Democratisation and civil–military relations in Namibia, South Africa and Mozambique

ROBERT J GRIFFITHS

Namibia, South Africa and Mozambique have undergone major change over the past five years. Namibia gained its independence in 1990 and a popularly elected constituent assembly produced what is considered Africa’s most democratic constitution. South Africa’s democratic transition began with the legalisation of outlawed anti-apartheid groups and the release of Nelson Mandela in 1990 and culminated in the country’s first all-race elections in April 1994. Mozambique’s long civil war ended with a ceasefire agreement in October 1992, followed by elections two years later in October 1994. All three countries are now engaged in a complicated, multi-dimensional democratic consolidation process that involves fundamental institutional change.

Before their democratic transitions, each country experienced serious civil conflict during which the armed forces played a crucial role in maintaining the previous regime’s power. As a result, one of the critical institutional changes necessary to democratic consolidation is demilitarisation and the establishment of a new, democratic pattern of civil–military relations.

The traditional focus of civil–military relations has been primarily concerned with the armed forces’ institutional characteristics and their actual or potential political role. The military’s corporate characteristics and interests, as well as its political role, remain vitally important to any analysis of transitions in civil–military relations. However, analysis of this transition in divided societies emerging from authoritarian rule must also include examination of both the symbolic and practical problems associated with institutional reform of the armed forces. These problems include making the armed forces more representative, ensuring their political neutrality, and bringing them under firm civilian control. Solutions to these problems reflect the complexity of democratic reform.

Because of the pivotal role the armed forces played in maintaining the previous regime’s power, institutional reform of the military helps demonstrate a commitment to a new political order and enhances the armed forces’ legitimacy. The military’s potential as a power base from which to influence political reform makes it essential that no one faction either dominates the armed forces or controls it. At the same time, the armed forces also have concerns in the transformation of civil–military relations. Important institutional interests may be at stake, including funding, mission and composition of the officer corps. As a

Robert J Griffiths is at the Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina, Greensboro, 237 Graham Building, UNCG Greensboro, NC27412-5001, USA

0143-6597/96/030473-13 $6.00 © 1996 Third World Quarterly
result, the relationship between the armed forces and society suggested by the term civil–military relations is both complex and more salient during democratic transition and consolidation.

Democratic civil–military relations requires, at a minimum, restrictions on the military’s political role and the delineation of clear boundaries between civilian and military power. Practically, the transformation in civil–military relations involves three related components: 1) demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of combatants into society; 2) determination of force size, the integration of previously warring factions and the reorientation of the military’s mission; 3) institution of firm civilian control over the military. These changes are essential to establishing a democratic pattern of civil–military relations.

The connection between political reform and armed forces restructuring means that a new pattern of civil–military relations will result from the influence of variables that involve both the armed forces and civil society. Four factors stand out as crucial: the past pattern of civil–military relations, threats to the armed forces’ institutional interests, ethnic/political fragmentation, and the impact of military restructuring on reconciliation, reconstruction and development. This article examines the role of these factors in the transformation of civil–military relations in Namibia, South Africa and Mozambique and provides insight into the complexity of democratic consolidation. The importance of civil–military relations in each of these cases, and the similarities in the challenges each country faces, suggests a comparative examination of the issue. Their geographical proximity, past regional relationships, and the future military balance in the region offer further reasons to take a comparative perspective.

The transformation of civil–military relations is a sequential process. The first stage in the transformation of civil–military relations is disarming and demobilising combatants, followed by integrating personnel who either do not want, or are unqualified to continue in the military into civil society. From there, the size and composition of the armed forces must be determined, their role established and mechanisms to assure civilian control implemented.

**Demobilisation and disarmament**

Because Namibia, Mozambique and South Africa all experienced varying levels of armed conflict in their recent histories, one of the first concerns during the transition was disarming and demobilising combatants in order to reduce chances for further fighting. Failure to effectively disarm and demobilise troops in Angola before the 1992 elections led to ‘the Savimbi option’, that is, UNITA’s resumption of civil war following its electoral loss. Angola’s slide back into civil war after the 1992 elections clearly demonstrates the importance of effective demobilisation at an early stage.

