

A Functional Relationship: Political Extensions to Europe–Taiwan Economic Ties

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All European countries, with the exception of the Holy See, have established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC), and, consequently, have developed non-official ties with Taiwan. The latter are limited to the economic and cultural sphere, and should leave aside any move or transaction suggesting that Taiwan is anything else than a part of China under the PRC's rule. This article will broadly confirm this picture.¹

Since the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan lost its United Nations (UN) seat to the PRC in 1971, and suffered major diplomatic setbacks, only the United States has expressed concern for the future of Taiwan. European countries have never been a party to the settlement of the Taiwan issue, with the exception of the United Kingdom which had participated in the Cairo and Potsdam inter-Allied conferences, in 1943 and 1945 respectively.² Yet, the question of a peaceful resolution of the Sino-Taiwanese dispute has never triggered any debate in Europe, nor rallied public opinion. Generally speaking, democratization in Taiwan is unlikely to enhance Taipei's leverage in international relations as much as the mainland's potential power of destabilization enhances Beijing's leverage.

Yet, growing economic exchanges between Europe and Taiwan have, from time to time, exceeded the limits implicitly or explicitly set by the PRC: representative offices have been installed, a government-to-government dialogue initiated, and arms sales authorized. Hence, political extensions to economic ties have multiplied. They are political in the sense that from Taipei's and/or Beijing's point of view they can be considered as a sign of the ROC's claim to statehood. However, while allowing such extensions, in no way are European countries willing to oppose, in the long term, Beijing's one-China policy. The process is exclusively functional: it aims to take full advantage of Taiwan's economic potential, for lack of any real political plan with regard to Taiwan's future.

Abiding by a One-China Policy

Dealing with the Taiwan issue. After Mao's victory on the mainland, Chiang Kai-shek lost almost all his Western allies, including the United

1. Unless otherwise stated, this article is based on interviews carried out in Taipei in July 1989, October 1991 and October 2000.

2. See below.

States. However, the Cold War extended to Asia which helped the ROC maintain considerable diplomatic status. Meanwhile, some European countries recognized the PRC in 1950: the UK, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland and the Netherlands.³ The outbreak of the Korean war stopped this process, and all other European countries waited for the early signs of a Sino-American rapprochement at the beginning of the 1970s in order to normalize their relations with Beijing.⁴ Among them, some had diplomatic ties with Taipei and just switched recognition: Italy, Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg Spain and Portugal. France stands apart. The Indo-China war had dissuaded Paris from switching recognition in the wake of the communist victory in China, but as soon as the Algerian war was over, General de Gaulle distinguished himself from his Atlantic allies by establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1964.

In practice, according to the timing and to the geo-political stakes, the Taiwan issue has been managed in more than one way. The various compromises reached by the UK, France and the Federal Republic of Germany are cases in point. But, far from providing room for manoeuvre, these few differences rapidly faded into the background as pre-eminence was given to the one-China principle to which all European governments have, explicitly or implicitly, subscribed. Recalling this early process helps to measure the extent of the one-China policy, and thus to assess the political extensions that subsequent substantial relations with the island have, in passing, produced.

On 6 January 1950, the UK was the first West European country to recognize the PRC, but in so doing, it did not take a stand on Taiwan's status. However, after the Cold War had extended to Asia, London abided by Washington's thesis according to which the status of Taiwan was undetermined.⁵ This stance was all the more important as the UK was a party to the settlement of the Taiwan issue, as it had participated in the Cairo and Potsdam conferences. Yet, soon after the Shanghai communiqué was issued, London acknowledged⁶ the position of the Chinese government that Taiwan is a province of the PRC,⁷ and decided to remove its official representation in Taiwan – the consulate in Tamshui.

3. On 6, 7, 9, 13, 14, 17 January, and 27 March, respectively.

4. Italy on 6 November 1970, Austria on 28 May 1971, Belgium on 25 October 1971, Iceland on 8 December 1971, Greece on 5 June 1972, the Federal Republic of Germany on 11 October 1972, Luxembourg on 16 November 1972, Spain on 9 March 1973, Portugal on 6 January 1975, and Ireland on 22 June 1979.

5. Sir Anthony Eden said on 4 February 1955: "Under the peace treaty of April 1952, Japan formally renounced all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores; but again this did not operate as a transfer to Chinese sovereignty, whether to the People's Republic of China or to the Chinese Nationalist authorities. Formosa and the Pescadores are therefore, in the view of Her Majesty's Government, territory the de jure sovereignty over which is uncertain or undetermined." Great Britain, Parl. Deb. (Hansard), House of Commons, Official Report, 4 February 1955, Col. 159, Written answers, cited by J.P. Jain, "The legal status of Formosa," *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 57 (1963), p. 28.

6. Joint communiqué dated 13 March 1972.

7. Responding to a Member of Parliament, Sir Alec Douglas-Home said: "The Government of the United Kingdom acknowledges the position of the Chinese government, that Taiwan is a Province of the People's Republic. We held the view at Cairo and Potsdam

Consequently, Beijing agreed to upgrade diplomatic ties with the UK to the ambassadorial level.

In 1964 General de Gaulle was committed to recognizing Beijing unconditionally. Establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC was part of General de Gaulle's policy of "national independence" for France.⁸ In so doing, he could not have accepted Beijing's terms, in particular with regard to the Taiwan issue. This is reflected in his instructions to Jacques de Beaumarchais, then director of the Foreign Affairs Minister's cabinet, in charge of secretly negotiating the France-PRC normalization in Bern. "On both sides there is no question of laying down conditions ... It's a question of succeeding in an agreement without conditions, nor prerequisites."⁹ The laconic Sino-French communiqué dated 27 January 1964 is revealing in this respect.¹⁰ Such a stance – not recognizing that Taiwan is an integral part of China as represented by the PRC – must be ascribed to a matter of principle rather than to a deliberate will to influence the future of Taiwan. Indeed, France has never been a party to the settlement of the Taiwan issue as it did not attend the inter-Allied conferences dealing with this question.

