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Democracy in Postwar Western Europe: The Triumph of a Political Model

The most striking feature of the history of postwar Western Europe is the remarkable uniformity of its political structures. From Italy in the south to the Scandinavian countries in the north, parliamentary democracy became the standard model of political organization. There were of course manifold and substantial points of difference between the fifteen or so states that constituted the somewhat truncated territories of Cold War Western Europe. Some were monarchies, others were or, in the case of Italy, became republics; most were centralized regimes, while the Federal Republic of Germany emphatically was not. Some such as France and Germany acquired new regimes, while the Low Countries and Switzerland remained loyal to their pre-existing constitutions or, in the case of the United Kingdom, failed to acquire a constitution at all. Above all, there remained the very different regimes of the Iberian peninsula and of Greece, where the limited and often Potemkinite structures of parliamentarism could not disguise the fact that real power lay elsewhere. Yet, even taking into account all of these differences, it is the sameness of the political regimes of postwar Western Europe which constitutes their most striking feature. Never perhaps since the *ancien régime* monarchies of Europe in the eighteenth century had a single political model acquired, and more importantly maintained, such a dominance.

Viewed from the end of the twentieth century, the political landscape of Europe from the end of the 1940s to the social and political changes of the 1960s appears neat, controlled and ever so slightly boring. A Europe which in the previous generation had seemed to possess an inexhaustible ability to generate fierce

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ideological conflict and murderous ethnic and social strife had mutated into the polite rituals of parliamentary debates, coalition governments, and regular and unsurprising elections. There is an inescapable air of anti-climax about the Europe of the 1950s: the Communists had been excluded from power and, outside of France and Italy, deprived of much of their immediate postwar popularity, while other disruptive figures such as de Gaulle had been pushed, at least for a while, to the political margins. In their place Europe was ruled, or more exactly governed, by predominantly middle-aged and middle-class men in suits, whose regular rotation of ministerial offices seemed only to reinforce their relative anonymity. Once again a number of contrary examples come readily to mind: the tumult of the Belgian royal crisis of 1950 and, on a larger scale, the collapse of the French Fourth Republic in 1958. But these were indisputably exceptions to the muted temper of the age, in which reheated Catholic-anticlerical disputes about the financing of education, incremental reforms to welfare systems and, above all, the very gradual process of European integration appeared to be the somewhat undramatic successors to the bitter struggles of the preceding thirty years. Conflicts of ideology and above all of social class had not disappeared, but at least within the parameters of formal parliamentary politics there was a tangible and pervasive absence of passion. Non-Communist Europe, it seemed, had attained a new centre of political gravity which was more profound than the mere centrist logic imposed by electoral proportional representation. The breadth of the political spectrum had tangibly narrowed, reinforcing a culture of power-sharing and of compromise within a parliamentary culture, the formal and informal rules of which were widely understood and accepted.

This remarkable phenomenon presents historians of postwar Europe with two inter-related and, to all practical purposes, inseparable questions: Why did democracy acquire such a durable dominance, and why did that democracy take the very particular form that it did? A certain number of easy answers to these questions come readily to mind. The discrediting of authoritarian alternatives in the murderous chaos of the Second World War, the dictates of the predominantly free-market capitalism that emerged out of postwar economic reconstruction, and above all the informal influence exercised by the USA over the states of Western Europe were three factors that clearly defined what was

possible and, more especially, what was not possible in postwar Western Europe. As explanations of the uniformity and distinctive tameness of postwar democracy, these are, however, no more than rough-and-ready explanations. Events in Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet states since 1989 have amply demonstrated that victories of democracy can prove to be more immediately apparent than durably real. This was, or ought to have been, all the more so in the case of mid-century Western Europe. While the transitions in the post-Communist states were overshadowed from the outset by the hegemonic political model of European and US democracy as well as by the qualifications required for membership of Western political, economic and financial organizations, no equivalent straitjacket existed in 1945. A variety of political options was open to the West European states in 1945, but predominantly they opted for only one of them.

Indeed, viewed in a longer historical context, parliamentary democracy was in many respects an unexpected victor of the Second World War in Europe. As the articles by Tom Buchanan and Stefan Berger in this collection well illustrate, no consensual model of democracy had emerged in Europe since the nineteenth century. Democracy as a noun had long required an adjective to acquire any stable meaning. Liberal democracy, social democracy and Christian democracy, as well as French Jacobinism and the anti-statist traditions of anarchism and syndicalism, were not different brands of the same product but rival and largely incompatible political models generated by Europe's haphazard transition to mass (predominantly male) politics. Moreover, during the 1930s and more especially after the German military victories of 1938–40, the parliamentary model of democracy had appeared to have reached the end of its historical life. To the generation who lived through the sufferings of the economic depression of the 1930s and the subsequent failure of the Western powers to respond adequately to the challenge of Nazism, parties and parliaments seemed to be outmoded legacies of nineteenth-century notable politics.[1] The future appeared to lie with more efficient and hierarchical structures of government, and one of the underlying ironies of post-1945 politics was that it marked the triumphal re-emergence of exactly those institutions that only a few years previously had been widely regarded as obsolete.[2]

Nor do the events of the war years themselves appear, at least

at first sight, to have constituted a 'road to democracy'. If the initial impact of the German military victory in Western Europe in 1940 had been to provide unprecedented political opportunities for movements of the authoritarian right, its more durable consequence was to create a less structured and more open environment in which a wide diversity of formerly marginal or suppressed political traditions could flourish. Above all, there was a cult of newness. Nostalgia did not form part of the mood of wartime and liberation Europe, and neither the passage of time nor Nazi oppression served to rehabilitate retrospectively the regimes and rulers of prewar Europe. Instead, the movements which possessed the greatest appeal were those such as Communism, or in some areas Christian Democracy, which could demonstrate their differentness from both the wartime rulers and their prewar predecessors. In addition, a much more profound consequence of the war years was to liberate Europeans from their rulers. The plethora of competing forms of legitimacy which emerged in many areas of Europe during the war years left Europeans free to construct their own political structures or simply to drop out of political life altogether. Perhaps the most striking consequence of this *parenthèse* was a culture of localism, in which the needs of the immediate community took precedence over the more abstract (though much invoked) nation. The fiercely local structures of Resistance movements in southern France, the committees of liberation which multiplied across northern Italy during 1944 and 1945 and, on a more modest scale, the 'anti-fa' committees in western and southern Germany in the summer of 1945, all reflected in their different ways this ascendancy of the local.[3] Though emphatically democratic, their ethos and ambitions resembled more the city-state republicanism of 1848 or even the Paris commune of 1870–1 than they did the structures of parliamentary democracy as they were established after 1945. Indeed, the spirit of primitive egalitarianism, localism and direct democracy which flourished briefly in many areas of Europe around the moment of liberation was in many respects the antithesis of the hierarchical, national and representative structures that came to prevail a few years later. In the urban communities of Belgium and northern France, for example, liberation provided a glimpse of a different form of participatory political community which, however unrealistic it might have been, lies at the heart of the durable sense of disillusionment and

of a missed opportunity that pervades popular memories of the liberation.[4]