Demobilisation has proven difficult, however. In Namibia, the United Nations assumed responsibility in April 1989 for designating assembly points and supervising demobilisation. The convergence of South West Africa Peoples Organization (SWAPO) guerrillas at demobilisation assembly points at the beginning of April immediately threatened to upset the transition process. South Africa inflicted substantial casualties on SWAPO guerrillas, who claimed to be
headed from bases in Angola to assembly points within Namibia. The South Africans eventually withdrew and SWAPO troops either gathered at UN assembly points or dispersed, allowing the transition to continue. Although the incident was attributed to differing interpretations of the ceasefire agreement, it threatened to destroy the transition before it commenced.\(^3\) Incomplete deployment of the UN Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) contributed to the circumstances that led to the SWAPO–South African engagement.\(^4\)

In Mozambique the demobilisation process was protracted. A ceasefire agreement between the government and Renamo (Reisistencia Nacional Mocambicana) went into effect in October 1992. UN troops were deployed to supervise the demobilisation of an estimated 60 000–100 000 combatants from both sides. Renamo claimed 21 000 troops, while western military analysts estimated that the number was under 15 000. The government gave estimates of its troop strength at between 60 000–150 000 while foreign military analysts estimated that the government had fewer than 50 000 active soldiers.\(^5\) Mozambique’s demobilisation process lagged behind schedule thanks to disputes between the government and Renamo negotiators, and UN delays in approving troop deployments and the budgets to support them.\(^6\) Delays of up to a year also resulted from disagreements over the location and number of assembly points, mutinies among both Renamo and government troops, and a slow training schedule for members of the new armed forces.

Finally, a total of 49 assembly points were designated and jointly administered by UN observers and representatives from the Frelimo (Frente de Libertacao Mocambique) government and Renamo.\(^7\) Demobilisation ended on 15 August 1994 and, as of late September 1994, 52 108 government (Frelimo) troops and 18 227 Renamo soldiers had been demobilised. Of these, 7 774 troops, 4296 from government forces and 3478 from Renamo began training for the new armed forces.

There have been major problems within the military since the October 1994 elections. Soldiers have staged mutinies on four different occasions since January 1995. There have been reports of drunk and disorderly troops, and serious grievances about pay exist. The strength of the armed forces remains only about 12 000, well short of the 30 000 originally envisioned by the 1992 ceasefire agreement.\(^8\)

South Africa’s demobilisation process was also troublesome. South Africa’s demobilisation plans called for joint monitoring of the African National Congress’s armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) and the South African Defence Forces (SADF). Under the terms of the Transitional Executive Council (TEC) all armed forces were obliged to submit lists of weapons and forces to the TEC. The TEC established a Joint Military Command Council consisting of representatives of parties participating in the transition negotiations. The monitoring forces were to include former guerrillas, members of the SADF, officers from the homelands defence forces, and foreign observers. They were based at assembly points and army bases.\(^9\) Demobilisation problems included delays in determining personnel to be integrated into the new South African National Defence Force (SANDF), incomplete lists of troops, a limited number of instructors for training, and one of the biggest obstacles, political partisanship among the troops. MK also cited as
further problems a lack of information about integration, inadequate pay and suspicion about the British Military Assistance and Training Team’s neutrality. According to one senior SANDF officer, many of the problems resulted from the fact that the integration was administered largely by structures established under the old SADF. Since integration of MK troops, homelands defence forces and representatives of other political factions was unpopular within the SADF it is not surprising that problems developed. In November 1994 over 2000 MK troops went absent without leave while training for integration. Those who failed to return were dismissed from the SANDF. Some MK troops threatened to resume fighting if their demands for payment of promised financial rewards, release of MK personnel still in jail, and reburial of MK troops buried in exile were not met.

Incomplete demobilisation posed another problem. In South Africa, some former MK cadres formed self-defence units in the townships, ostensibly to help protect ANC sympathisers from attack by rival political factions. Others drifted into criminal activity, in some cases tied to the self-defence units, while others languished in ANC camps outside South Africa awaiting repatriation.

In Mozambique there was apparently some ‘self-demobilisation’ where soldiers, impatient with the pace of demobilisation, drifted off home. This complicated Renamo’s efforts to contribute its specified number of troops to the new army, and also raised the possibility of former combatants returning to their homes with their weapons and constituting a potential future threat. Another disturbing development was the arrival of troops at assembly points in pairs with only one weapon. Although Renamo leader Alfonso Dhlakama said that his troops did not have as many weapons as the UN assumed, Renamo was thought to have stockpiled weapons for the future. Weapons continue to be readily available, with estimates of up to six million Kalashnikovs scattered throughout the country. The UN Ceasefire Commission was unable to verify 40% of Renamo’s arms caches and both sides are suspected of retaining secret caches as a hedge against the future. Reports also circulated that weapons from Mozambique found their way to South Africa’s townships and fuelled the factional fighting there in the run-up to elections. This transborder weapons trade illustrates the potential for demobilisation problems to transcend national boundaries.

