

PARTY LEADERS, POWER AND CHANGE

Seth Goldstein

ABSTRACT

Shocks to the incentive structures of party organizations are few and far between, making it difficult to see how different types of party professionals respond to attempts to change the systems providing them with power. I make use of one such shock – the adoption of the McGovern–Fraser reforms by the Democratic parties of the 50 American states in the early 1970s – to test the proposition that party leaders who wield a great deal of power over their organizations are more likely to resist changes intended to decentralize power than party leaders who do not. With the help of a duration model, I find that party leaders respond to reform movements in predictable fashion. Leaders of traditional, organized parties are less likely to reform party rules than other types of leaders. However, electoral incentives also play an important role. Party leaders, even while safeguarding their power, must monitor the desires of important constituencies.

KEY WORDS ■ party leadership ■ party organization ■ party reform

I. Introduction

The demise of the stereotypical party machine has continued relatively unabated over the course of the twentieth century; however, leaders of party organizations still exercise some degree of control over access to elective office and the resources needed to contest elections credibly. Aspiring office-holders are certainly no longer beholden to party leaders as they once were; however, candidates, especially those competing at the state and local level, are still well advised to develop a good working relationship with party regulars.

Where party organizations wield considerable power over nominations and offices, a variety of groups will have incentives to press for change. Candidates and office-holders, while thankful for the help the party provides, would prefer a system where they have more control over their own fates. Issue advocates would prefer an environment where party

organizations exercise proportionately less influence over candidates and office-holders and they exercise proportionately more.

Where candidates and issue advocates seek freedom from party bosses, these leaders can be expected to guard their prerogatives jealously. Just as career-minded legislators are unlikely to embrace term limits and campaign finance reform, certain types of party professionals are unlikely to welcome efforts to reduce their power and ability to structure incentives for other party members.

However, even the most self-serving party leader must also be concerned with winning elections and satisfying the desires of his party's key constituencies, lest they replace him or withdraw their support from the party. Electoral concerns force party professionals to pay attention to interests they represent or hope to represent, just as these concerns force office-holders to do so.

While this line of reasoning is intuitively appealing, it is rarely subjected to a rigorous investigation. Large and widespread shocks to the incentive structures of party organizations have been few and far between, making it difficult to see how different types of party professionals respond to attempts to change the systems that provide them with power and prestige. I make use of one such shock – the adoption of the McGovern–Fraser reforms by the Democratic parties of the 50 American states in the early 1970s – to test the proposition that party leaders who wield a great deal of personal power over their organizations are more likely to resist and insulate themselves from changes intended to decentralize power than party leaders who do not have such a stake.

This article proceeds as follows. In Section II, I develop an argument about the decision-making calculus that party leaders engage in when dealing with questions of organizational change. In Section III, I briefly discuss the history of the McGovern–Fraser reforms. In Section IV, drawing upon the decision-making argument from Section II and the history from Section III, I offer a number of hypotheses about factors, including the relative power of party leaders, that may have influenced the adoption process in the various states. In Section V, I employ a Cox proportional hazards model to test these hypotheses and present the results. Finally, in Section VI, I summarize the major findings and suggest avenues for further research.

II. Party Leaders

Party professionals, such as state and county chairmen, ward chiefs, etc., can be viewed similarly to elected officials, at least in certain respects. Like office-holders, party professionals may receive monetary compensation for the services they provide. However, like office-holders, many party professionals are talented individuals who could find more lucrative work

elsewhere. Why, then, do they choose to serve? Like elected officials, party leaders derive pleasure from the power and prestige of their positions and their ability to affect political outcomes.

The amount of power wielded by party leaders will vary from place to place and from time to time. To maintain leverage over elected officials, they must be able to supply candidates with the resources needed to gain office. Election laws in some states and localities may allow party leaders to determine who appears on the ballot with relatively little input from rank-and-file members. Insurgents cannot always overcome the advantages that party leaders have in supplying members with signals and cues. If candidates want the money, organizational support and credibility that come with a major party nomination, they may have to work with party leaders.

Depending upon the political entity in question, elected officials will have more or less discretion in determining who receives government positions and contracts and policy concessions. If party leaders have leverage over these officials, they may be able to gain control over the distribution of these benefits to reward valuable party service. Obviously, the number and quality of such benefits will determine how much effort party leaders can demand from benefit seekers. When such plums are few in number or of poor quality, leaders cannot expect much in return. Shafer (1983) discusses how these factors played out in the state parties.

Despite a century-long decline in the number of fully articulated and disciplined organized parties, the differences in 1970, at the margins, could still be striking. Organized parties like those in Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Missouri, or Texas had all the classic characteristics: tangible rewards which could be used in a discretionary fashion, a substantial corps of party officeholders (and their dependents) who were reliably at the service of the party, and the consequent ability to intervene in nomination politics and to mount coordinated election campaigns. At the other end, volunteer parties like those in California, Minnesota, Vermont, or North Carolina presented all the standard opposites: personalities as the sole means of mobilizing campaigns, independent activists as the major sources of political manpower, and a skeletal hierarchy of party offices which could not begin to intervene in nomination campaigns or coordinate a slate of election campaigns.

(Shafer, 1983: 283)

Party leaders act as brokers between office-seekers and benefit-seekers. Where they control electoral resources and access to nominations, candidates and elected officials must cooperate with them. As a result, party leaders will have some discretion over where the benefits of governmental control shall be bestowed. They can use these benefits to induce participation and contributions from the party membership. The contributions of members provide party leaders with money, volunteers and expertise – the very items they need to induce cooperation from current and prospective office-holders.