It would however be wrong to consider that General de Gaulle sought a two-China policy. First, Chiang Kai-shek adamantly refused to call into question the principle of China's unity. General de Gaulle certainly knew that his decision would result in Taipei severing its links with France, which was announced on 1 February 1964. Then, on the eve of establishing diplomatic ties with Beijing, General de Gaulle refused to open any kind of talks with Taipei, as testified both by the letter he sent to Chiang Kai-shek,¹¹ and by the attitude of the French emissary, General Pechkoff, during the various meetings he had with Chiang Kai-shek on 19 and 20 January 1964 in Taipei.¹²

In fact, as soon as diplomatic ties were established with Beijing, the French government refused any contact with ROC officials, and a low profile attitude towards Taiwan became the rule among French politicians¹³ and civil servants. Moreover, it was generally admitted that, in 1964, France had acknowledged the sovereignty of the PRC over Taiwan.

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that Taiwan should be restored to China. We think the Taiwan question is a Chinese internal affair, to be settled by the Chinese people themselves." *The Times*, 14 March 1972.

8. Developing an independent nuclear deterrent, or withdrawing from the defence organizations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization were the main facets of this policy.

9. Charles de Gaulle, *Lettres, Notes et Carnets: Janvier 1964 – Juin 1966 (Letters, Notes, and Notebooks: January 1964 – June 1966)*, Vol. 10 (Paris: Plon, 1987), p. 30.

10. It is indeed concise. "The government of the French Republic and the government of the People's Republic of China have decided of a common accord to establish diplomatic relations. To that effect, they have decided to appoint ambassadors within a period of three months." *Articles et documents*, La Documentation française, no. 0.1494, 13 February 1964.

11. See de Gaulle, *Lettres, Notes et Carnets*, pp. 22–23.

12. See Jacques Guillermez, *Une vie pour la Chine, Mémoires (1937–1989) (A Life for China, Memoirs)* (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1989), pp. 290–95.

13. Except those of the far right.

Examples are numerous, ranging from Alain Peyrefitte's writings¹⁴ to notes of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs' China desk.¹⁵ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs even issued a communiqué on 27 September 1991 on the sale of frigates to Taiwan¹⁶ stating that "France reaffirms *the terms of the Franco-Chinese joint declaration of 1964* according to which the PRC government is the sole legal government of China."¹⁷

When the Federal Republic of Germany normalized its relationship with the PRC in 1972,¹⁸ it had never recognized the Republic of China. And in order not to antagonize the German Democratic Republic, Beijing did not insist that the sovereignty of the PRC over Taiwan should be mentioned in the communiqué announcing the establishment of diplomatic relations, as Bonn, in turn, could have insisted on inserting a clause on Berlin.¹⁹ Unlike the French case, what was at stake was not a refusal to support Beijing's claim over Taiwan, but just reaching a mutually acceptable compromise. In practice, the German government recommended a low profile attitude when dealing with Taiwan,²⁰ as did all other European governments whether they had previously recognised Taipei or not, and whether they had or had not explicitly committed themselves on the one-China policy when recognizing the PRC.²¹

The supranational level was no different. As early as 1961, Taipei asked to establish diplomatic relations with the European Community (EC). Out of the six member-states, four had, at that time, diplomatic relations with the ROC (France, Belgium, Luxembourg and Italy). But, as soon as General de Gaulle initiated a rapprochement with the PRC, France shifted its initial favourable position, and vetoed Taipei's plan to dispatch one of its diplomats to Brussels. However, the ROC succeeded in signing a textile agreement in October 1970.²² But after the European

14. See, for instance, *La Chine s'est éveillée. Carnets de route de l'ère Deng Xiaoping (China has Woken Up. Travel Diaries of the Deng Xiaoping Era)* (Paris: Fayard, 1996), pp. 22, 230 and 236. Alain Peyrefitte, former minister of General de Gaulle, became a China affairs expert of right-wing governments, acting, on more than one occasion, as a go-between.

15. See Françoise Mengin, *Les relations entre la France et Taiwan de 1964 à 1994. Contribution à une étude des relations extérieures d'un non-Etat (Relations between France and Taiwan from 1964 to 1994. A contribution to a study of a non-state's external relations)* Doctoral thesis, Institut d'études politiques de Paris, 1994, pp. 622–27.

16. On this sale, see below.

17. My italics.

18. The German Democratic Republic had recognized the PRC as early as 1949 (on 27 October), as had the USSR and the other East European countries. Until Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik, had Bonn been tempted to recognize the PRC, the so-called Hallstein doctrine of 1955 would have prevented it from doing so.

19. The so-called Berlin clause – West-Berlin being an integral part of the Federal Republic of Germany – was usually set by Bonn as a precondition when establishing diplomatic ties.

20. See Gunter Schubert, "German-Taiwanese relations since 1949: a critical assessment," paper presented at the conference *The Role of France and Germany in Sino-European Relations* organized by the French Centre for Research on Contemporary China and the Europe-China Centre, Department of Government and International Studies, Hong Kong Baptist University in Hong Kong, 22–23 June 2001, p. 5.

21. For instance the decree 14/055/022 dated 14 October 1986 of the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wilfried Martens, which asked Belgian civil servants to avoid any relationship with Taiwan representatives. See Mengin, *Les relations entre la France et Taiwan*, pp. 208–209.

22. Valid until 1973, it has not been renewed.

Commission extended diplomatic recognition to the PRC in 1975, not only did the EC abide by Beijing's one-China policy,²³ but the nascent economic dialogue between Brussels and Taipei was interrupted. Taiwan was denied membership of the EC's Generalized System of Preferences, as well as any other economic assistance from which all the other Asian new industrialized countries were benefiting.

Nonofficial ties from the outset. The nature of Taiwan-Europe relations was based upon economic and cultural ties which have, from the beginning, developed without any official support, at least on the European side. Unlike Japan and the United States which simply continued relations with Taiwan on a non-official level after normalizing with the PRC, from the outset European countries developed strictly non-official ties with Taiwan. During the 1970s, when Taipei was facing major diplomatic setbacks, only Japan and the United States developed substantial relations with the ROC. These two countries were Taiwan's major commercial partners, while the European share of the island's exports and imports remained of minor importance:²⁴ 10.1 per cent and 9.7 per cent respectively in 1970.²⁵ No European country, even among those that had diplomatic ties with Taipei prior to the 1970s, had substantial dealings with the island at that time.²⁶

Certainly, there was a formal disengagement of the Japanese and the American governments from Taiwan after they severed diplomatic ties with the ROC in 1972 and 1979, respectively. But, in so doing, they have relegated official relations to the unofficial sphere by replacing the former embassies by private associations, that is *ad hoc* institutions carrying out comparable functions, including the issuing of visas, in order to maintain "cultural, commercial and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan."²⁷ In the Japanese case, a non-governmental agreement signed on 26 December 1972 (three months after the severing of diplomatic relations) set this institutional framework. In the American case, it is a unilateral instrument issued by a state institution, the US Congress: the Taiwan Relations Act of 10 April 1979.

