

‘Stalinization’ and its Limits in the Saxon KPD, 1925–28

The ‘Stalinization Debate’

The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 broke a documentary dam, facilitating a flood of studies on all aspects of the former German Democratic Republic. In contrast, however, hardly even a steady trickle of new research on the German Communist Party (KPD) during the Weimar Republic has used the newly available documentary material to contribute to the existing pool of knowledge. Two new studies, by E.D. Weitz and K.-M. Mallmann, have at least stimulated the beginning of a debate on the nature of the KPD’s political development in the mid-1920s.¹ In a review article, Koch-Baumgarten perceptively pointed out that these new documentary-based studies once again reformulated the old 64,000-dollar question: can the political developments of the KPD be more properly ascribed to exogenous or to endogenous conditions?²

The debate on the determinants of the KPD’s political character has gone through certain broadly definable stages.³ The ‘Stalinization-thesis’ was most fully detailed in Hermann Weber’s *Wandlung des deutschen Kommunismus*, which placed the emphasis of explanation on Moscow’s ability to purge Stalin’s opponents in the KPD parallel to those in the Bolshevik Party (CPSU) and to centralize the channels of decision-making. The net outcome was the transformation of the KPD into a political actor whose lines were written in Moscow. Weber did not overlook the role of German conditions in facilitating Moscow’s hold over the KPD. Indeed, the crucial conditioning factors in this process were found in the KPD’s own structural and ideological dependence on Moscow, not least because the party was trapped

in a 'bourgeois' republic without immediate prospect of revolution.⁴ However, exogenous factors were given as the key to explaining the party's political behaviour.

During the 1970s, a wave of 'histories from below' placed the dynamic of the KPD's *policy-making* decisions firmly within the German context, relegating the role of Moscow to a non-decisive secondary factor. Socio-economic developments and their impact on political thought inside the working classes and the party itself were detailed as the determinants of party policy.⁵ With various degrees of emphasis on social, economic and political factors, consensus lay in locating the KPD's role in German politics as a response to endogenous conditions. However, because it was impossible to gain access to the party archives in East Berlin, empirical gaps were often filled with theoretical assumptions, and localized findings were generalized into national-level explanations.

To date, the two documentary-based studies of the KPD continue to run in the 'revisionist' groove. Weitz acknowledges the part played by Moscow's influence, and the 'vituperative' factionalism present in internal party life. However, first, his study stresses the formation of a common 'communist culture', in which there were substantial areas of agreement between the factions.⁶ And, second, the KPD's political role during the Weimar Republic, and the policies that it adopted, are presented as responses within an identifiable German tradition, addressing specifically German problems.⁷ Unemployed workers under the Weimar Republic, for example, were attracted to the KPD's Marxist-Leninist 'strong state' solutions as this made sense to workers who had experienced the pre-war beginnings of the *Sozialstaat*. The KPD, according to this view, was the heir to the pre-war Social Democratic Party's (SPD's) constituency among those who felt excluded from German society.⁸ In broad agreement with Weitz, Mallmann also locates the KPD's origins and later development within the traditions of the radical left wing of the pre-war SPD. In order to explain the different political tendencies housed within the KPD, Mallmann constructs an interpretative framework which identifies four locally based 'milieux', from ultra-left antagonism with and isolation from the SPD, to extensive contact and co-operation for common objectives. However, the author's research findings focus on the Saar region, and stress the importance of a 'left-proletarian

milieu', in which the division in the workers' movement between SPD and KPD was much shallower than previously thought. In this respect, Mallmann differs from earlier 'revisionist' historians, who argued that the sociological split in the workers' movement provided a separate social basis for the KPD and SPD, and explained the two parties' ideological tribalism and political blood feud. Mallmann's thesis, therefore, over-emphasizes the continued existence of the pre-war homogeneous 'niche society', which continued to influence local-level *politics* on the left during the Weimar Republic.⁹ This leads into the second strand of Mallmann's revision of the history of the KPD, which pushes the KPD's factional feuds out of the party's social history. In place of intra-party fratricide, in which each faction would ultimately purge its opponents, the power struggle in the KPD is reduced to a preserve of the leadership, while the 'ordinary' party membership simply ignored policies handed down from above if they failed to make sense locally.¹⁰

The contribution of this article to the emerging debate on the KPD's political development takes the form of an empirical reconstruction of the impact of factionalism on internal party life, using the more recently available micro-level documentation. It will be argued that local conditions created an environment which influenced the strength of the KPD's factions, their political orientation, and the intensity of the internal party feud over the political identity of German communism. Saxony provides a suitable model for a comparison of how the party's factions responded to policy changes in that the region's three district-party organizations spread across the political spectrum from left to right.¹¹ The party district in West Saxony, centred on Leipzig, was an organizational stronghold of the SPD, the (socialist) Free Trade Unions, and the wider network of social democratic free-time organizations. Despite the district SPD's position on the party's left wing, it remained loyal to the Reich leadership, and widely upheld the official ban on campaigning with the KPD. In this socio-political environment the KPD's membership were unable to create a political space in which it would be possible to work towards *communist objectives* within the wider workers' movement. For these reasons, local communist activists inclined towards the ultra-left isolationist wing of the KPD. In Erzgebirge-Vogtland, by contrast, the SPD was considerably less strongly implanted as a political party, in the trade unions, and in

the socialist free-time associations. During the early years of the Weimar Republic a far-left, independent-minded party faction, the *Klassenkampf* group, developed in the SPD. In this local setting, communist activists felt able to work towards communist goals in contact and limited co-operation with the wider, socialist-dominated, workers' movement. In the third KPD district party, centred on Dresden, the party had been unable to attract a significant membership. The right wing of the SPD dominated local party- and union-based politics, and in the industrial villages along the river Elbe between Dresden and Meissen the social-democratic free-time organizations were deeply implanted. In this environment the KPD leadership found it much easier to contain the party's endemic factional feuding. However, in a number of small industrial villages, in which the KPD remained on the fringes of local politics, rank-and-file activists were drawn into campaigns under *de facto* SPD leadership. The primary indicator of where this would take place was in areas in which local communists came in daily contact with social-democratic workers in the SPD-dominated free-time clubs and associations.

The Impact of the Comintern's 'Right-Turn'

In September 1925 a new phase in the KPD's factional feud was triggered by the announcement, in the form of an 'open letter' from the Comintern to the German membership, that the party was to end its isolation by creating a pro-Soviet left wing in the social-democratic-led workers' movement.¹² The errors of the previous policy were blamed on the leadership of Ruth Fischer, and, in an attempt to allay the fears of the party's left wing, the new leadership passed to the 'Stalin-faction' of leftists around Ernst Thälmann. Whereas the Fischer-leadership had come to power in the KPD as a result of the membership's majority decision to reject the united-front policy's overtures to the SPD-led workers' movement, the new leadership was imposed as a result of Moscow's machinations, playing one leadership faction off against another behind the scenes.¹³ Two factors were decisive in bringing about the policy change: the new factional constellation in the CPSU, and Soviet concerns that German foreign policy was beginning to turn its back on Moscow.¹⁴ The previous

two years in Saxony, the setting of the 'abortive revolution' of October 1923, had seen the party tear itself apart in a factional feud over the correct policy for a revolutionary party. The prospect of a regional return to prominence of the 'old leadership', which had been largely pushed out of its positions of influence by the Left in the District Leaderships (*Bezirksleitungen*: BL), was treated as a storm signal among left-wing Saxon communists.¹⁵

The Comintern could not simply change the German party's political policy at the flick of a switch: once again the circuitry had to be reinstalled by the leadership in Berlin through local-level political conduits. When the disagreement between Ruth Fischer and Moscow went public, the fragile unit of the Left, which had occupied the leadership, was torn apart, fragmenting into its component groups. The factions within the Left which remained in opposition to the Comintern's change of policy, the Fischer–Maslow Group and the various ultra-left grouping, fell into factional opposition and discord. The ultra-left factions, which had been the most vociferous in their resistance to Moscow's machinations, now sub-divided into smaller denominations with rival theories purporting to explain the 'degeneration' of the communist movement.¹⁶ The divisions within and between the ultra-left factions allowed the KPD's national leadership to purge the weakest groups around Katz in early 1926,¹⁷ and to sideline the so-called Intransigent Left, around Korsch and Schwarz, completing the purge of their remaining adherents by the autumn.¹⁸

However, the two left-wing factions most deeply rooted in the membership remained active in their local and district strongholds during 1926. The Fischer–Urbahns Group was a re-foundation of the Left Opposition from before autumn 1923; it was centred on Berlin and comprised largely former leading functionaries from the Fischer leadership. In factional terms, its significance lay in strong personal connections with the Joint Opposition in the CPSU.¹⁹ The other faction remaining in the KPD was the Wedding Opposition, which was led by Hans Weber in Pfalz, Willi Kötter in Berlin-Wedding, and by Arthur Vogt in West Saxony. The significance of this group was in its strong support among workers in these party districts.²⁰ In the course of the winter of 1925/6, it became clear that behind the seemingly smooth installation of the new national leadership and

change in political tactics lay a hornets' nest of regional discontent. Saxony illustrates this well as it housed regional centres of both left- and right-wing communist factions.

In Erzgebirge-Vogtland a feud began in the KPD between the Left in the BL and the Right, which, in addition to its strength among local activists, now had key positions in the regional party leadership. The 'Chemnitz Left' around Paul Bertz and Heinz Wesche, which had refused to carry out the 'right turn', continued to exert influence on the BL in Erzgebirge-Vogtland.²¹ Indeed, its influence grew after the return of the 'old leadership' to leading positions in the Saxon KPD. For example, Paul Böttcher, a prominent Right Communist, was appointed to head the Saxon Regional Executive, which co-ordinated political campaigns in the region. These developments indicated that the Zentralkomitee's (ZK) political programme for Saxony, decided in November 1925, had already made concessions to the 'Brandler faction' (i.e. the Right) in its Saxon stronghold.²² These concessions marked out a significant difference between Saxony and the Reich: while the Right continued to be excluded from the national leadership, in Saxony it rejoined the party leadership.

At the District Party Congress in Erzgebirge-Vogtland during early December 1925, Böttcher was able to have the Comintern's political line unanimously endorsed.²³ However, a dispute emerged between the BL majority and the Right, which had the support of the ZK's representative. This centred on the party's attitude to the SPD's left-wing leaders, who were particularly prominent locally.²⁴ The BL majority insisted that the SPD's left wing continue to be the KPD's 'main enemy', and stressed that the acceptance of the united front as defined by the Right would mean a return to the policies which led to the 'October defeat'. The Right, under Böttcher, Siewert and Lorenz, were now on the factional offensive, having adopted a strategy to dominate district party policy at a factional conference in Chemnitz on 27 September.²⁵

The 'Chemnitz Left' now set out to prevent the return of the Right and their influence on policy. The Left, which still had a majority in the BL, initiated a second, unofficial, party debate on the implications of the return to a united-front policy in Saxony. The continued control of the district party apparatus by the Left allowed the manipulation of the process of delegation to the District Party Congress, which had been called to debate the

policy changes following the Comintern's 'open letter'.²⁶ At the District Congress the 'Chemnitz Left' was able to reconsolidate its position as a Left leadership group.²⁷ Max Opitz remained Political Secretary and Heinz Wesche, although prevented from taking the influential position of Organization Secretary, was elected Agitprop Secretary by 65 votes to 60, in open defiance of central party instructions.²⁸ While the District Congress unanimously endorsed the sixth Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI) Plenum's resolutions on the struggle against the ultra-Left, the 'Declaration of the 61', which included the signatures of fifteen members of the BL, drew attention to the Comintern's undertaking to struggle equally against the Right.²⁹ In Erzgebirge-Vogtland, the Left leadership in the BL represented a minority of the district membership. Unable to win their arguments among rank-and-file activists, the 'Chemnitz Left' now re-entered the BL in the hope of preventing the united-front policy from being carried out in south-western Saxony.³⁰

In East Saxony, the KPD's organizational weakness made the factional feud easier for the party machine to control than in the party's strongholds.³¹ The reintroduction of the united-front policy had brought about little factionally based resistance in the cells, local groups and residential districts.³² In East Saxony at the end of 1925, the problem appeared to be a pervasive lack of motivation to take part in party activities to all. The leading apparatus functionary, Wilhelm Koenen, reporting to the ZK on developments in the BL in late December, complained that the influence of the Political Secretary, Martin Schneider, and the Organizational Secretary, Gäbel, was so weak that:

