

Political culture and a new definition of the Third World

MEHRAN KAMRAVA

To say that recent global changes have thrown Third World studies into serious confusion is an understatement. Thanks to the dizzying global changes of the 1980s and the 1990s the usual standards for categorising countries and their political systems have become hopelessly outdated and anachronistic. Neither economic nor the traditional political classifications that once so conveniently placed groups of countries in distinct categories can be applied to the contemporary globe any longer. The end of the Cold War threw into confusion more than just diplomatic alliances and ideological bedfellows; it also shattered long-held assumptions about political categories based on levels of economic industrialisation, political development, or both. As the recent flurry of scholarship on the subject attests, students and scholars of the Third World are clamouring to redefine and rediscover their field of expertise and to either rethink their long-standing presuppositions entirely or to reformulate them according to the new realities of the international arena.¹ Scholars have scurried to make sense of the new disorder, which, as if to deliberately add to the confusion, has at times masqueraded as a 'New World Order'. The great victor, by some accounts, has been culture, the new defining essence of national identity.² Others have declared the triumph of *the path* and the death of history, with those left behind only muddling through irrelevant ideological squabbles.³ In the pages to come, I hope to demonstrate that history is not dead, nor has culture triumphed, but that what has instead emerged as the ultimate arbiter of national politics on a global scale is political culture.

At first look, it would appear that a new classification of the international state system can be devised by pointing to the nature and type of relationships that may exist between various states and their societies. I myself argued for such a paradigm in a previous publication,⁴ although I have since become somewhat unhappy with its explanatory limitations. In the Third World, I argued, as in any other region of the globe, state-society relationships may assume any one of four types: a 'strong' state dominating a 'weak' society, resulting in praetorianism; a dysfunctional state trying to rule over an internally-torn society, with a 'multiple authority polity' being the outcome; a 'quasi-democratic' system in which the state-society gap is bridged by little more than an institutional façade of democracy; and a 'viable democracy' supported by a civil society. Missing from this equation is the pivotal role of political culture, which I have since come to see as one of the most significant—if not indeed the most significant—determining element in state-society relations.

The typology laid out above does not adequately address the dilemma here earlier, namely that the First, Second and Third Worlds, especially the latter

Mehran Kamrava is J S Seidman Research Fellow and Associate Professor of International Studies at Rhodes College, Memphis.

two, no longer seem to exist and, therefore, require us to rethink our very conceptions of what their labels stand for. For one reason or another, the question of exactly what to call that group of countries that we once conveniently called the 'Third World' seems particularly puzzling. Most former communist countries can now be called just that, 'formerly communist'. But with its runner-up gone, both the title as well as the notion of the 'Third World' seem in dire need of repair. And the hallowed label of 'developing', with all its neutrality and objectivity notwithstanding, still leaves much to be desired because of its frequent application to vastly different national political and economic entities. More importantly, those of us who have invested much time and intellectual energy in studying the Third World have yet to come up with a convincing argument that our subject of interest is indeed still not *passé*. Are we, as students and scholars who have spent years studying the Third World, clinging to a notion whose slow but very certain death we are unwilling to admit? Or is it still a valid intellectual exercise to point to that group of countries once called the Third World and ascribe to them specific features and characteristics that set them apart from a group of others? Can we, simply put, still place Afghanistan, Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil and South Africa in the same category of countries? It was with these same questions in mind that Mark Berger, in an article pondering 'the end of the 'Third World',' argued that we could only use the term if we confine the limits of analysis to increasingly narrow historical and global processes.⁵