Postwar democracy therefore seems to have been a product more of a rupture than of a gradual evolution. Though the post-1945 regimes could be presented as the culmination of a process of progressive democratization that had been taking place since the late-nineteenth century, such an interpretation risks ignoring the extent to which the course of European political history had been flowing — in very different directions — over the previous thirty years. Not surprisingly, the constitutions and regimes established after the war, notably in France and Italy, were very much presented to their populations as new departures. They based their legitimation not on references to an often troublesome history but on their modernity and fitness to meet the challenges of the future. In contrast to the corruption, ineffectiveness and conflicts that were perceived — often unjustly — as having characterized the parliamentary regimes of the past, democracy in its new post-1945 manifestation would provide efficient and modern government, staffed by new men (and even a few women) possessed of new ideas and a new spirit.[5] Such rhetoric, voiced indiscriminately in the later 1940s and 1950s by social democrats, liberals and Christian democrats alike, should not of course be taken at face value. Appeals to the future were often little more than a deliberate attempt by the rulers of postwar Europe to distract attention from their own past actions. Moreover, whatever their claims of newness, regimes such as the Austrian and Italian republics, as has been long recognized, relied heavily on structures and personnel inherited from their authoritarian predecessors.[6]

Nevertheless, even bearing in mind these important qualifications, it is difficult to deny the extent to which postwar democracy marked the emphatic triumph of a new political model. Seen through the prism of hindsight, it is the limitations of that model that seem most evident: the absence of an effective purging of those tainted by a fascist or collaborationist past, the symbolic but superficial enfranchisement of women, and the arbitrary use of state power to marginalize and undermine Communists and those suspected of being, in the loaded language of the age, fellow-travellers. Democracy in these ways was not ‘achieved’ in Western Europe after the war and, indeed, in most states became more circumscribed as the atmosphere of the Cold War gained in

intensity. What, however, did occur was the construction of a particular and relative form of democracy, which like all such phenomena should be considered not in relation to an ideal-type but in the context of the historical reality of the era. Comparison in this respect is an easy but rather redundant game: whether West Europeans were freer or less free in the 1950s compared with earlier or later Europeans, or indeed with their contemporaries in Franco's Spain or Communist Eastern Europe, would seem to matter less, at least to historians, than understanding the particular character of the democratic regimes that emerged.

With a considerable degree of over-simplification, it might be argued that the postwar model of democracy was composed of five key elements. First, it was based on a reassertion of the authority and responsibilities of the nation-state. As Alan Milward has famously argued, Europe after 1945 witnessed the rescue of the nation-state.[7] Far from marking a diminution in the powers of national states, the limited pooling of predominantly economic decision-making that occurred within institutions such as the ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community) and the EEC served to reinforce the viability of individual nation-states. Milward's argument, as applied to the process of European integration, does of course have its critics.[8] But, considered in the context of postwar democracy, it rightly serves to draw attention to the way in which the new political structures were based on a privileging of the nation-state at the expense of regional or local units. Power was often shared by nation-states but it was only rarely devolved to subsidiary layers of government. In France and Italy the new republics were uncompromisingly centralizing in their establishment of a single national assembly as the exclusive repository of democratic authority, while in Belgium and Britain the opportunity for a devolution of political authority from the national level was either missed or simply not considered. The striking exceptions to this trend were of course the Second Austrian Republic and, more especially, the Federal Republic of Germany, where federalism was not merely imposed by the Western Allies but rapidly became a central element of the new political culture. These exceptions notwithstanding, it was, however, the nation-state that constituted the basic unit of currency of postwar democracy. Only, it seemed, by raising democracy to the level of an omnipotent national assembly could

the potentially disruptive and fissiparous consequences of democratic participation be adequately controlled.

The second central element of postwar democracy was therefore the supremacy of parliaments. Monarchs, presidents and judges did not, understandably enough, appear in the harsh light of postwar Europe to be plausible defenders of democratic freedoms. Instead, it was parliaments, assemblies of the directly elected representatives of the undifferentiated mass of the citizenry, that became the fulcrum of the political process.[9] Freely elected national parliaments were the fetish symbols of postwar Western Europe, advertised both to the Communist world and to colonial populations aspiring to freedom from European tutelage as the indispensable institutions of a democratic political system. The emphasis, however, within this parliamentarism was placed more on management and control than it was on mass participation. Retrospective perceptions of the failure of interwar democracy and the electoral rise of anti-democratic movements such as Nazism presented lessons that the new rulers of Europe (fearful of the actual or potential electoral appeal of Communism) were eager to learn. Hence, postwar parliamentarism aimed to be inclusive rather than exclusive: proportional representation gave space for several political movements while guarding against the danger of single-party dictatorship. In turn, coalition governments imposed a logic of compromise whereby everybody could enjoy a share of the spoils of political power. In this way, the postwar parliamentary regimes sought to be respectful of the diversity of the societies within which they operated. This was especially so in the so-called 'pillarized' societies that characterized the Low Countries, Germany and some areas of northern Italy, where the national parliaments provided a forum for what political scientists like to term 'consociational democracy', in which the political representatives of each social pillar, notably the Catholics, Socialists and Liberals, could voice their concerns and reach mutually satisfactory agreements.[10]

Within this parliamentary culture, legitimacy was derived from the will of the people but not exercised by the people. The third characteristic of postwar democracy was therefore that it was emphatically a governed democracy. The fashionable authoritarianism of the interwar years had been decisively swept away, but what replaced it was a 'top-down' culture of public administration in which decision-making was largely remote from the

people. The self-consciously modern structures of administration established after 1945 emphasized the complexity of government. Legislation was prepared by bureaucracies, assisted by a plethora of committees and advisory boards, few of which could claim a direct democratic mandate. Within this process, ministers and parliamentary deputies had only a limited voice; instead, government was primarily a matter for 'experts' around whom clustered a plethora of lobbyists and pressure-groups, each seeking to ensure that their interests were represented in the arcane details of parliamentary legislation and administrative regulation.