For months, especially after the Comintern's letter, hardly a BL Meeting has come to a fundamental political position or to a precise position on the political tasks . . . The comrades feel that the speech and position on the political tasks by the ZK made in the BL is *virtually a statement of utter rubbish*.³³

With the intention of stimulating political activity in the district, Koenen suggested that Sigfried Rädcl, another trusted apparatus functionary, be co-opted onto the East Saxon BL.³⁴ Controlling the BL was a core component of the KPD's 'Stalinization', not least because it facilitated rigging the process of delegation to District Party Congresses which adopted policy resolutions.³⁵ A typical method of controlling the district

decision-making process was to appoint compliant ‘worker comrades’ from the large factories to positions of influence. In East Saxony five such ‘worker comrades’ were appointed by the inner-leadership group to the Narrower BL, the district party’s politburo, ensuring majority votes for the ZK’s policy directives. Koenen actually stated that this built-in compliant majority in the Narrower BL ensured a ‘majority over the District Secretaries’.³⁶ The atomization of the membership into numerically small cells, a key component of ‘organizational Bolshevization’, complemented the appointment of district party personnel from above. Although the number of factory cells in East Saxony was marginal, a hugely disproportionate number of delegates were sent from them to the District Congress in late January. From 242 delegates, 95 were from the factory cells, 43 from the street cells, 88 from local groups and only 16 from the residential organizations to which most members belonged.³⁷ At the District Party Congress only Martin Hoop, a sub-district secretary in Bautzen, called for a return to the policies adopted at the tenth Reich Party Congress (i.e. only weeks before the Comintern’s intervention) and reminded the Congress of the ‘failures’ associated with the united front-policy in Saxony.³⁸ The debate on the ‘Russian Question’ (the changing factional constellation and policy direction in the CPSU) had made so little impact on the membership that the District Committee (*Bezirksausschuss*) reported that:

To some extent the comrades have understood the Executive’s resolution prohibiting discussion on the question of the CPSU’s 14th Party Congress in the Western European sections of the Comintern as a ban on discussing the Russian Question at all.³⁹

When Rosa Meyer-Levine wrote in her memoirs that: ‘The split caused by the Comintern’s “open letter” was on the whole negligible’, it appears that this statement was probably based on the experience of Ernst Meyer’s East Prussian stronghold rather than the wider party picture.⁴⁰ The Saxon example indicates that the intensity of the debate on policy depended on the strength of the district party and the political disposition of the membership.

At the Meeting of District Secretaries and Editors on 16 and 17 April in Berlin, it seemed on the surface that the KPD had been brought into line with Comintern policy. The Conference voted by sixty-five votes to two to accept the policy decision of

the Sixth ECCI-Plenum and to condemn the Left Opposition factions as marginal groupings which intended only to weaken the KPD's ability to struggle.⁴¹ However, at least in the district strongholds of the Left, it was still possible locally to jam the wheels of the party machine. In West Saxony the Vogt Group's continued popularity among the rank-and-file membership and its remaining positions in the BL set the scene for a furious and enduring turf war.⁴² The Vogt Group's factional platform called for an open discussion on the 'Russian Question', in which it supported the 'Joint Opposition's' criticisms of 'socialism in one country'; a 'return' to party democracy, whereby the membership decided policy; and convening the eleventh national party congress. The overriding objective was to overturn the united-front policy.⁴³ The Vogt Group insisted that the district membership did not trust the 'old leadership', which had been responsible for such serious 'mistakes',⁴⁴ and would not co-operate with its policy. Furthermore, the Thälmann leadership was reminded of its broken promise to make no concessions to the Saxon Right, in terms of either political policy or appointment to influential positions.⁴⁵

At this point the ZK set out to mobilize the full force of the party apparatus against the Opposition throughout Germany. In Pfalz the ZK continued to come up against the barrier of solid and well-organized factional resistance led by the Wedding Opposition.⁴⁶ In Berlin, however, the ability of the apparatus to rig the process of delegation to the District Party Congress in July had enabled the ZK to appoint Wilhelm Pieck, who was already part of the inner core of staunch Comintern-loyalists, as Political Secretary.⁴⁷ In West Saxony, the strength of the opposition forced the ZK to act against the Vogt Group in the form of a 'discussion' beginning in the party's base-organizations and culminating in another District Party Congress. During this process the party apparatus had a double function: to mobilize the base-organizations to carry out official party policy by entrusting this to 'suitable' local functionaries, and to ensure those delegates attending the District Congress were 'ZK-loyal'. The party machine used the party press, circulars to lower party organizations, and leaflets to depict the Vogt Group's behaviour as a 'betrayal' of the Bolshevik Revolution and harmful to the interests of the KPD.⁴⁸ However, the ZK's intention to win over as many rank-and-file leftists as possible was indicated by

Koenen, the ZK's District *Kommissar*, who insisted that a 'left-turn' would be introduced as soon as conditions changed.⁴⁹ The Political Secretary, Max Strötzel, a former member of the Fischer Group who had gone over to Thälmann's faction, also made clear his belief that the KPD must not lose the ordinary leftist rank-and-file members.⁵⁰

The party 'discussion' began with an 'Information Evening' in Leipzig on 30 April.⁵¹ Following this, apparatus functionaries were sent into cells and local groups throughout the district to make a speech on the Sixth ECCI-Plenum's political resolutions and elect delegates to the District Congress on the basis of support for or rejection of the Comintern's political pronouncements. The process of delegation from cells and local groups to Working Area, City District, and Sub-District Conferences, before the final election of delegates to the District Congress, ensured that support for the Opposition had to be rock solid locally to get through the ever tighter mesh.⁵² Not only did the election of delegates give disproportionate representation to members organized in factory cells,⁵³ but the mode of delegation was also used to filter out the Opposition. In Leipzig, the centre of the Opposition, one delegate was to be elected on the basis of ten paid up members; in the outlying sub-districts the ratio was reduced to one delegate for every five members.⁵⁴ Despite all of these organizational advantages in the hands of the ZK, the District Party Congress, which had already been delayed since the publication of the 'open letter', was postponed for another month because of the continued strength of resistance.⁵⁵ During the debate in West Saxony, the strength of support for the Vogt Group forced the District Politburo to warn the Opposition that, 'continued factional work is insufferable in a democratic centralist party'.⁵⁶

Events in West Saxony indicate the omnipresence of the factional feud in ordinary members' everyday experience, at least in the Opposition's strongholds. While the Left's fragmentation eased the appointment of the new national leadership, developments at district level and below were very different.⁵⁷ In the Wedding Opposition's strongholds in Pfalz, Berlin and West Saxony, the factional feud went into the party's lowest units, burning up the political oxygen necessary for effective local-level campaigning.⁵⁸ The strength of the Vogt Group in West Saxony also owed something to the role of Arthur Vogt, who tried to

balance differences *within* the Opposition using what the BL called a 'middle course' capable of integrating many functionaries who did not want to risk expulsion.⁵⁹

At the District Party Congress, held 9–10 July 1926, the BL majority was able to endorse the ZK's political line, its position on the factional struggle, and to pass a resolution endorsing the CPSU's policy of 'socialism in one country'. The latter was presented to the wider membership in positive terms: the possibility of 'independent socialist construction' in Soviet Russia as opposed to abandoning world revolution.⁶⁰ However, the strength of the Opposition throughout the district party was reflected in its ability to secure 57 of the 123 delegates elected to the Congress, despite the organizational manipulation which had been intended to marginalize it as a force at the Congress.⁶¹ With this degree of support for the Opposition it remained necessary to hand nine of the twenty-seven positions as BL Secretaries to the Vogt Group. The feared split-off of a very significant number of party workers was avoided at the cost of leaving the Opposition with its positions from the lowest cells to the BL itself.⁶² Kötter, the leader of the Wedding Opposition in Berlin, was able to make a speech at the Congress. Furthermore, a lengthy 'no confidence' motion in the ZK's policies was submitted for discussion.⁶³ The Opposition's motion rejected the political line set by the Sixth-ECCI-Plenum and its justification on the basis of the 'relative stabilization' of political and economic life in Germany. The Comintern's policy statement was dismissed as 'un-Marxist and unsuitable as a revolutionary policy in the Comintern's national parties'.⁶⁴ The Opposition also expressed sympathy for the expelled Korsch, Schwarz and Schagewerth grouping in the Reichstag, which had voted against the German–Soviet Trade Treaty, agreeing that the Treaty placed Soviet foreign policy above the demands of the German Revolution.⁶⁵ In a show of solidarity with the 'Leningrad Opposition' the motion blamed 'The suppression of debate on the 14th CPSU Congress for the "false" application of the united-front policy, factionalism, the reorganization of the ZK, and the rape of internal party democracy.'⁶⁶ The platform of the Opposition concluded that: 'This District Party Congress supports the Leningrad Opposition from the honest conviction that the KPD can only undertake its historic tasks if, in the place of the present opportunist course, a clear revolutionary line is adopted.'⁶⁷

The District Congress, however, did mark a turning point in the Opposition's tactics. The issue of support for all expelled factions and individual leaders, including Ruth Fischer's removal from the ZK and Comintern, split the Vogt Group's vote. Thirty delegates belonging to the Vogt Group voted with the BL on the specific question of support for expelled factions; their motivation was a fear of expulsion.⁶⁸ If the leadership feared losing the left-wing rank-and-file activists, then they feared losing the party in the same measure. The BL majority now hoped that the Opposition had at last divided into 'open anti-Bolshevik elements' and 'pro-party' elements.⁶⁹ Although a demarcation line had been drawn through the Opposition, it remained far from broken in its resistance to the re-introduction of the united-front policy and the Right's return to political influence in Saxony. It did, admittedly, signal the need for a more cautious approach by the Opposition.⁷⁰ The continued ability of the Vogt Group to organize factional opposition to the ZK's policies also indicates that, where resistance to a policy was sufficiently pronounced, it could continue.

Saxony and the 'Letter of the 700': German Communism Watches the International Purge its Internationalists

In July 1926 Ruth Fischer's unauthorized return from Moscow, and Maslow's release from jail generated a surge in the Left Opposition's agitation on the 'Russian Question'. The Left Opposition's campaign centred on opposition to the policy of 'socialism in one country', which was seen as a threat to the Comintern's stimulation of world revolution, and support for the Joint Opposition in the CPSU. In early August the leaders of the Left Opposition co-operated with the groupings comprising the Wedding Opposition and the Korsch-wing of the Intransigent Left, which had already been expelled, to arrive at a joint declaration. The immediate response of the ZK was to expel Fischer and Maslow on 19 August, using the pretext of their contact with Korsch, and to accuse them of propagating the slogan 'Against Moscow' and attempting to split the KPD.⁷¹ The public statement of the Opposition groups took the form of the 'Letter of the 700', whose signatories were still party functionaries. The Letter challenged the development of Stalin's personal dictator-

ship, presenting it as a 'falsification' of Leninism.⁷² However, the cause of the Left in the KPD was not helped by developments in the CPSU: on 16 October Zinoviev and Trotsky admitted they had broken party discipline and withdrew their support for the Left throughout the Comintern. Despite this, their last ditch attempt to retain their positions of influence in the CPSU was unsuccessful. At the end of October Trotsky was ousted from the Politburo and Zinoviev was replaced by Bukharin as chairman of the Comintern.⁷³ In Germany the KPD leadership also acted against the Opposition. The ZK condemned the 'Letter of the 700' as a 'criminal attempt to split' the KPD, and began a purge of those who would not submit to party discipline. On 5 September the KPD purged leading figures whose names appeared on the petition, including Urbahns, Scholem and Schwan. The purge of these leading figures was followed up by a 'loyalty declaration', according to which those refusing to submit to party discipline would be expelled from the party.⁷⁴

The expulsion of the leaders of the Left Opposition, and the sidelining of the Joint Opposition in the CPSU, dominated internal party life between August and November 1926.⁷⁵ In Erzgebirge-Vogtland, the Left in the BL was not factionally connected to the Joint Opposition in the CPSU, sheltering it from the full force of the factional feud. Only a handful of members of the Narrower BL initially refused to condemn Trotsky's and Zinoviev's political activities outright.⁷⁶ The debate on the 'Russian Question' was then forced through the district party from the cells and local groups to Sub-District, City District and Workers' Delegate Conferences, which culminated in a District Party Congress on 26 September.⁷⁷ The membership's support for Right-communism ensured that there would be little objection to party policy. Almost all of the meetings in the KPD's base-units accepted the ZK's policy statement unanimously. However, efforts to eliminate even the limited dissent of abstaining in the vote further charted the development of the KPD's self-image as the party *nemine contradicente*.⁷⁸ The three localities with any significant dissent, Plauen, Döbeln and the local group in Hartha, all had structural features helping to explain the conflict with the leadership since the return of the united-front policy. In the case of Plauen, high levels of unemployment in the textile industry gave a sociological basis to support for the Left. In the autumn of 1926 12,000 textile workers were un-

employed.⁷⁹ The sub-district of Döbeln had an economic structure and pattern of strong organization in the SPD and trades union more similar to the West Saxon party district. The local group in Hartha also used its close geographical proximity to the Leipzig KPD to develop contacts with the Wedding Opposition.⁸⁰