We can, indeed, still benefit from the concept of—if not necessarily the term—'Third World', although not by pointing to supposed economic, social and/or political commonalities among countries once conveniently classified as such, which even the most general of observations would fail to yield. There is, nevertheless, a distinctive similarity, a common denominator, which a significant number of countries around the globe still share regardless of their different political systems, level of economic affluence, military might or diplomatic orientation. This similarity is in political culture. More specifically, the similarity is in levels of political cultures' social acceptance and popular resonance. Regardless of their specific differences, there is a simple dichotomy in the political cultures found across the globe: some are popularly accepted and agreed-upon by all inhabitants of a country, while others are hotly contested and deeply fragmented. Whether 'developed' or 'developing', wealthy or poor, located in the North or in the South, part of the First or the Third World, democratic, democratising or dictatorial, there are blocs of countries whose political cultures embody one central characteristic: each political culture is either socially accepted by an overwhelming majority of citizens or it is not. This social acceptance must have evolved to the point of subconscious psychological internalisation at the popular, mass level, having, as a result, developed specific norms and 'givens' of its own. Citizens, those politically active as well as those who are merely passive audiences, may disagree over the particulars—is this party's platform better than the other one's?—but they do not disagree over the overall premise of the game of politics. These systems are based on political cultures whose norms and mores are popularly accepted by the people and have, in fact, been internalised.

There are other political cultures, however, that have not yet evolved to the point of popular acceptance; rather, the notions they uphold as norms and premises are often bitterly debated and fought over. In these countries, even if there is a façade of unanimity over an agreed-upon political culture, one needs to distinguish between the public political claims of people—their ‘regime orientations’—versus their genuine feelings and sentiments—their ‘political orientations’. In non-democratic countries there are often sharp differences between what political subjects really think and what they are willing to admit. Many, in fact, develop elaborate political pretences in order to win favours and promotions or avoid persecution. In other instances where a populist system prevails, divergent political values are often swept into unison under the tides of revolutionary inclusion, with everyone hailing the leader and cherishing his liberating Cause. But populism eventually fizzles out, its emotional bonds between the ruler and the ruled ultimately replaced by cumbersome bureaus and efficient police forces. For their part, democratising polities seem to have the greatest cohesion in their political cultures, but they too have yet to withstand the test of time and the trials of post-democratisation economic delivery and political consolidation.⁶ Their political cultures appear as cohesive and unified so long as they keep their new constituents happy, catering to the new and rising demands of an electorate to which they are, at times literally, hostage. Thus former and current members of the ‘Third World’, regardless of the transformations they might have undergone over the past decade or so, still have political cultures over which there is little national consensus, even if that political culture is at present ostensibly democratic. Whatever labels one may come up with are ultimately less important than the analytical distinctions that can be drawn. At the most general level, there are now two types of political culture, one that has widespread social acceptability and one which largely does not. This very factor distinguishes the political and social constellations of one group of countries as opposed to another.

Political culture

What exactly is ‘political culture’ and why, as the above assertions suggest, does it play such a pivotal role in determining a country’s politics? The first part of the question—definition of political culture—is much less contentious than the second part—its importance. Scholars generally agree that political culture is made up of those norms and values that relate to the political system, or, in the words of Almond and Verba, that it is the ‘particular distribution of patterns of orientation toward political objects among members of the nation’.⁷ Although generally valid, an important qualification needs to be made here. Political culture is not always what it appears to be. In fact, in many instances, public manifestations of political culture may mask tendencies that point in the opposite direction. If taken at face value, such episodes as public grieving for the late Kim Il Sung by thousands of North Koreans, street marches in Baghdad in support of Saddam Hussein, or parades glorifying Fidel Castro and communism in Cuba give at best a misleading impression of the political cultures that prevail in each of those countries. It is, however, easier to draw inferences concerning people’s

political choices and preferences in democracies, as there is often little compelling need for them to engage in such orchestrated charades. There may, therefore, be important differences in the ways people go about demonstrating their preferences towards specific political personalities and institutions—their ‘regime orientations’—and their true feelings and sentiments towards the broader domain of politics in general—‘political orientations’.⁸

