in some US inner city environments, communism in crisis,[22] and possibly societies in collapse, such as in Russia or Liberia, where people believe (often with reason) that they have no control over their lives and situations, and that their leaders do not consider their interests or preferences, so they are not part of a 'group'. People in each way of life will behave and think in such a way that they reproduce their way of life, and there are certain beliefs and actions which are uniquely compatible with each way of life.

Each way of life provides its adherents with a coherent world view which explains the world for them. Each interprets the same facts and events differently, and would have a different definition of justice and the good society. A hierarchical way of life would see a stratified and ordered society as just, each person doing the work and receiving the rewards appropriate to his/her

station. This Platonic ideal contrasts with the egalitarian view of justice as removal of differences in status and wealth, all of which are illegitimate. Individualists would see a just society as one in which each individual is free to pursue happiness (individually defined, usually as wealth or status) according to his/her ability and ambition. The fatalist does not believe that a just society exists, since he/she believes that life is random and arbitrary, and that rulers make decisions without concern for their interests. These views of justice are fundamentally contradictory, based on different values and assumptions, and people in one way of life will not view other systems as just or fair.

Equality is an issue for discussion of Tanzanian policies and African socialism, but each way of life views it differently. The egalitarian concept reflects the socialist ideal, equality of outcome or condition. Individualists would see that as unjust, denying people the fruits of their labour and diminishing the incentive to work.[23] They value equality of opportunity, reduction of legal/structural barriers to personal enterprise. Hierarchists do not value equality, because people are not equal, and democracy leaves them wandering about without direction or purpose. Fatalists define themselves as victims, unable to control their lives, so equality is irrelevant to them. These real cultural differences affect the kind of society which adherents of each way of life will choose and build, and they affect evaluation of institutions and policies.

A society is not culturally uniform or monolithic. Different ways of life coexist within a society and interact with each other, defining themselves in opposition to the practices and values of the others.[24] However, societies do have dominant configurations which will explain social organisation and policies.[25] The qualities of Tanzanian society which I have described above suggest an individualist political culture, mediated by hierarchical tendencies in some communities, and in family relations. Even when ethnographers use the term egalitarian to refer to some practices, the practices are generally identifiable as individualist rather than egalitarian, and even hierarchical communities have underlying individualist tendencies. However, ways of life and cultural configurations are likely to vary across ethnic groups, so I will expect variance, not simply in surface practices, but in ways of life. Tanzania is a dynamically heterogeneous and ethnically fractionalised society, and I expect culture to reflect that.

Essential characteristics of Tanzanian society

Generalisations concerning the diverse forms of Tanzanian social and economic organisation are uncertain. However, generally organisation and political authority was based on personal relationships, especially through family and clans. Personalisation, together with the family focus of subsistence agriculture, meant that political power was mediated by cross-cutting loyalties and relationships:

> Even in the most highly organized regions the extent of specifically political authority must not be exaggerated. African states were webs of relationships which grew steadily weaker with distance from the capital until they merged into the statelessness of peripheral peoples … Men still had many loyalties: to nuclear

> family, extended family, descent group, clan, village, patron, chiefdom, perhaps even tribe. One was relevant in one situation, another in another … the societies of 1800 were in the midst of the dynamic, autochthonous change which came from the mingling of diverse colonists.[26]

Several overarching characteristics of the pre-colonial Tanzanian society have been widely observed, which I will discuss in turn:[27] Non-centralization and relative absence of strong authority and control; family as the unit of decision; autonomous, diverse, interacting communities. These qualities are interdependent and seemed to characterise the many varied kinds of social and political organisation to some degree.

Non-centralisation

Non-centralisation suggests the absence of a central authority which makes binding decisions on distant groups, and enforces them, whether by force or legitimate acceptance, or delegation to other authorities (as opposed to a ritual or symbolic government which has little influence on local policies). The Pare and Usambara, which attempted genuinely centralised states would be exceptions. Many groups were essentially stateless, such as the Iraqw, the Ndendeuli and the Makonde, and any organisation was at village level. Coordination between and even within villages was often *ad hoc*.[28] The states often had internal cleavages and alternate sources of legitimacy and organisation, especially in lineage and clan. Material factors such as distance, as in the case of many western chiefdoms such as the Fipa, reduced further the ability of leaders to command, and the willingness of people to follow. However, material explanations such as distance, agriculture or technology are inadequate to explain the extent of non-centralised decision making, which often extended into the village, across levels of organisation. While centralisation was attempted by military contenders for power in the 19th century, and was imposed later by the colonial powers, it had uncertain effectiveness, whether for material or cultural reasons.

Family

The family was generally the fundamental unit of decision making, as well as of economic production. Families were fairly autonomous in many decisions, and often were free to leave one village or area and move to another to seek unused land and economic opportunity, or to flee from quarrels and personality conflicts. While in some groups, lives were highly prescribed, there usually seems to have been freedom to exit and colonise elsewhere.

