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Bouteflika digs in

President Abdelaziz Bouteflika's allies won a big majority in parliamentary elections despite the continuing violence. The international 'war on terror' means substantial new support from Europe and the USA for his war on Islamist violence. Western governments let a low poll turnout and a boycott in the Kabylie region pass without comment.

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Last of the dinosaurs

The sacking of Prime Minister Agbéyomé Kodjo suggests the race to succeed President Gnassingbé Eyadéma may have started. But there is no obvious candidate with the skills to lead Togo out of decades of steadily deepening economic and political paralysis.

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After an uncertain start, President Levy Mwanawasa has settled into the presidency enough to take on his predecessor, Frederick Chiluba. Corruption and libel accusations are flying and the row threatens to split the ruling party.

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NIGERIA

Beware false profits

Booming Christian fundamentalist sects make good business but not good politics

Religion is moving fast up the political agenda, as elections loom next year. From antagonistic theological positions, Christian and Muslim fundamentalists explain Nigeria's growing poverty, corruption and crime; as disillusion with mainstream politicians grows, the opposing fundamentalisms grow stronger and the room for dialogue narrows.

Islamists demand 'Allah's law not man's law'. They reject a national government headed by a Christian, especially a proselytising Christian like President **Olusegun Obasanjo**, who delayed the announcement of his presidential ambitions for 2003 while waiting for a message from God. Fundamentalist Christians are just as exclusivist: leaders of the burgeoning Pentecostal movement argue that supporters of the *Sharia* (Islamic law) criminal code should support it in a separate state. Since civilian rule was restored in 1999, thousands of people have been killed in fighting sparked by the imposition of *Sharia* in northern states such as Kaduna and Kano.

The issue of *Sharia* has split the North between the Muslim majority, many of whom backed it to fight rising crime, and the Christian minority for whom it represents an attack on civil rights. States which have adopted the *Sharia* criminal code haven't cut poverty or crime. Meanwhile, some *Sharia* exponents are accused of grand corruption. Neither Muslim nor Christian leaders advocate political and economic reforms that might tackle crime and economic decline.

In the formerly peaceful city of Jos in the Middle Belt, religious violence claimed hundreds of lives last October and flared again last month. Politicians exploit the issue in the lead up to next year's presidential and legislative elections. Many northern Muslim politicians use *Sharia* to prove their northern nationalist credentials, denouncing their southern political adversaries under Obasanjo, a south-western Christian. General **Muhammadu Buhari**, the former military ruler seeking the presidential nomination of the All People's Party (AC Vol 43 No 9) backs the *Sharia* criminal code and calls on states with substantial Muslim populations to implement it.

Traders in the temple – miracles on demand

This may not win many votes. There is no reliable census, so nobody knows how many Nigerians are Muslim, how many are Christian and how many stick to traditional belief systems – or any combination thereof. It is widely assumed that Muslims and Christians are roughly equal in numbers. Most Muslims are in the north, most Christians in the south but there are substantial numbers everywhere. Many Muslims oppose the *Sharia* criminal code as divisive and ineffectual; Pentecostal proselytising jars on many Christians.

Pentecostal Christianity, with its missionary zeal for conversion, rivals Islam as the world's fastest growing religious movement and is one of Nigeria's most successful exports after oil, as teams of Pentecostal missionaries head for Europe to stem the tide of atheism and win converts from all races. The best attended Christian church in **Britain** is a Nigerian Pentecostal church in East London. The charitable status of many UK churches allows them to claim back the tax paid on donations by their congregations.

Nigeria's mainstream religions are appalled by the rapid growth of the rival churches. Anglican (Episcopal) and Roman Catholic priests question the doctrinal integrity of the new pastors, suspecting many of financial rather than religious motives.

The Pentecostal Fellowship of Nigeria, an umbrella organisation led by Bishop **Mike Okonkwo**, has several hundred member churches, and there are probably over 1,000 different Pentecostal church organisations in Nigeria. Religion is one of the few fast-growing economic activities. When factories close in the industrial Ikeja district of Lagos, pastors quickly buy up the warehouses and convert them into vast churches. The demand for church space has pushed up property prices in the federal capital, Abuja. Churches do a roaring trade in video and cassette tapes, books and other Christian paraphernalia.

The new churches and their owners (see Box) have grown affluent by tithing, where pastors encourage their followers to give ten per cent of their income to the church. Often they demand more, asking congregations to donate 'sacrificially' or make 'advance' cash payments, in return for which God will

Harvesting souls

Nigeria's popular charismatic movement took root with **Joseph Ayo Babalola's** Christ Apostolic Church in the 1930s. In the 1970s, the late **Benson Idahosa** of the Church of God Mission ran mass crusades of healing, speaking in tongues and exorcism. What is new about the pentecostals and evangelicals of today is the size of the following, the diversity of the congregation – the poor and hungry have been joined by the rich and upwardly mobile – and the bewildering choice of churches. Each pastor attracts a following with a personal narrative and cult. Among the most influential are:

- **Winners Chapel-Faith Tabernacle:** Bishop **David Oyedepo's** chapel, near President **Olusegun Obasanjo's** farm at Otta, outside Lagos, seats over 50,000 worshippers, equivalent to a medium-sized football stadium. It is Africa's largest church and one of the largest in the world, with hotels and a religious school in its compound. The Bishop enjoys an opulent lifestyle to match and provides spiritual advice to the President. The ten-year-old Winners movement claims to be in 32 different African countries as well as Europe and the Americas: Oyedepo's 'prosperity preaching' pulls big audiences in **Ghana**.
- **Redeemed Christian Church of God:** set up in the 1950s by **Enoch Adeboye**, its annual Holy Ghost prayer meetings attract congregations of more than a million. In 1980, the church had 42 parishes; it now claims 33,000 across the world, many of them in London, where they have charitable status. Rapid expansion has caused organisational difficulties; Adeboye recently sacked many church workers who missed seminars.
- **House on the Rock:** founded in 1995 by Pastor **Paul Adeferasin** from a wealthy Yoruba family, son of a Lagos judge and, he says, a former crack cocaine addict. He claims political connections and Obasanjo has often led Sunday services at the presidential chapel at Aso Rock, where the well-to-do seek contacts on Sundays. Adeferasin is building a multi-million dollar centre on the Lekki Peninsula in Lagos and says it will be Africa's largest air-conditioned church. The House on the Rock has 13 churches in **Congo-Kinshasa**, where it hopes to train French-speaking pastors and send them as missionaries into Francophone Africa and perhaps even to **France**.
- **Household of God:** Pastor **Chris Okotie**, former singing star, speaks of his presidential ambitions and has publicly attacked other pastors.
- **Synagogue Church of All Nations:** Prophet **Temitope B. Joshua's**