In Mozambique the link between disarmament and demobilisation and the larger transition was evident in Renamo’s use of demobilisation for leverage in the negotiations with the government. Renamo demanded more funds, uniforms and the appointment of some Renamo officials as provincial governors in return for demobilising. Keeping some of its forces in the field increased its leverage in gaining concessions. This may have also contributed to Renamo’s electoral fortunes in rural areas where the population may have had the incentive to vote for whichever side looked most likely to resume the fighting if they lost the election. Undoubtedly, Renamo recognised that one of its real strengths lay in this implicit threat to resume fighting.

Closely related to the disarmament and demobilisation process is the reintegration of demobilised forces into society. In Namibia, the government established Development Brigades to provide ex-combatants with training in civilian
skills such as agriculture and construction. While undergoing training these ex-soldiers were provided stipends and upon completion of their training, they were re-integrated into society. In a further attempt to ease this transition, the government also provided initial capital to form small businesses and steered contracts to those companies. According to some reports, however, these Development Brigades have not been entirely successful.

South Africa has not established a formal re-integration programme for ex-combatants. Returning from exile, MK soldiers often faced economic hardship, including recession and unemployment, as well as public hostility and a less-than-enthusiastic welcome from some internal ANC leaders. While many retrenched members of the SADF were given substantial benefits upon leaving the service, most MK returnees have not received much help. Some received limited help from the National Coordinating Committee for the Repatriation of South African Exiles, but there has not been much attention focused on the problems of demobilised soldiers from the various anti-apartheid military forces or the homelands defence forces. Any programme designed to deal with this problem will have to compete with the priorities established by the ANC’s Reconstruction and Development Programme. Complicating the problem is the overall employment picture in South Africa. Unemployment is one of South Africa’s major challenges, with half of the black workforce of some 15 million lacking formal employment. An annual economic growth rate of 3%–4% will be necessary to prevent unemployment from increasing. Disgruntled ex-soldiers, some of whom have drifted into criminal activity, could also be a potential source of instability should economic opportunity remain limited.

In Mozambique, soldiers arriving at assembly points received information on reintegration and were paid demobilisation subsidies. Demobilised troops were transported to their chosen resettlement areas and once established, ex-soldiers were provided with seeds, tools and access to emergency food distribution. It was anticipated that these former soldiers would also benefit from area-based relief programmes and labour intensive projects in their regions.

The potential for political destabilisation or criminal activity related to dissatisfied demobilised troops represents a major threat during democratic transition and consolidation. For instance, some armed bandits arrested by police in Mozambique have admitted to being former soldiers. The likelihood of ex-combatants’ involvement in these activities increases over time if their demands are neglected. Those who no longer wish to serve or are not qualified must be reintegrated into society. Returning soldiers to productive civilian life not only reduces the possibility they will become alienated and engage in disruptive activity but also enhances the country’s potential, provided they become productive citizens.

Restructuring the armed forces

Because of their role in support of the previous regime, restructuring the armed forces is critical to enhancing their legitimacy. The public must be convinced that the armed forces are, if not neutral, at least politically representative; that they are not a strain on the economy; that they are firmly under civilian control.
and cannot be used to intimidate government opponents or threaten democratisation. Legitimacy requires the balancing of a number of factors with regard to force size, composition, role and civilian control. These considerations clearly affect the armed forces institutional interests, however. This means that the eventual pattern of civil–military relations will reflect the influence of both civilian and military concerns and involve an interplay of variables, including the armed forces’ organisational interests, past patterns of civil–military relations, future security requirements and the impact of military restructuring on the new government’s political, economic and social objectives.

The Namibia Defence Force consists of some 8000 troops drawn both from the former South West Africa Territorial Force (SWATF) and the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN). For such a large territory this seems rather modest, but represents a considerable cost. Namibia must absorb this cost, however, in order to avoid the higher cost of unemployment among ex-combatants.\(^{27}\)

South Africa’s armed forces numbered about 85,000 before the election. Early plans for the new South African National Defence Force called for an initial troop strength of 55,000–65,000.\(^{28}\) Plans now call for an initial troop strength of up to 130,000 and a gradual reduction to 91,000.\(^{29}\) These plans reflect concern about the potentially disruptive consequences of unemployed soldiers.