It was the growing exchanges between West European countries and Taiwan during the 1980s, and not the necessity to safeguard existing exchanges, that gave rise to the need for an institutional framework, and even, as will be shown, to some governmental support. It has thus been

23. See the statement of European Commission Vice-President Christopher Soames in 1975 in Christopher M. Dent and Debra Johnson, "Taiwan-EU economic relations: a European perspective," *EuroAmerica* (Institute of European and American Studies, Academia Sinica, Taipei), Vol. 30, No. 1 (March 2000), p. 118, n. 5.

24. See Robert Ash's article in this issue.

25. *Ibid.*

26. In 1963, on the eve of the severance of diplomatic ties between Taipei and Paris, France's exports to the island amounted to French Francs (FF) 6.6 million and its imports to FF 10 million. These figures were negligible compared to France's trade with the PRC for the same year of FF 288 million and FF 104 million respectively. *Notes et études documentaires*, Paris, La Documentation française, no. 4014-4015, 3 September 1973, pp. 48-9.

27. US Statement on Establishment of US-PRC Diplomatic Relations, 1 January 1979.

a incremental process whose pace has changed in accordance with how substantially exchanges were improving. From the end of the 1970s, the Europeans were attracted by the success of the island's economic miracle, while the authorities in Taipei wanted to compensate for their growing isolation on the world scene by diversifying their commercial relations. Ten years on, a similar trend surfaced with East European countries, as well as with the Commonwealth of Independent States. For a long time, Taipei had maintained a ban on any relations with socialist countries, but at the end of the 1970s, ten years before the fall of the Berlin Wall, this stance was progressively liberalized. With East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland trade was possible after 1979, and with the Soviet Union after the mid-1980s, but on condition that all transactions were carried via a third country. Subsequently, after the end of the Cold War, this prerequisite no longer had any *raison d'être*.

The Political Extensions to Growing Taiwan-Europe Exchanges

Functional relations and strategic dealings. The picture of the institutional framework of Europe-Taiwan economic and cultural exchanges at the beginning of the 1990s is that of normalized relationship in the daily work of diplomatic and consular missions. A network of non-official representative offices developed both in Europe and in Taipei.

The Taipei government has developed, as early as the 1960s in countries with which it had never had diplomatic ties, a network of organizations staffed by personnel from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and subsequently did so in the 140 or so countries recognizing the PRC. In general, these associations have been paired, in each country, with an office that has a more economic role. In addition, one of Taiwan's main promotional organizations in Europe has been the Euro-Asia Trade Organisation (EATO). Founded in 1975, it presented itself as a private organization promoting commercial and economic relations with Europe. In fact, it came under the aegis of the Board of Foreign Trade of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which provided the bulk of its funding, while its senior staff came from the civil service. Under the umbrella of EATO, at a bilateral level, the structure of official representations was completed by institutions grouped together within the framework of annual bilateral economic co-operation conferences held alternately in Taiwan and Europe.

Though there were many Taiwan representative offices in Europe, there was little coherence to the system.²⁸ Heterogeneous designations

28. Free China Centre in the United Kingdom; Fernost Informationen, and Far East Trade Service in Germany; Centro Commerciale Per l'Estremo Oriente in Italy; Institute of Chinese Culture in Austria; Association pour la Promotion des Echanges Commerciaux et Touristiques, and Centre Asiatique de Promotion Économique et Commerciale in France; Far East Trade Centre in Greece; Centro Sun Yat-sen in Spain; Centre Culturel Sun Yat-sen, and Far East Trade Service in Belgium; Centre Dr Sun Yat-sen in Luxembourg; Centre Sun Yat-sen, and Far East Trade Service in Switzerland; Far East Trade Office, and Taipei Information Centre in the Netherlands; Far East Trade Office, and Free China Information

could only emphasize the unofficial, if not underground, presence of Taiwan in Europe. But during the 1990s, under the pressure of Taipei officials, and of firms within each country competing for key contracts in Taiwan, some European governments accepted changes of name in order both to standardize more or less the various designations, and to upgrade these offices. These are, in order of importance: "Taipei Economic and Cultural Office,"²⁹ "Taipei Representative Office"³⁰ and even "Taipei Mission."³¹

The setting of European offices in Taiwan³² is more significant of the progressive upgrading of Europe-Taiwan relations as, contrary to their Taiwanese counterpart, the European authorities were unwilling to engage in any institutionalization of bilateral relations with the island. In addition, in January 1988 a European Chamber of Commerce in Taipei was instituted, aiming to represent Europe in Taiwan as an alternative to the United States. To this end, it did not wish to limit its membership exclusively to the firms of the EC's nation-states and in no way was it aiming to be an intermediary for Brussels.³³

Despite the great variety of legal formulas adopted, there were two main categories: private associations which were set up given the administrations' own authority, and chambers of commerce or private boards representing private industries.³⁴ Only the two French associations in Taipei could from the very beginning be listed in the former category. However, some belonging to the latter category, though representing private interests, also reproduced the pattern of services that normally exist in embassies. For instance Austrian commercial affairs abroad are handled by trade promotion offices that are part of the Federal Economic Chamber of Austria, as was the Austrian Trade Delegation in Taipei, as soon as it was installed in 1981. Thus, from this date there was no

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Office in Denmark; Taipei Trade and Cultural Office in Finland; Taipei Trade Tourism and Information Office in Sweden; Taipei Trade Centre in Norway; Free Chinese Centre in Ireland.

