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The Region as *Essence* of the Fatherland: Regionalist Variants of Spanish Nationalism (1840–1936)

1. Introduction

In Spanish history, the role played by regionalism is somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, regional identities have participated in fashioning the nineteenth-century Spanish nation-state, just as they did in the nation-building processes of other countries.[1] Yet the existence of 'historical regions', which were territorial identities forged during the course of the middle ages and the early modern period, acted as a necessary precondition that fostered the emergence of several peripheral nationalisms during the last third of the nineteenth century: the Catalan, Basque and Galician ones. Their common position was one of denying the existence of a Spanish nation as identified with the territory of the state, and a desire to achieve self-determination for their specific territories. In fact, peripheral nationalisms usually have regionalist forerunners, and tend to accompany the emergence or development of *regionalisms* in different forms.

This makes Spain a good case study in the ambiguous processes of region-building and nation-building. To give a clear definition of *what a region is* seems as complicated a matter as giving a definitive answer to the question of what a *nation* is. Geographers, economists and social scientists coincide in pointing out that no single definition of 'region' can be agreed upon: regions are economic entities, historical territories, frontier areas and geographical units bounded by natural features. But they are also a form of collective identity.[2] According to M. Hroch, in the central European context regionalism meant a form of supra-

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ethnic territorial loyalty similar to the *Landespatriotismus*, which was devoid of ethnic content and hence could be shared by linguistically or ethnically diverse segments of the population.[3] However, this definition cannot be applied in Western Europe, since the social construction of regions has also implied the 'rediscovery' of a *unique* history, traditions, languages or even a disappearing local ethnicity. Some scholars hold that regionalism has three characteristics in common with minority nationalisms: (i) the shaping of a territorially bound collective identity; (ii) the existence of a centre–periphery conflict of either cultural, economic or political nature within the state; and (iii) the existence of social mobilization and/or political organizations of a territorial character. In this way, regionalism and minority nationalism could be considered as two parallel products of the existence of an ethno-territorial conflict and social mobilization, with diffuse lines of demarcation.[4] Yet two common underlying elements would be ethnic mobilization and a demand for the territory to be considered a political unit.

Under the influence of modernization theory, classical definitions of nationalism presupposed that an increase in social communication and a weakening of local and regional identities were necessary preconditions for nation-building. Therefore, regional identities (or any defence of them) were implicitly seen as premodern vestiges of the past, and opposed to national identities.[5] The *modern* form of collective identity, which was also linked to the legitimacy of power, was to be the nation. The regions would remain only as areas of traditional culture, folklore, rural mores etc. In fact, the French Jacobin version of nation-building attempted to erode any form of pre-national territorial identity, as the whole country was to assimilate a unified and codified culture. This perspective has permeated historical research on the matter, holding that the survival and maintenance of meso-territorial identities and of any form of regional claims during the modern period should be seen as a symptom of weak nation-building and a possible forerunner of minority nationalism. This assumption has decisively influenced Spanish academic research on the national question. Historical studies of Basque, Catalan or Galician nationalism have also led historians in other Spanish regions to highlight any form of regional affirmation and/or local claim for autonomy, merely applying the same explanatory model to all cases. Regionalism was seen as a precursor of

minority nationalism, and within regionalism, all possible forerunners (no matter what the ideology: federal republicans, monarchists, cultural folklorists etc.) were lumped in a sort of catch-all movement that would surely result in the emergence of a new peripheral nationalism.

This article will examine the relationship between region- and nation-building, focusing on the political dynamics of regionalism in Spain from the nineteenth century on, as well as the theoretical and doctrinal aspects of regionalist discourse.[6] Recent historical research has toned down the classical assertion of region-building as an opposite process to nation-building, or has even held the contrary thesis: nation-building may also imply region-building, to the point that the former may be heavily dependent on the latter, and vice versa. Collective identities may be regarded as a series of overlapping concentric spheres, complementing each other; and, as all forms of collective identity, they are the result of dynamic historical processes.[7] In many cases, nationalist movements and states that carried out nation-building policies also reaffirmed local and regional identities so as to strengthen the roots of national identity among the population. Moreover, this phenomenon occurred among diverse currents and varieties of nationalism, as can be seen, for example, in nineteenth-century Germany and to some extent France. Promoting regional symbols and patterns of identity was a way of promoting *national* identities at the grass-roots level. For instance, in several regions within Wilhelmine Germany, love for the *Heimat* implied love for the *Vaterland*, and this was used by conservative nationalists and the local bourgeoisie to recreate the idea of a classless national community by means of celebrations and festivals.[8]

However, not all forms of collective identity have equal dimension, and not all expressions of local and regional identity are infused with present-day political consequences, such as the claim for self-determination, which is exclusively in the realm of nationalism and national identities. Although some forms of regional identity may lead to a conflict with the national identity under certain factors and circumstances, not all of them do. Regional identities may be sustained by a (more or less invented) historical tradition, or they may be founded on common cultural traits, fostered by the previous existence of collective political institutions. The relationship between nation- and region-

building is not a fixed one, but instead is subject to constant change over time. Moreover, the basic discussion that has arisen in the current research on nationalism may also be applied to regions, regional identities and regionalism. Are nations/regions given pre-existing entities, or rather a construct of nationalist/regionalist doctrines and movements? What came first: the regions or the regional identity? Why are some regions successfully constructed (or, if one prefers, invented) while others are not? Are regional identities complementary or opposed to national identities?

Although regional identities as collective identities have many precedents in the middle ages and the early modern period, our departure point will be to assume that in the modern period these identities were constructed by various actors (the state, local elites, institutions and political movements). These actors developed the criteria for defining a region as a collectivity, in some cases proposing a certain level of collective political rights, but never seeking the right to self-determination and full sovereignty, not even necessarily considering that the region should be composed of members with common political/legal rights and duties. In the course of this construction process, regionalists have been forced to appeal to elements which are very similar to those proclaimed by the nationalists. But, in contrast with the latter, the regionalists always maintain their belief in the existence of a nation which enhances their *region*, as well as the other ones, and may even see regional identity and regionalism as a step in the process of consolidating *the nation* as a whole. The Spanish case shows how one process of region-building may turn into nation-building while another may not; how both identities are shifting and are sometimes contradictory over time; and also how different social actors have constructed different concepts of the *region*.

2. Socio-political Preconditions for Region-Building in Nineteenth-Century Spain

Although the history of Spanish nationalism has still been scarcely examined at the empirical level,[9] recent historical research has put forward the thesis that Spain's nation-building was a weak one during the nineteenth century. Hence, the strong

survival of localism and regional identities must be seen, first of all, in the context of the liberal state's lack of efficiency in achieving an overall nationalization of the Spanish territory, in comparison with more successful nation-building processes in France or Italy.

By the end of the eighteenth century, *ancien régime* Spain was marked by the strong presence of diverse traditions, political privileges and legal codes which were characteristic of the different historical territories that had integrated the unified Spanish monarchy at the beginning of the sixteenth century. The Habsburgs' Spain exhibited the traditional formula of 'aggregative monarchy', that is, the existence of different 'kingdoms' united by a common Crown and the principle of dynastic loyalty, with each of them retaining their diverse laws, taxes, mores and political traditions.[10] Although the Bourbon dynasty which occupied the Spanish throne in 1714 after the Succession wars undertook a state-centralizing policy following the French pattern, its impact on Spain's territorial structure was less than expected. So, by the end of the eighteenth century, Spain was more than ever a composite of very diverse territories united under the Monarchy. Many of these territories kept not only their languages (although in a mostly pre-literary form), but also very distinct customary laws and legal codes. And, in some cases, such as the Basque provinces and Navarre, they retained political institutions of their own, such as governing assemblies and collective territorial privileges (the *Fueros*), which had been neither restrained nor abolished by the enlightened monarchy.[11] In Catalonia, although the traditionally autonomous self-governing institutions were abolished in 1714, a strong sense of community persisted after that date among the Catalan population and its elite. In other cases, such as the 'Ancient Kingdom' of Galicia, self-governing institutions had more limited political influence, so that their capacity to create a common regional identity and to coalesce social interests proved very limited.

By the beginning of the nineteenth century, Spanish traditional *regions* were considered to be a vestige of past structures. This series of territories or 'kingdoms', gradually integrated into the Iberian Monarchies from the middle ages on, had experienced collective institutional recognition in the past. They included the kingdom of Aragón, composed of the kingdoms or principalities

of Aragón, Valencia, Catalonia and the Balearic Islands; the kingdom of Navarre; and the various territories, ancient 'kingdoms' or *señoríos* which shaped Castile, such as Galicia, Asturias, the Basque provinces, León etc. New territories conquered in the low middle ages had been also added: 'New' Castile, Extremadura, Andalusia, Murcia and the Canary Islands. In fact, Spanish nationalist historiography during the nineteenth century always insisted upon the plural character of these territories which, fighting together in the name of Christianity, merged to form Spain.[12]

What are the reasons for the strong persistence of regional loyalties and local areas of social communication in nineteenth-century Spain? So far, the following three conditioning factors have been advanced by historical research:

i. The comparatively low level of economic modernization, and especially industrialization, which from the mid-century on was located in certain specific areas (Catalonia, the Basque provinces of Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa, and other specific enclaves). This gave rise to differentiated regional patterns of economic development, and to a permanent territorial imbalance. The scarcity and difficulty of communications and transport between the different Spanish regions was a constant feature of nineteenth-century Spain. This also resulted in the persistence of a very marked localism at the social level.

ii. In Spain the transition from the *ancien régime* to the new liberal order during the nineteenth century occurred slowly and with some difficulty. Native-born Spanish liberalism and the bourgeoisie were weak. After King Fernando VII's death in 1833, the liberals seized the reins of power, but proceeded to split into two opposite factions, the *moderados* (moderates) and the more pro-democratic *progresistas* (progressives). The *moderados* reached an agreement with some social segments (mainly rural landlords and aristocracy) in order to build a new liberal state under Queen Isabel II, while the *progresista* liberals, as well as the absolutists who supported Don Carlos (the Carlists) remained in opposition. The *moderados* developed a project for reforming the state's territorial structure, known as the reform of Javier de Burgos (1833). Following the French Jacobin (unitary and centralist) model, the reform implemented a new territorial division (partially imitating the example of the French departments), partitioning the old 'historical regions' of Spain into forty-nine new 'provinces'. The *moderados* also reorganized the

state administration and imposed a rigid and bureaucratic centralization, avoiding any form of municipal power.[13]

Nevertheless, state centralization was not complete, due to the issue of the Basque–Navarrese supporters of the *Fueros*. Although formally abolished in 1839, the *Fueros* lasted in a restricted form until 1876, and some of their more important elements (such as the financial autonomy of the regions involved) even managed to survive under the new form of 'economic agreements' between the state and the Basque Provinces after 1878. Legal codification advanced very slowly, and the state's effort to modernize the administrative structure of Spain proved quite limited.

