HOLY RUSSIA IN MODERN TIMES: 
AN ESSAY ON ORTHODOXY AND CULTURAL CHANGE

Alas, ‘love thy neighbor’ offers no response to questions about the composition of light, the nature of chemical reactions or the law of the conservation of energy. Christianity, . . . increasingly reduced to moral truisms . . . which cannot help mankind resolve the great problems of hunger, poverty, toil or the economic system, . . . occupies only a tiny corner in contemporary civilisation. — Vasilii Rozanov

Chernyshevski and Pobedonostsev, the great radical and the great reactionary, were perhaps the only two men of the [nineteenth] century who really believed in God. Of course, an incalculable number of peasants and old women also believed in God; but they were not the makers of history and culture. Culture was made by a handful of mournful skeptics who thirsted for God simply because they had no God. — Abram Tertz [Andrei Siniavskii]

What defines the modern age? As science and technology develop, faith in religion declines. This assumption has been shared by those who applaud and those who regret it. On the one side, for example, A. N. Wilson laments the progress of unbelief in the last two hundred years. In God's Funeral, the title borrowed from Thomas Hardy’s dirge for ‘our myth’s oblivion’, Wilson endorses Thomas Carlyle’s doleful assessment of the threshold event of the new era: ‘What had been poured forth at the French Revolution was something rather more destructive than the vials of the Apocalypse. It was the dawning of the Modern’. As Peter Gay comments in a review, ‘Wilson leaves no doubt that the “Modern” with its impudent challenge to time-honoured faiths, was a disaster from start to finish’. On the other side, historians

* I would like to thank the following for their useful comments on this essay: Peter Brown, Itsie Hull, Mark Mazower, Stephanie Sandler, Joan Scott, Richard Wortman and Reginald Zelnik.

1 V. V. Rozanov, Russkaia tserkov’ [The Russian Church] (St Petersburg, 1909), 26.
2 Abram Tertz [Andrei Siniavskii], The Trial Begins, and On Socialist Realism, trans. Max Hayward and George Dennis (New York, 1960), 181. Nikolai Chernyshevskii (1828–89) was an important radical thinker, who inspired the Populists; Konstantin Pobedonostsev (1827–1907) was procurator of the Holy Synod, 1880–1905.

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have tended to celebrate the European nineteenth century as ‘part of the grand narrative of secularization’ inaugurated by the science-minded Enlightenment, to whose values they subscribe. 4

The secularization thesis, which has dominated the social sciences, stresses the institutional and intellectual shifts that displaced religion from the centre of European politics and culture. But, as Peter Gay observes, the picture is not that simple: ‘The age of Darwin was also the age of Newman’. 5 The spread of public education did not inhibit the power of evangelical Protestantism in Victorian England, while Catholic revivals encouraged popular piety in Germany, Ireland and France. 6 Today’s proponents of creationism are derided by the general public for clinging obstinately to false beliefs. But the very existence of creationism testifies to religion’s enduring power to shape the way some people, even in high-tech lands, understand the world. Even A. N. Wilson is happy to announce that God is not dead after all. The twentieth century, he writes, confirms ‘the palpable and visible strength of the Christian thing, the Christian idea’. 7 But adjustments that take account of the continuing vitality of spiritual conviction even in the contemporary West do not dispense with the fact that religion is no longer central to the organization of public life in the industrialized nations. 8

7 Wilson, God’s Funeral, 354.
When it comes to Russia, however, the assumptions are reversed. The nineteenth century produced the story not only of Europe as the land of reason and progress but also of Russia as a land of Christian endurance and cultural inertia. While post-Enlightenment Europeans boasted of their break with tradition, the Russian empire acquired the reputation, partly home-made, of failing to keep pace with time. This image of a stubbornly pious Russia was not dislodged by evidence that science, technology and cultural change had begun, by the turn of the twentieth century, to destabilize familiar values and ways of life even there. It is an image that has survived the reign of Communism and its fall.

Looking for an icon of spiritual survival in the face of modernity’s most concerted assaults, A. N. Wilson recounts an incident in the life of Alexander Solzhenitsyn, newly liberated from a Stalinist camp, whose heart is touched by the sight of a peasant woman making the sign of the cross. Evoking Solzhenitsyn’s story, Wilson echoes a myth that Russian intellectuals have created about their culture’s relation to and difference from the West.

In the realm of stereotypes, East–West mirrors tradition–modernity, instinct–reason, religious–secular, Russia–Europe, in a series of mutually reinforcing pairs. Historians inherit from each side a dominant version of itself, in different degrees celebrated or deplored, which must then be refuted or endorsed. This essay will begin instead by supposing that nineteenth-century Russia and Europe were moving on parallel tracks; that religion, as ethos and observance, was evolving in tandem with other cultural forms — in Russia, too. Reframing the question in terms of parallels rather than contrasts does not dispute the power of the grand oppositions between old and new, East and West, to shape the way Europeans and Russians have positioned themselves in space and time. But imperial Russia was in fact, on the level both of the state and of educated society, a participant in contemporary trends. Even the ancestors of Solzhenitsyn’s peasant crone — the populace at the greatest remove from the nation’s sophisticated

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10 For a recent example: ‘As modernization challenged tradition in Russia, it . . . encountered Orthodoxy at virtually every turn’: William B. Husband (ed.), The Human Tradition in Modern Russia (Wilmington, Del., 2000), 3–4.

11 Wilson, God’s Funeral, 337, quoting D. M. Thomas’s version of Solzhenitsyn’s account.
upper crust and most closely identified by that elite with a resilient traditional core — felt the impact of change.

The discovery of tradition was itself to some extent a modern undertaking. Russians, like their contemporaries abroad, reacted to Enlightenment iconoclasm by reconstituting the past. It was not, for example, until after the Napoleonic wars that educated Russians, accustomed to European styles, began to value Orthodox icons, not as objects of worship, but as works of art to be treasured as a cultural legacy. Families now paid attention to the icons they already possessed; the wealthy started to collect them. Icons discarded by churches were rescued from neglect; many were restored to their original condition and for the first time hung in museums. New icons were painted to look like old ones. In the early twentieth century, modernist artists cherished the ‘primitive’ style cultured Russians had originally denigrated as crude.