The power of party leaders rests upon a house of cards. A change in

election law or party rules, the development of alternative sources of electoral resources, a reduction in the number of patronage positions – any of these events may be enough to destroy the system of interlocking incentives that allows party professionals to wield influence. In as much as party leaders value their power, they will resist attempts to change the factors that contribute to this power.

Despite this inclination towards intransigence, party professionals may have good reason to alter existing structures. Party leaders are responsible for the electoral performance of their organizations. To fulfill this responsibility, they must continue to satisfy important segments of the party's existing coalition and recruit new groups into the party fold. Leaders who repeatedly fail to win elections may face removal from office. Thus, electoral pressures can force leaders to reform even when doing so will weaken their authority.

Party professionals must balance their desire for power with their need for intra-party harmony and electoral success. Efforts to alter the status quo will be subject to something akin to cost-benefit analysis. Consider the following expression: $\Delta P_i + \Delta S_i - E_i$, where ΔP_i represents how adoption of the reform will effect the power of party *i*'s leaders; ΔS_i represents how adoption of the reform will effect party *i*'s electoral coalition; and E_i represents the resources necessary to enact the reform in party *i*. If $\Delta P_i + \Delta S_i - E_i > 0$, party *i*'s leaders will support the reform effort.

One such effort occurred within the Democratic Party during the late 1960s and early 1970s. The McGovern–Fraser reforms were designed to drastically alter presidential nomination politics and to limit the role that party professionals played within these politics. The eventual adoption of these reforms by the state parties was, in retrospect, quite amazing considering the array of forces expected to stand against them. Opponents initially failed to recognize the threat that these reforms posed to their interests, and, once the threat was recognized, failed to coordinate their actions in a manner that could preclude the changes.

While this article is concerned primarily with explaining the variation in the timing of state party adoption of the McGovern–Fraser reforms and what this variation can say about political party leadership, the story behind the passage of the reforms is, in and of itself, a fascinating one. I can only offer a much-abridged version here, designed to provide background information, although I refer the reader to Ranney (1975), Crotty (1978), Polsby (1983) and especially Shafer (1983) for more comprehensive and eloquent accounts of the reform process.

III. The McGovern–Fraser Reforms

Prior to 1968, state party leaders controlled the presidential nomination process. State party executive committees or state party conventions

dominated by party regulars would determine who would represent the state at the national convention. While a small group of states did make use of presidential primaries, they often went uncontested by those seeking the nomination. In a process controlled by party professionals, a presidential candidate tailored his strategies towards wooing these individuals to his side.

After the events of 1968, however, this process would no longer be used. Spurred on by dissatisfaction with the Johnson administration's Vietnam policies, Senator Eugene McCarthy attempted to wrest the party's nomination away from the incumbent president. Party leaders were less than enthusiastic about his decision and rebuffed his attempts to gain the support of the delegations they controlled. McCarthy was forced into a primary strategy, hoping that a strong performance in the electoral arena would force the administration to alter its Vietnam strategy or possibly convince the party leadership that public support for Johnson was so weak that they should support him instead of the president.

After a strong showing by McCarthy in the New Hampshire primary, Johnson shocked the nation by announcing he would neither seek nor accept the party's nomination. However, at the time of President Johnson's announcement, delegate selection had begun in all but 12 states (Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection, 1970). These delegates, loyal to Johnson and the party leadership, now turned to Vice President Hubert Humphrey. Humphrey announced his candidacy one month after Johnson's shocker, carefully choosing the date as to fall after the filing deadlines for the remaining primaries (Crotty, 1978). He would win the nomination without formally contesting a single presidential preference primary.

During the month before the convention, McCarthy loyalists, enraged by the fact that they could not translate popular support for their candidate into a proportional amount of convention votes, turned their attention from the effort to nominate McCarthy to a movement to reform the procedures that they saw as frustrating that effort (Shafer, 1983). Forming an ad hoc committee, a small group of McCarthyites began to develop recommendations for opening up the nomination process.

This committee presented its report to the Rules and Credentials Committees at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago. While the nation's attention was fixed on the bloody demonstrations occurring in the streets of the city and the spirited debate over the content of the platform's Vietnam plank, other revolutionary events were occurring in a very quiet fashion.

First, the Rules and Credentials Committees, while rejecting most of the McCarthyites' suggestions for the 1968 convention, agreed to call for the appointment of official party bodies to study and reform the 1972 state delegate selection procedures in their reports to the floor. Second, and more surprisingly, the full convention, in a close vote where it appears that not all delegates understood the issues being debated, passed a minority report of

the Rules Committee. This report required the 1972 convention to allow all Democrats full opportunity to participate in the nomination process by eliminating the unit rule (the practice whereby all of a political unit's delegates are bound by the will of the majority) from all stages of the process and by ensuring that all delegates are selected through 'procedures open to public participation within the calendar year of the national convention' (Democratic National Committee, 1968). The agreement to look into the matter further and the adoption of the minority report would provide reformers with a base from which and resources with which to operate in the months and years ahead (Shafer, 1983).

In February of 1969, DNC Chairman Fred Harris appointed the 28-member Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection. The McGovern-Fraser Commission, as it came to be known after its two chairmen, was ostensibly to be composed of members from all the elements of the party. However, Harris, hoping to ingratiate himself with the liberal wing of the party for a possible run at the presidency, saw to it that the body had a pro-reform tilt. Party professionals and organized labor representatives were noticeably absent from the roster. Indeed, after the Commission's initial meeting in March in which the group's leanings were made apparent, the AFL-CIO decided that its representative, I. W. Abel of the United Steelworkers of America, would no longer attend Commission meetings in order to demonstrate labor's lack of support for the eventual recommendations (Glass and Cottin, 1971; Shafer, 1983).