The fourth element of the new democracy was therefore that it was based on limited and controlled structures of popular participation. The regimes were certainly participatory; indeed, with the enfranchisement in France, Italy and Belgium of the majority of the adult population that was female, it can, and should, be argued that electoral democracy was established for the first time in most of Western Europe. The most striking characteristic, however, of the enfranchisement of women was the absence of public debate that surrounded it.[11] It owed less to a sea-change in attitudes to issues of gender on the part of most men, and indeed women, than it did to the dominant ethos of postwar democratic politics. All regimes (except of course the obstinate Swiss) felt the imperative to base their legitimacy on the votes of the undifferentiated and equal participation of all adult citizens. Special statutes, exclusive franchises and indirect or hierarchical representation were replaced almost everywhere by the simplicity of universal suffrage. The culture of citizenship that derived from this triumph of electoralism was, however, formal and in many respects rather limited. Every adult was incited, and in some cases obliged, to give his or her personal endorsement to the democratic process by voting soberly and seriously at appointed intervals in national and local elections. Voting, however, was in many respects the beginning and the end of citizenship. Democratic accountability, mass petitioning and still less the unstructured and dangerous actions of crowds did not form part of the ethos of postwar politics. Once their right to vote had been exercised, the people were expected to retreat from the political stage and allow their representatives to act in their name.

The absence of a culture of active and participatory citizenship, and the strident critiques that this would subsequently generate

during the 1960s, demonstrate a fifth, and final, characteristic of postwar democracy. This was its reliance on the individualist and essentially negative definitions of freedom developed by anti-Communist liberals such as Isaiah Berlin and Raymond Aron, and propagated by Cold War propagandizing organizations such as the Congress for Cultural Freedom.[12] In some respects, this vision of freedom, as a freedom to live and to think in a personal sphere independent of the dictates of the state, reflected the marked and abrupt intervention of US notions of liberalism in European political culture after the war. It was also, however, generated from within Western Europe itself. The prolonged nightmare of arbitrary and often violent state actions that constituted most Europeans' abiding memory of the Second World War, as well as the spectacle of 'totalitarian' Communism demonstrated by the show-trials in Eastern Europe and by the bloody suppression of the Hungarian uprising in 1956, served to convince most Europeans that a restricted and individualist definition of liberty had much to commend itself. As Mark Mazower has argued, Europeans rediscovered after 1945 the 'quiet virtues' of democracy. The freedom to get on with one's own life was one that was understandably cherished by a postwar population who were less inclined to influence the actions of the state than to ensure that the state did not once again invade their lives.[13]

This limited and even rather 'lifeless'[14] conception of democracy was of course accompanied by the more material freedoms brought by the enhanced structures of social welfare introduced in many states of Western Europe after the Second World War. Indeed, seen from a British perspective, 1945 has often been viewed as heralding the inauguration of a new and more social definition of democracy. How far this can be generalized to Western Europe as a whole is, however, dubious. There was no sudden espousal of 'the Swedish model' by democracies elsewhere in Europe, where the statist and universalist principles that underpinned the National Health Service, for example, in Britain were largely ignored. Welfare reform, as it developed after the war, was piecemeal and often owed much to prewar precedents. Moreover, its expansion often took place within established insurance structures administered by autonomous 'pillarized' institutions rather than by the state. In this respect, it proved to be Christian Democracy, with its principles of subsidiarity and

concern for the interests of families, that had a considerably greater influence on postwar welfarism than did Social Democracy.[15]

How, then, can historians attempt to address the question posed at the outset of this article as to why democracy assumed the particular contours sketched out above? The answers advanced, often more implicitly than explicitly, in the existing historical writing on immediate postwar Europe have broadly tended to fall within three explanatory paradigms, each of which reflects a particular geographical perspective on the transition from war to peace in Europe. A 'western' interpretation has long seen the 'triumph' of parliamentary democracy as inseparable from the logic of the wartime military alliances. The Second World War, according to this account, was not an *ideological* war (a term which seems too closely associated with Communist views) but it was emphatically a *political* war in which the victory of the Anglo-American allies could not but lead to the establishment of political regimes that emulated the values and institutions of the victorious liberators. Indeed, this was from the outset one of the war aims of Britain and more especially of the USA, for whom the values of the Atlantic Charter provided both a legitimation of the sacrifices of the war and a promise of a better world in which evils such as Nazism (and increasingly Communism) could not re-emerge.

In contrast, a 'southern' interpretation has tended to regard postwar democracy as a product not so much of the Second World War (a term which itself becomes somewhat nebulous when applied to the experiences during the 1940s of Greece, the Balkans or even Italy) as of the subsequent Cold War. It was the integration of states such as Greece, Italy and even to some extent France within the political and security institutions of a US-led Western alliance that imposed an alien model of bourgeois parliamentary democracy on recalcitrant societies. The influence of the USA was diplomatic and political but also, and perhaps more importantly, economic and cultural. In the diplomatic sphere, the USA was often an uncertain superpower, which more often than not found its policies being manipulated to the advantage of the resurgent state bureaucracies of Western Europe.[16] But in a more profound sense, the invasion of American experts, culture and forms of industrial organization that occurred

during the later 1940s and 1950s, as well as the considerable control that the USA exerted discreetly over the armed forces and police structures of Cold War Western Europe, created what Richard Vinen has recently termed an 'American Europe'.[17]

Especially when applied to southern Europe, this emphasis on US power has tended to be accompanied by an implicit or explicit assumption that a 'failed revolution' occurred during the later 1940s. Throughout Mediterranean Europe from Toulouse and Milan to Rome and Athens the victory of the radical political forces generated by the war, including most notably the Communist-led (though not necessarily Communist-controlled) Resistance, was stifled by the *deus ex machina* of the USA, acting in collaboration with the post-fascist elements within each state.[18] According to this account, revolution was defeated militarily by Allied intervention in the Greek Civil War, and politically in Italy, where US actions during the election campaign of 1948 and in particular the uncompromising stance adopted by the formidable US ambassador Clare Booth Luce symbolized, in the words of David Ellwood, the 'situation of limited, political, economic and military sovereignty' occupied by the new Italian republic.[19]