If tradition was the subject of conscious reflection everywhere, the notion of ‘the modern’ was a controversial and highly politicized one in the Russian case. Modernity came to Russia as a state-sponsored project at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Looking to Europe for technical knowledge, cultural paradigms and instruments of rule, Peter the Great (reigned 1682–1725), as is well known, created a virtue of innovation. His predecessors had already turned to European artists and craftsmen for expertise. They had adopted foreign symbols and military techniques. Elements of Latin Christianity had affected the teachings and practices of the Orthodox Church. Seventeenth-century Russian culture had begun to distinguish between secular and sacred modes of expression. Peter was different, however, in proclaiming the start of a new era. He linked...
the onset of ‘modernity’ to the introduction of European culture and the fight against ignorance and tradition. In contrasting the public or political realm with the domain of religion, he instituted a new civil alphabet that demarcated secular from sacred texts and labelled the language of holiness Church Slavonic, to maintain its distance from the newly codified literary tongue. He also subordinated the church to bureaucratic control, establishing the lay office of over-procurator to run the Holy Synod, which exercised final authority over the episcopal elite. Incorporating sacred elements into court life, he did so in a mocking or provocative spirit that demonstrated his power to manipulate the trappings of the faith and define the political meanings of culture.

Europeans acknowledged Peter and his eighteenth-century successors as enlightened monarchs in the contemporary mode and recognized the refitted empire as part of the international state system. They accepted the terms in which Peter couched his war on the recalcitrant native culture — including the traditions of the Orthodox Church. Recalling the changes the tsar had imposed in the religious domain, an English Protestant, writing a century later, praised ‘the value of that reformation, which Peter, so justly styled the Great, wrought upon the Russian church, which, before his time, lay in a state of the utmost ignorance and degradation’.

From within the Orthodox fold, Father Georges Florovsky views Peter’s policies as a blow to religion. ‘What is innovative in this Petrine reform’, he wrote in

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1937, ‘is not westernization but secularization’. Deprived of institutional autonomy, the church continued to serve the needs of a state that now conceived its own objectives in secular terms and demanded of the church that it meet secular standards. Peter’s strategy of subordinating and denigrating the faith did not, however, survive his reign. The Holy Synod continued to govern the church at the highest levels, but later sovereigns mobilized the resources and charisma of religion to bolster imperial rule.

The church, for its part, was deeply influenced by secular trends and struggled to adjust to the changing political context. As an institution, Gregory Freeze has argued, it was in some ways enhanced by incorporation into the state. The Holy Synod centralized and streamlined the clerical chain of command and presided over the restructuring of ecclesiastical administration. The hierarchs were able to exercise more effective control over subordinates and over practical affairs. In contrast to their predecessors, eighteenth-century prelates were well-educated, worldly men. Under the thumb of this sophisticated elite, the ordinary priesthood, by contrast, suffered from inappropriate and inadequate training, economic hardship and all too close association with the reality of village life. If the average parish priest did not experience a cultural transformation, the church as a whole emerged from the state-imposed changes better able to function in an increasingly rationalized public sphere.

In the Muscovite era, the church had been more independent but also closely implicated in legitimating princely rule. In Peter’s wake, religion continued to provide the tsars with support and justification. The new symbiosis demonstrated, however, that both church and state had changed. What Viktor Zhivov calls the ‘cultural synthesis of absolutism’ began to crystallize in the mid-eighteenth century. It incorporated both spiritual and secular forms of expression into a unified court culture symbolizing the all-pervasive character of the autocratic regime.


Catherine the Great (reigned 1762–96), bishops educated in Western thought shaped a spiritual vocabulary compatible with Enlightenment principles of morality and rational exposition. Men of letters as well as churchmen forged a literary language that blended elements of Church Slavonic and the vernacular; the production of sermons on the one hand, and dictionaries on the other, testified to the existence of an 'enlightened Orthodoxy', in which faith and reason found common ground. Metropolitan Gavriil (Petrov, 1730–1801), for example, preached in a Protestant vein; Archpriest Petr Alekseev (1727–1801) helped compose the Academy dictionary of the Russian literary language, which drew on sacred as well as secular texts for linguistic models.\(^{23}\)

Enlisting elements of Orthodoxy in the project of state-sponsored culture (the ‘mirage’ of official Enlightenment, in Zhivov’s phrase\(^{24}\)), Catherine nevertheless continued Peter’s policy of undermining the institutional autonomy of the church. The confiscation of church lands had a particularly damaging effect on the monasteries, which she viewed, in the Petrine spirit, as parasites on the social organism.\(^{25}\) She promoted the reform of religious education and resisted the church’s efforts to persecute false belief. Her tolerance for Old Believers and heretics, as well as her support for minority confessions,\(^{26}\) had little to do, however, with civil rights. A pragmatic response suited her cameralist attitude towards governance. Religious conflict threatened social tranquillity. Persecution confirmed ‘fanatics’ in their zeal, and fanaticism itself was detrimental. Also with an eye to the general welfare, Catherine preferred the priesthood to the monks and hierarchs, valuing the priests’ pastoral ministry as a social service.\(^{27}\)

\(^{23}\) Zhivov, Iazyk, 372–6, 403–6.
\(^{24}\) Ibid., 375.
\(^{25}\) On confiscation, see Isabel de Madariaga, Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great (New Haven, 1981), 111–22.
Despite their connection to the contemplative life, the monks were more powerful than the priests in both the political and ecclesiastical spheres. In resisting the monarch’s demands, they had more to lose. Metropolitan Arsenii (Matseevich, 1697–1772) was detonsured and exiled for protesting against the seizure of monastery lands, and his example had the desired inhibiting effect on his colleagues. A knowledgeable foreigner described Catherine’s dilemma in promoting a secular agenda: ‘The monastic order . . . cannot be altogether abolished among the Russians, without an essential change in the constitution of their church; for the higher ranks of the clergy can only be chosen from amongst the monks. On this account, it is an object of great importance to the government, that such men should enter into this order, as may afterwards prove worthy the offices of spiritual fathers and rulers of the people’. Indeed, Catherine improved the quality of the episcopal elite by appointing talented men of intellectual stature. Metropolitan Platon (Levshin, 1737–1812) was educated in the Slavonic–Greek–Latin Academy, along with the future luminaries of secular culture, the poet Vasilii Trediakovskii (1703–69) and scientist Mikhail Lomonosov (1711–65). Favoured by Catherine for his learning, Platon was proficient in Latin and French. He impressed foreigners with his intellectual breadth, spirit of tolerance (towards Old Believers, though not towards Catholics or Jews) and rhetorical skills. Emperor Joseph II, on a visit to Russia, remarked that Platon was ‘plus philosophe que prêtre’. His sermons and compositions were translated into foreign languages, published abroad and admired, by Voltaire among others, for their stylistic polish. In a sermon at the tomb of Peter the Great, delivered to celebrate the Russian victory over the Turks in 1770, Platon extolled that emperor’s achievements.