Most of the Commission's official members were not involved with its operations in the months ahead, leaving the work to the body's executive committee, even more pro-reform than the full committee, and the staff, which had been almost exclusively imported from the McCarthy campaign (Shafer, 1983). The end result was a set of recommendations for state parties that, if implemented, would significantly alter delegate selection procedures. These guidelines would eliminate the use of the unit rule, reduce the potential for abuse of proxy voting, provide rank-and-file members with adequate notice about meetings and deadlines and ensure fair representation of women, minorities, young people and supporters of various candidates.

When the Commission reconvened in late September for a two-day meeting, a majority of the commissioners were seeing these recommendations for the first time (Shafer, 1983). The staff possessed a huge informational advantage in terms of assessing the practical effects of the proposed rules and succeeded in getting the guidelines accepted with little or no modifications. After a small debate about what exactly fair representation entailed, the Commission adopted the 18 final guidelines at another two-day meeting in mid-November.

Choosing to interpret the 1968 convention resolutions rather liberally, the executive committee and the staff viewed the Commission's work as 'binding on all state parties for 1972' (Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection, 1970). By February 1970, the staff had sent letters to all

state party chairmen informing them as to what had been decided and what the state party would have to do to come into compliance with the McGovern-Fraser guidelines. At this point, they expected some type of backlash against the reform movement, but none was forthcoming.

State party leaders viewed the Commission's work with varying levels of trepidation. Some were surprisingly receptive to the new rules. Others didn't fully understand what effects the rules would have upon their ability to run party affairs. Even those who realized the broader implications of the reforms raised no substantial outcry (Crotty, 1978; Shafer, 1983).

This inaction was the result of three factors. First, developing a coordinated effort to stop the reforms took time and energy. Whereas the Commission possessed a central headquarters and a well-informed staff to assist reformers across the nation, no such body existed for those hoping to frustrate them.

Second, any prominent action taken against the reforms would essentially admit that the reforms were likely to have a significant effect on party operations and might attract unwanted attention from a media perceived to be pro-reform. Party regulars would publicly embrace and loudly acclaim the proposed changes, and there the matter would end. The party would go on record in favor of 'fairness', 'openness' and 'democratic representation'; nothing would change and politics-as-usual would be the order of the day (Crotty, 1978: 105).

Third, despite the Commission's belief that its work was binding, the guidelines had yet to be officially supported by the DNC, where state party leaders might be able to block them. All in all, adopting a wait-and-see approach to the reforms with at least the pretense of cooperation made more sense for party professionals and labor leaders opposed to change than initiating a costly and potentially dangerous anti-reform campaign. 'Most northern states followed a basic law of politics: say nothing, do little, see how events work out' (Crotty, 1978: 106). However, the lack of an initial objection by those strongly opposed to the reforms may have sent a signal to fence sitters that no such objection would come. These individuals began work on implementing the reforms.

As reform politics played themselves out in the various states, the Commission's staff focused its efforts on those states where reform was most likely to succeed. By the time the DNC met in February of 1971, 16 state parties were in nearly full compliance and 22 others were believed to be on their way. Opponents of the guidelines found themselves with nowhere to run when the national committee approved the guidelines. Their policy of inaction had cost them the chance to alter the outcome of the debate. Reluctantly, these groups moved to comply, lest their state delegations be unseated at the 1972 convention.

In many cases, state parties found it in their best interest to completely divorce their delegate selection mechanisms from state party politics (Cotter and Bibby, 1980; Ranney, 1975; Truman, 1984-85; Walz and Comer,

1999). Where state party committees or conventions retained discretion over delegate selection, candidate supporters and issue advocates had an incentive to gain control of these bodies. The McGovern–Fraser reforms now gave them the ability to accomplish this. Rather than lose control of state party operations to ideologues and activists who were more interested in national policy (Bruce et al., 1991), party professionals ceded control over presidential nominations by instituting primaries or participatory caucuses to maintain their power within their states. Between 1968 and 1972, the number of states holding presidential preference primaries increased by 72 percent. The number of states with ‘organized’ parties holding such primaries increased by 125 percent, while the number of states with ‘volunteer’ parties holding primaries increased by 43 percent.

By July of 1972, 40 state parties were in full compliance with the guidelines. The remaining 10 were in various states of ‘substantial’ compliance, with most of the problems occurring where state parties were unable to alter state election law (Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection, 1972). In less than four years, presidential nomination within the Democratic Party had gone from a procedure dominated by party leaders to one that would come to be dominated by candidate organizations and rank-and-file members motivated enough to participate (Crotty, 1978; Polsby, 1983; Ranney, 1975).

IV. Hypotheses

Using the decision-making framework established in Section II, I now offer a number of hypotheses concerning state party adoption of the McGovern–Fraser reforms. What factors increased the likelihood that a state party would move from non-compliance to compliance? What factors decreased this probability?

$$\Delta P_i$$

ΔP_i represents the net effect the reform would have upon the power of party *i*'s leadership. The McGovern–Fraser Commission clearly hoped to open up the presidential nomination process. They ‘shared a belief that the image of an organization impervious to the will of its rank and file threatened the future of the Party’ (Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection, 1970: 9). They hoped to eliminate secret caucuses, closed slate-making, proxy voting and any other procedure that left the process of delegate selection in the hands of a few party leaders. Since the McGovern–Fraser guidelines struck at the heart of state party leaders’ power, it is reasonable to assume that these leaders would resist implementing them.