After 1808, Spanish liberalism was characterized by a strong historicist component in order to distance itself from the French model represented by the Napoleonic invaders. Hence, early nineteenth-century Spanish liberals invented a link between the new liberal freedom and the old 'provincial' liberties that supposedly existed prior to the 'foreign' monarchies of the Habsburgs and the Bourbons. The medieval parliaments of the kingdom of Aragón, and even to some extent the Basque *Fueros*, were considered the real forerunners of modern Spanish liberalism. Consequently, the defence of the region's 'political liberties' was not always seen as contradictory to the new liberal nation-building plan for Spain.[14] This explains why both Carlists and progressive-democrats used the defence of regional identities and 'local liberties' as a political weapon.[15]

Hence, the region became the *locus* of political agitation and ideological instrumentalization. For the Carlists, the defence of the Spanish regions' 'traditional liberties' and privileges meant upholding a pre-liberal view of the state, in the form of a 'joint monarchy' composed of different institutional and territorial 'bodies', denying the *liberal* principle of national sovereignty. Thus, they first incorporated the defence of regional *Fueros* (affecting the Basque Country and Navarre) into their political agenda in 1834, and thereafter also defended other so-called 'regional liberties'. In contrast, for *progresistas* and democrats the defence of 'regional liberties' was seen as a manner of reinterpreting the medieval 'liberties' as a form of early Spanish liberalism.

iii. One additional factor must be added: Spanish nation-building during the nineteenth century was comparatively weak

within the western European context, because of the state's lack of capacity to carry out a complete and efficient *nationalization*. The vehicles of French and Italian nation-building in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, such as schooling, male military conscription, symbolic integration, and the development of public administration, remained largely inefficient in Spain, although there is some discussion about this point.[16]

Unsuccessful economic and social modernization, political divisions, and the state's partial failure to bring about a complete nationalization of the Spanish territory certainly favoured the strength of regional and local loyalties during the nineteenth century. This was manifest, for instance, in the weak acceptance of the 1833 administrative division of the country into forty-nine provinces. However, the new provincial structure neither broke nor altered the limits of Spain's *historical regions* by arbitrarily partitioning the territory, as the French reform did. It basically limited itself to dividing the regions into several units, including several boundary alterations. Nevertheless, it only gradually changed previous territorial and local loyalties, so that the nineteenth century demonstrates a proliferation of new models and projects for Spain's administrative division, each one including elements of an ideological survival of the traditional territorial model, shared by both democrats and traditionalists.[17] The provincial institutions concentrated on the task of political control and hardly served as modernization's vehicle: unlike the French *préfets*, the state's representatives in each province, the Civil Governors, were not concerned with administrative co-ordination and organization.[18]

3. Regions and Regionalism during the Nineteenth Century

The social and political preconditions that ensured the survival and growth of regional loyalties during the nineteenth century also paved the way for the diverse dynamics that fostered regionalist discourses during that century's second half. Several factors shaped the conditions of the cultural revival of regional languages, which became especially intense in Catalonia and Galicia after 1850. One factor was the impact, from about 1840 on, of romanticism, which aroused new interest in the past, in ethnographic characters and 'little folk-cultures'. Another factor

was the persistence of strong regional loyalties among broad segments of the middle class and the intelligentsia, along with the tendency of certain conservative elites to revive the past in order to counteract the social challenges posed by modernity — as has been shown to be the case in the region of Catalonia.[19]

In spite of being minority intellectual movements, they were crucial in two aspects. First, they contributed to relegitimizing the literary use of peripheral languages, and therefore slowly to initiating their modern standardization. Secondly, the cultural revivals meant a certain historical legitimization of the regions through the development of regional historiographies. These were not necessarily conceived by their promoters as *national* histories that were to stand as alternatives to that of Spain; on the contrary, they saw their role as *complementary* to the latter. But in the Catalan and Galician cases — as well as in the Basque Country, where regional historiography already had deep roots in the eighteenth century thanks to the *fuerista* tradition — the development of regional histories introduced a potentially conflictive element with Spanish nationalism. Their products principally depicted the history of their regions as one of ancient kingdoms and cultures that flourished in the middle ages, or even earlier, applying to their regions the postulates of nineteenth-century nationalist historiography. For that reason, regional historiographies increasingly considered Catalonia, the Basque Country or Galicia to be *dead nationalities*, or communities that once upon a time had potentially been nations, but which subsequently merged into a common Spanish nation. This model of historical legitimization would subsequently be used by both democrats and traditionalists.

Added to this incipient dynamic of peripheral cultural revival was the interaction of socio-political factors. Although from very different perspectives, both democrats and traditionalists adopted the defence of the *historical regions*, some of which were already described as 'nationalities'.

i. From the mid-nineteenth century onward, federalism became the best expression of the Spanish liberal left's 'return to the regions'. As elsewhere in Europe, Spanish federalism advanced the need to rebuild the state from below, starting with the local municipalities and achieving a new state structure composed of several units. Although nineteenth-century federalism has often been considered as the forerunner of ethnic nationalist

movements, it must be noted that the Spanish federal project was a *national* project, aimed at regenerating and democratizing the state from the bottom up, never questioning Spain's existence as a unitary nation. Nevertheless, after 1868 some segments of the Catalan and Galician federalists began to interact with the peripheral cultural movements. Basically, the federalists were influenced by the historical and cultural legitimization of the regions, and hence began to argue that a Federal Republic would be the best solution to the challenge of adapting the laws of each region to its own historical personality and culture. The basic units forming the federation should be defined by 'objective' criteria.[20] In return, the incipient regional movements received from federal republicanism a more defined and precise political model for restructuring the state. However a Federal Republic was not acceptable to the traditionalists, who instead preferred to coalesce around a 'federated monarchy' along the lines of the *ancien régime*'s model of state, updating it afterwards along the lines of Charles Maurras' thought. Subsequently the Carlists and neo-traditionalists advanced the concept of 'organic federalism', that is, a federation based on the addition of 'natural' social entities (the family, the municipality and the region).

ii. For traditionalists and Carlists, regional claims constituted an increasingly important part of their political agenda. Carlism gave birth to a regionalist doctrine based on the recovery and redefinition of the ancient *Fueros* and regional liberties, according to the traditional 'Habsburg' concept of Spain.[21] By seeking decentralization and 'devolution' to the town councils it was clear that their final political aim was, of course, very different in nature from that of the democrats. The defence of the historic regions, defined as an 'organic' objective entity alongside the family and the corporations, came to be considered by traditionalists as a barrier against state secularism and liberalism, and after 1880 against socialism. Thus, traditionalist groups were also interested in promoting the sub-national cultures, and in this manner aided the incipient elaboration of a *regionalist* ideology.[22]

Both dynamics contributed to the emergence of several regionalist movements that were not opposed to the belief in a single Spanish nation. All of them advanced the goal of reshaping the state's structure according to their *Weltanschauung*. But, at the same time, they introduced ideological elements of regional

affirmation infused with objective and organic doctrines (such as the recovery of their history, languages, traditions and laws). These elements bordered on becoming alternative nationalist discourses. Common to them all was a rejection of the *moderado* centralized state model. This opposition increased after the monarchical Restoration of 1874, and became radicalized among certain social and political groups that had very limited opportunities to intervene in state politics. At this time the possibility that actual peripheral nationalist movements might develop became a reality. These movements began to leave behind their primary ideological heritage as currents of *regional* affirmation within the defence of Spanish nationalism. The rise of peripheral nationalism took place from the 1890s onwards in Catalonia and the Basque Country, and from 1916 on but in a weaker fashion in Galicia. That it did so was due basically to a combination of three factors:

i. The final defeat of the traditionalists after the Third Carlist War (1872–6) closed the door to an insurrectional restoration of the *ancien régime*. In the Basque Country, and also in Catalonia, certain currents within Carlism and native *Fuerismo* transformed their rejection of the liberal state into a reaction against the Spanish nation.

ii. Two of the Basque provinces, Vizcaya and (to a lesser extent) Guipúzcoa, and — in a different manner — Catalonia after 1876 all experienced sudden economic and social transformations thanks to industrialization and the massive arrival of immigrants from other Spanish regions. This favoured the emergence of peripheral nationalism as a new ideology that in large degree was a reaction against the new social context.

iii. Some segments of the peripheral bourgeoisies and large portions of the middle classes lost their confidence in the Spanish national project after Spain's catastrophic defeat in the short 1898 colonial war against the United States. The loss of the last colonies of the Spanish overseas empire (Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines) in the age of new imperialism brought about a deep cultural pessimism and a widespread crisis of Spain's national sentiment.

