

AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL

CHAD

3

Digging a hole

The World Bank's efforts to ensure Chad's oil money is spent on poverty alleviation are well intentioned but far behind schedule, while work on building the oil pipeline surges ahead. Campaigners and even the Bank's advisors have suggested stopping the digging while the committees catch up, but there is little hope that the developers will listen.

SOUTH AFRICA

4

Congress gets scratchy

The ruling ANC is looking to its December annual conference to map out strategy for the 2004 elections. Powerbrokers are jockeying for position and the centralisation of power in the President's hands is under scrutiny.

CONGO-BRAZZAVILLE

5

Old guard, new guard

Five years after winning the civil war, President Denis Sassou Nguesso has new legitimacy as an elected leader, with a constitution giving him sweeping powers and a new cabinet retaining his key lieutenants. But he still has powerful potential adversaries in the army and party old guard, as well as the Ninja militias.

NAMIBIA

6

Post Sam, more Sam?

A surprise cabinet reshuffle ahead of a party congress has brought forward two potential successors to Sam Nujoma in 2004.

POINTERS

8

Zambia, Sudan/ USA, Francophone Africa & Ghana

CAMEROON

Winning Biya mile

The government is set free by an election landslide and an opposition collapse

President **Paul Biya** is now likely to exploit June's electoral triumph by bringing the presidential poll forward a year to late 2003. His *Rassemblement Démocratique du Peuple Camerounais* won more convincingly than in the stolen vote of 1992 and 1997. Biya has moved key ally **Marafa Hamidou Yaya** to the Territorial Administration Ministry, which controls the electoral machinery. With 133 of the National Assembly's 180 seats, the RDPC landslide postpones the pressure to tackle corruption.

Biya has three alternatives. He can run for re-election, win, and serve a full seven-year term; pick a successor from the RDPC and stand down; or stand, win but not serve the full term. The third choice looks most probable. The legislative elections were a test for potential successors, making them demonstrate the RDPC's support in their home areas. Premier **Peter Mafany Musonge**, Speaker of the National Assembly **Cavaye Yeguie Djibril**, RDPC Secretary General **Joseph Charles Doumba**, and Marafa all passed with flying colours; Marafa, the least overtly ambitious, did best.

Like other long-time leaders, Biya needs safety from potential prosecution for human rights abuses and the corruption of his administration. For now the RDPC focuses on holding power through its network of ethnic constituencies: individuals or factions who question Biya's leadership are quickly dismissed or sidelined. To maintain that hold over the party, the Biya succession will be kept opaque.

The opposition Social Democratic Front (SDF), *Union Nationale pour la Démocratie et le Progrès* (UNDP), *Union Démocratique Camerounaise* (UDC) and *Union des Populations du Cameroun* (UPC), are in disarray. The two strongest, **John Fru Ndi**'s SDF and **Bouba Bello Maigari**'s UNDP, differ on the key constitutional issue. Militantly Anglophone, Fru Ndi wants a return to the pre-1972 confederal arrangements based on the Anglophone-Francophone divide. Bouba Bello is content with the mild decentralisation in the 1996 constitution. Opposition politics will get grumpier and the linguistic divide may grow sharper. Fru Ndi has fallen out with Bouba Bello and the UNDP, which used to dominate the north, and split with the French-speaking Bamiléké businessmen who kept his party's coffers full. Having alienated most of his former Francophone supporters, he would lose little by moving towards separatism. He may give up seeking national power and concentrate on constitutional concessions for English-speakers. Fru Ndi has been critically damaged by three successive election defeats.

Language barriers, party battles

Unless the opposition pulls together, which looks more unlikely than ever, Biya could win the presidential election legitimately. He has presided over one of Africa's most corrupt governments, under which Cameroonians have grown far worse off, and he has taught the opposition some painful lessons. His landslide was greased by corrupt payments to favourites who control electoral registration, by apathy, and above all by opposition incompetence and division.

This year, just 4.4 million people registered to vote, in an estimated population of 16 mn.; in 1997 4.3 mn. were registered out of 14 mn. The turnout of those registered was 64 per cent. Growing apathy is one explanation; the opposition also blames the RDPC for skewing the registration process. But the administrative disorganisation which forced postponement of the voting from 23 to 30 June cannot explain the opposition parties' collapse. In the SDF's old stronghold of Western Province the RDPC won 13 seats, against five in 1997; in northern Adamaoua, a UNDP stronghold, the ruling party took all 10 seats, against four in 1997. Fru Ndi's SDF won 21 seats, all of them in Anglophone constituencies, compared to 43 in 1977. In the north (Adamaoua, North and Far North provinces) Bouba Bello's UNDP was all but wiped out when the RDPC took 12 of the 13 seats taken by the UNDP in 1997.

Ndam Njoya's UDC held on to all its five seats in the Bamoun-dominated Noun District, Western Province. **Augustin Frederick Kodock**'s faction of the UPC rose from one to three seats, while **Henri Hogbe Nlend**'s rival faction won no seats. **Dakolé Daissala**'s *Mouvement des Républicains* and **Marcel Yondo**'s *Mouvement pour la Libération de la Jeunesse Camerounaise* won a seat each in 1997, but none this time. The Supreme Court annulled the results in nine constituencies (with 17 seats) because of electoral irregularities. The RDPC is expected to win most of them at the rerun in mid-September.

Biya's RDPC won 286 of the 336 town councils, compared to 219 in 1997. The party ran business

President, people, parties

● President **Paul Biya** has been in power since 1982, and the 1997 constitution allows him two more seven-year terms. He will almost certainly be the presidential candidate of the *Rassemblement Démocratique du Peuple Camerounais* (RDPC). He is cunning, able to outwit more cerebral opponents and happy to delegate, whether managing an election or negotiating with the World Bank. Since a coup attempt in the early 1980s, he has kept a tight grip on the military, police and intelligence services. His young wife **Chantal** adds to his playboy reputation; he enjoys property, foreign holidays and hobnobbing with the likes of **French** President **Jacques Chirac**. His strongest critics (in private) are military officers appalled at widespread corruption and social collapse.

● **Marafa Hamidou Yaya**, Minister of Territorial Administration, was for many years Secretary General of the presidency; he trained in the **United States** as an oil engineer, favours and understands Western corporate minds, and helped coordinate economic reforms with donors. He does little to expand his base beyond the north, where he is popular. He is widely respected, and opposition politicians think him conciliatory. But he owes everything to Biya. He ran the President's office and later designed the anti-corruption policy which donors require.