However, the reforms would not affect all leaders in the same way. Those with comparatively more power over their organizations had comparatively

more power to lose. On the one hand, leaders of traditional parties, operating in an environment of patronage and political favors, had a great deal at stake. On the other hand, leaders of less professional parties had little to lose.

Hypothesis 1: States with more traditional parties (where $\Delta P_i < 0$) are less likely to adopt the reforms than are states with less traditional parties (where $\Delta P_i = 0$).

$$\Delta S_i$$

ΔS_i represents the net effect the reform would have upon party i 's electoral coalition. The McGovern–Fraser guidelines sought to broaden electoral support for the Democratic Party by explicitly increasing the influence of previously marginalized groups. However, there were also groups that believed, correctly or otherwise, that their influence within the party would be decreased or diluted as a result of implementing the new rules. Adoption of the guidelines might bring new groups into the party fold, but might convince other groups to abandon the party. Conversely, a failure to adopt the guidelines might be a missed opportunity to increase support in formerly untapped areas, but would lead to no decrease in support from traditional members of the party coalition. Party leaders hoping to keep or make their party as electorally viable as possible would have to consider the net effect of the guidelines upon the groups within their state before deciding how to proceed.

Blacks may have been the most obvious beneficiaries of the reforms. Guideline A-1 addressed the problem of racial discrimination and urged state parties to make their procedures open to minorities. It went as far as to require 'representation of minority groups on the national convention delegation in reasonable relationship to the group's presence in the population of the state' (Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection, 1970). Blacks had good reason to support adoption of the guidelines. Thus, party leaders could ingratiate themselves and the party with this bloc of voters by quickly implementing the reforms. This incentive was greater in states where blacks made up a larger percentage of the population.

Hypothesis 2: State parties in states with large black populations are more likely to adopt the reforms than state parties in states with small black populations (ΔS_i is larger for state parties in states with large black populations).

While blacks certainly welcomed a larger role in the delegate selection process, there were groups that did not welcome blacks into the party with open arms. At this time, many state parties in the South were more or less white-only. Since the reforms would force these parties to allow blacks to participate in party councils, state parties in the South should be expected

to resist change and reduce the probability of compliance.¹ Indeed, Southern governors were some of the most vocal critics of the McGovern–Fraser Commission and its proposed changes (Crotty, 1978).

Hypothesis 3: Southern state parties are less likely to adopt the reforms than state parties in other regions of the country (ΔS_i is smaller for state parties in southern states).

Many in the reform movement found their start in the McCarthy campaign. Frustrated in their attempt to get what they considered a fair hearing for McCarthy at the 1968 convention, they now worked so that future candidates would be able to translate public support into a proportional amount of representation. Guideline B-5 forbade use of the unit rule and related practices like instructing delegations. State party leaders hoping to keep the McCarthy supporters within the party could do so by moving swiftly to adopt the guidelines.

Hypothesis 4: Parties in states with organized McCarthy supporters are more likely to adopt the reforms than parties in states without organized McCarthy supporters (ΔS_i is larger in states with organized McCarthy supporters).

While McCarthy supporters actively worked for the reforms, organized labor withheld its support from the McGovern–Fraser Commission. Labor leaders such as AFL-CIO President George Meany did not believe ‘that there was a need to reform a convention system that had given the nation Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, Kennedy and Johnson’ (Glass and Cottin, 1971). The AFL-CIO’s decision not to attend Commission meetings indicates that it feared the new procedures would reduce its power within the Democratic coalition. Party leaders needing to stay in the good graces of labor leaders had an incentive to avoid or delay adoption of the guidelines.

Hypothesis 5: Parties in states with powerful labor lobbies should be less likely to adopt the reforms than parties in states with weak labor lobbies (ΔS_i is smaller in states with powerful labor lobbies).

E_i

E_i represents the amount of effort necessary to cause the change to occur. The McGovern–Fraser Commission’s 18 guidelines imposed a stringent set of conditions upon state parties. Even those state parties eager and willing to adopt the reforms still had to expend time and resources to move into compliance. The delegation selection procedures of some states violated more of the Commission’s standards than did those of others.

Hypothesis 6: State parties with a large number of violations should be less likely to adopt the reforms than state parties with a small number of violations (E_i is larger in states with more violations).

In some cases, state election law was itself in violation of the Commission's guidelines. Thus, certain state parties faced legislative hurdles in their efforts to move into compliance with the reforms.

Hypothesis 7: State parties requiring a legislative change to enact the reforms should be less likely to adopt the reforms than state parties not requiring such a change (E_i is larger in states requiring legislative change).

V. Methods and Results

While the argument that party professionals with personal stakes in their party organizations were more likely to resist the McGovern–Fraser reforms than those who did not have such stakes seems reasonable enough and is largely borne out by the examinations of Crotty and Shafer, demonstrating empirically that this was the case, will further validate the hypothesis. Ideally, I would incorporate some measure of the level of control party leaders exercised over their organizations into a probit model to determine what effect this factor had upon the probability that a state party adopted the guidelines. Unfortunately, because all state parties more or less came into compliance with the new rules, there would be no variation in the dependent variable in such a model. However, using duration analysis, I can take advantage of information about *when* each of the 50 state parties moved into compliance to estimate the effect of party leader power upon the adoption process. Inasmuch as traditional party organizations were more likely to resist the changes, states with such parties should be more likely to remain in a state of non-compliance than those without.

