

Mediator Tactics and Sources of Conflict: Facilitating and Inhibiting Effects

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Sometimes mismatches between tactics used by mediators and causes of the dispute may reduce the likelihood of achieving a settlement. Data from collective-bargaining disputes suggest that when party inflexibility was a source of the dispute, added mediator pressure increased the likelihood of a settlement, but discussing alternatives reduced the likelihood of a settlement. However, mediation success improved in cases where there is a high level of interparty hostility and mediators focused on negotiation processes.

Overview

The conflict-resolution literature suggests that mediators are most effective at helping parties resolve their disputes when they employ tactics that are selected carefully to deal with the underlying causes of the dispute (Kochan and Jick 1978; Carnevale 1992). Recently, much of mediation literature has illustrated how the type of dispute moderates the effectiveness of various mediation tactics (Wall 1984; Carnevale and Conlon 1988).

This article replicates prior research on the effectiveness of mediator tactics and the moderating impact of the type of dispute on mediator success. However, underlying this research stream is the implicit assumption that mediator tactics will have either a positive effect or no effect. That assumption is challenged in this study. This article extends

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our understanding of the mediation process by showing that in some contexts the wrong mediator tactics may reduce the likelihood of a settlement.

Theory

The early mediation literature on mediator effectiveness focused on bivariate relationships between specific mediator tactics and mediator success (e.g., Krislov, Mead, and Goodman 1975). More recent research has explored matches between the type of dispute and the most effective mediation tactics (e.g., Lim and Carnevale 1990; McLaughlin, Carnevale, and Lim 1991).

Kochan and Jick (1978) and others demonstrated that there may be several factors underlying a dispute that could minimize the effectiveness of mediation. Kochan and Katz (1988) found that mediation is typically less successful when there are internal party problems or the conflict is more intense. Internal party problems are evident when one party lacks negotiation skills. As the conflict becomes more intense, the parties may become less flexible and feel a greater degree of hostility toward each other. Higher levels of incompetence, inflexibility, and hostility make it more difficult for the parties to reach an agreement on their own or with the aid of a mediator. This hypothesis essentially replicates findings of earlier studies in other contexts.

Hypothesis 1: Negotiator incompetence, inflexibility, and inter-party hostility will be related to lower mediator effectiveness.

There are several types of mediator tactics. One tactic is mediator pressure. Mediators apply pressure to the parties by doing such things as pushing them to make compromises and telling them that their positions are unrealistic. The evidence for the effectiveness of mediator pressure tactics is somewhat mixed. Studies by Krislov, Mead, and Goodman (1975), Briggs and Koys (1989), and Dilts and Karim (1990) suggest that mediator pressure helps to resolve disputes. However, Karim and Peggnetter (1983) found that mediator expressions of displeasure with the progress of negotiations were negatively related to settlement for both union and management representatives.

Several researchers have suggested that the effectiveness of a mediator may be contingent on the fit between the underlying sources or nature of the dispute and the tactics the mediator uses (Kochan and Katz 1988; Wall 1984; Van de Ven and Drazin 1985; Carnevale 1992, 1986; Carnevale and

Conlon 1988; Carnevale and Pegnetter 1985; Pruitt and Johnson 1970; and Dilts, Rassuli, and Karim 1992).

The conflicting findings regarding the effectiveness of mediator pressure tactics may be due to the contingent nature of this particular tactic. In fact, one sample of mediators reported that mediation tactics that are helpful in one type of dispute may be harmful in another type of dispute (Lim and Carnevale 1990).

In some disputes, pressure may be a helpful tactic, whereas in other cases, it may exacerbate the conflict between the parties. Mediator pressure tactics should be most effective in situations where the underlying cause of the dispute is party inflexibility. By applying pressure, the mediator induces the parties to reevaluate their positions and to consider alternatives that are more in line with the interests of the opposing party. This may result in a change in their "resistance point" (Lewicki, Saunders, and Minton 1997; Thompson 1998), or bottom-line settlement position. This change could create a positive bargaining zone or settlement range that did not exist prior to intervention of the mediator.