29. In Portugal, Spain, Luxembourg, Austria, Switzerland and Norway.

30. In the UK, France, Ireland, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy and Germany.

31. In Sweden and in Latvia. For relations with Latvia, see below.

32. German Cultural Centre, and German Trade Office; Spanish Chamber of Commerce; Anglo-Taiwan Trade Committee, and Anglo-Taiwan Education Centre; France-Asia Trade Promotion Association, and French Association for Cultural and Scientific Development in Asia; Hellenic Chinese Cultural Association, and Office of Representative A.H. Hellenic Organization for the Promotion of Exports; Belgian Trade Association; Austrian Trade Delegation, and Austrian Tourism Delegation; Netherlands Council for Trade Promotion; Swedish Industries' Trade Representative Office; Danish Trade Organization; Institute for Trade and Investment of Ireland; Italian Trade and Economic Centre; Office of Finnish Industries and Transport. This list mentions the first designation of the various offices, in the order in which they were opened. The countries of Eastern Europe, and of the Commonwealth of Independent States all opened trade offices in Taipei comparable to those of Western Europe.

33. Source: interviews carried out in Taipei in July 1989.

34. Among many examples: in 1979, the Belgian Trade Association was installed by Fabrimetal (a federation of metallic building industries); in 1981 the German Trade Office was installed by the German Association of Industry and Commerce; in 1982 the Swedish Industries' Trade Representative Office was installed by the Swedish Trade Council, etc.

distinction, in the promotion of Austrian trade, between Taiwan and any other country with which Vienna has diplomatic ties. In addition, the contrast between representative offices set up given the administrations' own authority and those installed by private boards representing private industries became blurred at the end of the 1990s, as more offices in Taipei were staffed with personnel of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and/or of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, indeed even headed by career diplomats. Some of these offices even started issuing visas directly in Taipei – though under the seal of consulates in Hong Kong. Unofficial offices have also been granted some advantages, such as diplomatic privileges and immunities or communications facilities, the latter including the sending of encoded telegrams, the installation and use of radio transceivers, and the use of the diplomatic bag.

Beyond this “administrative” normalization, there was a significant increase in the level of contact between legislators and government authorities at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. Although visiting Taiwan in their private capacity only, these officials met their Taiwanese counterparts, and more generally, members of the government, including Lee Teng-hui.³⁵ The visits of members of parliaments have been followed by those of high-ranking civil servants, also travelling in a private capacity.³⁶ A further step was taken when serving ministers began travelling abroad. This move was initiated in the 1980s by the ROC's serving ministers visiting Europe. As to serving ministers going to Taiwan, France initiated this important change in January 1991 by sending the Minister of Industry and Regional Planning. Until then, no cabinet member of any country having diplomatic relations with the PRC had visited Taipei. Following this visit, other European countries have sent officials of a similar level. In 1991 alone, they were the Irish Minister and Vice-Minister of Industry and Commerce in March, the Italian Minister of Public Works in April, the Swedish Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs in June, the German Minister of Post and Telecommunications in August, the Swedish Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs in November, and the Latvian Minister of Foreign Affairs in December.

Arms sales also show how relations with Taiwan have easily exceeded the limits initially set. Among countries having diplomatic ties with the PRC, only the United States has clearly defined its policy in this field, both towards Taipei and Beijing. The amount of American arms that can be delivered to Taiwan is specified by the Taiwan Relations Act of 10 April 1979 and the US-PRC Joint Communiqué of 17 August 1982. But some European governments did not refrain from authorizing such deals. In 1981, the Netherlands sold two submarines to the ROC, and France

35. From France there were visits of Raymond Barre, Michel Rocard, and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, all possible candidates at that time for the French Presidency.

36. One of the most important French delegations was the one led in September 1990 by the Director-General of the Ministry of Industry. In September 1990, Jean de Lipkowski, a former minister, was in Taiwan in the private capacity of “special envoy of the Prime Minister of the French Republic.”

sold six La Fayette frigates – frigate hulls including propulsion systems and electronic equipment – in 1991,³⁷ and 60 Mirage 2000–5s the following year.³⁸

These sales triggered strong reactions from the PRC. In 1981, Beijing's reaction was to downgrade its relations with the Netherlands to the level of chargé d'affaires, to order Shell to end its prospecting activities in Shanxi province, to command Chinese naval vessels to boycott the port of Rotterdam, and to refuse to grant visas to Dutch nationals. As to the French deals, Beijing's pressure seems to have been strong enough to provoke a spectacular – though short-lived – U-turn by the French government at the end of 1989. A few days after the French government had given its consent for the Directorate of Naval Construction to respond favourably to Taiwan's appeal for tenders, a government spokesman announced that the decision was being revoked. Yet, a few months later the negotiations could resume.

For its part, the French government has insisted that the sale was a commercial deal exclusively. The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a communiqué on 27 September 1991 stressing that only frigate hulls were sold, and that the contract was merely binding the French firm Thomson-CSF and the shipbuilding yard of Taiwan. Furthermore, this communiqué states that France recognizes the government of the PRC as the sole legal government of China. If this communiqué seems to have reassured the Chinese authorities – in fact all the circumstances of the La Fayette deal are still unclear³⁹ – the Mirage sale, on the contrary, triggered a strong reaction. At the end of December 1992, the Chinese government ordered the closing of the French consulate and of the French Trade Commission in Guangzhou, and French firms have been excluded from some contract awarding processes, including Guangzhou's mass-rapid-transit system.⁴⁰ Certainly, these sanctions aimed not only at punishing France, but also at deterring further arms sales. Thus on 28 January 1993, Bonn did not authorize the sale of submarines and frigates,⁴¹ and on 14 February 1993, The Hague did the same.

At the beginning of the 1990s, Taipei's government has been capable of strengthening Taiwan's external relations by establishing the island as an essential market for Western key national industries, including defence, nuclear and transport, and the overbidding attitude among European countries has been at the core of this process.

37. The contract included the firm purchase (US\$ 2.5 billion) of six frigates, and the optional purchase (US\$ 4.8 billion) of another ten. In 1993, the newly appointed right-wing government authorized the sale to Taiwan of some armaments for the frigates.

38. A contract amounting to US\$ 7.6 billion.

39. It is beyond the scope of this article to ponder the corruption scandal – the so-called Dumas Affair – that broke in 1997. On this matter, see Jean-Pierre Cabestan, "France's Taiwan policy: a case of shopkeeper diplomacy," paper presented at the conference *The Role of France and Germany in Sino-European Relations*, pp. 5 and 6, 10 and 12.