There is much less agreement over the precise significance of political culture. There is a group of scholars, most of whom are highly renowned and respected, who claim that political culture is ultimately not all that important and is, at the most, only secondarily significant as compared to political and institutional arrangements. In particular, the crucial role that political culture may play in such processes as state-building, political development or democratisation is often considered vastly different according to one scholar’s analysis as compared to another’s. In recent years, no doubt, the study of political culture has acquired some currency again, but the recent literature lacks even a broad consensus regarding its significance.⁹ Much of the rediscovery of the phenomenon falls short of placing it in its proper context within the larger polity. Among political culture’s foremost proponents are Larry Diamond and a group of collaborators, who see it as one of the primary elements in transitions to democracy.¹⁰ ‘Dispositions toward authority’, Diamond writes, ‘drive to the very heart of what democracy is about.’¹¹ Most other authors, however, are unwilling to give political culture credit for even a supportive and secondary role in the overall political process.¹² In his celebrated essay on democratisation Giuseppe Di Palma takes a consciously politically ‘minimalist view’ and argues that political values and principles are eventually moulded by the prevailing political arrangements and practices.¹³ Samuel Huntington also forcefully argues in favour of the primacy of political arrangements over social and cultural ones—in his first major work, *Political Order in Changing Societies*,¹⁴ he ignored culture altogether—although he has since gone on to assert that some cultures, notably Confucianism and Islam, may contain within them features that are inherently antithetical to democracy.¹⁵ Not unlike Di Palma, Huntington points to political arrangements, pacts, and the viability of institutions as the prime forces influencing a country’s political life. Most—but by no means all—other authors currently writing on democratisation or other political phenomena also tend to see political culture as far less significant compared to the plethora of other dynamics they see at work.

Despite this widespread neglect in scholarly corners, political culture is an important component of the nexus between state and society. It forms the general rubric within which political values and sentiments are formulated and expressed. If we take politics to mean the end result of the interaction between state and society—as well as, of course, within them—then political culture plays an indispensable role in determining the overall shape and contours of that interaction. ‘Politicking’ in the traditional sense, especially in the Third World, in the form of espousing specific ideologies, rhetoric and dogma, or being subject to the functions of various political institutions and arrangements, is only part of a much larger and more complex picture. Just as important, if not more so, are the individual and collective perceptions of people, be they citizens with

all the political rights accorded to them or mere subjects, with whom the state must inescapably have some sort of interaction. Even if the state's relations with the larger society are based purely on coercion or on manipulative techniques, the collectivity of people's political views and sentiments can still potentially place an overbearing constraint on state actions. Even when such political nuances as patriarchy or coercion give regime orientations a facade of unanimity, normalcy and stability, political orientations prompt people to resort to a different type of behaviour toward the state—i.e. to engage in a different form of politics—if they are given the opportunity to do so. Exactly how political culture comes about and to what extent it is susceptible to the political machinations of the state varies from case to case and depends on the specific forces and circumstances involved. In fact, some states may be far more adept than others at manipulating various tenets of popular beliefs and customs in their efforts at staying in power. Once in place, however, the formulative role of political culture in shaping popular views and sentiments regarding the political process cannot be overlooked.

Political culture does, of course, change over time and is not static. There is a certain degree of built-in fluidity in political culture that allows it to adapt to changing social and political circumstances over time. This changeability is most acute in societies and/or political systems that are embroiled in profound and fundamental processes of transformation. When states change, or societies change, or states and societies together change, the popular perceptions and views that people have of politics must also necessarily change. During such transformative periods, there are few givens, few norms over which people can unanimously agree for a reasonable period of time. This is most representative of modernising societies in the throes of economic growth and industrial development, where the very class and social fabrics of society change with unprecedented frequency and where, as a result, new and alternative political demands arise, whether quietly or with a bang. This is the major thesis for which Huntington's *Political Order in Changing Societies* is justly renowned.¹⁶ Regardless of the shortcomings that we may attribute in the 1990s to the modernisation theories of the 1960s and the early 1970s, their contribution to our understanding of the causal relationships between economic change and social and political instability cannot be denied. As classic modernisation theory maintains, economic and/or social change can sharply agitate different political orientations and, therefore, demands.