Duration analysis is a useful tool for determining the effects of factors upon the time until an event occurs (Kiefer, 1988; Chung et al., 1991; Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 1997). Duration data are longitudinal records of when events occur, and duration models analyze the length of time until an event occurs. Such models have been used profitably elsewhere in political science (Box-Steffensmeier, 1996; Box-Steffensmeier et al., 1997; Katz and Sala, 1996).

The critical feature of a duration model is the hazard rate, which indicates the probability that an event will occur at a certain time, given that the event has not yet occurred. The hazard rate has two components. The first is a set of independent variables thought to have some effect on the timing of the event. Parameter estimates for these variables denote the degree to which they increase or decrease the risk of the event occurring.

The second component is a baseline function that represents the rate of event occurrence, given that the effects of all the independent variables are zero. This baseline indicates how the rate of occurrence changes with respect to time.

I make use of a Cox proportional hazards model (Cox, 1972) to examine the timing of state party change. For a state party with a vector of characteristics, X , the model assumes a hazard rate of the form

$$h(t/x) = h_0(t)e^{X\beta}$$

where $h_0(t)$ is the baseline hazard function. For the purpose of this analysis, the major advantage of the Cox model over other types of duration models is that it makes only minimal assumptions about this baseline, allowing estimation of the effects of independent variables without having to specify a particular distribution for the hazard function. An incorrect specification of the hazard rate can lead to biased estimates. The proportional hazards model only assumes that the effect of each independent variable is proportional and time invariant.

The dependent variable, indicating the time at which a state party came into compliance, is coded as the number of months after April 1970 until the state party came into compliance. April 1970 marked the public distribution of the McGovern–Fraser Commission’s Mandate for Reform. By selecting that particular month, I set the earliest state reform passage to a duration of 1 and eliminate worries about left censoring, which occurs when one or more of the cases has changed states prior to the first period of observation (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 1997; Chung et al., 1991; Kiefer, 1988).

The 40 states deemed by the Commission to be in full compliance with the directives have durations ranging from 1 to 26 (indicating compliance in June 1972, two months before the national convention). Of the 10 in substantial, but not full, compliance, I judged four of these to possess negligible violations and coded their durations as the month in which they had made the last major changes to their rules. I judged the violations of the six remaining states to be noteworthy enough to warrant special attention and coded them as remaining in a state of non-compliance at the time of the 1972 convention.² A dichotomous variable indicating whether or not a state would comply by August 1972 was incorporated into the analysis to deal with right censoring, which occurs when one or more of the cases has not changed states by the final period of observation (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 1997; Chung et al., 1991; Kiefer, 1988). Figure 1 presents the state compliance data.

A variety of independent variables are included in the model to investigate the hypotheses developed in Section IV. Summary statistics for these variables can be found in Table 1.

Table 1. Variables included in the timing model

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Hypothesized effect on hazard rate</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Standard deviation</i>	<i>Min.</i>	<i>Max.</i>
Compliance time	NA	18.52	5.66	1	27
TPO	Decrease	2.1	1.58	1	5
Organization	Decrease	0.48	0.5	0	1
Black	Increase	8.83	9.28	0.2	36.8
South	Decrease	0.22	0.42	0	1
Union	Decrease	23.43	8.81	7.6	42.8
McCarthy	Increase	28.32	28.32	0	100
Challenge	Increase	0.36	0.48	0	1
Violation	Decrease	8.7	2.1	5	12
Law	Decrease	0.3	0.46	0	1

 ΔP_i

Shafer (1983: 282) divides state parties into two groups – volunteer and organized – after assembling a wide array of qualitative data. A dichotomous variable, *Organization*, indicates this distinction.

Mayhew (1986) also examined party organization in the states during the time period in question, developing a five-point scale, the Traditional Party Organization (TPO) score, to rate each state party in terms of autonomy from other politically-motivated groups, power over nomination, hierarchy and incentive system. The variable *TPO* indicates the rating that Mayhew gave to each state.

There is a great deal of correlation ($r = 0.78$) between Shafer's dichotomy and Mayhew's scale, indicating general agreement about which state parties were more organized. Because of the difficulty in capturing the nature of a political party organization, I estimate two separate models, utilizing Shafer's categorization in one and Mayhew's scale in the other.

 ΔS_i

Black is the percentage of a state's population that was black according to the 1970 US Census. *South* is a dichotomous variable indicating whether the state is in the southern part of the nation. *Union* is the percentage of a state's non-agricultural workforce that holds a union membership according to the 1970 US Census.

McCarthy is the percentage of each state delegation that cast votes for Senator McCarthy at the 1968 convention. *Challenge* is a dichotomous variable indicating whether or not a state's 1968 delegation was challenged at the convention. Together these two variables indicate how large an issue reform was in a state prior to the formation of the McGovern-Fraser Commission.

E_i

Violation indicates how many of the 18 guidelines each state party was in violation of at the time the guidelines were published (Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection, 1972). *Law* is a dichotomous variable indicating whether a change in current state election law was necessary for a state party to comply.

As noted above, the Cox model assumes that the effect of each independent variable is proportional and time invariant. This is not a trivial assumption. If the effect of any independent variable varies over the time period examined, estimation of a proportional hazards model may result in biased parameter estimates, incorrect standard errors and misleading inferences. A misspecified model will overestimate the impact of variables whose effects are increasing over time and underestimate the impact of variables whose effects are decreasing over time (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn, 1998).