40. See, in particular, *Renmin ribao*, 16 and 24 December 1992.

41. The deal concerned ten submarines and ten frigates, and amounted to DM 12.5 billion. Christoph Nesshöver, "Bonn et Paris face à Pékin (1989–1997): vers une stratégie commune?" ("Bonn and Paris's relations with Beijing (1989–1997): towards a common strategy?"), *Politique étrangère*, No. 1 (1999), p. 100.

An overbidding process. Far from being the outcome of deliberate policies, political extensions are closely related to the competition among firms for shares in the Taiwan market. France has on more than one occasion played a key role in this incremental process. In addition, besides catching up with Japan and the United States, European countries had, at the beginning of the 1990s, gone beyond the United States, causing the latter to reappraise its stance towards Taiwan on two main issues: sending cabinet members, and selling sophisticated arms.

Since 1978, the France-Asia Trade Promotion Association (*Association Française pour le Développement du Commerce avec l'Asie*, or AFDCA) functioned as a Trade Commission of the Foreign Trade Office (*Direction des Relations Economiques Extérieures*, or DREE) of the French Ministry of Economy and Finance. In particular the director and deputy-director of AFDCA were civil servants from the DREE temporarily attached to the office in Taipei. This trend was further carried on when, in 1986, a retired ambassador was chosen to head the French Association for Cultural and Scientific Development in Asia (*Association Française pour le Développement Culturel et Scientifique en Asie*) installed in 1980 and changed into the French Institute in Taipei (*Institut Français à Taipei*) in 1989. In 1990, an ambassador who had taken early retirement became director of the Institute. Immediately, in 1992, other European countries started to appoint foreign ministry personnel to Taipei, for example Sweden,⁴² the United Kingdom⁴³ and Germany.⁴⁴ Similar initiatives have been taken by other Western countries, in particular Canada.⁴⁵ France finally took an additional step in January 1993, when a career diplomat, on temporary secondment, was sent to head all the French representative offices in Taipei combined into the French Institute. From then on, the French Institute was the equivalent, although on a smaller scale, of its American counterpart, the American Institute in Taiwan.⁴⁶ The French Institute remains headed by an ambassador-level career diplomat and its staff has expanded. In February 2000, the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs brought the German representative office into line with the American and French structures: it installed the German Institute Taipei of which the diplomatic staff is no longer “on leave” but “on duty.”⁴⁷

Until 1985, among countries not having diplomatic relations with the ROC, only Japan and the United States issued visas directly in Taipei. Taiwanese, especially businessmen, wishing to travel to Europe had first to go to a third country to obtain their visa. First Belgium and then France took decisive steps to issue visas. Belgium worked out a system allowing

42. See *Free China Journal* (Taipei), 15 May 1992, p. 1 and 24 November 1992, p. 8.

43. See *Free China Journal*, 26 May 1992, p. 1.

44. In 1994. See: Schubert, “German-Taiwanese relations since 1949,” p. 10.

45. *Free China Journal*, 21 August 1992, p. 1.

46. However, from 1993 onwards, the institute has always been referred to as “French Institute, Taipei” (instead of “French Institute in Taipei”). This slight change bears witness to the will of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs to avoid any sign of an officialization of France-Taiwan relations.

47. Schubert, “German-Taiwanese Relations since 1949,” p. 10.

Taiwanese to travel directly to Brussels.⁴⁸ In 1985, France followed the Japanese and American formula, and began issuing visas directly in Taipei. Following this precedent, other European representative offices in Taipei got their government to open similar “visa sections.”

In the field of ministerial visits the same chain reaction can be noticed. Minister Fauroux’s visit to Taiwan in January 1991 led other European countries to send officials of a similar level. From January 1991 to June 1993, more than 20 European cabinet members made the trip to Taipei.⁴⁹ Some governments even authorized two ministerial visits within one year: the Swedish Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs was in Taipei in June and in November 1991, as were the French Minister of Industry and Country Planning and the French Secretary of State for Foreign Trade (in January 1991 and January 1992 respectively). Though relations between Taiwan and countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union were recent, ministerial visits to Taipei developed at the same time: Latvian Minister of Foreign Trade in December 1991, Ukrainian Minister of Health in May 1992, Czechoslovakian Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs in June 1992, Latvian Prime Minister in September 1992.⁵⁰ Moreover, the European serving ministers’ visits to Taiwan rapidly prompted a similar move from the United States. From 30 November to 3 December 1992, a cabinet-level US official visited Taiwan for the first time since Washington recognized Beijing in 1978. Such was also the trend among other Western countries.⁵¹ Although the talks in Taipei of US Trade Representative Carla Hills came within the scope of the US-Taiwan bilateral agenda, this visit also aimed at supporting American firms bidding for key projects. The lifting of the ban on US cabinet-level officials’ visits to Taiwan seems to have been a reply to European efforts to share in the island’s future key contracts.

As to arms deals, the La Fayette frigates sale has been followed closely by two significant deals for Taiwan: not only 60 French Mirage 2000–5s but also 150 American F16s. In this respect, the Taipei government has very astutely succeeded in fomenting competition between France and the United States over the jet fighter purchases,⁵² which, in fact, turned out to reinforce both deals. Moreover, several projects were unveiled during the winter of 1992–93, but at once deterred by Beijing’s sanction against France.⁵³

48. At the office of the Belgium Trade Association in Taipei, Taiwanese received a copy of a telex from the Belgian Minister of Justice authorizing them to obtain a visa on arrival in Belgium.

49. For a list of these visits see Françoise Mengin, “Taiwan’s nonofficial diplomacy,” *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (March 1997), pp. 236–37.

50. On Latvia consular relations with the ROC, see below.

51. The Canadian Trade Minister visited Taipei in September 1992, and the Australian Tourism and Resources Minister in October 1992.

52. See François Godement, “Policy dynamics,” *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 17 September 1992, p. 26.

