

Security Communities in the Baltic Sea Region: Real and Imagined

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Introduction

THIS ARTICLE WILL BE DIVIDED into a *before* and an *after* – that is, before and after the great European turbulence of 1989–91, which included the fall of the Berlin Wall, the East European revolutions and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Before that period, the Nordic balance and the Nordic security community were the main components of the North European power structure. Afterwards, the Nordic balance had been replaced by a pattern of parallel action, though the Nordic security community remained. At issue was whether that community could ‘cross’ the Baltic Sea and include its eastern shore – perhaps even Russia. In order to shed light on this issue, we should first focus on the self-reinforcing process of a security community and how to start it and, second, on the historical issue of how the Nordic security community got started. These two questions will be at the core of this article, together with the Nordic and EU security communities’ possible crossing of the Baltic Sea during the years ahead. In particular, the article will examine whether Baltic–Russian relations should be modelled after the Nordic or the EU paradigm for building a security community.

Before the Turbulence

Let me first sketch the Nordic power configuration prior to the great European turbulence. A so-called *Nordic balance* was in existence, meaning that relations between the bipolar power blocs in this region were less tense than in Central

Europe. The idea was that Denmark and Norway kept a low profile in NATO in return for the Soviet Union's treating Finland gently.¹ This low profile meant the non-stationing of foreign troops or atomic weapons on the Danish and Norwegian mainlands, as well as reluctance towards NATO exercises in the vicinity of either the island of Bornholm in the Baltic Sea or the Soviet/Norwegian border to the north – that is, near the Cold War frontline. In return, the Soviet Union abstained from invoking the Finnish–Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which could have led to Finnish–Soviet military cooperation, including perhaps the stationing of Soviet nuclear weapons on Finnish territory. This, of course, would have meant the end of Finnish neutrality.

It is undisputable that such a relatively low-tension area existed, but it did so partly for the 'wrong' reason – that is, a non-Nordic reason. As has been documented by historians of the Cold War, the Danish and Norwegian low profiles were maintained primarily as geopolitical non-provocation devices in relation to the Soviet Union.² The 'Nordic balance' was, in other words, not primarily caused by Nordistic³ concerns for the fate of Finland, but rather by bilateral concerns directly related to the Soviet Union. Popular resistance to the hosting of nuclear weapons also played a role for policymakers. The Nordic connection *did* matter to some extent, for example in the sense that it was effective in a NATO context: concerns about maintaining the low-tension status of Norden, including Finnish neutrality, were effective arguments when Danish or Norwegian ministers needed to persuade their NATO colleagues that a low profile would be preferable for all concerned.

It is also undisputable that the Nordic countries formed a *security community* during most of the 20th century; a 'we feeling' – not excluding mutual rivalries – had developed at the popular level, making war unthinkable between the Nordic states.⁴ It is also possible to count a series of 'non-wars' during the 20th century, where conflicting interests between pairs of states could easily have led to war but where peaceful solutions were found.⁵

The development of a security community is much akin to snowball-rolling: once the process gets started, it becomes self-reinforcing. As the Nordic countries could convince each other and the world around that they indeed formed a security community, the incentive to retain this state of affairs – or even boost it – was all the more important. The security community was a common public-relations success, linked to the trans-Nordic ideology of Scandinavianism from the middle of the 19th century, which created the necessary 'we feeling': the Scandinavians speak (almost) the same language; they are brethren, even though organized in separate states, and brethren do not fight each other.⁶ During the second half of the 20th century, the security community also walked hand in hand with the Nordic balance, somehow signalling that Norden was particularly peaceful. It could be further coupled to Sweden's 'world conscience', as well as to the high profiles of the Nordic countries in

relation to the UN and, in particular, their contributions to UN peacekeeping forces. Furthermore, the security community fitted neatly with the Swedish/Nordic model of society,⁷ of which one of the axioms was/is a belief in social engineering based on science and rationality. From this perspective, in an analogy to the fighting of disease, war could be seen as an irrational phenomenon that should be eradicated.

In sum, traditional Scandinavianism, the Nordic balance, the Nordic UN profile and the Swedish/Nordic model of society all supported each other and the self-reinforcing idea of a Nordic security community. This all amounted to a big success, both in reality and from a public-relations point of view. Inevitably, a certain self-righteous flavour crept in: 'See how peaceful we are.' Of course, there is no reason to believe that the Nordic peoples should be innately any more peaceful than other peoples, given their record of warfare in previous centuries; however, this was what they gradually became, both in rhetoric and in reality, once the snowball had started rolling.

