

Garibaldi and the Legacy of the Revolutions of 1848 in Southern Spain

The seductive example of Garibaldi, toppling thrones and invading kingdoms with a handful of adventurers, which so attracts the poorer class, combines with the natural tendencies of the times, and the daily preaching of democratic newspapers, whose effects are felt much more in the countryside than in the capital. This preaching has been perverting the day labourer and worker, who see in Garibaldi a hero, in the republic a beautiful ideal, and, in anything to do with government and order, tyranny.¹

(Letter of 7 July 1861, Antonio Guerola, Civil Governor, Málaga, to Exmo. señor D. José de Posada Herrera, Interior Minister, Madrid)

If yesterday a Cámara succumbed, if today a Pérez del Alamo fails, tomorrow a Riego or a Spanish Garibaldi, more fortunate, or more able, will complete the work into whose foundations has flown so much generous blood.²

(Fernando Garrido, *Propaganda democrática, el Socialismo y la Democracia ante sus adversarios, procedida por una carta de José Mazzini*, 3rd edn, London, 1862, 34)

Robert Gildea places Spain alongside Great Britain, Belgium and The Netherlands as parliamentary, limited monarchies that escaped the violence of 1848 relatively lightly: ‘Here were oligarchies which, by various combinations and coalitions in parliament, managed to navigate a difficult passage between revolution and reaction.’³ Yet, as Clara Lida has observed, Spain was not insulated from Europe’s ‘Springtime of Peoples’.⁴ The year of revolutions witnessed several waves of street-fighting (in Madrid and the major provincial capitals), widespread rural unrest, a Carlist uprising, and a republican conspiracy (under a Bourbon *infante!*), keeping the conservative, Moderado (Moderate Liberal) regime constantly on its guard. But Spain’s Liberal army, chastened by successful campaigns against the Carlists

under the decisive leadership of General Ramón María Narváez, rose successfully to the challenge, brutally suppressing internal unrest, while also making an important contribution, under General Fernando Fernández de Córdoba, to the defeat of the Roman Republic.⁵

The year 1848, then, was an unpropitious moment for the success of *progresista* (Progressive Liberal) insurrections in Spain.⁶ Yet, the year of revolutions permanently altered Spain's political geography. Progresista internal divisions prompted the formation, in March 1849, of the Democrat Party (Partido Demócrata, henceforth Democrats), Spain's first party committed both to universal suffrage and to social reform. Over the subsequent twenty years, the Democrats dedicated themselves to legal opposition, but also to building up a clandestine national network of *carbonari* cells to challenge the prevailing Moderado constitution of 1845, which restricted suffrage to major property holders.⁷ The year 1848 also saw the belated formation in Madrid of 'Young Spain' ('Joven España'), an internationalist association established by the Cádiz utopian socialist, Fernando Garrido, and linked with Giuseppe Mazzini. This rejuvenated movement of the Liberal left culminated in the revolution of September 1868, when a coalition of Progresistas and Democrats, led by the popular war-hero General Juan Prim, succeeded in bringing down the oppressive and discredited Bourbon regime. This inaugurated a six-year period of constitutional experimentation known as 'el sexenio revolucionario', during which many of the democratic and social ideas of 1848 were implemented (albeit, as in France of 1848, largely unsuccessfully).

Violently suppressed in the short term, the 1848 revolutions had therefore important longer-term consequences in Spain. This article explores these consequences in southern Spain. In particular, the chapter plots the intersection of three conspiratorial strands with their roots in the frustrated movements in Spain and Portugal during 1848: the diffusion of democratic propaganda through the press, the generation of mass support through *carbonari* organization, and the espousal by local leaders and their followers of Mazzinian ideas of 'democratic internationalism'. 'Democratic internationalism' in Spain involved, above all, solidarity with the Italian Risorgimento, especially with the popular leader of Sicilian and Neapolitan revolutions, Giuseppe Garibaldi. It also included support for 'Iberianism': the reunifi-


cation of Spain and Portugal under constitutional monarchy or as a republic.

These conspiratorial strands took particularly vigorous root in an archipelago of towns and rural estates (*cortijos*) along the mountainous borderlands of the provinces of Córdoba, Granada and Málaga, and coincided with the Italian Risorgimento between 1859 and 1864 (See Map 1). Two periods of popular mobilization resulted. The first, during the winter of 1860–1, culminated briefly in a massive popular uprising during the summer of 1861, under the leadership of Rafael Pérez del Alamo, a bearded veterinarian from the Granada town of Loja. The second conspiracy, which is the principal focus of this article, was organized during the winter of 1863–4, but was aborted in May 1864, before it became an uprising. So far unnoticed by historians, the ‘conspiracy of the Garibaldinos’ occupied the same region as the Loja uprising, and was organized by Pérez del Alamo’s second-in-command in July 1861, Ramón Calvo Jiménez. But it differed from the Loja uprising of 1861 in its anticipation of external leadership, to be provided by ‘officers of Garibaldi’, possibly even by General Giuseppe Garibaldi himself.

This article will contribute, it is hoped, to the revision of a still current view of nineteenth-century Spain as ‘marching out of step’ with the rest of Europe.⁸ It will suggest that the politics of this region of eastern Andalucía, from the end of absolutism in 1833 until the restoration of the monarchy in 1875, bear marked similarities to the politics of parts of southern France and southern Italy, particularly in the responsiveness of the middle class, peasants and agricultural labourers to democratic ideas conveyed by newspapers, and in the association of people from these diverse social categories in common, ‘modern’ forms of sociability, such as clubs, lodges, cafés and *carbonari* associations.⁹

The ‘bienio progresista’ and the Liberal Union, 1854–68

Spain’s ‘1848’ was delayed until July 1854. Alarmed by rumours that the Court of Queen Isabella (1843–68) would attempt a return to absolutism, General Leopoldo O’Donnell led a military coup against the corrupt and discredited ministry of José Luis Sartorius. A movement of Conservative generals quickly broadened into a popular insurrection led by reconstituted National



Map 1 Andalusia

Militia companies. (The National Militia, seen as favouring the Progresistas, had been suppressed by the 1845 Constitution.) This enabled Progresistas and Democrats to gain control of Madrid and major provincial cities and to convoke a constituent assembly. Their aim was to restore the Progresista Constitution of 1837, and to enhance its democratic character. For a leader, the revolutionaries chose Marshal Baldomero Espartero, 'Duque de la Victoria', popular hero of the Liberal triumph against the Carlists in 1839. However, in the face of a wave of working-class unrest in Catalonia, Progresistas vacillated. A new constitution was drafted but never enacted. Moderados took advantage of Progresista–Democrat divisions. O'Donnell then ousted Espartero. Spain's 'bienio progresista' ended in counter-revolution, as had most of Europe's revolutions six years earlier.¹⁰ Yet the 'Bienio' heralded the onset of a new kind of politics, characterized by the appearance of an organized working class and a more militant middle class, temporarily united around a pressing popular agenda: the National Militia as the guardian of popular sovereignty, universal suffrage and social reform. These issues set the agenda of opposition politics over the subsequent two decades.¹¹

After a brief campaign of repression under Narváez, who violently demobilized the National Militia, power passed to O'Donnell. Together with a great number of less memorable first ministers, O'Donnell presided over a shifting coalition of Moderados and Progresistas, known as the Liberal Union, until the Revolution of 1868.¹² Spanish government under the Liberal Union was a contradictory, and ultimately explosive, amalgam of moderately reformist aspirations and reactionary and authoritarian instincts.¹³

Constitutionally, 'Liberal Union' Spain was still regulated by the highly restrictive and centralized Moderado constitution of 1845. Voting was the preserve of a narrow elite of 'major tax payers' (*mayores contribuyentes*). Elections were organized by centrally appointed provincial civil governors around small, 'natural' districts (towns and their territories), that ensured the predominance of local bosses known as 'caciques'. Central control was reinforced by the right of civil governors to nominate mayors (*alcaldes corregidores*) to towns of more than 2000 souls. All favoured a top-down control of the electoral system that resulted in docile parliamentary chambers (a Cortes and a

Senate).¹⁴ Such a system, which might have achieved stability under a single dominant party, was a recipe for instability under the power-sharing arrangement of the Liberal Union. Moderados, always more favoured than Progresistas by Court patronage, enjoyed preference in prime-ministerial and cabinet appointments.¹⁵ Democrats, whose natural support was disenfranchised by the high property qualification, could justly claim that insurrection was their only option. After the elections of 1863, Progresistas increasingly allied with Democrats in a policy of electoral abstention ('retraimiento'). Helped by barracks revolts and subsistence crises, General Juan Prim's expeditionary force invaded Cádiz and brought the system down in September 1868.

That such a restricted and corrupt electoral system lasted for so long was due, in large part, to Spain's favourable economic performance between 1855 and 1864. Civil disentanglement (*desamortización*) after 1857 completed the liquidation of seigniorial, Church, municipal and communal land tenure which had begun in the late eighteenth century under Charles IV, and spurred the expansion of an agricultural bourgeoisie. Catalonia experienced a textile boom, until the American Civil War put an end to it. Foreign (largely French) investment financed the rapid extension of a railway system. Massive increases in public spending re-equipped the army and navy and enabled Spain to embark upon a series of mostly unsuccessful colonial ventures in an attempt to recoup past glory. This expansion of the public administration, and the patronage that it afforded, served to reinforce Madrid's dominance, and accentuate top-down political control through managed elections under restricted suffrage.¹⁶ The immediacy and intimacy of central control was further assisted by the growth of the centralized Civil Guard, a momentous expansion of the postal service, and growing use of the telegraph by the public administration.¹⁷

While in one respect, economic growth, financial solvency and better communications served to reinforce the highly centralized and exclusionist political system, in another, they worked to undermine it. Many Democrats and radical Progresistas, through the benign laws of the free market, succeeded in attaining the property necessary to vote, or even in becoming 'mayores contribuyentes'. Consequently, they expected their share of local power. Their increasingly flagrant exclusion through a host of

bureaucratic devices, dubious electoral practices and intimidation, made good copy in the opposition press.¹⁸ The response of the government, eager to demonstrate the legitimacy of the regime, was moderately to extend suffrage by lowering the property qualification, and to allow greater local control over nominations.¹⁹ These reforms occasionally permitted notable opposition victories in municipal elections. For instance, in October 1860 the Granada town of Loja, the bailiwick of the Moderado chieftain General Ramón Narváez, fell to a largely Democrat council. But ministerial control over elections to the Cortes remained absolute, driving Progresistas and Democrats together into a policy of *retramiento* after the elections of 1863.²⁰

The problem for the Liberal Union lay in the ever-widening gulf between the political and the constitutional nations. At one extreme, the court of Queen Isabel, herself prey to the advice of her confessor, Father Claret, increasingly became a focus for 'neo-Catholics' and absolutists, who made their voices heard during ever more frequent cabinet crises. At the other, Democrats and Progresistas discovered that *retramiento* brought them more gains than electoral participation. Encouraged by the occasional victory in municipal elections, and served by a relatively free press, Democrats and Progresistas persisted, through military conspiracies, masonry and *carbonari* associations, to prepare the electorate for universal suffrage, convinced of the inevitability of revolution.