53. These deals included the purchase of German submarines and the acquisition of shipbuilding technology and components from the Netherlands (see Ingrid d’Hooghe, “The 1991/1992 Dutch debate on the sale of submarines to Taiwan,” *China Information*, Vol. VI, No. 4 (Spring 1992), p. 44 and p. 48, and Michel Korzec and Georg Hintzen, “Het eeuwige

In addition, the 12 January 1994 joint communiqué signed on the eve of the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between France and the PRC certainly untangled the Paris-Beijing crisis by stating that “the French government commits itself not to authorize French firms in the future to participate in the armament of Taiwan,” while “the Chinese side declares that French firms are welcomed to compete, on an equal footing, on the Chinese market.” For all that, the communiqué did not end French arms sales to Taiwan as a list – annexed to the communiqué but not made public – restricts the French side’s commitment to offensive arms. This was implicitly confirmed by the then Minister of Foreign Affairs’ own words.⁵⁴

The important part played by France is closely linked to the composition of its trade with Taiwan. It is worth noting that two countries whose trade with Taiwan was for a long time of comparable volume, Italy and France, have developed relations of different natures. Though, at the beginning of the 1990s, France and Italy ranked alternately fourth or fifth among Taiwan’s European commercial partners,⁵⁵ their exports to Taiwan were differently composed. While Italian exports consisted of ordinary trade, France relied mostly on key contracts that need more governmental support. These included Airbuses supplied by Aérospatiale,⁵⁶ one-third of Taiwan’s enriched uranium needs for power generation supplied by Cogema,⁵⁷ a large stretch of the mass-rapid-transit system constructed by Matra,⁵⁸ as well as arms sales, La Fayette frigates and Mirage 2000–5s. In addition, as early as the end of the 1980s, French firms were preparing to compete for the Taipei-Kaohsiung high-speed railway, and for the fourth nuclear plant. The Italian Trade and Economic Centre was one of the last European representative offices installed in Taipei (in 1989), and it started issuing visas only in 1992.

Because economic and political factors are both involved at the national level when key contracts are at stake, it is in the nature of the decision-making mechanism that cabinet members must intercede. But European countries would not have been so prompt to establish a government-to-government dialogue if Taipei had not forged a diplomatic instrument suited to the nature of Taiwan’s external relations: the Six-Year National Development Plan (1990–95). The US\$303 billion plan proposed 775 projects including, among others, a fourth nuclear plant, a high-speed railway, mass-rapid-transit systems and several highways. In fact, not only was the Six-Year Plan more a “white paper” than a proper

footnote continued

ship” (“The eternal ship”), *Financieel Economisch Magazine*, 12 December 1992, p. 31. On the deterrent effect of the sanctions decided by Beijing against France, see above.

54. See *La politique étrangère de la France (France’s Foreign Policy)* (Paris: La Documentation française, 1994), p. 100.

55. In 1988, Taiwan’s trade with Italy and France was worth US\$ 1.4 billion and US\$ 1.5 billion respectively. In 1990, these figures had increased to US\$ 1.8 billion and US\$ 2.2 billion. Source: Euro-Asia Trade Organization.

56. In the 1980s Aérospatiale supplied about 15 Airbus aircraft.

57. Contracts signed in 1982 and 1985. Together these contracts amounted to FF 5 billion.

58. Contract signed in 1988, and amounting to US\$ 271 million.

development plan as there were no attempts to define priorities and no allocation of scarce resources, but many of the 775 projects – especially as to key contracts concerning foreign firms – were not new when the Plan was adopted (e.g. the fourth nuclear plant), or were even under way (e.g. Taipei's mass-rapid-transit system).

The Six-Year Plan was indeed adopted at a time when, for European partners, Taiwan's big projects were involving, not only businessmen, but also high-ranking civil servants, and subsequently cabinet members. Therefore, the Six-Year Plan acted on foreign governments as a catalyst, for at least three reasons. First, it revived Taiwanese market potential. For instance, in 1991 the amount of US\$303 billion was often compared to three times the estimated cost of rebuilding Kuwait. Secondly, the Plan displayed many key-contracts together as a whole. This was essential for political support insofar as a parallel is always drawn between opportunities in Taiwan and in the PRC as soon as relations with Taipei are likely to antagonize Beijing. Thirdly, the Plan prompted a chain reaction among governments willing to support their firms win a larger share of the contracts.

The diplomatic goals of the Plan were further underlined when the Minister of Transportation and Communications⁵⁹ proposed on 14 August 1991, after visiting Europe, that an extra requirement should be included in international tenders for infrastructures projects according to which foreign bidders would have committed themselves to put pressure on their government to improve diplomatic relations with the ROC.⁶⁰ In fact, it seems that the Minister did not mean proper diplomatic relations, but only political moves such as the granting of landing rights. Even if, from a legal point of view, such a requirement could hardly be included in international tenders – especially at a time when the ROC was seeking to re-enter GATT – Minister Chien's suggestion did underline the diplomatic purposes of the Six-Year Plan. However, after some major breakthroughs, the development of political extensions to Taiwan-Europe relations has faded.

No Decisive Political Gains

A limited process. If, at the beginning of the 1990s, the Six-Year Plan was unquestionably effective in contributing towards a chain reaction of increased activity among European governments, this trend lost momentum as the Plan rapidly encountered difficulties of implementation. For instance, Taiwan was facing a crucial land shortage and the Plan required that at least 3 per cent of agricultural land should be transferred. This applied in particular to the high-speed railway for which German, French and Japanese firms were in competition. Next, the implementation of the Plan was rapidly hampered by the democratization process, as each

59. One-third of the US\$ 303 billion was allocated to transport and telecommunications.

60. See, among others, *Zhongguo shi bao* (*China Times*), 15 August 1991, and *Lianhe bao* (*United Daily News*), 15 August 1991.

project had to be approved by the Legislative Yuan that turned out not to be a rubber stamping parliament. Besides, some of the key-projects involved local governments. Such was the case for the fourth nuclear plant – the main competitors were American and French firms – planned to be constructed in Taipei county (*Taipei xian*) whose magistrate was a prominent figure in the then opposition Democratic Progressive Party,⁶¹ You Ching. Generally speaking, some projects – in particular the fourth nuclear plant – came up against the growing power of interest groups, especially the environmentalists. Because of delays in carrying out certain projects, bilateral exchanges – those with France in particular – have relied less on big government-sponsored deals.