However, if the dispute were related to party inability to negotiate effectively, adding more pressure would be less likely to facilitate productive negotiations. For example, a party may have a limited ability to negotiate effectively because it lacks the necessary authority to make agreements. In this situation, mediator pressure on this party would be ineffective because the party might not have the authority to respond either to the opposing party's demands or to the mediator's pressure.

Likewise, if the dispute has a high level of interparty hostility, mediator pressure probably would be less effective in an already emotionally charged situation. A key concern in conflict situations is that the expression of negative affect creates a tendency for the opponent negotiator to reciprocate with a similar response (Lazarus 1991). An escalating and hostile conflict spiral can result from these reciprocating negative expressions of hostility (Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim 1994). The negotiator who is the target of mediator pressure in this type of situation is likely to view the mediator's pressure as evidence of mediator alignment with the opposing party (Morris and Su 1995). The negotiator will then respond to the mediator's pressure with the same negative expressions of hostility that were directed toward the opposing party. This will exacerbate an escalating conflict spiral and reduce the likelihood of settlement.

Hypothesis 2: The effectiveness of mediator pressure tactics will depend on the nature of the dispute. Mediator pressure tactics will be positively related to settlement if a cause of the dispute

is negotiator inflexibility and negatively related to settlement if the dispute is caused by party incompetence or inter-party hostility.

Sometimes mediators attempt to facilitate the negotiation process by assisting the parties in setting agendas or managing the pace of negotiations. However, there are some situations where the parties are involved in very a hostile relationship. In these cases they may avoid these type of negotiation process behaviors for fear that they might be interpreted as a sign of weakness by the opposing party. For example, in a very hostile situation, parties may be unwilling to suggest or call for meetings because they may believe that this sends a signal to their opponent that they are more willing or desperate to get to the table to make some kind of compromise. Where this type of interparty hostility exists, the mediator may provide a useful service by facilitating the negotiation process.

Hypothesis 3: The effectiveness of mediator negotiation process tactics will depend on the nature of the dispute. Mediator negotiation process tactics will be positively related to settlement if an underlying cause of the dispute is interparty hostility.

There are several studies that suggest when mediators discuss alternatives with the parties, settlements are more likely (Karim and Peggnetter 1983; Carnevale and Pruitt 1992). However, the presence of party inflexibility suggests that as the negotiation process is proceeding, one or more of the parties is becoming more committed to its position.

The literature on escalation of commitment (e.g., Staw 1997) suggests that people become more committed to and less flexible about their positions after they are presented with negative feedback about the correctness of their decisions.

In some cases mediators may attempt to move intransigent parties off their positions by discussing alternatives. However, when they do so, they actually may exacerbate the conflict by pushing the parties into a higher level of commitment to their existing positions. Thus, mediator discussion of alternatives for settlement actually may hinder success in negotiation when party inflexibility is a source of the dispute.

Hypothesis 4: The effectiveness of the mediator suggesting alternatives for settlement will depend on the nature of the dispute. Mediator discussion of alternatives generally will be positively related to settlement, unless an underlying cause of the dispute is

party inflexibility. When party inflexibility is a source of dispute, mediator discussion of alternatives will reduce the likelihood of achieving a settlement.

While the effectiveness of some mediator tactics may depend on the nature of the dispute, other tactics may be successful across different types of disputes (Kochan and Jick 1978). Prior research suggests that mediator tactics of friendliness and avoiding negative emotions will be effective in facilitating negotiated agreements in many contexts (Kressel 1972; Krislov, Mead, and Goodman 1975; Karim and Peggnetter 1983).

Hypothesis 5: The effectiveness of mediator friendliness and avoiding negative emotions will not vary with the underlying nature of the dispute.

Methods

This is a field study of mediators who work for a state employment relations agency that handles collective-bargaining disputes between employers and employees represented by labor unions. The unit of analysis in this study is individual labor-management disputes. The primary function of the mediators examined in this study was to assist public-sector employers (e.g., cities, counties, and school districts) and the labor unions that represent their workers to voluntarily reach a negotiated collective-bargaining agreement. Archival records on the cases handled by these mediators were obtained from the state employee relations agency. These records identified individual cases in which the parties (i.e., representatives of labor or management) were engaged in collective bargaining.