Despite his Western training and loyalty to the throne, Platon defended the autonomy of spiritual values. He resented the extent to which the monarch dominated church governance by manipulating the membership and policies of the Holy Synod. Together with Gavriil, another of Catherine’s protégés, he championed the

28 Polnyi pravoslavnyi bogoslovskii entsiklopedicheskii slovar’ [Complete Encyclopedia of Orthodox Theology], 2 vols. (St Petersburg, 1913), i, 231–2; K. A. Papmehl, Metropolitan Platon of Moscow (Petr Levshin, 1737–1812): The Enlightened Prelate, Scholar and Educator (Newtonville, Mass., 1983), 34.
30 Papmehl, Metropolitan Platon, 24, 79, 106. See Platon, Present State.
importance of Orthodox mystical asceticism, of which the empress did not approve. This posture also set him at odds with outspoken defenders of the priesthood such as Archpriest Petr Alekseev. Conversant with Western theology, especially the Presbyterian brand, Alekseev attacked the hierarchs, endorsed Catherine’s anti-monasticism, and proposed a Protestant-style reorganization of the priesthood along professional lines.31

It is clear that the division between Enlightenment and spirituality did not run simply between church and state; nor did it sharply distinguish priests and bishops. It sometimes even bisected individual souls. A loyal practitioner of enlightened court rhetoric and a graduate, along with Platon, of the Slavonic–Greek–Latin Academy dominated by a Latin-based curriculum, Metropolitan Gavriil was at the same time a devotee of asceticism, who promoted the patristic legacy and sponsored the monastic revival. Nor were spiritual and rational always distinct in the lay world. The most famous of the eighteenth-century Russian civic enlighteners, Nikolai Novikov (1744–1818), was initially encouraged by Catherine in his socially constructive activities (charity, publishing, education), but was later punished for his association with the mystical Martinist branch of Freemasonry. Metropolitan Platon defended him as a good Christian, but Catherine was nervous in the wake of the French Revolution about the political consequences of the Enlightenment and retracted her earlier support. To some extent, Novikov’s ventures represented the emancipation of cultural expression from state tutelage, and since Catherine considered culture a matter of state, his independence was his undoing.32 The mysticism with which he was charged also made him politically suspect, since it was associated with the monastic elite.

By the Napoleonic period, the political balance had shifted. The religious enthusiasm that captivated Alexander I (reigned 1801–25) and his court signalled the collapse of the Catherinian cultural synthesis. Like their contemporaries abroad, educated Russians were disillusioned with Enlightenment ideals. They turned, however, not to standard-issue Orthodoxy but to European-style mysticism instead. Alexander’s own inclinations led him to embrace a romantic Pietism. Prince Aleksandr Golitsyn, appointed to head the Holy Synod, shared the tsar’s

31 Tsapina, ‘Secularization and Opposition’.
spiritual tastes. The days of ‘enlightened Orthodoxy’ were over, but for all their pious rhetoric, subsequent tsars were no less instrumental in promoting the faith than the anticlerical Peter and Catherine. The aggressively conservative Nicholas I (reigned 1825–55) valued the Orthodox Church as an arm of the state, not as the repository of absolute truth. In his reign, the procurator of the Holy Synod radically curtailed the bishops’ powers, tightened the censorship of religious ideas, thus stifling the church’s own intellectual development, and reoriented the clergy towards a more pragmatic, less sacramental role. Coping with defeat in the Crimean War, Alexander II (reigned 1855–81) liberated the serfs and instituted the Great Reforms (1861–74), endowing Russia with a modern judiciary and institutions of local self-government, while also improving the conditions of clerical life. In the wake of his father’s assassination, Alexander III (reigned 1881–94) reversed course, presenting himself in archaic terms as a national monarch, surrounded by religious pageantry and cloaked in traditionalist garb. The deeply devout Nicholas II (reigned 1894–1917), whose regime was buffeted by social unrest and elite discontent, continued in the same vein, orchestrating the canonization of saints as a device for bolstering popular support.

In the face of social and institutional change, the language and symbols of religion were read as continuous with the past, yet the church itself was not unaffected by shifts in the culture at large. Nor was it insulated from foreign influences. Building on earlier contacts with Western Christianity, eighteenth-century Russian seminaries exposed their students to contemporary philosophy and spiritual trends such as Pietism. Metropolitans Platon (Levshin) and Filaret (Drozdov, 1782–1867) selectively invoked Western ideas for their own purposes.

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35 Gregory L. Freeze, The Parish Clergy in Nineteenth-Century Russia: Crisis, Reform, Counter-Reform (Princeton, 1983), 16–18, 45.

36 See Wortman, Scenarios of Power, ii, pt 2.


38 Polnyi pravoslavnyi bogoslovskii entsiklopedicheskii slovar’’, ii, 1812–13, 2231–2; Robert L. Nichols, ‘Orthodoxy and Russia’s Enlightenment, 1762–1825’, in Robert (cont. on p. 139)
demonstrates the contradictory cross-currents that swept Russian politics and culture in the first half of the nineteenth century, when he was the church’s most authoritative spokesman. In sponsoring the translation of the Bible from Slavonic into the vernacular, he reflected the Protestant influence that permeated the seminaries, an influence reinforced by the foreign Bible missionaries who flocked to St Petersburg during Alexander I’s reign.  

The Alexandrine years were a time, as Florovsky complains, when ‘the [Russian] soul completely gave itself over to Europe’.  