● **Peter Mafany Musonge**, Prime Minister since 1997, runs the RDPC's dialogue with opposition politicians. The other two top party posts are held by men from the Francophone south and the Muslim north; for balance he is from the English-speaking south-west, where he opposes secession. Washington and Whitehall like him. He has been a director of the Cameroon Development Corporation and supports economic reform.

● **Cavaye Yeguie Djibril**, elected speaker of the National Assembly in 1992, runs the RDPC in the far north, the most populous province. He disciplines RDPC parliamentarians, and distributes patronage to the Social Democratic Front, which gratefully backed his re-election in 2001.

● Ex-Finance Minister **Eduoard-Akame Mfoumou** successfully promoted economic reform and was on good terms with the IMF and the Bank until Biya, thinking him too ambitious, sacked him in April 2001. His ally **Amadou Ali** was moved from Defence to Justice, while another potential dissident, Foreign Minister **Augustin Kontchou Koumegni**, was sacked.

● **John Fru Ndi** leads the English-speaking Social Democratic Front, which almost certainly won the 1992 elections as an alliance between Anglophones and the business-minded Bamiléké of western Cameroon. He failed to consolidate that success, expelling northern and Bamiléké members including **Mahamat Souleymane**, a senior northerner. Support from **Nigeria**, which distrusts Biya, and the USA, which regarded Fru Ndi as a democrat, made him overconfident. Party funds haven't been audited since it was founded in 1991, and policy-making is as top-down as the RDPC's. With its disastrous electoral performance the SDF now risks becoming exclusively Anglophone.

● **Bouba Bello Maigari** leads the *Union Nationale pour la Démocratie et le Progrès* (UNDP); after boycotting the 1997 presidential election he rejoined the government coalition. Dissidents in his party suspect him of wanting the presidency after Biya.

● The Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC) led by **Frederick Ebong**, by **Martin Luma**, or – according to activists in the USA – by Justice **Frederick Alobwede**, advocates self-rule for English-speaking Cameroonians. Last year police arrested and allegedly tortured 55 SCNC militants for complicity in a guerrilla campaign that killed three gendarmes. The SDF rejects the SCNC's separatist agenda. English-speakers feel discriminated against, but few would fight for secession or confederation; local chiefs, well looked after by the government, back its proposal for devolution of limited powers to ten new states. The SCNC's boycott of the June elections was generally ignored.

magnates for mayoral office, such as **Victor Fotso** (Bandjoun Council), **André Sohaing** (Bayangam) and **Joseph Kadji Defosso** (Bana); this paid off in Western Province, home of the business-minded Bamilékés. The SDF won 36 councils, 30 in the Anglophone north-west.

Marafa oversaw the nomination of RDPC candidates and replaced some unpopular barons, such as **Antoine Ntsimi**, with more acceptable new faces. Only the RDPC fielded candidates in all constituencies and adequately funded its campaigns. In the Centre, South and Eastern provinces (homeland of Biya's Beti-Bulu) the RDPC won 63 seats of 66: it portrayed the SDF as an ethnic party attempting to re-establish Anglophone-Bamiléké hegemony. The UNDP's local Beti heavyweight, **Abanda Metogo**, had defected to the RDPC in 1997.

Ministers delivered the vote. Musonge won all 14 seats in his South-West Province and ten of the 11 seats in Littoral Province. In the traditionalist Adamaoua and North provinces, Marafa wooed most of his fellow northerners from the UNDP to the RDPC. Cavaye Yeguie Djibril, President of the National Assembly, took all 29 Far North seats for the RDPC. Bouba Bello has already lined up with the RDPC and kept his job in government.

RDPC election campaigns play the opposition parties against each other – northern Muslims against western Anglophones, and so on. They suborn traditional leaders, hand out funds for local development projects, and keep the media on a tight rein. Of more than 400 newspapers, only about 15 appear regularly. The opposition and independent press is short of cash. The RDPC controls the only daily, the *Cameroon Tribune*, and dominates radio broadcasting. Unlicensed anti RDPC stations do not reach much beyond Douala and Yaounde.

The opposition has been pressing for electoral and constitutional

reform since the 1992 elections; in 1997 the SDF proposed an independent electoral commission, but the ruling party refused to debate the bill. In 2000 the SDF organised a march in Yaounde to call for electoral reform; the marchers were stopped by security forces.

Cameroonians do not believe that the opposition parties would improve social conditions. The United Nations Development Programme says primary school enrolment dropped from almost 100 per cent in 1980-85 to 62 per cent in 1997. Child mortality and HIV/AIDS infection have soared. Social services have declined, extreme poverty has spread from rural areas into the towns, unemployment has grown and household incomes have fallen.

The International Monetary Fund and World Bank are meant to help pay for reforms, including privatisation. Sales of the electricity, water and telecoms companies, a state insurance company and a state bank are either complete or well advanced, and the IMF is pushing the government to sell two big agro-industrial combines, the Cameroon Development Corporation and the state cotton company.

Favourable weather for cotton, cocoa and bananas boosted gross domestic product growth by 5.5 per cent in fiscal 2000-2001, from 4.2 per cent in 1999-2000, and exports rose by 11 per cent. But imports, boosted by capital goods for the **Chad**-Cameroon oil pipeline, rose by 31 per cent to CFA 1.2 trillion (\$1.6 billion), pushing the current account into deficit. External debt has been slowly falling, and the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative may cut it by a further \$2 bn. For that, Biya's regime can thank **French** President **Jacques Chirac**. Corruption and human rights abuses have not weakened the two leaders' special relationship. If they compare notes on their electoral victories, the relationship could become a notch more special.

CHAD

Digging a hole

The World Bank appears to be struggling to create transparency but at least it's trying

Perhaps it is no surprise that the construction part of the Chad-Cameroon pipeline is way ahead of schedule while the capacity-building element in Chad lags far behind. Digging a trench is easier than establishing accountable institutions. Yet the World Bank is supposed to be financing the project precisely to set up these kinds of safeguards and prevent the kind of unaccountable oil development seen in countries such as **Sudan** (AC Vol 43 No 5).

The leaking of a report on the project by the Bank's independent Inspection Panel, requested in March 2001 by Chadian opposition leader **Ngarléjy Yorongar** on behalf of himself and over 100 residents of the Doba Basin, comes just in time to embarrass the Bank at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in **South Africa**.