The interaction between previous regionalist dynamics of fostering autonomous political projects and the new socio-political circumstances made it possible for Basque and Catalan nationalism to establish themselves as mass social movements

during the first third of the twentieth century. The development of Galician nationalism lagged far behind until 1931. But that is beyond the scope of this article.

4. Spanish Regionalism, 1898–1936: Socio-political and Cultural Dynamics

What happened to the *other* Spanish regional movements between 1898 and 1936? Several theses may be advanced:

i. The regionalisms that emerged in the last third of the nineteenth century had cultural and ideological roots that were very similar to those of the peripheral nationalist movements. However, their ideas on regional affirmation never became transformed into a nationalist discourse (except in a few marginal instances). Quite the opposite, they remained as a variant within, or even a complement to, different currents within Spanish nationalism.

ii. The pressure that the peripheral nationalist movements exerted upon the state had a very important demonstration effect on the regionalist movements, so much so that they had a tendency to follow the political strategies of the former. Catalan mainstream nationalists never gave up the hope of incorporating the Spanish regionalist movements into a common political project aimed at reshaping the entire structure of the Spanish state, within which Catalonia would then exercise a sort of 'modernizing hegemony'.

iii. Intellectual and cultural dynamics of regional affirmation throughout Spain did not imply the promotion of distinct 'minority nationalisms', but rather a vehicle for regional and local affirmation of the concept of a Spanish nation. Nevertheless, some of these dynamics of regional culture and identity construction gave rise over time to several points of tension with Spanish state nationalism.

iv. The evolution of Spanish nationalism during the first third of the twentieth century was strongly conditioned by its increasing opposition to peripheral nationalist movements. Henceforth, far-right and radical Spanish nationalists increasingly tended to consider all forms of regional identification as a potential peripheral nationalism.[23] This position was often opposed to other currents within Spanish nationalism that advocated either

full autonomy or, at the very least, generous decentralization in favour of the regions and town councils.[24]

Regional identity is something broader than regionalism, but is also a construct of regionalism. The *invention of the region* was carried out by two sets of actors at several different levels (political–ideological, literary and historical). One group, the provincial intellectual elites and reformist currents of the professional and middle classes, had been influenced by peripheral nationalism's image, by Krause's organicism, and later by the diffuse regenerationist movement. They undertook the task of defining regional identities and advancing regional claims for decentralization as a better means of *revitalizing* Spain, without questioning its existence as a single nation. The conservative–traditionalists were another group, composed in good measure of former Carlists and Catholic integralists. They proclaimed the regions as *natural* entities in an order above the family and the municipality, and sought the revival of regional identity and organic decentralization as the best manner of perpetuating a new version of the pre-liberal concept of Spanish nation.

4.1. Socio-political Dynamics of Region-Building

On a political level the concept of region was understood in different manners. The two main ideological versions of 'regionalism', the conservative–traditionalist option and the progressive–regenerationist one, at times were confusingly combined into common programmes, associations or media.

i. The conservative–traditionalist view basically consisted in an extension of the arguments for regional decentralization and renewal of the *Fueros* which had been advanced by nineteenth-century Carlism. According to the traditionalists, the defence and preservation of regional identity (and therefore of local dialects, regional mores etc.) went hand-in-hand with preserving tradition as a whole, and hence opposing capitalist modernization, secularism and the liberal state.

By the last decades of the nineteenth century this theory had been codified in several regions. The Galician regionalist leader Alfredo Brañas maintained that regional decentralization should be closely linked to a return to ancient privileges and 'organic liberties' in the political sphere, and to corporatism and a pre-capitalist order in the economic sphere, although also incorporat-

ing certain updated forms. Nevertheless, Brañas defined the regions as natural entities, clearly marked by 'certain ethnographic borders', even when not marked by geographical, administrative and political borders. 'The nature of the native soil, the dominance of mores, individual idiosyncrasies', and traditional institutions shaped 'the true psyche that is regionalism's soul'.[25] Brañas applied to organic–objective regions exactly the same definition he used for organic–objective nations, without clearly establishing the difference between them. Since the nation was not seen by traditionalists as a voluntaristic union based on the free will of citizens, the difference between nations and regions remained obscure. Brañas tried to solve the problem theoretically by establishing a hierarchy between the *regions*, sometimes defined as 'little fatherlands' or 'old nationalities', and the *nations*, 'great fatherlands' or 'full nationalities'. The nations were the result of a historical process integrating old, incomplete nationalities.[26] But even then the regions existed within the state 'enjoying independent and exclusive life, without confusing their sphere of action with that of the national interests'.[27] The Galician author exerted a strong influence on the development of conservative regionalism throughout Spain. However, he remained loyal to the belief in a Spanish nation. Brañas' model of state decentralization mainly consisted in an updated version of corporatist monarchy.

During the first two decades of the twentieth century similar ideas were proclaimed by other conservative–traditionalist politicians, such as the Carlists and the representatives of Social Catholicism. The main Carlist ideologue of this period, the Asturian Juan Vázquez de Mella, fully supported Brañas' formulations, since, for him, 'regionalism has its foundations in Tradition'.[28] Thus, it was intrinsically linked to the Catholic religion and to the maintenance of a corporatist, organic and 'natural' order. The same view was shared by one of the main theoreticians of Spanish counter-revolutionary and conservative thinking towards the end of the nineteenth century, the historian and writer Marcelino Menéndez y Pelayo. To him, Spain, as an objective and organic nation, was composed of a set of old 'nationalities' and historical regions, which merged in the fifteenth century to form a single nation united by two cohesive elements: the Monarchy and Catholic tradition.[29]

Still, the traditionalists' ideological definition of a region

contained the same level of ambiguity and theoretical vagueness as in Brañas' case. For Vázquez de Mella, a region was 'an incipient nation' which at a given historical moment had been unable to develop fully its personality and instead chose to join a greater nation — either incipient or developed — to which the region transferred 'a part of its collective life, although retaining its personality'. In sum, Spain was to be built upon the principle of 'diversity within unity'. The Spanish national spirit would be the synthesis of several regional *Volksgeist* that complemented each other as organic entities (along with the municipalities and the whole Spanish nation).[30] Vázquez de Mella attempted to draw a clear distinction between the concepts of 'social sovereignty' and 'political sovereignty' which had been usurped by the state. In his view, the regionalist revival which emerged throughout Spain was not an expression of a *fin-de-siècle* decay, but rather 'a healthy and living movement, stimulated by the example of a great people [Catalonia]'. Nevertheless, Vázquez de Mella explicitly disagreed with Catalan nationalists in one respect: Spain was not a state composed of several nations, but a nation formed by the aggregation of 'the regional spirits, which are synthesized into a superior unity'. According to him, geography, race and language were not sufficient elements to constitute a nation. They also required another central element, the unity of a joint independent history, generating 'a moral unity . . . transmitted from generation to generation'. Spain's history was not to be confused with the state. Instead, the state was at the service of the nation, since the latter had its own historical and cultural heritage, with the regions as its basis. Suppressing regional liberties meant damaging the nation's essence.[31]

According to the conservative Antonio Goicoechea in 1919, Nature and History had laid down the foundations for regional heterogeneity. This had to be preserved in accordance with national unity, which the Monarchy could do by means of a generous delegation of power from the state to the natural–historical regions.[32] Traditionalist regionalists who did not entirely oppose the liberal form of the modern state at least had a further argument to differentiate the regions from the nation. For the Valencian Rafael Criado-Cervera, the regions were natural entities with boundaries established by the existence of geographical factors, customs, language, a history and regional character of their own etc. The nation was the natural union of all

regions marked by a common geography ('limited by the Seas and the Pyrenees'), a common history built upon the joint participation of all regions, and a common language which was — in theory — understood throughout Spain. In short, the nation was composed of all the elements which to a more limited extent were used to define the regions. But the Nation (Spain), because it was more 'perfect' as a more complex entity than the individual regions, deserved the attribute of sovereignty. The province was merely an artificial entity without any 'natural' or objective basis between the two natural entities (the region and the nation).[33] As the Asturian traditionalist P. Graciano-Martínez wrote in 1923, the revival of the *natural regions* would erase the provinces, which were seen as the product of 'the absorbent centralism brought into Spain by the Bourbons' and the 'exotic imperialism introduced by the Habsburgs, aggravated by the liberalesque policy of the last century'.[34]

ii. The progressive–regenerationist option grew out of the 1898 national crisis, although its intellectual roots may be traced back to a decade earlier at least. As already mentioned, the origins of 'federalist regionalism' can be traced to the republican and federalist thinking of the nineteenth century, as outlined by the Catalan republican leader Francesc Pi i Margall (and others).[35] His argument was that decentralization and regional autonomy were the most effective grounds for consolidating democracy. Given that history was a central feature of the early formulations of nineteenth-century Spanish liberalism, and that later on Krausist organicism also heavily influenced them, even republicans could not avoid including 'objective' organic elements in the definition of a region. The republican view held that the region was the result of pre-existing historical and cultural factors. As Gumersindo de Azcárate said in 1907, there are 'social, natural entities which exist on their own and do not owe their existence to the state or to the individual's will'.[36] But, for the republicans, defending the historical personality of the regions and arguing that they should become the federal units composing the future Spanish republic did not imply a rejection of Spain's national sovereignty. Hence, the unitary nation was Spain, which in their opinion was built upon a diversity of historical regions. For that reason provincial organization of Spain as it had been decreed in 1833 was not appropriate, mostly because it did not improve democracy. In many democrats'

view, the provinces were only the lower echelon of a centralist–bureaucratic system based on electoral corruption and political clientelism.