Autonomous, diverse communities

Communities were not isolated from each other; there were high levels of interaction, from migration and colonisation, and from trade in regionally specialised crops and crafts. Therefore, a community's coercive ability was

limited, since other options were readily available. Communities generally had internal approaches to problems and conflicts, and would have freedom to determine survival and growth strategies. Chieftainships were relatively independent. Even where there were complex systems of chiefs and subchiefs, their jurisdiction might be limited to specific kinds of conflicts (especially inter-community conflicts), with the expectation that the community or individuals involved should resolve conflicts peacefully. Community autonomy is also indicated by the lack of central coercive power, or taxes and tribute to transfer wealth to the centre. Tanzania was composed of dozens of different groups, each with its own form of social and economic organisation, distinct from its neighbours but interacting.[29]

The picture presented above suggests that pre-colonial Tanzania was composed of a loose collection of interacting and intermingling (especially through the extensive Swahili culture and language) but autonomous communities, which contained little strong authority and left great scope for individual and family action, within the parameters of a subsistence economy. This generalised view suggests individualistic cultural tendencies. I argue that these qualities are present even in hierarchically organised societies, as well as in the more informal and stateless societies, and that they help to explain post-independence peasant behaviour. If these are indeed the qualities which can be associated with the Tanzanian culture, there are major implications for Tanzanian policy and political life. I argue that the Tanzanian culture was incompatible with *Ujamaa* and Tanzanian socialism. Below, I will discuss the cultural bases of these policies in President Nyerere's writings.

Independent Tanzania: Nyerere's conception of the peasantry and *Ujamaa*

Julius Nyerere was a charismatic leader of the nationalist movement, and president of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). He became Tanzania's first Prime Minister, then President, and was the major philosopher and architect of independent Tanzania's development policy. He was known for his personal integrity, magnetism, popularity, and his selfless devotion to the good of the nation as he saw it; stories reflecting this character are widespread and unquestioned. Early independent government programmes were based on and justified by Nyerere's socialist commitment. He wrote and spoke extensively of his moral commitment to equality and community, which he based on the nature of the pre-colonial indigenous Tanzanian social structure, and so claimed was culturally appropriate. I have abstracted from his words to provide a tentative summary of his perception of the nature of African society. Did Nyerere's view of the nature of African or Tanzanian society reflect the cultural and historical reality of the area?[30]

Traditional society

One of the major themes in Nyerere's writings on African society was that of a community sharing available resources with all members:

> In African society … traditionally we lived as families, with individuals supporting each other and helping each other on terms of equality. We recognized that each of us had a place in the community, and this place carried with it rights to whatever food and shelter was available in return for the use of whatever abilities and energies we had. The old and the sick, or those whose crops had been destroyed by natural disasters, were not left alone in their suffering. Other people shared with them, and did so without any feeling on either side that this was "charity" from the better-off, or involved any loss of human dignity for the one who was (through no fault of his own) in need … The community was a unit in which every individual was important, and among which the goods available were shared without too great inequality.[31]

Traditional African society, as depicted above, is based on three major beliefs: first, an obligation to work and participate in society; second, a communal sharing of property when members were in need; and third, respect due each person for the role they played in the communal effort, even if it was a minor role.[32]

Nyerere frequently commented on the centrality of hard work to traditional life, and placed a high value on it, suggesting that rewards should be received for effort as well as need. However, communal ownership of property was also central; '… results of their joint effort were divided according to well-understood customs on the basis of the fact that every member of the family had to have enough to eat before any of them had any extra'. Furthermore, this communal ownership implied a kind of social security system: 'Nobody starved, either of food or of human dignity because he lacked personal wealth; he could depend on the wealth possessed by the community of which he was a member' even in a situation of no surplus. Land was also considered to be communal property, and the only individual rights to it were use rights, not sale or exchange. The fundamental values suggested by these principles were equality and participation, with no conflict between the interests of the individual and those of the community. Individualistic preferences for competition and individual advancement to achieve prosperity were seen as alien, capitalist exploitation, inculcated by the colonial government.[33]

Nyerere's policy was structured in accord with these communitarian ideals; Nyerere argued that hereditary aristocracy was a foreign import. With no hierarchical structures or hereditary rulers, the Tanzanian community had been governed democratically, as 'a society of equals and it conducted its business through discussion … they talk till they agree'.[34] Nyerere based his concept of democracy on this assumption concerning traditional Tanzanian government, and argued that 'our first step must be to reeducate ourselves; to regain our former attitude of mind'. However, traditional equality was not enough for a modern society, however valuable, since it was 'an equality of poverty, the cooperation was on small things'. His aim was to modernise the base which tradition had laid down and use it to meet modern goals.[35]

It is controversial to assert that Tanzania's cultural history is predominantly individualistic, especially in the context of President Nyerere's belief in an egalitarian pre-colonial history. Careful analysis of ethnographic studies is necessary to explore this issue. To pursue this question, and suggest whether it

is supported by more specific evidence, I will examine studies of the Makonde, Ndendeuli, and Shambala groups for evidence of their ways of life.[36] These studies explore historical practices, which, may not be followed today. However Nyerere based his policies on an "historical" Tanzania, and so I based my critique there as well. This is a preliminary survey, and these groups are not representative, but it should be suggestive.

Makonde

The Makonde peoples[37] are located in the southern coastal plateau area, where they migrated from Mozambique over a period of centuries. The plateau provided a basis for shifting agriculture and protection from enemies, by hiding in the impenetrable bush. Migration has continued to be a defining characteristic of Makonde social structure.[38]

The Makonde maintain two significant group memberships, kinship and village. However, these two ties are fairly weak in terms of prescription of behaviour and maintenance of group boundaries. Inheritance is matrilineal, so young men move from their family's home to their bride's, and often work under her family's authority. Separations, sometimes permanent, between the residence of a man and his family might result, weakening kinship ties. However the family did prescribe with respect to inheritance, religion and taboos, and it provided assistance in old age and emergency, so it had a stronger hold than the village. Villages were generally scattered settlements which exercised little authority, partly because of the presence of multiple lineages and the prevalence of flight and resettlement. Other networks also formed, meeting social, economic and political needs, especially through initiation rites and neighbourhoods.[39] These networks were independent of both village leader and lineage groups.