While both of these first two interpretations of the origins of postwar democracy prioritize political and international developments, a third more social explanation has become increasingly influential in recent years. What one might term this 'eastern' interpretation, in that it is often applied with particular emphasis to postwar Germany, stresses the social destruction wrought by the war. The atomized, uprooted and exhausted populations of postwar Europe accepted, more passively than actively, the structures of parliamentary democracy because they came to embody a combination of political stability and economic prosperity that mirrored the more individualist and conservative popular mood. The success of postwar democracy was, according to this account, more negative than positive. The radical alternatives of left and right had been discredited, while the rapid rise in living standards attributed, however misleadingly, to the largesse of the Marshall Plan served to create a durable association between parliamentary democracy and economic prosperity. Fridges and motor cars rather than voting legitimized democracy in the minds of most Europeans.[20]

None of these three arguments lacks plausibility; nor, despite

obvious differences of emphasis, are they necessarily contradictory. The victory of the Western Allies, the subsequent development of the Cold War and the complementary social dynamics of exhaustion and prosperity constitute three essential elements of any convincing historical explanation of the establishment of the postwar democratic regimes. Both individually, and more especially collectively, they do, however, also suffer from shortcomings. All of them prioritize the moment of creation at the expense of the most striking element of the regimes, namely (with the exception of the French Fourth Republic) their remarkable durability. Moreover, all tend towards the circumstantial or even the accidental. By highlighting particular forces within the 1940s they imply that had events within and beyond the war years evolved differently the political outcome, too, would have been very different. In many ways this is no more than a commonsense truth: no war in modern European history contained more unexpected twists and turns than the series of overlapping conflicts that we conveniently but inadequately term the Second World War.[21] The list of might-have-beens is almost endless, which — without wandering into the shoals of virtual history — rightly warns us to regard the outcome of the war as having been highly contingent on particular chains of events. However, it is less clear whether we should transfer such contingency from the military and diplomatic spheres to the political one. Is it really possible to imagine a profoundly different political future for Europe after 1945? Had events evolved differently, culminating perhaps in a compromise peace between Germany and the Western Allies or in some form of Resistance–Communist uprising, the postwar map of Western Europe would have initially looked very different and certainly much less uniform. But, taken over a period of ten or twenty years, it would seem a distinctly plausible proposition that the initial variety of regimes would have converged (undoubtedly rather imperfectly) towards a norm that would not have differed profoundly from the regimes that did in fact establish themselves with accidental abruptness around 1945.

Such arguments suggest that, amidst the contingency of the 1940s, we should not lose sight of the less visible but more durable forces that were moving Western Europe towards some form of corporatist and parliamentary regime. This is not to suggest, in the sub-Hegelian manner of Francis Fukuyama, that

the victory of democracy in Europe was ineluctable; but it does imply that, rather than emphasizing the causal importance of the war, we should perhaps see the emergence of postwar democracy as the consequence of processes that had been occurring over the preceding twenty years. Within this medium-term time-frame of 1930–50, the traumatic events of the Second World War had both a destructive and a catalysing effect, sweeping away many of the institutional and political obstacles to the subsequent establishment of parliamentary democracy but also serving to accelerate trends that had been evident during the interwar years. The consequence was the tangible terminus that Europe appeared to reach around 1949–50, when the often hectic pace of political change over the preceding generation suddenly gave way to the stability and even immobility of the subsequent decade.

Within the context of this article it is of course impossible to do justice to this broader framework of forces. Three themes, however, are perhaps worth highlighting, not because they provide in themselves a complete answer to the problem but because they well illustrate the way in which prewar and wartime events and social, political and economic factors all determined the character of postwar democracy. The first of these is the way in which the events of the war years contributed to a longer-term change in the relationship between the individual and the political process. It is tempting to regard war as a politicizing force; in fact in the case of the Second World War the opposite proved more often to be the case. As has already been remarked, one of the most immediate consequences of the outbreak of war was to suspend or at least substantially reduce national political life. Political elites were often marginalized, either through imprisonment or by being forced into exile; and, except in a few rare havens of relative tranquillity such as Denmark, the war threw into abeyance the institutions of parties, elections and a political press which had long served as the mediating institutions of modern European politicization. Consequently, the war narrowed political and personal horizons. It was the tangible community of the village, town or at most region, rather than the abstract nation, which became the centre of activity and the focus of loyalty. The consequence was an almost archaic strengthening of horizontal loyalties at the expense of vertical hierarchies: people worked together within tangible networks of solidarity rather than within the more vertical structures that have tended to

characterize modern European citizenship.[22] Above all, at a more personal level, the welfare of one's immediate family, amidst the manifold dangers of conscription, aerial bombing and labour deportation, became the overriding and at times exclusive preoccupation of many Europeans. As memoir material and more especially diaries and personal correspondence amply demonstrate, war and foreign occupation provided a forced education for the populations of Europe in unofficial and even illegal ways of behaving, obliging them to rely on family networks, the black market and fraud to 'make ends meet' or simply stay alive.[23]

The social consequences of this experience for postwar Europe were considerable. To the dismay of intellectual commentators, materialism and sheer unabashed selfishness surged after the war as the populations of Europe gratified appetites repressed during the austerity of the preceding years. The consequence was a less conformist society, with higher levels of crime and delinquency, especially among a younger generation for whom the war had disrupted their education and had exposed millions of them to the brutalizing experiences of military service and deportation to work in the Greater Germany or the daily uncertainties of a clandestine life in the *maquis*.[24] Such trends were not merely the short-lived consequences of the war, however, but also marked a social and geographical expansion of the more individualist and consumerist culture that had been developing in the major urban centres of Europe over the preceding decades. The culture of mass-consumption cinema, popular magazines, 'dream' advertising, and US-style beauty contests that continues to dominate the memory of the postwar boom years[25] had its roots emphatically in interwar social trends towards smaller families, a greater concern with personal appearance, and the development of new definitions of female identity. Short hair, make-up and domestic appliances may not seem to our eyes to be plausible agents of women's liberation, but they formed powerful forces which from the 1920s onwards had been offering new and very popular ways of being female within West European society.[26]

It would be rash to construct too close a connection between what Louis Aragon famously dismissed as this 'civilization of bathtubs and frigidaires'[27] and the political structures of postwar Europe. Nevertheless, there are evident parallels between the more individualist and in some respects egalitarian society of Europe in the 1940s and 1950s and the less ideological and more

materialist agenda of postwar democracy. Politics made fewer demands on people, according them an enhanced private sphere removed from the dictates of the state. Political movements, with the marked exception of Communism, and to a lesser extent Catholicism, sought not to mobilize people *en masse* but to appeal to them as individuals. Politics, to borrow the famous observation of Carl Schorske about *fin-de-siècle* Vienna, had moved into 'a new key'.[28] Crowds and even mass meetings were a declining element of politics in Europe by the 1950s, and had been displaced by new and more private methods of electioneering. Especially within the pillarized societies of Catholic Europe, political choice was still defined more by family background and upbringing than by personal choice, but politicians could no longer take the uncritical allegiance of their supporters for granted. The more self-conscious citizens of postwar Europe, the majority of whom it must be recalled were women, expected tangible personal rewards in return for their votes. Taxation levels, economic subsidies and welfare benefits (which came to focus more on issues of life enhancement than on the elimination of real deprivation) all formed part of the personal balance-sheet whereby many voters calculated their political choices.[29]