At this point the factional feud took an unexpected turn in Erzgebirge-Vogtland. Although the 'Chemnitz Left' could accept the ZK's stance against the Joint Opposition in the CPSU, this did not mean that the development of political policy *per se* was disregarded. Initially Max Opitz and Heinz Wesche were actively involved in preserving the unity of the Left in the BL: not least because of the strength of support for the Right among the membership.⁸¹ However, at the District Party Congress on 26 September Opitz and Wesche resigned over the party's failure to act equally against the Right and the ultra-Left. At the end of October, the district's political leadership passed to Ernst Schneller, a senior functionary in the Reich party apparatus and earlier member of the Fischer-leadership.⁸² Schneller's first task in Saxony was to ensure support for the German and Russian leaderships' position against the Joint Opposition and the signatories of the 'Letter of the 700' in Germany.⁸³

In East Saxony it was not the 'Russian Question' and factional infighting which were restricting the KPD's political activities, but chronic organizational and financial weaknesses.⁸⁴ During the first half of 1926 Martin Schreiter, the Political Secretary, complained that because the ZK had not adequately informed him about internal party matters he had first learned about them in the SPD's press.⁸⁵ While the other Saxon party districts were immersed in the factional infighting in the summer and autumn of 1926, the East Saxon District Congress did not put the issue on the official agenda.⁸⁶ The protocol of the District Congress only registered a complaint from the delegate of the cell group Sachsenwerke that 'The BL has placed too little value on conducting the party discussion in the cells.'⁸⁷ In East Saxony, only the leadership of the sub-district Bautzen actively opposed the party line and the expulsion of Ruth Fischer and Maslow.⁸⁸ Sigfried Rädcl, the functionary sent to Bautzen to assess the situation in the wider party membership, concluded that 'The intellectual *spiritus rektor* is Hoop . . . [but] he has as good as no support behind him.'⁸⁹ Interestingly, the Opposition in Bautzen

sent a letter of protest to the ZK in Berlin and to the ECCI in Moscow, causing concern in the BL that developments in the district would be misinterpreted.⁹⁰

In East Saxony, the city of Meissen and its surrounding industrial villages provide an example of the effects on KPD campaigning within the SPD-dominated cross-party milieu located in the socialist sports and cultural organizations, the so-called *Vereinsnetz*.⁹¹ During the campaign to expropriate the property of the former princely houses, which had been inspired by the KPD, the united-front policy was given wide exposure.⁹² Although the campaign to expropriate the former princely houses was carried out at the height of the 'moderate' united-front policy, the continued ultimate objective of destroying the SPD as a party and a movement remained explicitly clear. Paul Böttcher, a leading Right communist and architect of the political campaign in Saxony, tellingly summarized the KPD's policy as a means to, 'Increase class conflicts and help organize the sympathetic classes in the party. Unity means communist influence in the SPD and therefore requires the sharpest struggle against the SPD leadership.'⁹³ However, if the KPD had been able to set the political agenda, then it remained unable to control how even its own membership set out to achieve the expropriation of the former Saxon monarchy. In the city of Meissen itself the strength of the mainstream SPD proved an insurmountable obstacle to joint campaigning.⁹⁴ However, the situation in the surrounding industrial villages was different. In and around Loschwitz, the KPD co-operated with the SPD in a 'Working Committee' which prepared events for the expropriation campaign at joint meetings. The two parties' members distributed material together and immediately prior to the referendum vote on the 20 June the local KPD put its members at the disposal of the local SPD to ensure the co-ordination of effective work.⁹⁵ In Schmeideberg, the local Sports Cartel co-operated with the KPD to facilitate joint demonstrations of the two parties.⁹⁶ It was in this environment that the Reichsbanner also took part in joint demonstrations.⁹⁷ The KPD's BL became increasingly concerned that, while members in the cities were ignoring calls for 'united' action, in the industrial villages they misinterpreted this to mean genuine co-operation during the campaign. For example, in Obersfriedersdorf a 'Workers' Cartel' was set up with the objective of overcoming the split in the workers' movement and bringing about a

reunification with the SPD.⁹⁸ Of central importance is the fact that the local memberships of the SPD and KPD were cooperating for radical reformist objectives rather than on the basis of a communist-led 'united front'. Local communists' membership of SPD-led sporting and cultural organizations had created the political space for local-level working-class politics to enjoy a degree of 'relative autonomy' from the directives of their party leaderships. However, in the longer term, rank-and-file communists who belonged to this above-party milieu were predominantly pushed out of the KPD, and either joined the SPD or left active politics.⁹⁹ These developments also had an important impact on the factional struggle. They reinforced the Left in the belief that the KPD should be cut off from all organizational points of contact with the SPD in order to prevent the attraction of radical reformism among the party's membership.¹⁰⁰

In this political environment, the Political and Organization Secretaries of East Saxony, Schreiter and Gäbel, were demoted from their leading positions in the BL, not for factional activities but largely because of their outspoken honesty concerning their inability to make the KPD a strong political force.¹⁰¹ Their replacements were symptomatic of the KPD's on-going Stalinization. The new Political Secretary, Melcher, had no background in Saxony, either political or personal. The appointment of a Political Secretary who owed his position to the Reich leadership rather than to the district party's membership was to prevent knowledge of local conditions influencing his political judgement, and accepting a situation in which the ZK's directives rarely left the paper they were written on. The new Organizational Secretary, Schwarz, began his promotion by participating in an eight-week schooling course in Berlin. The course dealt with the KPD's structural reorganization and its function in driving policy and controlling dissent, which gave the Organizational Secretary a key power-position in the BL.¹⁰²

West Saxony, by contrast, remained at the centre of the KPD's factional feud. At Reich level, the crucial contributory factor in the eventual demise of the Wedding Opposition has been regarded as its fragmentation into signatories and non-signatories of the 'Letter of the 700'.¹⁰³ In West Saxony the Vogt Group had refused to sign the 'Letter of the 700'. However, this did not represent a capitulation to the ZK: it was a tactic to maintain the unity of the Vogt Group as a faction *within* the KPD.¹⁰⁴ Strong

resistance to the ZK's political line continued at a Party Workers' Conference on 30 November, which dealt with the party's political tasks. The Opposition rejected any communist support for an SPD-led regional government, or voting with the SPD on matters relating to unemployment benefits in the Landtag or in Town Halls. It also denounced the use of the united-front policy to win over non-communist workers in the preparations for the Congress of Working People, a campaign of meetings organized by the KPD which was to culminate in a conference in Berlin in December 1926.¹⁰⁵ The ZK's use of the 'loyalty declaration' against the signatories of the 'Letter of the 700' was roundly condemned and a resolution was adopted calling for the return of all those expelled on the 5 November for refusing to capitulate. Hans Weber, who had signed the Letter, was called on to 'oppose the ruinous party course still more strongly . . . and to struggle for the revolutionary Leninist party line'.¹⁰⁶ That this was no isolated case is illustrated in a report sent to the Politburo on the 19 November which stated that 'It must not be overlooked that they [the Opposition] have the support of the leading party workers and of the factory and street cells. Opposition cell leaders are distrustful of the present leadership.'¹⁰⁷ The report further informs the Reich leadership that eliminating the Opposition's activities would not be possible until the process of reorganization was completed.¹⁰⁸ The report also details how the Vogt Group had been able to paralyse the district party's political work from the BL into the local party organizations.¹⁰⁹ The factional struggle prevented the BL from acting as the district KPD's nerve centre: no weekly meetings took place to co-ordinate policy and the channels mobilizing the party according to the ZK's directives had seized up. In the factories there was a chronic lack of propaganda material.¹¹⁰ The Opposition at grass-roots level was also continually asserting its right to 'proportional representation' in the election of delegates to party conferences.¹¹¹ These developments illustrate the extent of the disruption to party work in the manner threatened by the Vogt-Group in July.¹¹² If the ZK was able to get majority support in all BLs for its policies by the end of October, then this, at least in the Opposition's strongholds, only reflected the 'yes' votes of the national leaderships' place-men.¹¹³ The purges of the leaders of the leftist Opposition groupings (political Stalinization) had indeed weakened the influence of these factions in the party. However, the 'new' micro-level

documentation further supports the crucial part played by 'organizational Stalinization' in 'liquidating' the Opposition. Without the party machine's manipulation of the 'election' of delegates to District Party Congresses, the BL in West Saxony would have been a preserve of the Vogt Group and in Erzgebirge-Vogtland it would have been dominated by the Right.¹¹⁴

The Changing Demands on the Saxon KPD

When the Seventh Plenum of the ECCI met in December 1926, it seemed as if the Left Opposition's days were all but over. The factions around Katz, Korsch and Schwan had been expelled, the Wedding Opposition had been split, and the Left Opposition's main leaders, Fischer, Maslow and Urbahns, had been expelled.¹¹⁵ The decisive event in the factional feud was the return of Ernst Meyer and the so-called Centre Group to the national and district leaderships; the faction's strong endorsement of the united-front policy made it essentially the respectable face of the Right in the national leadership.¹¹⁶ The constellation of factions in the KPD's leadership was set for a final showdown with the left-wing dissidents.¹¹⁷ However, while warning the Wedding Opposition that its factionalism must stop, the ECCI-Plenum made clear that the communist movement did not want its rank-and-file leftists.¹¹⁸ The political tide was beginning to turn, bringing with it the surviving members of the Vogt Group. These early political indications of a gradual return to a left-wing policy were also shown in Thälmann's ability to prevent Brandler and Thalheimer returning to Germany, where they would undoubtedly have actively agitated for a more pronouncedly right-wing variant of the united-front tactic.¹¹⁹

During the negotiations between the KPD's delegation and the CPSU at the seventh ECCI-Plenum on 22 and 24 December, Thälmann had called for the dissolution of all of the factional groups represented in the ZK; in other words, the dissolution of all factions organizing party members on the basis of political platforms at odds with official party policy. However, because Meyer would not join the leadership under these conditions, Stalin imposed on Thälmann the compromise that Bukharin had been unable to achieve.¹²⁰ Although the new leadership group in Berlin had been appointed by the leadership of the CPSU before

the KPD congress was announced to the party membership, it could not contain the factional ferment this produced among party activists. The scene was set for a titans' tug-of-war running from Moscow through Berlin into the district party organizations between the advocates of a left-isolationist policy and the supporters of winning over left-wing social democrats to the side of revolution using the united-front policy.¹²¹

The delay in calling the eleventh Reich Party Congress, which had been originally planned for December 1926, had two causes. First, it was necessary in order to enable the party apparatus to prevent any significant delegation from the Opposition on the Left.¹²² Second, it was symptomatic of the top-down imposition of policy that the KPD was unable to set an agenda in preparation for a Reich Congress, which dealt with party policy, until the ECCI had set the political line for Germany. A ZK circular to the BLs stated that until the seventh ECCI-Plenum had dealt with policy in Germany 'no preparations' for the Reich Congress could be undertaken.¹²³ In January 1927 the KPD began its internal discussion on party policy leading to the Eleventh Reich Congress. In East Saxony no District Congress was held due to the district's financial weakness; instead, delegates to the Reich Congress came from the sub-district conferences.¹²⁴ In the district party itself there was little factional infighting. However, ultra-leftism had become submerged in the RFB (Rotfront Kämpferbund), the KPD's paramilitary organization. The district RFB went into open rebellion against the national leadership and the BL when a party functionary, König, was imposed on the *Gau* leadership without consultation with the membership.¹²⁵ The incident paralysed all party work during January and led to the expulsion of six members of the *Gau* leadership, including the RFB's former district leader, Bernard Koch.¹²⁶ The leadership's method of dealing with these developments was a telling symptom of life inside the KPD: the RFB militants were informed that 'iron proletarian discipline' in a Leninist party did not permit 'democratic discussion'.¹²⁷

In Erzgebirge-Vogtland the situation was very different. The city of Chemnitz continued to be a stronghold of the KPD's right wing. Here, Right Communism continued to enjoy solid support among communist factory workers, especially among skilled metal workers in the city's suburbs. Support for the Right was underpinned by the ability of communist union functionaries to

win positions in the factory councils using a policy of contact and limited co-operation with colleagues in the SPD on issues specifically relating to the individual factories.¹²⁸ The KPD also had its deepest penetration of local politics in the electoral district Chemnitz-Zwickau, where it had almost half the number of councillors that the SPD had.¹²⁹ In this environment, the two workers' parties lent each other the support necessary to achieve improvements in workers' living and working conditions. In many Town Halls, the KPD's councillors voted with the SPD in order to achieve increases in unemployment benefits, rather than using contact only to 'unmask' the SPD's alleged 'betrayal' of workers' interests.¹³⁰ In February 1927 the SPD helped the KPD in Oelsnitz to elect a communist *Bürgermeister*.¹³¹ Crucially, these tactics at local level helped to extend the KPD's roots into the local workers' movement.