The Italian Policy of the Liberal Union

The political fragility of the Liberal Union made Spaniards of all political complexions peculiarly sensitive to events overseas. Progresistas admired the pragmatic, incrementally representative democracy and progressive foreign policy of Great Britain. For their part, Moderados felt closer to the counter-revolutionary France of Louis-Philippe and Napoleon III, anticipating that France would save Spain from revolution, as it had done in 1823 (and repay Narváez for his support for counter-revolution in France in 1848).²¹ Progresistas felt uncomfortable with the Moderado *entente* with Napoleon III, and with the Queen's ultramontanist and self-appointed guardianship of the Papal States.²²

These differences were placed in sharper relief by the struggles for Italian unification. O'Donnell and the Progresistas favoured recognition of the Kingdom of Italy, seeing the likely loss of the Pope's temporal power as an inevitable consequence of the modern age. The Court and Moderados, by contrast, were distressed at the collapse of the Bourbons in Parma and southern Italy and horrified at the humiliation of Pius IX. However, in contrast to 1848, from the moment that Napoleon III joined Victor Emanuel and Cavour in backing Piedmontese expansion, Spain found herself isolated in Europe on the Italian issue. In any case, with the armed forces tied up in a colonial war in Morocco, Isabel II was in no position to intervene militarily, either to defend the Pope or to back her cousin Francesco II in recapturing the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily from his exile in Rome. For four years (until June 1865), the Liberal Union withheld recognition of the Kingdom of Italy, further alienating Progresistas from the monarchy and dramatizing Spain's isolation and weakness in Europe.²³

The accession of a progressive constitutional monarchy in Portugal in 1863, inspired by that of Piedmont, added to the sense of isolation and encirclement felt by Moderados, particularly in the face of mounting pan-Iberian and pan-Latin sentiments among the ever-conspiring exile community of Spanish Democrats in Lisbon. Talk of an Iberian union, then of a possible Braganza-Savoy marriage to replace the now isolated Bourbon rump in Spain, compounded the fears of the Isabeline regime.²⁴ Would Portugal now become Spain's Piedmont? Not unnaturally, Spain's already bearded and Phrygian-hatted Democrats began to see themselves as potential Garibaldis.²⁵

Such cross-fertilization between Spanish and Italian Democrats was well advanced long before the Risorgimento. Although Spanish Democrats looked to France for ideas, organization and strategy, the Italian experience seemed more relevant to their predicament.²⁶ Democrats in Spain and southern Italy could trace common roots in *carbonari* associations and the struggle against Bourbon despotism.²⁷ Both parties faced the challenge of organizing popular support in agrarian societies in which restricted suffrage and illiteracy were the norm.²⁸ Yet the task of Democrats in southern Spain and southern Italy was made less daunting by the fact that people lived compactly, in large agro-urban communities that were hard to police. Moreover, the

ancien régime (the Church and nobility) in the 'mediodías' of Spain and Italy had been already weakened by precocious Liberal reforms applied since the late eighteenth century.²⁹ Finally, the new secular successor states in Spain and southern Italy remained weak, while local politics had become highly factionalized, offering Democrats potential footholds.

Facing similar predicaments, Spanish and Italian democratic leaders were also in direct contact with each other. During the 1850s, Cádiz utopian socialist, Fernando Garrido, maintained close contact with Mazzini on behalf of 'Young Spain', while also representing Spanish Democrats on the European Central Democratic Committee.³⁰ In 1859, exiled Spanish Democrats in Lisbon agreed to organize an Iberian legion to fight with Garibaldi in Italy.³¹ Although this project was temporarily abandoned after the death of Sixto Cámara, the principal Democrat organizer, his close ally, Fernando Garrido, continued over the subsequent four years to organize support for his Italian counterparts in the belief that Italians would come to the help of Spain's own imminent 'risorgimiento'.³² Garibaldi's gratitude to Garrido for his efforts in raising the Iberian legion is confirmed in a letter he wrote upon learning of Spain's 'Glorious Revolution' in September 1868. Sending his congratulations, Garibaldi added that 'the Italian Republican Party proposes sending a corps of volunteers to Spain to help consolidate its ideals'.³³ This pan-Latin idealism culminated in 1870 when, upon hearing of the fall of Louis Napoleon, Garibaldi resigned his seat in the Italian congress and travelled to Marseilles to organize a force of Italian, Spanish and Portuguese sympathizers of the beleaguered French Republic.³⁴

Sympathy for the Italian patriotic struggle was not confined to Spain's Democrat leadership. From 1859, local Democrat associations began to choose Garibaldi as their patron.³⁵ In September 1860, *El Pueblo*, a Democrat newspaper, issued a free portrait of the Italian Democrat while continuing, during the winter and spring of 1860–1, to serialize biographical fragments about the 'Hero of Marsala', written by Alexander Dumas and George Sand.³⁶ In August 1863, Manuel Rodríguez, alias 'El Americano', a prominent Democrat from the town of Santa Cruz de Alhama, was arrested for teaching a crowd in Ardales (Málaga) to sing the Hymn of Garibaldi. Only weeks after his release, Rodríguez was reported to be gathering signatures from

men working on the construction of the Córdoba–Málaga railway, offering to send Garibaldi, on their behalf, a letter wishing him a swift recovery from wounds suffered on the battlefield of Aspromonte in August 1862.³⁷ In April 1864, Trinidad Moreno, leading Democrat in Ventas de Zafarraya, a remote mountain village in western Granada, wrote to the Italian general congratulating him on his recovery from this wound.³⁸ And, as we shall see, during the summer of 1864 Democrats in this region awaited the arrival of Garibaldi and his generals, not in millennial expectation but in conspiratorial readiness, to lead the revolution against the Liberal Union.

The Evolution of Spain's Insurrectionary Tradition

It is not hard to imagine why Garibaldi should have attracted so much interest among Spain's Democrats (or provoked so much fear within the Liberal Union). The charismatic adventurer reappeared on the European scene just at the moment when in Spain the insurrectionist strategy favoured by Progresistas and Democrats seemed to have exhausted itself. Between 1808 and 1848, Spanish Progresistas and their Liberal forebears had seen the army as the key to unlocking any constitutional advance. Until 1856, senior army officers had fulfilled this service, making Spain the envy of revolutionaries elsewhere in Europe. The heroes and martyrs of Spanish Liberalism — Riego, Torrijos, Espartero — were all military men. The 'Hymn to Riego' (leader of the Cádiz revolt in 1820) had become Spain's 'Marseillaise'.

During the 'bienio progresista' (1854–6), the assumption that army officers would secure constitutional advances received a knock. As Progresistas hesitated over replacing the 1845 constitution, O'Donnell and the Moderados stole a march, brought down Espartero, and demobilized the National Militias. Reporting the events in Spain between 1849 and 1856, Karl Marx admired the steely decisiveness of the counter-revolutionary Moderado Ramón María Narváez, as he abhorred the dithering of the Progresista Espartero.³⁹ After the Bienio, with the exception of General Juan Prim in the 1868 revolution and Manuel Ruiz y Zorrilla in the 1870s, the Spanish army became a steadily less Liberal and more reactionary institution.⁴⁰ The Spanish insurrectionist tradition passed, instead, to civilians.

In the conspiracies hatched by leftist Progresistas and Democrats between 1857 and 1868, although civilian leaders still counted on the suborning of officers and sergeants, they placed increased emphasis upon civilian associations and conspiratorial links. Four overlapping networks of propaganda, diffusion and conspiratorial activity developed. First, senior Democrats, such as Garrido, maintained their links with Mazzini's 'Democratic International', and with groups of Spanish exiles in Portugal. Second, masonry helped to integrate and provide cover for national, regional and local networks of Progresistas and Democrats. Third, Democrat newspapers, such as *El Pueblo*, *La Discusión* and *La Democracia*, provided an effective and territorially comprehensive means for the diffusion of foreign, national and local news, through nationwide networks of correspondents and newsagents. Finally, revived *carbonari* associations were expected to ensure the mass support when the call for insurrection came.

Andalucía and the Insurrectionary Tradition

The conspiratorial geography of Spain over the period of the Liberal Union remained much the same as before the Bienio, although with greater emphasis upon organizing the countryside, particularly the agro-towns of Andalucía, and less upon the more developed, Catalan industrial fringe and cities, such as Barcelona, Valencia and Saragossa, which had been so assertive in 1854–6, but whose militias had been so defenceless in the face of Moderado counter-revolution.⁴¹

In Andalucía, between 1856 and 1868, Progresista and Democrat conspiracy was continuous and attempts at insurrection almost an annual event. In November 1856, Sixto Cámara, Romualdo de la Fuente and Bernardo García mounted an unsuccessful revolt in Málaga. In June 1857, Cámara and Fernando Garrido planned an uprising in Seville, which was infiltrated by government informers. The movement went ahead without its leaders and culminated in the execution of several hundred rebels in the Sierra de Cádiz, on orders of General Narváez. In July 1859, anticipating Democrat and army uprisings in Badajoz, Cádiz and Antequera, Sixto Cámara entered Extremadura from Portugal. Again, the regime's intelligence proved effective. The

plot in Badajoz was foiled and Cámara died of thirst near Olivenza on his retreat to Portugal. Garrido was imprisoned in Cádiz. Exemplary punishments (public garrotting) were then meted out on the army sergeants involved in the conspiracy.⁴²

The death of Sixto Cámara, the Democrats' most energetic and adventurous leader, was a great blow to the party. The conspiratorial cell of Democrat political exiles in Lisbon was now leaderless. Before the revolution of 1868, no Democrat of Cámara's stature was prepared to step forward as the party's senior insurrectionist. Plans for the formation of an Iberian Legion to be sent to Italy were interrupted.⁴³ Democrats in Madrid and provincial cities were hounded into exile. The strategy of involving the army through the suborning of sergeants was discredited. Serious divisions appeared within the party over the wisdom of insurrection.⁴⁴

The Garibaldi Cult and the Uprising at Loja, 1859–61

In the wake of Sixto Cámara's death, the Italian Risorgimento came at a time when the confidence of Spanish Democrats in insurrection as the way forward was at low ebb. Recalling Spain's own patriotic war of independence against the French in 1808, the Italian struggle for unification dramatized the failure of Liberal Spain to reform a Bourbon regime that seemed poised upon a return to absolutism. Progresistas and Democrats viewed events in Italy with mounting fascination and envy. In particular, Garibaldi's successes in southern Italy rekindled Democrat enthusiasm for the idea of patriotic struggle.

Throughout 1859 and 1860, *La Discusión*, the main Democrat newspaper, documented events in Italy in a 'Weekly Review of the War in Italy'.⁴⁵ Portraits of 'el simpático Garibaldi', mounted in passe-partouts for the modest price of 6 reales, were offered to readers.⁴⁶ *El Pueblo*, from its first edition on 1 September 1860, followed suit. Readers were fed a steady diet of stories documenting Garibaldi's heroic, indeed miraculous, achievements in Italy.⁴⁷ The *garibaldino* erudition of *El Pueblo* readers could be enhanced by the serialization of the 'Memorias de Garibaldi' by Alexander Dumas, or by ordering the *Historia del General Garibaldi* by Emilio Montes, for only 3 reales.⁴⁸ Doubts over the wisdom of belonging to secret societies could be

dispelled by reading about the history of *carbonari* associations in Italy and their contribution to the cause of liberty, democracy, national unity and international brotherhood. By publishing the programme of the Italian Democratic Party in April 1861, *El Pueblo* gave comfort and encouragement to provincial Democrat subscribers that the programme of triumphant Italian democracy was identical to their own.⁴⁹

El Pueblo readers could also witness, and even contribute to, a very public debate about the wisdom of insurrection and the place of Socialism within the Democrat party. Democrat moderates, such as the Valencian José María Orense (Marqués de Albaida) and the *sevillano* José Nicolás Rivero, believed the insurrections organized by the exile community in Lisbon, which had led to the death of Cámara, to have been fruitless gestures. They argued that, while Democrats should always be prepared, they should be patient until conditions were more propitious. In reply, Fernando Garrido and the Catalan Democrat Ceferino Tressera urged continual perseverance. They upheld Garibaldi as the perfect example of a leader who took chances and did not simply sit and wait for an appropriate moment:

Until now, Garibaldi has come out of his risky enterprise so well, not, as you claim, for having waited twelve years since his famous defence of Rome before going to Sicily, but for a mixture of fortuitous circumstances, which for him have been favourable, but which had been inauspicious for Pisaconi some years earlier. Garibaldi, I repeat, has taken a risk.

For the true Democrat, simply to be prepared was not enough. He should also organize, conspire and strike whenever possible, rather than just wait patiently so as not to alarm the middle classes.⁵⁰

In spite of the inspiration derived from Garibaldi's successes, the confidence of the Democrat national directorate was nevertheless shattered by the death of Sixto Cámara. The swiftness and effectiveness of the army's response to insurrection reminded Spanish Democrats that they faced less favourable political circumstances than their Italian counterparts. The Liberal Union was not slow to respond to the danger of the Italian example. José Posada y Herrera, authoritarian Minister of the Interior (known as the 'Grand Elector' for his Mastery of electoral fraud), stepped up the pursuit of Democrats and Protestants and increased the surveillance of masonry and secret societies. During the winter of 1860/1, repression varied between the

prevention of blind broadsheet sellers in Madrid from announcing news of Garibaldi's victories,⁵¹ to the imprisonment of Protestants in Málaga and Granada,⁵² to the uncovering in Antequera (Málaga) of a secret society entitled 'La Sociedad Secreta Carbonaria Socialista Garibaldina de Antequera', with an estimated membership of more than 6000 factory workers and agricultural day labourers.⁵³ The editors of *El Pueblo* observed bitterly that priests who burned portraits of Garibaldi in Asturian villages, or who used village festivals in Gaucín (Sierra de Cádiz) for raising funds for sending to Pius IX, were praised by the same regime that detained Democrats for no other cause than showing an interest in foreign affairs.⁵⁴ This tone of ironic detachment from events in the provinces, adopted by the editors of *El Pueblo*, was designed to disguise their knowledge of continuing, clandestine conspiratorial activity in these regions, and to defend themselves against press censorship.