This combination of organic–objective criteria mixed with republican tenets for defining the federal units became a source of ideological tension within some segments of Spanish republicanism. From 1874 onwards, communication and interaction with peripheral nationalists took place, and as in the case of traditionalist regionalism, the theoretical demarcation between regionalism and peripheral nationalism remained quite tenuous.[37] After 1874 the idea of a federal restructuring of the state as a means for achieving further democratization became a fixed tenet for Spanish democrats, republicans and, at least in theory, the workers' movement. It also provided the budding minority nationalisms with a model for the future reformulation of the state. The main difference lay in that for Spanish republicans it should be a federal but *national* state, while for peripheral nationalists Spain should become a federalized *multinational* state.

Not all republicans were, however, fully convinced of the need for regional devolution. Furthermore, there was much confusion over the form of regionalization that the state should adopt. Republican leaders each subscribed to one of several possibilities: the model of administrative decentralization, the federal model, or even another one based on regional autonomy. A fourth element should also be considered: the idea of municipal autonomy, which was also present in Spanish democratic thought from the second third of the nineteenth century on.[38] In contrast, the dynastic Liberal Party was in favour of accepting a deeper municipal autonomy without reinforcing 'artificial' provincial and regional demarcations, since these, in minister Segismundo Moret's view, were superfluous to Spanish nation-building.[39]

4.1.1. The Regionalist Ambiguity of Regenerationism After 1890 the regenerationist movement, a distinctively Spanish ideological phenomenon, contributed to reinforce the previously mentioned trends. The colonial war disaster and its aftermath, including the spreading throughout Spain of a wave of *Kulturpessimismus* and sense of national decadence, contributed to the forging of regenerationism as an ideological reaction against Spain's prostration, although its ideological roots lie prior to 1898.

Regenerationists wanted to transform Spain not by revolution but by reform and education. The first requirement in order to accomplish this was to overcome the institutional blockade imposed until then by the two dominant parties (Conservative and Liberal after 1874), by destroying *caciquismo* (political clientelism) and oligarchy.[40] With ideological ambiguity, regenerationist proposals on the question of 'What is Spain?' attempted to answer this by offering a new common project based on state modernization and renewal of Spanish values. This would be achieved through decentralization, an emphasis on Castile's historical legacy and personality as Spain's shaping element since the middle ages, and reinforcement of local democracy through municipal autonomy and decentralization. In the regenerationists' perspective, the usual setting for clientelism's machinery was again the provincial division established by nineteenth-century liberals and reinforced after 1874 by the Restoration system. Thus they advocated a variety of regionalization proposals, attempting to combine 'historical regions' with geographically based new territorial entities. Ricardo Macías-Picavea, for instance, proposed a territorial demarcation of eight 'natural regions' in conjunction with local and regional autonomy.[41]

As a better means for reforming Spain, the regenerationist tenets of regional decentralization opened up a novel route for the emergence of new regionalisms, especially after the failure of the regenerationist plan for a political party spanning the entire country. They also had a strong influence on pre-existing regionalisms and even peripheral nationalisms, such as the Galician and Catalan versions.[42] The new 'regenerationist regionalisms' were generally limited to the provincial intelligentsia, principally composed of intellectuals and professional elites, but they achieved a wider audience in certain conservative circles and local institutions. No less significant was the fact that the first electoral victory of Catalan nationalism, in 1901, meant that peripheral nationalism entered the scene as a new feature of Spanish parliamentary politics. This encouraged both demonstration effects and political reactions in other regions. A combination of these factors can be observed, for instance, in the case of Andalusia and Extremadura.

Andalusian regionalism had previous political forerunners in local nineteenth-century republicanism, but its main thinker

during the first decades of the twentieth century was lawyer Blas Infante. This movement had its roots in a form of provincial regenerationism which incorporated a strong element of agrarian reformism. Blas Infante and a small group of followers attempted to elaborate an ideology which, despite being limited to regional affirmation, included emphasizing historical and cultural factors in order better to define Andalusia's 'objective' identity. It should be pointed out that Infante's proposals included a rather vague definition of Andalusia as a 'nationality', basing the Andalusian *Volksgeist* on historical and socio-economical conditions, but without demanding self-determination. This doctrinal position was never able to overcome an ambivalent and undefined political stance prior to the Civil War. The 'Andalusian Manifesto' of 1919 sought full political autonomy as well as municipal autonomy, emphasizing Andalusia's role in regenerating the decadent Spanish state.[43] As the regionalist leader Dionisio Pérez wrote in 1916, once Andalusia recovered its historical personality and was ruled by real democracy, the region could aim at being 'Spain's keeper and the stronghold of Castile's independence'.[44]

Immediately after the 1898 crisis, regionalism emerged in Extremadura as a weak political trend with mainly republican ideological origins. The colonial disaster led Extremadura's regionalists to reaffirm Spanish identity and firmly oppose what, in their view, was the separatist betrayal of Catalan nationalism. Nevertheless, the Catalanists provided these local regionalists with new arguments in favour of decentralization and regional autonomy. The press that defended regenerationist regionalism from 1899 on stressed Extremadura's role as a synthesis of Spanish *Volksgeist*, while also attempting to develop arguments from historical and literary sources in order to sustain the regional identity (which was undermined by the provincial organization that divided the region into the two provinces of Cáceres and Badajoz). Hence, the 'resurgence' of the regions was supposed to reinforce Spain. Yet, in spite of 'being the most Spanish region' of the country, regionalists considered that Extremadura had been neglected by the state, resulting in backwardness and poverty. Clientelism and centralism were the culprits. Therefore, the solution both for Extremadura and for the whole of Spain lay in putting an end to centralism, reinforcing regional identity in place of the divisive forms of provincialism, and achieving autonomy for the town councils and regions of

Spain without 'favouring' Catalonia.[45] Regionalism was supposed to be an inter-class movement, based on broad inter-group solidarity. Therefore, the first task would be firmly to frame the defining elements of regional identity.

Regenerationism also had a strong influence on the new reformist movement which, headed by Antonio Maura, emerged from the ranks of the Conservative Party in 1907. It was in power between 1907 and 1909 and, in conjunction with the parliamentary pressure of Catalan nationalists and republicans in Madrid, determined that the regional autonomy question was discussed in the Spanish parliament on several occasions. The *Mauristas* wanted to carry out reform 'from above', in order to ensure real democratization and social–Christian reform. As part of their regenerationist goals they designed a programme for municipal autonomy, which included certain corporatist features. Nevertheless, an agreement between the Catalanists and Maura was a difficult matter. As their minimum objective, the Catalan nationalists sought to achieve regional autonomy for 'historical regions', that would be infused with legislative powers or based upon a pseudo-federal relationship between Catalonia and the rest of Spain. Maura's party only accepted a somewhat revised form of local autonomy based on town councils, which did not go beyond the level of administrative decentralization.[46] The law on *Mancomunidades* finally came into effect in 1913, allowing the provincial institutions (*Diputaciones*) of those regions which so desired it to shape a unified institution, whose powers were in practice limited to administrative matters. However restrictive this law may have been for the scope of Catalan nationalism, it was at least a first step in the recognition of regions as political entities, and the first Catalan *Mancomunitat* was set up in 1914.[47]

The rest of the regions had, in theory, the right to form similar regional administrative bodies. This encouraged other regionalist movements to advance their claims for autonomy, which met with limited success. In some cases the local elites sought to organize themselves on a regional basis in order better to represent their economic interests before the central government. In Castile there was interest in defending regional agriculture and protecting the national market through protectionist tariff policies established by the state, while the Catalan industrial bourgeoisie was accused of defending a policy of free trade in agricultural products. Moreover, these regionalist initiatives

tended to imitate the Catalan example in a contradictory way that sometimes exhibited a certain paranoia. The conservative local or provincial elites reacted against so-called 'Catalan privileges' by demanding regional decentralization and local autonomy for all Spanish regions. In 1914, shortly after the constitution of the Catalan *Mancomunitat*, the presidents of the provincial *Diputaciones* of Old Castile assembled in Burgos and issued a proclamation requesting a similar level of autonomy to Catalonia's.[48] Stirred up by the repeated accusations of 'Castilian hegemony' over Spain that emanated from Catalan nationalism, the theoretical elaboration of Castilian regionalism evidenced a high degree of confusion. Thus, when in 1918 A. Carretero published his attempt to develop a theory on 'Castilianism', his arguments were a blend of voluntaristic and objective factors to uphold the demand for Castilian regional home-rule. For him the difference between nation and region resided in the present full sovereignty of the former, but nothing else. The devolution programme advocated by Carretero combined in an eclectic way administrative decentralization, municipal autonomy and financial power.[49]