The office of 'leader' in a village was hereditary, based on descent from the first coloniser, but he had limited authority and few special privileges (virtually no coercive authority). The primary duties were spiritual, involving ancestor worship.[40] Another role which commonly fell to leaders was mediation of disputes and negotiation of settlements, if they had a reputation for wisdom and skill in mediation. Such skill was respected, since there was no universally accepted code of behaviour and no socially defined superior or neutral arbitrators. Respect based on wisdom was earned by the individual, not inherited.[41] The leader did not rule, and countervailing power bases existed.

Decisions were made collectively by interested parties, partly because of the many countervailing groups and loyalties within a small community.[42] The major countervailing authority lay in the elders of other family groups, who protected the interests of their groups. Disagreements including restitution, were negotiated, and advantage in negotiations often depended on who had the greatest force or influence available. Disruptive behaviour which threatened the harmony of the community was controlled through judicial settlements which sought compensation for injury rather than punishment of deviance.[43]

The main economic sanction available to the leadership was assignment of vacant land to new immigrants. However, that control was limited (after two years, new immigrants had equal rights with other residents), and there were no other economic sanctions. The climate and technology provided little potential

for accumulation of wealth. Taxes were minimal, and ritual tributes and gifts (including bride price) were tokens, reducing the transfer of wealth and hence the potential for economic coercion. In general, sanctions were almost non-existent, either aimed at non-members (recent immigrants) or stemming from negotiation. After all, sanctions are ineffective when the exit option is available and attractive.[44]

What were the primary characteristics of the Makonde discernible from Liebenow's study? Prescription was virtually absent. Each community had different practices. There were no universally accepted codes of behaviour, and rights or privileges were determined by negotiations which were influenced by the relative strength of the parties.[45] If local norms were unacceptable, an individual could leave. Leadership had little practical power, since it was not inheritable and had no sanctions. Ascribed status and roles were minimal.

Group membership was very loose; lineage was important, but only the most important of several loose ties, and the combination of marital practices and the propensity to migrate reduced the strength of the lineage group as a support system or definer of social identity. The Makonde were characterised by the formation of networks of relationships, based on different criteria (lineage, location and colonisation, interest, marriage, friendship, etc) and they functioned within these overlapping and cross-cutting webs,[46] rather than as members of ascribed groups. In addition, religion did not support either group cohesion or prescription of behavioural norms, since there was no centralised religious authority. Religion was based on ancestor worship, so each person or family unit could practise religion without outside interference or assistance. These qualities suggest a strongly individualistic way of life, characterised by personal freedom.

There are three major exceptions to this individualistic social structure, suggesting a hierarchical subculture. First, there was a 'castelike' relationship between the Makonde and more recent immigrants. This included some occupational specialisation and some contempt for 'unclean' personal habits. However, this stratification may not have played a major role in daily life. The second hierarchical characteristic was the ability to 'pawn' relatives (especially female) and use them as security for debts, or in place of labour owed as compensation. However, pawns were not permanent, had rights, were not slaves, and it is unclear how prevalent the practice was. Even so, pawning suggests some clear status differences (mostly gender, which followed in other areas of family life). The third exception was the practice of keeping domestic slaves. Slave status was essentially permanent, and slaves had fewer rights than pawns. These exceptions do not seem to have been important in daily life, but they do suggest a distinct thread of hierarchical organisation running through the culture.[47]

Ndendeuli

The Ndendeuli,[48] also of southern Tanzania, clearly define themselves and their interactions in terms of kinship relations: 'Rights and obligations, privileges and responsibilities … were ubiquitously and continually explained and morally justified in terms of the kinship relations of people.'[49] However, this apparently

strongly bounded group identity was mitigated by the highly fluid and 'ego centred' definitions of kinship. Each individual forms 'complex networks' for purposes of social interaction and economic cooperation. These networks (kin-sets) include those persons who are reliable and available to assist in cooperative endeavours. Each individual will define his or her kin-set differently, though kin-sets will overlap. Kinship is defined primarily as involving those people with whom one has a reciprocal relationship, rather than having relationships with people who are kin. This somewhat counter-intuitive system seems to organise agricultural labour and social interactions effectively.

As with the Makonde, the Ndendeuli are a colonising people. They lived in small communities,[50] and practised shifting cultivation, growing crops in one field (adjoining the home as nearly as possible) until it was infertile. They would then move the field by clearing unclaimed land, still remaining close to the home. After a number of years, when no usable land was conveniently available for cultivation, they would move. These moves were not coordinated, families would move in different directions and at different times, and new communities created would not resemble the ones dissolved. A few heads of households would find a new location and settle. Other immigrants would join later, generally sponsored by a present member of the new community. Honour accruing to the first immigrants did not translate into real power or authority; even influence was minimal aside from whatever personal reputation developed. Communities formed clusters of households to facilitate cooperation for some of the tasks of clearing bush and agriculture,[51] and 'persisted only so long as they retained tolerable supplies of cultivable land, and as they adequately satisfied men's needs for fairly reliable cooperation with their neighbors'.[52]

The regular, extensive economic cooperation suggests clear forms of social organisation, but based on neighbourhoods, shifting relationships and varying needs. No organising principles such as common descent, property rights or common defence bound communities together.[53] The 'rules' by which interactions were guided were ego-centred, situational and interpreted conditionally and continually. Obligations were reciprocal though shifting and conditional; understandings changed over time, and were based on practical realities.