The nipping in the bud of the three major Democrat insurrections since the Bienio had meant that, although the higher ranks of the party had faced repression and exile, the lower levels, structured around masonic lodges and *carbonari* cells, remained largely intact. Moreover, international connections were kept alive through Fernando Garrido's energetic arms-raising activities in France, Belgium and Great Britain, as well as through direct, masonic links with the exile community in Lisbon, particularly through the 'Gran Oriente Lusitano de la Masonería Ibérica'.⁵⁵ The extent to which Democrat organization had taken root in eastern Andalucía was revealed during the summer of 1861 when Rafael Pérez del Alamo, blacksmith and veterinarian of Loja, took command of a peasant uprising.⁵⁶

At daybreak on 29 June 1861, only three months after condemning his co-religionists in the neighbouring town of Zafarraya for holding a riotous meeting at which 'Vivas a Garibaldi' had been offered, the bearded Pérez del Alamo (wearing a straw hat, dressed in short, black riding jacket and an open topped white shirt, brandishing an American revolver,⁵⁷ and mounted on a white horse) led 600 poorly armed men into the southern Córdoba town of Iznájar.⁵⁸ Here, in the municipal council chamber, he declared for the rights of man, liberty of the fatherland, freedom of the press and opinion, and respect for property and the home.⁵⁹

The seven-day insurrection which ensued involved some

20,000 day labourers from towns in provinces of Málaga, Córdoba and Granada, attracted considerable international attention, and filled the columns of Spain's numerous national newspapers for months after its suppression. Ever since, it has occupied historians in attempts to define the movement. Upon rumours that the rebels had called for 'Death to Pius IX, Long live the Republic', Conservative contemporaries accused the movement of being a British-backed, Protestant plot to overthrow the Bourbon monarchy.⁶⁰ Democrat newspapers, disavowing any knowledge of the movement, saw Posada-Herrera's provincial police, along with the Civil Guard, as responsible for precipitating Pérez del Alamo's decision to launch a rebellion. Their aim, it was suggested, was to discredit the Democrats in order to justify a further clampdown on opposition. Social historians have variously interpreted the events as an example of Andalucía's 'indigenous socialism', as a 'spartacist' slave revolt of landless day-labourers, as Spain's first popular revolution without the involvement of the military, as eastern Andalucía's first reapers' strike, etc.⁶¹

Although observers commented on Pérez del Alamo's 'garibaldino' appearance, and reported the leader to have proclaimed 'Viva la República, viva Garibaldi and viva la Libertad!' at the start of the rebellion in Iznájar, no historian to date has reflected upon the value of the Italian example for understanding the 'sucesos de Loja'.⁶² Yet, as the Loja correspondent for both *La Discusión* and *El Pueblo*, Pérez del Alamo would have been perfectly informed about events in Italy. The secret society in nearby Antequera, which was expected to provide at least 8000 rebels (had it not been discovered, and its leaders arrested), proclaimed Garibaldi centrally in its title. And it is significant that an appeal to Spanish patriotism, but no reference to republicanism, socialism or protestantism, was at the centre of Pérez del Alamo's proclamation at Iznájar on 29 June 1861.⁶³ Finally, unlike all previous and later nineteenth-century Spanish revolutions, the Loja uprising got under way unaccompanied by any barracks revolt or *pronunciamiento* by a senior military figure. Inspired by Garibaldi's success in attracting a rebel army from the Sicilian countryside around a few hundred patriotic volunteers, Pérez del Alamo anticipated that his 600 rebels at Iznájar, Córdoba's remotest district, would attract the region's day labourers and small farmers (already formed into work gangs

having just completed the harvest) in their thousands, to join him in a triumphal march upon the provincial capital in Granada. For a week, this expectation was not disappointed.

The Loja uprising of July 1861 is not our main subject. Yet, given the internationalist, pan-Latinist remit of this article, it is useful to point out characteristics the Loja revolt shared both with the *carbonari* uprisings in France during the early 1820s against the Bourbon Restoration, studied by Alan Spitzer,⁶⁴ and with the Montagnard uprisings of 1851–2 in southern France against Louis Napoleon's coup d'état, studied by Maurice Agulhon and Ted Margadant.⁶⁵

In 1821, in eastern and central-west France, an elaborate, hierarchical, *carbonari* association mimicked the centralization of the neo-Bourbon state it hoped to replace. The leaders of *carbonari* cells maintained close contact through the Grand Orient Lodge. The strategy of rebellion was for 'armed civilian bands to rally to provincial centres under the tricolour and send swelling columns onto the capital'. Conspirators also counted on subverting military units, particularly sergeants. The rebellion left a republican martyrology of suborned and guillotined sergeants, which has endured into this century. As we have seen, the Loja uprising possessed all of these characteristics. However, in at least three respects, Loja was different.

French carbonarism in the early 1820s was entirely secular. No oath was offered to 'the grand master of the universe and the glorious Saint Theobald'. Members merely vowed to uphold fundamental principles — equality before the law, freedom of the press, the election of officers of the National Guard — and promised never to usurp the authority of the French people. In eastern Andalucía initiation ceremonies were held in the presence of a crucifix (and often a skull and dagger as well!) and the authority of Saint Theobald was also invoked.⁶⁶

The second difference was in leadership. In 1822, French conspirators were in awe of the Spanish insurrectionary model of the *pronunciamiento*, dazzled by the recent example of Riego and Quiroga in bringing down absolutism with a few military parades.⁶⁷ Although many soldiers from provincial regiments (particularly soldiers from 'Provinciales de Jaén') joined the Loja revolt, there was no attempt to attract a prominent general to provide a symbolic head to the movement in the way that the French rebels in 1822 sought to attract the pensioned revolutionary

generals Lafayette and Berton as figureheads. Perhaps needing to make a virtue of a necessity, Pérez del Alamo cast himself in this role, mindful, no doubt, of the recent example of Garibaldi, who the Loja veterinarian clearly admired and imitated sartorially. No 'pronunciamiento' from a garrison was therefore anticipated. Rather, former members of the National Militia, so ruthlessly demobilized by Narváez in 1856, were expected spontaneously to take to arms throughout Spain and to resume their role as guardians of national sovereignty and exemplars of patriotic virtue.⁶⁸

The third point of difference is in the social depth of the two carbonarisms. In France, carbonarism in this period drew support almost exclusively from the 'incipient provincial middle class' and 'recruited almost no noblemen and few wage earners'.⁶⁹ Eastern Andalusian carbonarism, by contrast, although captained by the middle class — veterinarians, pharmacists, small landowners, priests, public officials — was extremely successful at recruiting artisans, factory workers, agricultural day labourers and estate dependants.

In its civic rather than military character, and its multi-class backing, Loja resembles far more the Montagnard, democrat-socialist uprisings in southern France against Louis Napoleon's *coup d'état* in 1851–2. Both took place in regions formerly renowned for their royalism and religious fanaticism, and where conversion to democratic socialism was a recent phenomenon.⁷⁰ Both movements arose out of recent electoral disputes and municipal feuds, representing more 'universal suffrage on the march' than armed rebellions.⁷¹ With poorly armed, democratic columns, headed by men dressed in their Sunday best, carrying party banners, accompanied by wind bands playing patriotic tunes and operatic arias rather than military music (emphasizing their legality and moderation), the intention seems to have been to overwhelm the regime with a show of civic force in the expectation that opposition would simply melt away.⁷² As it happened, both movements were swiftly defeated by disciplined national armies.

The failure of the Loja rebellion, and the harsh repression that followed, did not deter further conspiracy in eastern Andalucía. In 1863–4, in the same region that had provided the hearth for the revolt (the borderlands of the three provinces of Córdoba, Málaga and Granada), Democrat conspirators, who had con-

tinued to meet in *carbonari* cells linked through the Grand Orient Lodge, lived in expectation of a general uprising, this time led not by a Spanish veterinarian, but by one of Garibaldi's own generals, if not by Garibaldi himself.

Democrat Conspiracy in Granada, 1863–4

Between his defeat at the hands of the Piedmontese army at Aspromonte in July 1862, and his re-enlistment as Italy's only successful general in the disastrous war with Austria in 1866, Garibaldi returned to his island home of Caprera (Sardinia). By spring 1864, he had recovered sufficiently from his serious leg wound to visit England. In London, he received what *The Daily Telegraph* called 'the most memorable ovation that has ever been given at any period of the world's history', attracting a spontaneous demonstration of an estimated 600,000: 'No King, no Emperor, has ever been accorded such a triumph.' When he was not being fêted by the British aristocracy, or visiting the House of Lords, or meeting the boys of Eton College, or inspecting the British fleet at Portsmouth, he was calling on fellow democratic-socialist leaders exiled in London: Alexander Herzen, Louis Blanc, Alexandre Ledru-Rollin and Karl Blind.⁷³ Gildea observes how Garibaldi's visit to England coincided with, perhaps even partly catalysed, the revival of a radical movement of constitutional and social reform (as well as with the launching, in September 1864, of the International Working Men's Association).⁷⁴ Spanish Democrats reported on the popular jubilation attending Garibaldi's visit to England with undisguised envy.⁷⁵

The country that had provided Mazzini with a home since the 1830s soon found the presence of Garibaldi too disturbing to the peace. At the end of April 1864, the 'Hero of Marsala' was politely invited to continue his journey.⁷⁶ He left Southampton on board the Duke of Sutherland's private yacht, the 'Ondine', stopping on 4 May 1864 in Gibraltar, where he received visits from numerous admirers (including a poor Gibraltarian branch of his family), before continuing his journey to Caprera.⁷⁷ News of Garibaldi's swift departure from Gibraltar would have been received with considerable relief by the Spanish authorities. Since January 1864, the civil governor in Granada had become convinced that the 'Dos de Mayo' patriotic celebrations would

provide the occasion for an insurrection led by Garibaldi or one of his generals, that would break out in the Serranía de Ronda, to which the towns of western Granada had been preparing to send their contingents.

Given the catalogue of failed Progresista and Democrat rebellions between 1856 and 1868, it is unsurprising that there is no mention of this aborted insurrection, even in the regional, let alone the national historiography. To enter the history books, insurrections at least need to be launched. This revolution got no further than the records of the provincial police and the Ministry of the Interior. What explains this lacuna?

After the failure of Pérez del Alamo's revolt in July 1861, *carbonari*-based conspiracies, perhaps correctly, were considered dead letters, as much by the provincial police who had succeeded in infiltrating the secret societies as by most national Progresista and Democrat leaders. Moreover, the fact that the monarchy was eventually brought down in September 1868 by a fairly conventional sequence of Progresista-inspired barracks and naval revolts, aided by social unrest accompanying the poor harvests of 1867 and 1868, has tended to obscure the tenacity of clandestine Democrat opposition to the regime on the local level.⁷⁸ Yet, in towns and the countryside of eastern Andalucía, Democrats, often in alliance with Progresistas, can be observed fighting elections, while also organizing popular support through secret societies, throughout the final six years of the Isabeline regime.

The events in eastern Andalucía in 1863–4 therefore deserve attention for what they reveal about the political world of provincial Democrats. With the Progresista *retrainamiento* in 1863, provincial Democrats found ready allies and substantially improved prospects for challenging the regime. Apart from shedding light on local party alliances and factionalism, the events of 1863–4 also reveal how provincial Democrats responded to a greater assertiveness and activity on the part of Democrat leaders, particularly Fernando Garrido, on the international front.