Employees were represented by unions such as the Fraternal Order of Police, the International Association of Fire Fighters, the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, and state-level units of the National Education Association and the American Federation of Teachers. Several other unions also represented workers included in this sample. Employees worked as police officers, firefighters, teachers, maintenance workers, etc. for local government employers such as cities, counties, and school districts. When a labor agreement expired, the parties contacted the state employee relations agency, and an agency case file was opened. A mediator who was a full-time state employee was assigned to assist the parties in each case. The mediator informed the state employee relations agency of the outcome of the case, and this

information was stored in a computer database that contained the identities of the parties, the mediator, the type of bargaining unit, the outcome of the case, and other information.

In addition to examining archival data, surveys were used to measure the tactics used by individual mediators in recent cases. The survey data were collected as the second branch of a two-part study. The first branch focused on arbitrator acceptability, and those data are reported elsewhere (Posthuma, Dworkin, and Swift 2000). This second branch focused on mediator effectiveness and is reported here.

Parties who were involved recently in collective-bargaining negotiations in which a mediator was provided by a state employee relations agency received a survey in the mail. The survey respondents identified the names of individual mediators who were working with the parties to help them resolve a collective-bargaining dispute. Respondents were asked to voluntarily identify themselves so that a follow-up questionnaire could be sent to them. Survey responses from time 1 and time 2 were matched.

At time 1, surveys were mailed to 522 individuals who represented either labor or management. A total of 237 usable responses were received, for a 45 percent response rate. A total of 207 individuals voluntarily identified themselves at time 1. A follow-up mailing was sent approximately 2 months later to the 207 individuals who identified themselves at time 1. Usable responses were received from 149 of these individuals, for a 72 percent response rate at time 2.

Measures

Prior mediator success rate. Archival records were obtained from the state labor relations agency for the 10-year period 1985–1995. In the state in which this survey was conducted, unions representing public safety employees such as police officers, deputy sheriffs, and firefighters were entitled to invoke interest arbitration in the event that the parties did not voluntarily reach a collectively bargained agreement. Interest arbitration is a procedure whereby an arbitrator determines the terms of a new collective-bargaining agreement. The individual mediator success rate was calculated from all the cases in which mediators were involved during this 10-year period. The rate was calculated using the number of cases in which the individual mediator was involved and the case was settled and those cases which were not settled and thus proceeded to arbitration. Data from these 633 cases suggest that, on average, 19 percent of the cases with which mediators were involved were settled. However,

some mediators had settlement rates that were significantly higher or lower than the mean. Thus there is evidence that some mediators are consistently more effective than others or were assigned more often to cases in which the parties settled voluntarily. Mediator success rate was entered into subsequent regression analysis to control for these possibilities.

Mediator tactics. Participants were asked to report the tactics used by the mediator. They responded to several questions on a five-point Likert scale indicating the extent of their agreement (1 = strongly disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 = neither agree nor disagree; 4 = agree; 5 = strongly agree). The time 1 survey instrument asked the respondents whether they agreed that the mediator used each of several mediator tactics. The tactics were comprised of five categories of mediator tactics: pressure, negotiation processes, friendliness, avoiding negative emotions, and discussing alternatives. A principal-components factor analysis was conducted using varimax rotation. The resulting rotated factor structure of these scales is shown in Appendix Table A1.

These five categories reflect prior measures of mediator tactics used by other authors. First, the measure of pressure is related to Karim and Peggnetter (1983)—expressions of displeasure with progress—and Krislov, Mead, and Goodman (1975)—forceful mediators. Second, the negotiation processes measure related to Kressel (1972 and 1977), Kressel and Pruitt (1989), Lim and Carnevale (1990), and McLaughlin, Carnevale, and Lim's (1991) measures of contextual tactics and agenda. Third, the friendliness tactic reflected Karim and Peggnetter (1983)—humorous disposition. Fourth, the avoiding negative emotions tactic reflected Karim and Peggnetter (1983)—reducing hostility and directing dispute away from personal antagonism. Finally, the discussing alternatives tactic related to Kressel (1972 and 1977) and Kressel and Pruitt (1989)—substantive tactics—Karim and Peggnetter (1983)—making proposals—and Carnevale and Pruitt (1992), Lim and Carnevale (1990), and McLaughlin, Carnevale, and Lim (1991)—making suggestions for settlement.