The intense impact of the First World War on Spanish politics also influenced the development of peripheral nationalist strategies. Spain did not take part in the war, but the political paralysis and the underlying social tensions of the country broke loose in 1917, resulting in a threefold institutional, social and political crisis. This Restoration régime's moment of weakness was exploited by the peripheral nationalist movements, who put pressure on the Government in order to achieve home-rule for Catalonia, the Basque Country and all the Spanish regions that desired it. This strategy led the Catalans to search for partner movements throughout Spain, consciously promoting the emergence or development of local regionalist movements, either by direct political or financial involvement.[50] The Catalan autonomy campaign of 1917–19 and its efforts to seek allies outside Catalonia contributed to the reinforcement of regionalist claims in Asturias, Extremadura and Aragón, among other regions. Aragón's geographical proximity to Catalonia and the economic adjustment in the regional agricultural economy due to the 1898 crisis gave rise after 1912 to several groups and organizations led by intellectuals and segments of the urban bourgeoisie that consciously imitated Catalanist strategies. Yet their claims remained

entirely within the limits of regenerationist regionalism.[51] In Asturias, the traditionalists were among the first to raise the banner of regional identity and to claim autonomy, using regional history to legitimize a return to the *Fueros* and laws of the *ancien régime*. A combination of Catalanist impulses, regional affirmation and Spanish nationalism, can be seen in the political programme of the regionalist group *Liga Pro-Asturias* that emerged in 1917–18. The programme followed the model of Catalans Muntanyola and Prat de la Riba's *Compendi de la doctrina catalanista* (1894), structured as a popular catechism of questions and answers. But the differences with the Catalan model were meaningful. The answer to the question 'What is the Fatherland of the Asturians?' was 'Asturias and, by extension, SPAIN, which is the historical, geographical and political continuation of the ASTURIAN STATE, from which it has received its essence.' The answer to the question 'Has Asturias been a STATE?' was 'When Asturias incarnated the whole personality of the Spanish nation, it was a fully sovereign state', and later on became 'a state within another superior state.' The rest of the text emphasized Asturian traditions, historical personality, consuetudinary legal codes and ethnic distinctiveness (expressed in the 'race' and the use of a particular 'dialect'), as well as the past historical *grandeur* of regional institutions before 1835.[52] At this time it became clear that, although following a common strategy (the achievement of home-rule for all Spanish regions), peripheral nationalists and regionalists were in fact playing different games with the same deck of cards.

A majority of the newly born regionalist organizations adopted the novel concept of 'healthy regionalism', which did not imply breaking with the Spanish nation. As P. Graciano suggested in 1923,

> . . . the Fatherland is a very natural consequence of love for the region where one is born. The family tends to expand and to become a village, the village expands and becomes a region, and the region expands and becomes a State . . . Why should regionalism, that is love for the region which formed the Fatherland, be opposed to the Fatherland? The more we love the region, the more we love the Fatherland.[53]

4.1.2. The Authoritarian Dérive *and Conservative Regionalisms*

The sudden end of the Catalan autonomy campaign in 1919 due to the outbreak of severe social conflicts in Barcelona (which

forced the Catalan bourgeoisie to seek the Army's protection and to put aside demands for home-rule), along with the failure of Catalanist attempts to regenerate the system by taking part in Madrid's government, in turn led the various regionalist movements to cease their political agitation. Since these movements were composed solely of segments of the provincial intelligentsia and local elites, this mobilization process produced no enduring regionalist organizations. In fact, when general Primo de Rivera, with the support of the Army, put an end to the failing Restoration system with the September 1923 coup d'état, most regionalists and even a large number of the Catalan nationalists saw him as a possible authoritarian 'regenerator' of Spain. Hence, regionalists expected the new military Dictatorship to undertake a reforming process, eliminating clientelism and reinforcing local and regional autonomy. But at that time the military was strongly influenced by authoritarian Spanish nationalism, which denied any possibility of regional home-rule beyond the sphere of administrative decentralization.[54] As a result, shortly after the coup the military Government outlawed the official use of minority languages, prohibiting their use in the schools and even requesting that only Spanish be used during religious ceremonies. In the end the promised home-rule concessions were reduced to the Municipal Law of March 1924 and the Provinces' Law of 1925, which in fact reinforced both municipal and provincial administration, while explicitly barring the provincial institutions from merging together into a regional one.[55] Thus, Catalonia's regional *Mancomunitat* was dissolved.

The Primo de Rivera dictatorship actually caused the peripheral nationalisms to radicalize their positions, while neither the military nor their civil supporters were able to promote a new project of inclusive Spanish nationalism. Moreover, the authoritarian right increasingly abandoned the regionalist tradition inherited from Carlism. In 1929 the foremost intellectual producer of propaganda for the Dictatorship, José-María Pemán, expressed in a somewhat elaborate fashion the doubts in the régime's thinking. Pemán recognized that the region was a kind of 'intermediate link' in the 'spontaneous hierarchy of natural societies'. The Region was simply an 'aggregate of municipalities, associated around a certain number of economic, historical and geographical similarities'. But the legal embodiment of this entity posed certain complex problems. Pemán recognized the

geographical, historical and cultural diversity of Spain, but found unifying factors in the Monarchy, the similarity of Iberian languages (except for Basque, which was considered a relic of the past) and the common Catholic religion. Nevertheless, following Ortega y Gasset's ideas, Pemán regretted the lack of a common Spanish project to forge a *Schicksalsgemeinschaft*, along with the problem of territorial 'divisions'. Finally, although he acknowledged that the province was an 'artificial element', he supported Calvo Sotelo's project of administrative decentralization that would empower the provinces and town councils, in order to avoid the danger both of centralism and of 'excessively' reinforcing the regions.[56]

The proclamation of the Spanish Second Republic (1931) opened new political horizons for the resolution of the national question. The peripheral nationalists, and especially the Catalans, sought to achieve a federal republic from the very beginning, and established it as a condition for co-operation with Spanish republicans, thus forcing the new régime to adopt a decentralized structure. The Republican Constitution established Spain as an 'integral state', which is to say that the Spanish nation would be the only subject to possess sovereignty. But it allowed the regions to enjoy autonomy if a sufficient majority expressed their will for home-rule. In 1932 Catalan autonomy was passed by referendum; in 1933 the population of the two coastal Basque provinces, Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa, approved a project for Basque home-rule; and in 1936 Galician autonomy was also established by referendum. Regional autonomy was now a reality.

As had happened in the 1900–23 period, the autonomy campaign set in motion by the peripheral nationalists was echoed throughout Spain. Regionalist claims re-emerged almost everywhere. But, as before, they demonstrated a contradictory character. Some of the new regionalisms claimed to be a sort of 'Spanish regional affirmation', seeking to ensure that all Spain's regions would enjoy similar rights to those 'granted' to Catalonia. As in the pre-1923 period, provincial and local institutions, regional elites, and bourgeois elements contributed to revive regenerationist proposals which were often re-elaborated by local republicans and a handful of enthusiastic regionalists.[57] Some of the new regionalist currents even attempted to 'invent' new entities which had not formerly existed in any institutional or historical sense.[58]

Last but not least, during the Republican period Spanish conservative nationalism increasingly reacted against any regional home-rule option. This process paralleled the ideological radicalization that took place between the Left and the Right, and hence the anti-republican and authoritarian *dérive* experienced by right-wing Spanish nationalism. The main counter-revolutionary right-wing party, the Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas (CEDA), was formed in 1933 when several regional groups merged. Yet virtually none of the right-wing regional organizations was interested in building regional political entities, with the exception of the Valencian party (Derecha Regional Valenciana) and certain Galician leaders. But, in theory at least, CEDA's tenets permitted the possibility of regional self-government as a continuation of the historical *Fueros*, and furthermore as a means for preserving national sentiment, since it was supposed to be based on love for the region and the 'local Fatherland'. And in the case of the Valencian right-wing regionalists, some of whom came from the Carlist ranks, regional home-rule was also seen as the best way to defend the economic interests of the Valencian agrarian bourgeoisie.[59]

In 1931 the Spanish Carlists formed a coalition with Basque nationalists seeking Basque–Navarrese autonomy, in order to build a sort of autonomous anti-republican stronghold within Spain. However, the Carlists steadily lost interest in regional home-rule and became rather ambivalent on this issue. The Carlists rejected regional autonomy as implemented by the Spanish 'secular' Republic, but remained loyal to the defence of regional home-rule in a form that would make love for the region and love for the nation compatible, based on the traditional *Fueros*. The Navarrese Carlist Víctor Pradera (who was to become one of the pre-eminent theoretical defenders of the Franco régime after 1936) favoured the concept of organic society, but in his scheme each of the 'social elements' involved in shaping the nation (the family, the municipality and the region) was deprived of any sovereignty, though granted some degree of independent personality. These social elements were 'infra-sovereign societies' that should coexist harmoniously with each other. The traditional *Fueros* would make it possible for the whole system to function, in that the family, the municipality and the region would each enjoy 'autarchy' for their 'particular' goals; and the Nation would have full sovereignty. A return to the

Fueros in the form of administrative decentralization, combined with religion and the unifying role played by the Monarchy, was supposed to be once again the solution to Spain's national problem.[60]

The military uprising which took place in July 1936 interrupted the new process of regionalization in Spain. Most conservative regionalists joined Franco's side, as did the Carlists. There was no place for regionalism and regionalization under the new régime set up in 1939, since authoritarian and radical right-wing Spanish nationalism became the dominant doctrine.