But in today's world, modernisation and industrial development are no longer as equally politically disruptive worldwide as they were once, largely accurately, held to be. In a number of countries today, not just in Europe but in Latin America, East Asia and elsewhere, industrial development has already progressed far enough—or was at one point already disruptive enough—not to upset a social order that, despite its fragility in the past, now deals with change in a routine and non-disruptive manner. The social order in these countries is far from static; it has, however, reached a level where its present balance can no longer be easily shattered by infrastructural or normative change. There are by nature different forms and processes of social change, some more accelerated and violent than others, some more superficial and skin-deep than others. In the

early stages of development, competition over such prized phenomena as political power, economic resources, and social prestige is much more intense, if not, in fact, at times brutish. Such sought-after commodities are, after all, more scarce and are jealously guarded by the privileged few who have them. When change comes, therefore, it tends to be more sudden and more disruptive of the existing social, political, and economic orders. The whole system, as it were, is less adept at absorbing change and when change finally comes, it tends to come in the form of a shock with rather unsettling consequences. When development has progressed further, however, and there is a greater equalisation of opportunities to access sources of privilege and power, social change tends to be far less disruptive. The more developed the polity, the better equipped it is at dealing with change, until it reaches a stage when it thrives and flourishes on change rather than being structurally or normatively disrupted by it. This is how post-materialism, or what Anthony Giddens calls the era of 'life politics', comes about.¹⁷ Life stops revolving around fending off change and instead becomes concerned with improving itself *through* change. The ensuing consequences for political culture and the larger premises according to which the states affected have long operated, are astounding to say the least.

Two types of political culture are likely to result. On one side are political cultures that reflect the more fundamental and disruptive nature of the ongoing changes in their social and political settings. Such political cultures are far less cohesive, tend to be disjointed, and seldom embody a meaningful social consensus over the essence and definition of what 'politics' is. These political cultures are, at any rate, far from culturally resonant and historically permanent. On the other side are political cultures reflective of the confidence with which their polities handle change. They reflect the comparably higher levels of social, economic, and political development reached by their societies, exhibiting a degree of political maturity not found in the first category of political cultures. Whereas those in the first category tend to be fragmented, the ones in the latter are cohesive and enjoy the support of an overwhelming majority of the nation. In fact, they are so ingrained in the minds of citizens that they become part of the national subconscious and an integral and uncontested part of the identity of the whole nation. As it happens, this type of political culture arises along with post-materialism.

Recent years have witnessed a concerted effort on the part of some nations to switch from the first variety of political cultures to the second, and it is precisely within this context that there has been a 'wave'¹⁸ of 'great transformations'¹⁹ across the global political landscape. Today's state configurations are dramatically different from those of a mere decade ago. That these changes have not been universal does not lessen their importance or magnitude. How these states have changed or are changing depends on specific circumstances, ranging from internal impulses for change to the interplay of international dynamics. Most are not as badly off as the former Yugoslavia or Russia, but many have yet to settle such burning political questions as, for instance, the nature of civil-military relations (Poland) or the permissible degree of state intervention in the economy.²⁰ And even if these states have assumed their final institutional form, they have yet to give popular resonance and internalised acceptance to the political

norms they are seeking to popularise. In this respect, their political cultures are at best still in flux and at worst impermanent. Simple democratisation, though a step in the right direction, is in itself insufficient in developing a resonant and cohesive political culture that is supported by national consensus. Also required is a crucial test of time and, more importantly, the occurrence of political or economic adversity, to see if the norms that support the newly democratised state can withstand the onslaught of contending, nondemocratic values.