Still, this does not answer the question: how does one *initiate* a security community? In particular, how was the Nordic security community initiated? The security-community literature referred to neglects the issue that somebody must have formed the snowball in the first place. My thesis here is that that somebody was Sweden.

Sweden: The Generous Core

This last assertion may be slightly taboo, since an inherent part of Nordistic rhetoric is that no one Nordic nation-state should be emphasized above the others. This is a politically sensitive issue, and one which has to some degree spilled over into the scholarly field. However, it seems to me, from the non-wars and from other evidence, that Sweden was the initiating 'generous core' of the community, the *sine qua non* for the process's starting out. The party critical for the occurrence of a non-war is, evidently, the non-war's 'loser', if it could credibly wage war and thereby gain tangible benefits. Sweden was never on the winning side in the series of non-wars referred to, and – most importantly – it was a loser in the vital first two non-wars that occurred. Had war broken out in any of these cases, the snowball would have melted and the whole idea would have become obsolete, at least for a couple of generations.

The first precarious and paradigmatic instance of the security community occurred when Norway seceded from the Swedish–Norwegian Union in 1905.⁸ Here, Norway got what it wanted, whereas Sweden 'lost Norway', as the developments were commonly seen in Sweden. Still, Sweden did not use its marked military superiority to prevent the secession. This was seriously considered, but eventually the Swedish king and government decided against

it: it was not for Nordic 'brethren' to fight each other. In the words of King Oscar II, 'the Union is not worth anything, if it is to be upheld by force'.⁹ Since issues related to secessions, territory and sovereignty normally have a strong tendency to cause military action, a peaceful secession from a neighbouring state, such as the one at stake here, is indeed a rare phenomenon;¹⁰ its only parallel, prior to the 1990s, was Singapore's leaving Malaysia in 1963.

Similarly, Sweden was a loser in the strife with Finland over the Åland Islands after World War I. In a referendum, 90% of Ålanders had voted to join Sweden, and the islands located adjacent to the Stockholm archipelago were of significant strategic importance to Sweden to say the least (a Great Power occupation of the islands in a crisis situation was described as a potential 'pistol in the back' of Sweden). Still, Sweden acquiesced in the decision of the Council of the League of Nations to give Finland sovereignty over the islands (though with preconditions, such as the safeguarding of the Swedish language). The Åland population (approximately 25,000) is the largest one that has had its fate decided by an international court after a dispute between two states.¹¹

Why was Sweden so generous? Again, there is no reason to believe that Swedes should be any more 'peaceful' than, say, Norwegians or Finns. However, there were certain seemingly domestic reasons for the Swedish peacefulness. Sweden had *not* received the injections of nationalist adrenalin that Denmark, Norway and Finland had experienced during the second half of the 19th century. Political dependence and wars, whether won or lost, produce popular nationalist sentiment.¹² Denmark received its injections in connection with the wars of 1848–51 and 1864, leading to an inward-oriented, defensive type of nationalism. As the underdog in its relationship with Sweden, Norway had mobilized nationalism continuously since 1814. A similar process took place in Finland while it was part of the Russian empire, in particular during *ofärdsåren* (the 'years of oppression') from about 1890. In contrast, Sweden had lived a geopolitically insulated life, protected as the core of Norden by the Finnish and Norwegian flanks (and by Denmark to its southwest). Sweden has not been at war since the Napoleonic wars.¹³ This has provided barren soil for nationalism, but fruitful soil for the kind of internationalist/idealist opinion that favoured a security community. In addition to this fundamental factor, it is likely that other factors played a role in favour of Swedish internationalism. In the climate of opinion permitted by geopolitical fundamentals, there were niches for the 'free churches' and the workers' movement, as well as for a rationalistic impulse in public opinion.¹⁴