Fortunately, the proportionality assumption holds, as shown by a test for non-proportionality based on the weighted residuals from the model plotted over time (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn, 1998). Table 2 presents the results of this test. For each variable, the correlation between the weighted residuals and the rank of survival time does not indicate that its effects

Table 2. Results for Harrell (1985) and Grambsch and Therneau (1994) tests for non-proportionality

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Rho</i>	<i>Chi-squared</i>	<i>p-value</i>
With Shafer indicator included			
Organization	0.119	0.977	0.32
Black	0.044	0.116	0.73
South	-0.031	0.057	0.81
Union	-0.043	0.103	0.75
McCarthy	0.11	0.764	0.38
Challenge	-0.212	2.4612	0.12
Violation	0.081	0.276	0.6
Law	-0.036	0.094	0.76
Global	-	4.67	0.79
With TPO score included			
TPO	-0.056	0.179	0.67
Black	0.125	0.772	0.38
South	-0.104	0.613	0.43
Union	-0.001	0.001	0.99
McCarthy	0.053	0.126	0.72
Challenge	-0.136	1.104	0.29
Violation	0.075	0.24	0.62
Law	-0.076	0.388	0.53
Global	-	3.52	0.89

are non-proportional. In addition, the global test fails to indicate non-proportionality in either model.

Given the failure to detect non-proportionality, the model's results can be interpreted with some degree of confidence. Table 3 presents the results of the Cox proportional hazard model with the Shafer organizational indicator included, while Table 4 presents the results of the Cox proportional model with Mayhew's TPO score included. The results are nearly identical.

The fit of each model is very good. We can reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients are jointly zero at the 0.0001 level. The coefficients indicate whether the independent variable in question increases or decreases the probability that a state will move from non-compliance to compliance at any given time and the magnitude of such an effect. *P*-values can be interpreted in the traditional manner. Of the eight independent variables, all but *McCarthy* has a coefficient with a sign supporting the major hypotheses.

The last column in each table presents each variable's effect upon the hazard rate. For a dichotomous variable, the percentage change in the probability of moving into compliance is calculated as:

$$100[e^{(\beta*1)} - e^{(\beta*0)}] / e^{(\beta*0)}$$

where β represents the coefficient estimate for that variable.

Table 3. Factors influencing the timing of state compliance (Shafer dichotomy included)

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Estimate</i>	<i>Z</i>	<i>p-value</i>	<i>Percentage change in hazard rate</i>
Organization	-1.144***	-2.619	0.01	-68.1
Black	0.0711**	1.975	0.05	1249 (123.8)
South	-2.009**	-2.208	0.03	-86.6
Union	-0.022	-0.848	0.4	-54.2 (-25.4)
McCarthy	-0.006	-0.854	0.39	-46.2 (-18.8)
Challenge	0.371	0.913	0.36	44.8
Violation	-0.031	-0.379	0.7	-19.2 (-11.4)
Law	-2.763***	-4.25	0	-93.7

R-squared = 0.568

Likelihood ration test = 42 on 8 *df*, *p* = 0.00000

Wald test = 28.7 on 8 *df*, *p* = 0.00036

Efficient score test = 36.4 on 8 *df*, *p* = 0.00001

***Significant at a 99 percent confidence level.

** Significant at a 95 percent confidence level.

* Significant at a 90 percent confidence level.

For dummy variables, the change in the hazard rate was computed by changing the value of the variable from 0 to 1. For continuous variables, the change in the hazard rate was computed by changing the value of the variable from its minimum to its maximum. In addition, the change in the hazard result resulting from changing the variable from the value it takes at the first quartile to the value it takes at the third quartile is presented in parentheses.

Table 4. Factors influencing the timing of state compliance (TPO included)

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Estimate</i>	<i>Z</i>	<i>p-value</i>	<i>Percentage change in hazard rate</i>	
TPO	-0.383***	-2.462	0.01	-78.4	
Black	0.079**	2.224	0.03	1701	(144.7)
South	-2.372***	-2.518	0.01	-90.7	
Union	-0.018	0.738	0.46	-47.2	(-21.3)
McCarthy	-0.001	-0.194	0.85	-11.5	(-4.0)
Challenge	0.498	1.211	0.23	64.6	
Violation	-0.047	-0.565	0.57	-27.9	(-17.0)
Law	-2.516***	-4.011	0	-91.9	

R-squared = 0.564

Likelihood ration test = 41.5 on 8 df, *p* = 0.00000

Wald test = 28 on 8 df, *p* = 0.00047

Efficient score test = 36.4 on 8 df, *p* = 0.00001

*** Significant at a 99 percent confidence level.

** Significant at a 95 percent confidence level.

* Significant at a 90 percent confidence level.

For dummy variables, the change in the hazard rate was computed by changing the value of the variable from 0 to 1. For the TPO score, the change in the hazard rate was computed by changing the value of the variable from 1 to 5. For continuous variables, the change in the hazard rate was computed by changing the value of the variable from its minimum to its maximum. In addition, the change in the hazard result resulting from changing the variable from the value it takes at the first quartile to the value it takes at the third quartile is presented in parentheses.

For a continuous variable, the change is calculated as:

$$100[e^{(\beta^*[x + \Delta])} - e^{(\beta^*x)}] / e^{(\beta^*x)}$$

for a change in value in the independent variable from *x* to *x* + Δ .