Sources of dispute. The time 2 survey asked respondents whether they thought each of several items was an obstacle to settlement in the case. The obstacles to settlement consisted of three categories: party incompetence, inflexibility, and interparty hostility. These measures were adapted from Kochan and Jick's (1978) measures of sources of dispute. A principal-components factor analysis was conducted using varimax

rotation. The resulting rotated factor structure of these scales is shown in Appendix Table A2. The means, standard deviations, and coefficient alpha internal consistency reliability estimates for each of the five mediator tactics and the three obstacles to settlement are shown in Table 1.

Negotiation success. At time 2 the parties were asked to respond to several questions about the outcome of the dispute. The responses were based on a five-point Likert scale on which responses ranged from strongly disagree to strongly agree. The items used on this measure asked the parties whether the dispute was settled, whether at the conclusion of the mediation anything was left unclear, a mutually beneficial settlement was reached, a lasting agreement was reached, there were no adverse political ramifications, and the parties felt the agreement was their own. This six-item measure was adapted from Kochan and Jick (1978) and had a coefficient alpha internal consistency reliability of 0.86.

Party variables. The survey respondents indicated whether they represented management or labor. These survey responses were dummy coded (1 = management; 0 = union). In addition, survey respondents were asked the number of years of experience they had in collective bargaining. The means and standard deviations for these variables are shown in Table 1.

To test for the possibility that subject attrition resulted in nonrandom sampling, a logistic multiple regression analysis was performed. The dependent variable was response to one or both surveys (coded as 1 for those who responded at both times and 0 for those who responded only at time 1). A time 1 measure of mediator impact, which was similar to the time 2 measure of negotiation success, and the time 1 measures of mediator tactics were the independent variables in this logistic regression analysis. None of the independent variables significantly predicted response at time 2, suggesting that subject attrition should not bias analysis of the time 2 data (Goodman and Blum 1996).

Results

Hypothesis 1. Table 1 reports the Pearson bivariate correlations between mediator success rates and the survey measures collected at time 1 and time 2. Prior individual mediator success rates were not significantly related to settlement in the cases studied here. However, four of the five measures of mediator tactics were significantly and positively related to settlement at time 2. In addition, as expected, the three measures of the

TABLE 1.
CORRELATION ANALYSIS OF MEDIATOR SUCCESS RATES, MEDIATOR TACTICS, AND SOURCES OF CONFLICT

Variable	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1. Prior mediator success	0.19	0.81	—											
2. Party (1=mgmt)	0.40	0.49	.07	—										
3. Party years/experience	17.31	8.16	-.10	.27	—									
Tactics (T^1)														
4. Pressure	2.91	0.79	.07	.11	.08	.65								
5. Processes	3.58	0.73	-.04	-.08	.01	.24	.73							
6. Friendliness	3.76	0.63	-.09	-.15	-.06	.00	.55	.76						
7. Avoiding negative emotions	3.86	0.87	-.12	-.15	-.07	.01	.61	.61	.65					
8. Discussed alternatives	3.53	0.69	.02	-.03	-.07	.21	.59	.59	.66	.78				
Conflict (T^2)														
9. Party incompetence	2.79	0.80	.00	.24	.19	.08	-.08	-.08	-.12	-.04	.71			
10. Inflexibility	3.22	0.77	.03	.09	.01	.01	.06	-.01	-.08	.01	.39	.66		
11. Interparty hostility	3.49	1.03	.19	.31	-.16	.11	.03	.02	-.04	-.07	.23	.33	.74	
12. Settled (T^2)	3.57	0.83	-.05	-.21	.05	-.09	.32	.34	.40	.23	-.11	-.14	-.25	.86

$N=149$. Coefficient alpha reliabilities shown in *italics* on the diagonal. Correlations $> .14$ significant at $p < 0.10$; correlations $> .18$ significant at $p < 0.05$; correlations $> .23$ significant at $p < 0.01$.

sources of conflict [party incompetence ($r = -0.11$, n.s.), inflexibility ($r = -0.14$, $p < 0.10$), and interparty hostility ($r = -0.25$, $p < 0.01$)] were negatively correlated with party perceptions of successful resolution of the dispute. These data are consistent with Hypothesis 1.