During the second half of the 19th century, the free churches gained a foothold in Sweden that was unparalleled in the other Nordic countries. Denmark, for instance, had experienced a spiritual and inward-oriented nationalist awakening, which prevented these foreign, not least American, churches from gaining significant support there.¹⁵ The free churches, most of them characterized by puritan piety, stressed noble deeds – as distinct from mere noble

intentions – more strongly than the established Lutheran state church. In Sweden, the state church had to engage in a tough competition with these newcomers and, in the process, to emulate them to some degree. Thereby, it developed in a less fundamentalist Lutheran direction than the state churches of the other Nordic countries. Both the state church and the free churches obtained significant direct influence on various political parties. Also, they engaged in extensive transnational collaborations with their opposite numbers, and the Swedish state church became an international pioneer in ecumenical efforts, in which the 1925 Stockholm meeting became a milestone.¹⁶ The Danish church, by contrast, took a much more reserved attitude in this regard, due both to its fundamentalism and to the absence of a unitary leadership (such as an archbishop). Sweden's ecumenical profile was a forerunner of its 'world conscience' role in the political realm. The Swedish archbishop Nathan Söderblom even tried to establish an initiative to mediate between the belligerents of World War I.

The church sector also had an impact in more indirect ways. The emphasis on noble deeds made for a more moralistic climate of debate in Sweden than was the case in Denmark, notably.¹⁷ In other words, this difference diffused from the religious sector to public debate in general. Morality, including political morality, was not such a 'private affair' in Sweden as it would have been under a more fundamentalist Lutheran conception.

In addition, Sweden developed a stronger workers' movement than the other Nordic countries, one reason for this being the Swedish large-scale production units (e.g. *brukssamhällen*), which provided fertile soil for workers' cohesion and solidarity. Internationalism was a marked and integral part of the ideology of workers' movements at the time.¹⁸ It was in line with such internationalism that the Social Democratic leader Hjalmar Branting threatened in 1905 that the use of force by Sweden against Norway would trigger a general strike in Sweden. In other words, Swedish internal cohesion would be endangered in the process.¹⁹

In this internationalist climate of opinion, it is no wonder that the rationalist engineer Alfred Nobel decided to award one of his prizes to the promotion of peace. In other words, the religious and ideological peace orientations gained a rationalistic, scientific counterpart. The worldwide public-relations success of the Nobel prizes, including the peace prize awarded in Oslo, evidently contributed to the self-reinforcing development of a Nordic security community. Sweden made a virtue out of its geopolitically conditioned need to keep apart from Great Power conflicts, imbuing 'neutrality' with a special peace-loving implication. And after World War II, Sweden had an even greater vested interest in playing the role of 'world conscience'. In other words, what was permitted, perhaps even beneficial, for geopolitical reasons had its domestic underpinning in religious values, the workers' movement and the institutionalization of rationalism in, not least, the Nobel Prize. Even though

not all the beneficial effects revealed in the course of the 20th century could be clearly observed in 1905 or 1921, it was seen as better to play the 'good guy' than to go for short-sighted military gains in what later came to be seen as the first vital test cases of a Nordic security community. Denmark, Norway and Finland, preoccupied with more immediate concerns of their own – licking their wounds or striving for full independence – could not at the outset cultivate the 'luxury interests' that Sweden could afford. In other words, Sweden formed the initial snowball and was thereby the *sine qua non* for the process's getting started.²⁰

After the Turbulence

After the great European turbulence of 1989–91, there was still a Nordic security community, but the Nordic balance had disappeared. The overall European power structure was one of core–periphery, the core – or pole of attraction – being a symbiosis between the USA (in terms of its influence in Europe) and the EU. Denmark, Sweden and Finland belonged to the northern periphery of this core. Together, they came to form the 'North–EU pillar of parallel action'. Parallel action here refers to the synchronic behaviour of units of approximately the same resource base, the same values and the same task environment. Units emulate each other, partly out of rivalry, partly out of co-operation/identification. Denmark, Sweden and Finland now had approximately the same task environment, essentially the EU agenda and the Baltic Sea agenda.²¹ Analogously, there was a Baltic pillar of parallel action: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania shared their Russian neighbour and past experiences with it, the Baltic Sea agenda and their aspirations for EU and NATO membership. In each pillar, there was the mixture of cooperation and conflict, a kind of sibling rivalry, so characteristic of parallel action. The issue in the Baltic pillar was essentially a beauty contest of the form 'Who among us is the best suited for EU and NATO membership?', whereas the North–EU pillar was preoccupied with the question 'Who among us should be seen as the informal regional leader?'. The North–EU pillar saw itself as a catalyst for Baltic EU memberships, thereby turning the Baltic Sea into an EU lake.²² The countries in the North–EU pillar saw a geopolitical self-interest in consolidating the re-emerged states in the Baltic pillar and in furthering peaceful conditions on the eastern shore of the Baltic Sea.