Political culture and international classifications

There are, therefore, two catalysts that lead to the changeableness of political culture: economic and/or social changes, and political transformations. When looking at the world we are struck by a simple dichotomy of prevailing political cultures. There is a group of countries in which there is broad agreement over the nature, form and limits of the political game. In these countries the state and the premises on which it is based have enough longevity behind them, at least in relation to society, for the values attached to it to have been accepted and internalised by the people. Also, the social changes occurring in these countries are no longer of a type that would significantly alter the core political values over which a popular consensus has historically evolved. In other words, although there may be subtle nuances and changes within the overall polity, these changes have little or no bearing on the precise formulations of the political culture. The political culture, in fact, has developed an independent and autonomous life for itself which, instead of being slave to the two, keeps both the state and society in check. This is the type of political culture found in Western Europe, North America, Japan, New Zealand and Australia, where any deviation from the dominant political culture (the rise of skinheads in Europe or militia groups in the USA, for example) is cause for much alarm and consternation. Not only is there near-complete social acceptance of the body politic in these countries, the values and norms attached to them are by and large internalised by the population. The nature and rules of the political game are accepted and agreed-upon without challenge, and disagreements revolve not around the general definition of politics but over what is *good* politics. Thus even if the Japanese or the Italians cannot decide over a Prime Minister, they are unanimous in their support of the overall system which the PM represents.

The fact that most, though not all, of these countries happen to be in the Western hemisphere is more than simply coincidental. The West has been home to relatively old states residing over similarly old societies. This is not to assert, as is often wrongly done, that it was in the West that nationalism as a phenomenon first developed.²¹ Nationalism, in its simplest form, represents attachment to and love of a motherland that is often, but by no means always, represented through loyalty and devotion to the state. In this sense, the ancient imperial systems of China and Persia are far more likely candidates as the initial birthplaces of nationalism than the countries of the European continent, where the modern state arose comparatively much later. It is undeniable, however, that as far as the contemporary era is concerned, it has been in Europe and the rest of the 'Western' world that there has been the most continuous and uninterrupted

process of political rulership. In other words, as a modern invention, the 'state', with all its elaborate institutional differentiations, is decidedly Western in genesis, having attained the height of maturity in the West earlier than elsewhere. A snapshot of history highlights some of the flash-points of this maturation process in the modern era: when non-Western states were resting on their historical laurels and relishing in past glory, those in the West began evolving and flourishing well beyond their own borders. Colonialism and neo-colonialism only strengthened the Western state and further weakened non-Western ones. During and after the Second World War, as many states in the West were forced to reconstitute themselves, those elsewhere had to start from scratch. Although many Western states had to re-establish their ties with their societies completely following World War II, those in the non-Western world had a much harder task: they had to sell their societies the whole concept of the 'state'—the very *raison d'être* for their existence—with which the masses had lost familiarity and emotional attachment after centuries of direct colonial rule or indirect neo-colonial submission. Western societies were far more familiar with the state as an entity, a state that had always been their own and not someone else's. More importantly, they were now determined to get it right and not let the disasters of the war be repeated. Here we see the birth of the first unified, cohesive political cultures, quite deliberate and thought-out at first, but gradually, through socialisation via schools and other means, internalised and part of the national subconscious.

The experiences of the West contrasted markedly with those of the non-Western world, giving rise to a completely different brand of political culture there. In today's non-Western world one finds countries that embody changing societies but static states, changing states with societies in which change is now largely politically inconsequential, or changing states and changing societies. In any event, because one or both of the social and political spheres of these countries are changing (or have only recently stopped changing), their political cultures also lack consistency and permanence. These are the countries once labelled 'Third World' for which a new designation is needed today. By nature, changes in the state are not everlasting in the way that social changes are permanent, and sooner or later states are likely to settle into a political routine of their own. This is precisely what happened in the 1980s to most parts of the former Second and Third Worlds, with significant political changes eventually resulting in a routinised, albeit completely different, set of political institutions and formats. But a termination of political change is not by itself sufficient to usher in a new and permanent political culture. Political culture needs time to mature and to become popularly internalised as part of people's political routine. It needs to develop popularly accepted norms and givens, and the mass internalisation of such political norms, especially in transformations of historic proportions, does not occur overnight. Significant and historical political changes took place in the 1980s in parts of Latin America and in Eastern Europe, the full domestic and international ripple effects of which have yet to manifest themselves. It is inaccurate or at best shortsighted to assume that simply because these changes have resulted in seemingly permanent new political arrangements, their accompanying political cultures must also have assumed their final overall