In Erzgebirge-Vogtland, tensions emerged between the BL, which had been installed by the national leadership, and the membership, which continued to be dominated by supporters of the Right. In the BL, the so-called 'Chemnitz Left' made clear their reservations about the Centre Group's return to influential positions in the leadership.¹³² In the district party they had good cause for concern about a shift to the Right in policy: a lively campaign had been carried out among the rank-and-file membership for the return of Brandler and Thalheimer to Germany.¹³³ The strength of support for the Right ensured that the issue would dominate the District Congress's agenda. A motion forwarded by Böttcher and Siewert calling for Brandler's return to Germany was supported by 43 of the 147 delegates at the District Congress.¹³⁴ In Erzgebirge-Vogtland, the use of the KPD's re-organization on the basis of factory cells to limit opposition to the political line came up against the obstacle of factory cells being predominantly the domain of Right communists. Furthermore, while the ZK continued to concentrate on completing the purge of independent-minded leftists, the Right's criticisms of policy were again able to be expressed in the district party press: a development of considerable concern to the BL.¹³⁵

In Berlin and the Ruhr, which had been centres of the Left Opposition, the party apparatus had been able to impose compliant BLs under Pieck and Wilhelm Florin.¹³⁶ In West Saxony, however, there was continued strong resistance to the imposition of party policy from above. This was made evident when fourteen

members of the street cell 'Leipzig-Centre 5' left the party because of the party apparatus's refusal to accept the adoption of a majority resolution supporting the Opposition's position.¹³⁷ A report sent to the Politburo also indicated that this means of eliminating the Opposition did not win the trust of the ordinary party membership, whom the ZK wanted to win over.¹³⁸ When the District Party Congresses met immediately prior to the Essen Congress, the only district to elect a new BL with a majority for the Wedding Opposition was Pfalz.¹³⁹ To this can be added the very strong support for the Vogt Group in West Saxony.

At the West Saxon District Party Congress in March 1927, the manipulations of the party apparatus had been able to increase the overall 'pro-ZK majority' from eleven to nineteen delegates.¹⁴⁰ However, the drive to sideline the leading figures in the Vogt Group brought certain important developments. The Reich leadership, facilitated by changes to the KPD's statutes in 1926, appointed George Schumann, a leading member of Meyer's Centre Group, as Political Secretary. In contrast to developments at national level, the Right also entered the BL under Böttcher, who took up the influential position of editor-in-chief of the *Sächsische Arbeiter Zeitung*, and Arthur Lieberasch, a senior trade-union functionary. The Thälmann faction, under Max Strötzel, although nominally the majority faction, lost their positions in the district party's main political offices. The Vogt Group, on account of its continued domination of local-level party life also retained its position in the BL.¹⁴¹ The Congress speeches by the rival factions indicated that there was no prospect of the new BL actually functioning as a party 'coalition' leadership.¹⁴² Despite leaving the actual relationship between the West Saxon party membership and official KPD policy unresolved, it had prevented the Vogt Group from sending a delegation to voice its concerns at the Reich Party Congress in Essen.

Crucially, the Essen Congress, which met in March 1927, was not defined by a statement of support for the 'moderate' implementation of the united-front policy as advanced by the Centre Group, which had taken up positions in the Politburo and Secretariat. The SPD's leadership was attacked for their alleged support of an 'imperialist war' against the Soviet Union, and district party organizations were criticized for carrying out a 'opportunist [i.e. "moderate"] implementation' of the united-front policy.¹⁴³ The Thälmann Group's control of the proceedings

at the Reich Congress was so tight that Meyer told of how he felt like a 'lamb going to the slaughter' while presenting a minority motion on policy.¹⁴⁴ In spite of the KPD's official announcement of the 'course of concentration', which claimed to represent all groupings supporting Comintern policy, it was clear that already Thälmann was trying to force a 'turn to the left' in party policy, which involved purging all dissenting voices in the leadership. With this purpose in mind, a Control Commission was set up to bring the dissidents into line by means of imposing 'iron party discipline' and further atomizing the membership in small, isolated cells.¹⁴⁵

1927: The Year of Comintern Transition and the Saxon KPD

In West Saxony, the collision of factions in the BL, the continued support for the Vogt Group among the membership, and the conflicting statements on party policy combined to jam the wheels of the district party. The District Party Congress in December 1927 admitted that the Reich leadership's appointments to the BL that spring had been rejected by the membership and as a consequence the BL had been unable to carry out party work.¹⁴⁶ The first stage in setting the wheels of the district party's political work in motion again was the reconstruction of functioning departments in the BL. This began with the Organization Department, which gradually restored co-operation between the various other departments.¹⁴⁷ However, it did not achieve the mobilization of the wider membership for work on the basis of the official party line in the cells or residential organization: for example, only 105 party members from Greater Leipzig were involved in the October recruitment campaign. Even more significantly, the Vogt Group continued to dominate the implementation of party campaigns, such as the campaign against the Saxon *Bürgerblock* government in early August.¹⁴⁸ In West Saxony the Vogt Group was using a parallel party apparatus to instruct its supporters on the basis of support for the policies adopted during the Fischer leadership of 1924–5.¹⁴⁹

Resistance to the official party line continued throughout 1927 on a massive scale. BL reports complained that in Greater Leipzig the party line had been 'sabotaged' in several City District Leaderships and local groups.¹⁵⁰ Sub-District con-

ferences, uniting delegates from the grass-roots party organizations, were able to paper over dissent in Meuchelwitz, Reisa and Grimma, but in the centres of the opposition in Wurzen and Borna the district apparatus was unable to enforce the leadership's position.¹⁵¹ Local communists also refused to elect delegates to party conferences at cell group meetings, continuing instead to use membership meetings as forums for discussion.¹⁵² Importantly, the domination of the Vogt Group brought about the collapse of the courier system, which functioned as the main artery between the BL and the base-organizations.¹⁵³

The BL majority set out to use the party machine to bring the membership into line with official party policy. Baumgärtel, an *apparatchik*, was given the task of instructing 'loyal' local party leaderships in the use of 'organizational means' (i.e. manipulating the 'election' of delegates to conferences on party policy) to 'overcome differences' with the membership on party policy. These 'organizational measures' also detailed how to include new functionaries in party work, especially from the large factories, and how to offer 'formerly oppositional comrades' the opportunity of returning to the party fold.¹⁵⁴ While the BL majority tried to eliminate the influence of the Vogt Group, representatives of the central party apparatus were encouraging local members of the Opposition in the belief that their day was about to dawn again in the KPD.¹⁵⁵ One example of these overtures to the Vogt Group was the ZK-sanctioned readmittance of Lauschke and Henning, who were expelled in March 1926 for their refusal to abandon the independent communist transport workers' union in Leipzig.¹⁵⁶

At local level in West Saxony, the Opposition also continued to express solidarity with the Joint Opposition in the CPSU. On 16 November, a membership meeting in Wurzen adopted a resolution in support of Trotsky and Zinoviev and expressed hostility to any move to expel them from the party.¹⁵⁷ The chairman of the local RFB, Munkelt, stated that 'It would be outrageous to expel Trotsky and Zinoviev . . . [because] there would also be expulsions in the KPD for representing a different point of view.'¹⁵⁸ The Opposition also pointed out the BL's refusal to discuss the failure of Comintern policy in the Anglo-Soviet Trade Union Committee, which they had consistently criticized as a cause of the 'false united front tactic'.¹⁵⁹ The Vogt Group's criticisms of party policy were intensified after the ZK suddenly issued a policy resolution on 17 July, which adopted

Meyer's interpretation of the united-front policy and relations with the SPD.¹⁶⁰ There is no documentation explaining why Meyer was able to push the ZK to the right in July 1927, so soon after the KPD's Reich Congress had poured scorn on his policy resolution. However, the most likely explanation is that the Comintern, under Bukharin, had been able to intervene at the highest level in the KPD.¹⁶¹ During 1927 it appears that the KPD's inner core of senior party leaders were gaining and losing the upper hand in policy decisions in relation to developments within the CPSU, and that this was sending conflicting ripples throughout the district parties and local groups.

When the District Party Congress met in December 1927, the agenda continued to concentrate on ending the factional feud; reorganizing the membership in factory cells; and imposing 'party discipline': in the KPD's *Parteisprache* these were the core components of political and organizational Bolshevization.¹⁶² From 1924, Stalin, and his Comintern representative in Germany, Manuilsky, had identified a core of functionaries to be trained at the Comintern School in Moscow in the techniques of party organization and its use in the KPD's 'Bolshevization'. This inner core of Stalinist functionaries was intended to act as a form of failsafe to guarantee the loyalty of the Thälmann-leadership. The key figure in this group was Walter Ulbricht. In 1927 he played a key role in eliminating dissent within the KPD.¹⁶³ In Saxony, his place of birth, Ulbricht was responsible for a series of modifications to the ZK resolutions to be endorsed by the District Congress. This often necessitated abrupt U-turns at the meetings held in the lower party organizations.¹⁶⁴ The ever-tighter mesh spread by the full-time apparatus functionaries who drove the party machine finally closed down the Vogt Group's ability to represent its view in the press and at the District Congresses. Furthermore, the district apparatus was able to limit the distribution of the Opposition's policy statements by sequestering leaflets and factional circulars.¹⁶⁵ By manipulating the mode of delegation to the District Congress (the delegate-to-membership ratio being 1:30 in Leipzig but only 1:10 in all other areas) the Vogt Group's representation was dramatically reduced.¹⁶⁶ In addition to bulldozing by the district apparatus, some members of the Vogt Group went over to the more 'moderate' BL Left-faction under Max Strötzel, known as the 'Leipzig Left', which was not aligned to the Joint Opposition in

the CPSU. The same process took place among supporters of the Right in West Saxony, who transferred their support from Böttcher to Georg Schumann in the belief that this would give a louder voice to their concerns.¹⁶⁷

Before the District Party Congress the Opposition extended the factional struggle into the communist front organization, the Rote Hilfe (RH), which had been set up as a conveyor belt to carry social democrats into the KPD.¹⁶⁸ The RH has usually been identified as a haven for functionaries from the Right, who, having been pushed out of their party position in 1924, resurfaced in this organization. The Right's interpretation of the united front as a means of winning over social democrats for communism was held to have reinforced their commitment to the RH's more broadly based campaigns.¹⁶⁹ However, in West Saxony the Vogt Group was able to win the support of the overwhelming majority of RH members.¹⁷⁰ The solid support for the Vogt Group prevented the BL from reasserting its control over the RH, despite repeated attempts during the summer to use meetings of the District Executive to do so.¹⁷¹ At the District Congress in December it was stated that in the first half of 1927, 'The whole period of the report stands under the impact of the Vogt Group's struggle. [They] used the RH, a non-party organization, as a bulwark for their factional struggle inside the party.'¹⁷²

In the summer of 1927 all RH meetings were dominated by the factional struggle.¹⁷³ After negotiation failed, the BL dissolved the District Executive of the RH in July and re-founded it with a new compliant leadership.¹⁷⁴ However, it was at this point that it became clear that the central party apparatus and the Thälmann Group had no intention of losing the leftist rank-and-file supporters of the Vogt Group. They had been able to weather the party storm against the Left long enough to begin to rise again on the sea change in party policy. Crucially, Arthur Vogt's expulsion in July, for 'splitting' the RH, was in reality a suspension. Vogt resurfaced as the leadership's *Kommissar* in the Right-dominated party organization of Stuttgart, and was included on the party list in North Rhine Westphalia for the forthcoming Reichstag elections. Max Strötzel's high position on the party's candidate list also indicated that a 'left-turn' was looming in the KPD — a development which produced shock waves among the Saxon Right.¹⁷⁵