Mozambique’s armed forces were originally supposed to consist of some 30,000 troops drawn equally from Renamo and government forces.\(^{30}\) Problems with demobilisation have slowed the formation of a new army and, as of the end of November 1994, only about one-third of the anticipated force level had been assembled.\(^{31}\)

Determining the size and composition of new armed forces is complicated by a number of factors. Force levels will be determined not only by security requirements but also by the need for political, and perhaps ethnic balance. One of the initial problems is that the number of former combatants, coupled with the lack of civilian employment opportunities, may provide a larger pool of soldiers than the new military can absorb. Furthermore, it is not just a matter of choosing the most qualified recruits. Restructuring also requires making the military more politically representative of society. This involves integrating members of various political factions into the armed forces. The danger is that the armed forces could be politicised by the incorporation of politically affiliated factions. A further complication is that personnel with different types and levels of training must be incorporated into the new military. These considerations have consequences for effectiveness and cohesion. These problems are perhaps less serious for Namibia and Mozambique, where there were essentially two factions. But in South Africa, there were around 17 armed groups which may have to be accommodated.\(^{32}\)

At the command level, staffing of the officer corps also requires the appointment of individuals who are representative of political factions that have to be incorporated and this can meet resistance from current officers. It may also generate some public apprehension when those whose activities were tied to past excesses are appointed to important positions. For instance, there was some concern about the appointment of Major General Solomon Hawala as army
commander in the Namibian Defence Force. Hawala’s supervision of SWAPO’s exile purges and his position as PLAN’s intelligence commander raised questions among moderates and SWAPO opponents. Reflecting this concern about past actions, indemnity for former combatants in South Africa remains a major point of contention between the ANC and the National Party (NP).

Not only do political factions have to be accommodated but there is also a potential ethnic dimension to restructuring the armed forces. As Cynthia Enloe noted, the composition of the military reflects the existing inter-ethnic distribution of power. In all three cases, the ethnic balance of the armed forces could be a factor. South Africa’s administration of Namibia favoured ethnic groups in the central and southern regions over the Ovambo in the north, highlighting regional and ethnic differences. In Namibia’s first election, SWAPO, with almost unanimous support from the more numerous Ovambo, won over 57% of the popular vote and 41 of 72 seats in the National Assembly. Although Namibia has successfully pursued a policy of national reconciliation, there is lingering concern among non-Ovambo peoples about Ovambo influence.

In all three cases, the ethnic balance of the armed forces could be a factor. South Africa’s administration of Namibia favoured ethnic groups in the central and southern regions over the Ovambo in the north, highlighting regional and ethnic differences. In Namibia’s first election, SWAPO, with almost unanimous support from the more numerous Ovambo, won over 57% of the popular vote and 41 of 72 seats in the National Assembly. Although Namibia has successfully pursued a policy of national reconciliation, there is lingering concern among non-Ovambo peoples about Ovambo influence.

In South Africa, apartheid reinforced ethnicity by categorising blacks in conjunction with the homelands policy. The legacy of this ethnic classification could influence armed forces restructuring. The deadly violence between the Zulu-based Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the ANC, which is perceived by some Zulus to be dominated by Xhosa, could lead to pressure for ethnic balance in the military. Senior SANDF officers are reportedly concerned about both political and ethnic identification, as well as rivalries between and within black and white factions. The success of national reconciliation is crucial in reducing ethnic divisions and eliminating the need for political and ethnic balancing in the South African armed forces.

Ethnicity has also played a role in Mozambique’s transition. During the election campaign, Renamo appealed to ethnic sentiment by arguing that Frelimo was dominated by Shangaans from the south and excluded minority Ndaus and the largest ethnic group, the Macua. Ethnic balancing was apparently behind the nomination of Brigadier Lagos Lidimo to fill the government’s position in the two-man joint military command formed before the new government’s installation. Lieutenant General Tobias Dai was expected to fill the government’s position, but in conjunction with Renamo’s nominee, Lieutenant General Mateus Ngonhamo, that would have put the armed forces under the control of two officers from the central province of Manica. This was reportedly unacceptable to many in Frelimo, especially among the Makonde in the north, who were influential in Frelimo’s army.