Under Nicholas I, however, Filaret was dismissed from his position in the Holy Synod, partly for having supported the translation project, of which the energetic and conservative procurator disapproved.  

But though Filaret promoted scholarship and the spread of religious knowledge, he was no liberal. The author of the proclamation announcing the emancipation of the serfs (an act he personally opposed), he was a stubborn defender of corporal punishment and came increasingly to resist any attempt at church reform, an issue that gained widespread endorsement in the 1860s. Even his opposition to change connected him, however, to current trends. As the Anglican dean Arthur Penrhyn Stanley remarked in 1862, ‘the venerable Metropolitan of Moscow, represents, in some measure at least, the effect of that vast wave of reactionary feeling which . . . has passed over the whole of

(n. 38 cont.)

L. Nichols and Theofanis George Stavrou (eds.), Russian Orthodoxy under the Old Regime (Minneapolis, 1978); Florovsky, Ways of Russian Theology, 141–6, 201–20, 331.  


Florovsky, Ways of Russian Theology, 162.  

Freeze, Parish Clergy, 19, 23, 44–5.  

See M. S. Korzun, ‘Gosudarstvenno-pravoslavnaia sotsial’naia doktrina v svete uchenii mitropolitov Platona i Filareta’ [The Social Doctrine of State-Orthodoxy in Light of the Teachings of Metropolitan Platon and Filaret], in Sporenne problemy istorii russkoi obschestvennoi mysli (do nachala XIX veka) [Vexed Questions in the History of Russian Social Thought (until the Early Nineteenth Century)] (Moscow, 1992).  

Europe’. In the Russian context, moreover, the lines between modern and traditional were not clearly drawn. Under the banner of political and cultural conservatism, Nicholas I sponsored reforms intended to professionalize the priesthood and diminish the power of bishops, who were castigated for their Westernized views. Whatever his conflict with the secular authorities, Filaret expressed a similar mixture of resistance and adaptation to the cultural and institutional demands of a changing world.

Another attempt to strengthen the church in modern times by drawing on tradition can be discerned in the revival of monasticism that occurred in the last decades of the eighteenth century. Peter the Great had tried to convert the monasteries into charitable organizations. Catherine’s confiscation of church lands in 1764 drastically reduced the monasteries’ power and number. It did not take long, however, for some of the remaining sites to become centres of spiritual renewal. Charismatic men of the cloth, such as the monk Paisii Velichkovskii (1722–94), revitalized the Greek tradition of spiritual elders (starchestvo) and produced an inspirational literature drawn from hesychast sources. Hesychasm was a form of contemplative Orthodox mysticism that stressed the worshipper’s inward mental focus and outward stillness. Repetition of the Jesus Prayer, an appeal for God’s mercy mumbled continuously under the breath, was designed to connect the supplicant with the Holy Spirit. It is easy to forget, however, that the hesychast tradition needed to be resurrected before it became widely known. The compilation of texts by the Eastern Church Fathers called the Philokalia, from which these practices were drawn, was first published in Greek in 1782, translated into Slavonic by Velichkovskii in 1793, under the sponsorship of Metropolitan Gavrill, and into the vernacular Russian only in

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45 Freeze, *Parish Clergy*, 17.
46 On how Filaret’s image and reputation evolved, see O. E. Maiorova, ‘Mitropolit moskovskii Filaret v obshchestvennom soznanii kontsa XIX veka’ [Metropolitan of Moscow Filaret in the Social Consciousness of the Late Nineteenth Century], in E. V. Permiakov (ed.), *Lotmanovski sbornik* [The Lotman Collection], 2 vols. (Moscow, 1994–7), ii.
Metropolitan Platon, praised by Joseph II as a ‘philosopher’, rebuilt the sixteenth-century Optina Hermitage, which had since fallen into disuse, and it became the focal point of the contemplative style. The style’s inspiration, however, was not purely Orthodox in origin. As Robert Nichols puts it, ‘The contemplative life rediscovered on Mount Athos . . . was not and could not be in Russia a simple recovery of an earlier Eastern Orthodox mystical and eremitical tradition. Rather, the awakening included those elements but it also owed something to Catholicism and Protestant pietism’. Starchestvo, as Vladimir Lossky remarks, was ‘at once so traditional and so surprising in its novelty’.

The revived eldership was indeed a synthesis, not only of Western and Eastern Christian themes, but also of the contemplative and energetic mission. Though the elders emerged in answer to the aggressive secularism of the eighteenth century, they did not preach withdrawal from the world. Perhaps reflecting prevalent Enlightenment views, they counselled a spiritual life that encouraged engagement as well as retreat. Catherine the Great took charity out of the hands of the church and created new institutions for dealing with poor relief. It was, however, as Adele Lindenmeyr points out, a religious ethos that motivated the charitable undertakings of nineteenth-century polite society. Caring for the poor involved the participation not only of monastics but of lay people as well, and, in this sense, the traditionalist elders, in leading the worldly back to God, encouraged them to connect with the world.

The Orthodox Church thus entered the nineteenth century with an intellectual elite steeped in Western learning but determined to shape a native cultural style. Nicholas I shared the nativism but repudiated the model of the West. In his reign, piety

50 Robert L. Nichols, ‘The Orthodox Elders (Startsy) of Imperial Russia’, Mod. Greek Studies Yearbook, i (1985), 8.
51 Ibid., 3–6.
52 Vladimir Lossky, ‘Les Starets d’Optino’, in Vladimir Lossky and Nicolas Arseniev, La Paternité spirituelle en Russie aux XVIIIème et XIXème siècles (Bégrolles-en-Mauge, 1977), 93. Fyodor Dostoevsky, in The Brothers Karamazov (1880), reminds his readers that the figure of Father Zosima, based on the Optina elders, represents a type of devotion only recently revived.
was attached to imperial ideology, not, as was the case under Catherine the Great, in order to enlist churchmen in the enterprise of enlightenment. Nicholas, on the contrary, borrowed the aura of stability and continuity associated with a purportedly unchanging national faith for purposes of state. While Catholic conversion and mystical enthusiasm had been the fashion in Alexander I’s court, Nicholas determined to restore the prestige of Orthodoxy among the cultural elite. This same desire was also evident in some aristocratic circles, but intellectuals resented the monarch’s heavy-handed intrusion into church affairs and the restrictions he imposed on free expression.