A second theme within the history of prewar and wartime Europe that contributed to the resilience of postwar democracy was the reconfiguration that took place in the structure and attitudes of social elites. It is an oft remarked aspect of the democratic systems of Europe in the interwar years that they failed to engage the support of many social elites. In marked contrast, the elites of postwar Europe almost universally regarded parliamentary democracy as the best guarantor of their economic interests and social influence. This change in part reflected an evolution in political loyalties on the part of certain elites, notably industrialists;[30] but it was also the consequence of changes in the composition of the elites themselves. The war years witnessed the final demise of certain pre-industrial elites, such as the *Junkerdom* of Eastern Germany, but also the resurgence of other 'natural' elites, whose power had been marginalized by the development of mass politics over the preceding decades. The suspension of the political process, and the reorientation of loyalties to local communities, offered opportunities to landowners, lawyers and other men of social substance to regain, or discover for the first time, their role as local 'notables'. They became the privileged inter-

mediaries in dealings between the community and external authorities such as the German occupiers, Resistance movements or subsequently Allied liberators. It was, moreover, a role deliberately encouraged by the various occupation authorities who on the whole preferred to deal with these 'community leaders' than with those disruptive groups, such as pro-German collaborationist enthusiasts or the Anti-Fa committees in Germany in 1945, whose pretensions to leadership could not disguise their lack of real influence.[31]

The Catholic Church acquired a stature of particular importance within these wartime elites. The institutional reorganization of the Church undertaken during the pontificate of Pius XI (1922–39) as well as the rapid expansion in affiliated social organizations such as Catholic Action ensured that the Church was particularly well placed to seize the new opportunities offered by the war years.[32] The uncertainties and material sufferings of wartime provoked a significant if circumstantial rise in religious practice, but also an increased demand for its social and charitable role.[33] In Italy after the collapse of the Mussolini regime and in southern Germany during the summer of 1945, the bishops, local clergy and the lay Catholic elites became, in the absence of any other structures of effective government, the one grouping that possessed both the legitimacy and the resources to act as the leader of the local community.[34]

With the re-establishment of state and political authority after liberation, the Church and the other 'notable' elites abandoned many of the informal roles that they had assumed during the war. This was, however, a gradual process and one which on the whole conciliated these elites rather than displacing them. Studies of postwar conservative politics have well demonstrated how the 'new men' who appeared on the national political stage after 1945 were in reality often bourgeois figures who had come to prominence at a local level over the previous decade. This was especially so in the case of the lay Catholic elites who moved effortlessly from their prewar and wartime activities in Catholic social organizations into the nascent structures of the postwar Christian Democrat parties.[35] While the ecclesiastical hierarchies in France and Italy initially viewed with distrust the secular and republican regimes that emerged after the war, fearing a resurgence of the anti-clerical campaigns of the turn of the century, their anxieties were rapidly allayed as they discovered

the more reliable opportunities that parliamentary regimes provided for guaranteeing Catholic interests compared with the unpredictable dictatorships of the 1930s.[36]

As well as conciliating pre-existing elites, the new democratic regimes proved successful at integrating those new elites who had been coming to the fore over the preceding decades. Prominent among these was a newly ambitious state bureaucracy, composed of professional and qualified administrators eager to implement policies of social and economic modernization. In the 1930s, these bureaucrats had been frustrated by the immobilism and perceived corruption of parliamentary regimes and had often been attracted by fashionable projects of authoritarian reform. After the war, however, they found a more congenial home in the new state structures of Western Europe, where the dominant ethos of expert government and incremental reform flattered the ambitions of civil servants and accorded them considerable freedom of action. Thus, for example, technocrats such as Jean Monnet played an influential role in devising state-led policies of economic modernization during the French Fourth Republic, before often transferring to the newly established institutions of European integration which by operating at a further remove from democratic control rapidly became a privileged and durable domain of autonomous bureaucratic action.[37]

Closely allied to state bureaucrats was the burgeoning world of well-organized and professional social organizations and lobbyists. The clarity of the nineteenth-century struggle of capital and labour had long been replaced by a much more crowded arena in which the formerly dominant role of trade unions was overshadowed by sectional interest-groups, including business and farmers' organizations, and a plethora of more specialized lobby-groups. Once again, the postwar regimes proved able to draw these organizations into their processes. The enhanced role accorded to non-elected advisory committees and to scrutiny by parliamentary committees removed government from the domain of mass politics and offered ample opportunities for those with particular interests to influence the actions of the state. Some regimes were of course more successful in this respect than others. Some of the problems of the French Fourth Republic, prior to the Algerian Crisis, seem to have stemmed, for example, from the way in which agricultural and small-business interests felt that they were not being listened to sufficiently by those in

power.[38] Elsewhere, however, and more especially in those states ruled by Christian Democrat parties, the process of government increasingly took on a neo-corporatist character as a multi-layered process of social negotiation developed within the parties themselves, within the socio-economic institutions, within parliament and ultimately within the government. It may have been neither publicly transparent nor even particularly democratic, but as a way of ensuring that everybody felt that their voice was being heard it generally worked.[39]

Alongside the relative success with which postwar democracy responded to shifts in elite power, it also rested firmly on a class coalition of the middle class and of rural populations, supported in some states by the non-Communist organizations of the working class. This durable class alliance provides a third, and final, underlying theme of the success of postwar democracy. It was based above all on the way in which since the 1920s power in much of Western Europe had shifted significantly, and often quite dramatically, away from the industrial working class. The 'forward march' of the working class evident since the mid-nineteenth century had been abruptly ended by three successive crises: the economic depression of the early 1930s, the emergence of authoritarian regimes which ruthlessly deployed state power to destroy autonomous institutions of working-class organization, and ultimately the Second World War itself. It is difficult to exaggerate the extent to which the war was destructive of the working class of Europe. Killed (or taken prisoner) on the battlefields, bombarded in their factories and neighbourhoods by aerial warfare, and subjected to often ruinous impoverishment by the actions of the authorities and of employers, they were the incontrovertible social victims of the war.[40] The consequence was seen most immediately in the surge in strikes, pillaging, food riots and other forms of popular protest, including carnivalesque rituals of purging, which continued beyond the moment of liberation into the politics of the immediate postwar years. But its more durable legacy was evident in the strange invisibility of the working class in much of the political life of postwar Europe. The younger, less articulate and above all less internally structured working class that emerged from the war was poorly placed to achieve its goals within the political process. Though the elaborate structures of socio-economic corporatism put in place in a number of European states in the late-1940s superficially

institutionalized the voice of trade unions within the making of government policy, these often served merely to oblige trade-union leaders to accept sacrifices in the name of the national interest and economic modernization.[41] Unsurprisingly therefore many workers chose to reject these formal processes, and opted to pursue their goals more directly through strike action or, as was notably the case in northern Italy and France, through allegiance to the oppositional counter-culture of Communism.