The Bank should be embarrassed: keen to promote energy development in Africa, it had presented the project as a new model for the transparent management of oil revenues. The report was supposed to be confidential until the Bank's board had responded but was leaked to non-governmental organisations campaigning about the pipeline. There is talk of a rift between the Inspection Panel's new **Ghanaian** head, **Edward Ayensu**, an international development advisor on environment and energy, and his Panel, as well as some tension among Bank departments.

A meeting of the board on 12 September is expected to decide on action. There is no question of a pullout at this stage; the board is likely to note that the Panel visited Chad last January, while a Bank staff report in July said capacity-building had speeded up during the first half of this year. A major rationale for World Bank involvement was to develop institutional capability so that the government could manage the petroleum sector in an environmentally and socially sound manner. 'This objective has not been achieved and raised questions about the project's ability to realise several of its social objectives,' said the report.

It found that the project's 19-volume environmental management plan had failed to consider the cumulative effects of bringing a US\$3.7 billion project into such an undeveloped area. Yorongar had expressed concern that southern Chad would suffer similar problems to **Nigeria's** Ogoniland but the Panel said the technology for the pipeline was 'much more advanced' than that in Ogoniland, where vandalism of Shell's abandoned installations is a significant source of pollution. The Chad-Cameroon pipeline is buried and insulated and it uses lined pits and ponds and oil-spill detectors. Gas produced with the oil will be used for local power generation rather than flared.

The Panel suggested that the five per cent share of royalties from oil revenues to go to the producing region was chosen somewhat at random in the absence of any Bank policy or procedure, or any targeted study to determine the appropriate level. 'This is a matter of great concern,' the report said.

The original project documents stated that the first oil would be exported 51 months after project approval by the World Bank board. First oil is now set for June 2003 or 37 months from approval; the speed of the oil development side makes the failings on the revenue management side even more glaring.

Another concern is that revenue estimates are based on an oil price

of \$15 per barrel, while international oil prices are now around \$30. The Panel said there was very little detail in the Revenue Management Programme on how income above absorptive capacity would be handled in order to avoid macroeconomic effects that could jeopardise poverty reduction.

It also says that governance and human rights are not specifically part of the Panel's mandate but then goes out of its way to comment on human rights in Chad. Yorongar himself was arrested and beaten in May 2001, a few days after the flawed presidential election in which he came second to President **Idriss Déby** (AC Vol 42 No 12). Members of the Inspection Panel had been able to inspect the scars of previous torture for themselves when they visited him in hospital in Paris in April 2001. Campaign groups say the Bank would be wise to call a halt to further building till these issues have been resolved, a call first made by the International Advisory Group on the project.

Habré trial

The project now indirectly dominates every aspect of Chad's messy politics and is influencing Déby's regional relationships. At the same time, the crimes against humanity case against Déby's predecessor, **Hissène Habré**, is about to take a further twist. The case in **Belgium** has been in limbo since a ruling by the International Court of Justice at the Hague over charges filed in Brussels against **Abdoulaye Yerodia Ndombasi**, **Congo-Kinshasa's** Foreign Minister under the late President **Laurent-Désiré Kabila**. The ICJ refrained from confirming the universality of Belgian jurisdiction in human rights cases if the subject of an accusation were not on Belgian soil when the complaint was filed. The 1993 Belgian legislation is ambiguous on this point, leaving Yerodia's lawyers a useful line of appeal. Belgian Foreign Minister **Louis Michel** has close links in Kinshasa, further dampening Belgian political enthusiasm for a maximalist interpretation of the law. The Belgian parliament will debate the issue in October.

Senegal, where Habré has lived since Déby overthrew him in 1990, would not oppose a Belgian extradition request, despite pressure on President **Abdoulaye Wade** from old-guard Francophone leaders. Pursuit of the Habré case would have huge implications for Déby and several other regional leaders.

The lead organisation here is Human Rights Watch, led by its Vice-President, **Reed Brody**. HRW and Amnesty International are adamant that Déby was the key man in atrocities of Habré's era, including 'Black September' 1984, when thousands of anti-Habré southerners were massacred in an operation coordinated by the current President. Pursuing the action against Habré has been tricky: the necessary cooperation from N'djamena has come at a price. Of Déby's culpability, Brody has pragmatically admitted, 'We don't talk about that', despite a damning report from Amnesty last year. This month's report by the *Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l'Homme* accused N'djamena of deliberately obstructing research on the Habré case.

The *Alliance Tchadienne des Droits de l'Homme* says its key goal is to prosecute both Déby and **France**. On 24 August, Déby told journalists that France remained his principal ally, a pointed reminder to Paris that repercussions from the Habré case would affect French leaders as well as himself. ATDH Secretary General **Mahamat Tahir Abderahaman** has repeatedly accused Déby of responsibility for 25,000 deaths. Exiled Chadian human rights activists claim the President is rattled.

Many key operatives from the Habré era remain in senior positions in the feared security service, the *Agence Nationale de Sécurité* (ANS): they want a trial even less than Déby does. Habré's personal security has been stepped up. Belgium has come under intense pressure from the **United States** and France to call the judges off, we hear, amid interdepartmental fighting in all three governments.

It is the other intelligence agency, the *Renseignements Généraux*, answerable to Déby alone, which has been spearheading the President's offensive against his own ethnic group, the Zaghawa, itself a tiny minority of the population. Recent years have seen torture and murder of members of the Bideyat and Borogat clans of the Zaghawa. An attempt by Déby in 1998 to impose his younger brother **Timane** as Sultan of the Bideyat continues to cause conflict, further weakening the presidential powerbase. Resentment remains high among the Borogat, the result of unrest over the alleged ANS murder in 1995 of Chief of Staff **Becher Musa**, a distinguished Borogat. He died in a supposed car accident in Paris, though when Borogat elders opened the coffin in N'djamena, several claim to have seen two bullet holes in his head. Musa has steadily become a more taboo subject as the Doba starting date approaches, according to Zaghawa exiles.

SOUTH AFRICA

Congress gets scratchy

The development summit gives Mbeki less trouble than his own party

The World Summit on Sustainable Development, which overruns Johannesburg this week, is riven by competing interests and chaired by President **Thabo Mbeki**. It is also punctuated by street protestors mourning the betrayal of the revolution. So it will be good practice for the conference of the governing African National Congress at Stellenbosch in December.