In addition, when the two long-awaited contracts were not awarded to European firms, it became clear that Taiwanese business' and administration's close American and Japanese connections could override political, if not technical and financial considerations. In 1997, General Electric was chosen instead of Framatome for the building of the fourth nuclear plant. More significantly, the long-expected high-speed train contract, for which the Franco-British GEC-Alsthom and the German Siemens had prepared a joint bid, was, contrary to all expectations, awarded to Japan in 2000.

Whatever the future opportunities for European firms in the Taiwan market may be, the diplomatic benefits Taipei can gain from the political extensions of its relationship with Europe must, above all, be qualified. In spite of the installation of an institutional framework and the initiation of a government-to-government dialogue, bilateral issues are still solved through private contacts. Substitutes to official relations have been found, but, as such, they deprive Taiwan of the guarantees attached to diplomatic and consular institutions. The different representative offices are considered to be simple private associations. Visas are authorized via consulates in third countries or territories. Ministers travel in their private capacity and the signature of government-to-government agreements is out of the question. The advantages granted to the representative offices can be described as privileges departing from common law granted to private entities. These facilities have been granted in a sketchy way until now, and not on the basis of international agreement,⁶² nor on that of a national law – as in the case of the United States.⁶³ They have been granted solely on the basis of administrative regulations. Therefore, the granting is precarious, and there is often no strict reciprocity.

As for strategic dealings, it is worth comparing the sale of the French Mirages and that of the American F-16 jets. Though George Bush had given the green light both for election purposes – about 3,000 jobs at General Dynamics' factories in Texas were protected – as well as to prevent the purchase of the French fighters, he has also put the stress on the strategic side of the deal, reaffirming the United States' commit-

61. *Minjindang*.

62. The 1961 and 1963 Vienna Conventions on diplomatic and consular relations.

63. The Taiwan Relations Act deals with this matter.

ment to a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue. He has recalled both to the Congress and to the Chinese government that the United States had committed itself progressively to reduce their arms sales to Taiwan, but also to maintain a qualitative advantage in favour of Taiwan, that was currently diminishing because of the PRC's recent acquisitions. In practice, French arms sales to Taiwan do not involve a political stand, in favour of a strategic balance between the two sides of the Straits, but a calculated risk, taking into account national economic interests – in terms of employment and balancing external trade – on the one hand, and strained relationships with the PRC, on the other.

In fact, the development of political extensions to economic exchanges aims primarily to uphold the status quo in the Taiwan Straits. As Taipei non-official partners have found substitutes for diplomatic and consular relations in order to lighten the day-to-day consequences of Taiwan's non-recognition without reopening the question, and as they do not refrain, if the case arises, from infringing Beijing's sovereignty over Taiwan – by selling sophisticated arms in particular – the system is flexible enough to fulfil all their needs, taking full advantage of Taiwan's market potential.⁶⁴

Beijing's Growing Irredentism

At the beginning of the 1990s, the Taipei authorities were more than ever willing to find any way to make their relations with Europe more official in order to boost their new foreign policy. The democratization of the Kuomintang regime went hand in hand with a redefinition of Taipei's foreign policy. While the constitutional reforms were putting an end to the myth of a regime representing the whole of China, Taipei accepted, from 1989, the principle of dual recognition, though the various attempts in this field failed. In short, Taipei's new foreign policy can be seen as a two-China policy aiming at bringing Taipei alongside Beijing in the inter-state arena. Therefore, it was no longer necessary to make a clear distinction between the search for official ties – diplomatic relations and full membership in international organizations – and the pursuit of substantial, albeit non-official, ties, as both partake of the so-called pragmatic diplomacy (*wuxing waijiao*) that misses no occasion to initiate Taiwan's (re)integration into inter-state relations.

In this respect, the changes in Europe generated by the break-up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia demonstrate Taipei's diplomatic weakness. Indeed, the arrival on the world scene of small states needing financial assistance tested the reach of Taipei's new foreign policy. Consular relations are usually expanded because of international trade and economic links. They are independent of diplomatic relations or even mutual

64. See Françoise Mengin, "The substitution of conventional diplomatic relations: the case of Taiwan," in Jan Melissen (ed.), *Innovation in Diplomatic Practice* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), pp. 243–46.

recognition.⁶⁵ Consular relations seem therefore most suitable for the case of Taiwan. When Latvia became independent, it at once established diplomatic ties with the PRC as Riga could not risk being vetoed by Beijing when entering the UN. But in January 1992 consular relations between Taipei and Riga were established; yet they were severed in 1994 under pressure from Beijing. Likewise, substantial economic and financial aid is not sufficient to deter a country – whose needs were huge – from resisting Beijing’s pressure. On 27 January 1999 formal diplomatic relations were established between the Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of China.⁶⁶ They were severed, on Taipei’s initiative, on 18 June 2001, as Skopje was about to resume official relations with Beijing whose support in the UN was essential.

Beyond these diplomatic failures, there is Beijing’s untiring bureaucratic harassment in order to hamper Taiwan’s pragmatic diplomacy. Hence, the various hitches that pepper trips of Taiwanese officials in Europe. In January 1997 Premier Lien Chan visited the Republic of Ireland and, while he was in Rome paying an official visit to the Holy See, he managed to meet some members of the Italian government. But during the same trip, the French government did not allow him to hold a press conference at the airport hotel. In October 1997, due to Beijing’s pressure, Lien Chan’s trip to Spain, after he had visited Iceland, was cancelled at the last minute.

Moreover, some major breakthroughs have been immediately offset by concomitant commitments to Beijing’s one-China policy. For instance, during the Sino-French crisis triggered by the Mirage deal, Taipei purchased some armaments for the La Fayette frigates, although the 12 January 1994 Sino-French communiqué restricts France commitment not to authorize further arms sales to Taiwan to offensive arms only.⁶⁷ But this joint communiqué states in addition that the “French side confirms that the French government recognizes the People’s Republic of China’s government as the sole legal government of China, and Taiwan a part of the Chinese territory.” In other words, it commits France on the very issue on which General de Gaulle had refused to do so.