4.2. The Dynamics of Cultural Region-Building

Regionalists undertook the task of 'inventing' the regions, advocating their existence and (in some cases) their political rights. Region-building presents many points in common with the cultural nation-building processes which were taking place almost at the same time in the Catalan, Basque and Galician cases. A majority of the architects of the cultural construction of the regions came from traditional–conservative political circles. Nevertheless, in other cases provincial institutions, town councils and bourgeois elites consciously promoted cultural events that proclaimed the ideological affirmation of 'historical regions', and at the same time insisted upon their Spanishness. Regional history was mostly seen as the means to emphasize the contribution made by each region to a common Spanish history dating back to the middle ages. A third factor should also be pointed out, which flows along the lines of what A.M. Thiesse has shown to be the case in French literary regionalism. Specifically, centralization of cultural and literary activities in the capital caused a reaction by the younger intellectual elites of the periphery, who attempted to create new space for cultural expression by reviving local traditions and making the region become the *locus* of their creativity. In this sense, if Brittany was a paradoxical example for French provincial intellectuals proclaiming the *revéil des provinces*,[61] Catalonia became the equivalent for certain segments of the Spanish 'provincial' *intelligentsia*.

Four aspects of this process may be pointed out:

i. From the mid-nineteenth century onward, an effort at elaborating regional historiographies took place, looking to the past in search of differentiating elements. This task was carried

out mainly by traditionalist historians, who attempted to revive and idealize ancient forms of rural life, such as constructing social harmony under the guidance of priests and nobility or gentry, and even defending forms of pre-liberal rural 'organic democracy', such as the communal councils of the middle ages. In Cantabria, for example, this meant stressing the uniqueness of the most rural part of the region (in this case the *Montaña* or upland zone) as a reaction against the modernization and liberalism found in the cities (or 'the Coast'). This was the case for historians such as Escagedo-Salmón and Menéndez y Pelayo, who inaugurated a regional historiographic school that was institutionally consolidated in the twentieth century by the foundation of the Centro de Estudios Montañeses (1934).[62] To a certain extent, parallel dynamics were to be found in Asturias, where in 1920 the Centro de Estudios Asturianos was set up by Carlist local historians who wanted to revive the region's historical personality dating back to the middle ages.[63] Likewise, in 1844 the provincial Historical Monuments Commissions (Comisiones de Monumentos Históricos) were set up by the Government in each province. In some cases they played an active role in encouraging the study and recovery of regional history, and therefore of regional identities — in spite of the fact that their functioning was theoretically restricted to the administrative provinces. One of the first regionalist journals in Extremadura (the *Revista de Extremadura*, 1899–1911), was in fact the mouthpiece for the Monuments Commissions of Badajoz and Cáceres provinces.[64]

ii. Related to the previous activity, we encounter a recovery of cultural traditions, which was undertaken especially by folklorists, ethnologists and anthropologists. From the last third of the nineteenth century onward, specialized periodicals on ethnology and regional folklore emerged, as well as scholarly studies of rural and 'lost' or disappearing traditions. In many cases they were linked to the same intellectual and political circles that supported the promotion of regional history and literature. Research on the traditional way of life and mostly rural culture of the regions sought to identify the similarities among the inhabitants of different provinces within the same historical region. The best example of this can be found in some Andalusian anthropologists between 1868 and 1890. Still, their purpose was primarily to illustrate the personality of an *organic* part of the Spanish nation.[65]

iii. The development of a specific category of 'regional literature' took place from the mid-nineteenth century on, partially inspired by romantic influences. In some cases, regional languages or dialects were revived, although in a more limited fashion than in the Galician and Catalan cases. The Asturian language, for instance, received its first grammar book in 1869, and was then cultivated during the rest of the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century by several folklore writers (satirized and traditional poems, short stories or children's tales, etc.).[66] And in Cantabria (Santander), the late romantic 'regionalist literature' of authors such as Amos de Escalante and José María de Pereda attempted to revive a kind of pre-liberal and rural regional life in their novels.[67]

Related to this we find the celebration of literary contests (*Juegos florales*). Their origin lies in the 1859 Catalan literary contests in vernacular language, imitated in Galicia in 1860. In other regions, such as Valencia, regional literary celebrations were held from 1874 onward. They were often presented as meetings for regionalist cultural affirmation and, on occasion, served as political tribunes. In the Castilian case, for instance, literary contests started in 1878 in Burgos, and were subsequently held in Soria, Palencia, Zamora and Salamanca. An analysis of the thematic contents of the Castilian literary contests shows that between 1878 and 1923 regional topics increased in frequency, while local–provincial and national ones decreased. Nevertheless, regional topics emphasized both Castilian historic glories and Castile's contribution to Spain's *grandeur* in the early modern era. To give a contrasting example, the thematic evolution of Catalan literary contests displays a substantial difference: before 1898, Catalan and Spanish historical topics coexisted in harmony, with the former often being presented as part of 'Spanish glories'. After that date, most topics referred almost solely to Catalan historical myths that idealized Catalonia's lost independence.[68]

iv. An additional aspect was the promotion of regional events, such as regional economic or agricultural fairs, art exhibits, and the like. They were usually fostered by Chambers of Commerce or provincial institutions, along with the institutionalization of regional symbols such as the celebration of 'regional holidays', which generally implied the search for a 'regional patron saint' and, if possible, a symbolic sanctuary (such as

Covadonga in Asturias and Guadalupe in Extremadura). In some cases a regional anthem was even created. Though these initiatives received very weak social support before 1936, they are meaningful as attempts to consolidate regional identity. But it should also be noted that Spanish national symbolism, official celebrations and 'patron saints' were not definitively set until 1923. An example of this is the late institutionalization (1918) of the 'Spanishness day' (*Día de la Hispanidad*), which was supposed to raise the Spanish-speaking *Schicksalsgemeinschaft* with Latin American countries. The symbolic context and even the repertoire of regional and national identities was very dynamic indeed.

5. Some General Conclusions

i. The process of region-building implies historical dynamics which, to a certain extent, are similar to nation-building ones. The identity of the region tends to be built upon similar arguments (history, tradition, the people's will), that may be incorporated or defended by elites in accordance with their interests and political motivations. The theoretical difference between the *region* and the *nation*, and therefore between *regionalism* and *nationalism*, lies in the notion of present collective sovereignty, which is exclusively ascribed to the nation.

ii. The Spanish case illustrates how these dynamics may converge or diverge over time, but in any case they are deeply interrelated since both have similar historical origins.[69] The relatively incomplete character of state-promoted Spanish nation-building in the nineteenth century, and the persistence of strong regional identities, as well as the existence of regional elites in need of preserving given social or economic interests, may succeed in pushing a regionalism to become a nationalism if confidence in the previous nation-state fails, or if the interests of one or more social groups require a complete change in national loyalties. In fact, it is hard to find a nationalist movement that has not emerged from a previously existing form of collective identity or *ethnoterritorial* mobilization.

iii. Peripheral nationalisms project a clear demonstration/imitation effect *vis-à-vis* regionalist movements. This may have a decisive influence on the level of theoretical discourse or ideology

involved, but it hardly contributes to the social spreading of new nationalisms.

iv. Regional identity, like the nation, constitutes an 'imagined community', whose construction is initially carried out by elites and intellectuals.[70] Nevertheless, regional consciousness is aided in spreading due to the presence of institutional mechanisms. Hence, the more real power regional institutions have, the more they consciously promote the territorial loyalty of their citizens.

v. Regionalism and regional affirmation do not *per se* imply a contradiction or opposition to nation-building, but in some cases they may add elements of ideological friction into the mesoterritorial political arena which under varying circumstances may result in the development of a distinct peripheral nationalism. Otherwise expressed, region-building may be potentially conflictive with nation-building. It depends, on the one hand, upon the precise and concrete articulation of both processes with social interests, as well as, on the other, upon their interaction with political and social movements which tend to 'regionalize' their projects and aims.

Notes

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1. See a good sample of some case studies in H.-G. Haupt, S.J. Woolf and M. Müller, eds, *Regional and National Identities in Europe in the XIXth and XXth Centuries* (The Hague–London–Boston 1998).

2. See P. Anderson, *The Invention of the Region 1945–1990*, European University Institute Working Paper EUF 94/2, 1994.

3. See M. Hroch, 'De l'ethnicité à la nation. Un chemin oublié vers la modernité', *Anthropologie et Société*, Vol. 19:3 (1995), 71–86.

4. See, e.g., L. Moreno, *La federalización de España* (Madrid 1997), 11–23; and D. Petrosino, *Stati, nazioni, etnie. Il pluralismo etnico e nazionale nella teoria sociologica contemporanea* (Milan 1991).

5. See, for instance, K.W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (Cambridge, MA 1953).

6. For an overview, see X.M. Núñez, 'Region-Building in Spain during the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries', in G. Brunn, ed., *Region und Regionsbildung in Europa. Konzeptionen der Forschung und empirische Befunde* (Baden-Baden 1996), 175–210.

7. See A. Smith, *National Identity* (London 1991), 1–43.

8. For the German case, see C. Applegate, *A Nation of Provincials: The German Idea of Heimat* (Berkeley, CA 1990); A. Confino, *The Nation as a Local Metaphor: Württemberg, Imperial Germany, and National Memory, 1971–1918* (Chapel Hill–London 1997). For the French case, see H.G. Haupt, 'Die Konstruktion der Regionen und die Vielfalt der Loyalitäten im Frankreich des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts', in G. Lottes, ed., *Region, Nation, Europa. Historische Determinanten der Neugliederung eines Kontinents* (Heidelberg 1992), 121–6. An interesting comparison between France and Germany can be found in Ch. Tacke, *Denkmal im sozialen Raum* (Göttingen 1995).

9. For an overview, see X.M. Núñez, 'Los oasis en el desierto. Perspectivas historiográficas sobre el nacionalismo español', *Bulletin d'Histoire Contemporaine de l'Espagne*, Vol. 26 (1997), 483–533.