Before uncovering this forgotten Garibaldino conspiracy in eastern Andalucía, we need first to glance at the national scene. The fall of General O'Donnell's six-year 'Long Parliament' in March 1863 signalled the end of any broader involvement of Progresistas within the Liberal Union, leaving Moderados even more fully in control of government and Court until the revolution of 1868. After the convocation of new elections of August

1863, the Progresistas officially announced a policy of *retraiamiento*.⁷⁹ The Democrats, although divided over whether they should organize a separate *retraiamiento*, or collaborate with the Progresistas, followed suit.⁸⁰ In the spring of 1864, General Prim, war-hero and acknowledged leader of the party (along with Salustiano Olózaga), began organizing the military conspiracy which would culminate in the Revolution of 1868. On 2 May 1864, at an open-air banquet attended by Progresistas and Democrats in Madrid's Campos Eliseos to commemorate the uprising against the French occupation in 1808, Prim announced that, within two years and a day, they would be in power. Along with necessary protestations of loyalty to Queen Isabel II, General Prim added that the 'traditional obstacles' (meaning the Constitution of 1845) would then be removed.⁸¹

On the same day that Progresistas and Democrats banqueted in Madrid, Democrats in eastern Andalucía expected Garibaldi to cross into Spain from Gibraltar (where he was expected to disembark on his journey back from England) to lead an insurrection.⁸² Although this was to have been the culmination of a regional Democrat conspiracy, it is inconceivable that such a movement would have gone ahead without the knowledge of General Prim and Progresista conspiratorial cells within the army.⁸³ The Catholic newspaper *La Regeneración* credited Olózaga, a Progresista with republican inclinations (who modelled himself on Cavour even down to his personal attire), with the choice of Garibaldi to lead an insurrection in Andalucía. As a committed Iberianist, what better figure than Garibaldi to complete the topographical analogy with the Italian Risorgimento? The only obvious Spanish candidate to assume the head of a Progresista–Democrat uprising apart from Prim, who was holding back until his own preparations — particularly the necessary diplomatic initiatives — were more advanced, was Espartero. But the Duque de Victoria would never have been accepted by Democrats, who had not forgiven him for repressing Barcelona's Democrats in 1855.⁸⁴ Given this deficit in domestic leadership, the idea of an Andalusian insurrection led by Garibaldi, or by one of his generals, is perhaps not so implausible, even if local authorities in western Granada considered the idea of an Italian leading the Spanish Revolution as a fantasy of the disturbed mind of Ramón Calvo Jiménez, the young leader of Loja's Democrats.⁸⁵

Sixto Cámara's strategy of combining Democrat revolution in Spain with Iberian unification, within a broader European democratic offensive, continued to exercise a powerful influence upon Spanish Democrats after the prophet's death in July 1859. During the winter of 1860/1, while *El Pueblo* published long lists of the names of Democrats contributing to the maintenance of Cámara's impoverished widow, and to the cost of exhuming the martyr's remains in order to return them from Badajoz to Madrid, senior Democrat leaders — Fernando Garrido, Romualdo de la Fuente and Nicolás Díaz Pérez — worked to bring Cámara's vision of an Iberian Legion to fruition.⁸⁶ The arrest in October 1861 in Badajoz of Díaz Pérez, accused of distributing Protestant propaganda and rallying field workers to his cause, is evidence of the persistence of a joint Iberian-Italian democratic strategy.⁸⁷ Further evidence came in November 1861 when 100 republicans, disciples of Mazzini, captained by the young (seventeen-year-old) Ricardo López, rose up in Medinaceli (north of Madrid).⁸⁸ In the face of mounting persecution of Democrats in Spain in 1861 and 1862, fragmenting the masonic and *carbonari* links that had co-ordinated the domestic front, the international, particularly the Italian, connections became proportionately more important.⁸⁹

During 1863-4, the activities of Spanish Democrats on the international level, particularly Eduardo Ruiz Pons in Oporto and the peripatetic Fernando Garrido, reached an unprecedented pitch. In April 1863 Ruiz Pons, on behalf of the 'centro revolucionario de la Unión Ibérica', attempted unsuccessfully to raise the northern (reflecting Pons's Galician origins) and eastern provinces of Spain in rebellion against the monarchy. At the same time, the Marqués de la Ribera, Spain's anxious ambassador in Lisbon, reported on the official visit of two senior Italian army officers to the Portuguese court. After expressing their anti-Bourbon sentiments, the Italian officers had continued their journeys to Madrid and Cádiz to meet members of the Spanish opposition.⁹⁰ Clara Lida's account of Fernando Garrido's efforts elsewhere in Europe in the winter of 1863/4 shows that De la Ribera's concerns were not exaggerated.⁹¹

The Iberian-Italian democratic axis became more marked during the winter of 1863/4 as Italy and France reached an agreement over the withdrawal of troops from Rome in exchange for Florence becoming the new capital. To Mazzini and

Garibaldi, this conservative compromise must have seemed an indefinite postponement of Italian unification with the national capital in Rome. The publication of Pius IX's 'Syllabus of Errors', exhorting Catholics to crusade against liberalism and democracy, added to the sense of political exclusion and persecution felt by Democrats in Italy and Spain. Evidence of this convergence of Italian and Spanish Democrat anger and frustration over their mutual political exclusion can be found in the correspondence columns of *El Pueblo* during the second half of 1863.⁹²

In December 1863, Mazzini sent emissaries to Spain who visited many parts of the country, especially Andalucía, to assess the prospects for a successful Democrat insurrection. Although six months later, Italian officers would consider Spain's revolutionary preparations to be too incomplete to risk Italian involvement, in late 1863 it seems that their prognosis was more sanguine.⁹³ In March and April 1864, Spanish diplomatic agents reported Fernando Garrido to be in close contact with Mazzini in London, with Garibaldi in Italy, and with Spanish exiles in various European cities, but particularly with the circle of exiles headed by Eduardo Ruiz Pons and Romualdo de la Fuente in Oporto and Lisbon. Even more significantly, Lida has found evidence that in March 1864, 'after meeting with Mazzini in London, [Garrido] was in Marseilles buying and sending arms to Spain to initiate the revolution'.⁹⁴

Was this the revolution for which the Democrats in eastern Andalucía had been preparing so carefully since 1863? Although no direct connection has been found between activities of exiled Spanish Democrats, itinerant Garibaldino generals, and the Democrat leaders in Andalusian towns who lived in expectation of a general insurrection in the summer of 1864, a conspiracy involving some co-ordination between these levels seems likely. In April 1863, Ruiz Pons's abortive uprising in northern and eastern Spain had echoes in Andalucía.⁹⁵ Exterior promptings may explain the divisions reported in April 1863 among Loja's Democrats, culminating in an attempt on the life of Democrat leader, Rafael Pérez del Alamo.⁹⁶ These local divisions echoed deepening national differences among Democrats throughout 1863 and 1864, principally over whether and how to collaborate with the Progresistas in *retramiento* and over the meaning of socialism. In December 1863 these differences resulted in the

appearance of a third national Democratic newspaper: *La Democracia*.

Directed by Emilio Castelar, *La Democracia* distanced itself from the incipient socialism of *La Discusión* and then from the policy of collaboration with the Progresistas favoured by *El Pueblo*, urging instead a much more aggressive and conspicuous stance by Democrats against the Monarchy, taking advantage of the relaxation of restrictions upon political assembly decreed by Florencio Rodríguez Vaamonde, Minister of the Interior, in August 1863.⁹⁷ The greater activity and volatility of local Democrats must partly have been a response to this decree, combined with Castelar's insurrectionary promptings. Circulation of *La Democracia* in the towns of western Granada was reported to have increased at the expense of *La Discusión* during 1864.⁹⁸

The first evidence of Democrat conspiracy in the province of Granada since the suppression of the Loja uprising was uncovered by the city of Granada's police in the summer of 1863. In July 'two foreigners with beards' (Eduardo Roniger, a French traveller, and Emilio Lattes, an Italian silversmith) and 'three vecinos of Granada' were arrested in the Fonda de los Siete Suelos having been overheard toasting 'freedom of religion', 'socialism' and 'Garibaldi', while calling for 'death to Pius IX', during their breakfast. Emilio Lattes had recently been seen in the company of Ramón Calvo of Loja and others, who together 'had sung hymns to Garibaldi and offered "vivas" to the Republic'. Moreover, Rafael Pérez del Alamo was reported to have been a frequent recent visitor to the Italian's silver workshop.⁹⁹ Although Francisco del Castillo, civil governor of Granada, was extremely relaxed about the state of public order in the province, his air of calm was not shared by the Minister of the Interior, Rodríguez Vaamonde, who had received information of a co-ordinated Democrat conspiracy extending into the neighbouring provinces of Jaén and Almería.¹⁰⁰ Later in July, Rodríguez Vaamonde reported that army officers had departed from Madrid to assume the direction of a revolutionary outbreak in the Serranía de Ronda.¹⁰¹

From this evidence, it is clear that, during the spring and summer of 1863, a Progressive-Democrat conspiracy existed in Andalucía, extending from Granada, through Loja, Ardales and the Serranía de Ronda (Málaga), at least as far as Seville, where Rafael Pérez del Alamo, pardoned by the queen in September

1862, had taken up residence.¹⁰² This conspiracy also extended south to Almería, and north through Jaén to Madrid, where links clearly existed with Ruiz Pons's conspiracy in northern Spain, Catalonia and Valencia. In Emilio Lattes, the Italian silversmith, there is evidence of an Italian connection, useful not only as a source of Garibaldino patriotic songs, but also perhaps as a supplier of forged money or maker of arms, both of which would become a key factors in the conspiracy in 1864.

It is quite possible, of course, that this Italian connection was no more than the admiration and enthusiasm felt by Spanish Democrats for Garibaldi and his heroic achievements. Manuel Rodríguez's signature-gathering in Ardales (Málaga) in August and September 1863, to wish Garibaldi recovery from his wounds, might be included under Beales's heading of 'the politics of Italian enthusiasm',¹⁰³ as might the letter sent by Trinidad Moreno of Zafarraya to Garibaldi in April 1864, congratulating the general on his recovery from the wound received two years earlier at Aspromonte.¹⁰⁴ However, Rodríguez, leader of the Democrats of Alhama and Santa Cruz (Granada), was not gathering signatures in Ardales purely out of sympathy for Garibaldi's injury. He was also signing up ('apuntando') *malagueño* day labourers and railway workers, who would be ready to answer the call to arms.¹⁰⁵ Similarly, Trinidad Moreno, leader of the Democrats of Ventas de Zafarraya (Granada), as well as hailing in his letter the general's recovery, also stated that 'we await with impatience the order from the Illustrious Garibaldi. Once he resumes his rapid journey among all oppressed peoples, we will be able to begin the honourable crusade against the oppressive tyrants.'¹⁰⁶ Police reports enable us to confirm the importance of the Italian connection in providing Democrat leaders with a figurehead, in Garibaldi, and with an emotional issue, in Italian unification, around which to organize resistance to the Moderado-dominated Bourbon regime. However, they do not furnish definitive proof that Garibaldi, or one of his generals, was poised to enter Spain and lead the Revolution.

In January 1864, Antonio Guerola, civil governor of Granada, paid an administrative visit to Loja, where he toured the schools, the municipal granary, the workhouse, the hospital and the prison, and attended a long council meeting in which 'I took notes on public order and "gente revolucionaria".'¹⁰⁷ Although

Guerola, having served formerly as governor of Málaga during the Loja insurrection in 1861, was as aware as any of Isabel II's public servants of the dangers of small-town Democrats, he nevertheless considered the public order in the province of Granada to be secure:

'Vigilance', this branch is not important in Granada. This province was reputed to have been the most tranquil in Spain, and would still have kept this reputation had it not been for what the Loja upheaval in 1861 revealed about the spread of revolutionary elements there. Yet, in spite of this memory, Granada, with respect to public order, was not Málaga, or Barcelona, or even Seville . . . Public order did not take up much of my time.¹⁰⁸

Although, on his return from Loja to Granada, the civil governor would have found a letter on his desk that surely would have increased his concern about the state of public order in Granada, he was saved from having to act on the information contained in it. On 25 January 1864 this experienced Democrat hunter was recalled to Madrid to assume the civil governorship of Barcelona.

In this letter, the military commander of the province detailed the activities of Andrés Pérez del Alamo, brother of Rafael. A corporal in charge of the stage post near 'El Cortijo de las Mozas', Pérez del Alamo's olive estate near Loja, had observed Andrés's frequent visits to Málaga, on the pretext of collecting debts, from where he travelled on to meet his brother in his Seville exile. Andrés was also in regular correspondence with Emilio Castelar in Madrid (Castelar was editor of *La Democracia*, the new Democrat newspaper that had increased its circulation in the towns and villages of Granada, at the expense of *La Discusión* and *El Pueblo*). Loja's post-master had intercepted a letter in which Castelar instructed Pérez del Alamo to begin enlisting people for a revolution, as his brother had done in 1861.¹⁰⁹ Here, then, was proof of the survival of the conspiratorial network that had brought western Granada out into open revolt in July 1861. Moreover, the conspiracy was linked to other Andalusian cities, and to Madrid, via Emilio Castelar, rising star of the Democrat Party.¹¹⁰

During February and March 1864, mayors, military commanders and police chiefs reported 'more than the usual agitation' among Democrat leaders throughout the towns of western Granada: Loja, Alhama, Santa Cruz, Zafarraya, Huetor Tajar, Salar, Algarinejo and Montefrío. These same towns had sent contingents to Loja during Pérez del Alamo's revolt in 1861.