global following accompanies his reputation for miracle cures for AIDS and other diseases. **South Africans, Germans and Americans** flock to his Lagos 'Synagogue'. Rival pastors claim he uses black magic and is an instrument of the Devil. It is said that **Frederick Chiluba** visited him while seeking to change the **Zambian** constitution to allow him a third term as president. A seasoned US traveller said she thought some of his disciples were drugged.

- **Christ Embassy:** **Chris Oyakhilome**, based in Ikeja, offers miracles of health and prosperity and has both himself. His weekly congregations number more than 10,000; his internet site shows before-and-after pictures of HIV-positive patients whom he claims to have healed.
- **Latter Rain Assembly:** **Tunde Bakare's** political ventures include a prophecy, in February, that Nigeria would be taken over by a young man from Adamawa in the north-west, in whose hands the economy would recover faster than **Japan's**. Blood would flow, heads would roll within 100 days or 100 weeks. Later he was questioned by the security services after predicting that the political system would soon auto-destruct. 'IBB [former military ruler **Ibrahim Babangida**] will help to consume Obasanjo. Obasanjo will help to consume the PDP [the ruling party]. The PDP will consume the [opposition] APP. The APP will consume the AD [an allied party]. And the new Nigeria will come after the coming conflagration.' His repute rose in the early nineties when he said that Chief **M.K.O. Abiola** would not survive the 1993 elections but fell after he predicted that Obasanjo wouldn't be sworn in as President in 1999.
- **Kingsway International Christian Centre:** **Matthew Ashimolowo**, the leading Nigerian pastor in London, UK, recently celebrated his 50th birthday with a sumptuous party at Claridges Hotel, pictured in *Ovation*, Nigeria's equivalent of **Britain's Hello** magazine. He frequently visits Lagos churches.

Foreign evangelists who have strayed onto Nigerian shores include **Reinhard Bonke**, a German whose mass crusades have led to mass violence between Christians and Muslims. He is said to be close to Obasanjo and attended a thanksgiving ceremony after the presidential inauguration in 1999. Pastor **T.D. Jacques** is a black Texan with connections to several Nigerian sects; House on the Rock offers tithes to his Potters Bar church in Dallas.

bless them with abundance or, in more specific cases, with US\$1 million. Established churches lambast such materialist preaching, the lack of accountability of church funds and the opulence in which some pastors live.

Paying for paradise

As the claims, the scandals and the frauds grow more outrageous, the congregations grow faster still. One pastor told his congregation that God had given him all the wealth accumulated in the Bermuda Triangle to disperse among his flock in Apapa, Lagos. Those wanting a share must contribute in advance ten per cent of the amount they hope to receive; \$1 mn. would cost a believer \$100,000. There are similarities to the so-called 'advance fee' frauds developed by Nigerian conmen who target mostly foreign victims

It is hard to tell which churches are founded on spiritual beliefs and which are run as personal businesses. A Lagos newspaper editor says the press has trouble investigating the financial deals and the miracles claimed by pastors, because many journalists are keen believers. Many pastors play on their congregations' insecurity and despair about the future; churches may provide a sense of community and hope in towns where both have disappeared. Tithing fits in with

traditional notions of appeasing the spirit world or making sacrifices to the ancestors. It also fits with Christian and Muslim traditions. Pentecostal churches promote belief in an ever-present Holy Spirit who can provide physical protection from daily dangers. Many pastors claim miracle cures for diseases such as AIDS, where modern medicine is inaccessible or ineffective.

Such reference to the Holy Spirit (in Christianity, one of the three principal manifestations of God) raises the spectre of violence and manipulation existing around **Alice Lakwena's** Holy Spirit Army, later to become ex-Catholic catechist **Joseph Kony's** Lord's Resistance Army, in **Uganda**. Backed by **Sudan's** Islamist government, the National Islamic Front, the LRA has, in the name of the Holy Spirit and Ten Commandments, coerced its soldiers, often children, into committing appalling massacres, rapes and torture.

Nigeria's Pentecostal churches are subject to no rules and publish no accounts, while many pastors live in opulence. **David Oyedepo** is said to own a private jet; **Chris Okotie** drives an S-class Mercedes; **Paul Adeferasin** has personal bodyguards. Christians unite against what they regard as the threat of Islam but otherwise are increasingly fragmented. The field is ripe for charismatic pastors to compete to harvest souls. The leaders of the established Catholic and Anglican

denominations and of the new charismatic churches do not hide their mutual contempt.

Traditional Christians argue that the success of the Pentecostal movement is less a reaction to a morally bankrupt state than a reflection of it. Catholic priests admit they have refashioned their services, including more music and adapting their message, to retain their congregations as the independent pastors advertise miracles of wealth and health.

Obasanjo handled the *Sharia* issue cautiously but brings his own faith into politics, encouraging Nigerians to believe, in the words of one pastor friend, that he is 'mandated by God to ensure the country survives democracy'. When he said this year that he was waiting for God's word on whether to stand for re-election, he was speaking a language familiar to many. When he announced that he was running, the implication was that God had told him to. This, say the cynics, was a strategic message to millions of born-again Christians, that to vote against Obasanjo would be to oppose God. If he faces a Muslim opponent who claims a similar mandate, the election could make the religious street battles of the past three years look like a picnic.