Table 2 reports the results of a multiple regression analysis of the party's perceptions of settlement (time 2) on the time 1 measures of mediator tactics and sources of conflict (time 2). To measure the independent influence of each variable, semi-partial correlation coefficients for each parameter estimate using type I sums of squares were calculated. These are reported as ΔR^2 in Table 2. These figures show the unique contribution to the overall R^2 for each independent variable given that the prior variables are already in the model (Tabachnik and Fidell 1989; SAS Institute 1990). The significant and negative parameter estimate for interparty hostility provides further evidence that increased interparty hostility was negatively related to party settlement, although the relationship was only marginally significant ($p < 0.10$).

Hypothesis 2. Table 1 reports the Pearson bivariate correlations between mediation success (time 2) and mediator tactics (time 1). The correlation between mediator use of pressure and settlement was small and not significant. In Table 2 the parameter estimate for the main effect of pressure tactics was significant, and the parameter estimate for the interaction of party inflexibility and mediator pressure tactics was positive and marginally significant ($B = 0.9459$, $p < 0.10$). This lends partial support for Hypothesis 2. However, the interaction terms for party incompetence and mediator pressure and party hostility and mediator pressure were not significant.

Hypothesis 3. Mediator use of negotiation process tactics positively interacted with interparty hostility to produce higher settlements at time 2 ($B = 1.73$, $p < 0.05$). However, the interaction between process and either party incompetence or inflexibility was not significant. This is consistent with Hypothesis 3.

Hypothesis 4. Tables 1 and 2 report a significant and positive relationship between discussing alternatives and settlement. However, there is a significant and negative relationship ($B = -0.2316$, $p < 0.05$) in the interaction between discussing alternatives and party inflexibility. This suggests that when the parties are inflexible, mediators who discuss alternatives are not helping and actually may interfere with the parties achieving a settlement. This is consistent with Hypothesis 4.

TABLE 2
REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF TIME 2 PERCEPTIONS OF SETTLEMENT
ON MEDIATORS AND TIME 1 TACTICS

Variable	DF	Parameter Estimate	Standard Error	Standardized Estimate	ΔR^2
Intercept	1	6.0933	3.0126	0.0000	—
Prior mediator success	1	0.0221	0.0819	0.0214	.00
Control Variables					
Party (mgt. = 1, union = 0)	1	0.2514	0.1522	0.1466	.04
Party experience (years)	1	0.0078	0.0086	0.0757	.01
Mediator Tactics (Time 1)					
Pressure	1	1.3718	0.5666	1.2870**	.01
Negotiation processes	1	1.8810	0.7194	1.6328**	.11
Friendliness	1	1.5281	0.9223	1.1439*	.02
Avoiding negative emotions	1	-0.1930	0.6876	0.1987	.03
Discussed alternatives	1	1.0666	0.6620	0.8759*	.00
Sources of Conflict (Time 2)					
Party incompetence	1	-0.1505	0.6788	-0.1422	.00
Party inflexibility	1	-0.0713	0.7840	-0.0654	.00
Interparty hostility	1	-1.0151	0.6202	-1.2444*	.03
Tactics (T^1) \times Conflict Sources (T^2) Interactions					
Incompetence \times pressure	1	0.0843	0.1169	0.3377	.01
Incompetence \times process	1	0.1056	0.2083	0.4723	.00
Incompetence \times friendliness	1	-0.1422	0.2459	-0.5828	.01
Incompetence \times avoid neg.	1	-0.1728	0.1972	-0.8005	.00
Incompetence \times alternatives	1	0.2228	0.1848	0.9058	.00
Inflexibility \times pressure	1	0.2314	0.1387	0.9459*	.02
Inflexibility \times processes	1	0.2657	0.2176	1.2075	.00
Inflexibility \times friendliness	1	-0.2380	0.2485	-1.0369	.01
Inflexibility \times avoid neg.	1	0.2970	0.1850	1.4531	.01
Inflexibility \times alternatives	1	-0.5274	0.2048	-2.3160**	.04
Hostility \times pressure	1	0.0484	0.1015	0.2598	.00
Hostility \times processes	1	0.3101	0.1303	1.7302**	.03
Hostility \times friendliness	1	-0.0424	0.1630	-0.2356	.00
Hostility \times avoiding emotions	1	-0.0358	0.1403	-0.2189	.00
Hostility \times alternatives	1	-0.0326	0.1381	-0.1721	.00