The ANC meeting matters more for Mbeki's political career. It will determine the party's campaign team for the 2004 elections, Mbeki's running mate and the next cabinet and it will shape the next generation of leaders. Above all, it will test Mbeki's leadership skills, under attack in his first term of office from both left and right. There will be robust debates about the ANC's alliance with the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) and SA Communist Party (AC Vol 43 No 13), about black economic empowerment, land reform, crime and health. More discreetly in question will be the broader issues of political management and the increasing centralisation of power.

One Mbeki ally, Eastern Cape Premier **Makhinketi Arnold Stofile**, says the nine provincial governments do little more than coordinate, supervise and monitor central policies. There is concern that political patronage, through the promotion of affirmative action companies, looks similar to the former National Party's promotion of Afrikaner capital. The country now has a strong liberal constitution designed to stop such abuses but there is persistent criticism of the ANC's business friends and their ability to circumvent the rules.

The ANC's fractious alliance with Cosatu and the SACP has long been said to be doomed but is likely to hold for the elections since none of the three would benefit from a split now. The junior partners are jockeying for policy concessions. Cosatu plan a two-day general strike on 1 October, blaming ANC policies for job losses (over a million since 1994) and the decline in working class living standards.

At the SACP congress in June, Cosatu said its future lay with the Party. Delegates rejected the pro-privatisation Minister of Public Enterprises, **Jeff Radebe**, and Minister of State **Essop Pahad**, Mbeki's confidant, who were seeking re-election to the SACP Central Committee. Mbeki cancelled his speech to the congress and his main ANC assistant, **Smuts Ngonyama**, mounted a heavy attack on **Jeremy Cronin**, the SACP's deputy leader; Cronin had spoken of the marginalisation of the left in the ANC and accused the party of

'Zanufication' (a reference to the ruling **Zimbabwe** African National Union, ZANU). Cronin subsequently apologised for 'personalising' the issues by targeting Mbeki's leadership.

The centralisation of power in the presidency has increased Mbeki's political muscle but exposed him to attack. Whatever goes wrong – for instance, the government's failings on HIV/AIDS or unemployment – is quickly tracked back to Mbeki. However, open criticism comes only from predictable long-time opponents outside the ANC; within the Alliance, low-key grumbling is the style. The President's position looks unassailable. Last year's potential challengers, **Mathews Phosa**, **Tokyo Sexwale** and **Cyril Ramaphosa**, were besmirched by farcical accusations of conspiracy and are now barely visible. Mbeki takes no chances. His former political advisor, **Vusi Mavimbela**, now heads the security services.

Mbeki's allies

At the ANC's last national conference in 1997, Mbeki got three allies elected to the top six positions: Deputy President **Jacob Zuma**, General Secretary **Kgalema Motlanthe**, Treasurer **Mandi Msimang**. **Mosiua** (formerly **Patrick**) **'Terror' Lekota** (now Defence Minister) won the national chairpersonship, with support from Cosatu and SACP delegates, against the Mbeki-backed candidate, **Steve Tshwete**. Zuma, a front-runner for the party leadership after Mbeki's second term, stoutly resisted attempts to persuade him to challenge the President. Mbeki also won strong backing from the ANC Youth League, whose President, **Malusi Gigaba**, left parliament and now chairs the Umsobomvu Fund investment company.

Mbeki's opponents may try to vote down his allies from the National Executive Committee, who include Radebe, **Ivy Matsepe-Casaburri** (Communications Minister) and **Manti Tshabalala-Msimang** (Health). Defeat for Tshabalala-Msimang, who follows Mbeki's line on HIV/AIDS, would be a symbolic disavowal of his health policy. Other mooted challenges include a run by Defence Minister Lekota against Zuma for deputy President. **Pallo Jordan**, an old Mbeki rival now out of cabinet and in the chair of the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs, might run for Lekota's current position.

Thenjiwe Mtintso, until recently on the SACP Central Committee, has been systematically undermined since her election as ANC Deputy Secretary; ill health may now force her resignation. The dour Housing Minister, **Sankie Mthembu-Mahanyele**, is the approved successor.

Tokyo Sexwale has declined requests by ANC branches in Gauteng, North-West and Limpopo to stand as treasurer. **Winnie Madikizela-Mandela** is still popular and Mbeki's adversaries might have exploited her to undermine him but a long court case about fraudulent accounting in the ANC Women's League rules her out for now; moreover, parliament has disciplined her for non-attendance and Zuma has reprimanded her for failing to hold a Women's League conference.

Mbeki has seen off most of his national opponents but has some problems in the provinces. ANC conference delegations consist of members from the branches, where he is least popular. Three provincial congresses, held in advance of the national congress, have rejected pro-Mbeki candidates – Free State, North-West and Mpumalanga. At issue is the national leadership's prerogative to appoint provincial premiers over the heads of members. North-West Province Premier **Popo Molefe** is not favoured by national leaders because of his non-exile background but he beat the Mbeki-sanctioned candidate, **Thandi Modise**, who chairs the Parliamentary Committee on Defence.

In Free State, late July's provincial congress elected two errant members of parliament, **Ace Magashule** (as chairperson) and **Pat Mathosa** (to the Provincial Executive Committee), reviving squabbles from 1996. Lekota was then Premier, Mathosa Provincial Chairperson

Local, global or both

A coalition calling itself the Social Movement Indaba is organising mass demonstrations around the World Summit on Sustainable Development. President **Thabo Mbeki** and his African National Congress government are confronted by the Anti-Privatisation Forum, the Jubilee debt cancellation campaign, the Rural Development Services Network and many others. Demonstrations by the National Land Committee and the Landless People's Movement quickly led to fierce confrontations with police. 'We don't want this meeting to take place', said **Trevor Ngwane** of the APF.

A similar alliance, highlighting local disputes about government-initiated water and electricity cuts or housing evictions, disrupted the World Conference on Racism in Durban in August 2001. That event coincided with a two-day strike by four million members of the Congress of South African Trade Unions and spoiled the ANC's attempt to show off the new South Africa to over 10,000 foreign delegates and journalists.