Examining the statistically significant variables, we see that organized or traditional state parties complied later than volunteer parties. If a volunteer state party were to become an organized party, its probability of complying at any point in time would decrease by 68.1 percent. Similarly, state parties with a TPO score of 5 were 78.4 percent less likely to move into compliance in any period than those with TPO scores of 1. It appears that the highly structured incentive systems of organized parties responded to mandates for reform less quickly. Party leaders in these states would not favor the changes and would be expected to resist as long as they could.

To demonstrate this point a bit more graphically, I have included plots of the estimated survival curves for the different types of parties. These plots indicate the probability of a state party still being in non-compliance at a

particular period in time, holding all the other covariates constant. Figure 1 presents the survival curves for volunteer and organized states according to Shafer's categorization, while Figure 2 presents the survival curves for states with TPO scores equal to one and those with scores greater than one. The shapes of the curves representing volunteer and less organized state parties clearly differ from the shapes of the curves representing more organized state parties. The probability of being in a state of non-compliance for less organized parties begins a gradual decline around April 1971, while that of more traditional parties begins a much more precipitous decline around January 1972. Organized parties with powerful leaders were much less likely to jump on the reform bandwagon.

State parties that found it necessary to alter existing state law to make their procedures agree with the 18 McGovern–Fraser guidelines were also much less likely at any particular moment to change their rules. Having such statutes on the books reduces the hazard rate by 93.7 percent in the Shafer model and by 91.9 percent in the TPO model. Legislative hurdles constituted formidable obstacles to compliance efforts.

Southern state parties resisted change for longer periods of time as well. If the party was located in the South, the hazard rate decreases by 86.6 and 90.7 percent, respectively. This confirms the expectation that party professionals in these states would avoid reforming party practices, as these changes would likely result in the enfranchisement of large numbers of blacks.




Figure 1. Estimated survival curves for state parties (by Shafer dichotomy)
(♦ = volunteer; ■ = organization)




Figure 2. Estimated survival curves for state parties (by TPO classification)
(◆ TPO = 1; ■ TPO > 1)

The presence of a significant black population apparently provided an incentive for electorally-minded state party leaders to move more quickly. An increase from the minimum to the maximum black population share increases the hazard rate by 1249 percent in the Shafer model and by 1701 percent in the TPO model. A more moderate change – from the first quartile to the third – increases the hazard rate by 123.8 and 144.7 percent, respectively.

The remaining four variables – percentage of labor force in unions, percentage of delegation for McCarthy in 1968, the presence of a 1968 credentials challenge, and number of violations – do not reach traditional levels of statistical significance in either model.

VI. Summary and Conclusion

Where party structures enabled leaders to wield relatively greater power than party professionals in other states, these leaders were far less likely at any given point in time to change their party's delegation selection methods to comply with the McGovern–Fraser guidelines. Inasmuch as these guidelines essentially eliminated the role of party leaders in presidential nomination politics and threatened the ability of party leaders to manipulate

outcomes in their own states, this type of intransigent behavior is exactly what we would expect self-interested party professionals to exhibit.

Electoral incentives also played a role in the timing of the states' adoption times. Where groups that were likely to benefit from the reforms were prevalent, state parties moved more quickly to approve them. Conversely, where groups that believed they would be hurt by the guidelines were prevalent, state parties moved less quickly. Party leaders, even while safeguarding their personal power, must monitor the desires and wishes of important or potentially important constituencies.

Finally, the difficulty of achieving change had an impact upon the process. State parties that needed the state legislature to act in order to comply with the guidelines had more difficulty meeting the standards than those that did not need such assistance.

The timing model presented here enhances our understanding of party organizations and party leaders. Party leaders in different states responded to the mandate for reform in a predictable manner. Thus, the model provides some support for the decision-making framework developed in Section II.

The number of situations where this framework can be profitably employed may be limited. As noted above, identifiable shocks that affect the incentive structures of a number of party systems at the same time are few and far between, making it difficult to see how different types of parties or party professionals respond to attempts to change the systems that provide them with power and prestige. However, there is at least one important area where this framework may prove very useful.

The European Union continues to grow in importance, evolving into a political system as complex as any of its member states. Transnational party federations, comprised of like-minded parties from the various member states, try to coordinate activity in the European Parliament (EP). However, these federations are relatively weak. Members of the EP are first and foremost members of their national party. Elections to the EP are conducted in each member state under the electoral rules of that state. National parties choose the candidates who will stand for election to the EP and determine how the campaign will be run. These elections tend to be more about the member state's internal politics than about EU policy (Hix, 1999).

If there is ever to be a genuine 'European' contest fought between rival European-wide parties and about the direction of the EP legislative agenda, structural changes in the way EP elections are conducted may be required (Hix, 1999). For example, the transnational federations may need to exercise greater authority over their member parties, perhaps by taking control of the candidate nomination systems. We can expect any attempt by the federations to increase their power relative to the national parties to be met with resistance. Where nominations to the EP are an important part of the way national parties structure the incentives of their members, party leaders will be loath to relinquish control over them to the transnational

federations. Thus, the level of resistance will vary from member state to member state and it will vary in a systematic manner. The type of framework used here to analyze the adoption of the McGovern–Fraser reforms may help scholars predict and explain change within the EU party system.

Regardless of the particulars of the situation where the framework is employed, the same type of pattern should emerge that emerged during the Democratic reforms of the 1970s. Party leaders who exercise more control over their party organizations will be more likely to resist attempts to decrease that control than party leaders who do not exercise that level of control. However, even intransigent party leaders must determine what affect such resistance is likely to have upon their party's electoral coalition.