The Nordic security community no longer existed in splendid isolation. In the course of the Cold War, the EC/EU had developed into a security community.²³ War had become unthinkable between EC/EU members, even between Germany and France, the two 'hereditary enemies'. These had now a common enemy in the form of the Soviet Union and a common ally in the

form of the United States – an ally that was so superior in strength to both Germany and France that rivalry between the two for alliance leadership was altogether redundant. During these geopolitically optimal conditions, there was time for the establishment of a security community ('stable peace *because of community and identity*').²⁴ The common coal and steel production arrangements made war virtually impossible in the short run, and, with strong common institutions and deepened integration, war would simply be too costly for all parties concerned. With war no longer a practical option, there was some trickling-down of elite 'we feeling' to civil society. Although there is much less 'we feeling' among the European peoples than among the elites, there is judged to be enough of this commodity for the idea of a community to apply, although no time demarcation or series of non-wars has been offered.²⁵ As the geopolitically optimal conditions for stable peace disappeared with the Soviet Union in 1991, the EC/EU security community faced its real test – a test that was apparently passed. People had stopped thinking how and why this community got started; mutual peace now seemed a 'natural' thing.

Even though the Nordic and the EC/EU security communities were initiated according to different models (see below), it is noteworthy that geopolitical background conditions were probably necessary for their emergence in the first place: the strengthening of Prussia (facilitating Scandinavianism) and Sweden's protected location in the former case, and the US–Soviet connection in the latter case.

A Security Community on the Eastern Shore of the Baltic: 'Bottom Up' or 'Top Down'?

A key question after the Cold War has been, in essence, whether a security community could be created on the eastern shore of the Baltic Sea. This could be imagined as an enlargement either of the Nordic security community or of the EU security community. This is more than an academic alternative. The point is that Norden and the EU represent widely different, almost paradigmatic, cases of how to initiate a security community. Once this process has gained momentum and the snowball starts rolling, it matters little or nothing how it got started. In this sense, in their *current* functioning there is no essential difference between the Nordic and the EU security communities. For this reason, it is a question of no practical relevance whether one regards the Nordic security community of *today* as an integral part of the EU community or as a community of its own.

However, when the practical and intellectual task is to *initiate* a security community, there is every reason to distinguish between a Nordic method

(‘bottom up’) and the EU method (‘top down’) and see which one best suits the circumstances in the region in question. ‘Bottom up’ means that mutual sympathies and transnational ties develop spontaneously over a long time-span at the popular level; for instance, nongovernmental organizations, grass-roots organizations and professional bodies establish ties, perhaps even umbrella organizations. In this way, top decisionmakers in the states concerned find themselves deprived of the option of mutual war. In other words, the community is created *inadvertently*. In the Nordic case, intra-Swedish developments during the 19th century made Sweden the generous core power, which, combined with transnational ties and the ideology of Scandinavianism, laid the ground for a security community during the 20th century. The ‘top down’ method, on the other hand, starts out with security visions from above (for example, with Jean Monnet and others in the EC case wishing to see a permanent end to Franco-German wars), a common project and common institutions, as in the case of the EC. Gradually, the peaceful expectations come to encompass the popular level. The Nordic Council or Council of Ministers, by contrast, did not cause Scandinavianism and a Nordic security community; instead, it was the other way round. This appears, for one thing, from the temporal sequence: Scandinavianism and the Swedish developments referred to date back to the mid- and late 19th century; the security community emerged about 1905; whereas the institutions were not created until the post-World War II period (1952 and 1971).

The question now is which of these two starting methods – ‘bottom up’ or ‘top down’ – is the most appropriate for the eastern shore of the Baltic Sea. Generally, the odds for a security community here are quite unfavourable, not least owing to the overdoses of adrenalin (nationalism) that all parties concerned have experienced during the 20th century. Also, while the Nordic countries had civil societies and extensive transnational ties between these, and the pre-EC European countries had civil societies (though with modest transnational ties), this third group of countries, with their socialist pasts, started out in 1991 with *no* independent civil societies.