The basic unit of action in the community was the household, headed by a married man who organised his household, administered it as an economic unit and represented it to the community.[54] The household would include wives, children and young unmarried men, and any dependents related to either the husband or the wife (such as widows and their children). Young married men had labour obligations to their fathers-in-law, and so resided near them in the early years of marriage. In a village, any head of household was related to several other heads of household, either through blood or marriage. If there were too few 'kin neighbours' to provide a base for effective economic cooperation and social interaction, more relatives would be sponsored to join the community. An individual would have a number of households which would provide a logical pool of cooperation. However, as men grew older, by preference they would gradually develop 'somewhat diverging sets of active kinship relations and the desire for a greater degree of autonomy of choice in social action'.[55]

Networks are developed based on some concept of kinship, but it was a fluid

concept that depended upon convenience and personal affinities. Each individual would have many linkages to different people to whom their kin were not related; definition of kin neighbour was individually negotiated, not ascribed. Men aligned themselves with those kin-members with whom they had closer obligations and affinities and 'developed their own sets of kin-linkages that became partly idiosyncratic to each individual'. Lineal kinship was not a strong factor, and it seemed foolish to 'impose artificial limits on the range of social relationships'. Practically, these networks worked out in ad hoc workgroups recruited for a specific purpose from kin-neighbours.[56]

Desire for personal choice in relationships and household decisions is reflected in the orientation towards community influence and leadership. 'Household heads were considered to be equals who did not recognise any authority over them within the community'.[57] Leadership was tentative and based on personal prestige. If an individual was talented and able, he might use his wisdom and influence in resolving disputes and supporting his kin-neighbours and friends in disputes. A person could aspire to status as a notable or a big man, but that status was fragile, dependent on continual success.

Conflict resolution demonstrates the network processes. When a dispute arose within a community, there was a strong interest in resolving it quickly so that the normal patterns of cooperation could continue undisrupted. The dispute might be amicable, over conflicting work parties, or more personal, over debts, insults or strongly disruptive or antisocial behaviour. A serious conflict might disrupt economic cooperation and social relationships throughout the community, since networks were inextricably linked. A 'moot' or meeting would then be called, convening an assembly of neighbours on neutral ground. The principals would be present with their action sets and possibly other interested parties or notables. Individuals who did not want to support either side (because of conflicting obligations) might be absent, visiting distant kin. 'There were few rules of procedure; and there was no one to act as chairman, let alone as arbitrator or judge.' The matter would be discussed, facts would be agreed to, and a decision concerning resolution and compensation (if necessary) would be reached. Notables had the opportunity to use their wisdom and influence to resolve conflicts, and would increase their prestige if effective. The moot would usually end genially, with the drinking of beer and the restoration of social relations. There were no sanctions available to enforce judgments; cooperation was voluntary.[58]

Economic cooperation provides more examples of the shifting, idiosyncratic networks of cooperation among the Ndendeuli.[59] Economic cooperation involved coordinating work parties to share in the labour of clearing new fields, repairing houses, preparing land for planting, and the actual planting. Kin-neighbours would be asked to join a work party formed for specific tasks, and they would join based on their other obligations, their relationship with the organiser, and their interest in maintaining reciprocal obligations. Families participated in the work parties of those with whom they had reciprocal obligations, and those with whom they wanted to strengthen obligations. These ties were originally formed due to kinship bonds and over time became self-defining. However, each field

was clearly the property of the man who had claimed it and his produce was his alone.

In terms of culture theory, the Ndendeuli are clearly very low grid; the behaviour of heads of households is not prescribed by social conventions and mores, and individuals have tremendous autonomy in social action. Kinship is defined so loosely that individuals define their kinsmen for purposes of cooperation and social interaction. There are no negative consequences or sanctions for building a kin–neighbour network in a particular way, and men participate in an action-set or network for a variety of reasons.[60] Therefore, group boundaries are clearly weak. The individualist label is supported by culture theory's contention that ego-centred networks are the primary organisational form of low group social relationships: 'If relationships are organized into networks, the pattern you will trace out will be unique to the individual you have chosen … they spread out all over the place, have no boundaries and are as numerous as the individuals who build them.'[61] This description clearly fits the Ndendeuli.

Shambala

The Shambala (or Shambaa) kingdom, in the Usambara mountains of northeast Tanzania, forms a far more hierarchically organised system than do the Makonde and the Ndendeuli. It is organised through lineage. Chiefs or royal lineages have authority over interlineage relations and legitimate monopoly over coercion, though there are councillors who advise and check chiefly power. The system's ability to control all aspects of life is extensive and group identity is strong, though the option of migrating and founding a lineage exists.

The basic residential and economic unit is the household, which is built around an autonomous family, ideally with multiple wives and many children. Each wife has a separate house, fields and stock which are allocated to her at her marriage, and inheritable through her by her children. This property cannot be taken from her without her permission. The family is nested within a lineage, and most lineages are fairly localised, living within a village. As with the Makonde and Ndendeuli, the lineage of the first migrant has leadership rights, but for the Shambala, there is more real power associated with inherited leadership. Land tenure is permanent, rather than temporary, and land ownership and rights are inherited, though the lineage retains rights so that land cannot be alienated or disposed of outside the lineage.[62]

The lineage has strong group boundaries; any action taken by a member of a lineage is the responsibility of the entire lineage. When fines or compensation are required, they are paid by the lineage as a group to the offended lineage as a group. 'Kinship groups … retain a considerable responsibility for the security of the individual and the regulation of social relationships … it is the legitimate business of the lineage to settle' any disputes within the lineage. While villages are generally not completely of one lineage, different lineages may be merged by marriage and genealogies may be falsified to increase solidarity.[63]