Most prominent and vociferous among Democrat activists were those former Loja rebels who had been granted royal pardons in 1862, which they brandished as badges of political immunity. Democrat meetings were being held more openly and frequently, leaders were travelling throughout the countryside persuading day labourers to swear oaths of allegiance, and towns in neighbouring Málaga and Córdoba — notably Iznájar, hearth of the 1861 Loja revolt — were also becoming involved.¹¹¹

Several reports commented on the animated mood of Democrats. In late April, the mayor of Algarinejo reported that ‘the affiliates of the Democrat party meet with greater frequency and it is to be noted in their expressions a certain kind of satisfaction and happiness which appears provocative’.¹¹² Loja’s police chief was quite specific about the reasons for this animation. In his view, the Democrats of Loja were

. . . content and animated . . . [because] . . . among them circulates the belief that in Ronda and its *serranía* there is much fruitful preparation for an imminent uprising, and there are even those who add that a colonel of Garibaldi has already visited, or still is visiting, those towns. Antequera is also involved.¹¹³

By April, then, the provincial authorities had uncovered firm evidence of an international dimension to the Democrat conspiracy. Loja Democrats, led by Ramón Calvo Jiménez, Rafael Pérez del Alamo’s second-in-command during the revolt of July 1861, were reported to be receiving ‘emissaries’ not only from Málaga and other Spanish cities, but also from Portugal and Italy, and even from an Englishman (although he was suspected of being an Aragonese or Catalan).¹¹⁴ These men were visiting towns throughout the extensive *serranías* between Ronda and Almería, which they had divided into three cantons, each under a military commander who would ‘lead and represent them’. They had brought with them large quantities of forged money — ‘two thousand coins of 100 reales to be distributed among the affiliates’ — and orders had been placed with Granada armourers for weapons and gunpowder.¹¹⁵

This alarming report of an imminent general uprising in eastern Andalucía should be treated with some caution, coming as it did from Loja, where the boastful Ramón Calvo (believed by the authorities to be insane) held sway.¹¹⁶ Yet, although Calvo’s promise that ‘on 2 May there will be a *pronunciamiento* in Spain at whose head Garibaldi will place himself, having come from

Gibraltar¹¹⁷ proved in the end to be illusory, his vision of imminent liberation echoed the upsurge of organizational activity, public demonstrations and optimism among Progresistas and Democrats throughout Spain during the first half of 1864.¹¹⁸ This public resurgence of the left was a response to the collapse of the Liberal Union and the attempt by the Ministry of the Count of Miraflores to attract the Progresistas back from *retrainimiento* by such measures as the September 1863 decree granting freedom to hold political meetings. Calvo's tireless activity in the towns of western Granada and eastern Málaga, often in full sight of the authorities, was in part a consequence of this decree.¹¹⁹

A thin, pale young man of between twenty-six and thirty years of age, of medium height with 'high brow and full beard grown to nature': ('coca algo sumida, barba poblada y crecida al natural'), Ramón Calvo Jiménez was different in most respects (apart from his energy and his Garibaldino beard) from his mentor, and now rival for the leadership of Loja's Democrats, Rafael Pérez del Alamo. In contrast to the latter's austere teetotalism, Calvo delighted in doing the rounds of Loja's cafés and billiard halls, accompanied by fellow Democrats from other parts, giving impromptu orations on the future democratic utopia. His favourite speech-line, that 'within three months we will have achieved happiness', was not so empty a promise as the public authorities believed. Police reports record Calvo, accompanied by his personal secretary, José Cuberos, preaching this message, not only on his home patch of western Granada, especially in the towns of Salar, Alhama, Santa Cruz, Zafarraya and Huétor Tajar, but also in the neighbouring Málaga towns of Archidona, Colmenar and Periana.¹²⁰

Calvo's effort to sign up support in Huétor Tajar is significant. As the first town east from Loja across the fertile, irrigated and densely populated Granadan plain ('vega'), Huétor Tajar was the first step on any advance upon the provincial capital. This suggests that Calvo's objective, much like that of Pérez del Alamo in 1861, was to raise the entire province of Granada in revolt. In late April 1864, Calvo narrowly missed capture in Huétor Tajar while unloading forged money brought up on the river Genil by barge.¹²¹ As in June and July 1861, Democrat leaders appreciated the need immediately to reward their affiliates with cash (albeit forged money), to compensate them for laying aside their reaping and thus sacrificing their wages.

The insurrection in western Granada would be met by an uprising in the provincial capital. We have seen how Calvo's links with Democrats in Granada were already well established in the summer of 1863. In 1864 his activity in Granada went beyond hymn-singing with an Italian silversmith, to buying gunpowder and contracting an armourer, one 'García', to supply weapons. Granada possessed an active Democrat party numbering several hundred, some of whom would have been in touch with the conspirators in the western towns of the province.¹²² In spite of Calvo's comings and goings between Loja and Granada, José Pérez Ordóñez, Loja's *alcalde-constitucional*, doubted whether the Loja Democrat enjoyed much sympathy among his co-religionists in the provincial capital. Pérez Ordóñez believed, however, that Calvo might find support among Granada's 'idlers and criminals' ('los osiosos de mala vida y criminales') who would meet the ten to twelve thousand men Calvo had signed up for the revolt in the towns of western Granada.¹²³ The Minister of the Interior had information that Romualdo de la Fuente, the leading Democrat in Málaga, was in close contact with confreres in Granada. However, the civil governor, perhaps not wishing to disturb a sensitive political situation, did not pursue the matter any further.¹²⁴

Early May 1864 saw a frantic level of activity in the towns of western Granada as Democrat leaders drilled their followers in anticipation of the arrival of the foreign military leaders of the revolt. The civil governor remained unruffled in the face of these alarming reports. The mayors of towns with large Democrat parties, such as Alhama and Loja, had assured him that Democrat leaders, however well they had disciplined their followers, would not make a move before a lead was first taken from elsewhere (police intelligence that would be proved correct). The Italians did not appear.¹²⁵ The Democrat conspiracy in western Granada quickly withered.

Would Calvo's conspiracy have been successful had the emissaries of Mazzini and Garibaldi been more adventurous and entered Spain to lead the revolution in May 1864? Would eastern Andalucía have risen against Queen Isabel as it had done fleetingly in July 1861? Of course we will never know. However, evidence from Loja, the town chosen by Castelar for its democratic and patriotic antecedents as a centre for challenging the regime, suggests that there were internal obstacles to a co-ordinated

challenge upon the central power. Loja's Democrats were deeply divided in 1863 and 1864 over ideology (the socialists versus the individualists) and strategy (alliance with the *Progresistas* or a more adventurous course).¹²⁶ Democrats also faced an active *Moderado* opposition in Loja in the form of the local *camarilla* of the 'Espadón [broadsword] de Loja', General Ramón María Narváez, who returned to become Spain's first minister between September 1864 and June 1865.

Throughout 1863 and early 1864, taking advantage of divisions among Loja's Democrats, Narváez pursued his old rival, Rafael Pérez del Alamo, through the courts, counting on the loyal services of his appointee in the *Juzgado civil*, Lorenzo Montero Rodríguez, and the *Moderado* deputy for Loja, Carlos Marfori. In spite of having received a royal pardon in September 1862, Pérez del Alamo was sentenced to a renewed two-year term of exile in Seville, given hefty fines requiring the embargo of his properties in Loja, leading eventually to his imprisonment in Seville for debt.¹²⁷ Apart from placing legal obstacles in the way of his Democrat opponents, Narváez and the *Moderados* worked hard to build up political clienteles throughout the district, especially in Zafarraya, a Democrat stronghold, by promising to set up agricultural credit banks, fund road projects and help with the construction of churches and municipal buildings.¹²⁸ Hence, Democrats in eastern Andalusian towns, apart from their internal divisions and ambiguous relations with *Progresistas*, faced assertive *Moderado* local opposition, and a centralized state which could closely monitor Democrat movements through the provincial police and the Civil Guard. A few Italian officers would not have significantly improved their predicament. Only a revolt within the Spanish army would push the balance in the favour of Democrats and *Progresistas*. For this they had to wait until September 1868.

On three occasions in mid-May 1864, Ramón Calvo requested a passport for Portugal (not realizing that all he needed for his departure was a certificate of residence [*cédula de vecindad*]).¹²⁹ His short spell as leader of western Granada's Democrats had ended.¹³⁰ In an extraordinary switch of allegiance, Calvo ended up later in 1864 in Madrid working as a police commissioner under General Narváez's restored ministry, a post secured for him by Carlos Marfori, *Moderado* congressmen for Loja.¹³¹ By August 1864 Granada's provincial police had switched

their attention to the danger of Emilio Castelar, whose much-publicized visit to Loja and Alhama reanimated the region's Democrats, as it preoccupied the authorities.¹³²

By mid-May, then, the provincial authorities could breathe a sigh of relief in the knowledge that Calvo's attempt to resurrect the Revolution of Loja had failed. However, later in the month, the governor was reminded that the public order of the province was not isolated from its wider European context. A telegraph from his counterpart in Málaga informed him that the 'Condé d'Hainault', a Belgian steamship, having deposited railway equipment, had departed with its remaining cargo of arms which the captain intended to unload on the coast of Granada. Frantic correspondence ensued with the mayors of Alpujarra towns.¹³³ Even more worrying in late June was the uncovering of a Democrat conspiracy, organized by a retired army sergeant 'who reads Madrid newspapers', in the strategic town of Albuñol, which linked Sierra Nevada with the coast. Like the Loja Revolution, this was organized by former members of the National Militia which had been disbanded in 1855.¹³⁴

The Albuñol conspiracy was no isolated affair. Albuñol's Progresista and Democrat conspirators were expecting a delivery of arms and ammunition from Gibraltar, after which they intended to take to the Sierra de Yegen, to extend operations to the entire Alpujarra, thence to join up with rebels from the Serranía de Ronda, Málaga, Córdoba and Jaén.¹³⁵ The Gibraltar connection was confirmed when the governor received news of the departure from Barcelona of the British packet 'Lesprig' carrying seventy-one cases of arms from Marseilles.¹³⁶ Were these the arms gathered in March by Fernando Garrido in Marseilles?

Conclusion

Revolutionaries elsewhere in Europe often looked for inspiration to Spain, a country where revolution seemed to have more protagonists and to face fewer obstacles than at home. In a letter to Emilio Castelar after learning of the Revolution in Spain in September 1868, Mazzini wrote: 'L'Espagne vient de realiser glorieusement une révolution immaculé . . . la placer à la tête des nations européennes.'¹³⁷ Spanish progressive Liberals, Democrats and Republicans did not share this optimism. Spain's great,

nineteenth-century rite of passage into modern nationhood — the war of independence against the French invasion in 1808 — anticipated, by several decades, comparable acts of national self-determination elsewhere in Europe. Yet in most other basic prerequisites of a modern nation state — the separation of Church and State, freedom of conscience, free press and freedom of association, universal suffrage — Spain was a laggard, achieving only an incomplete charter of individual rights during the ‘sexenio revolucionario’ (1868–74) before a long Bourbon restoration set in, during which many constitutional gains were reversed or rendered ineffective. Pioneer of the *pronunciamiento*, seasoned in the art of Liberal insurrection, nineteenth-century Spain was an equally experienced practitioner of reaction and counter-revolution.

In 1864, as in 1848, Spain’s Moderado authorities were confident that corrosive, democratic ideas filtering from overseas could be successfully kept at bay. In spite of the breadth and depth of Democrat conspiracy in the province of Granada during 1863 and 1864, Granada’s governor was confident that, through the judicious use of his administrative powers, and in collaboration with the Church, he could successfully stem the tide of revolution:

I do not deny that here, where politics have always inspired passion, democracy possesses its frenetic champions. And I do not deny that democracy has corroded the imagination of many simple and ignorant people, in the mistaken belief that they will achieve happiness. Democracy is a grim fact throughout the world, as it has also become here in Spain over the past few years, especially in our southern towns. Perhaps in the future, but a long time ahead, it may become a danger for society, but there is an immense difference between this and what today confronts the province under my command.¹³⁸

Democrats would be kept at bay, the governor believed, by a more rigorous enforcement of the law on firearms (particularly banning firearms from casinos, cafés and the streets where arms were often used to intimidate ‘men of order’), by a programme of public works to employ the poor from among whom the Democrats recruited, by episcopal missions to reanimate the village clergy, by the propagation of ‘classical and religious texts which so sweetly provide understanding and moralize the hearts of people’, in short, ‘disarming the revolutionaries legally, and properly moralizing the ordinary people, is the way to defeat these evils’.¹³⁹

In response to the governor's moralizing exhortation, the archbishop of Granada obligingly sent a mission to Alhama de Granada in August 1864 (timed to coincide with the visit of Emilio Castelar) which the village clergy were invited to attend. Meanwhile, municipal authorities, backed by the civil guard, arrested Democrat leaders and combed town and countryside for illegal holders of firearms (and legal holders if we are to believe Ramón Calvo's indignant letters to *La Democracia*).¹⁴⁰

In a further letter to the Minister of the Interior in mid-August 1864, the governor enlarged upon the measures he was taking. Appreciating the corrosive power of Democrat propaganda, he proposed to fund the publication of a series of exemplary books entitled the

. . . *Biblioteca de Escritores Granadinos* . . . which, having awoken patriotic sentiment, will substitute with good, tasteful and moralizing doctrines, the bad and pernicious books which the Democrats propagate and which, without any scandal or incineration, will cease being used.