Notes

- 1 'Southern-ness' and the presence of a large black population are highly correlated. In an OLS regression, this correlation might lead to coefficient estimators with larger variances and covariances, leading to the acceptance of the 'zero null hypothesis' (i.e. the true population coefficient is zero) more readily. Ideally, I would incorporate an interaction variable into the model to separate the effect that size of black population has in southern states versus non-southern states. Unfortunately, it is not quite clear how to interpret such variables in a duration model, and I have been forced to do without one. However, the coefficient estimates provided by the model indicate that both variables have significant effects in the expected direction. From this we can infer that southern states with large black populations were more likely to adopt the reforms than southern states without large black populations but not as likely as non-southern states with large black populations.
- 2 'Substantial' compliance states included Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Maryland, Montana, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania and West Virginia. Florida (10 percent of delegates selected too early, but still bound to primary results), Oregon (filing fees too high), Maryland and Georgia (delegates apportioned equally among the state's congressional districts instead of by formula) were deemed to be in 'full' compliance by the author. Parties in Connecticut, Indiana, New York, Montana, Pennsylvania and West Virginia had more serious violations in terms of supplying the public with information about slate-making, requiring too high a signature threshold on petitions and allowing delegates to express the presidential preferences on the ballot. I deemed these six parties to be in a state of non-compliance (relative to the others) by the time of the convention. The results presented reflect these coding decisions. However, models with 0, 2, 4, 8 and all 10 of these parties right-censored were also estimated with little change.

References

- Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M. (1996) 'A Dynamic Analysis of the Role of War Chests in Campaign Strategy', *American Journal of Political Science* 40: 352–71.

- Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M., Laura W. Arnold and Christopher J. Zorn (1997) 'Strategic Position Taking and the Timing of Voting Decisions in Congress: A Study of the North American Free Trade Agreement', *American Political Science Review* 91: 324–38.
- Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M. and Bradford S. Jones (1997) 'Time is of the Essence: Event History Models in Political Science', *American Journal of Political Science* 41: 1414–61.
- Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M. and Christopher J. W. Zorn (1998) 'Duration Models and Proportional Hazards in Political Science'. Mimeo. Ohio State University and Emory University.
- Bruce, John M., John A. Clark and John H. Kessel (1991) 'Advocacy Politics in Presidential Parties', *American Political Science Review* 85: 1089–105.
- Chung, Ching-Fan, Peter Schmidt and Ann D. Witte (1991) 'Survival Analysis: A Survey', *Journal of Quantitative Criminology* 7: 59–98.
- Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection (1970) *Mandate for Reform*. Washington, DC: Democratic National Committee.
- Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection (1972) *The Party Reformed*. Washington, DC: Democratic National Committee.
- Cotter, Cornelius P. and John F. Bibby (1980) 'Institutionalization of Parties and the Thesis of Party Decline', *Political Science Quarterly* 95: 1–27.
- Cotter, Cornelius P., James L. Gibson, John F. Bibby and Robert L. Huckshorn (1984) *Party Organization in American Politics*. New York: Praeger.
- Cox, D. R. (1972) 'Regression Models and Life Tables', *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, B* 34: 187–220.
- Crotty, William J. (1978) *Decision for the Democrats: Reforming the Party Structure*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Democratic National Committee (1968) *Proceedings of the 1968 Democratic National Convention*. Washington, DC: Democratic National Committee.
- Glass, Andrew J. and Jonathan Cottin (1971) 'Democratic Reform Drive Falters as Spotlight Shifts to Presidential Race', *National Journal* 1293–304.
- Hix, Simon (1996) 'The Transnational Party Federations', in John Gaffney (ed.) *Political Parties and the European Union*, pp. 308–30. New York: Routledge.
- Hix, Simon (1999) *The Political System of the European Union*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Katz, Jonathan N. and Brian R. Sala (1996) 'Careerism, Committee Assignments, and the Electoral Connection', *American Political Science Review* 90: 21–33.
- Kiefer, Nicholas (1988) 'Economic Duration Data and Hazard Functions', *Journal of Economic Literature* 26: 646–79.
- Koelble, Thomas (1996) 'Economic Theories of Organization', *Party Politics* 2: 250–63.
- Mayhew, David (1986) *Placing Parties in American Politics: Organizations, Electoral Setting and Government Activity in the Twentieth Century*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Nugent, Neill (1994) *The Government and Politics of the European Union*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press
- Polsby, Nelson (1983) *Consequences of Party Reform*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Ranney, Austin (1975) *Curing the Mischiefs of Faction: Party Reform in America*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

- Shafer, Byron E. (1983) *Quiet Revolution: The Struggle for the Democratic Party and the Shaping of Post-Reform Politics*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Truman, David B. (1984–85) 'Party Reform, Party Atrophy and Constitutional Change: Some Reflections', *Political Science Quarterly* 99: 637–55.
- Walz, Jeffrey S. and John Comer (1999) 'State Responses to National Democratic Party Reform', *Political Research Quarterly* 52: 189–208.

SETH GOLDSTEIN is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of Rochester. His present research focuses on the evolution of party rules and structures in the American states and on the relationship between electoral vulnerability and legislative party behavior.

ADDRESS: 2100 Walnut Street, Apt. 5G, Philadelphia, PA 19103, USA. [email: smgoldst@law.upenn.edu]

Paper submitted 26 April 2000; accepted 19 June 2001.