10. J. Fernández-Sebastián, 'España, Monarquía y Nación. Cuatro concepciones de la comunidad política española entre el Antiguo Régimen y la Revolución liberal', *Studia Historica. Historia Contemporánea*, Vol. 12 (1994), 45–74.

11. See J. Fernández-Sebastián, *La génesis del fuerismo* (Madrid 1991); J. Juaristi, *El linaje de Aitor* (Madrid 1987); C. Rubio-Pobes, *Revolución y tradición. El País Vasco ante la Revolución liberal y la construcción del Estado español, 1808–1868* (Madrid 1996).

12. See, among others, P. Cirujano-Marín, T. Elorriaga-Planes and J.S. Pérez-Garzón, *Historiografía y nacionalismo español, 1834–1868* (Madrid 1985); and B. Pellistrandi, 'Escribir la historia de la nación española: proyectos y herencia de la historiografía de Modesto Lafuente y Rafael Altamira', *Investigaciones Históricas*, Vol. 17 (1997), 137–59.

13. See A. Calero-Amor, *La división territorial de 1833. Bases y antecedentes* (Madrid 1987).

14. See J. Varela Suances-Carpegna, *La Teoría del Estado en los orígenes del constitucionalismo hispánico (las Cortes de Cádiz)* (Madrid 1983), and J.G. Beramendi, 'A función da historia no nacionalismo español', *Actas do Congreso Internacional da Cultura Galega* (Santiago de Compostela 1992), 125–32.

15. It was certainly not a feature exclusive to Spanish history. A similar process (although to a limited extent) has been pointed out for France. See G. Rossi-Landi, 'La région', in J.F. Sirinelli (dir.), *Histoire des droites en France. 3. Sensibilités* (Paris 1992), 71–100.

16. See J. Corcuera-Atienza, 'Nacionalismo y clases en la España de la Restauración', *Estudios de Historia Social*, Vol. 28–29 (1984), 249–82; B. de Riquer, 'La débil nacionalización española del siglo XIX', *Historia Social*, 20 (1994), 97–114; and J. Alvarez-Junco, 'La nación en duda', in J. Pan-Montojo, ed., *Más se perdió en Cuba. España, 1898 y la crisis de fin de siglo* (Madrid 1998), 405–69. For an overview, see also X.M. Núñez, *Los nacionalismos en la España contemporánea (siglos XIX y XX)* (Barcelona 1999), 18–30.

17. See F. Nadal, *Burgueses, burócratas y territorio. La política territorial en la España del siglo XIX* (Madrid 1987), 39–53.

18. See L. Morell-Ocaña, 'La provincia en el segundo tercio del siglo XIX. su concepción como ámbito de articulación del centro político y la sociedad periférica', *Revista de Administración Pública*, Vol. 114 (1987), 39–92. On the role of Civil Governors, see M. Risques-Corbella, *El govern civil de Barcelona al segle XIX* (Barcelona 1995).

19. See M. Tomàs, 'Notes sobre la Renaixença i els seus orígens', *Recerques*, Vol. 9 (1979), 133–55; J.M. Fradera, *Cultura nacional en una societat dividida. Patriotisme i cultura a Catalunya (1830–1868)* (Barcelona 1992); C. Hermida, *Os precursores da normalización. Defensa e reivindicación da língua galega no Rexurdimento (1840–1892)* (Vigo 1992); P. Anguera, *El català al segle XIX. De llengua del poble a llengua nacional* (Barcelona 1997).

20. See A.M. Hennessy, *The Federal Republic in Spain: Pi i Margall and the Federal Republican Movement (1868–1874)* (Oxford 1962); J.M. Jover, 'Federalismo en España: cara y cruz de una experiencia histórica', in G. Gortázar, ed., *Nación y Estado en la España liberal* (Madrid 1995), 105–68.

21. See E. Olcina, *El carlismo y las autonomías regionales* (Madrid 1974).

22. See V. Garmendia, *La ideología carlista (1868–1876). En los orígenes del nacionalismo vasco* (San Sebastián 1984); J. Real-Cuesta, *El carlismo vasco 1876–1900* (Madrid 1985); M. Ramisa, *Els orígens del catalanisme conservador i 'La Veu del Montserrat', 1878–1900* (Vic 1985); E. Olcina, *Carlisme i autonomia al País Valencià* (Valencia 1980); B. de Riquer et al., *El catalanisme conservador* (Girona 1996); and R. Máiz, *Alfredo Brañas. O ideario do rexionalismo católico-tradicionalista* (Vigo 1983).

23. The Castilian Vicente Gay, for instance, wrote in 1908 that the real task for the future was 'to shape the nation, to educate *Spaniards*', and not to 'shape the regions' personality': see V. Gay, *El regionalismo ante el nacionalismo y el imperialismo modernos en la formación de los Estados* (Valladolid 1908), 23–4.

24. The relationship between both aspects (regional and municipal autonomy) was, as in Italy, very confusing and sometimes contradictory. See the contributions by A. Varni, F. Grassi Orsini and E. Berselli in R. Chiarini, ed., *La costruzione dello stato in Italia e Germania* (Manduria 1993), as well as G. Galasso, 'Origini e sviluppo del regionalismo italiano', in L. de Rosa and E. di Nolfo, eds, *Regionalismo e centralizzazione nella storia di Italia e Stati Uniti* (Florence 1986), 19–29.

25. A. Brañas, *El regionalismo* (Barcelona 1889), 59.

26. A. Brañas, 'El Concepto de patria', *La Patria Gallega* (Santiago de Compostela), 30 June 1891, 1.

27. Brañas, *El regionalismo*, 123.

28. J. Vázquez de Mella, 'Regionalismo gallego' (1916), in idem, *Obras completas* (Barcelona–Madrid 1935), Vol. 27, 78.

29. A. Santoveña-Setién, *Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo. Revisión crítica de un pensador católico* (Santander 1994), 94–105.

30. J. Vázquez-de Mella, 'Regionalismo' (1900), in idem, *Obras completas*, Vol. 26, 71–8.

31. In addition, Spain was considered to be a geographically 'superior' unit, where religion played the most cohesive role. See J. Vázquez-de Mella, 'Principios regionalistas' (1907), and 'Regionalismo. Definición y notas características' (1918), in idem, *Regionalismo y Monarquía*, ed. S. Galindo-Herrero (Madrid 1957), 49–93 and 94–151.

32. A. Goicoechea, *El proyecto de Estatuto Regional y las aspiraciones autonomistas* (Madrid 1919). See also P.C. González-Cuevas, 'El pensamiento sociopolítico de la derecha maurista', *Boletín de la Real Academia de la Historia*, Vol. 190:3 (1993), 365–426.

33. R. Criado-Cervera, *Regionalismo y descentralización* (Valencia 1906), 22–6.

34. P. Graciano-Martínez, *Regionalismo y patriotismo* (Madrid 1923), 20–1.

35. See F. Pi i Margall, *Las nacionalidades* (Madrid 1876). According to him, autonomy should be restored to those human groups (regions) which had already enjoyed it in the past.

36. Parliamentary speech, 21 June 1907, reproduced in G. de Azcárate, *Municipalismo y regionalismo* (Madrid 1979), 271.

37. Some Catalan federalists close to Valentí Almirall separated from Spanish republicanism and subsequently merged with ancient traditionalist regionalists within the Catalan nationalist movement. The same phenomenon occurred, although to a very limited extent, in Galicia around A.J. Pereira's group as well as in Valencia. See, for the case of Catalonia, J. Trías-Vejarano, *Almirall y los orígenes del catalanismo* (Madrid 1975); and J.M. Figueres, *Valentí Almirall, forjador del catalanisme polític* (Barcelona 1990). On federalist regionalists in Galicia, see R. Máiz, *O rexionalismo galego. Organización e ideoloxía (1886–1907)* (A Coruña 1984), 399–436. For Valencia, see A. Cucó, *El valencianisme polític (1874–1936)* (Catarroja 1999, 2nd edn).

38. See J. Sánchez-Morón, *La autonomía local. Antecedentes históricos y significado constitucional* (Madrid 1990). On the variegated decentralization proposals advocated by Spanish republicans, see A. de Blas-Guerrero, *Tradición republicana y nacionalismo español (1876–1931)* (Madrid 1991).

39. See S. Moret y Prendergast, *Centralización, descentralización, regionalismo* (Madrid 1900); A. Royo-Villanova, *La autonomía y la municipalización* (Madrid 1919).

40. See C. Serrano, *Le tour du peuple: crise nationale, mouvements populaires et populisme en Espagne (1890–1910)* (Madrid 1987); idem, *Final del Imperio. España, 1895–1898* (Madrid 1984); and J. Harrison, 'The Regenerationist Movement in Spain after the Disaster of 1898', *European Studies Review*, Vol. 9 (1979), 1–27.

41. See R. Macías-Picavea, *El problema nacional* (Madrid 1899). On the various decentralizing proposals of regenerationist thinkers, see Nadal, *Burgueses*, 204–18.

42. In Galicia, for instance, the influence of regenerationism in the formation and development of the 1907 *Galician Solidarity* coalition was quite clear indeed. The coalition's political programme (which brought together traditionalists, republicans and proto-nationalists) stressed that Spanish regeneration could only be achieved on a regional basis. See J.G. Beramendi and X.M. Núñez, *O nacionalismo galego* (Vigo 1996, 2nd edn), 68–70.