If we look at the three Baltic states only, it is dubious whether they form a security community today. The fact that they have never been engaged in mutual war is no proof that they form such a community. Their mutual differences, which are more significant than perceived from outside, the absence of a ‘generous core power’ and the absence of historical transnational ties or any analogy to Scandinavianism speak against an affirmative answer. Still, there seems to exist, after all, a fragile ‘we feeling’, so it cannot be ruled out that the EU/Norden-induced process started after the Cold War may lead to a security community. We need not go further into this question here, however, since intra-Baltic conflicts have always been overlaid²⁶ with the Baltic–Russian conflict. That is to say: intra-Baltic conflicts have been secondary to the Baltic–Russian conflict, and the ‘common enemy’ has caused a degree of cohesion among the Balts, depending on the degree of Baltic–Russian tension at any

the Balts, depending on the degree of Baltic–Russian tension at any given time. This tension has never ‘allowed’ intra-Baltic conflicts to develop in a serious direction.

The conflict of practical interest, therefore, is the Baltic–Russian one. Is a Russian–Baltic security community realistic, and if so from a ‘bottom up’ or ‘top down’ starting-point? One thing is granted: such a community does not exist today, nor ever has. Quite to the contrary: Stalin’s incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union in 1939–40 and again in 1944, his subsequent deportations of Balts to Siberia and the Soviet Union’s suppression of Baltic freedom between 1944 and 1991 have had far-reaching implications for the Balts’ perception of Russia, which is seen as the ‘empire of evil’. Whereas many Russians tend to interpret themselves as the Balts’ co-victims in relation to the Soviet Union, the Balts look back on the Soviet Union as the imperialist tool of Russia. So not only are the ‘Nordic’ attributes mentioned above absent, but the traumatic experiences of the past virtually forbid any ‘bottom up’ development in the direction of a security community. So the Nordic way of starting such a community is unrealistic, to say the least. But what about the EU method?

It may sound naive, but since the EU ‘top down’ method could create a security community between the French and German ‘arch-enemies’, it is not unlikely that it can do so also in the case of Russia and the Balts. However, it may be legitimately objected, first, that Russia and the Balts do not share a common enemy and, second, that Russia will never become an EU member. The first objection is undeniably valid. A compensation for a common enemy could be huge, common problems, for instance of an environmental nature – ‘huge’ and ‘common’, that is, so that only a common, concerted effort could solve them.²⁷ That Russia will never join the EU is probably also correct, since the country’s size alone seems forbidding. However, there are a number of other mechanisms, more or less related to the EU, that may also play a role in establishing a security community in the long run. First of all, there are the disciplining effects of EU/NATO norms on would-be EU/NATO members;²⁸ these effects are basically a consequence of the unipolar power structure in Europe, where the EU/USA is the one and only pole. In order to qualify for membership, candidates must live up to EU/NATO norms in a number of respects. For instance, they should not have unsettled border issues, and they should not have internal conflicts with minorities of ‘foreign’ nationalities. These norms have caused the Baltic would-be members not only to settle their mutual border issues but also to reach border agreements with Russia (although not all are ratified). The conditions of the Russian minorities in Estonia and Latvia have improved, probably owing to the same logic. All these developments have obviously been steps towards improved Baltic–Russian relations.²⁹

With regard to the second objection, various types of cooperation can be subsumed under the codeword *Einbindung* (binding): instead of trying to deter a presumed threatening actor (in this case Russia), one binds it into a web of commitments, over time socializing the actor and oneself to mutual trust and the non-use of force. EU–Russia relations are at stake here, for example as subsumed under the heading ‘EU Northern Dimension’.³⁰ This originally Finnish idea is to develop the EU’s political and economic relations towards its northern adjacent areas, in particular northwest Russia; such fields as transport, investment, environment (including nuclear safety), organized crime and illegal immigration are covered (see below). Should Russia again decentralize – as appeared possible prior to Putin – the Balts’ perception of one (threatening) Russian actor will be hard to uphold.