The cost of restructuring is also likely to be considerable. Ideally, force levels can be reduced because of perceptions of an improving security climate and the necessity of diverting resources into social programmes and reconstruction. In reality, integration of forces and subsequent training are expensive tasks and compete with other transition objectives for limited fiscal resources. In South Africa, for instance, the percentage of GDP expended on the military declined from 4.3% in 1983–84 to 2.6% in 1993–94. SANDF Deputy Chief of Staff Maj Gen P Venter estimated the costs for restructuring at R4.1 billion ($1.13 billion) over three years. Mozambique recently announced that it would bow to
international donor pressure and reduce military spending.\textsuperscript{43} This will further complicate Mozambique’s efforts to restructure its military.

The military has both the power and the incentive to seek to influence restructuring issues. Questions regarding force levels and the armed forces composition, role, mission and budgets are core institutional issues. Decisions on these questions will inevitably reflect the military’s influence on the decision-making process. Despite the ideal of a politically neutral institution that simply serves the government of the day, as Claude Welch has noted, no military can be completely apolitical.\textsuperscript{44} More to the point, as Bengt Abrahamsson emphasised, military professionalism involves not only expertise but also resources that influence decision making.\textsuperscript{45} Transitions in civil–military relations involve issues that relate not only to the military’s expertise, but also its corporate interests. It is logical to expect that the armed forces will help to shape their transition, as well as be shaped by this process.

The past pattern of civil–military relations provides the basis for this influence. Alfred Stepan’s ‘new professionalism’ emphasises the politicisation of the military, its concern with internal security, and its political skills, managerialism, and expanded role and scope of action.\textsuperscript{46} The development of these skills, as well as the connections between military personnel and political factions provides both the means and the motivation to seek to influence decisions on core issues.

Evidence of military influence in decision making is clearest in South Africa, where the military played a major role in decision making in the past and has maintained substantial influence in the ANC-led government. Although defence spending has declined dramatically since 1989, falling in real terms by 40% according to Deputy Defence Minister Kasrils,\textsuperscript{47} the military succeeded in securing an allocation of R1.6 billion in 1994. That was more than four times the amount earmarked for the ANC’s Reconstruction and Development programme.\textsuperscript{48} A working alliance seems to have developed among some ANC officials and the former SADF leadership that has thus far proven effective in defending the military’s corporate interests against further budget cuts. For the time being, this alliance has held off the challenge of military technocrats, the ANC’s anti-militarist wing, and other apartheid opponents who advocated a smaller military.\textsuperscript{49} SANDF Chief, General George Meiring, said that there were serious gaps in the military’s combat and logistical capabilities as a result of past budget cuts and warned that spending would have to increase in the future, particularly because of costs related to integration and retrenchments.\textsuperscript{50} The initial demands of integration and the subsequent downsizing of the armed forces to reach the 91 000 target makes arguments for substantial funding likely.

Furthermore, the South African armed forces’ role in domestic security is expected to continue, at least for the time being. The potential for political violence enhances the armed forces’ influence in decision making on security-related issues. In addition, the creation of veteran or service battalions to absorb many of the new recruits and tackle civilian projects would give the armed forces a greater role and more influence, as would their desire to play a larger part in border policing, refugee control, and fighting drug trafficking and other criminal activity.\textsuperscript{51} Although many major decisions on the future role of the
military have yet to be made, military personnel developed expertise in many areas during apartheid under the National Security Management System (NSMS). As a result of the past pattern of civil–military relations, not only does the military have the political and managerial skills with which to remain influential, but the new South African government will probably have to rely on the inherited expertise of the Ministry of Defence more than that of other government ministries. The combination of corporate interests, expertise, the past pattern of civil–military relations and potential internal security threats virtually assures that the armed forces will be influential in shaping the country’s future and its pattern of civil–military relations.

The military’s influence in Namibia and Mozambique is less clear-cut, but some factors indicate a potential for influence. The role of the Namibia Defence Force is basically to guard against external aggression and to assist the police with law enforcement when required. It may also be called upon in national disasters and help in enforcing Namibia’s coastal Exclusive Economic Zone. The NDF’s role is being continuously re-defined and it may also play a role in nation-building and economic advancement. The redefinition of the military’s role and the development of a navy and air force offer the opportunity for influence in decision making relevant to these tasks.