Within the lineage, there are clear status differences which prescribe the range of acceptable behaviour closely. Prescriptions include behaviour expected between generations, generally in terms of formality and respect. Relatitve age

within a generation is also significant, since eldest sons have first claim on bride wealth and tend to inherit more than younger sons. Villages are led by the acknowledged leader of the first lineage and these leaders have far greater authority than among the Ndendeuli, mostly thanks to the position of all younger men as deferential to them, and their role as intermediaries with non-members. Leaders also have sanctions at their disposal, though these are weakening over time.[64]

The chiefs represent a level of authority above village leaders. Lineage heads have familial authority, while chiefly authority is 'expressly political in nature'. Chiefs monopolise the exercise of authority in interlineage relations, and some acts are defined as a challenge to the chief's authority. For example, murder is prohibited, since only the chief can allow killing of any kind: 'it eats the chiefship for common people to do the things that only a chief can do'. This points up a difference between the Shambala and other groups; while most acts, including murder, were civil issues to the Makonde and Ndendeuli, requiring compensation to the victim based on discussion and negotiation, the Shambala have a real sense that 'murder is an injury to the body politic and a challenge to the authority of the chief rather than a private injury'.[65]

The chief has the authority to command services from his subjects, collect fines and exact tribute and taxes. The chief and the system of which he is part also define the 'public goods'[66] which are collectively provided through obligatory communal labour and taxes. He commands the allegiance of his people, and through that their property, though the burdens tend not to be onerous. Winans argues that the system is weakened by the chiefs' technological inability to control their distant subjects.[67] However, control of behavior is highly effective. Technology does not determine the hierarchical nature of the society and the system functions effectively.

Explicit lines of authority and deference exist within chiefs' courts as well as between different level of chiefs. However, countering concentration of power upward, there is an institutional check to the power of chiefs. The councillors advise the chief on many issues, announce his decisions and determine succession, based in part on agreement of commoners as to the best chief. The legitimacy of the chiefs' rule is based on the support and acquiescence of their subjects, as in the belief 'that the royal chief is a chief because the people wish him to be'.[68]

The Shambala system has clearly delineated roles and relationships, with sanctions for violating norms. There are strong deference patterns and differentials in status based on ascribed criteria. Nor is this an imposed system; there seems to be 'a belief in the inborn fitness of the ruling class to rule'.[69] These characteristics reflect hierarchy. Group boundaries are also high; there is true corporate authority, group membership is the defining characteristic of one's life, and groups act as representatives for their members. Even though ancestors are viewed as capricious and controlling one's luck, often negatively, they were believed to be controllable with the appropriate formula of sacrifices, which suggests a culture which is based on rules and appropriate behaviour to control and stabilise the world (an extremely hierarchical view of nature or life).

Even with this very hierarchical social system, there are individualistic

undercurrents. The first is the more casual relations between grandparents and grandchildren, which circumvent prescriptions concerning relations between relatives and between generations. (This reflects the 'joking relationships' which are found in many African societies, whereby casual, even bizarre or violent behaviour is allowed, even expected, between people who have certain relationships). The second is the option of migration, which remains viable, though probably not the most desirable. These provide some 'escape valves' for pressures building up within society.

A Tanzanian political culture?

Given the variation in the groups discussed above, it would be difficult to select one organising principle or way of life which predominates in traditional Tanzanian society. There are certain commonalities, explained by culture and reinforced by technology, but no universal or monolithic culture. These common attributes include the 'loosely linked small communities',[70] the propensity for migration, and the cross-cutting loyalties and obligations. Many authority structures were weak, but certainly not all, though the state had little ability explicitly to control daily life. Among the Shambala, intrusion was unnecessary, since norms and prescriptions legitimately determined much individual behaviour and accepted rules governed conflict management. While experiences varied, many pre-colonial Tanzanian peasants may have experienced some autonomy in subsistence and lifestyle preferences. Obedience to a central authority was not an aspect of the Tanzanian peasant's life, nor was cooperation on a large scale. This is a logical development from a subsistence economy based on rain-fed agriculture in a marginal area with unreliable rains and low level technology, but certainly not the only logical development. A materialist explanation is inadequate to explain differences, while cultural analysis helps to explain variation in social systems built around different preferences.

Nyerere and Tanzanian culture

There are a number of problems with Nyerere's analysis of traditional society. He speaks in general terms of 'African society,' or 'the African family', with little consideration for the tremendous diversity of social forms found in Tanzania, and throughout the African continent. He identifies African society as egalitarian, composed of small communities and families who owned property communally with no status differentials or hereditary aristocracies. However, there are hierarchies in Tanzania; Nyerere's insistence that the few Tanzanian aristocracies were composed of immigrants, rather than indigenous peoples, avoids the fact that some of these migrations occurred in the distant past, and the myths of origin, whether factually true or not, were used to legitimate the hereditary leadership's right to rule.

Nyerere also suggested that small communities owned property in common. However, there is a distinction between land which cannot be alienated from a family or lineage and land which is communally owned, with shared rights to appropriate produce. In Mount Kilimanjaro, land was privately owned and meticulously divided. The Shambala practised inheritance of land within a family

and the rights were quite specifically divided among wives and through them to their children. These property rights could not be changed without the wife's agreement, though the land could not be alienated outside the community. Furthermore, many communities such as the Ndendeuli were composed of shifting cultivators, who would farm available land until it was infertile, and then move on to clear more unoccupied land. Unowned and unoccupied land is not communally owned, and the concepts of property ownership, communal or individual, beyond short-term use rights (inferred by clearing bush), would have been irrelevant.