It was in this context that the Slavophiles developed their model of opposing types, pitting the rational West against the spiritual East, the heartless engine of absolutism against the organic wholeness of the Orthodox Church. They welcomed Russia’s resistance to the inroads of modernity and hailed the persistence of archetypes derived from the principles of the Eastern faith. In their eyes, the communalism of the peasant world replicated in social terms the merging of self-in-spirit of the Orthodox religious community. Aleksei Khomiakov (1804–60) used the term *sobornost* to describe this type of harmonious spiritual life, which he understood as the antithesis both of Western individualism and of the authoritarian Roman Church. Indeed, the concept of *sobornost* became shorthand for what was distinctive about the Russian culture that Peter the Great had not managed to legislate away. In the words of Nikolai Berdiaev (1874–1948): ‘The Slavophiles not only defined our national consciousness as religious in spirit and purpose, but formulated the basic theme of East and West. This theme suffused the entire intellectual life of nineteenth-century Russia’.

Whatever they may have cherished, however, about the real or imagined past, the Slavophiles’ style of thinking was neither archaic nor specifically Russian. Like their debating partners, the so-called Westernizers, they received excellent European educations and read German philosophy. Andrzej Walicki describes them as romantic conservatives. Enamoured of folk simplicity,

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54 N. A. Berdiaev, *Aleksei Stepanovich Khomiakov* (Moscow, 1912), 28. See also B. F. Egorov, V. A. Kotel’nikov and Iu. V. Stennik (eds.), *Slavianofil’stvo i sovremennost’: Sbornik statei* [Slavophilism and the Present: An Essay Collection] (St Petersburg, 1994).

they were not in principle hostile to science, which they considered a different, if more limited, mode of apperception than religious inspiration. They were not, however, ordinary churchgoers, any more than they were complacent monarchists. Despite their philosophical conservatism, they were critical of the absolutist regime and of the institution of serfdom. Wishing to separate the Orthodox legacy from its involvement in structures of rule, they sometimes espoused contradictory positions. The Aksakovs, for example, distrusted Filaret (Drozdov) because of his closeness to power, although they respected his talents and mind. They also

'?59 56 Letter from I. V. Kireevskii to A. S. Khomiakov, 15 July 1840, quoted in Polnoe sobranie sochinenii I. V. Kireevskogo v dvukh tomakh [Complete Works of I. V. Kireevskii in Two Volumes], ed. M. Gershenzon (Moscow, 1911), i, 67.
57 Gleason, European and Muscovite, 9.
59 Stanley, Lectures, 412.
60 Russia and the English Church, ed. Birkbeck, 71 (bracketed words in text).
championed Russia’s role as defender of Orthodoxy during the Crimean War. Ivan Kireevskii (1806–56) found a partial solution to this dilemma in the Optina elders, who offered a point of contact with formal religion, while allowing him to keep a safe distance from the church in its official role. His wife was close to the monk Filaret (Novospasskii, 1758–1842), whose influence helped precipitate her husband’s ‘conversion’ from casual to intense involvement in the faith. Kireevskii later collaborated with the Optina elder Father Makarii (Ivanov, 1788–1860) in translating the writings of the Church Fathers.

Most interesting of all, perhaps, in trying to gauge the relationship between spiritual revival and the modern spirit, is to position the Slavophiles in relation to like-minded thinkers in the West: that is to say, nineteenth-century Europeans who also took religion seriously and made it the centre of their moral and intellectual lives. The case of Khomiakov is instructive. The exact contemporary of John Henry Newman (1801–90), he corresponded with William Palmer (1811–79), one of the Oxford Tractarians. The two exchanged opinions about Christianity in its various incarnations and about Russia in particular. Khomiakov had written a series of theological essays in French, first published abroad to avoid censorship restrictions and only later translated into Russian. His letters to Palmer were written in superb Victorian English.

The members of the Oxford movement found themselves in a situation somewhat analogous to that of the Slavophiles: as intellectuals and pious men, they resented the established church’s subordination to secular authority, from which its privileged position derived. As patriots, however, they sought a spiritual outcome that was in some sense still national, while also universal. They debated only where this ‘catholic’ principle might lie. Nor did they see the search for spiritual continuity as a flight from the present. At a moment when many of their contemporaries

61 Dnevnik Very Sergeevny Aksakovoi, 1854–1855 [The Diary of Vera Sergeevna Aksakov, 1854–1855], ed. N. V. Golitsyn and P. E. Shchegolev (St Petersburg, 1913), 16, 20, 73.


had abandoned religion, they expected traditional forms to satisfy a contemporary need.

The preoccupations of the Slavophiles are usually discussed in terms of Russia’s internal dialogues and dilemmas or as an example of the appropriation of Western styles of thought. They can also, however, be seen as part of an international conversation on the nature of modern Christianity. Indeed, Jaroslav Pelikan, in his history of Christian doctrine, uses the term *sobornost*’ as the heading for his chapter on nineteenth-century ecclesiology. ‘A sign of its [Eastern Orthodoxy’s] increasing influence [in the nineteenth century]’, he writes, ‘was the adoption, as almost a technical term, of the Russian word “sobornost” by Western theologians of many linguistic and denominational traditions’. In the sense of distinguishing ‘Eastern ecclesiology from both the “papal monarchy” of Roman Catholicism and the “sola Scriptura” of Protestantism’, the term *sobornost*, he explains, ‘entered the vocabulary and the thought world of the West’.64

While recognizing these differences, Western theologians were interested in the search for common ground. Palmer argued for the harmony between Anglican and Orthodox doctrine in a book published in 1846, of which he sent complimentary copies not only to Khomiakov but also to Metropolitan Filaret and others in Moscow.65