In Saxony, the KPD's other major front organization, the RFB, was also drawn into the factional feud. In contrast to the RH, the 'average' RFB militant has been depicted as either an unemployed or a semi-skilled worker, instinctively on the party's left wing, whose members' inclination for action (*Tatmenschen*) immunized them from participation in the paralysing factional feuds.¹⁷⁶ However, while the Ruhr and Berlin conformed to this generalization, West Saxony was an area producing a prominent left-wing Opposition.¹⁷⁷ In August 1927 the BL's internal reports described the situation in the RFB as 'critical'. However, an initial attempt to oust the Left from the *Gau* leadership was unsuccessful.¹⁷⁸ After a meeting in September 1927 between the Narrower BL and the RFB leadership, around Hoffmann, Franz Albrecht and Schubert, George Schumann complained that the organization 'lacked discipline and had received insufficient political schooling'.¹⁷⁹ Despite repeated efforts, Schumann was unable to replace the leftist RFB district leader, Arthur Hoffmann, with Hans Pütz, the General Secretary of the Reich leadership.¹⁸⁰ These events illustrate that in West Saxony the RFB did not merely re-emerge to carry out the 'ultra-left' political line after its gradual reintroduction during 1928; it had carried out a leftist political line throughout the period when the 'moderate' united front had been official party policy.¹⁸¹

When the District Party Congress met on 10–11 December 1927, 132 delegates voted with the BL majority and only 18 supported the Opposition. This, however, was not an accurate reflection of the situation in the membership, but a façade constructed by the machinations of the party machine.¹⁸² Furthermore, the BL's eventual ability to marginalize the Vogt Group using the party machine coincided with the early signals of a 'left turn' in party policy.¹⁸³ The complex of conflicting developments in the KPD during 1927 and early 1928 helps explain the fragmentation of the factions comprising the so-called Wedding Opposition in Pfalz, Berlin and West Saxony. In Berlin, Kötter abandoned factional activity for the security of a position in the district party in Bielefeld.¹⁸⁴ However, in West Saxony, despite Vogt's physical removal from the district, the so-called Vogt Group survived until the return to an ultra-left isolationist policy in the course of 1928. The Vogt Group had not simply dissolved itself because of a lack of support among the membership, as earlier studies thought.¹⁸⁵ Access to 'new' documentation demon-

strates that the Vogt Group continued to exercise unbroken *de facto* control at local level, at least in its Leipzig stronghold.

The ability of the Vogt Group to remain in the KPD as an organized faction helps to explain the failure of the Lenin Bund in West Saxony. The Lenin Bund, an unstable political construction led by the expelled Left Opposition leaders around Fischer, Maslow, Urbans and Scholem, was an attempt to unite the Left factions in the KPD with those already expelled from it in a campaign for a left-wing policy. There were meetings between Urbahns and members of the Vogt Group in West Saxony. However, despite considerable sympathy for the plight of their former party comrades, there was no mood to join the Lenin Bund's campaign outside the KPD, all the more so as the party had begun a new 'left-turn'.¹⁸⁶ The early signs of the Comintern's adoption of ultra-leftism also initiated the Lenin Bund's fracture into a repentant group which sought re-entry into the KPD, under Ruth Fischer,¹⁸⁷ and a group which favoured remaining outside the KPD, under Hugo Urbahns. A dislike of political life outside the KPD was also prominent among the Lenin Bund's membership: the majority of them accepted an olive branch from the ZK in early 1928 allowing them to return to the KPD on condition that they desisted from oppositional activities for six months.¹⁸⁸

Conclusion: Factionalism, Fratricide and Political Failure or Radical Socialist Solidarity?

The new documentation illustrates how, despite the KPD's becoming a 'Stalinized' party, its leadership was unable to impose the Comintern's ever-changing General Lines on a membership which remained rooted in its local environments. In terms of the decision-making process in the KPD, the documentation strongly supports the 'Stalinization-thesis'. Party policy was decided 'from above', ultimately by the leadership of the CPSU; it was enforced in Berlin by purging factionally organized opponents and installing a highly centralized party machine. The key to 'Stalinizing' the district party organizations was control of the BL and, in particular, the Organizational Division. Control of the party machine, and the installation of the organizational mechanisms of 'democratic centralism', enabled

the leadership to construct a façade of conformity with official party policy. The ‘debates’, which took place during the election of delegates to the District Party Congresses, were in reality used as a means of pumping the official party line into the party’s grass-roots; the Opposition could only send delegates from areas providing rock-solid support. However, the micro-level documentation also delineates the limits of ‘Stalinization’. The strength of the factions, and their political disposition on the party’s right or left wings, was rooted in the local environment in which activists campaigned.¹⁸⁹ While the ever-compliant full-time functionary core could be uprooted from the realities of local conditions, the membership’s ties to the party were weakened, and frequently broken off, when it could not comprehend the relevance of the leadership’s ever-changing policy proscriptions.¹⁹⁰

This leads the historian to the question: what conditions integrate rank-and-file activists in a political party, motivating them to campaign for party policy? In the case of the SPD, the wider socialist subculture was a fundamental factor in anchoring the members in the movement: the stronger the *Vereinsnetz* of sporting and leisure organizations, the stronger and more stable the SPD.¹⁹¹ By contrast, the KPD failed to create the *Wir-Gefühl* of a subculture, securing the membership’s lasting loyalty to the party, because of the all-pervasive politicization of internal party life. During the mid-1920s, the average variation in the Reich KPD’s membership stood at 16 per cent; in Saxony this rose to 34.5 per cent.¹⁹² The hunt for the ‘enemy within’ throughout the Saxon KPD, RH and RFB burnt up the political oxygen necessary to sustain an activist, social revolutionary movement.¹⁹³ Crucially, where local communists belonged to the SPD-dominated sporting and cultural organizations, the attraction of ‘radical reformism’ on the membership intensified the factional feud throughout the party.

Communist militants’ positions on the pro-contact (Right) and isolationist (Left) wings of the party responded to a number of factors. One of these was sociological location within the working class: Right communists tended to be skilled workers with a history in the wider socialist movement, while the Left had its key support among those excluded from it, the unemployed.¹⁹⁴ There were, however, also immediate local conditions which influenced which wing of the party appealed to party activists.

In Erzgebirge-Vogtland, where the workforce was less well organized in the SPD, the trade unions, and the social democratic free-time associations, an independent-minded left wing developed. With a political space to work within, local communist activists supported the united-front policy of tactical cooperation with social democrats to achieve common objectives in order to win over the SPD's left wing.

The reverse of this occurred in West Saxony. Although the SPD's district party organization belonged to the party's left wing, it remained loyal to the Reich leadership's ban on joint campaigning with the KPD. In a political environment in which the SPD was anchored in a solid and stable wider social democratic subculture, which acted as a barrier to communist influence, the KPD turned in on itself and rejected the 'moderate' united-front policy in favour of open confrontation and independently organized action. Only in East Saxony, where the KPD was weakly organized, was the membership *relatively* less inclined to faction building. However, in localities in which the SPD was almost completely dominant, above all in the dispersion of industrial villages along the Elbe valley, communist activists took part in political campaigning under SPD-leadership or in genuine joint actions. According to Marxist-Leninist ideology, this represented a 'betrayal' of the united-front tactic, which was intended to bring social democrats under communist leadership and thereby erode the influence of the party's leadership.¹⁹⁵

Saxony, as the centre of the 'Failed October' of 1923, remained a region where the factional feud over policy had a particular relevance, and thus burned with particular intensity. Rosa Meyer-Levine's belief that, after the policy change of September 1925, a major rift in the KPD was avoided by Ruth Fischer's supporters in the leadership 'jumping ship' into the new vessel of Leftism, the Thälmann leadership, is too generalized.¹⁹⁶ On the basis of interviews with former party members in Hannover, Reuter constructed a thesis that Thälmann functioned as an 'integration figure', appealing to members who stood on opposing sides of the factional divide.¹⁹⁷ In Saxony, however, when Thälmann seemed to abandon the aims of the Left, the Left abandoned him. Saxony also differs from Reuter's findings in terms of the membership's strength of factional and political conviction. While it is correct that some members did change their factional loyalties, there is no evidence that they switched across

the factional spectrum from Right to Left and *vice versa*.¹⁹⁸ Party members' incentive to embark on a factional flit appears to have been motivated by a strong desire to avoid any sanction against them by the leadership, and took the form of accepting an olive branch, in the form of the programme of the most similar 'ZK-loyal' faction. The only enclaves in the KPD which could have remained oblivious to the factional feud and the changes of official policy in the mid-1920s, as Daycock details did happen, were in areas like East Saxony where the party itself was weak.¹⁹⁹ Importantly, the Vogt Group in West Saxony was able to remain in the KPD, despite preventing the united-front policy from being carried out. The endurance of the faction derived from its broad and deep implantation among the local membership, left-wing benefactors in the Comintern and KPD leadership, and the fresh appeal to the party's left wing in the course of 1927.

In contrast to the recent studies of the KPD by Weitz and Mallmann, this article stresses that, at least in the case of the Saxon party, intense factional feuding was desisive and ultimately eroded the elements of a common communist culture. Mallmann's research adds to the state of knowledge on German communism during the Weimar republic by stressing how different local conditions influence the political predilections of local activists. However, if factionalism in the Saar was a sideshow in which the membership acted independently of the directives of the leadership with impunity, then in Saxony it was central to the local history of communism. The power struggle in the Saxon KPD was not just a horizontal *Kleinkrieg* between leadership and membership, but also a vertical feud between adherents of the different varients of communism in Germany. Crucially, while there was an above-party milieu which spanned between the SPD and KPD during the mid-1920s, this only existed in the non-political sports and cultural organizations, and to a lesser extent in the trade unions. The division in the workers' movement, although stronger in the cities than in the proliferation of Saxony's industrial villages, was already dug deep at the level of political campaigning.²⁰⁰ Only in highly exceptional circumstances was the KPD ever able to organize small numbers of SPD workers in the so-called united front organizations; the objective of which was always to end the influence of the SPD in the workers' movement.²⁰¹

The KPD-leadership's emphasis on political tactics, rather

than anchoring the party's constituency through responding to the membership's immediate social needs, loosened the party's ties to the German political scene as the decade progressed. The KPD's increasingly centralized structure rejected any concession to local political influences on the membership produced by local conditions. The refusal to sanction a limited degree of local autonomy in implementing policy at local level eroded the memberships' ties to the party and repelled the activists needed to pursue party policy. As the 'Stalinization-thesis' pointed out, the membership became increasingly passive, enabling the party machine to drive German Communism down a Soviet route into a social and political ghetto.²⁰²

Notes

The author would like to thank the following people for their help and encouragement during the course of writing this article: Professor Stefan Berger, Professor Mike Dennis, Dr Ben Fowkes and Professor George Peden.

1. E.D. Weitz, *Creating German Communism, 1890–1990: From Popular Protest to Socialist State* (Princeton 1997); K.-M. Mallmann, *Kommunisten in der Weimarer Republik. Sozialgeschichte einer Revolutionärer Bewegung* (Darmstadt 1996). Mallmann's thesis is given in summary form in, idem, 'Milieu, Radikalismus und lokale Gesellschaft. Zur Sozialgeschichte des Kommunismus in der Weimarer Republik', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, Vol. 21 (1995), 5–31.

2. S. Koch-Baumgarten 'Eine Wende in der Geschichtsschreibung zur KPD in der Weimarer Republik?', *Internationale wissenschaftliche Korrespondenz zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung*, Vol. 46 (1998), 82–9 (p. 82).

3. For a fuller treatment of the 'Stalinization thesis' and its critics, see N. LaPorte, 'The German Communist Party in Saxony: Factionalism, Fratricide and Political Failure' (PhD dissertation, University of Stirling, 1998), 3ff. For an appraisal of the former East German historian's treatment of the KPD, see H. Weber, *Kommunismus in Deutschland 1918–1945* (Darmstadt 1983). Former East German historians had largely remained silent since 1989. For a critical appraisal of the KPD during the 'Third Period' (1929–34), see K. Finker, 'KPD und Antifaschismus 1929 bis 1934', *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, Vol. 41 (1993), 385–98.