ALGERIA

Bouteflika digs in

The President is pleased with the polls but hasn't yet won the war

Islamist violence and Kabyle protests continue, while Algerian militants feature large in the **United States**' 'war against terrorism'. Yet President **Abdelaziz Bouteflika** can feel more secure than ever since he took power in 1998, rejoicing (despite a low turnout) in the big majority secured by his allies in the former single party, the *Front de Libération Nationale* in the 30 May elections. The FLN now has 199 members of parliament in the new 389-seat *Assemblée Populaire Nationale*.

Municipal elections will follow on 10 October, at which 'every measure will be taken to allow voters to freely exercise their rights in selecting their representatives', according to the President's office. The five-year term of mayors and other elected local government officials ends on 22 October, by which time the President expects to control most town councils outside Kabylie, where the Berber uprising against the agents of central government continues.

Algeria has learned to organise elections amid continued violence involving Islamist organisations, shadowy death squads associated with the security services and the Kabyle dissidents. The government is especially angry with one of its opponents, **Habib Souaïdia**, an ex-officer recently sued for slander in a Paris court by a former Defence Minister, Major General **Khaled Nezzar**. What upset Nezzar were Souaïdia's remarks during a May 2001 TV interview to promote his best-selling book *'La Sale Guerre'* ('The Dirty War'). Chief of Staff Lieutenant Gen. **Mohammed Lamari** has dismissed Souaïdia's claims of official brutality and declared victory in the guerrilla war against the *Groupe Islamique Armé* (GIA) and other Islamists.

US and other international support is substantial. Since 11 September, US President **George W. Bush** has been in close touch with Bouteflika (AC Vol 43 No 1). US Ambassador **Janet Sanderson** has been told to strengthen military/security cooperation and Bouteflika's security advisor, Maj. Gen. **Mohamed Touati**,

has been consulted on anti-terrorist initiatives. The authorities in **Germany, Italy** and other European countries where Islamists are active crack down on sympathisers of the GIA and the *Groupe Salafiste de Prédication et de Combat*. These are at last being officially linked to the *Al Qaida* network and Washington has designated them 'foreign terrorist organisations'. Algeria's armed forces have been upgrading their surveillance and other anti-terrorist equipment and expect more *matériel* to arrive to squeeze the remaining armed Islamists (AC Vol 43 No 6).

Independence Day murder

Peace has not yet broken out. The 40th anniversary of Independence on 5 July was marked by killings: people had their throats cut in several communities and on 6 July, a bomb killed at least 48 people in the market town of Larbaa, 25 kilometres south of Algiers. These breaches of security challenge the ambitious commander of the First Military Region, Gen. **Brahim Fodhil Cherif**, who has won promotion by reducing attacks in Algiers and in the 'triangle of death' around Larbaa. He is in line to replace the land army commander, Maj. Gen. **Gaïd Salah**, when he retires; rival candidates include Gen. **Saïd Bey**, commanding the Fifth Military Region.

Bouteflika toys with his senior officers. On 4 July, when he paid his annual visit to the Defence Ministry to award promotions and medals, two generals became major generals and eight colonels were made generals but the long awaited reshuffle of senior ranks remains on hold. Boutef may perhaps name a defence minister; at present, the Chief of Staff runs the Ministry, enacts the President's orders and signs documents in his name.

The generals dislike the Bouteflika camp's suggestion that a civilian could become defence minister, even a civilian with roots in the security establishment, like the President's old ally, Interior Minister **Nourredine 'Yazid' Zerhouni**. This one issue unites long-time rivals such as Lamari, who says he will not take another job after his long spell as Chief of Staff ends, and military security chief **Mohamed 'Tawfik' Medienne**, who is also expected to go into gilded retirement. Such personal rivalries are the substance of Algerian politics, whose analysts see the hand of the shadowy military establishment (known as '*le pouvoir*', power) behind most political and much business life. *Pouvoir* manoeuvres give Bouteflika a headache and he regularly cites them to explain his periodic attempts to resign.

The elections indicated that things were going Bouteflika's way. The FLN's 199 MPs allowed him to confirm Prime Minister **Ali Benflis** in his job and showed the ruling establishment and the 'loyal opposition' who was boss. The official turnout was 46.17 per cent of the 18 million registered electors, compared to 65.49 per cent in the 1997 polls. Even if the real turnout was much lower, it was enough to allow the authorities to claim free and fair elections, despite the Kabyle boycott. The claims and counter-claims drew little comment from the USA or the European Union, which in April had finally signed a new 'Euro-Med Partnership' agreement with Algiers. Western governments had widely criticised past Algerian elections, even when turnouts were much higher than in May.

The *Rassemblement National Démocratique*, a party which prospered under the previous President, **Lamine Zeroual**, won 48 seats instead of its previous 155 and is now expected to lose members to the FLN. The RND leader and Minister of State for Justice, **Ahmed Ouyahia**, an unpopular 'eradicationist' former Premier, stood down as RND head: the little known **Abdelkader Malki** is interim leader.

The legalised Islamist groups that had been expected to do well

also polled badly, losing an overall 22 seats on the 1997 parliament (AC Vol 43 No 11). Sheikh **Mahfoudh Nahnah**'s *Mouvement de la Société pour la Paix* (Movement of Society for Peace – MSP, ex-Hamas) won 38 seats against 69 last time; Nahnah blamed 'irregularities'. Sheikh **Abdallah Djeballah** edged ahead of his old rival Nahnah, with his *Mouvement de la Réforme Nationale-Al Islah* (MRN) taking 43 seats.