43. Centro Andaluz, *Manifiesto andalucista de Córdoba, 1919. Ideario de la nacionalidad* (Córdoba 1919).

44. D. Pérez, 'Cómo somos regionalistas en Andalucía', *España* (Madrid), 3 August 1916, 7–6. On the regenerationist influence on Andalusian regionalism, see J.A. Lacomba, 'Costismo y andalucismo. La influencia de Joaquín Costa en Blas Infante', *Anales de la Fundación Joaquín Costa*, Vol. 11 (1994), 77–84; and M. González-de Molina, 'Los orígenes del Andalucismo histórico: nacionalismo o regeneracionismo', in P. Anguera et al., *IIIes Jornades de Debat. Orígens i formació dels nacionalismes a Espanya* (Reus 1994), 143–69.

45. See J. Sánchez-González, 'El regionalismo extremeño', in J.P. Fusi, ed., *España. Autonomías* (Madrid 1989), 423–63; idem, 'El periódico *Extremadura* y el regionalismo extremeño en torno a 1900', *Norba*, Vol. 8–9 (1987–88), 125–39.

46. See M.J. González-Hernández, *Ciudadanía y acción. El conservadurismo maurista, 1907–1923* (Madrid 1990), 161–70; and A. Colomines, *El catalanisme i l'Estat. La lluita parlamentària per l'autonomia (1898–1917)* (Barcelona 1993).

47. See A. Balcells, *La Mancomunitat de Catalunya i l' autonomia* (Barcelona 1996).

48. See S. Orduña, *El regionalismo en Castilla y León* (Valladolid 1986), 150–52; and R. Robledo, 'L'actitud castellana enfront del catalanisme', *Recerques*, Vol. 5 (1975), 217–74.

49. A. Carretero, *La cuestión regional de Castilla la Vieja (el regionalismo castellano)* (Segovia 1918).

50. For the case of the Canary Islands, see M. Melián-González, 'El catalanismo político y su influencia en el regionalismo canario (1906–1923)', in *Actes del Congrés Internacional Catalunya i la Restauració (1875–1923)* (Manresa 1992), 87–91. For the Aragonese case, see A. Peiró, *Orígenes del nacionalismo aragonés (1908–1923)* (Zaragoza 1996), 48–9.

51. This is the case with the exception of some activists among Aragonese immigrants in Barcelona, who attempted to develop a specific 'Aragonese nationalism', and elaborated a more careful differentiation between nation and state. For them Aragón had been a nationality in the past, and hence should recover a form of 'full autonomy' which would at the same time 'reinforce Spain': see J. Calvo-Alfaro, *Doctrina regionalista de Aragón* (Zaragoza 1922). Gaspar Torrente was more radical in his doctrinal affirmation of the existence of an *Aragonese Nation*: see his *La crisis del regionalismo en Aragón* (Barcelona 1923). On the ideological development of the Aragonese movement, see C. Forcadell-Álvarez, 'Las fantasías historiográficas del aragonesismo político', in C. Forcadell, ed., *Nacionalismo e historia* (Zaragoza 1998), 143–60.

52. Vizconde de Campo-Grande, C. Alonso and J. González (1918), *Doctrina Asturianista Aprobada por la Junta Regionalista del Principado* (Gijón 1977). For the origins of Asturian regionalism, see P. San-Martín, *Asturianismu políticu. 1790–1936* (Oviedo 1998).

53. Graciano-Martínez, *Regionalismo*, 18–19. Similar postulates may be also found in J. García-Acuña, *Idearium regionalista* (A Coruña 1925).

54. See C. Navajas-Zubeldía, *Ejército, Estado y sociedad en España (1923–1930)* (Logroño 1991), 259–70.

55. See J. Tusell and D. Chacón-Ortiz, *La reforma de la Administración Local en España (1900–1936)* (Madrid 1987).

56. J.M. Pemán, *El hecho y la idea de la Unión Patriótica* (Madrid 1929), 235–55.

57. This was, once again, the case for Castile, Extremadura, Andalusia and Aragón. See F. Sánchez Marroyo, 'La cuestión regional en Extremadura durante la IIa República', in J.G. Beramendi and R. Máiz, eds, *Los nacionalismos en la España de la II República* (Madrid 1991), 451–86; J. Palomares, 'Aproximación al regionalismo castellano durante la IIa República', *Estudios de Historia Social*, Vol. 28–29 (1984), 375–88; A. Peiró-Arroyo and B. Pinilla, *Nacionalismo y regionalismo en Aragón (1868–1942)* (Zaragoza 1981); M. Hijano-del Río and M. Ruiz-Romero, *El Ideal Andaluz en la Segunda República* (Seville 1995).

58. For instance, in the Castilian province of Santander, new regionalist tendencies re-emerged advocating the creation of a region of its own (*Cantabria*) separated from Castile. Another example was to be found in Murcia, where a

minority of the province's middle class demanded the constitution of a 'Levante Region' composed of the provinces of Murcia, Alicante and some border districts of Almería, Granada and Jaén located around the Segura river basin. See B. Madariaga de la Campa, 'Introducción', in idem, *Antología del regionalismo en Cantabria* (Santander 1989), 18–21; and C. González-Martínez, *La gestión municipal republicana en el Ayuntamiento de Murcia, 1931–1939* (Murcia 1990), 87–104.

59. See J.R. Montero, *La CEDA y el catolicismo social y político en la IIa República* (Madrid 1977), Vol. II, 225–41; R. Valls, *La Derecha Regional Valenciana. El catolicismo político valenciano (1930–1936)* (Valencia 1992), 71–81; on regionalist proposals of Spanish right-wing parties in the Basque Country, which advocated the return to the *Fueros*, see J.A. Rodríguez-Ranz, *Guipúzcoa y San Sebastián en las elecciones de la II República* (San Sebastián 1994), 155–81. On regionalist postulates of the Galician Right, see E. Grandío, 'Dereita e rexionalismo galego na II República. Carlos Ruiz del Castillo', *Grial*, Vol. 134 (1997), 185–217.

60. See V. Pradera [1935], *El Estado nuevo* (Burgos 1937), 137–42; M. Blinkhorn, *Carlismo y contrarrevolución en España, 1931–1939* (Madrid 1979), 213–15; J. Ugarte, *La nueva Covadonga insurgente. Orígenes sociales y culturales de la sublevación de 1936 en Navarra y el País Vasco* (Madrid 1998), 287–88 and 311–43; P.C. González-Cuevas, *Acción Española. Teología política y nacionalismo autoritario en España (1913–1936)* (Madrid 1998), 50–3.

61. See A.-M. Thiesse, *Écrire la France. Le mouvement littéraire régionaliste de langue française entre la Belle Époque et la Libération* (Paris 1991).

62. See M. Suárez-Cortina, 'Región, regionalismo e historia. La invención de la tradición en la Cantabria contemporánea', *Historia Contemporánea*, Vol. 11 (1994), 215–40.

63. The Centro de Estudios Asturianos was mainly composed of traditionalist-oriented aristocrats and intellectuals, but also some republicans took part in its activities. This also occurred in Extremadura, where the Centro de Estudios Extremeños was founded in 1925 under the auspices of the provincial *Diputación* of Badajoz. See J. Uría, *Cultura oficial e ideología en la Asturias franquista. El IDEA* (Oviedo 1984), 8–17; and Sánchez-González, 'El regionalismo extremeño', 454–5.

64. Likewise, many of Navarre's regionalists were members of the provincial Monuments Commission, subsequently forming the *Asociación Euskara* (ideological forerunner of Basque nationalism in Navarre between 1877 and 1897): see M.P. Huici-Goñi, 'Las Comisiones de Monumentos históricos y artísticos con especial referencia a la Comisión de Navarra', *Príncipe de Viana*, Vol. 189 (1990), 119–96; as well as I. Iriarte-López, *Tramas de identidad. Literatura y regionalismo en Navarra (1870–1960)* (Madrid 2000), 23–102. A relatively similar example is found in the so-called Società di Storia Patria in nineteenth-century Italy: see G.B. Clemens, 'Le società di storia patria e le identità regionali', *Meridiana*, Vol. 32 (1998), 97–119.

65. I. Moreno-Navarro, 'Primer descubrimiento consciente de la identidad andaluza', in A. Domínguez-Ortiz, ed., *Historia de Andalucía* (Barcelona 1980), Vol. VIII, 233–51; for a more critical view, see González-de Molina, 'Los orígenes', 156–7.

66. See C. Díaz-Castañón, *Literatura asturiana en bable* (Salinas 1976); and

A. García, 'El Rexonalismu, Asturianismu y la Lliteratura', in A. García, ed., *Tiempu de Pepín de Pría* (Oviedo 1992), 45–68.

67. See J. Gale, *El regionalismo en la obra de José María de Pereda* (Madrid 1990); and M. Suárez-Cortina, *Casonas, hidalgos y linajes. La invención de la tradición cántabra* (Santander 1994).

68. See J.L. Sánchez, *Burguesía castellana y regionalismo cultural. La Asociación de la Prensa palentina (1916–1936)* (Palencia 1993), 80–118, and J.Ll. Marfany, 'Mitologia de la Renaixença i mitologia nacionalista', *L'Avenç*, Vol. 164 (1992), 26–9.

69. This point has been stressed, among others, by B. de Riquer and E. Ucelay-Da Cal, 'An Analysis of Nationalisms in Spain: A Proposal for an Integrated Historical Model', in J.G. Beramendi, R. Máiz and X. M. Núñez, eds, *Nationalism in Europe: Past and Present* (Santiago de Compostela 1994), Vol. II, 275–301; as well as by J.G. Beramendi, 'Identidad nacional e identidad regional en España entre la guerra del francés y la guerra civil', in *Los 98 ibéricos y el mar. Tomo III. El Estado y la política* (Madrid 1998), 187–215.

70. See B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London 1983).

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