This month's demonstrations have been bolstered by anti-globalisation protesters from all over the world (AC Vol 43 No 12), come to join in marches and 'mass actions' in suburban Sandton, where the summit is based. They hope to emulate the people who lobbied and sometimes inconvenienced delegates to international meetings in Seattle and Genoa and are bolstered by well known activists such as **Naomi Klein**, **Susan George** and many others.

and Magashule, on the Provincial Executive Committee. Disputes between factions led by Lekota and by Magashule-Mathosa had paralysed government in the Province. Lekota was later removed, while Magashule and Mathosa were found seats in the national parliament. Magashule's election will give the Province two centres of power; his supporters want him to have a say in how the provincial government is run by uninspiring Premier **Winkie Direko**, appointed by Mbeki. The Lekota-Mathosa skirmishes seem likely to revive.

In Mpumalanga, Premier **Ndawenu Mahlangu** was imposed by Mbeki, who had fallen out with Mathews Phosa. The provincial conference elected **Fish Mahlalela** to the chair, with support from branches unhappy with Mahlangu. The ANC national leadership had hoped to pre-empt a revolt by getting rid of Mahlangu and replacing him by **Thabang Makwetla**, a former party boss in Cape Town who had been hurriedly moved into the provincial legislature. Yet the Makwetla and Mahlangu votes were split.

Limpopo Province (till recently, Northern) will hold its congress soon. **Ngoako Ramathodi**, a Mbeki favourite who previously failed to win the chair against **George Mashamba** of the SACP Central Committee, may fail again. In May 2001, the National Executive disbanded the Provincial Executive and replaced it with a 25-member 'interim leadership core' dominated by former exiles and Mbeki-types, until Mashamba was elected.

There is a big mess in Mbeki's native Eastern Cape Province, where the national leadership stands by the much criticised Provincial Executive Committee led by Premier Stofile and his ministers. **Mkhuseli Jack**, a popular Port Elizabeth politician-turned-businessman, has called on Mbeki to dismiss Stofile; his answer was apparently a reprimand from the party. Allegations of corruption are rife; public services have almost collapsed; provincial ministers leave the public unimpressed, notably Education Minister **Stone Sizani**.

In 2004, after two terms as Premier, Stofile will retire. Potential successors include provincial Finance Minister **Enoch Godongwana** (deployed by Mbeki), **Nceba Faku** (Mayor of the Province's main city, Port Elizabeth) and ANC national spokesperson Ngonyama. Madikizela-Mandela, though not a candidate, is admired by some traditional leaders and rural electors and could cause trouble; another

The intelligence services watch the protesters closely and trawl for spies. Thousands of police have been deployed. The best known faces of the protest movement are Ngwane, **Dennis Brutus** and **Fatima Meer**. Once an ANC exile, Brutus now lives in Pittsburgh, **United States**, and is a celebrity in the anti-globalisation movement. Ngwane, a former ANC councillor in Johannesburg, was expelled from the party for bravely voicing opposition to the privatisation of council services. He now chairs a successful campaign against the privatised former electricity parastatal, Eskom, in Soweto, the million-strong township on the outskirts of Johannesburg.

Professor Meer, a lifelong ANC activist who wrote **Nelson Mandela's** official biography, *Higher than Hope*, has recently led protests in Durban's Indian townships against the ANC-dominated council's housing policy.

Key issues are land, water and housing. Tactics include illegal reconnection of electricity supplies. Yet the movement has its own divisions, notably between ANC-aligned organisations and the more militant groups. An attempt to make peace failed in mid-July; the idea was to create a South African Social Forum, hosted by the South African Non-Governmental Coalition (Sangoco), which is well funded by the European Union. The rival blocs that resulted are the ANC-aligned Global Civil Society Forum of trades unions, churches, Sangoco and some of the once formidable township civic associations and the Social Movement Indaba.

influential loose cannon is former 'homeland' ruler **Bantu Holomisa**, who founded the breakaway United Democratic Movement and resisted ex-President **Nelson Mandela's** attempt to woo him back to the ANC.

In Western Cape, Gauteng, Northern Cape and kwaZulu-Natal (AC Vol 43 No 15), ANC leaders seem to be in control, although kwaZulu-Natal Provincial Chairperson **S'bu Ndebele** could be challenged by a group supporting his deputy, **Zweli Mkhize**. Gauteng is regarded as the best run ANC province and Premier **Mbhazima Shilowa's** government is an inclusive front of Alliance partners. In Western Cape, **Ebrahim Rasool's** leadership has been purged of his enemies and he rules in coalition with the New National Party. Northern Cape is stable but holds fewer than one million widely scattered people, who serve mainly as a labour pool for Gauteng and Cape Town. **Manne Dipico** is secure as Premier but will have served two terms in 2004.

ANC national leaders have failed in their bid to dissolve at least four provincial leaderships. By electing populist leaders, voters can at least assert opposition to the President's growing power. That is a political inconvenience, a reminder of grassroots discontent and an affirmation of democracy but it doesn't come close to removing Mbeki.

CONGO-BRAZZAVILLE

Old guard, new guard

After five transitional years, the former President has a new mandate – of sorts

President **Denis Sassou Nguesso** chose a significant date to end the long transition that began with his forces' defeat of **Pascal Lissouba** in October 1997. The *Fête Nationale* of 15 August commemorates both Independence in 1960 and the ousting of President **Fulbert Youlou** in 1963 after three days of fighting. For Congo's numerous Roman Catholics, it is also a very holy day, the Feast of the Assumption. Sassou Nguesso's inauguration the previous day passed without incident, despite fears of an attack on the capital by Ninja militias loyal to cult leader **Frédéric Bitsangou**, known as *Pasteur Ntumi*.

The rulers of **Central African Republic, Chad, Congo-Kinshasa, Gabon** and **Mali** lined up to pay their respects to Sassou, revelling in his new-found legitimacy as an elected President. In his inaugural speech, he railed against government corruption, lack of transparency, the mismanagement of public funds and the political exploitation of Congo's ethnic divisions, as though someone else had ruled for the past five years. Behind the improbable, bloated, victory of his *Parti Congolais du Travail* (PCT) and its allies in March's presidential and June's parliamentary elections is a real mandate from an electorate tired of war and desperate to see the return of stability.

People want to earn a living and rebuild their lives and homes. They also long for less corruption and a more efficient government, not just one staffed by cronies creaming off income from state oil revenue. A new constitution, adopted by referendum in January using an electoral register which human rights groups harshly criticised, gives the President executive powers to override the bicameral parliament and issue decrees. Ministers are answerable to him, parliament cannot dismiss him.