4. H. Weber, *Wandlung des deutschen Kommunismus. Die Stalinisierung der KPD in der Weimarer Republik* (Vol. 1; Frankfurt-am-Main 1969), passim. For a summary of Weber's four-point explanatory thesis, see *ibid.*, 10–12. For other literature subscribing to the Stalinization thesis, see O.K. Flechtheim, *Die KPD in der Weimarer Republik* (3rd edn; Hamburg 1986); S. Bahne, *Die KPD und das Ende der Weimarer Republik. Das Scheitern einer Politik 1932–35* (Frankfurt-am-Main 1976); B. Fowkes, *Communism in Germany under the Weimar Republic* (London 1994).

5. E.C. Schöck, *Arbeitslosigkeit und Rationalisierung. Die Lage der Arbeiter und die Kommunistische Gewerkschaftspolitik 1920–1928* (Frankfurt-am-Main 1977); U. Stolle, *Arbeiterpolitik im Betrieb. Frauen und Maenner, Reformisten und Radikale, Fach und Massenarbeiter bei Bayern, BASF, Bosch und in Solingen (1900–1933)* (Frankfurt-am-Main–New York 1980); L. Heer-Kleinert, *Die Gewerkschaftspolitik der KPD in der Weimarer Republik* (Frankfurt-am-Main–New York 1983). The literature is extensive; for an excellent introduction to it, see S. Koch-Baumgarten, 'Einleitung', in Flechtheim, *KPD*, 9–54.

6. Weitz, *German Communism*, 270–1. For an interesting summary of factionalism in Halle-Merseburg and the Ruhr, see *ibid.*, 270–8. Here Weitz does modify Flechtheim's early observation that the KPD's political tendencies did not have a causal connection with social and economic conditions.

7. *Ibid.*, 7ff., 233ff.

8. Weitz's main thesis is set out in his 'State Power, Class Fragmentation and the Shaping of German Communist Politics', *Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 62 (1990), 253–97.

9. Mallmann, *Kommunisten*, 165–240 (sociology), 18–54, 261–83, 294–303 (niche society). For a detailed critique of Mallmann's thesis, see Andreas Wirsching, "'Stalinisierung' oder entideologisierte "Nischengesellschaft"? Alte Einsichten und neue Thesen zum Charakter der KPD in der Weimarer Republik', *Vierteljahresheft für Zeitgeschichte*, Vol. 45 (1997), 449–66. For a good summary of the four locally based 'milieux' which located the KPD's local political orientation, see Mallmann, *Kommunisten*, 6ff.

10. For Mallmann's critique of Weber's 'Stalinization-thesis', see his *Kommunisten*, 54–83.

11. The following explanatory model was the central hypothesis tested in the author's doctoral thesis. For source references, see LaPorte, 'KPD in Saxony', chapter two. An excellent evaluation of the developments of the Saxon SPD, with statistical details, is provided by F. Walter, 'Sachsen — ein Stammland der Sozialdemokratie?', *Politische Vierteljahresheft*, Vol. 32 (1991), 207–31. For the political developments in the Saxon SPD, see the articles in H. Gerbing, H. Mommsen and K. Rudolf, *Demokratie und Emanzipation zwischen Saale und Elbe. Beiträge zur Geschichte der sozialdemokratischen Arbeiterbewegung bis 1933* (Essen 1993).

12. For the events surrounding the publication of the 'open letter' and a discussion of the conditions imposed, see J. Degras, *The Communist International, 1919–1943* (Vol. 2; London 1971), 223–32.

13. LaPorte, 'KPD in Saxony', chapter 3.4 (citing documentary evidence).

14. For developments in the CPSU, see L. Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (London 1963), 290ff. On the implications of Soviet foreign policy, and further source references, see H.A. Winkler, *Der Schein der Normalität. Arbeiter und Arbeiterbewegung in der Weimarer Republik 1924–30* (Bonn–Berlin 1985), 437–8. For the response of the KPD's leadership, see the documents in the files series SAPMO, ZK (I 2/2/8), Politbüro (I 2/1/5).

15. It has been estimated that 60–70 per cent of Right communist functionaries were removed from their positions in the party apparatus after 1923: see K.J. Tjaden, *Struktur und Funktion der KPD-Opposition (KPO). Eine organisationssoziologische Untersuchung zur 'Rechts'-Opposition im deutschen Kommunismus zur Zeit der Weimarer Republik* (Meisenheim-am-Glan 1964), 44.

16. S. Bahne, 'Zwischen "Luxemburgismus" und "Stalinismus". Die "ultra-linke" Opposition in der KPD', *Vierteljahresheft für Zeitgeschichte*, Vol. 9 (1961), 363ff.

17. G. Reuter, *KPD-Politik in der Weimarer Republik. Politische Vorstellung und soziale Zusammensetzung der KPD in Hannover zur Zeit der Weimarer Republik* (Hannover 1982), 84ff.

18. Bahne, 'Zwischen "Luxemburgismus" und "Stalinismus"', 365; Weber, *Wandlung*, 150–1; B. Herlemann, *Kommunalpolitik der KPD im Ruhrgebiet 1924–1933* (Wuppertal 1977), 70. Most of the 'Intransigent Left's' basis of support came from unemployed party members in the Ruhr and Lower Rhine. The Intransigent Left split into 'radical' and 'moderated' wings in September 1926.

19. Winkler, *Schein der Normalität*, 431.

20. Weber, *Wandlung*, 156; In the following discussion, reference is made to several activist and functionaries in the Saxon KPD. The best biographies of the most of these individuals are still to be found in H. Weber's *Wandlung des deutschen Kommunismus* (Vol. 2; Frankfurt-am-Main 1969).

21. SAPMO I 3/9/73, Der Fall Bertz. Polbüro Erzgebirge-Vogtland, Bl. 53f.; SAPMO I 3/8–10/7 Ergänzungen, Mappe 1, An die Unterbezirksleitung Chemnitz. Bezirksleitung, Chemnitz, den 28.7.1925, Bl. 301.

22. SAPMO I 3/9/68, Bezirksleitungssitzung (BLS) Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 31.8.1925, Bl. 251ff.; SAPMO I 3/8–10/8, Landesvorstand Sachsens am 7.12.1925. Bl. 79. For the ZK's policy in Saxony, see SAPMO I 3/9/60, Bezirksparteitag Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 10–11.4.1926, Resolution zur Lage, Aufgaben und Taktik der Partei, Bl. 25. In early 1924 Brandler had been called to Moscow; in part this was to avoid arrest for his role in the 'Failed October' of 1923. For details of his role until 1924, see J. Becker, and H. Jentsch, 'Heinrich Brandler — biographische Skizze bis 1924', in *Jahrbuch für Historische Kommunismusforschung*, Vol. 2 (1996), 273–95.

23. SAPMO I 3/9/59, Bericht über den Bezirksparteitag in Erzgebirge-Vogtland (Sitzung des Polbüros vom 7.12.1925), Bl. 16.

24. On the role of these left-wing SPD leaders, see M. Seidel, 'Max Seydewitz und die Zwickauer SPD. Ein Beitrag zur regionalen Parteihistoriographie im Südwest-saechsischen Raum', in Gerbing et. al., eds, *Demokratie und Emanzipation*, 305–17.

25. SAPMO I 3/9/68, BLS. Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 30.9.1925, Bl. 278; SAPMO I 3/9/73, Politischer Bericht für den Bezirk Erzgebirge-Vogtland vom 10. Parteitag bis Oktober 1926, Bl. 333.

26. SAPMO I 3/9/73 Bericht vom Bezirk Erzgebirge-Vogtland. Monat Januar 1926, Bl. 261.

27. SAPMO I 3/9/60, Erklärung von Bertz, Opitz und Wesche, Bl. 40.

28. SAPMO I 3/9/60, Bericht vom Bezirksparteitag Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 10–11.4.1926, Bl. 14.

29. SAPMO I 3/9/73, Politischer Bericht fuer den Bezirk Erzgebirge-Vogtland vom 10. Parteitag bis Oktober 1926, Bl. 333.

30. SAPMO I 3/9/60, Bericht vom Bezirksparteitag Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 10–11.4.1926, Bl. 12–13; SAPMO I 3/9/73, Politischer Bericht für den Bezirk Erzgebirge-Vogtland vom 10. Parteitag bis Oktober 1926, Bl. 333.

31. SAPMO I 3/8/25, Protokoll der BLS der KPD Ostsachsens am 24.4.1926, Bl. 30 (Schneider); SAPMO I 3/8/25, KPD.8.Ostsachsen. Protokoll der BLS.

vom 25.2.1926, Bl. 8 (Böttcher); Also see Arbeiterstimme, 23.4.1926, Nr. 94 and 24.4.1926, Nr. 95.

32. For the 'debate' in the lower party organizations, SAPMO I 3/8/27, KPD.8.Ostsachsen. Bericht vom 1.11–15.12.1925, Bl. 363–5; SAPMO I 3/8/33, Bericht vom Unterbezirkstag des Unterbezirks Ebersbach und Zittau (undated), Bl. 14ff.; SAPMO I 3/8/33, Bericht über die EKKI-Brief Diskussion im Zellenblock 'Universelle' (Betreibe der Zwickauer und Chemnitzer Strassen), Bl. 42ff. For the discussion in the BL, SAPMO I 3/8/24, KPD.8.Ostsachsen. Bericht von der BLS am 11.11.1925, Bl. 148ff. At this meeting only Martin Hoop (Bautzen) opposed the theory of 'relative stabilization' and its implications for the political line in Germany, see SAPMO I 3/8/24, Bericht über die BLS. vom 28.12.1925, Bl. 184ff.

33. SAPMO I 3/8/24, Bericht ueber die BLS. Ostsachsen vom 28.12.1925, Bl. 184–5 (Koenen).

34. Ibid.

35. For example, see SAPMO I 3/8/24, Organisationsbericht. Protokoll vom ostsächsische Bezirksparteitag am 23–4.1.1926, Bl. 17–18; SAPMO I 3/8/33, Bericht vom Unterbezirkstag des Unterbezirks Ebersbach und Zittau (undated), Bl. 14–15.

36. I 3/8/24, Bericht ueber die BLS vom 28.12.1925, Bl. 188 (Koenen).

37. Ibid., Bericht der Mandatspruefungskommission. Protokoll vom ostsächsische Bezirksparteitag am 23–24.1.1926, Bl. 22.

38. SAPMO I 3/8/27, KPD.8.Ostsachsen. An das ZK der Partei. Dresden, den 9.6.1926, Bl. 429–31.

39. Ibid.

40. R. Meyer-Levine, *Inside German Communism: Memoirs of Party Life in the Weimar Republic* (London 1977), 93.

41. SAPMO I 2/2/8, Resolution zur innerparteilichen Lage. Sekretäre und Redakteure Konferenz am 16–17.4.1926, Bl. 136.

42. The West Saxon faction within the Wedding Opposition will be referred to as the Vogt Group. Not only was it the term used in Saxony but it emphasizes that the Wedding Opposition was an umbrella faction nationally for a left tendency among party members.

43. SAPMO I 3/10/115, Bericht über die Tätigkeiten des Bezirks Westsachsen der KPD vom 1.4.1925 bis 31.3.1926 (Leipzig 1926), Bl. 169; SAPMO I 3/10/112, Resolution II (der Gruppe Vogt), Bl. 402.

44. SAPMO I 3/10/112, Protokoll der BLS am 28.4.1926. Diskussion der Diskussion über den Bericht der weiterten Exekutive, Bl. 411 (Lau).

45. At the BLS of 1.12.1925, the Vogt Group made a statement that it would uphold 'party discipline'. This involved acknowledging the detrimental role of the 'ultra-Left'. In fact, only lip service was paid to this, in order to forestall any attempt to oust the faction from the BL. By early 1926, the Vogt Group felt secure enough to withdraw its statement on adhering to 'party discipline': see SAPMO I 3/10/112, BLS. West Sachsen am 1.12.1925, Bl. 341; *ibid.*, Resolution II (der Gruppe Vogt), Bl. 402; *ibid.*, Protokoll der BLS am 28.4.1926. Diskussion über den Bericht der weiterten Exekutive, Bl. 409 (Vogt).