The elections, even if flawed, brought a wider range of opinion into the Assembly. The *Parti des Travailleurs* (Workers' Party, PT), led by the 'Trotskyist' anti-Islamist **Louisa Hanoune**, got 4.8 per cent of the declared vote and 21 seats instead of two. Another familiar face on **French** television, the anti-Islamist feminist **Khalida Toumi-Messaoudi**, became Communications and Culture Minister in place of **Mohammed Abbou**, who could not cope with journalists' questions during the campaign. As government spokesperson, Messaoudi may help to calm Kabylie and to reassure the French public that a solution to the crisis there exists.

Boycotting the polls

Faith in the electoral process was damaged by the stand of the main Kabyle parties, **Hocine Aït Ahmed**'s *Front des Forces Socialistes* (FFS) and **Saïd Saadi**'s *Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Démocratie* (RCD). They refused to take part while Kabylie was in ferment and their militants were on the streets. The Kabyle protest movement was formerly based on minority demands for recognition of the Kabyle (Tamazight) language and some local autonomy; it is now seen as representing Algeria's wider malaise, though the stand of the FFS and RCD had no effect outside Kabylie.

The new government suggests business as usual, with a more liberal tinge than its predecessor. The RND and MSP complained loudly about the polls but were pleased to accept a few posts in the coalition government. Influential non-party liberals, including Energy and Mines Minister **Chakib Khelil**, kept their jobs. Khelil's ally **Abdelmadjid Attar**, former boss of the state energy company Sonatrach, was named Minister of Water Resources, a troubled sector; this summer, there have already been some localised riots about the dire urban water shortages and market reforms could bring more protests.

Mohammed Terbeche, once a banker then a junior minister, has replaced **Mourad Medelci** at the Finance Ministry, where he may try to speed reform of the financial sector. **Noureddine Boukrouh**, a minor party politician with friends in the security establishment, became Commerce Minister, freeing **Abdelhamid Temmar** to return to his preferred job – trying to restructure and privatise non-energy state companies. Khelil and Temmar came back to Algeria with Bouteflika after years away (Khelil was at the World Bank) and share the President's taste for economic reform.

Zerhouni has kept the Interior and Local Authorities portfolio despite his clumsy handling of the Kabyle troubles. **Abdelaziz Belkhadem** (who is close to Bouteflika's Chief of Staff and power-broker, **Larbi Belkheir**) remains Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. Ouyahia's election services were rewarded by his being appointed as the President's personal representative; his Justice Ministry went to **Mohamed Charfi**, who is said to be close to Belkheir. One of the RND's founders, **Abdelkader Bensalah**, was elected head of the National Assembly's upper house, the *Conseil de la Nation*, following the death in Paris last month of **Mohamed Cherif Messaadia**, an unpopular and veteran power-broker. In Algeria's closed political system, even the new faces are familiar, as the establishment renews itself in preparation for five more years of power.

TOGO

Last of the dinosaurs

Splits in the ruling party could finally bring the changes the opposition seeks

Most African leaders have at least made a stab at multi-party democracy over the last decade but Togo's President **Gnassingbé Eyadéma** has never really bothered. Opposition parties are barely tolerated; one of the main opposition leaders lives in exile, another recently got out of gaol. Now it looks as if the all-powerful *Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais* (RPT) is crumbling beneath its leader, after 30 years in power

Prime Minister **Agbéyomé Kodjo** was sacked on 27 June, in a move Eyadéma tried to explain as preparing for long awaited parliamentary elections. He is in hiding and his wife is under house arrest. He had expressed support for another RPT dissident, **Dahuku Péré**, a former president of parliament who in March wrote an open letter to the party leadership blaming the RPT for the country's steady slide into poverty.

Kodjo, replaced as Premier by the ultra-loyalist RPT Secretary General and Education Minister **Kofi Sama**, published a 14-page letter the day after his sacking detailing some of the regime's abuses. Kodjo, a southern Ewe from Kpalimé, is a member of Togo's largest ethnic group, while Eyadéma is a northern Kabyle. Eyadéma then sought to discredit Kodjo further by announcing an investigation into claims of corruption while he was head of the *Port Autonome de Lomé*.

Time to go

In 1999, Eyadéma announced that he would step down at the next elections, as the constitution demands. Since then, there has been discreet jostling within the RPT to succeed him – along with speculation that he will change the law and seek a third term. Eyadéma's barons include **Moussa Barry Barké**, the President's Special Advisor; Foreign Minister **Pierre Koffi Panou**, his son-in-law; **Famboré Natchaba**, National Assembly President; and **Gbéhon Amegboh**, the powerful Secretary General of the presidency. They all suspect Kodjo of seeking to position himself as Eyadéma's eventual successor.

Natchaba is also after the job, which he feels should stay in the safe hands of northerners like himself and Eyadéma. The exiled opposition leader **Gilchrist Olympio**, son of the democratically elected first President, **Sylvanus Olympio**, is Ewe, and Eyadéma's inner circle doesn't trust the Ewe. Worse, Kodjo is married to **Alfreda Amorin**, whose opposition activist brother **Tavio** was shot and fatally wounded in Lomé in 1992.

Gilchrist Olympio says he won the 1998 presidential election, in which Eyadéma was declared winner with 52 per cent of votes before all the ballots were counted (AC Vol 39 No 14). Large numbers of bodies, thought to be of opposition supporters, were found at sea or on beaches in neighbouring **Benin**. Olympio might have won again next year, if it weren't for a law passed in February that stipulates that presidential candidates must have resided in Togo for a year before elections.

Ironically, in the home of the Lomé Convention, most aid has been suspended for a decade, ever since the violent suppression of pro-democracy protests as Eyadéma resisted pressure for reform.

International mediators have been coming and going for just as long, with little effect. A framework agreement between government and opposition in July 1999, the *Accord-cadre de Lomé*, provided for new legislative elections supervised by an independent electoral commission, to replace the polls of March 1999, which the opposition had boycotted.

The commission was duly established in December 1999 but the polls have been postponed several times and the commission's opposition representatives withdrew their cooperation in protest after the gaoling in August 2001 of **Yaovi Agboyibo**, ironically for defaming the Prime Minister who has just been sacked. In May, Eyadéma replaced the commission with a panel of seven judges.