There are also other types of socializing cooperation, an example being the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS). As distinct from its substantial tasks (such as democracy and minority issues, environment, education and crime fighting), the high-politics significance of the CBSS is inherent in the very fact that Russians and Balts sit around the same table (they do so also in the UN and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), but not in such a relatively narrow and intimate circle). Also, multilateral diplomacy makes possible bilateral meetings that, for domestic political reasons in the countries involved, might be difficult to arrange as state visits (as in the cases of Russia and Estonia or Russia and Latvia). Given the similarity of substance between the EU and CBSS agendas, and given that four CBSS states are EU members and four are aspiring to membership (and that the EU Commission is also represented in the CBSS), the CBSS has become an important forum for EU enlargement discussions or discussions of EU relations to non-members (e.g. the EU–Russian partnership). It is increasingly obvious that the high-politics role of the CBSS is to add to the blurring of the NATO and EU external ‘borders’ in Europe.³¹

This is in no way the Balts’ ‘cup of tea’; they would like a clear dividing line. The attitude eastwards follows the formula ‘We belong to Europe, and Europe ends *here*’.³² Therefore, the Baltic engagement in the CBSS has been lukewarm at best. The Baltic countries have feared that regional fora would be exploited by Western countries to disclaim ‘responsibility’ for the Baltic countries’ security. However, now that major NATO and EU enlargement decisions have been taken for the foreseeable future, the Baltic countries seem less averse to regional fora than they used to be, even one like the CBSS, of which Russia is a member.

Whereas Great Power resistance makes NATO conceived as an *alliance* less realistic on the eastern shore of the Baltic Sea, NATO can assist in binding through its Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme. PfP has been referred to as a ‘geopolitical eraser’, removing or weakening sharp dividing lines between NATO members and non-members.³³ Whereas the Baltic countries have participated eagerly and with increasing efficiency in PfP – because they see it as a road towards NATO membership – PfP cooperation with Russia has been

modest and has been put on ice as a consequence of NATO enlargement, the Kosovo war and the Chechnyan uprising in Russia.

Kaliningrad as the Golden Opportunity

With the parallel-action structure among the Baltic countries, the most realistic strategy for improved Baltic–Russian relations is probably that one Baltic country functions as forerunner. This may already be happening in the case of Lithuania,³⁴ and for reasons that are not hard to understand. Although Lithuania's relations with Russia have been as traumatic as those of Estonia and Latvia, Lithuanian–Russian relations are built on more stable foundations: there is no tense border region (as is the case with Estonia), and the Russian population is smaller and more integrated than in Estonia and Latvia. Lithuania has two idealtypic options for its relations with Russia upon EU membership: the Greece–Turkey option and the Finland–Russia option. Whereas Greece very much sought to use the EC/EU as an instrument in its eastward conflict, Finland has worked energetically for good EU–Russia relations since joining the EU (the Northern Dimension initiative being the best example of this). Whether Lithuania will select the Greek or the Finnish example upon entering the EU remains to be seen, but there are already signs – also demanded by the EU – that Lithuania will come much closer to the Finnish than to the Greek example.³⁵

Also – paradoxically as it may sound – Lithuania and Russia have the kind of tangible, clearly delimited, 'huge, common problem' that was called for above, in the form of Kaliningrad. 'Huge' needs no further justification (environmental problems, not least), and 'common' is simply due to Kaliningrad's geopolitical and geoeconomic situation in the middle of a future enlarged EU: a source of regional instability. In other words, Kaliningrad is far from a zero-sum problem; quite to the contrary, benefits to Kaliningrad are also benefits both to Russia and to Lithuania (as well as to Poland to the south). Moreover, Kaliningrad has already attracted the interest of the EU, through its being incorporated in the EU Northern Dimension. In other words, powerful external catalysts in the form of the EU and EU member-countries are available.³⁶ Of course, possible Russian suspicions of a Western plan to secede Kaliningrad from Russia should not be nourished; however, as long as an attempt is not made to circumvent Moscow and as long as EU–Russia relations remain stable, this should not be a problem.

The Enlargement Potential of Security Communities

Whereas the 'bottom up' method of initiating a security community *may* be relevant to intra-Baltic relations, it is unrealistic in the case of Baltic–Russian

relations. The Nordic prescription says: 'Do like us: nominate a generous core power, create a transnational ideology, develop transnational ties, "let the thousand flowers bloom" – and wait from fifty to a hundred years.' With such a prescription, the *enlargement potential* of the Nordic community is modest. By contrast, the EU security community has a significant enlargement potential: owing to the EU–US unipolar power structure in Europe, there is one core – which is also a pole of attraction – from which power and influence radiate. Power and influence are applied 'top down' to relations and regions to be 'conquered'. The EU prescription says: 'If you don't follow our norms and rules, you will be deprived of future benefits, and/or the option of EU membership will vanish.' This is a much more effective prescription than the Nordic one.