Mozambique’s transition to democracy is at too early a stage to know what influence the armed forces may have. There is, however, potential for the military to be influential. During the disarmament process in the run-up to elections, heavy weapons were deactivated. This has left the new army with weapons that do not work. The members of the Joint Commission on the Formation of the Mozambique Defence Armed Forces has expressed concern about this situation. The recently announced defence spending cuts were targeted at equipment and the Finance Minister denied that military pay cuts were pending. There is clearly an incentive for the military to seek influence on future decisions related to their corporate interests. The explicit denial of rumours about pay cuts may be an acknowledgement of the military’s implicit influence.

Moreover, there are some indications that the armed forces may take on duties not specifically related to defence. For instance, the Namibian Defence Force’s role is being redefined to allow it to actively participate in nation-building and economic advancement. The long-run goal is to evolve the NDF into a civil defence force. In South Africa the armed forces are gradually reorienting their focus towards changing regional circumstances. The establishment of service or veterans brigades to aid in civilian projects and military involvement in areas such as drug trafficking and refugee control would also enhance military influence in decision making. Mozambique’s armed forces may also play a role in civil society. In any case, the armed forces are likely to play a role in any reorientation of their mission.

Establishing civilian control

The establishment of effective civilian control over the armed forces is a major challenge to countries in transition. Samuel Huntington’s The Soldier and the
State emphasised a distinction that is particularly important to civil–military relations in southern Africa. Huntington’s distinction between objective and subjective control is relevant to the political divisions that, to varying degrees, characterise conditions in Namibia, South Africa and Mozambique. Fear of subjective control, that is, the military coming under the influence of a particular group or groups remains a concern. South African blacks may be sceptical that the armed forces are fully under the control of the majority government, while some whites may fear that ANC control will ensure radical political and economic policies. In Mozambique there may be similar concerns among Frelimo and Renamo supporters.

Combined with training programmes that instill professionalism in the traditional sense, meaning expertise, responsibility, corporateness and political neutrality, civilian control ideally creates conditions for objective control, that is, making the armed forces the instrument of the state. Mechanisms of civilian control include executive/legislative control of the armed forces and the establishment of a civilian-controlled Ministry of Defence.

In Namibia, the President is the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Force with the power to appoint the chief of the Defence Force on the recommendation of the Security Commission. The National Assembly has the power to approve budgets and the cabinet ministers are accountable to both the President and the Parliament. In addition, a National Council, composed of representatives from regional councils throughout the country, has the power to review bills passed by the National Assembly and conduct investigations in the same way as the National Assembly. Finally, the Ombudsman, appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission has the power to investigate complaints concerning the defence force as they relate to ‘a balanced structuring of such services or fair administration in relation to such services’.

South Africa has yet to draw up its permanent constitution. The National Assembly elected in the first all-race election in April 1994 will also write the new constitution. Under the former South African system, the Minister of Defence was responsible to Parliament. The Chief of the Defence Force served as the principal accounting officer and was responsible to Parliament’s Public Accounts Committee as well as any other committees established. Although that arrangement provided a measure of legislative control, the practical effect was limited for two reasons. National security was of paramount importance and this gave the armed forces considerable leeway in their activities. Moreover, members of Parliament never developed an expertise in military matters and were content, for the most part, to accept the armed forces’ assertions and explanations. The lack of expertise and a parliamentary support system for research into military matters meant that civilian control mechanisms were never fully utilised. There was also speculation that former president de Klerk was unable to exercise complete control over the armed forces during the transition. This demonstrated either executive inability and/or unwillingness to supervise the military effectively.

A defence secretariat could be in place in South Africa as early as April 1995, marking a major step towards establishing firm civilian control. The structure of the Secretariat was determined by a blueprint endorsed by the Joint Military
DEMOCRATISATION IN NAMIBIA, SOUTH AFRICA AND MOZAMBIQUE

Command Council (JMCC) and authorised by the Ministry of Defence. Initial plans call for the Secretariat to be staffed primarily by personnel transferred from the Defence headquarters. Eventually staffing would be 80% civilian. Under this arrangement, control and policy formulation would be shared by the Minister of Defence and the Defence Secretariat working closely with the 
SANDF
 and Defence headquarters. The mostly civilian staff would formulate the policy while the defence force would carry out the implementation. The Minister of Defence would submit the necessary budgets to the Parliament.70