46. Weber, *Wandlung*, 165.

47. The Opposition continued to have strong support at local level: see Fowkes, *Communism in Germany*, 141.

48. SAPMO I 3/10/112, Bezirksleitung Westsachsen. Polbüro. An der ZK. Polbüro, Leipzig den 24.4.1926, Bl. 404.
49. Ibid., Protokoll der BLS am 28.4.1926. Diskussion über den Bericht der weiterten Exekutive, SAPMO, Bl. 412–3 (Koenen).
50. Ibid., Bl. 411 (Strötzel).
51. Ibid., BL Westsachsen (Polbüro). An der ZK. Polbüro. Leipzig den 24.4.1926, Bl. 404.
52. Ibid., Beschluss der BL über die Durchfuerung der Diskussion ueber den Bericht der erweiterten Exekutive, Bl. 426.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid., Protokoll der BLS am 28.4.1926. Diskussion über den Bericht der weiterten Exekutive. Bl. 411 (Strötzel).
55. Ibid., Beschluss der BL über die Durchführung der Diskussion über den Bericht der erweiterten Exekutive, Bl. 426.
56. Ibid., BL Westsachsen. An der ZK (Information). Leipzig, den 1.6.1926, Bl. 437.
57. Weber, *Wandlung*, 156f.; Meyer-Levine, *Inside German Communism*, 93.
58. SAPMO I 3/10/107, Bezirksparteitag Westsachsen am 10–11.7.1926. Stand der Organization, Bl. 34.
59. Ibid., Bl. 33.
60. Ibid., Beschluss der Bezirksparteitag. Westsachsen am 9–10.7.1926, Bl. 32.
61. Ibid., Bezirksparteitag Westsachsen am 10–11.7.1926, Bl. 15.
62. Ibid., Beschluss der Bezirksparteitag. Westsachsen am 9–10.7.1926, Bl. 32.
63. Ibid., Bezirksparteitag Westsachsen am 10–11.7.1926., Resolution an der Bericht der Bezirksleitung, Bl. 19ff.
64. Ibid., Bl. 21–2.
65. Ibid., Bezirksparteitag Westsachsen am 10–11.7.1926. Resolution an der Bericht der Bezirksleitung, Bl. 27.
66. Ibid., Bl. 25.
67. Ibid., Bl. 28.
68. Ibid., Beschluss der Bezirksparteitag. Westsachsen am 9–10.7.1926, Bl. 32.
69. Ibid., Bl. 33.
70. Ibid.
71. Degras, *Communist International*, 348.
72. Fowkes, *Communism in Germany*, 141. The Intransigent Left split into a radical wing, under Schwarz, and a 'moderate' wing, under Korsch, which entered into a tactical co-operation with the Left Opposition. See Bahne, 'Zwischen "Luxemburgismus" und "Stalinismus"', 371.
73. Schapiro, *Communist Party*, 290ff.
74. Weber, *Wandlung*, 158–9; Winkler, *Schein der Normalität*, 432–3; R. Fischer, *Stalin and German Communism: The Origins of the State Party* (Cambridge 1948), 537ff.
75. SAPMO I 3/9/69, Protokoll der Sitzung der Engeren Bezirksleitung Erzgebirge-Vogtland vom 16.8.1926, Bl. 241ff.; *ibid.*, Protokoll der Sitzung der Engeren Bezirksleitung Erzgebirge-Vogtland vom 13.9.1926, Bl. 267ff.; SAPMO I 3/9/73, Politischer Bericht für den Bezirk Erzgebirge-Vogtland vom 10. Parteitag bis Oktober 1926, Bl. 333ff.
76. SAPMO I 3/9/73, Politischer Bericht. Bezirk Erzgebirge-Vogtland July–August 1926, Bl. 320–1. The same document is in, *Ergänzungen. I 3/8–10/7*,

Mappe 1, Bl. 13ff.; SAPMO I 3/9/69, Protokoll der Sitzung der Engeren Bezirksleitung Erzgebirge-Vogtland vom 16.8.1926, Bl. 241–2.

77. SAPMO I 3/9/73, Politischer Bericht. Bezirk Erzgebirge-Vogtland July–August 1926, Bl. 320–1.

78. Ibid., Politischer Bericht für den Bezirk Erzgebirge-Vogtland vom 10. Parteitag bis Oktober 1926, Bl. 334.

79. Ibid., Bl. 326.

80. Ibid., Politischer Bericht. Bezirk Erzgebirge-Vogtland July–August 1926, Bl. 320.

81. Paul Bertz also opposed the role of Katz in areas such as Limbach, where there were efforts to set up the Spartakus Bund Nr. 2. See *ibid.*, Bl. 319–21.

82. Ibid., Bl. 334–5; SAPMO I 3/9/69, Protokoll der Sitzung der Engeren Bezirksleitung Erzgebirge-Vogtland vom 11.10.1926, Bl. 285.

83. SAPMO I 3/9/69, Protokoll der Engeren Bezirksleitung Erzgebirge-Vogtland vom 1.11.1926, Bl. 300.

84. Organizational weakness refers to both the organization of the party itself and the number of members and functionaries. These complaints were made constantly at BL level: see, for example, SAPMO I 3/8/27, KPD.8.Ostsachsen. An das ZK. Dresden, den 9.6.1926, Bl. 431; A shortage of money restricted the prosecution of several campaigns at the one time and led to a system of prioritizing certain issues. To overcome financial problems ‘Aufbaumarken’ (priced 1.50M) were proposed at the District Congress in September: see SAPMO I 3/8/19, Anträge zum Bezirksparteitag, Bl. 4.

85. SAPMO I 3/8/25, Protokoll der BLS. Ostsachsen vom 10.7.1926, Bl. 100.

86. SAPMO I 3/8/19, Einberufung der Bezirksparteitag zum 11–12.9.1926, Bl. 8. The official agenda reads: The Political Situation and Our Tasks; The Tasks in Saxony; The Forthcoming Elections.

87. SAPMO I 3/8/19, Anträge zum Bezirksparteitag, Bl. 4.

88. SAPMO I 3/8/27, KPD.8.Ostsachsen. An das ZK. Dresden, den 9.6.1926, Bl. 429–30.

89. Ibid., Bl. 429.

90. SAPMO I 3/8/25, Protokoll der BLS. Ostsachsen vom 10.7.1926, Bl. 101(Renner).

91. On the role of the *Vereinsnetz*, see P. Loesche and F. Walter, ‘Zur Organisationskultur in der sozial-demokraten Arbeiterbewegung in der Weimarer Republic. Neidergang der Klassenkultur oder solidarergemeinschaftlicher Hoehpunkt?’, *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, Vol. 15 (1989), 511–36. For a critic of Mallmann’s conception of the *Vereinsnetz* as a location for the KPD and SPD co-operating for joint local-based objectives, see Wirsching, ‘Stalinisierung’, 455–6.

92. The expropriation campaign is dealt with in detail by U. Schuren, *Der Volksentscheid zur Fürstenenteignung 1926. Die Vermögensauseinandersetzung mit den depossidierten Landesherren als Problem der deutschen Innenpolitik unter besonderen Berücksichtigung der Verhältnisse in Preussen* (Dusseldorf 1978).

93. SAPMO I 3/8/25, Protokoll der BLS vom 25.2.1926, Bl. 7.

94. SAPMO I 3/8/33, Abschrift. Bericht über die Durchführung der Kampagne zum Volksentscheid im UB Meissen. Meissen, am 10.7.1926. An die BL Ostsachsen, Bl. 138.

95. Ibid., Volksentscheid. Arbeitsgeniet Loschwitz (undated), Bl. 152.

96. Ibid., Abschrift. Bericht der Volksentscheidskampagne der KPD (18.7.1926), Bl. 150.

97. Ibid., Abschrift. Bericht von Kötzschenbroda (12.7.1926), Bl. 148.

98. SAPMO I 3/8/25, KPD.8.Ostsachsen. Sitzung der engeren BL. vom 26.5.1926, Bl. 80.

99. Mallmann himself is aware of how the KPD leadership's intervention pushed members out of the party: see his *Kommunisten*, 75, 77, 158–60, 357ff.

100. On the leadership's position, see Stolle, *Arbeiterpolitik*, 260ff.

101. For Schreiter's and Gäbel's position during the discussion on the expulsion of Fischer and Maslow, see SAPMO I 3/8/25, KPD.8.Ostsachsen. Sitzung der engeren Bezirksleitung vom 19.8.1926, Bl. 124–5. For the changes made in the BL, as 'recommended' by the ZK, see KPD.8.Ostsachsen. BLS am 15.8.1926, SAPMO I 3/8/25, Bl. 129–32.

102. SAPMO I 3/8/25, KPD.8.Ostsachsen. BLS am 15.8.1926, Bl. 132.

103. Weber, *Wandlung*, 164–5.

104. SAPMO I 3/10/107, Bezirksparteitag Westsachsen am 10–11.7.1926. Weitere Entwicklungen des Bezirks, Bl. 33.

105. SAPMO I 3/10/110, Bezirksleitung Westsachsen. Polbüro. An das ZK. Polbüro. Leipzig, den 30.11.1926, Bl. 9–10.

106. SAPMO I 3/10/112, Resolution. Mitgliederversammlung von Gross-Leipzig (Über den Ausschuss Urbahns und Genossen), Bl. 515.

107. SAPMO I 3/10/115, Bericht vom Bezirk Westsachsen. Leipzig, den 19.11.1926, Bl. 158–9.

108. Ibid., Bl. 159.

109. Ibid.

110. Ibid., Bl. 158–9.

111. Ibid.

112. SAPMO I 3/10/107, Beschluss der Bezirksparteitag. Westsachsen am 9–10.7.1926, Bl. 32.

113. Winkler, *Schein der Normalität*, 433.

114. Cf. Weber, *Wandlung*, 170–1. The previously available documentation gave Erzgebirge-Vogtland the appearance of a left-dominated district party, and also led to underestimating the strength of the Vogt Group in West Saxony.

115. Weber, *Wandlung*, 166; Degras, *Communist International*, 348–52.

116. Tjaden identifies Meyer's rejoining the leadership in 1927 as the seeds of the KPD(O), which grew out of those on the Right who continued to criticize party policy, see Tjaden, *Struktur und Funktion der KPD-Opposition*, 100.

117. The Soviet leadership showed no gratitude towards Meyer, deriding his political views in *Pravda* immediately after he rejoined the KPD's leadership, see Meyer-Levine, *Inside German Communism*, 108–9.

118. SAPMO I 2/1/52, Sitzung der Politbüro am 7.1.1927, Bl. 26; Degras, *Communist International*, 353–4.

119. SAPMO I 2/1/52, Beschluss des Politbüros in der Fragen der Genossen Brandler und Thalheimer. Berlin, den 7.1.1927, Bl. 18. The Politburo meeting accepted the seventh ECCI-Plenum's resolutions but 'chose' not to permit the return of Brandler and Thalheimer on the grounds this would 'not be advisable for the KPD'.

120. A. Watlin, *Die Komintern 1919–1929* (Mainz 1993), 76. For Meyer's declaration, see Meyer-Levine, *Inside German Communism*, 111–2.

121. For examples of left–right policy shifts during 1927, see Winkler, *Schein der Normalität*, 435; D.W. Daycock, ‘The KPD and the NSDAP: A Study in the Relationship between the Political Extremes in Weimar Germany, 1923–33’ (PhD dissertation, London School of Economics, 1980), 145–6. Thälmann’s own inclination for a return to a ‘left’ political line is made clear in the ZK meeting of early August 1926: see SAPMO I 2/2/9, Bl. 310–15.

122. Weber, *Wandlung*, 169–70. During January and February an ‘exact check’ on the membership was used to assist the expulsion of the opposition.

123. SAPMO I 3/8/31, KPD.8.Ostsachsen. Rundschreiben zum Januar-Arbeitsplan 1927. Dresden, den 21.12.1926, Bl. 157.

124. Ibid., KPD.8.Ostsachsen. An das ZK. Sekretariat. Dresden, den 1.10.1926, Bl. 134. Already in September 1926 the district party leaderships were expecting the annual party congress.

125. This was standard practice in the RFB. After the Comintern’s ‘open letter’ in 1925, Koenig had been sent to Breslau to bring the *Gau* into line with the new political line: see K. Schuster, *Der RotFront Kämpferbund 1924–29. Beiträge zur Geschichte und Organisationsstruktur eines politischen Kampfbundes* (Dusseldorf 1975), 62. For another example of KPD policy being imposed on RFB *Gau* in Hannover in late 1925, see *ibid.*, 101–2.

126. Ibid., 102–3.

127. Ibid., KPD.8.Ostsachsen. An das ZK der KPD. Dresden, den 8.2.1927, Bl. 3–10; After the BL imposed its authority on the *Gau* RFB the Reich RFB leadership suddenly removed the apparatus functionary König whose imposition on Dresden had caused all the trouble. See *ibid.*, KPD.8.Ostsachsen. An das ZK. Polbüro. Dresden, den 9.3.1927, Bl. 10f.