There is also an intermediate method between these two: 'top down' *without* power projection. An example could be the OSCE, which covers an area 'from Vancouver to Vladivostok'. The security-community potential of the OSCE has been discussed by Adler.³⁷ Being an intergovernmental organization, its principles and consensus (minus one) decisions (based on the lowest common denominator for mutually heterogeneous states) are transmitted 'top down' to crisis situations. However, they are not supported by a corresponding power structure (e.g. the inside/outside logic) – as are the EU and NATO norms. Therefore, the OSCE's authority *eo ipso* is modest (although, for instance, NATO has gone far in emulating OSCE practices). Other intergovernmental organizations like the CBSS also belong to this intermediate category; however, the CBSS as characterized above is more closely tied to the EU, and therefore it can to some extent lean on its power structure.

In the context of Baltic–Russian relations, a 'top down' method of governmental binding based on the European power structure seems to be the only way ahead – especially if huge, common problems require concerted efforts. The EU Northern Dimension, the CBSS and NATO PfP cooperation have been mentioned as strivings in this direction. In all of these fora, Denmark, Sweden and Finland – as well as Norway on occasion – have taken on rather active roles as co-binders. This seems to be Norden's most useful security role on the eastern shore of the Baltic Sea – rather than functioning as a model proper. Whether the 'top down' approach will lead to a Baltic–Russian *security community* in the long run, it is evidently too early to tell. However, something less than a security community can suffice.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

- * Hans Mouritzen is a Project Director at the Danish Institute of International Affairs and a member of Norway's Research Council. He has formulated his conception of international politics in *Theory and Reality of International Politics* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998). The author is grateful for valuable comments on a previous draft of the present article

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- 1 Arne Olav Brundtland, 'Nordisk balanse før og nå' [Nordic Balance Then and Now], *Internasjonal Politikk*, vol. 25, no. 5, 1966, pp. 491–541.
- 2 Poul Villaume, *Allieret med forbehold: Danmark, NATO og den kolde krig. En studie i dansk sikkerhedspolitik 1949–1961* [Allied with Reservation: Denmark, NATO and the Cold War. A Study of Danish Security Policy 1949–1961] (Copenhagen: Eirene, 1995).
- 3 The term 'Nordism' and its derivative 'Nordistic' refer to the ideology behind Nordic cooperation. 'Norden' refers to Scandinavia plus Finland and Iceland.
- 4 Karl W. Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organisation in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957); Emanuel Adler & Michael Barnett, 'A Framework for the Study of Security Communities', in Emanuel Adler & Michael Barnett, eds, *Security Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 29–66.
- 5 Håkan Wiberg, 'The Nordic Security Community: Past, Present, Future', in Bertel Heurlin & Hans Mouritzen, eds, *Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2000* (Copenhagen: DUPI, 2000), pp. 121–137.
- 6 Scandinavianism was facilitated by the emergence of Prussia (later Germany) as a Great Power during the 19th century. Likewise, the subsequent addition of Finland to the club was facilitated by the Great Power status of the Soviet Union.
- 7 For example, Hans Mouritzen, 'The Nordic Model as a Foreign Policy Instrument: Its Rise and Fall', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 32, no. 1, February 1995, pp. 9–21.
- 8 Evert Vedung, *Unionsdebatten 1905: En jämförelse mellan argumenteringen i Sverige och Norge* [The Union Debate 1905: A Comparison Between the Debates in Sweden and Norway] (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1971).
- 9 Clive Archer, 'The Nordic Area as a "Zone of Peace"', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 33, no. 4, November 1996, pp. 451–467.
- 10 Wiberg (note 5 above).
- 11 Ibid.
- 12 Unless, of course, the regime in question breaks down in the process, as for instance did Nazi Germany in 1945. Then a counter-reaction is likely to take place that makes nationalism and national self-assertion politically incorrect. See, for example, Jack Snyder, 'Nationalism and the Crisis of the Post-Soviet State', *Survival*, vol. 35, no. 1, Spring 1993, pp. 5–26; Hans Mouritzen, *External Danger and Democracy: Old Nordic Lessons and New European Challenges* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997).
- 13 The pattern described here has been exacerbated by 20th-century events. Finland fought two wars with the Soviet Union – in 1939–40 and in 1941–44 – and remained afterwards somewhat in the shadow of Soviet power. Norway and Denmark were occupied by Germany in 1940–45.
- 14 For my view of the interplay between domestic and external (geopolitical) factors in conditioning foreign policy, see Hans Mouritzen, *Theory and Reality of International Politics* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), ch. 6.
- 15 For example, Jakob L. Balling & Poul G. Lindhardt, *Den nordiske kirkes historie* [A History of the Nordic Churches] (Copenhagen: Nyt nordisk forlag, 1967), ch. III; Tim Knudsen, *Den danske stat i Europa* [The Danish State in Europe] (Copenhagen: DJØF, 1993), ch. 7.
- 16 Balling & Lindhardt (note 15 above).
- 17 Also influential in this regard was the temperance movement.
- 18 During the 20th century, Sweden developed the strongest workers' movement in the Western world.