A combination of factors is likely to contribute to more effective civilian control in the current South African administration. Former MK commander Joe Modise has taken over as Defence Minister and former MK intelligence chief Ronnie Kasrils has become Deputy Defence Minister. Furthermore, the military appears to have accepted and adapted to majority rule more quickly than other government departments.71 The ANC also has a solid majority in the National Assembly, holding 252 of the 400 seats and 18 of 27 cabinet positions. While General George Meiring was re-appointed to head the 
SANDF
, former MK chief-of-staff Siphiwe Nyanda was appointed 
SANDF
 chief-of-staff and will become the head of the defence force when Meiring’s term expires in 1999.72 In addition, seven former MK members have been appointed generals and two have become brigadiers.73

The results of Mozambique’s October 1994 elections gave Frelimo 129 seats and Renamo 112 in the new parliament. This distribution of power will undoubtedly make for difficult political bargaining, especially when it comes to institutional reform. Nevertheless, the legacy of the long civil war and lingering suspicions on both sides makes institutional reform essential and provides a powerful incentive for the establishment of firm civilian control of the military.

Conclusion

The establishment of a new pattern of civil–military relations is a crucial part of democratisation efforts. In divided societies like Namibia, South Africa and Mozambique, where the armed forces played a pivotal role in maintaining the former regime’s power, a reconstituted armed forces is essential to demonstrating a commitment to a new political order and establishing the military’s institutional legitimacy. The first step in the transformation of civil–military relations is demobilisation of combatants in order to reduce militarisation and the chances for renewed fighting. This step is also necessary to begin the process of identifying and training members of a new, more representative military. From there, the armed forces must be made more representative, their role and mission must be defined, and civilian control established. In each of the three cases, political, economic and social realities are reflected in the creation of a new pattern of civil–military relations.

The analysis of important variables that influence this transformation process provides a better understanding of the issues and processes that surround transitions in civil–military relations. Among the important factors are political and ethnic fragmentation, the effect of military restructuring on reconciliation, reconstruction and development, the armed forces’ institutional interests, and the

483
past pattern of civil–military relations. Transitions in civil–military relations are related to both practical and symbolic issues and reflect the overall dynamics of the democratisation process. The transition in civil–military relations provides further insight into democratic reform efforts.

The reflexive approach suggested by this analysis is useful in a number of ways. It helps to frame policy questions related to the transformation of civil–military relations, highlights the relationship implied by the term civil–military relations and provides an analytical focus that takes into account interests and partisan political objectives. The relationship between democratisation and civil–military relations is important and provides insight into the complexity of democratic consolidation. To the extent that civil–military policy questions mirror divisions in society, examining the establishment of a new pattern of civil–military relations enhances our comprehensive understanding of democratic transition and consolidation. Geographic proximity and regional issues such as weapons transfers, drug trafficking, immigration and refugees, as well as uneasiness about South Africa’s past actions towards its neighbours and its continuing military dominance in the region, provide additional reasons for examining the civil–military transition process.

Notes


'Underpaid', p 7.


‘Lots of soldiers, no enemy’, *The Economist* 27 August 1994, p 35.


Welch, *Civilian Control of the Military*, p 2.


‘The military has a good war’, p 5.


‘Military has a good war’, p 7.

The NSMS was established in the 1970s in response to what the minority regime saw as a ‘total onslaught’ against South Africa. It was an integrated structure that stretched from the State Security Council (*SSC*) at the cabinet level to the Joint Management Centers (*JMC*) at the local level. The *SSC* Secretariat had branches for strategy, national intelligence, strategies communication and administration. The *JMC*s insured the implementation of strategy at the local level, provided services as part of a campaign to win hearts and minds, and also collected intelligence.

‘Military has a good war’, p 7.

Interview with the author, Embassy of Namibia, Washington, DC, August 1994.


Interview with the author, Mozambique Embassy, Washington, DC, August 1994.


Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, Articles 27, 32 (Sub-Article 4C).

Namibian Constitution, Articles 63 (Sub-Article 2A), 41.

Namibian Constitution, Article 59 (Sub-Article 3).

Namibian Constitution, Article 91 (Sub-Article B).


Interview with the author, Pretoria, June 1992.

Fourie, ‘Control of the armed forces’, p 16.


‘The military has a good war’, p 5.