Part consequence and part cause, the decline in the industrial working class was accompanied by a rise in the social power and political influence of rural populations and of the middle class. This change was particularly marked in the case of the commercial farmers of predominantly northern Europe who during the preceding decades had borne the brunt of state action and economic change. Overproduction, cheap imports and the increased levels of state taxation and regulation imposed since the First World War explain why farmers had been a volatile and embittered social group during the interwar years, frequently attracted by the anti-politician and anti-urban rhetoric of movements of the extreme right.[42] The Second World War, however, provoked a transformation in urban–rural relations. The food shortages of the war and its aftermath created a much more favourable economic environment for commercial farmers who were able to evade state regulation with relative impunity and were well placed to benefit from the primitive capitalism of the black market. Wealth shifted from the town to the countryside and with it came a change in political power. The political systems that emerged in postwar Europe were highly attentive to the interests of rural populations and more especially to the organizations of commercial farmers, which were the rural communities' most vocal spokesmen.[43] Indeed, one might argue, albeit with some exaggeration, that much of postwar Western Europe was governed from the countryside through the reliance of Christian Democrat parties on rural votes and the influential position that agricultural lobby-groups attained within the machinery of government. Once again, their actions may not have been especially democratic but, by forestalling any resurgence in rural support for the extreme right, they contributed significantly to the stability of the postwar democratic order.[44]

The war also reinforced the social and political power of the middle classes of Western Europe. The term 'bourgeois'

has understandably long haunted historical writing on postwar Europe. The personnel, values and very appearance of the regimes all reflected the way in which they appeared to find their fulcrum in the middle class.[45] This political dominance rested upon durable processes of social and economic change which had their origins as far back as the 1920s. The diversification of the European industrial economy, and the opportunities that it provided for new strata of professionals and technicians, as well as the enhanced importance accorded to educational qualifications, had forged an expanded and above all more self-confident European middle class which dominated, almost effortlessly, the new economy and society that emerged from the ruins of the Second World War. They also provided the vast majority of its political elites. Through the channels of Resistance activism, Christian Democracy or even, increasingly, Social Democracy, the new political leaders who came to the fore after 1945 were predominantly lawyers, intellectuals and other professionals who inhabited a common middle-class culture. Differences of ideology and confession did of course persist, but perhaps the most durable effect of the destructive changes wrought by the Second World War was the way in which it flattened many of the internal divisions of stratification and culture that had formerly characterized middle-class society. The European bourgeoisie that emerged from the 1940s remained a heterogeneous concept, but it was one that found itself better able to unite around its social interests and more especially around the structures of parliamentary democracy.

The three themes highlighted in this article — of changes in the nature of European political life, of the integration of social elites, and of shifts in class alliances — do not provide a complete explanation of the phenomenon of postwar democracy. Other factors mentioned earlier, such as the impact of the Cold War, and of course the enormous stabilizing effect provided by postwar economic growth, will remain indispensable elements of any adequate answer. But they do demonstrate that in seeking to address this problem historians need to go beyond the political circumstances of the immediate postwar era. Problems of continuity and change in this context, as in so many others, appear somewhat redundant. There was of course no 'year zero' in Europe after the demise of Nazism, and the regimes that emerged

were simultaneously a development of and a break from the legacies of the past.[46] Above all, they were the culmination of a multi-layered process of change that since the 1920s had been transforming the structures of European mass society and politics, which themselves had developed over the preceding century. In some states, of which Germany and Italy are of course the most dramatic examples, that change took place by means of a series of traumatic ruptures. Elsewhere, as in the Netherlands or Britain, the process of change was so gradual as to be almost invisible. Everywhere, however, the political system that emerged after 1945 was one that rested on substantially different bases from the parliamentary regimes of the past.

The degree of political stability achieved after the war can of course easily be exaggerated. This article has avoided, rather deliberately, any analysis of the political crisis that destroyed the French Fourth Republic as well as the durable cleavage within European politics provoked by the enforced marginalization of Communist parties. This is not to deny the importance of such aspects of postwar history, but they remain exceptions to the way in which Western Europe remained obstinately wedded to a centrist and parliamentary course. The other options available after 1945, such as the personal rule of De Gaulle or a Popular Front of Left forces, rapidly fell by the wayside. In that sense, there appears to have been a more profound match between the politics of Europe and its socio-economic character than is explained by the short-term circumstances of the immediate post-war era. Europe, it seems, got the regimes that it deserved, and which in some real sense it perhaps needed.

The realities that underpinned the success of the postwar regimes did not of course prove immutable. Many if not all of the factors highlighted in this article had waned by the later 1950s, opening the way initially to the presidentialism of the early Fifth Republic in France and subsequently to the wider social and political upheavals of the later 1960s and early 1970s. These events gave new energy to forces of the Left and Right, which had been marginalized after the Second World War, and also generated wide-ranging critiques of the limitations of postwar democracy.[47] Its compromising and centrist character, its highly gendered nature, and above all its lack of a culture of active citizenship were all subjected to vocal and even violent criticism. Such attacks were of course often all too justified and, though

their practical consequences often proved meagre, they serve to warn against any teleological interpretation of the history of democracy in twentieth-century Europe. Democracy did not advance as a single model towards perfection but took on a series of consecutive forms, none of which can be regarded as anything other than the products of its age.

Notes

1. Z. Sternhell, *Neither Right nor Left: Fascist Ideology in France* (Berkeley 1986). See also A. Groth, *Democracies against Hitler: Myth, Reality and Prologue* (Aldershot 1999).