128. SAPMO I 3/9/61, Bericht der Bezirksleitung. Abteilung Gewerkschaften, Bl. 17–18.

129. *Statistisches Jahrbuch für den Freistaat Sachsen* (StJFS) Nr. 46, (Dresden 1927), 458–9. In 1926 the ratio of SPD to KPD councillors was 1:2.2. The KPD’s internal report states that the KPD had almost parity of communal representation with the SPD: see SAPMO I 3/9/61, Bericht der Kompolabteilung. Bezirksparteitag. Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 12–13.2.1927, Bl. 22.

130. SAPMO I 3/9/61, Bericht der Kompolabteilung. Bezirksparteitag. Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 12–13.2.1927, Bl. 22ff.

131. Winkler, *Schein der Normalität*, 463–4.

132. Weber, *Kommunisten in Deutschland*, 171.

133. ‘Die politische Diskussion auf dem Bezirksparteitag der KPD’, in *Der Kämpfer*, 1 Beilage, Nr. 41, 18.2.1927.

134. ‘Die Entscheidung des Bezirksparteitages. Vorbehaltlos auf der Linie des ZKs’, in *Kaempfer*, 14.2.1927, Bl. 46; *ibid.*, ‘Politische Lage und die Aufgaben der Partei. Resolution des Bezirksparteitages der KPD Bezirk Erzgebirge-Vogtland’; *ibid.*, ‘Die politische Diskussion auf dem Bezirksparteitag der KPD’, in *Der Kämpfer*, 1 Beilage, Nr. 41, 18.2.1927.

135. ‘Politische Lage und die Aufgaben der Partei. Resolution des Bezirksparteitages der KPD Bezirk Erzgebirge-Vogtland’, in *Der Kämpfer*, 14.2.1927; *ibid.*, ‘Erfolge, Maengel und neue Wege unserer Partei Arbeit’, in *Der Kämpfer*, 1 Beilage, Nr. 41, 18.2.1927, Bl. 54.

136. Winkler, *Schein der Normalität*, 436; Herlemann, *Kommunalpolitik*, 69ff.

137. SAPMO I 3/10/112, Protokoll der BLS. West Sachsen am 26.11.1926, Bl. 511(Dasecke).
138. SAPMO I 3/10/115, Bericht vom Bezirk Westsachsen, den 19.11.1926, Bl. 158–9.
139. Winkler, *Schein der Normalität*, 436.
140. SAPMO 3/10/108, Bezirksparteitag Westsachsen am 28.2.1927, Bl. 1–2; Kötter, a national leader of the Wedding Opposition, was still able to make a speech from a factional perspective: see 'Die politische Resolution des Bezirksparteitages', *Sächsische Arbeiter Zeitung [SAZ]*, 1.3.1927.
141. 'Der Verlauf des Bezirksparteitages', in *SAZ*, 2.3.1927.
142. Ibid.
143. Winkler, *Schein der Normalität*, 436–7. Dengel criticized the KPD in Mecklenburg-Schwerin for abstaining in a vote in the Landtag in 1926, enabling an SPD–DDP government to be formed.
144. Meyer-Levine, *Inside German Communism*, 119. For the influence of Soviet foreign policy on the KPD's policy, see Winkler, *Schein der Normalität*, 438; These foreign-policy issues are detailed in SAPMO I 2/1/54, Protokoll der Sitzung des ZKs am 1.4.1927, Bl. 94.
145. Weber, *Wandlung*, 176–7.s
146. SAPMO I 3/10/108, Bericht der Bezirksleitung Westsachsen der KPD an der Bezirksparteitag am 10–11.12.1927, Bl. 64.
147. SAPMO I 3/10/108, Bericht der Bezirksleitung Westsachsen der KPD an der Bezirksparteitag am 10–11.12.1927, Bl. 64ff.
148. On 'passivity' in the factory cells, see SAPMO I 3/10/116, Tätigkeitsbericht für den Monat Oktober 1927. KPD Bezirk Westsachsen. Leipzig, den 24.11.1927, Bl. 106. For the recruitment campaign, *ibid.*, Bl. 112.
149. *Ibid.*, Organisationsbericht vom 1.7.1927 bis 15.8.1927, Bl. 38–9.
150. *Ibid.*, Bl. 40.
151. *Ibid.*
152. *Ibid.*
153. *Ibid.*, Tätigkeitsbericht für Monat August 1927, Bl. 63.
154. *Ibid.*, Bericht von der Sitzung der Stadtteileitung 'F' am 23.9.1927, Bl. 97. Tätigkeitsbericht für den Monat Oktober 1927. KPD Bezirk Westsachsen. Leipzig, den 24.11.1927, Bl. 103.
155. SAPMO I 3/10/108, Rundschreiben Nr. 15. KPD Bezirk Westsachsen. Leipzig, den 25.10.1927, Bl. 11–14.
156. SAPMO I 3/10/116, Bericht der Betriebszelle Engelsdorf, den 27.9.1927, Bl. 96.
157. *Ibid.*, Bericht ueber die Mitgliederversammlung in Wurzen am 16.11.1927, Bl. 186.
158. *Ibid.*
159. *Ibid.*
160. At this point Brandler published an 'Aktion Programm' in *Die Kommunistische Internationale*, which, although rejected, was similar to Meyer's position: see M. Krestin, *Die Beiträge der deutscher Marxisten in der Programmdiskussion der Komintern* (Mainz 1994), 66ff.
161. Fowkes, *Communism in Germany*, 143–4. At this point, Arthur Ewert, who was working in the Comintern apparatus, acted as a conduit between the German right and Brandler and Thalheimer in Moscow: see Watlin, *Komintern*,

76. For the role of Ewert in general, see D.P. Hornstein, *Arthur Ewert: A Life for the Comintern* (New York–London 1993), 73ff.

162. SAPMO I 3/10/108, Material zum Bezirksparteitag der KPD Westsachsen. Sekretariat (Nur für Mitglieder der KPD). Leipzig, den 3.11.1927, Bl. 28–30.

163. N. Podewin, *Walter Ulbricht. Eine neue Biographie* (Berlin 1995), 72ff.

164. SAPMO I 3/10/108, KPD Bezirk Westsachsen. An das ZK der Partei, Polbüro. Leipzig, den 26.11.1927, Bl. 54.

165. Ibid., Bericht der gemeinsamen Arbeitsgebiete Konferenz am 19.11.1927 der Arbeitsgebiet Boehlitz-Ehrenberg und Weideritzsch, Bl. 46.

166. Ibid., KPD Bezirk Westsachsen. An das ZK der Partei, Polbüro Sekretariat. Leipzig, den 19.11.1927, Bl. 43.

167. Both the Schumann and Böttcher Groups comprised the committee preparing for the District Congress but remained separately organized: see *ibid.*, KPD Bezirk Westsachsen. An das ZK der Partei, Polbüro, Sekretariat. Leipzig, den 30.11.1927, Bl. 55.

168. H. Wunderer, *Arbeitervereine und Arbeiterparteien. Kultur und Massenorganisationen in der Arbeiterbewegung (1890–1933)* (Frankfurt-am-Main 1980), 133.

169. Ibid., 134ff; Tjaden, *Struktur und Funktion der KPD-Opposition*, 45.

170. SAPMO I 3/10/116, Tätigkeitsbericht für den Monat Juni 1927, Bl. 2–3.

171. Ibid., Bericht für den Monat Juli 1927, Leipzig, den 22.8.1927, Bl. 35.

172. SAPMO I 3/10/108, Bericht der Bezirksleitung Westsachsen der KPD an der Bezirksparteitag am 10–11.12.1927, Bl. 85f.

173. SAPMO I 3/10/116, Bericht für den Monat Juli 1927. Leipzig, den 22.8.1927, Bl. 35.

174. The BL claimed that it had restored the RH's 'non-party' complexion by including 'non-party and socialist' functionaries in positions of authority: see *ibid.*, Bericht für den Monat Juli 1927. Leipzig, den 22.8.1927, Bl. 37; SAPMO I 3/10/108, Bericht der Bezirksleitung Westsachsen der KPD an der Bezirksparteitag am 10–11.12.1927, Bl. 85.

175. Weber, *Wandlung*, 180. The choice of Reichstag candidates from the party's left wing became a matter of concern for the other factions at all levels within the party: see SAPMO I 3/10/116, Bericht über die Stadtteilmitgliederversammlung 'D' am 1.6.1928, Bl. 478.

176. Reuter, *KPD-Politik*, 21, 104ff.; Schuster, *Der Rote Frontkämpferbund*, 139ff., 159–60.

177. For Berlin, see *ibid.*, 160ff. For the Ruhr, Herlemann, *Kommunalpolitik*, 71. For the RFB's role in campaigns against 'imperialist war' (i.e. defence of the Soviet Union), see K. Finker, *Geschichte der RFB* (Berlin[Ost] 1976), 16ff. An overview is given in Winker, *Schein der Normalität*, 445.

178. SAPMO I 3/10/116, Bericht für den Monat Juli 1927. Leipzig, den 22.8.1927, Bl. 37.

179. Ibid., Protokoll der gemeinsamen Sitzung der engeren Bezirksleitung mit der Gauführung des RFBs am 5.9.1927, Bl. 86–7.

180. SAPMO I 3/10/108, Bericht der Bezirksleitung Westsachsen der KPD an der Bezirksparteitag am 10–11.12.1927, Bl. 83–4. On the role of Hans Puetz (alias: Walter Frank) see Schuster, *Der Rote Frontkämpferbund*, 170ff.

181. SAPMO I 3/10/108, Bericht der Bezirksleitung Westsachsen der KPD

an der Bezirksparteitag am 10–11.12.1927, Bl. 84–7; SAPMO I 3/10/116, Tätigkeitsbericht für die Monate April und Mai 1928. KPD Bezirk Westsachsen. Leipzig, den 16.6.1928, Bl. 360ff.

182. Ibid., Tätigkeitsbericht für den Monat Dezember 1927, Bezirk Westsachsen. Leipzig, den 5.1.1928, Bl. 192.

183. For the political line presented by Schumann at the District Congress in December 1927, see SAPMO I 3/10/108, Bericht der Bezirksleitung Westsachsen der KPD an der Bezirksparteitag am 10–11.12.1927, Bl. 58ff.

184. Weber, *Wandlung*, 180.

185. Ibid.

186. On the meetings between the Vogt Group and the Lenin Bund, see SAPMO I 3/10/117, Bericht von der Urbahnsversammlung in Leipzig am Deinstag, den 29.11.1927, Bl. 69ff. From the perspective of the BL see *ibid.*, 'Urbahns in Leipzig', in *SAZ*, 6.11.1927, Bl. 68.

187. For the Comintern's rejection of their return to the party, see Degras, *Communist International*, 549–50.

188. R. Zimmermann, *Der Leninbund. Linke Kommunisten in der Weimarer Republik* (Düsseldorf 1978), 107ff.

189. For another interpretation of factors predisposing party members to the party's right and left wings, see Stolle, *Arbeiterpolitik*, 260ff.

190. O. Negt and A. Kluge, *Öffentlichkeit und Erfahrungen. Zur Organisationsanalyse von bürgerlicher und proletarischer Öffentlichkeit* (Frankfurt-am-Main 1972), 385–402.

191. Walter, 'Sachsen — ein Stammland der Sozialdemokratie?', *passim*.

192. In 1926, the Reich KPD membership reached a high of 134,172 and a low of 112,300; in 1926, the figures were 143,172 and 124,729. In Saxony, the equivalent statistics are, 14,333 and 9750, and 13,000 and 7750. See 'Structur und Mitgliederbewegung, 1926–31', in SAPMO I 3/8–10/158, Bl. 83–4.

193. Cf. Weitz, *German Communists*, 233ff., which stresses a common communist political culture and common interest over the fratricidal nature of factional fighting over 'correct' political tactics.

194. Weber, *Wandlung*, 16ff. Peukert called the pro-contact (united front) wing the 'old socialist tendency': see D. Peukert, 'Zur Sozialgeschichte der KPD', in A. Kooene and K. Vack, eds, *Zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung*, Vol. 4 (1978), 31.

195. For an introduction to the literature supporting this explanatory model, see note 11 above.

196. Meyer-Levine, *Inside German Communism*, 93.

197. Reuter, *KPD-Politik*, 91.

198. Ibid., 66–91.

199. Daycock, 'The KPD and the NSDAP', 145–6.

200. For a summary of Mallmann's construction of the 'niche society', see his *Kommunisten*, 6ff.

201. For a detailed appraisal of the Saxon KPD's political campaigning during the mid-1920s, see LaPorte, 'KPD in Saxony', chapter five.

202. Weber, *Wandlung*, 12; Koch-Baumgarten, 'Einleitung', 52.

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