Communal land ownership implies egalitarian community relations. Nyerere suggests that communities shared their produce with members in need, without obligation to repay. Generally, the basic economic unit was the family; families shared their resources and owned them in common (though control and appropriation rights were divided along various criteria). Consumption and contribution of agricultural labour were not equal within a family; in some cases, each wife might have her own plot of land, from which she grew food for herself, her children and husband. A more productive woman would feed her children better. Communal access to food and shelter did not extend to the village, clan or tribe. Tanzanian communities and peoples were so diverse that it is not useful to speak of them generally. However, there are some general statements which can be made: first, outside the family unit, there was little 'egalitarian' social organisation as Nyerere intends it. Villages did not hold their land in common, and food or seed was borrowed if shortages were found, rather than given as a right. In some communities, cooperation was used for agricultural chores, but the produce of the fields was strictly the family's. It appears that Nyerere's picture of a primitive African or Tanzanian socialism is not supported by evidence.

Conclusion

Tanzania's political culture

I return to my original question: was Nyerere's vision of pre-colonial Tanzania accurate? Nyerere saw Tanzanian traditional society as homogeneous and egalitarian, and he spoke of this legacy and its opposition to individualistic European culture often and explicitly. The Tanzanian peasantry were natural socialists who had been corrupted by the colonial system.[71] They needed only to relearn their natural cooperative patterns, and be taught how to upgrade their skills and technology so they could take advantage of economies of scale to create more wealth, which would make all better off. However, Tanzanian history has many examples of entrepreneurial behaviour independent of, or opposed to, colonial or independent government preferences, examples of which have continued in the contemporary 'second economy.'[72] This suggests a confusion of colonial capitalist exploitation with indigenous individualism, and a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of Tanzanian political culture.

Nyerere took some real aspects of Tanzanian life, generalised from them to all of Tanzania and Africa, and applied his principles beyond their appropriate-realm. While his references to 'African' traditional society may have been intended metaphorically, his beliefs about Tanzania were used as the basis of his

policy programme, and as 'a kind of mobilizing political myth which would enable the government to explain the *ujamaa* program to the peasantry and enlist its support … {the} historical accuracy of an ideology {is a crucial question} in determining its success as a mobilizing instrument'.[73] Nyerere's interpretation of Tanzanian culture and the social realities which shaped Tanzania's history was mistaken, and contributed to disastrous policy failures. The compromises and shifts in his policies over the years, as socialism was not effectively implemented, and the people were no better off, may be interpreted as tacit though reluctant acceptance of this contradiction.[74]

Cultural analysis suggests that, while ways of life varied, many Tanzanian peasants demonstrated individualist qualities, and could make independent choices concerning subsistence and lifestyle preferences which were relatively unconstrained by complex and intrusive systems of prescriptions. Options included migration, allowed exit from communities because of personal conflicts or limited opportunities. Equality of condition and limits of freedom seem to have been primarily the result of the limits imposed by technology, environment and the vagaries of subsistence agriculture. There were few indications of egalitarian culture. Though hierarchical systems existed, and were widespread, especially in response to the Ngoni invasions and the disorder of the 19th century,[75] obedience to a central authority was not the predominant experience of the Tanzanian peasantry before colonial rule, nor was large-scale cooperation. While there are dozens of other groups to consider, many of which have never been carefully studied, my findings are suggestive.

Culture theory and African politics

Culture theory has a distinctive capacity to take analysis of African politics and policy a step further than other modes of analysis, and infer appropriate policies and structures from the dominant ways of life within society. Culture theory can explain and compare varied behaviours, in different times and places, by their functions for supporting a way of life. It reminds us that institutions and policies must be consistent with the values and preferences of the population if they are to be effective. It addresses fundamental questions of human social life: Who am I? What am I to do?[76] And so it facilitates understanding of social processes. It can take us beyond generalisations concerning peasant behaviour in East Africa, to explain the ways in which people respond to their environment, and the varied institutions which they build to meet their needs. Tanzania does not have a homogeneous peasantry, so responses cannot be predicted by a monolithic theory.

The question of whether policies can be used to change ways of life is still open; Nyerere and others deeply believed that individualistic practices were unjust and would harm development.[77] Why was the elite egalitarian and hierarchical if the population was individualist? What differing cultural influences created this division between elite and peasants? More than that, how feasible is engineered cultural transformation? How far can structures be moved from values without disaster? Fatton, while agreeing that pre-colonial Tanzania was not naturally socialist, suggests that proper programmes could create a socialist culture.[78] This follows the logic of egalitarian culture (and socialist

philosophy), which suggests that human nature is a product of social intercourse; people are born good and corrupted by their institutions, so if the institutions are changed, people can be transformed.[79] How amenable to change are a people? Culture can and does change. If the material and political reality does not support the cultural world view, eventually people will shift to one which is more congruent with realty.[80] However, natural change in response to significant contextual shifts is different from engineered change, which is notoriously difficult, though often attempted, and frequently leads to unintended consequences. This remains an open question, worthy of study. Tanzania's failure to change its cultures could be the result of cultural resilience, ineffectiveness of social engineering or erratic, arbitrary and often coercive policy implementation.[81] Further research is necessary, though a definitive answer may be impossible. However, culture theory provides a potentially powerful tool for explaining Tanzanian and other African development and political anomalies.

Notes

I am grateful to Aaron Wildavsky for the guidance and encouragement he gave me on an earlier draft of this paper. His untimely death is deeply mourned. Larry Diamond, Goran Hyden, Sheen Rajmaira and Tony Waters also gave me valuable suggestions and it is not their fault that I did not follow all of them.

[1] J H Weaver & A Kronemer, 'Tanzanian and African socialism', *World Development*, 9 (9/10), 1981, pp 839–849.