2. At an individual level, this change in political fashions also caused political figures to change their attitude to democracy. In Belgium, the Socialist Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak had been one of the fiercest critics of parliamentary politics during the 1930s, advocating its replacement by a somewhat authoritarian 'socialisme national'. After 1945, however, he re-fashioned himself as a staunch defender of Western parliamentary democracy: see M. Dumoulin, *Paul-Henri Spaak* (Brussels 1999).

3. H.R. Kedward, 'Introduction', in H.R. Kedward and N. Wood, eds, *The Liberation of France: Image and Event* (Oxford and Washington, DC 1995), 1–9; D.W. Ellwood, *Italy, 1943–1945* (Leicester 1985), 184–6; R. Boehling, *A Question of Priorities: Democratic Reform and Recovery in Postwar Germany* (New York and Oxford 1996), 162–77.

4. M. Conway, 'Justice in Postwar Belgium: Popular Passions and Political Realities', in I. Deak, J. Gross and T. Judt, eds, *The Politics of Retribution in Europe: World War II and its Aftermath* (Princeton 2000), 152; R. Damiani and J.-P. Thuillier, 'Introduction à l'histoire orale de la région du Nord', *Revue du Nord*, Vol. 57 (1975), 313–28.

5. J.-P. Rioux, *The Fourth Republic, 1944–1958* (Cambridge 1987), 109; P. Ginsborg, *A History of Contemporary Italy: Society and Politics 1943–1988* (London 1990), 100–1.

6. C. Duggan, 'Italy in the Cold War Years and the Legacy of Fascism', in C. Duggan and C. Wagstaff, eds, *Italy in the Cold War: Politics, Culture and Society, 1948–58* (Oxford and Washington, DC 1995), 3–6; R. Knight, 'Narratives in Postwar Austrian Historiography', in A. Bushell, ed., *Austria, 1945–1955: Studies in Political and Cultural Re-emergence* (Cardiff 1996), 26–30.

7. A. Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State* (London 1994, rev. edn).

8. A. Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht* (London 1999).

9. Rioux, op. cit., 107–9; D. Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century* (London and New York 1996), 131.

10. A. Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1968); K.R. Luther, 'From Accommodation to Competition: The "Normalization" of the Second Republic's Party

System', in K.R. Luther and P. Pulzer, eds, *Austria, 1945–1995: Fifty Years of the Second Republic* (Aldershot 1998), 126–30.

11. H. Diamond, *Women and the Second World War in France, 1939–48: Choices and Constraints* (Harlow 1999), 184; A. Rossi-Doria, 'Italian Women Enter Politics', and S. Chaperon, '"Feminism is Dead. Long Live Feminism!": The Women's Movement in France at the Liberation', both in C. Duchen and I. Bandhauer-Schöffmann, eds, *When the War Was Over: Women, War and Peace in Europe, 1940–1956* (London and New York 2000), 95 and 146–60; E. Witte, 'Tussen restauratie en vernieuwing. Een introductie op de Belgische politieke evolutie tussen 1944 en 1950', in E. Witte, J.C. Burgelman and P. Stouthuysen, eds, *Tussen restauratie en vernieuwing* (Brussels 1990), 20.

12. M. Ignatieff, *Isaiah Berlin: A Life* (London 1998); P. Grémion, *Intelligence de l'anticommunisme* (Paris 1995); P. Coleman, *The Liberal Conspiracy: The Congress for Cultural Freedom and the Struggle for the Mind of Postwar Europe* (New York and London 1989).

13. M. Mazower, *Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century* (London 1998), xi. See also Boehling, op. cit., 209.

14. B. Marshall, 'The Democratization of Local Politics in the British Zone of Germany: Hanover, 1945–47', *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 21 (1986), 445.

15. Sassoon, op. cit., 137–49; P. Baldwin, *The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class Bases of the European Welfare State, 1875–1975* (Cambridge 1990), 158–62; H.L. Wilensky, 'Leftism, Catholicism and Democratic Corporatism: The Role of Political Parties in Recent Welfare State Development', in P. Flora and A.J. Heidenheimer, eds, *The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America* (New Brunswick and London 1981), 345–82.

16. W. Hitchcock, *France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944–1954* (Chapel Hill and London 1998).

17. R. Vinen, *A History in Fragments: Europe in the Twentieth Century* (London 2000), 308–16; V.R. Berghahn, *The Americanization of West German Industry, 1945–1973* (Leamington Spa 1986); T. Barnes, 'The Secret Cold War: The CIA and American Foreign Policy in Europe 1946–1956', *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 24 (1981), 399–415, and Vol. 25 (1982), 649–70.

18. E.g. T. Judt, ed., *Resistance and Revolution in Mediterranean Europe, 1939–1948* (London and New York 1989); T. Behan, *The Long Awaited Moment: The Working Class and the Italian Communist Party in Milan, 1943–1948* (New York 1997).

19. T. Sfikas, *The British Labour Government and the Greek Civil War, 1945–1949: The Imperialism of Non-Intervention* (Keele 1994); Ellwood, op. cit., 241; D.W. Ellwood, 'Italy, Europe and the Cold War: The Politics and Economics of Limited Sovereignty', in Duggan and Wagstaff, eds, op. cit., 25–46. US influence was, of course, not confined to southern Europe. US policies had a formative influence on the character of postwar German politics: D.E. Rogers, 'Transforming the German Party System: The United States and the Origins of Political Moderation, 1945–1949', *Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 65 (1993), 512–41.

20. This is the interpretation presented in Mark Mazower's influential and persuasive work *Dark Continent*, 294–6.

21. J. Keegan, 'Do We Need a New History of the Second World War?', in S.

Ekman and N. Edling, eds, *War Experience and National Identity: The Second World War as Myth and History* (Södertälje 1997), 84.

22. L. Taylor, *Between Resistance and Collaboration: Popular Protest in Northern France, 1940–45* (Basingstoke and London 2000), 147.

23. For example, A. Lefébure, *Les conversations secrètes des français sous l'occupation* (Paris 1993), and B. Groult and F. Groult, *Journal à quatre mains* (Paris 1994). See also Boehling, op. cit., 275, and Marshall, op. cit., 446.

24. M. Conway, 'The Liberation of Belgium, 1944–1945', in G. Bennett, ed., *The End of the War in Europe: 1945* (London 1996), 131–2.

25. V. De Grazia, 'Mass Culture and Sovereignty: The American Challenge to European Cinemas, 1920–1960', *Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 61 (1989), 53–87; S. Gundle, 'Feminine Beauty, National Identity and Political Conflict in Postwar Italy, 1945–54', *Contemporary European History*, Vol. 8 (1999), 359–78; R. Kuisel, *Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization* (Berkeley 1993).