- 19 Archer (note 9 above).
- 20 Without drawing the parallel too far, the role of West Germany as a generous actor was probably a necessary condition for European integration's gaining momentum in the postwar period. Germany, having lost the war and shifted regime, had to be the 'nice guy', paying the Community's bill at critical moments in the process.
- 21 There are nuances, of course, that space prevents me from delving into here; see Hans Mouritzen, 'High Politics in Northern Europe: Recent Developments and their Interpretation', in Lars Hedegaard & Bjarne Lindström, eds, *The NEBI Yearbook 1999* (Berlin: Springer, 1999), pp. 259–275.
- 22 Denmark also worked for Baltic NATO memberships, although that was hardly realistic owing to Great Power resistance within NATO.
- 23 See, for example, Ole Wæver, 'Insecurity, Security and Asecurity in the West European Non-War Community', in Emanuel Adler & Michael Barnett, eds, *Security Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 69–118.
- 24 Adler & Barnett (note 4 above).
- 25 Wæver (note 23 above), p. 101.
- 26 Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era* (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992).
- 27 Think of the earthquakes in Greece and Turkey (1999, 2000), creating at least an embryo of goodwill and cooperation between the two countries. No party could justifiably suspect the other of having orchestrated the earthquakes, and the usual zero-sum assumption between the two countries (i.e. that the gain of one party means a corresponding loss for the other) was invalid for this delimited field.
- 28 Mouritzen (note 14 above), pp. 103–108; Lykke Friis, ed., *An Ever Larger Union? EU Enlargement and European Integration* (Copenhagen: DUP, 1999).
- 29 See, for example, Graeme P. Herd, 'Russia's Baltic Policy After the Meltdown', *Security Dialogue*, vol. 30, no. 2, June 1999, pp. 197–212.
- 30 Clive Archer, 'Security Aspects of the EU's Northern Dimension', in Lars Hedegaard & Bjarne Lindström, eds, *The NEBI Yearbook 2000* (Berlin: Springer, 2000), pp. 315–327; Agnieszka Mazur-Baranska, 'The Northern Dimension of the EU', *Polish Quarterly of International Affairs*, vol. 9, no. 2, Spring 2000, pp. 31–44.
- 31 On the Baltic Sea rim space as a future grey zone, interpreted as a positive scenario through its blurring of sharp dividing lines, see Clive Archer, 'Prospects for Europe's Baltic Rim', in Hans Mouritzen, ed., *Bordering Russia: Theory and Prospects for Europe's Baltic Rim* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), pp. 259–281. On the beneficial, often unintended, consequences flowing from the sheer existence of international organizations, see Mouritzen (note 14 above), pp. 126–130.
- 32 Håkan Wiberg, 'Adaptive Patterns and Their Deep Roots: A European Overview', in Hans Mouritzen, Ole Wæver & Håkan Wiberg, *European Integration and National Adaptations* (New York: Nova Science, 1996), pp. 43–63, on p. 48.
- 33 Bertel Heurlin, 'Military Command Structures in the Baltic Sea Area', in Lars Hedegaard & Bjarne Lindström, eds, *The NEBI Yearbook 1998* (Berlin: Springer, 1998), pp. 405–422.
- 34 *Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review*, no. 2, Spring 2000 (special issue).
- 35 See, for example, Vygaudas Usackas, 'Lithuania and Russia: Knowing the Past, Building Genuine Partnership for the Future', *Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review*, no. 2, Spring 2000, pp. 9–26.
- 36 Ibid.
- 37 Emanuel Adler, 'Seeds of Peaceful Change: The OSCE's Security Community-Building Model', in Adler & Barnett (note 4 above), pp. 119–160.