[2] Mary Douglas is a classically trained British anthropologist, who studied ritual and religion in African societies. From that she became interested in culturally varying perceptions of risk. She developed the theory employed below in *Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966; *Natural Symbols: Explorations in Cosmology*, London: Barrie & Rockliff, 1970; *Implicit Meanings: Essays in Anthropology*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975; and (with Aaron Wildavsky) *Risk and Culture: An Essay in the Selection of Technical and Environmental Dangers*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1982.

[3] Kimambo disagrees. He suggests that a process of centralisation had been occurring in some parts of Tanzania over several centuries, probably accelerating in the 19th century. Hierarchy and centralisation are not necessarily synonymous; hierarchy suggests a particular form of social relations, where each person has a place in the system, knows that place, its duties and responsibilities, and receives rewards commensurate with that place, as will be discussed more fully below. Centralisation on the other hand suggests an authority which dictates and decides policy for members, and is able to enforce that policy. This is one possible logical extension of hierarchy, especially under conditions of coercive power, or advanced technology or communications. I Kimambo, 'The interior before 1800', in I Kimambo & A Temu (eds), *A History of Tanzania*, Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1969, pp 14–34, esp p 22.

[4] J Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979, p 13.

[5] Ibid, p 15.

[6] Ibid, pp 15, 529. Goran Hyden pointed out to me the unique importance of the Swahili language and culture in Tanzania.

[7] As was much of Africa. I Kopytoff (ed), *The African Frontier: The Reproduction of Traditional African Societies*, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1987.

[8] Iliffe, A Modern History; Kimambo, 'The interior before 1800', p 22.

[9] Names such as Ndendeule and Nyasa denote 'people of the bush or the valley, the savannah, the forest, or the lakeshore'. R Oliver & G Matthews (eds), *History of East Africa* Vol 1, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963, p 207.

[10] J Flint (ed), *The Cambridge History of Africa*, Vol 5, from c1790 to c1870, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976, p 310; and Oliver & Matthews, History of East Africa, pp 191–192.

[11] Iliffe, *A Modern History*, p 24.

[12] A Roberts, 'Political change in the nineteenth century', in Kimambo & Temu, *A History of Tanzania*, pp 57–84; and Flint, *The Cambridge History of Africa*, ch 8.

[13] Kimambo, 'The interior before 1800', pp 22–23, 30.

[14] J Vansina, *Paths in the Rainforest: Toward a History of Political Tradition in Equatorial Africa*, Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990; and Oliver & Matthews, *History of East Africa*, ch 6.

[15] Culture theory has been applied to a variety of policy issues, especially in the USA and Europe. Though it has not been applied systematically to African and other 'developing' societies, it can enrich our understanding of these social systems and their problems.

[16] C Lockhart & G Franzwa, 'Cultural theory and the problem of moral relativism', in D Coyle & R J Ellis (eds), *Politics, Policy and Culture*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994, pp 175–190; p 181. This model is relativist about fact, meaning 'there is no such thing as objective knowledge of realities independent of the knower,' since the social environment has a central role in determining beliefs about what is and what should be. A Flew (ed), *A Dictionary of Philosophy*, New York: St Martin's Press, 1984, p 303.

[17] I do not argue that culture is independent of material conditions, but rather that it interacts with the objective environment, and shapes reaction to it. A cultural world view will interpret and construct reality in a certain manner, and shape social response to that socially constructed reality. If circumstances change and the response becomes ineffective, people will move towards alternative world views which can more successfully explain reality. In 19th century Tanzania, for example, some communities adopted more hierarchical forms based on military discipline in response to the Ngoni raids and disorder.

[18] R Ellis, 'Why cultural theory?' in G Grendstad & P Selle (eds), *Culture as a Way of Life*, Oslo, Samlaget, forthcoming 1995.

[19] R Klitgaard, 'In search of culture: a progress report on research on culture and development', unpublished manuscript, 1991, p 90.

[20] M Thompson, R Ellis & A Wildavsky, *Cultural Theory*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990, p 5.

[21] E C Banfield, *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society*, New York: Free Press, 1958.

[22] J Clark & A Wildavsky, 'Why communism collapses: the moral and material failures of command economies are intertwined', *Journal of Public Policy* 10 (4), 1993, pp 361–390.

[23] For discussion of these two concepts of equality, see A Flew, 'Enforced equality—or Justice?', *Journal of Libertarian Studies* 8 (1), 1986, pp 31–41.

[24] Thompson *et al.*, Cultural Theory, p 215.

[25] A Wildavsky, *The Rise of Radical Egalitarianism*, Washington, DC: American University Press, 1991; R J Ellis, *American Political Cultures*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993; D Coyle & R J Ellis, *Politics, Policy and Culture*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994.

[26] Iliffe, *A Modern History*, p 25.

[27] John Iliffe has written the most extensive history of Tanzania, from pre-colonial times to independence, and his work suggested these themes to me. They are also observable in the many ethnographies which have been written of different groups in Tanzania, and are suggested in other interpretations of peasant interactions and communities. While I may draw different conclusions, I accept the descriptions. Iliffe, *A Modern History*.

[28] Iliffe, *A Modern History*; P H Gulliver, *Neighbours and Networks: The Idiom of Kinship in Social Action Among the Ndendeuli of Tanzania*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1971; J G Liebenow, *Colonial Rule and Political Development in Tanzania: The Case of the Makonde*, Nairobi: East Africa Publishing House, 1971.

[29] Kimambo, 'The interior before 1800', pp 26, 23.

[30] This is a problematic question, since Nyerere's intention was nation-building and developing support for his programmes, rather than scholarly exegesis. However, if his vision was incompatible with social reality, potential success of programmes would be affected.

[31] J K Nyerere, *Principles and Development*, Dar es Salaam, Information Services, 1966, p 9.