The governor concluded with a prophetic statement: 'if the army resists the contagion, there is nothing to fear throughout the breadth of the province of Granada'.¹⁴¹

Of course, this is what occurred in September 1868, when the monarchy of Queen Isabel was toppled by a series of military uprisings loosely co-ordinated by General Prim. Without the widespread dissent within the armed forces, Prim's revolution would have got no further than the numerous other conspiracies and insurrections which had so regularly punctuated the interlude between the 'bienio progresista' and the 'sexenio revolucionario'. Yet, without these twelve years of Democrat drilling, September 1868 would not have been the popular event that earned it the epithet of 'The Glorious Revolution' (an 'immaculate revolution' in Mazzini's view). The speedy and enthusiastic response of numerous towns to the 'Provincial Revolutionary Junta' established in Granada demonstrated the preparedness of Democrats and Progresistas, and their determination to recover the rights (particularly to form companies of National Militia) the loss of which they had lamented since the end of the Bienio in 1856.¹⁴²

But what came of the Italian connection? Some inkling of how the encounter between Spanish Democrats and a Garibaldino general might have been in May 1864 can be imagined from the rapturous response given by Spanish Democrats to Giuseppe

Fanelli during his visit to Spain in December 1868. (Fanelli was sent by Bakunin to Spain as ambassador of the First International.) Without a word of Spanish, Fanelli held audiences in Barcelona, Valencia and Madrid spellbound with his mellifluous oratory.¹⁴³ Garibaldi, having spent fifteen years in Uruguay, at least would have been able to speak to his Spanish admirers in their own tongue.

Garibaldi remained an important icon to the Spanish left, particularly among anarchists.¹⁴⁴ During the ‘sexenio revolucionario’, and specifically during the Cantonalist uprisings of 1874 in Andalucía, Federal Republicans took Garibaldi as a figurehead. His appeal continued into the Restoration. In 1877 a bandit named ‘El Garibaldino’, formerly of the Civil Guard, who claimed also to have served under Garibaldi as a captain, led a band of kidnappers in southern Córdoba and north-eastern Málaga.¹⁴⁵ In November 1877, Adolfo Atocha, a locksmith, succeeded in convincing the band in Seville’s ‘Café de los Emperadores’ to play the ‘Hymn of Garibaldi’, after which he called out ‘¡ Viva la República Federal !’ Civil governor Antonio Guerola, fearing that ‘the recent animation of the Cantonalists because of the recent events in France’ might threaten public order, hurried in person to the café with an order for its closure. Upon finding ‘440 or 500 people, among whom were several women in peaceful conversation, drinking, playing, talking at the tables’, Guerola considered it imprudent to enforce the order; a recognition, perhaps, of the power of music and Republican imagery.¹⁴⁶

Notes

I should like to thank the British Academy and the Nuffield Foundation for funding the research on which this article is based.

1. Antonio Guerola, *Memoria de mi Administración en la Provincia de Málaga como Gobernador de ella desde 6 de Diciembre de 1857 hasta el 15 de Febrero de 1863* (Seville 1997), Vol. 3, 1101.

2. Fernando Garrido, *Propaganda democrática. El socialismo y la democracia ante sus adversarios, procedida por una carta de José Mazzini* (3rd edn, London 1862), 34.

3. Robert Gildea, *Barricades and Borders: Europe, 1800–1914* (Oxford 1987), 171.

4. Clara Lida, ‘The Democratic and Social Republic of 1848 and its

Repercussions on the Hispanic World', in Guy Thomson, ed., *The European Revolutions of 1848 and the Americas* (London 2001).

5. Sansoles Cabeza Sánchez-Albornoz, *Los sucesos de 1848 en España* (Madrid 1981); Clara Lida, *Anarquismo y revolución en la España del XIX* (Madrid 1972), 39–45; Daniel Headrick, 'Spain and the Revolutions of 1848', *European Studies Review*, Vol. 6 (1976), 197–223.

6. Spain's main political parties between 1849 and the Revolution of 1868 were the Moderate Liberals (Moderados), conservative and centralist, the Progressive Liberals (Progresistas), who favoured greater regional autonomy, restoration of the National Militia and wider suffrage, and the Democrat Party (Demócratas), who favoured universal suffrage and social reform.

7. In the 1858 election, 157,931 electors (1.02 per cent of the population) chose Spain's national chamber of deputies. In 1865, as a consequence of Posada Herrera's electoral reform, this had increased to 418,271 electors, or 2.67 per cent of the population: José María Jover, *Política, diplomacia y humanismo popular en la España del siglo XIX* (Madrid 1976), 246.

8. Spanish exceptionalism is countered by David Ringrose, *España, 1700–1900: el mito del fracaso* (Madrid 1996), and by José Alvarez Junco and Adrian Shubert, eds, *Spanish History since 1808* (London 2000), 1–11.

9. Jordi Canal i Morell, 'El concepto de sociabilidad en la historiografía contemporánea (Francia, Italia y España)', *Siglo XIX* (Mexico) Segunda época, No. 13 (1993), 5–26.

10. V.G. Kiernan, *The Revolution of 1854 in Spanish History* (Oxford 1966); Lida, *Anarquismo y revolución*, 47–76; J. Solé Tura and Eliseo Aja, *Constituciones y períodos constituyentes en España (1808–1936)* (Madrid 1990), 47–52.

11. 'Fue 1854 para España lo que para Francia había sido 1848, la hora y señal para despertar el pueblo', writes Adolfo Royannes in the Democratic newspaper *El Pueblo* (Madrid), I: 13, 13 September 1860.

12. O'Donnell's 'Long Ministry' lasted from June 1858 to March 1863.

13. Raymond Carr, *Spain, 1808–1939* (Oxford 1966), 257–304; Jesús Cruz, 'The Moderate Ascendancy, 1843–1868', in Alvarez Junco and Shubert, *Spanish History*, 33–47.

14. For the local workings of the Isabeline electoral system, Enrique Aguilar Gavilán, *Vida Política y Procesos Electorales en la Cordoba Isabelina (1834–1868)* (Córdoba 1991).

15. For Isabel II's fear and distrust of Progresistas, Rafael Olivar Bertrand, *Así cayó Isabella II* (Barcelona 1955), 202.

16. Carr, *Spain*, 264–76.

17. In 1857, only 613 of Spain's 9625 municipalities received a daily post. By 1865, 7810 settlements were visited daily by the postman, Nelson Durán, *La Unión Liberal y modernización de la España Isabelina. Una convivencia frustrada, 1854–1868* (Madrid 1979), 95–7.

18. Evidence of the civil governor of Málaga's stacking elections in favour of the Liberal Union is ubiquitous in Antonio Guerola, *Memoria de . . . Málaga* (Seville 1995), Vol. 3, 1357–63; for Córdoba, see Aguilar Gavilán, op. cit., passim.

19. Aguilar Gavilán, op. cit., 369–72; Durán, op. cit., 119.

20. For commentary on these abuses in Loja, see the correspondence between Democrat/Progresista agent, Pérez del Alamo, and the editors of Democratic

newspapers *El Pueblo* and *La Discusión*, and Rafael Pérez del Alamo, *Apuntes sobre Dos Revoluciones Andaluzas* (Seville 1872; repr. Granada 1982), passim.

21. Jesús Pabón, *Narváez y su época* (Madrid 1983), 257–78.

22. Jesús Pabón, *España y la cuestión Romana* (Madrid 1972).

23. Durán, op. cit., 264–70.

24. Lida, *Anarquismo y revolución*, 99.

25. For the popularity of the Phrygian hat among educated youth in Badajoz, E. Rodríguez Solís, *Historia del Partido Republicano Español* (Madrid 1892) Vol. 2, 530. In 1860, leftist Progresista and Democrat deputies to the Cortes adopted the ‘chamburgo’ (cocked hat), known as ‘Cavours’, to demonstrate their support for Italian unification, Durán, op. cit., 115.

26. P. Gabriel, ‘Movimiento obrero y grupos republicanos y radicales en España, Francia e Italia’, in *Colloqui Internazionale ‘Revolución i socialismo’* (Barcelona 1989), Vol. 1, 105–21; Manuel Suárez Cortina, ‘Democratas sin Democracia. Republicanos sin República’, in Manuel Suárez Cortina, ed., *La Restauración, entre el liberalismo y la democracia* (Madrid 1997), 317–67; M Espada Burgos, ‘El eco de Garibaldi en España’, in *Giuseppe Garibaldi e il suo mito, Atti del LI Congresso di Storia del Risorgimento Italiano* (Genoa, 10–13 November 1982), (Rome 1984), 231–44; J.A. Ferrer Benimeli, ‘Garibaldi y España; un centenario olvidado’, *Historia 16* Vol. 7, (1982), 59–68.

27. Nettlau traced the arrival of *carbonari* associations in Spain to the ‘Trienio Liberal’ (1820–3) when, as a consequence of the contact of Catalan sailors and merchants with the Italian coast and of the presence of Piedmontese and Neapolitan exiles in Catalonia, Valencia and the Balearics, the rituals and hierarchies of Italian carbonarism took root in the Levant, spreading swiftly to the preferred home of insurrection in Andalucía. Max Nettlau, *La Première Internationale en Espagne (1868–1888)* (Dordrecht 1969), 17.

28. Denis Mack Smith, *Modern Italy: A Political History* (London 1997), 32–3.

29. For Italian Democrats: Clara M. Lovett, *The Democratic Movement in Italy, 1830–1876* (Cambridge, MA 1982). For Spanish Democrats, see C.A.M. Hennessy, *The Federal Republic in Spain. Pi y Margall and the Federal Republican Movement 1868–74* (Oxford 1962); Antonio Eiras Roel, *El Partido Demócrata Español (1849–1868)* (Madrid 1961); Demetrio Castro Alfin, ‘Unido en la adversidad, unidos en la discordia: el Partido Demócrata, 1849–1868’, in Nigel Townson, ed., *El republicanismo en España (1830–1977)* (Madrid 1994), 59–86; and, José A Piqueras and Manuel Chust, eds, *Republicanos y repúblicas en España* (Madrid 1996).

30. The European Central Democratic Committee was formed in 1850 and attended by Mazzini, the French democratic socialist Alexander Ledru Rollin, Louis Blanc, Alexander Herzen, Alfred Talandier etc. Nettlau, op. cit., 30; Lida, *Anarquismo y revolución*, 103.

31. ‘Sixto Cámara . . . se ocupaba . . . de formar, por encargo y de acuerdo con Mazzini y Garibaldi, una legión de españoles y portugueses que marchara a libertar Italia de los austriacos, creando un núcleo de un gran ejército revolucionario que, uniendo a los patriotas de Italia, Francia y España, produjera la caída de los tronos y el planteamiento de la República en estas tres naciones.’ Rodríguez Solís, op. cit., (Madrid 1897), Vol. 2, 528; Lida, *Anarquismo y revolución*, 85.

32. Part of this legion — 125 Catalan volunteers — did eventually embark for

Genoa on 18 September 1861, to enrol with Garibaldi's forces. Jordi Maluquer de Motes, *El socialismo en España 1833-1868* (Barcelona 1977), 302.

33. María Rosa Sauvin de la Iglesia, *Sobre el concepto de España en el Risorgimiento* (Valencia n.d.), cited in María Victoria López-Cordón, *El pensamiento político internacional del federalismo español (1868-1874)* (Barcelona 1975), 43.

34. Denis Mack Smith, *Garibaldi: A Portrait in Documents* (Florence 1982), 96-7.

35. Guerola, *Memoria . . . de Málaga*, Vol. 3, 1075-80.

36. In August 1860 the editors of *El Pueblo* announced a gift to subscribers of an 'Anuario' for 1861, containing articles by Emilio García Ruiz and Francisco Pi y Margall: 'formará un cuadernito en 4o de 80 ó mas páginas, irá adornado con el mapa de España y el retrato de GARIBALDI perfectamente litografiado'. Nine months later *El Pueblo* reported the case of a priest publicly burning a portrait of Garibaldi in the square of a village near Oviedo, Asturias: *El Pueblo*, 8 June 1861. George Sand in her biography of Garibaldi commented on the popularity of Garibaldi's appeal in southern France: 'I was so surprised to find Garibaldi's portrait in the homes of devout peasants who live in the mountains of the Velay and the Cévennes. This famous adventurer, who some fearful souls used to call a bandit, was here accorded a place among their pictures of the saints.' George Sand, *Garibaldi* (Paris 1859), cited in Mack Smith, *Garibaldi*, 99.