Khomiakov, however, conceived an ideal of the church as disconnected from the exercise of worldly power. He praised the timeless ‘ark of Orthodoxy’, which unlike the contentious Protestants and Catholics, ‘alone rides safe and unhurt through storms and billows’.66 This model of detachment has allowed his ideas to survive their original context and elicit a prolonged intellectual response. As part of a continuing dialogue with the past, the priest and philosopher-theologian Pavel Florenskii (1882–1937) takes Khomiakov to task for inventing the religion he wished to believe in. Nikolai Berdiaev observes that, while Khomiakov stresses the principle of love and the believer’s creative inner spirit, Florenskii is more accurate in identifying the

64 Jaroslav Pelikan, *Christian Doctrine and Modern Culture (since 1700)* (Chicago, 1989), 287.
historical church with the principle of authority. Even today, Khomiakov’s terms still provoke discussion. Like Berdiaev, Sergei Khoruzhii (b. 1941), a Moscow-based philosopher active in the revival of religious thinking in post–Soviet Russia, interprets sobornost’ as a form of spiritual communion that promotes personal liberation through faith. He understands the concept, not as an abstract idea susceptible to systematic elaboration, but as a formulation expressing the lived experience of Eastern Orthodoxy in its Russian form. Yet, he does not consider the idea of sobornost’ as national in a limiting sense. Insisting that its appropriation for political or nationalist purposes does violence to its historical and philosophical meaning, his interpretation is at odds with the Slavophiles’ own tendency to associate Orthodoxy with the Russian imperial mission. Opposed to current attempts to define Russian culture in opposition to the West, Khoruzhii prefers to see reason and faith, and within Christianity, the Western and Eastern traditions, as elements in a productive exchange.

Despite variations in their response to the Slavophile paradigm or to Khomiakov’s ideas, thinkers in this neo-theological vein understand him as a creative mind, working with a cultural (and specifically religious) legacy to fashion something new. They themselves bridge the distance between modern and traditional styles of thought. A remarkable polymath, Florenskii wrote on geometry, art history and linguistics, as well as religion, and he edited the Soviet Technical Encyclopedia from 1927 to 1933. Trained in mathematical physics, Khoruzhii is the author of a

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68 S. S. Khoruzhii, ‘Khomiakov i printsip sobornosti’ [Khomiakov and the Principle of Sobornost], in his Posle pereryva: Puti russkoi filosofii [After the Intermission: Paths of Russian Philosophy] (St Petersburg, 1994).
textbook on mathematics, as well as the Russian translator of James Joyce’s *Ulysses.* The difficulties in separating East from West and modern from archaic are vividly demonstrated, not just in the complex outlook of these two men, but also, in the case of Florenskii, in a less edifying dimension of his worldview. Recently disclosed archival material reveals that Florenskii held violently anti-Semitic opinions, which he did not want to express in public but which he conveyed privately to the openly anti-Semitic Vasilii Rozanov (1856–1919). Crude anti-Semitism was not exclusive to Russia, of course. Even Sergei Nilus, the author of the so-called *Protocols of the Elders of Zion,* was inspired by material from the contemporary West, and his composition has maintained its popularity well into the present.

Whatever else Florenskii may have believed, he seems to have resolved the tension that A. N. Wilson charts for the Victorian age, when science appeared to threaten religion with extinction. In Russia, too, the challenge of Darwin led to crisis and debate. *On the Origin of Species* (1859) and *Descent of Man* (1871) were quickly translated into Russian. Russian scientists and social thinkers met the challenge in two ways. Those who accepted the basic concept of the struggle for existence tended to modify its individualistic cast to include various forms of cooperation or group cohesion. Those who rejected Darwin’s ideas in turn took two alternative tacks. In religious circles some critics questioned

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the scientific enterprise itself; others used the authority of science to find fault with Darwin’s methods. They insisted, however, on the need for Orthodoxy to address the challenge science posed.77

In joining the debate, as Alexander Vucinich points out, theologians ‘involve[d] the church in the discussion of modern knowledge’.78 This discussion was part of a wide-ranging display of opinions and exchange of ideas in the pages of the many religious journals founded in the wake of the Great Reforms, paralleling the expansion of the secular press.79

There was an obviously political side to this discussion. On the one hand, the post-Reform generation of radical intellectuals espoused a credo of empiricism, materialism, utilitarianism and anticlericalism. All that was ‘tradition’ had to go. On the other, conservatives such as Fyodor Dostoevsky (1821–81) attacked the so-called nihilists on religious grounds. Nikolai Danilevskii (1822–85) made the case that Darwin’s vision of ruthless competition, no less than his relentless materialism, was peculiarly English. Indeed, Danilevskii viewed science itself as an essential component of European culture. He defined Russia, by contrast, in spiritual terms. That Danilevskii was a practising scientist (a member of the Imperial Russian Geographical Society, he was an expert on fish) only gave his objections more weight. Philosophers and theologians who defended the Russian legacy while remaining open to modern ideas thus found common ground with more intransigent thinkers, such as Konstantin Leon’t’ev (1831–91), who insisted that rationalism was a Western flaw.80 In the middle stood moderate liberals who envisioned a modern culture that respected the methods of science but embraced the higher truths of religion as well. ‘Progressive people feel obliged to treat religion with hostility or contempt’, complained Boris Chicherin

78 Vucinich, Darwin, 107.
(1828–1904) in 1879. ‘Religion, along with philosophy, are seen as the obsolete remnants of infantile prejudices. But if anything is a sign of outmoded thinking’, he remarks, ‘it is a purely negative attitude toward religion’. 81

In negotiating between scientific rationalism on the one hand, and conventional piety on the other, some people chose a middle course. In France and England, no less than in Russia, spiritualism and the occult were popular alternatives to both materialism and the established faiths. The theosophical movement was founded in 1875 by the Russian-born Helena Blavatsky (1831–91), who at the time made her home in New York. In Russia, spiritism was embraced by the eminent folklorist, lexicographer and defender of official Orthodoxy, Vladimir Dal’ (1801–72). Its principles were elaborated by Aleksandr Aksakov (1823–1903), a junior member of the celebrated Slavophile family, who claimed to demonstrate its precepts in modern scientific terms. He was vigorously challenged by the famed chemist Dmitrii Mendeleev (1834–1904). The Russian Spiritualist Society organized a congress in Moscow in 1906. Many of the artists and writers of the Russian Silver Age were steeped in theosophical, anthroposophical and spiritualist lore, and the last three tsars found the occult appealing. In this inclination, the Russian elites followed international fashion. 82 What was out of date in Nicholas II’s reign was not the existence of Rasputin but the persistence of the autocratic regime.