Model $R^2 = .41$; adj. $R^2 = .27$; DF = 122; $F = .3038$ ***; * $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$; ΔR^2 = type I squared semipartial correlations.

Hypothesis 5. Table 1 reports significant bivariate correlations between time 1 measures of mediator use of friendliness ($r = 0.34, p < 0.01$) and avoiding negative emotions ($r = 0.40, p < 0.01$) and settlement at time 2. This provides partial support for Hypothesis 5. In addition, Table 2 reports a positive parameter estimate for the use of friendliness that was marginally significant ($B = 1.14, p < 0.10$). In addition, none of the interaction terms of friendliness or the tactics of avoiding negative emotions were significantly related to settlement. This suggests that the friendliness tactic, and perhaps the tactic of avoiding negative emotions, may be marginally effective across situations in support of Hypothesis 5.

Summary and Discussion

Prior research suggested that mediator tactics may have either a positive effect or no effect on the parties depending on the underlying cause of the dispute. This study suggests that in some cases a mismatch between the type of dispute and mediator tactics not only may render the mediator tactics ineffective but also may reduce the likelihood of the parties obtaining a settlement. The evidence from this field study of actual mediation cases presents partial support for this conclusion. As expected, several mediator tactics were positively correlated with settlements, and several causes of dispute were negatively related to settlement. In addition, interaction terms between sources of disputes and mediator tactics that were expected to be helpful in resolving the dispute were either as predicted or were not significant. Furthermore, the use of the mediation tactics of suggesting alternatives resulted in a negative impact on settlements in cases where the underlying source of the dispute was party inflexibility.

This suggests that when party inflexibility is an underlying source of the dispute, mediators who discuss alternatives with the parties may not help and may in fact interfere with the successful resolution of the dispute. In this study, the measure of the mediator's use of discussion of alternatives included items such as "discussed other settlements or patterns," "pointed out the costs of disagreement," and "suggested a review of needs with your constituency." It may be that as parties become more entrenched in their positions, the mediator's discussion of alternatives for settlement actually may fuel the fires of the parties' intransigence. Since the parties are already inflexible, the discussion of alternatives by the mediator may force the parties to respond in a way that defends their position.

Carnevale (1992, 1986) suggested that one of the tactics that mediators may use to facilitate a negotiated agreement is "inaction." Perhaps

inaction is appropriate in some situations. This study suggests that in some cases mediator efforts possibly may interfere with successful negotiations. In such situations, inaction would be preferable to doing the wrong thing. As the old adage from human medicine “First, do no harm” suggests, sometimes it may be better to do nothing than to do the wrong thing. The data presented here suggest that in some cases mediators may do the wrong thing and that when they do, they reduce the likelihood of a negotiated agreement. However, further research using other samples and other methods is necessary to confirm this finding. In addition, the data present bivariate and multivariate correlational evidence that suggests significant relationships but cannot be interpreted as causal without further research. Future research may fruitfully explore mediator tactics across alternative contexts to determine which tactics will have a positive effect, no effect, or a negative effect.

One possible limitation of this study is that the mean of the measure of settlement was 3.57 with a standard deviation of 0.83. This suggests a fairly high settlement rate. Discussions with representatives of the state agency suggest that this is typical of all the cases this agency handles, so this may be a fairly representative sample. Nevertheless, it is possible that responses are biased in the direction of settlement. Thus future research is needed to confirm these findings.