37. Archivo de la Diputación Provincial de Granada (ADPG), 604/2, 'Gefes é instigadores de los apuntados en Alhama y Santa Cruz'.

38. ADPG, 604/3, 4 May 1864, Jefe de la Línea de Loja, Loja, to Provincial Military Commander, Granada.

39. Miguel Alonso Baquer, *El Modelo Español de Pronunciamiento* (Madrid 1983), 143-4.

40. Daniel R. Headrick, *Ejército y política en España (1866-1898)* (Madrid 1981), 141; Stanley Payne, *Ejército y sociedad en la España liberal, 1808-1936* (Madrid 1977), 42-56.

41. This tactical shift towards the countryside in Spain after 1857 is similar to France after June 1848. Zeldin shows how persecution caused Republicans and Socialists to unite, to redirect propaganda towards the countryside and to revive the secret societies. State uncertainty about this politically unfamiliar terrain in France of 1848-52 accounts for the 'red scare' in France in 1851-2. The fact that Democratic Socialists purposefully laid low until the elections in 1852 exacerbated the red scare. This resembles Democratic strategy in Spain where the regime perceived a comparable 'red menace' in the period we examine later in this article, that is between 1861 and 1864. Theodore Zeldin, *France 1848-1945* (Oxford 1973), 726-7.

42. These conspiracies and insurrections are examined in Joaquín Guichot y Parody, *Historia general de Andalucía desde los tiempos mas remotos hasta 1870* (Seville 1869-71), 8 Vols; Antonio María Calero, *Movimientos sociales en Andalucía (1820-1936)* (Madrid 1987); and Antonio Miguel Bernal, *La propiedad de la tierra y las luchas agrarias andaluzas* (Seville 1974).

43. After Cámara's death, Garrido (following his release from prison in Seville) accepted Mazzini's request to take over the formation of the *Legión Ibérica* to be recruited from among political refugees in Portugal and from among Catalan conscripts returning from the war in North Africa. Maluquer de Motes, op. cit., 302.

44. Eiras Roel, op. cit., 248–50.

45. *La Discusión* V, from July 1859. The editors offered Roque Barcía's *La cuestión de Italia* for sale to readers for 3 reales, *La Discusión* (Madrid) V, 1045, 22 June 1859.

46. *La Discusión* V, 1045, 22 June 1859.

47. Occupants of cafés in Granada, Málaga and Seville could read about their counterparts in Venice, where 'Los cafés estan desiertos, los paseos sin concurrencia, los almacenes cerrados; la alegría, la animación han desaparecido con la multitud de jóvenes que han marchado a vivir bajo un cielo más clemente. Alistándole en las filas de un jefe valiente, de un italiano honrado, del general Garibaldi.' *El Pueblo* I, 1, 1 September 1860.

48. *El Pueblo* I: 25, 25 September 1860.

49. *El Pueblo* II, 521, 24 April 1861.

50. Review of Fernando Garrido's biography of Sixto Cámara by José María de Orense, Madrid, 8 October 1860, and Garrido's reply, Gerona, 23 October 1860, in *El Pueblo* I, 71, 16 November 1860. For Ceferino Tressera's support of Garrido's position, Barcelona, 12 November 1860, and Orense's reply, Valencia, 22 November 1860, see *El Pueblo* I, 79 and 81, 19 and 21 November 1860.

51. *El Pueblo* II, 11, 16 September 1860.

52. For the arrest of nine Protestants in Málaga and later harassment, *El Pueblo* II, 211, 18 April 1861, and II, 253, 8 June 1861; Juan B. Vilar, *Intolerancia y libertad. Los orígenes del protestantismo español actual* (Madrid 1994), 346–9; for the Manuel Matamoros affair and religious intolerance in Granada, *El Pueblo* II, 186, 19 March 1861; Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo, *Historia de los heterodoxos españoles* (Madrid 1881), Vol. 3, 682–4; Gabino Fernández Campos, *Reforma y Contra-reforma en Andalucía* (Seville 1986), 214–22;.

53. Guerola, *Memoria de . . . Málaga*, Vol. 3, 1075–80.

54. *El Pueblo* I, 42, 12 October 1860.

55. Francisco Aguado Sánchez, *Historia de la Guardia Civil* (Madrid 1984), Vol. 2, 207.

56. Theodore Zeldin stresses the importance of the 'isolated activity of a single enthusiast who subscribed to a Paris newspaper and set himself up as a local sage', in building up Republican support in the remoter rural areas which provided the hearth for the Montagnard revolt in 1851–2. Zeldin, *France 1848–1945*, 479.

57. Upon entering Naples in September 1860, Garibaldi carried an American six-shooter pistol. G.M. Trevelyan, *Garibaldi and the Thousand* (London 1920), 41.

58. Pérez del Alamo's resemblance to Garibaldi was observed by a columnist in *La Epoca*: 'su traje algo garibaldino demuestra su fanatismo político'. *La Epoca* (Madrid) XIII, 4024, 3 July 1861.

59. *El Pueblo* II, 179, 11 March 1861; Rafael Pérez del Alamo, *Apuntes sobre dos revoluciones andaluzas* (Granada 1982), 83.

60. *Campesinos* marching from villages to join Pérez del Alamo in Loja were reported to be calling 'Viva la república! Viva Garibaldi! Abajo el Papa!' *El diario español político y literario* (Madrid) XX, 2788, 3 July 1861.

61. For two well-informed analyses of the Loja revolt, see Antonio María Calero, 'Introducción', in Pérez del Alamo, *Apuntes*, 9–47; Clara E. Lida, '¿Qué son las clases populares? Los modelos europeos frente al caso español en el siglo XIX', *Historia Social*, Vol. 27, (1997), 3–23; and Lida, *Anarquismo y revolución*, 87–98.

62. *La Correspondencia* XIV, 1027, 8 July 1861.

63. 'Ciudadanos: Todo el que sienta el sagrado amor a la libertad de su patria, empuñe un arma y únase a sus compañeros: el que no lo hiciere será un cobarde o un mal español.' Pérez del Alamo, *Dos Revoluciones Andaluzas* (Seville 1986), 65.

64. Alan Spitzer, *Old Hatreds and Young Hopes: The French Carbonari against the Bourbon Restoration* (Harvard 1971).

65. Ted W. Margadant, *French Peasants in Revolt: The Insurrection of 1851* (Princeton 1979), and Maurice Agulhon, *The Republican Experiment 1848–1852* (Cambridge 1983).

66. For these rituals in Loja: Real Academia de Historia (RAH), Archivo de Narváez, II, Vol. 85, 'Ritual'.

67. 'One of the often expressed assumptions was that no insurrection could proceed without a popular general at its head, not so much to furnish some indispensable technical skill as to supply the missing, common symbol and a well conceived programme.' Spitzer, *op. cit.*, 253.

68. The Democrats were divided in 1860–1, and again in 1864, over definitions of, and positions towards, socialism. Pérez del Alamo's faith in the National Militia, generally regarded as a Progresista organ, aligns him with the moderate individualist, rather than the socialist, wing of the party.

69. Spitzer, *op. cit.*, 237.

70. *La Epoca* included correspondence from *La España's* Granada correspondent which noted this recent conversion: 'El ánimo se abate y la razón se confunde al considerar que no hace muchos años todavía los proletarios de Loja, Antequera, Alhama y pueblos comarcanos eran todos furibundos realistas y fanáticos religiosos, al paso que hoy se han ido al extremo opuesto habiéndose empapado en todos los delirios de la demagogía.' *La Epoca* XIII, 4024, 3 July 1861.

71. Fernando Garrido asked of the Loja uprising: '¿El acto de rebelión? . . . la rebelión podía considerarse casi como una reunión de individuos que van a deliberar'. F. Garrido, *Historia del reinado del último Borbón de España De los crímenes, apostasias, opresión, corrupción, inmoralidad, despilfarros, hipocrasía, crueldad y fanatismo de los gobiernos que han regido España durante el reinado de Isabel de Borbón* (Barcelona 1868), Vol. 3, 542.

72. In spite of the emphasis upon military leadership, this expectation of a bloodless revolution was present in France in 1821–2. Spitzer comments on 'the essential gentleness of [General] Berton's quasi-revolution, his determination to lead the enterprise only on condition that not one drop of French blood be shed'. Spitzer, *op. cit.*, 253.

73. Mack Smith, *Garibaldi*, 22–3; Derek Beales, 'Garibaldi in England: The Politics of Italian Enthusiasm', in John A. Davis and Paul Ginsborg, eds, *Society and Politics in the Age of the Risorgimento: Essays in Honour of D. Mack Smith* (Cambridge 1991), 184–216.

74. Gildea observes how 'the success of Garibaldi and his Thousand had tremendous mythical power and seized the imagination of radical reformers in England, which . . . [Garibaldi] . . . was encouraged to leave rather hastily when he became a political embarrassment to the government'. Gildea, *op. cit.*, 213, 219.

75. *El Pueblo* IV, 1124, 21 April 1864.

76. *The Journal of John Wodehouse, First Earl of Kimberley for 1862–1902* (ed. Angus Hawkins and John Powell) Camden Society 5th Series, Vol. 9 (1997), 133–4.

77. *El Pueblo* V, 1142, 13 May 1864.

78. Headrick considers the Loja insurrection in 1861 as the last Democrat armed movement before the revolution of 1868, which itself, apart from Paúl y Angulo's 'popular' republican uprising in Cádiz in September, was largely Progresista inspired (and even supported by some Moderados). From the summer of 1864, Prim tirelessly organized Progresista dissent within the army. This reached advanced stages of conspiracy, without provoking insurrection, in June and August 1864, June 1865, January and June 1866, and July and August 1867. Only the sergeant's uprising in Madrid's San Gil barracks in June 1866 reached open rebellion, only to be quickly and brutally suffocated. Headrick, *op. cit.*, 149.

79. Pérez del Alamo, *Dos revoluciones andaluzas*, 95.

80. Eiras Roel, *op. cit.*, 280.

81. Eiras Roel, *op. cit.*, 285–7; Durán, *op. cit.*, 287–8.

82. The chief of the army garrison in Loja reported that Ramón Calvo, leading Democrat in Loja and Alhama, had convinced his followers that 'el 2 del próximo Mayo habrá un pronunciamiento en España, a cuyo frente se pondrá Garibaldi que debe venir desde Gibraltar'. ADPG, 604/3, 17 April 1864, Jefe de le Línea de Loja to Gobernador Militar, Granada.

83. Progressive preparations for an insurrection within the army were already well advanced by the winter of 1863–4. Durán, *op. cit.*, 287–8.

84. The only national newspaper prepared to admit knowledge of this conspiracy was *La Regeneración* XII, 124, 31 May 1864.

85. The *alcalde-constitucional* of Loja doubted Calvo's sanity. ADPG, 604/2, 10 February 1864, José Pérez Ordoñez, Loja, to José Sánchez de Molina, Granada.

86. The first contingent of the Legion left Barcelona for Genoa on 18 September 1860. In November Garrido visited Naples to establish links with Garibaldi's high command. Maluquer de Motes, *op. cit.*, 302.

87. Mazzini had charged Díaz Pérez with the organization of the Iberian Legion. He later became Mazzini's biographer. Aguado Sánchez, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, 207; Nicolás Díaz Pérez, *José Mazzini. Ensayo histórico sobre le movimiento político en Italia* (Madrid 1876).

88. This incident may have been linked to the very public trial of the Galician Democrat Ruiz y Pons, who would shortly swell the band of exiled Democrats in Portugal. Aguado Sánchez, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, 207, and Eiras Roel, *op. cit.*, 264–6.

89. Fernando Garrido excoriates the moderate Democrats, Nicolás Rivero and José María Orense, for abandoning and disowning Pérez del Alamo in 1861, after which they dismantled the 'Falansterio Nacional' in Madrid, the command centre of the national conspiratorial network. Garrido, *Historia del reinado del último Borbón*, Vol. 3, 533–44.