Sassou chose to bide his time until the visiting heads of state had departed before announcing the new cabinet on 18 August. The electorate might want change but the military and PCT old guard do not. They are strongly suspected of being behind April's attack on the *Chemin de Fer Congo-Océan*, the vital rail link between the port of Pointe-Noire and the capital, June's assault on Brazzaville and the ensuing fighting in the Pool Region south of the capital. All were officially blamed on Ninja rebels. Another train, carrying petrol and medical supplies, was attacked and derailed on 24 August.

The President seems reasonably confident that he has a deal that will prevent his adversaries threatening his hold on power. Two-thirds of the old cabinet have been culled, including strongmen such as **Mathias Dzon**, former Economy and Finance Minister, who was disqualified from the second round of legislative elections for incitement to violence (AC Vol 43 No 12). In his place is **Roger Rigobert Andely**, former Vice-Governor of the regional central bank, the *Banque des Etats d'Afrique Centrale*, in **Cameroon**. **Alain Akoualat**, who made a name for himself as part of Sassou's campaign committee, has been rewarded with the Communications portfolio. **Jean-Pierre Thystère-Tchicaya**, whose *Rassemblement pour le Développement et le Progrès Social* (RDPS) signed an accord with the PCT in December 2000, was elected Speaker of the National Assembly. **Ambroise Noumazalaye**, seen as a PCT hardliner, lost the job of party Secretary General and was voted in as Senate President.

The new cabinet of young technocrats from the private sector has the public hoping that Sassou is serious about shaking up corruption, nepotism and mismanagement. Some of the old guard remain, though, notably the powerful Interior Minister, General **Pierre Oba**, promoted to Minister in charge of Security and the Police. Former Communications Minister **François Ibovi** has also been promoted, to the Ministry for Territorial Administration and Decentralisation, while old-timer **Isidore Mvouba** has gained the biggest prize of Minister of State for Transport and Privatisation.

The cabinet includes just four new ministers from the south, the most populous area, bringing the total to six. Sassou and his supporters come from the north and the three civil wars of the last decade have been fought along this north-south divide. Despite Sassou's claims, peace is far from being achieved and partial elections could not be held as scheduled in Pool at the end of July. The army claims to have retaken places such as Vindza, Kindamba and Kinkala, where past clashes occurred, but has failed to capture Ntoumi and attempts at dialogue with him have been unsuccessful. The army must tread carefully, as Ntoumi's death would create an instant martyr and

damage Sassou's efforts to present himself as a man of peace.

The death of **Jonas Savimbi**, leader of the *União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola*, and the resulting Angolan peace accord, have deprived the Ninjas of a source of weapons. Angolan government forces helped Sassou win the 1997 civil war: so long as he does not entirely control the army, he may need their support again.

Some former deserters who joined militias loyal to Lissouba and former Premier **Bernard Kolélas** have been reintegrated into the army but could again prove partisan. Some 1,800 former militiamen, mostly Sassou's Cobras but also Kolélas's Ninjas (not the ones who now fight for Ntoumi) and Lissouba's Cocoyes, have also been brought into the army but are poorly trained and lack discipline. If fighting resumed, they might return to their old habits of looting and rape.

There are plenty of weapons around. The United Nations Development Programme estimated last year that of 40,000 weapons in circulation during the civil war, 16,000 had been collected. Of the remainder, perhaps a fifth no longer worked, so some 15,000 to 20,000 may still be in the hands of small warlords and militias around the country. The Cobras have hidden their arsenal in their strongholds in Brazzaville's northern districts, while the Ninjas and Cocoyes have cached theirs around Pool. The new cabinet holds nightly meetings well into the early hours, deciding whom to keep and who else to lose from the lower ranks of the old regime.

As the dust settles, dissatisfied old-timers could rally round Dzon. A former finance minister with a considerable fortune, he is believed to wield influence in the army. Sassou will have to tread carefully to neutralise any potential threat from disgruntled former allies but with the feared Gen. Oba still at his side, he can be sure of controlling some of the country's military might, at least for the time being.

The parlous state of Congo's finances belies its status as oil producer but the IMF is pressing for greater transparency. A financial audit of the state-owned *Société Nationale des Pétroles du Congo* (SNPC) is under way and the World Bank is reviewing companies in the oil sector to improve cooperation between the government, private companies and the SNPC, and maximise the government's share of revenues.

Congo's bishops issued an outspoken statement in June calling for legislation to ensure the transparent use of oil revenues, which make up 72 per cent of government income, and for action to convert the national debt into development projects. They are inspired by efforts in Chad to ensure that oil revenues go to alleviate poverty, not just to enrich the ruling elite. The foundations of the problem were laid in Sassou's previous presidency, when the government and **French** state oil company Elf Aquitaine enjoyed a close and mutually beneficial relationship. Many of Elf's old guard are under investigation in Paris. Sassou's old guard is back in power.

NAMIBIA

Post Sam, more Sam?

The veteran President wants to pick his successor but can't quite fix it

The longer leaders stay in office, the more they think themselves indispensable. **Safiishuna Sam Nujoma** helped found the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) in 1960, as a political exile. He went home and has led Namibia since it won Independence in 1990. Now his time is constitutionally up but he is determined that his influence and that of the party old guard will prevail after he steps down in 2004. Some think he will not but he insists that he will.

Nujoma's policies have kept down inter-tribal tensions and ensured the loyalty of Namibia's 80,000, mainly affluent, white citizens, just 4 per cent of its 1.8 million people. The same conciliatory policies have also carried cronyism, politicised promotion in the public service and fostered wasteful public expenditure, including subsidies to state companies such as Air Namibia. He has controlled Namibia and SWAPO by masking stern authority behind the genial public face of 'the Father of the Nation'. Party reformers had hoped the 'Old Man' would allow the free choice of a new leader. It seems that is not to be.

On the **Kenyan** model, Sam Nujoma is determined to keep control of the party after he retires by picking its new leader. He is 74 and in robust health; his retirement home is being built at Henties Bay, north of Swakopmund, a favourite spot for anglers, though he does not want to spend all his time fishing. On 27 August, after SWAPO's national congress of 23-26 August in Windhoek, he unexpectedly reshuffled the cabinet. **Hage Geingob**, Prime Minister since 1990, was replaced by the equally long-serving Foreign Affairs Minister, **Theo-Ben Gurirab**. Gurirab was replaced by Trade and Industry Minister **Hidipo Hamutenya** (though 'for the time being' Nujoma himself kept the Information and Broadcasting part of that portfolio). Geingob, offered the Ministry of Regional, Local Government and Housing, said the job was 'unacceptable' and resigned.