The spiritual quest of fin-de-siècle Russians thus extended beyond the boundaries of Orthodox belief, while at the same time theological preoccupations penetrated lay culture. The church, meanwhile, was buffeted by the same intellectual and political winds that affected educated society at large. The era of the Great Reforms stimulated arguments for innovation that echoed some of the themes developed by Archpriest Alekseev in the eighteenth century. 83 Pointing to the existence of Orthodox confraternities

81 B. N. Chicherin, Nauka i religiia [Science and Religion] (Moscow, 1879), v–vi.
82 See Maria Carlson, ‘No Religion Higher than Truth’: A History of the Theosophical Movement in Russia, 1875–1922 (Princeton, 1993), 23–6, 29. Having demonstrated that mystical and occult traditions originated in Europe, Carlson nevertheless endorses the stereotype of Russian culture that her evidence undermines: ‘Beneath that veneer [of rationalism introduced by Peter the Great] still lay the analogical, nonlinear, intuitive frame of mind that characterizes Russian thought even today’ (ibid., 16).
83 See Freeze, Parish Clergy; I. S. Belliustin, Description of the Clergy in Rural Russia: The Memoir of a Nineteenth-Century Parish Priest, ed. Gregory L. Freeze (Ithaca, NY, 1985); A. A. Papkov, Tserkovno-obshchestvennye voprosy v epohhu tsarstva-onsoboditeliia (cont. on p. 150)
in pre-Petrine Russia, some clergymen used that model to restructure parish organization and draw the laity into spiritual and charitable work. The revived confraternities mobilized tradition as a foundation on which to build something new: an arena in which the church and the public could join in addressing social ills such as ignorance and destitution. Other forms of clerical activism included the intensified efforts of missionaries to convert domestic heathens and combat heresy, an impulse they shared with Western Christians, as Westerners approvingly observed. By the early twentieth century, the intelligentsia included liberals who demanded freedom of conscience and philosophers who invited clergymen to join them in debate. The well-known story of the Religious-Philosophical Society is intimately connected with the flowering of the so-called Russian religious renaissance, associated with the names of Vladimir Solov’ev (1853–1900), Vasilii Rozanov and Nikolai Berdiaev. The church hierarchy meanwhile persisted in opposing reform of the laws governing marriage and divorce. It resisted any attempt to reduce the privileges accorded the official state religion, but the revolution of 1905 elicited calls for changes in the form of church governance from within the clergy itself.

Some myths, however, survive the contradictions they encompass: theologians criticizing Darwin on scientific grounds; scientists defending the logical necessity of divine creation; Slavophiles...
engaged in dialogue with Oxford intellectuals who reproach them for lack of missionary zeal; tsars enforcing respect for tradition while looking outside the church for otherworldly support. But the eddies of contention affected only the surface of national life. Or so it seemed to the contenders. This same educated elite, so sensitive to the shifting currents of contemporary thought, was also partly responsible for the impression that beyond the range of their journals and debates, Russia was a repository of untroubled faith, lodged in the uncorrupted common folk. The Slavophile insistence on Russia’s historic continuity with the spirit of Eastern Christianity, facilitated precisely by the country’s marginal relation to European culture, was a persistent trope, powerfully embodied in Dostoevsky’s reactionary politics (contrasting so dramatically with his precociously modern prose) and rearticulated in Solzhenitsyn’s stubbornly old-style nationalist ideal. We return to the pious crone.

If there are grounds for supposing that imperial Russia resisted the impact of cultural modernity, it should be found in the peasant residuum, not in the complicated thought patterns of the intellectual elite. But the question of popular Orthodoxy is difficult to untangle. Modern scholarship is scanty, and the classics on the subject (George Fedotov, Pierre Pascal, Andrei Siniavskii) merely confirm their authors’ Slavophile assumptions.

A renewed tendency to see the folk as permeated with an all-embracing Christian ethos emerges in some post-Soviet writing, in reaction to decades of denial and distortion. To what extent the peasants were ignorant of doctrine, as the clergy often complained, or resource-
ful in shaping local and spontaneous versions of the faith, is a question further research needs to ponder.\(^92\)

It is clear, however, that the religion practised by Russian-speaking peasants showed an inventiveness not always pleasing to the church. Vera Shevzov has demonstrated that villagers were deeply attached to their parish institutions but also developed local forms of expression, which were sometimes tolerated and sometimes condemned.\(^93\) Brenda Meehan has shown how pious women who withdrew from ordinary life without church sanction might be recognized by their neighbours as especially devout.\(^94\) Ordinary city dwellers, including factory workers, found new outlets for religious feeling. In St Petersburg, the Orthodox priests Father Gapon and Father John of Kronstadt attracted followers with a combination of old-style pastoral care and new-style welfare populism. Gapon built a social movement that precipitated the outbreak of revolution in 1905. Father John, by contrast, demonstrated complete loyalty to the established order. He combined the skills of the miracle-worker with those of the publicity-seeker to make himself an object of veneration in his lifetime.\(^95\)

Among the variations on Orthodoxy dramatically at odds with the norm the most important was the Old Belief. Originating in the seventeenth century as a reaction among the clerical elite against innovations in liturgy and ritual imposed with the support of the tsar by Patriarch Nikon (1605–81), its leaders defied the authority of both state and church. Adherents maintained their traditionalist beliefs in the face of vigorous persecution. Rejecting the very principle of change, they insisted on the sanctity of


sacred rites and objects. Their reverence for the precise wording of holy texts and for ancient icons made them seem archaic or literal-minded to outsiders, but the community eventually made peace with the world, engaging successfully in agriculture and trade, in which it showed a remarkable realism and adaptability. By the twentieth century, its members could be found at every level of the social hierarchy, from villagers to Moscow city councillors. Some forms of folk piety, such as the veneration of relics and faith in wonder-working icons, could also be viewed as archaic, but these had the approval of the church. Among groups the church condemned, some were better described as rationalistic. Certain mid-nineteenth-century Ukrainian peasants, for example, under the influence of neighbouring German settlers, adopted a form of evangelical Lutheranism (Stundism), and Baptism had a large following.