Poverty bites

With no aid coming in, Togo is in arrears to the African Development Bank and the World Bank, which suspended its remaining aid in January. The economy, hard hit by a general strike in 1992-93, recovered somewhat in January 1994 after the CFA franc was devalued by 50 per cent but Togo never really recovered its former status as a trading *entrepôt*. According to Kodjo, the state-owned *Office Togolais des Phosphates* is a key source of presidential funds, despite declining output. He cites bills of CFA 2 billion (US\$3 million) for drinks for a millennium party, CFA 250 mn. for a bust of the head of state and CFA 40 mn. for an ornamental cane as a gift to him. Starved of funds, the country's infrastructure has ground to a halt. Schools and hospitals built in more prosperous days have no equipment. With no foreigners, no nightlife and almost no street stalls, Lomé looks more like an old East Bloc city than a West African capital.

In his letter, Kodjo accuses Eyadéma of running the country as if it were under a permanent state of emergency, taking power over the administration and judiciary, and particularly over tax and customs receipts, which he says are paid into an account under the President's personal control. He accuses Eyadéma's son Colonel **Ernest Gnassingbé**, another potential successor, of abuse of authority and maltreatment of detainees.

Crucially, Eyadéma has the support of his old friend French President **Jacques Chirac**, who visited Lomé in 1999 on a tour that also took him to **Cameroon** and **Guinea**, two other states that fall somewhat short of the democratic ideal. The French navy carried out military exercises with its Togolese counterpart in May, just before the EU decided to pull out its 'facilitation mission' which was supposed to be overseeing and encouraging the shift towards proper democratic procedures. The EU said the process was no longer advancing and the replacement of the electoral commission by Eyadéma's team of judges meant it no longer met the conditions of the 1999 agreement. The EU's withdrawal leaves just **Lansana Kouyaté**, former Secretary General of the Economic Community of West African States, as a neutral observer with little clout.

On 2 July, the World Bank's Energy Sector Manager for the Africa region, **Ananda Covindassamy**, listed Togo even above **Zimbabwe** as a source of concern to the Bank, which worries that Togo's troubles could endanger the West African Gas Pipeline from **Nigeria** to **Ghana**, a key plank in the Bank's energy strategy for Africa.

Eyadéma enjoys some status as Africa's longest serving head of state, hosting diplomatic meetings interspersed with African wrestling tournaments at the presidential palace in his home village of Pya. He visited Brussels in June to put his case to the European Commission: President **Romano Prodi** firmly told him that Togo must organise transparent parliamentary elections before

aid could resume. Protesting Togolese exiles pelted his motorcade with tomatoes and eggs.

If he is to end the deadlock and revive the flow of money to his crippled country, Eyadéma will have to engineer a political process that France can sell to the rest of the EU as sufficiently democratic. The new government in Paris knows Eyadéma well and may have the necessary political will. Foreign Minister **Dominique de Villepin** has long experience in Africa and, in **Madagascar** (where on 3 July, he visited the then aspiring President **Marc Ravalomanana**, ignoring his rival, France's old friend **Didier Ratsiraka**) has already shown his willingness to intervene actively in domestic political tangles.

ZAMBIA

Levy at war

As the new President fights the old crowd, even mattresses are weapons

President **Levy Mwanawasa** has declared war on **Frederick Chiluba**, the man he replaced at the election last December. Chiluba's friends regard Mwanawasa as weak and ungrateful; they say he was handed the presidential nomination by Chiluba and has now turned against his sponsor; and they are deploying against him their old friends in the military and intelligence services. Mwanawasa is purging those services and suggesting that Chiluba should be prosecuted on corruption charges. This personal battle has split the ruling Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) and could threaten Mwanawasa's hold on power.

Lacking supporters at home, the President is looking outside. In **South Africa** this week for the launch of the African Union, he spoke up for **Libya's** Colonel **Moammar el Gaddafi**, who in May paid Zambia's arrears to the AU's predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). He also spoke up for **Angolan** President **José Eduardo dos Santos**, whose government helped fund Mwanawasa's election campaign.

Chiluba's libel battle

A libel case encapsulates the Chiluba-Mwanawasa duel. Chiluba, when in power, ordered the arrest for criminal libel of two journalists, **Fred Mmembe** and **Bivan Saluseki**, and two opposition members of parliament, **Dipak Patel** and **Edith Nawakwi**. All four had called Chiluba 'a thief' and defend themselves by producing examples of state corruption under his presidency. The documentation is so strong that Mwanawasa's office is suspected of discreetly helping to compile it from official house files. Alarmed, Chiluba tried to withdraw the case but the Director of Public Prosecutions refused. If the defendants win, they could counterclaim for wrongful arrest.

Donald Chanda, Chiluba's former economic advisor, failed to answer questions about the use of state funds and was imprisoned for eight days for contempt of court. Others summoned as witnesses include Chiluba himself and **Xavier Chungu**, his former intelligence director. Chungu faces questions about a now closed intelligence account, number 58/C40/70185/01, held at the Zambia National Commercial bank in London under the name Zamtrop, for which he was the sole signatory; it is said to have been used to pay Chiluba's personal expenses.

Defence lawyers have asked the court to order Chiluba and

Chungu to surrender their passports. Chiluba says this is disrespectful and retains his passport; Chungu's was confiscated. Both men are under continuous surveillance by security officers. The independent *Post* newspaper cheers on Mwanawasa: 'There is need to thoroughly cleanse the MMD and the government of these jackals – after all the fight has been instigated by themselves. Give it to them Levy!'