Nujoma has already imposed **Hifekepunye Pohamba**, SWAPO Secretary General since 1997 and one of his closest confidants, to replace the ailing **Hendrik Witbooi** as the party's new Vice-President. He had almost succeeded in installing his own picked leadership. Geingob stood in the way, insisting in a BBC interview that the leadership issue would be resolved at SWAPO's congress in 2004. The party, moulded in the discipline of a liberation movement, is not as malleable as it was. Delegates from its 13 regional organisations can and do face up to the central bureaucracy. The modernisers realise that the emergent middle class in Windhoek and other towns is tempted by the Congress of Democrats, a party founded by former SWAPO members and appealing to its wavering supporters.

The first significant cabinet changes since 1995 and the elevation of Pohamba clarify prospects for the extraordinary party congress that will pick the new leader in 2004. Geingob's resignation curbs the modernisers who broadly favour a more accountable party structure and pragmatism on economic and social issues. He is thought to have damaged his chances by indicating at the end of last year that he would stand down as Premier in 2005, thus obviously positioning himself for a presidential run while rivals, notably Hamutenya, were keeping their heads below the parapet. Geingob and his supporters have failed to back **Zimbabwe's** President **Robert Mugabe**, while Nujoma and the old guard have denounced **Britain's** alleged efforts to reimpose colonial rule. Geingob insists that land reform would continue 'by consensus', though white farmers could be more 'forthcoming'.

Nujoma's move leaves Gurirab and Hamutenya joint favourites: he favours both while keeping his intentions private. Hamutenya, 63, the son of a SWAPO founder member, is the ultimate party insider. Lacking the charisma of Nujoma, Geingob and others, he has a built-in advantage as a Kwanyama, the biggest sub-group of the northern Oshivambo who form most of SWAPO's members and 45 per cent of the population. As Trade Minister, he has attracted foreign investors with tax concessions and the export processing zone. Last year, he took credit for exploiting the **United States** African Growth and Opportunity Act to tempt **Malaysia's** Ramatex into a large textile and garment complex just outside Windhoek, to export finished items duty-free to the US. He lobbied in America to get the rules changed to Namibia's benefit; with equal skill he has cultivated the party's northern bosses, who hold the loyalty of rural voters there.

Gurirab has also cleverly advocated Namibia's interests abroad but has no record of domestic achievement and had notably failed to sort out the state-owned Namibian Broadcasting Corporation, hamstrung by financial mismanagement, corruption and political cronyism. At 64, he is young enough by African leadership norms and he is a team player and ultimate loyalist. He is not openly ambitious like Hamutenya but would clearly respond to a call from Nujoma and the old guard. Like Geingob, Gurirab is Damara, not from the north. This is an advantage: northerners prevail in the party leadership, in the Namibia Defence Force, the para-military Special Field Force and internal security. Nujoma himself, an Ogandjera from a small Oshivambo sub-group, has always tried to maintain the party's ethnic balance.

Pohamba, a northern Kwanyama, is said to be too old at 67 to lead Namibia. The 14 members of SWAPO's secretive Politburo, meeting on 4 August, were startled to hear that Nujoma wanted Pohamba as his number two, with Justice Minister **Ngarikutuke Tjiriange**, 59 and the only Herero minister, as Secretary General. Nujoma's choice was resented but accepted at the subsequent Central Committee meeting, described by participants as 'tense'. The President lashed out at 'a tendency developing among the SWAPO party leadership of forming factions', saying that candidates for party posts were driven by 'self-aggrandisement and political ambitions'. The only open dissent, indicative of the underlying tensions, came when Mines and Energy Minister **Jesaya Nyamu** proposed Hamutenya as an alternative candidate for the vice-presidency. Hamutenya declined and Nyamu was widely thought lucky to survive the cabinet reshuffle, when he moved sideways into Hamutenya's former post at Trade.

Nujoma's choices were accepted without open opposition at the congress but there was hectic lobbying for support in the elections for a new Central Committee. Nujoma was forced to drop a 25 per cent quota plan which would have nominated 21 women to the 83-strong Central Committee; this was deemed impossible since the party constitution says that 57 members must be directly elected and there are already 22 nominated members. A future congress will consider reserving 21 Central Committee seats for 'women comrades'.

In the party elections, most members kept their jobs. Top scorers were Higher Education Minister **Nahas Angula**, a Hamutenya supporter, and Home Affairs Minister **Jerry Ekandjo**, a potential Gurirab/Geingob supporter, each with 395 congress votes. Of the potential candidates, Gurirab did best, coming sixth with 377 votes; Geingob, ninth, took 368 votes; and Hamutenya was 13th with 352.

The 2004 contest should involve Hamutenya and/or Gurirab/Geingob. In mid-August, a delegation including traditional leaders petitioned for a referendum to amend the constitution and allow Nujoma to continue in office. Could the chiefs be his secret weapon?

Visit our website at: www.africa-confidential.com

Published fortnightly (25 issues per year) by Africa Confidential, at 73 Farringdon Road, London EC1M 3JQ, England.

Tel: +44 20-7831 3511. Fax: +44 20-7831 6778.

Copyright reserved. Editor: **Patrick Smith**. Deputy Editors: **Gillian Lusk** and **Thalia Griffiths**. Administration: **Clare Tauben** and **Juliet Amisshah**.

Annual subscriptions including postage, cheques payable to Africa Confidential in advance:

Institutions: Africa £312 – UK/Europe £347 – USA \$874 – ROW £452

Corporates: Africa £404 – UK/Europe £425 – USA \$985 – ROW £531

Students (with proof): Africa/UK/Europe/ROW £87 or USA \$125

All prices may be paid in equivalent convertible currency. We accept American Express, Diner's Club, Mastercard and Visa credit cards.

Subscription enquiries to: Africa Confidential, PO Box 805, Oxford OX4 1FH England. Tel: 44 (0)1865 244083 and Fax: 44 (0)1865 381381

Printed in England by Duncan Print and Packaging Ltd, Herts, UK.

ISSN 0044-6483

Pointers

ZAMBIA

Looking for clues

Zambia's under-paid detectives are no match for the sophisticated networks built up by ex-President **Frederick Chiluba**. The taskforce on allegations of plunder by him (AC Vol 43 No 15) and his cronies is having trouble finding solid evidence and President **Levy Mwanawasa** cannot afford to see his predecessor's team exonerated. Most of the suspect financial transactions involved the intelligence agencies. Chiluba is under house arrest and others have been detained but investigators believe they have destroyed the traces of money laundering, contract kickbacks and fraud.