90. Lida, *Anarquismo y revolución*, 99.

91. In July 1863 Garrido was present at a reunion of European Democrats (attended by German, Swiss, Italian, French and Belgian representatives) at La Chaux-de-Fonds in Switzerland, at which an 'Association for the creation of Democratic congresses' was proposed. Later in the year, it was rumoured that Garrido, on behalf of the 'Sociedades Democráticas de Cataluña', had met with his Italian counterpart in Brussels. Lida, *Anarquismo y revolución*, 103. On the hardship faced by Democrats and Garibaldinos in Italy, see Mack Smith, *Modern Italy*, 59–77.

92. 27 September 1863, Garibaldi, Caprera, to the Democrats of Loarre (Huesca), and 6 November 1863, Juan Pablo Solér, Zaragoza, to Eugenio Ruiz, *El Pueblo* IV, 988, 9 November 1863; 9 November 1863, 43 Democrats of Tová and Biosca, to 'Ilustre General Garibaldi', Caprera, in *El Pueblo* IV, 993, 16 November 1863; Letter from Victor Hugo to Garibaldi, in *El Pueblo* V, 1036, 7 January 1864; 25 December 1863, Garibaldi, Caprera, to Sr. Zolio Espejo, 'para los amigos de Montilla', Montilla, in *El Pueblo* V 1040, 12 January 1864. In January 1864 Garibaldi issued a manifesto from Caprera in which he called for 'a central unitary junta . . . to gather financial resources; to prepare spirits for concord, sacrifice and duty, for the saintly objective of national emancipation, and fraternal assistance of enslaved provinces on the chosen day of battle': *La Democracia* I, 22, 26 January 1864.

93. *La Regeneración* (Madrid) XII, 124, 31 May 1864.

94. Lida, *Anarquismo y revolución*, 100. In February 1864, troops boarded a British steamer in Málaga to find crates containing arms ('carbines, daggers, revolvers and war materials'). *El Espíritu Público* (Madrid) I, 41 and 43, 19 and 21 February 1864.

95. ADPG, 604/1, Telegraph, 19 April 1863, Min. of Interior, Madrid, to Civil Governor, Granada.

96. Pérez del Alamo, *Dos revoluciones andaluzas*, 83; ADPG, 604/1, 19 April 1863, José Pérez Ordoñez, Loja, to Civil Governor, Granada.

97. Eiras Roel, op. cit., 270–84.

98. On the popularity of *La Democracia* among Alhama's Democrats, at the expense of *La Discusión* and *El Pueblo*, see ADPG, 604/2, 1 March 1864, 'Gefes e instigadores de los apuntados en Alhama y Santa Cruz'.

99. The municipal night-watchman, who reported Pérez del Alamo's comings and goings at Lattes's silver shop, claimed to know nothing of his political antecedents! ADPG, 64/1, 1 July 1863, Joaquín Alonso, Juez de 1a Instancia, Granada (Campillo), to Francisco del Castillo, Civil Governor, Granada.

100. ADPG, 604/1, 8 July 1863, Min. of Interior, Madrid, to Civil Governor, Granada.

101. ADPG, 604/1, 19 July 1863, Florencio Rodríguez Vaamonde, Madrid, to Joaquín Alonso, Granada.

102. For the activities of Romualdo de la Fuente in Cádiz in May 1863, see Antonio Guerola, *Memoria de mi administración en la provincia de Cádiz como gobernador de ella desde 31 de marzo hasta 31 de mayo de 1863* (Seville 1993), 152–5, and of the exiled Pérez del Alamo and other conspirators in Seville, Antonio Guerola, *Memoria de mi administración en la provincia de Sevilla como gobernador de ella desde 11 de junio hasta 24 de octubre de 1863* (Seville 1993), 197–205.

103. Beales, 'Garibaldi in England', 184–216.

104. On 17 April 1864, *La Democracia* (for which Moreno was the local correspondent) contained an elegiac account of Garibaldi's heroic and adventurous career. On the following day, the Catholic paper *La Regeneración* replied with a catalogue of Garibaldi's failures, comparing *La Democracia*'s rosy account of Garibaldi to Don Quixote's description of the damsel Dulcinea: 'mientras D. Quijote buscaba su bellissimo ideal, el mundo se complacía en atormentarlo con el horroroso aspecto de Maritornes': *La Regeneración* (Madrid) XII, No. 90, 18 April 1864.

105. ADPG, 604/2, 'Gefes e instigadores de los apuntados en Alhama y Santa Cruz'.

106. ADPG, 604/3, 4 May 1864, Jefe de la Línea de Loja, Loja, to Provincial Military Commander, Granada.

107. 'Loja. Esta ciudad es la segunda población de la provincia y requiere un cuidado especial de parte del Gobernador, no sólo por su importancia material, sino por los elementos revolucionarios que encierra según se vio en la célebre insurrección del año 1861, lo cual no deja de formar un contraste notable con ser aquella ciudad la patria y residencia del Capitán general duque de Valencia, el cual tiene allí su casa, su parientes y sus bienes.' Antonio Guerola, *Memoria de mi administración en la provincia de Granada* (Seville 1996), 184.

108. *Ibid.* 159.

109. ADPG, 604/2, 22 January 1864, Comandante Militar de la Provincia, to Civil Governor; ADPG, 604/2, 1 March 1864, 'Gefes e instigadores de los apuntados en Alhama y Santa Cruz'.

110. In February, the leader of the Catholic newspaper *La Regeneración* detailed the extent of revolutionary preparations. Merchants and factory owners were being obliged, on threat of arson, to contribute to a fund for purchasing weapons and paying for legal defence. An 'Italian revolutionary' had recently left Madrid for Barcelona, promising to return when the revolution broke out. Commissioners had left Madrid to organize revolutionary committees in the provinces. Gibraltar's tailors were busy making Civil Guard uniforms to enable rebels to 'fake orders from above' and commandeer municipal funds. A Gibraltar merchant already had the rifles in stock for when they were needed. In the same edition, the Málaga correspondent's report on the discovery of a steamer loaded with arms, and a comment that *La Democracia* had published recent articles recalling the revolution of Loja, confirmed the editors' certainty that a revolution was afoot. *La Regeneración* XII, 41, 20 February 1864.

111. For the involvement of Iznájar (Córdoba), hearth of the Loja revolt in 1861, ADPG, 604/2, 20 February 1864, Federico Guzmán, Fiscalía de la Audiencia de Granada, to Civil Governor.

112. ADPG, 604/3, 26 April 1864, Raimundo Sillero, alcalde de Algarinejo, to José Pérez Ordoñez, *alcalde-constitucional* of Loja.

113. ADPG, 604/3, 14 April 1864, José Pérez Ordoñez, Loja, to Civil Governor, Granada.

114. '. . . otro que se titulaba Inglés, aún que mas bien parecía Aragonés o Catalán', ADPG, 604/3, 14 April 1864, José Pérez Ordoñez, Loja, to Civil Governor, Granada.

115. ADPG, 604/3, 17 April 1864, Jefe de la Línea de Loja, to Military Commander, Granada.

116. The *alcalde-constitucional* of Loja doubted Calvo's sanity, commenting on 10 February 1864 on his extravagant behaviour, 'espresando sus locas esperanzas por el porvenir y alentando con ellas a los que llama sus compañeros. Ninguna persona de razón puede tomar en cuenta sus locuras, pues que lo conocen y saben su incapacidad: los ignorantes podran atenderlo, pero siempre con el conocimiento de oír a un hombre desacreditado.' ADPG, 604/2, 10 February 1864, José Pérez Ordoñez, Loja, to José Sánchez de Molina, Granada.

117. ADPG, 604/3, 18 April 1864, José Pérez Ordoñez, Loja, to Civil Governor, Granada.

118. Eiras Roel, op. cit, 284–93; Durán, op. cit, 287–8.

119. The *alcalde-constitucional* of Loja described Calvo as ‘a madcap [*botarate*] who has clearly indicated his desire to be persecuted, and even imprisoned, so as to be able to demonstrate his importance among his people’. ADPG, 604/3, 18 April 1864, José Pérez Ordoñez, Loja, to Civil Governor, Granada.

120. ADPG, 604/3, 5 May 1864, Francisco del Castillo, Alhama, to Civil Governor, Granada; 8 May 1864, Telegraph from *alcalde-constitucional*, Loja, to Civil Governor, Granada.

121. On this occasion Calvo distributed ‘500 reales in gold pieces of 5 duros, said to be false’. ADPG, 604/3, 12 May 1864, José Pérez Ordoñez, Loja, to Civil Governor, Granada, and ADPG, 604/3, 25 April 1864, José Caballero, Huétor Tajar, to Civil Governor, Granada.

122. For police vigilance of Democratic meeting in Granada: ADPG, 604.3, 8 September 1865, Manuel Núñez, Granada, to Civil Governor.

123. ADPG, 604/3, 13 May 1864, *Alcalde Corregidor*, Loja, to Civil Governor, Granada.

124. ADPG, 604/3, 18 June 1864, draft of letter of Civil Governor to Minister of the Interior.

125. In a letter of January 1874, Garibaldi reminded Castelar that only the prudence of Spanish democrats had prevented him from offering his ‘presence and sword for the cause of Spanish liberty’, José Ferrer Benimeli, ‘Garibaldi y España’, 67.

126. Denunciations of socialism: 28 May 1864, Anastasio Ortega Palacios, Loja, to Castelar, Madrid, *La Democracia* (Madrid), I, 127, 1 June 1864; 1 June 1864, ‘Los demócratas de Loja a sus correligionarios’ (103 signatures), *La Democracia* I, 141, 17 June 1864.

127. Pérez del Alamo describes this persecution in *Dos revoluciones andaluzas*, 77–101; ARH, Narváez, II, 66/4, 12/letters 25–37; *El Pueblo* V, 1074, 22 February 1864.

128. 2 January 1864, José Trinidad Moreno, Zafarraya, to Eugenio García Ruiz, Madrid, *El Pueblo* V, 1036, 7 January 1864; *La Democracia* I, 127, 1 June 1864; ARH, Narváez, II, Vol. 66, 13/1–6. Letters from Manuel Moreno, Zafarraya, to Narváez, Madrid, 8 September 1863– 12 March 1866.

129. ADPG, 604/3 20 May 1864, *Alcalde Corregidor*, Loja, to Civil Governor, Granada.

130. ADPG, 604/3, 18 April 1864, Pérez Ordoñez, Loja, to Civil Governor, Granada.

131. Carr, op. cit., 294. This switch of political allegiance did not surprise Calvo’s rival, Rafael Pérez del Alamo, who, apart from accusing his fellow Democrat of attempting to murder him, claimed that Calvo had been recruited as a spy for the regime during his emigration in Portugal. Pérez del Alamo, *Dos revoluciones andaluzas*, 83.

132. ADPG, 604/2, 22 August 1864, José Pérez Ordoñez, Loja, to Civil Governor, Granada.

133. ADPG, 604/3, 31 May 1864, Captain General of Málaga to Civil Governor of Granada, and see folder on the Hainault affair in the same box.

134. For a denunciation of the persecution of Albuñol’s Democrats: 29 February 1864, J.R. Fernández, Albuñol, to Emilio Castelar, Madrid, *La Democracia* I, 53, 3 March 1864.

135. ADPG, 604/2 and 604/3, for several folders on the Albuñol conspiracy.
136. ADPG, 604/2, 23 July 1864, Minister of the Interior, Madrid, to Civil Governor, Granada.
137. López-Cordón, *op. cit.*, 24.
138. ADPG, 604/2, 21 August 1864, Civil Governor, Granada, to Minister of Government, Madrid.
139. *Ibid.*
140. *La Democracia* 1, 128, 2 June 1864.
141. ADPG, 604/2, 21 August 1864, Civil Governor, Granada, to Minister of Government, Madrid.
142. For the revolution of September 1868 in Granada, see ADPG, Orden Público, 604/4–604/12.
143. Nettlau, *op. cit.*, 55–60.
144. José María Jover, 'Conciencia burguesa y conciencia obrera en la España contemporánea', in *Política, diplomacia y humanismo Popular*, 81.
145. C. Bernaldo de Quíros and Luis Ardila, *El bandolerismo andaluz* (Madrid 1978), 162.
146. Guerola, *Memoria de . . . Sevilla*, Vol. 3, 671–85.

Guy Thomson

teaches history at the University of Warwick. His earlier research on Mexico resulted in *Puebla de los Angeles: Industry and Society in a Mexican City* (Boulder, CO 1989) and *Politics, Patriotism and Popular Liberalism in Mexico: Juan Francisco Lucas and the Puebla Sierra* (Wilmington, DE 1999). Since 1994 he has been working on Rafael Pérez del Alamo and the impact of the Democratic Party in eastern Andalusian towns between 1854 and 1876.