form. Institutions change much faster and more readily than do people's values. It takes far more than a new set of political arrangements for people to genuinely and heartedly agree over the nature of politics. What happened in Eastern Europe and Latin America in the 1980s went beyond mere institutional rearrangements; it involved a complete redefinition of 'the political' and a new way of perceiving and going about politics. A new political culture was ushered in. But for a new, popularly accepted and socially resonant political culture to take hold, it takes time, political crafting and, perhaps most importantly, a shared belief by a significant segment of the population that they have a common vested interest in the political process. Even if Eastern Europe and Latin America have recently turned democratic, their respective political cultures have yet to meet the various criteria required of them if they are to become permanent. So long as the system has not proven itself over time, and as long as radically different political norms and principles that challenge the whole normative legitimacy of the system can find receptive ears among the populace, the newly-formed states of Eastern Europe and Latin America, democratic as they may be, are far from resilient and socially resonant.

Democratisation appears as the single most crucial criterion for a political culture's permanence. To begin with, in addition to time and proven performance, a democratic polity is the only way to forge a common, nationally cohesive political culture. The two ingredients of time and democratic performance are indeed pivotal determinants of a common political culture, one in which there are no differences between or within 'political' and 'regime orientations'. It is no accident that all of the countries mentioned above, in which there is unanimous agreement over the general contours of political culture, happen to be long-established democracies. The new democracies of Eastern Europe and Latin America may be further along the road to developing a commonly accepted political culture, but they are not quite there yet. Through the mechanisms of democracy, they can foster a popular, deeply held sense of belonging and a vested interest in the workings of the system and influencing its performance. But populist regimes can do this too, and often do so far more intensely and effectively. What populist regimes do not have, however, is permanence, and their attempts at inclusion are often soon exposed as the political gimmicks they are. Thus performance alone is an insufficient criterion for permanence. A system's distributive efficacy must be proven over enough time for it to bestow on its subjects an internalised, unmanipulated sense of acceptance and belonging. No matter how captivating a leader's charisma, or how emotionally manipulative his ideology, or inclusionarily effective his populist institutions, he can still not mobilise popular support and emotional loyalty indefinitely. Some people may be fooled all the time, and all people may be fooled some of the time, but not everyone can be fooled all of the time. Only by routinised, uncoerced and unmanipulated participation in the political process over time will people develop an internalised acceptance of it. Fostering normative and emotional ties between the state and society is a unique characteristic of democracy which no other system has been able to replicate with quite the same degree of effectiveness.

Conclusion

We may be no closer to a satisfactory definition of the 'Third World' now than we were at the start of the article, but, hopefully, we have a new understanding of the analytical premises which the concept is supposed to signify. The Third World may no longer exist *per se*, but its historic and political legacies continue to shape and define the new set of states and societies found around the globe. In the traditional sense of the term, the label 'Third World' can no longer be classified as such because of the disappearance of the Second World on the one hand and the vast political and economic discrepancies among non-Western countries on the other. Nevertheless, despite these developments, countries of the former Third World still have one significant functional element in common: their political cultures. In the non-Western world, i.e. former Third World, political cultures tend to be tenuous, impermanent, fragmented and, even if recently democratised, still without social resonance. Whatever their specific features, the political cultures of these countries set them apart from those customarily called Western. How we classify these new political entities is largely a matter of semantics. It is, none the less, a reality that the political cultures of some countries with 'older' states are more unanimously accepted and thus more cohesive than those of others, whose states happen not to be as old.

On a purely political plane, therefore, irrespective of diplomacy, economics, or industrial development, we seem to have entered a two-fold era of national politics. On one side exist countries that have long settled on their political cultures, whose societies agree over exactly what to expect of and demand from the state. There is in these countries unanimous and time-hallowed agreement over what politics means and entails. On the other side are countries which have either only recently settled on a democratic political culture, which they hope to have accepted nationally, or which are still haggling over exactly what that is. It is to this latter group that the former states of the Soviet bloc and the new democracies of Latin America belong, as do such politically and economically diverse countries as Afghanistan and South Africa, Bangladesh and Zimbabwe. Whether the latest wave of democratisation will eventually shrink the size of this group remains to be seen, as does adopting an adequate label for describing them.