Mwanawasa needs convictions to give credibility to the accusations he read out in parliament on 11 July. The taskforce has confiscated suspects' vehicles and houses, frozen bank accounts and searched homes. Some arrested were freed on bail, allowing them to regroup. Chiluba's government made theft of a motor vehicle a non-bailable charge: the law's first victim was **Archie Mactribouy**, a businessman accused of flirting with Chiluba's wife, **Vera**. Now Chiluba's ex-Press Officer, **Richard Sakala**, faces a long wait in gaol for trial on a charge of stealing a government vehicle; sacked intelligence director **Xavier Chungu** is accused of stealing six.

Some Zambians think it absurd to hold Sakala and Chungu for ordinary crimes, rather than economic sabotage but the investigators need time and prison might persuade the defendants to give evidence. After a stint in gaol, **Faustin Kabwe**, a financial engineer, has offered to buy his freedom by uncovering Chiluba's so-called financial matrix. Sources close to Chungu say senior officials told him they want Chiluba, not him. Chungu won't cooperate; he's asked Mwanawasa to waive his intelligence oath, so he can defend himself in court without breaking the law.

Mwanawasa has threatened Chiluba with arrest if he testifies that December's presidential poll was rigged. Runner-up **Anderson Mazoka** is trying to have the result overturned and Supreme Court judges have warned Mwanawasa, a lawyer himself, against making such threats.

SUDAN/USA

Not forgotten

The anniversary of the 11 September attacks has brought a surprise for the National Islamic Front government: the demand by over 600 victims' relatives for more than US\$1 trillion in damages. 'The Republic of Sudan' is the only state defendant

in a civil action brought on 15 August: under the Foreign Sovereignty Immunities Act, only states that Washington lists as terrorist can be sued.

The plaintiffs also claim against 99 others, including three leading **Saudi Arabian** princes (**Sultan bin Abdel Aziz**, **Mohamed al Faisal** and **Turki al Faisal**), and a host of businessmen (often Saudi, some already US terrorist-listed, and including **Usama bin Laden**), banks, companies and charities.

The case is brought under several laws, including the recent Anti-Terrorism Claims Act, enabling a new definition of causation. If *Al Qaida* is deemed guilty of the '9-11' atrocities and if defendants are found to have knowingly supported *Al Qaida*, they may be convicted of 9-11.

The NIF's recent attempts to portray Usama as a mere visiting businessman rather than an integral part of its Islamist 'Salvation Revolution' and international network may need revisiting. The claimants note that he was 'invited' to Sudan by **Hassan el Turabi** and describe him as 'under the protection of the Sudanese regime' in a 'symbiotic' relationship (AC Vol 42 No 19).

The lawyers still have much evidence to gather but they are unlikely to be daunted. Leading attorneys on the suit are Ness, Motley of Mount Pleasant. This South Carolina firm has made itself a multi-billion reputation from suing asbestos and tobacco companies. 'They're not worried about annoying the US government and, unlike many leading East Coast attorneys, they don't have Saudi clients', noted one Islamist-watcher. 'If they don't get the evidence, they won't get their fees'.

FRANCOPHONE AFRICA

Poets and presidents

Momentum is gathering behind **Senegal's** ex-President **Abdou Diouf** to become next Secretary General of *La Francophonie* as **Congo-Brazzaville** tries to invigorate the campaign of its nominee, writer **Henri Lopes**. The election should have been held last October at the Francophone summit in **Lebanon**. But this was postponed after the 11 September terror attacks, leaving the outgoing Secretary General, **Egypt's Boutros Boutros Ghali**, to soldier on for another year.

The delay cost Lopes dear. Last year, Diouf's prospects were undermined by the frank reluctance of President **Abdoulaye Wade** to back his predecessor. This left the way open for Lopes, a former deputy Secretary General of the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation and currently Brazzaville's Ambassador to Paris, to secure African backing.

With voting now due this October, again in Beirut, Wade has finally come round to the idea of Diouf's candidacy, aware that it could add to

Senegal's international profile, already raised by its World Cup heroics. Wade's prominence in the New Partnership for Africa's Development has raised his international standing and Wade may no longer mind Diouf leading *La Francophonie*.

Having gracefully accepted defeat in Senegal's election in 2000, Diouf is clear favourite. Lopes risks joining the also-rans, including **Mauritian** ex-Culture Minister **Joseph Tsang Mang Kin** and **Mali's** ex-President **Alpha Oumar Konaré**.

GHANA

Boom boom

It was vintage Flight Lieutenant **Jerry John Rawlings**. His successor, President **John Agyekum Kufuor** (AC Vol 43 No 15), was presiding over 'the worst government Ghana had ever had', Rawlings told women supporters of his National Democratic Congress in Kumasi on 9 August. People shouldn't wait till the 2004 elections to show their opposition: they should resort to 'positive defiance' to stop the rot.

It was a 'boom' speech, so called because it suggests the guns will boom again and return him to power. Rawlings has form: he led two *coups d'état* in 1979 (one successful) and another on 31 December 1981 which gave him power for another 18 years. But he is no longer the hungry radical junior officer. He drove away from the Kumasi meeting in a US\$100,000 Jaguar sports car into which he squeezed his 114 kilogramme frame with difficulty, winning loud cheers from his core constituency (young women).

It wasn't the exhortations to defiance that irked Kufuor's ministers; Rawlings was speaking over the heads of the young women to his former comrades in the military. He claimed a soldier on guard duty at Kufuor's house had fallen from a roof and the government had falsely claimed the man died of illness.

A few weeks earlier, Rawlings had said that 2,000 soldiers were being summarily retired because of continued loyalty to him. That elicited a counterblast from Defence Headquarters in Accra insisting the armed forces were loyal to the constitution not to individuals.

Yet Kufuor is under growing pressure from former military officers led by Major **Mohammed Essah**, who want him to expunge the indemnity clauses from the 1992 constitution which protect Rawlings and allies from prosecution for human rights abuses during his first decade in power. They are frustrated by the government's slow progress in investigating the Rawlings regime. A truth and reconciliation commission has been promised and private investigators have been hired to probe the alleged fortune of Rawlings's family, to little effect. After the booming in Kumasi, that may change.