[32] J K Nyerere, *Ujamaa—Essays on Socialism*, London: Oxford University Press, 1968, p 107.

[33] Ibid, pp 2–7; 106–110; J K Nyerere, *Freedom and Unity: A Selection from Writings and Speeches 1952–1965*, Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1965, pp 105–106; *After the Arusha Declaration*, Dar es Salaam: Ministry of Information and Tourism, 1967, p 12.

[34] Nyerere, *Freedom and Unity*, p 103.

[35] Nyerere, *Ujamaa—Essays on Socialism*, p 6; *After the Arusha Declaration*, p 15.

[36] These studies were chosen unsystematically, and are not representative of Tanzanian society. A more exhaustive exploration (in process) does find all four ways of life. I will address this issue in the conclusions.

[37] Bantu peoples, including the Makonde, characteristically have no central political authority; their primary identity is through common lineage, language and beliefs. The discussion below is drawn from Liebenow's fieldwork and description of the Makonde.

[38] Liebenow, *Colonial Rule and Political Development*, pp 24–30.

[39] Ibid, p 59.

[40] The spiritual duties of ancestor worship provide no scope for control, since it would be unthinkable to individuals from religious observances except for heinous acts.

[41] This distinguishes the Makonde from hierarchical systems such as the Shambala, where the leader is considered to have strong ritual powers, including rain-making, and the leader's well-being is essential to the well-being of the society as a whole.

[42] Most decisions are made without reference to the leader, by the interested parties.

[43] Liebenow, *Colonial Rule and Political Development*, p 57.

[44] G Hyden, *Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured Peasantry*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1980.
[45] Liebenow, *Colonial Rule and Political Development*, p 47.
[46] Ibid, pp 44–5, 70–1.
[47] Ibid, pp 34–5, 66. Aaron Wildavsky suggests that all four ways of life are present in any society, though in different mixes, and the specific configuration explains policy preferences.
[48] This discussion is based on Gulliver's discussion of the Ndendeuli. Gulliver, *Neighbours and Networks.*
[49] Ibid, p 4.
[50] A community might contain 15 or 20 hamlets (small clusters of autonomous homes) totalling perhaps 150 to 200 people in two to three square miles. Gulliver, *Neighbours and Networks*, p 54.
[51] Cooperation in these tasks was believed to be necessary by the Ndendeuli, though the actual material practical value has been questioned by agriculture specialists. Gulliver, *Neighbours and Networks*, pp 195–196. Whether materially necessary or not, cooperation facilitated social organisation.
[52] Gulliver, *Neighbours and Networks*, p 54.
[53] Ibid, p 55.
[54] There were no female headed households among the Ndendeuli. Women needed the labour, coordination of agricultural cooperation, and community representation which only a man could provide. Gulliver, *Neighbours and Networks*, p 56.
[55] Ibid, pp 59, 61.
[56] Ibid, pp 223, 61, 126, 18.
[57] Ibid, p 65.
[58] Ibid, pp 135–136.
[59] Ibid, ch. 6.
[60] Ibid, pp 225, 227.
[61] Thompson *et al.*, *Cultural Theory*, pp 11, 12.
[62] E V Winans, *Shambala: The Constitution of a Traditional State*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1962, pp 32–43, 49.
[63] Winans, *Shambala*, pp 66, 104.
[64] Ibid, pp 51–54.
[65] Ibid, pp 100–105.
[66] Public goods include maintenance of chiefs' houses and royal burial places, and the construction and maintenance of roads and irrigation canals. Winans, *Shambala*, p 134.
[67] Ibid, p 120.
[68] Ibid, pp 128, 117.
[69] Ibid, p xx.
[70] Liebenow, *Colonial Rule and Political Development*, p 31.
[71] See Thompson *et al.*, *Cultural Theory*, pp 59–60.
[72] For pre-independence examples, see N Spalding, 'Resource mobilization in Africa: the role of local organizations in the Tanganyika independence movement', *Journal of Developing Areas*, 28 (1), 1993, pp 89–110. The second economy in Tanzania has been extensively documented, and provides the livelihood for many who could not support their families in the official economy. See T L Maliyamkono & M S D Bagachwa, *The Second Economy in Tanzania*, Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1990; N Spalding, 'The state–society debate in Africa: an exploration of the Tanzania experience', forthcoming, Polity (fall 1996).
[73] M F Lofchie, 'Agrarian socialism in the Third World: the Tanzanian case', *Comparative Politics*, 8 (3), 1976, pp 479–499, esp p 488.
[74] McHenry argues that shifts in policy are the result of power struggles between ideological factions within the government, responding to the economic, political and social situation. D E McHenry Jr, *Limited Choices: The Political Struggle for Socialism in Tanzania*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994. Those struggles seem to be cultural struggles, with the individualists eventually prevailing over egalitarians, as egalitarian policies failed to achieve their desired result.
[75] Kimambo, 'The interior before 1800', pp 19–29.
[76] A Wildavsky, 'Choosing preferences by constructing institutions: a cultural theory of preference formation', *American Political Science Review*, 81 (1), 1987, pp 3–22.
[77] Should a government work with indigenous values and institutions because they are culturally appropriate, or try to change them because they are exploitative, unjust or inefficient? This dilemma is central to development theory and policy.
[78] R Fatton Jr, 'The political ideology of Julius Nyerere: the structural limitations of "African Socialism" ', *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 20 (2), 1985, pp 3–24.
[79] Thompson *et al.*, *Cultural Theory*, p 34.
[80] Thompson *et al.*, Cultural Theory, ch 4.
[81] Spalding, 'The state–society debate in Africa'; Clark & Wildavsky, 'Why communism collapses'.