In another court case, it is claimed that the government lost at least US\$60 million in 1998-99, after junior officials from the state-owned Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines signed a cobalt marketing contract with **Bahamas**-based Metal Resources Group (AC Vol 43 No 12). Mwanawasa and Finance Minister **Emmanuel Kasonde** must decide whether to order a criminal investigation into who benefited from this arrangement. The European Union, which financed an audit of the cobalt sales to MRG, is encouraging Mwanawasa to take firm action, and so is the International Monetary Fund. The new government's investigators are said to have tracked down some state funds said to have been stolen in Chiluba's time and have linked the former President to the ownership of a private jet currently parked at Lanseria Airport in South Africa.

Mwanawasa's main offence was to create his own inner circle, sidelining Chiluba's team of seasoned politicians, who control the party machine. Mwanawasa's backers, many of whom opposed Chiluba when he was President, are political novices whose strength lies in their new government jobs. Some are opposition members, appointed by Mwanawasa to senior positions – the failed presidential candidate **Inonge Mbikusita-Lewanika** has been made OAU roving Ambassador, **Bwalya Ngandu** was appointed Chief Executive of the state-owned development bank.

KK backs Levy

The Chilubaists grumble that patronage is not coming their way and are furious about Mwanawasa's alliance with Zambia's founding President, **Kenneth Kaunda**, who detests Chiluba and the MMD – especially since Chiluba arrested Kaunda on treason charges in 1997. Mwanawasa and Kaunda celebrated African Freedom Day together at State House, the first official function Kaunda has attended since Chiluba unseated him in 1991.

That same day, 'concerned MMD members' published a full-page advertisement in the *Post*, accusing Mwanawasa of tribalism and of appointing only people from his Lenje group in central Zambia. Subsequent adverts alleged that he was insane and urged Vice-President **Enock Kavindele** to call an emergency cabinet meeting to relieve him of his duties.

The accusations of tribalism were taken up by some of the Bemba people, among whom Mwanawasa won most of his votes in the Copperbelt, Luapula and Northern provinces. His sympathisers then ran their own full-page ad detailing all senior government positions. It showed that, though there are many Lenje in Mwanawasa's inner circle, Bembas still have the majority in the new government; Chiluba himself is Bemba.

As Chiluba's intelligence director, Chungu was closely involved with his boss and annoyed Mwanawasa by saving his old antagonist **Michael Sata** from a gaol sentence. Sata, who resigned from his ministerial job last year in protest against the choice of Mwanawasa as MMD presidential candidate, was recently arrested and charged with stealing a vehicle. In Sata's defence, Chungu stated that the vehicle belonged to the intelligence wing and was given to him for an operation. The court acquitted Sata and the new government's lawyers said they would appeal.

Mwanawasa seems determined to gaol Sata, the man who forced

him out of the MMD in 1993, when Mwanawasa was Vice-President. The latest allegation is that Sata stole thousands of mattresses, used during the MMD convention last year. Police summoned party National Secretary **Vernon Mwaanga** to explain how the mattresses had disappeared. He declined to provide evidence against Sata, saying the MMD National Executive Committee (NEC) had resolved the matter; Sata said Mwanawasa should be arrested, since the mattresses were also used for his presidential campaign last year.

On 19 June, Mwanawasa started purging his government of those suspected of loyalty to Chiluba. He replaced a number of permanent secretaries and district administrators with his own appointees and sacked **Samuel Musonda**, ex-Chief Executive of Zambia National Commercial Bank, through whom it is alleged that the Chiluba government made some irregular payments.

Also fired was the air force commander **Sundie Kayumba**, who got the job without (as tradition demanded) having been a pilot. His replacement, recalled and promoted to lieutenant general, is **Christopher Singogo**, who was himself dismissed as deputy commander by Mwanawasa early this year, when some Chilubaists framed him as being an opposition member. Others dismissed were the police chief, **Silas Ngangula**; his deputy, **Emmanuel Lukonde**, and the Zambia National Service Commandant, **Wilford Fungika**.

A day later, Mwanawasa noticed that the dismissed commanders would enjoy unusual retirement packages, signed by Chiluba the day before he left office. They would receive 80 per cent of the incumbent's monthly salary, two domestic servants, two personal security guards, and the right to buy their luxurious official vehicles. Mwanawasa considered these packages mischievous, too heavy for the defence budget and 'a trap for the incoming administration'; adding that Chiluba had left a lot of 'mess' which he was now cleaning up.

This was Mwanawasa's first direct attack on Chiluba. Nothing has since emerged from numerous attempts to reconcile the MMD's warring camps, including a meeting of its NEC in March, when Mwanawasa was elected acting party President on the proposal of the known Chilubaists, **Eric Silwamba** and **Peter Machungwa**. Kavindele, as party Vice-President, should according to the rules have replaced Chiluba after he retired but both camps had agreed to seek a compromise. In the same spirit, Mwanawasa invited the known Chilubaist Mwaanga to join his delegation to **Tanzania**, thus demonstrating the MMD's unity.

Fighting dirty

The hope of compromise faded shortly afterwards, when anonymous adverts attacking Mwanawasa resurfaced, and the deputy Minister of Northern Province, **Peter Filamba**, claimed that a group of senior MMD leaders had been plotting Mwanawasa's overthrow. An indignant Mwaanga promptly suspended Filamba from the party until he named the plotters. Mwanawasa, annoyed by Filamba's suspension, declared it lifted, accused Mwaanga of fostering divisions and asked him to resign from the MMD. On 21 June in a letter to Mwanawasa, Mwaanga said the President had no power to lift the suspension and refused to resign from the party 'to give you the opportunity to bring in some of your colleagues and turncoats of doubtful loyalty to the MMD'.

It is widely believed that this defiant letter was in fact drafted by Chiluba. A group of Copperbelt parliamentarians have united to flush out Mwaanga but others remain coy. Some pro-Chiluba MPs who serve in the new government stayed away from a recent press conference to demand Mwaanga's resignation; notable absentees

were MMD Chairman **Chitalu Sampa, Webster Chipili, Roy Chulumanda** and his brother **George Chulumanda**, who is deputy Health Minister. The split deepens daily.