Nevertheless, the fairly high settlement rate and modest variance suggest that there is some restriction in range on this variable. This restriction of range may have decreased the size of the effects reported by correlational statistics. Thus the correlational evidence may somewhat understate the true size of the relationships that were studied.

There are also several implications for the practice of mediation and the training of mediators. This study suggests that there are an array of mediation tactics that may be successful (i.e., pressure, negotiation processes, friendliness, and discussing alternatives). Further, the parties suggest that the most effective mediators use pressure tactics when the parties are inflexible and negotiation process tactics when the level of party hostility is high. Also, it may be better to avoid discussing alternatives when the source of the conflict is party inflexibility. Training programs for mediators could include an explanation of both the different types of mediation tactics and the source of conflict. In addition, they could explain how the source of conflict may enhance the effectiveness of one type of influence tactic, render it useless, or in fact result in a negative impact on the dispute.

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APPENDIX

TABLE A.1

ROTATED FACTOR PATTERN OF MEDIATOR TACTICS: PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS ANALYSIS WITH VARIMAX ROTATION

Tactic	1	2	3	4	5
1. Pressure					
Tried to change your expectations	.64	.01	.10	-.16	.32
Pressed you to make compromises	.81	.17	.05	-.07	-.02
Told you that your positions were unrealistic	.65	-.02	-.20	-.20	.04
2. Processes					
Attempted to simplify the agenda by eliminating/combining issues	.04	.58	.18	.33	.30
Called for frequent caucuses	.08	.74	.13	.02	.09
Controlled the timing or pace of negotiations	.32	.48	.15	.19	.16
Kept you at the table and bargaining	.20	.55	.18	.22	.12
3. Friendliness					
Tried to gain your trust and confidence	.01	.30	.69	.20	.24
Used humor to lighten the atmosphere	-.06	.11	.66	.18	.14
Let you blow off steam in front of the mediator	.22	-.11	.64	.11	.09
Suggested tradeoffs among the issues	.25	.19	.41	.11	.24
Attempted to speak your language	-.17	.26	.59	.14	.10
4. Avoiding negative emotions					
Controlled expressions of hostility	-.08	.39	.38	.41	.27
Suggested proposals that helped you avoid the appearance of defeat on an issue	.13	.13	.31	.41	.37
5. Discussed alternatives					
Discussed other settlements or patterns	.06	.21	.15	.17	.66

Pointed out the "costs" of disagreement	.22	.11	.18	.00	.63
Suggested a review of needs with your constituency	-.02	.18	.08	.06	.57
Taught you about bargaining or the impasse process	.16	.02	.18	.08	.57
Helped you deal with problems with your constituency or superiors	-.09	.36	.16	.25	.45
Had you prioritize the issues	.12	.15	.33	.08	.45
Percentage of variance	6.7	7.9	28.0	11.0	8.8

Italics represent factor loadings on the specified measure used in subsequent analysis.

TABLE A.2
 ROTATED FACTOR PATTERN OF SOURCES OF CONFLICT: PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS ANALYSIS WITH VARIMAX ROTATION

	1.	2.	3.
1. Party incompetence			
Lack of leadership within labor or management	.52*	.17	.26
A chief negotiator lacked authority	.55	.21	-.20
Somebody backed off an initial proposal	.48	.21	.18
Somebody was not prepared for negotiations	.81	.17	-.05
A chief negotiator lacked experience	.76	-.08	.19
2. Party inflexibility			
A stubborn person was present in the negotiations	.16	.44	.32
Somebody held onto a position based on settlements in comparable jurisdictions	.15	.72	.09
There was an attempt to break from a pattern established in comparable jurisdictions	.13	.83	.02
Somebody wanted to control the proceedings	.00	.55	.25
3. Interparty hostility			
Hostility between labor and management	.03	.10	.83
Lack of trust between the parties	.20	.11	.82
Percentage variance explained	24.3	20.9	20.5

Italics represent factor loadings on the specified measure used in subsequent analysis.