The sale to Taiwan, in December 1999, of an observation satellite (Rocsat-2) by Matra⁶⁸ is an other telling example. The green light given to Matra by the French government to export an observation satellite to Taiwan came after the purchaser had already chosen the German firm Dasa. This authorization confirmed that the sale of a satellite, officially

65. There are many examples. As far as the ROC is concerned, the UK maintained a consulate in Tamshui from 1950 to 1972. Likewise, after Taipei severed diplomatic relations with Paris in 1964, the ROC consulate in Papeete was maintained until 1965. It was closed at the request of the French authorities, not because of Paris-Beijing diplomatic relations, but because nuclear tests were being conducted in the area. The same request was made to the American consulate.

66. During two and a half years, the Taipei government developed a number of co-operation plans, and provided economic, financial and medical assistance during the Kosovo crisis.

67. See above.

68. The contract was signed on 9 December 1999, and amounted to FF 482 million (*Le Monde*, 22–23 October 2000).

for civilian observation, did not run counter, in the mind of the French government at least, to the 12 January 1994 communiqué. But Dasa certainly gave up the contract because of Beijing's pressure on the German government,⁶⁹ and also because, in any case, Dasa was not able to produce the satellite on its own, while Matra refused to transfer production to Germany, although EADS was about to be created.⁷⁰ Matra at once obtained the contract which triggered severe tensions in the Sino-French relationship: Beijing put pressure on Paris to cancel the deal throughout 2000,⁷¹ insisting on the dual purpose of the satellite, but was unsuccessful.⁷²

The consequences of the Rocsat-2 deal can be differently assessed. If there has been no open crisis comparable with that of the winter of 1992–93, the sale has had repercussions, among them the reduction of Jacques Chirac's visit to China in October 2000 from five to two days, and delaying the negotiation of some key contracts, as well as excluding TotalFinaElf-Gaz de France Group from a US\$600 billion deal for a gas tanker terminal in Shenzhen.⁷³

Two lessons at least can be drawn from the Rocsat-2 episode. First, a sale to Taiwan that falls within the scope of a binding agreement – in this case the 1994 communiqué – can still trigger strong opposition from Beijing as soon as the object of the deal brings up, even indirectly, the issue of Taiwan's sovereignty. In this respect, the distinction made between civilian and military equipment turns out to be of little help. Next, France's refusal to cancel the Rocsat-2 deal is more telling of the Paris-Beijing relationship – excluded, for the time being, from excessive pressures – than of any change in France's Taiwan policy. At the very time France was selling an observation satellite to Taiwan, French diplomats were changing the practice previously followed by France at the UN on the Taiwan issue, a change that bears witness to the weight of Beijing's irredentism.

Since 1993, Taipei's diplomatic allies⁷⁴ ask that the issue of Taiwan's return to the UN be on the agenda of the General Assembly. If French diplomats have always voted against such a proposal, they refrained from making any comment. But such a restraint was abandoned in 1999, a change that occurred stealthily owing to what was first considered as a mistake; the next year, as a precedent had been set, it was difficult to reverse without triggering Beijing's strong reaction at the time of the

69. *Le Monde* (22–23 October 2000) sticks to this explanation.

70. European Aeronautic, Defence and Space Company which, since 10 July 2000, groups the French Aérospatiale Matra (€12.3 billion turnover), the German Dasa (€9 billion) and the Spanish Casa (€1 billion). Source: web sites of Matra (www.matra.com) and Dasa (www.dasa.com) consulted on 1 March 2001.

71. In particular when the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tang Jaixuan, visited France in February 2000. The issue seems to have been carefully avoided during Jiang Zemin's meetings with Jacques Chirac in France in October 1999.

72. It was not until Jacques Chirac's visit to China in October 2000 that the possibility of a cancellation of the contract was ruled out.

73. Source: interviews and *Le Monde*, 22–23 October 2000.

74. Their number fluctuates around 30.

satellite deal, and a few weeks prior to Jacques Chirac's visit to China. This episode reveals the contingency of any diplomacy,⁷⁵ but also the weight of Beijing's irredentism that, for a large part, relies on a progressive clarifying of what was supposed to remain tacit. But, in the end, such a process can only contribute to legitimizing the PRC's claim.

If competition among European countries has been at the core of the development of political extensions to economic ties, it is difficult to distinguish these countries according to their political stand on the Taiwan issue *per se*. Because of Beijing's successful irredentism, all European countries' Taiwan policies are devised exclusively in the perspective of trade opportunities which, on some occasions, can lead to temporary strains with the PRC.

By contrast, the European Parliament (EP) in Strasbourg has, on several occasions, taken political stands, expressing its concern to safeguard the future of Taiwan against Beijing's one-China policy. In 1996, the EP condemned the PRC for conducting military exercises in the Taiwan Straits on the eve of the ROC's first direct presidential election, and a resolution adopted on 15 February 1996 urged the PRC to renounce the use of force against Taiwan. On 18 July 1996, a resolution recommended the improvement of Taiwan's representation in international organizations. On several occasions, the EP has also pushed the Commission to establish a EU-level representative office in Taipei.⁷⁶

Certainly, the minor part played by the EP within the EU qualify these stands. Yet, if one sticks to commercial necessities, the EU should, sooner or later, give a new boost to the development of political extensions to economic ties. In particular, the issue of arms sales to Taiwan should prompt a common attitude at the European level in order to prevent Beijing playing one country against another.

Future arms sales to Taiwan cannot be ruled out. For the time being French firms and their state-shareholder stress the fact that, beyond Taiwan's market, all export opportunities rely heavily on the way the current contracts with Taiwan are managed. The follow-up of the 60 Mirage jets ordered in 1992 will last about 30 years, and will imply new arm exports. This follow-up is certainly a requirement for the Taiwanese side. It will also become a reference – be it positive or negative – for related French firms.⁷⁷ But the latter should soon become European given the ongoing restructuring of the arms industry throughout the EU. This should probably give a new impetus to the part played by Europe in the development of political extensions to economic ties, for lack of a real political relationship with Taiwan.

75. According to various sources, the 1999 change is ascribed only to the zeal of an inexperienced member of the French delegation, or to a "cohabitation clash" (the President and the Prime Minister currently belonging to two opposite political parties). However that may be, the following year, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not oppose the ambassador when he ratified this practice.

76. Resolutions of 18 July 1996 and of 13 July 2001.

77. It seems that it is in the field of the follow-up that Dassault has been less successful in the past, in particular in Latin American countries.