Peasants, in short, were capable of various forms of religious expression. The Slavophile ideal may perhaps be found at some point in the spectrum, but taking the Russian-speaking people as a whole, no one type does justice to the range. The Slavophiles liked to think that the core of folk sensibility grew from age-old cultural roots. But even if we search the Christian register for what seems like the most archaic version of all, we will find that it too responded to changes around it. Take the example of the mystical ascetic community, known as the Skoptsy, which practised self-castration. Throughout the 150 years of the group’s existence, from the mid-eighteenth to the early twentieth century,

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97 The church was, however, caught in the conflict of cultures. By the late nineteenth century, clergymen sometimes enlisted physicians to help verify the validity of miracle cures. See Christine D. Worobec, Possessed: Women, Witches, and Demons in Imperial Russia (DeKalb, Ill., 2001), 56.


99 For more on the Skoptsy, see Laura Engelstein, Castration and the Heavenly Kingdom: A Russian Folktale (Ithaca, NY, 1999).
the Skoptsy were decried as a throwback to a primitive age.\textsuperscript{100} The ritual originated, however, no earlier than the mid-eighteenth century. In applying the techniques of animal husbandry to the purification of his human flock, the sect’s founding prophet, a charismatic peasant, offered personal salvation through communion with the Holy Spirit.\textsuperscript{101} Skoptsy worship also included repetitious prayer and fervent dancing, practices they borrowed from an existing movement, known as the Christ Faith, or Khlysty, which also imposed self-denial, though not castration, on its members. In a more sublimated way, hesychast teaching focused on the reception of the Holy Spirit through constant prayer and self-forgetting.

Russian intellectuals at the turn of the twentieth century believed the folk mystics embodied a distinctively native approach to the spiritual life.\textsuperscript{102} If the Optina style itself incorporated some non-Orthodox elements, however, the same could be said for the popular version. A visiting Silesian mystic, Quirinus Kuhlman, was executed as a Quaker heretic by Princess Sofia in 1689. In denouncing the Khlysty as a ‘Quaker heresy’ fifty years later, Orthodox clergymen condemned the ‘enthusiastic’ style as a Protestant import. In so doing they betrayed their own debt to foreign sources, borrowing a rhetorical turn from English polemics denouncing sectarian fanatics.\textsuperscript{103} Aside from the specifics of castration, the ecstatic forms of worship and ascetic principles adopted by the Skoptsy and Khlysty did indeed share certain features with the Christian mysticism that flourished in late eighteenth-century England and Germany. The rhythmic dancing, chants and sexual abstinence resemble the practices elaborated by the English Shakers in the very same decades. Not just the timing of its appearance but also the persistence of the ‘enthusiast”.


\textsuperscript{101} These objections are raised by Viktor Zhivov, ‘Skoptsy v russkoi kul’ture: Po povodu knigi N. Volkova’ [The Skoptsy in Russian Culture: Apropos of N. Volkov’s Book], \textit{Novee literaturne obozreni}, no. 18 (1996).

\textsuperscript{102} See Aleksandr Etkind, ‘Khlysty, dekadenty, bol’sheviki: Nachalo veka v arkhive Mikhala Prishvina’ [Khlysts, Decadents, Bolsheviks: The Beginning of the Century in the Archives of Michael Prishvin], \textit{Oktiabr’}, xi (1996); Etkind, \textit{Khlyst}.

\textsuperscript{103} Tsapina, ‘Image of the Quaker’.
astic’ style conform to a European pattern. The nineteenth century, as we have noted, did not exhibit a simple decline in what an increasingly secular public considered old styles of worship. Manifestations of Christian piety that evoked an earlier age were thus not confined to the nation which itself seemed anachronistic. Russian sectarians were, moreover, a curious amalgam of pious primitivism and worldly savoir-faire. Old Believers clung to their beards and succeeded at commerce. Eventually they abandoned some of the habits which had set them apart, building urban communities and participating in civic affairs. Smaller, more resistant groups, such as the Dukhobors, who got into trouble for refusing to bear arms or cooperate with the authorities, were also capable agriculturalists. No less stubborn in defence of their core beliefs, the Skoptsy were adept at coping with their material and cultural surroundings. The forms of expression they used to consolidate their membership, communicate with the outside world, and understand their relationship to the host culture changed over time. They eagerly sat to have their photographs taken and arranged to have their legends and verses published in a book. They used telephones and hired attorneys. Some acquired considerable wealth.

What conclusions can we draw about the relationship of imperial Russia to cultural modernity, based on the character of its religious life? On the level of institutions, the state and church present a mixed picture. Conservative and tradition-minded, they sustained each other in maintaining the social and ideological status quo. As an agent of social transformation, on the one hand, and the enemy of independent public life, on the other, the state also strained this alliance. In the spirit of enlightened despotism, the monarchs deprived the church of administrative autonomy and weakened its economic base. Incorporated into the bureaucratic apparatus, the church was in a sense modernized against


its will. Some clergymen responded by addressing the cultural challenges of the age; others promoted institutional reform as a way to enhance the church’s influence and power. On the level of intellectual life, the profile is also confusing. The Slavophiles extolled an ideal of the past, even as they engaged contemporary religious and philosophical issues. They understood their affinity with Europeans grappling with similar spiritual concerns. Finally, on the level of popular expression, it is clear that old and new were also interconnected. Even the most rigid and literal-minded outliers on the sectarian frontier, the aggressively pious Skoptsy, were far from immune to the advantages and excitements of the modern age.

If the secularization thesis cannot withstand scrutiny, perhaps the notion of modernity also needs to be revised. We should not be surprised to learn that World War I provoked a surge of religious feeling among European combatants. We cannot describe the tsarist army command as archaic for the virulent anti-Semitism it demonstrated in relation to the Jews of the western provinces during that war. Both anti-Semitism and ethnic persecution were the wave of the future. Nor should we designate as a cultural anachronism the fact that many Russians greeted the end of Romanov rule as a literally miraculous occurrence. When the Bolsheviks assumed the mantle of modernity and consigned religion to the relics of the past they were engaging in ideological warfare.

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