AFRICAN UNION

Part of the union

Old quarrels and an old reluctance to pay union dues mark the rebranding of the OAU

South Africa won a narrow points victory in the battles surrounding the launching of the African Union (AC Vol 42 No 14) in Durban this week. At stake is the old Organisation of African Unity doctrine of non-intervention in the affairs of member states. The reform wing behind the AU wants it to break emphatically with 'non-intervention' and take a strong public stand from the start on good governance, corruption and human rights.

The reformers are led by SA President **Thabo Mbeki**, **Nigeria's** President **Olusegun Obasanjo** and **Senegal's** President **Abdoulaye Wade** (even though their own reform records are less than stellar); the dissidents, led by **Libya's** Colonel **Moammar el Gaddafi**, are a motley collection of autocrats such as **Zimbabwe's** President **Robert Mugabe**, **Kenya's** President **Daniel arap Moi** and **Gambia's** President **Yahya Jammeh**, who style themselves as African nationalists opposed to foreign interference.

On the surface, peace and unity reigned at the AU's spectacular launch party on 9 July, when 20,000 spectators were treated to a cast of African music stars, and Senegal's World Cup football heroes, the *Lions de Teranga*, played South Africa's *Bafana Bafana*. Behind the fun is the manoeuvring for control of committees and the crafting of resolutions. Firstly, Mbeki fought off demands from Libya and its allies for a year's deferral of the launch of the AU, which would take place in Tripoli. Calls by **Zambia's** President **Levy Mwanawasa** (whose government received some Libyan largesse in May) for the secretariat to move from Addis Adaba to Tripoli were also rejected.

More dramatically, South African security agents grounded most of the 60 cars in Gaddafi's motorcade, flown in last week. SA agents also faced down Libyan officials when they flew into Durban with two aeroplanes carrying small arms. On 10 July, the **Mozambican** government impounded a Libyan plane bearing weapons which landed at Maputo Airport, where Gaddafi was due days later.

Mbeki also defeated Gaddafi's plan for the chairperson of the AU to hold the post for five years; Gaddafi had seen himself as the first incumbent in the job. Mbeki and his friend Obasanjo have defended the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NePAD) as the ideological backbone of the AU against attack from several leaders such as Mugabe and Gaddafi who distrust its peer review provisions.

AU member states will be asked to submit to a review of governance standards (including accountability and human rights) to qualify for NePAD's health, education and infrastructure fund, to which the Group of Eight industrial countries have promised US\$6 billion. Gaddafi calls NePAD a neo-colonial plan designed to please 'colonialists and racists'.

However, Mbeki has compromised. NePAD's 15-strong implementation committee will now be 20-strong; new members include Gaddafi and Moi, both hostile to multi-party democracy. Reform-minded officials worry that they will dilute the 'peer review' and prevent it from censuring such governments as those of **Zimbabwe, Sudan** or **Liberia**, let alone their own regimes. Mbeki and allies have

also given way on OAU Secretary General and former **Côte d'Ivoire** Foreign Minister **Amara Essy**.

Essy stays on

The reformers wanted to sack Essy, who is close to Tripoli and describes Gaddafi as a 'driving force in Africa'. Essy has also proved extremely unpopular with the OAU secretariat, which accuses him of spending more time in Paris than **Ethiopia**. Yet the Council of Ministers' recommendation that he be given another year as AU 'interim Secretary General' looks likely to stand. After that, he may be replaced by a higher profile figure such as **Mali's** quietly lobbying former President, **Alpha Oumar Konaré**.

The AU's formidable task is to establish 17 new institutions, including: an annual assembly or summit of heads of state; an executive council of foreign ministers; a commission modelled on the European Commission, with a chairperson, deputy and eight commissioners, and responsibility for organising all meetings and interventions; a 15-member peace and security council to monitor and intervene in conflicts, and control a pre-stationed African peacekeeping force; a pan-African parliament to represent civil society organisations; a pan-African court of justice and human rights; an economic, social and cultural council, charged with setting up a central bank, monetary fund and investment bank.

More immediately, the AU faces a crisis of cash and morale. Some of the best OAU officials have left because of low salaries and bureaucratic in-fighting. Officials say the AU plans require a budgetary rethink if they are to stand a chance. To judge by contributions, members' commitment to the pan-African organisation is still low. Arrears to the OAU run at \$35 million (down from \$54 mn. in 2000) and funds are vital to recruit more staff and re-equip headquarters.

Wealthier states such as South Africa, Nigeria, **Angola**, **Algeria** and **Botswana** are expected to increase contributions. The African Development Bank will back research studies on the African monetary fund and central bank plans. Libya's Gaddafi prefers to bail out states on a bilateral basis to maximise diplomatic advantage but was prepared to bankroll the building of the secretariat or the African parliament if he could have persuaded the assembly to locate them in Tripoli. Some Western finance through the European Union may be available to revamp the AU secretariat in Addis. EU and US money will help finance some of the peace and security councils' operations, including an early warning and conflict monitoring operation. Many of the African peacekeeping troops available to the peace and security council may benefit from **French, British** and **United States** military training initiatives which the G8 summit pledged to expand in one of the few substantive benefits for Africa at the Kananaskis summit.

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Pointers

HIV/AIDS

Scant aid for AIDS

The International AIDS conference in Barcelona on 7-12 July underlined how Africa bears the brunt of the pandemic. The figures are more alarming than ever. The United Nations estimates 68 million people will die from AIDS in the 45 worst affected countries in the next 18 years.

Over 70 per cent of the 40 mn. people infected are in sub-Saharan Africa. In 2002, 2.2 mn. died in Africa from AIDS. The UN predicts that life expectancy in countries such as **Botswana** where 39 per cent of sexually active adults are HIV-positive will drop below 30 by 2020. Populations across southern Africa will shrink. Countries such as **Zambia** are training three times more teachers because of the high death rate.