Notes

I wish to thank Cathrine Cozart, Liz Markovits, Meredith Miller, Amy Oberhelman and Missy Rundt, all of whom are studying Third World politics at Rhodes College, for their helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this article.

¹ See, for example, James Manor (ed.), *Rethinking Third World Politics*, London: Longman, 1991; Mehran Kamrava, 'Conceptualising Third World politics: the state-society see-saw', *Third World Quarterly*, 14(4), 1993, pp 703-716; and Mark Berger, 'The end of the "Third World"?' , *Third World Quarterly*, 15(2), 1994, pp 257-275.

² The chief theoretician among this group of scholars seems to be Samuel Huntington. See his 'The clash of civilizations', *Foreign Affairs*, 72(3), 1993, pp 22-49.

³ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, New York: Avon Books, 1992.

⁴ Kamrava, 'Conceptualising Third World politics'.

⁵ Berger, 'The end of the "Third World"?' , pp 269–270.

⁶ For more on the difficulties of democratic consolidation see Giuseppe Di Palma, *To Craft Democracies*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990, pp 137–155; Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991, pp 270–279; and Robert Pinkney, *Democracy in the Third World*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994, pp 83–99.

⁷ Gabriel Almond & Sydney Verba, *The Civic Culture*, London: Sage, 1989, p 13.

⁸ For more on the differences between 'regime' and 'political orientations' see Mehran Kamrava, *Politics and Society in the Third World*, London: Routledge, 1993, pp 144–157.

⁹ For some of the contrasting conceptions of the role and significance of democracy see, for example, Larry Diamond (ed), *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1993; Mehran Kamrava, *Understanding Comparative Politics: A Framework for Analysis*, London: Routledge, 1995, forthcoming; and Mattei Dogan & Dominique Pelassy, *How to Compare Nations: Strategies in Comparative Politics*, Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1990, pp 68–77.

¹⁰ Diamond, *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries*.

¹¹ Larry Diamond, 'Introduction: political culture and democracy', in *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries*, p 12.

¹² See, for example, Georg Sorensen, *Democracy and Democratization*, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993, pp 25–27; Ian Budge & David McKay (eds), *Developing Democracy*, London: Sage, 1994; and Geraint Parry & Michael Moran (eds), *Democracy and Democratization*, London: Routledge, 1994.

¹³ Di Palma, *To Craft Democracies*, pp 27–28, 141–145.

¹⁴ Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968.

¹⁵ Huntington, *The Third Wave* pp 298–311. Most representative of Huntington's rediscovery of culture is his controversial think-piece 'The clash of civilizations', which is really more a work of cultural geography riddled with crude oversimplifications than a serious analytical work. For critiques of 'the clash of civilizations' see articles by Ajami, Mahbubani, Bartley, Binyan and Kirkpatrick in *Foreign Affairs*, 72(4), 1993.

¹⁶ See, especially, Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, chs 1, 3 and 4.

¹⁷ Anthony Giddens, *Modernity and Self Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991, pp 209–210.

¹⁸ Huntington, *The Third Wave*.

¹⁹ Sabrina Ramet, *Social Currents in Eastern Europe: The Sources and Meaning of the Great Transformation*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1991.

²⁰ See, for example, Simon Johnson & Marzena Kowalska, 'Poland: the political economy of shock therapy', in Stephen Haggard & Steven Webb (eds), *Voting for Reform: Democracy, Political Liberalization, and Economic Adjustment*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, pp 185–241.

²¹ See, for example, Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. Greenfeld's assertions, though different in emphasis, are largely representative of the arguments of this group of scholars. She claims that:

At a certain point in history, to be precise, in early sixteenth century England—the word "nation" in its conciliar meaning of "an elite" was applied to the population of the country and made synonymous with the word "people". *This semantic transformation signaled the emergence of the first nation in the world, in the sense in which the word is understood today, and launched the era of nationalism.* (Emphasis original.)

Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992, p 6.