26. M.L. Roberts, *Civilization without Sexes: Reconstructing Gender in Postwar France, 1917–1927* (Chicago 1994); S. Reynolds, *France between the Wars: Gender and Politics* (London and New York 1996). See also the perceptive analysis of postwar consumer culture in E. Carter, *How German Is She? Postwar German Reconstruction and the Consuming Woman* (Ann Arbor 1997).

27. Kuisel, op. cit., 38.

28. C. Schorske, 'Politics in a New Key: An Austrian Trio', *Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 39 (1967), 343–86.

29. Vinen, op. cit., 364–7. The evolution of European Socialist parties towards a *Volkspartei* strategy capable of appealing to all strata of the population reflected this change in political culture. See D. Parness, *The SPD and the Challenge of Mass Politics: The Dilemma of the German Volkspartei* (Boulder 1991); S. Timperman, '1945–1954. Le PSB s'ouvre aux classes moyennes', *Revue belge d'histoire contemporaine*, Vol. 28 (1998), 445–98.

30. R. Vinen, *The Politics of French Business, 1936–45* (Cambridge 1991); G. Kurgan-Van Hentenryk, 'Le patronat et la mise en oeuvre du pacte social', and G. Kwanten, 'Het katholiek patronaat, het Sociaal Pact en de uitbouw van de overlegeconomie 1944–1954', both in D. Luyten and G. Vanthemsche, eds, *Het Sociaal Pact van 1944* (Brussels 1995), 211–26 and 289–304.

31. J. Gérard-Libois and J. Gotovitch, *L'an 40* (Brussels 1971); Y. Le Maner, 'Town Councils of the Nord and Pas-de-Calais Region: Local Power, French Power, German Power', in T. Kirk and A. McElligott, eds, *Opposing Fascism: Community, Authority and Resistance in Europe* (Cambridge 1999), 97–119; Marshall, op. cit., 413–51; Boehling, op. cit., 271.

32. M. Conway, *Catholic Politics in Europe, 1918–1945* (London and New York 1997), 40–4; M. Agostino, *Le Pape Pie XI et l'opinion publique (1922–1939)* (Rome 1991).

33. V. Drapac, *War and Religion: Catholics in the Churches of Occupied Paris* (Washington, DC 1998).

34. J.-L. Clément, *Monseigneur Saliège, archevêque de Toulouse, 1929–1956* (Paris 1994); J.-D. Durand, 'L'épiscopat italien', in J. Sainclivier and C. Bougeard, eds, *La Résistance et les Français* (Rennes 1995), 95–108; E. Frei, 'Brot und Sinn. Katholizismus und Caritasarbeit in der Zusammenbruchgesellschaft 1945', *Historisches Jahrbuch*, Vol. 117 (1997), 129–46; W. Blessing, '"Deutschland in Not, wir im Glauben . . .". Kirche und Kirchenvolk in einer katholischen

Region, 1933–1949', in M. Broszat, K.-D. Henke and H. Woller, eds, *Von Stalingrad zur Währungsreform. Zur Sozialgeschichte des Umbruchs in Deutschland* (Munich 1988), 3–111.

35. J. McMillan, 'France', in T. Buchanan and M. Conway, eds, *Political Catholicism in Europe* (Oxford 1996), 61; P. Pasture, 'Entre église et citoyen', in *Un parti dans l'histoire, 1945–1995. 50 ans d'action du Parti Social Chrétien* (Louvain-la-Neuve 1996), 269–70; M. Conway, 'The Age of Christian Democracy: The Frontiers of Success and Failure', in T. Kselman, ed., *Christian Democracy: Comparative Perspectives and Future Prospects* (Notre Dame, forthcoming).

36. C. Warner, *Confessions of an Interest Group: The Catholic Church and Political Parties in Europe* (Princeton 2000).

37. E. Roussel, *Jean Monnet* (Paris 1996); P. Mioche, *Le plan Monnet. Genèse et élaboration 1941–1947* (Paris 1987).

38. Rioux, op. cit., 218–23.

39. M. Fulbrook, *Germany 1918–1990: The Divided Nation* (London 1991), 254–6; Luther, op. cit., 130; M. Conway, 'The Age of Christian Democracy'.

40. The wartime history of the working class is a field that demands further research. See Taylor, op. cit, and Behan, op. cit.

41. E.g. D. Luyten, *Sociaal-economisch overleg in België sedert 1918* (Brussels 1995), 123–56. A rather different school of interpretation stresses how the corporatist structures established after 1945 strengthened the influence of working-class organizations over governmental decisions. See, for an example of this argument, S. Berger, 'European Labour Movements and the European Working Class in Comparative Perspective', in S. Berger and D. Broughton, eds, *The Western European Labour Movement and the Working Class in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford and Washington, DC 1995), 247.

42. R.O. Paxton, *French Peasant Fascism* (New York and Oxford 1997); J. Osmond, *Rural Protest in the Weimar Republic: The Free Peasantry in the Rhineland and Bavaria* (New York and Basingstoke 1993); R.G. Moeller, *German Peasants and Agrarian Politics, 1914–1924: The Rhineland and Westphalia* (Chapel Hill and London 1986).

43. G. Noël, *France, Allemagne et 'Europe Verte'* (Bern 1995).

44. A.J. Nicholls, *The Bonn Republic: West German Democracy, 1945–1990* (London and New York 1997), 107–8; A. Parisella, 'La base sociale della Democrazia Cristiana Italiana. Elettorato, iscritti e organizzazione', in E. Lamberts, ed., *Christian Democracy in the European Union* (Leuven 1997), 197; W. Müller, F. Plasser and P. Ulram, 'Wähler und Mitgleider der ÖVP 1945–1994', in R. Kreichbaumer and F. Schausberger, eds, *Volkspartei: Anspruch und Realität* (Vienna 1995), 171–2.

45. Mazower, op. cit., 305.

46. R. Van Doorslaer, 'De oorlog tussen continuïteit en verandering. Vragen en problemen', in L. Huyse and K. Hoflack, eds, *De democratie heruitgevonden. Oud en nieuw in politiek België, 1944–1950* (Leuven 1995), 17–26. See also the comments of Tony Judt in his Preface to Deak, Gross and Judt, eds, op. cit., ix–xii.

47. A. Marwick, *The Sixties: Cultural Revolution in Britain, France, Italy and the United States, c.1958–c.1974* (Oxford 1998).

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