AIDS is recognised as one of the chief obstacles to development. But recognition isn't helping much. Donors' poverty reduction strategies require governments to write in policies to tackle the disease. Yet campaigners say the bureaucratic framework falls ludicrously short of what's needed. A study by the UK-based NGO Oxfam found that half the 26 countries obtaining debt relief under the World Bank and International Monetary Fund Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative spent more on debt servicing than on health. Zambia spends 30 per cent more, while **Cameroon** spends three and a half times more. Campaigners want HIPC countries to spend no more than five per cent of government revenue on debt servicing.

In 2000, the UN set up a global fund to combat AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria, saying developing countries needed US\$10 billion annually. Some \$2 bn. has been committed but only \$200 mn. has arrived. African countries spend only \$3-\$10 on health per capita each year: anti-retroviral treatment costs at least \$300 annually.

Claims by **American** biotechnology company VaxGen that an AIDS vaccine could be available by 2005 failed to brighten the picture. The vaccine is being developed for the 'B' strain of the virus prevalent in the USA and Asia. In Africa, the 'A' strain is commonest.

CÔTE D'IVOIRE

À la carte

Opposition leader **Alassane Dramane Ouattara** was at last granted a nationality certificate on 28 June (AC Vol 43 No 10) but was still unable to vote in district council elections on 7 July. The government insisted only those with a new green identity card or a special certificate could vote,

even though it admits some 600,000 cards have yet to be distributed. The opposition says the true number is far greater and notes distribution has been slower in the north, stronghold of Ouattara's *Rassemblement des Républicains*. The 1999 coup interrupted distribution, a problem unforeseen by a 1998 law which made the old yellow ID cards invalid after January 2000.

President **Laurent Gbagbo** warned on 5 July that security forces would arrest troublemakers, in a TV speech followed by an oath of loyalty by armed forces chief General **Mathias Doué**.

Voting was peaceful, if chaotic. ADO avoided confrontation, leaving Abidjan without trying to vote; his RDR called off a march planned for 9 July. The nationality question may not be closed, though. The President of the Abidjan tribunal refused to sign the certificate, and it was Vice-President **Matoh Cissé** who put her name to it. *Notre Voie*, party newspaper of Gbagbo's *Front Populaire Ivoirien*, virulently attacked Cissé as 'the **Guinean** who calls herself Ivorian'; it accused her of receiving a 50 million CFA franc bribe. FPI politicians suggest there may be plans to invalidate the certificate. The FPI and ex-President **Henri Konan Bédié**'s *Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire* each won 18 councils. The RDR won ten and former military leader Gen. **Robert Guéi**'s *Union pour la Démocratie et la Paix en Côte d'Ivoire* won three. Coalitions won four *départements*, independents another five.

The central town of Daloa is under curfew after clashes between indigenous Bétés and northern Dioulas on 25-26 June, when at least six people died and 50 were injured. Violence began when Bétés set up an FPI-PDCI rally near the main mosque and spread to the countryside, where Bétés chased Dioulas from their villages and burned huts. Over 2,000 were forced to flee, mostly Ivorian Dioulas but also some 500 **Maliens** and some **Burkinabès**. Clashes have occurred elsewhere and if Bétés fulfill threats to recover the land, conflict could spread.

SÃO TOMÉ E PRÍNCIPE

Murky waters

President **Fradique de Menezes** must perform a tricky balancing act – developing the oil sector under transparency rules which donors insist on and keeping his big **Nigerian** neighbours happy (AC Vol 43 No 3). In late May he criticised oil deals struck under **Miguel Trovoada**, the President he replaced last September. On 3 June he was visited by Nigerian President **Olusegun Obasanjo**, who advised him to say no more in public about the matter and agreed to review their joint exploration agreement.

Another potential benefactor is **Taiwan**, which has garnered the tiny state's support in its battle against **China** for diplomatic recognition.

President **Chen Shui-bian** visited on 3-4 July and promised housing, stadiums and libraries.

Last year the International Monetary Fund suspended budget support to São Tomé and insisted on a strict Staff Monitored Programme including close scrutiny of oil deals. Donors are curious about a May 2001 contract which gave a fat share of potential oil revenue to the **United States**-based, Nigerian-owned, Environmental Remediation Holding Corporation, which says it has not been asked to renegotiate the deal. In 1997 Trovoada's government signed a contract committing ERHC's former US owners to promote the islands' oil interests. That contract went to arbitration at the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris but was revived last year when Nigerian businessman **Emeka Ofor**'s Chrome Energy bought ERHC. That left Chrome well placed to benefit from a carve-up of the potentially oil-rich waters between Nigeria and São Tomé.

The IMF is also unhappy about overruns in São Tomé's budget spending, funded by a US\$2 million signature bonus paid in March 2001 by **Norway**'s Petroleum Geo-Services. In December the new government sought the World Bank's advice on the oil deals it had inherited and promised to spend this year's income on badly needed infrastructure, schools and health. Menezes has said he'd prefer to hand over the oil money for the Bank to handle. Sadly, government is just not that simple, even in a state with only 165,000 people.

BUSHMEAT

Sustainable soup

The UK Bushmeat Campaign has now gathered sufficient momentum to ensure that senior diplomats from **Cameroon**, **Ghana** and **South Africa** attended a 9 July meeting in London. After initial protests from traditional bushmeat eaters, the Campaign is now calling more tactfully for a sustainable use of resources. Campaigners led by London's Brent North MP **Barry Gardiner** stress this is a development issue, not just a conservation one, involving people as well as wildlife.

While bushmeat is a vital source of protein for forest populations, problems start with larger-scale hunting and the building of roads into virgin forest. Campaigners would like wildlife management included in poverty reduction strategies and discussed at the 26 August-4 September Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development. Government controls are not always successful; villagers may resent outsiders telling them what to do on their traditional lands. Organising hunters into cooperatives and encouraging pepper-soup sellers to use less endangered species works better, but resources to police wildlife reserves are scant, especially when well meaning donors build roads like one in Cameroon along the edge of the Dja Reserve.