GROWTH MACHINE UP-LINKS: URBAN RENEWAL AND THE RISE AND FALL OF A PRO-GROWTH COALITION IN A U.S. CITY

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Abstract

Recent research examining post-Second World War urban renewal and redevelopment programs acknowledges the pervasive influence of progrowth coalitions and the ideology of "growth" in local politics and decision-making. Yet few researchers have examined the role of state structures, political interests of urban planners and city officials, and the feedback effects of past growth initiatives and conflicts in shaping subsequent growth strategies and the composition of growth coalitions. I draw upon archival data and newspaper articles, real estate industry documents, and planning reports to examine the key actors, important decisions, and political struggles surrounding urban planning and redevelopment efforts in Kansas City, Missouri from 1940 through the 1960s. I use the narrative concepts of *path dependency* and *policy feedback* to illustrate how past events and actions, important decisions, and political conflicts can delimit future growth strategies and policy options, altering alliances between progrowth coalitions and local redevelopment agencies, and transforming the programmatic orientation of growth policy. Probing for the feedback effects of past redevelopment conflicts and institutional arrangements on subsequent growth strategies is useful for two reasons: First, it reveals how changing growth agendas and growth coalitions emerge not only in response to new socioeconomic conditions but also on the basis of previous growth policies. Second, it highlights an important "up-link" dimension (Molotch 1999) in the growth machine heuristic that connects local processes with the macrostructures of the state and the economy.

Introduction

Much research has documented the pervasive influence of growth coalitions in local politics and policy making and the powerful impact that growth ideology has on the formulation of local redevelopment drives. Yet only recently have researchers begun to document variations in the composition of growth coalitions, investigate the origin and implementation of specific growth policies, and identify sources of opposition to progrowth ideology (see Logan, Whaley, and Crowder 1997 for a review). Using a case study of growth politics in Kansas City, Missouri, I examine the impact of local institutional arrangements and political struggles between city officials and business elites on the formulation and

implementation of growth policy and redevelopment in the three decades after 1940. A vast literature has focused on mobilization of local businesses and the formation of growth coalitions in years following the Second World War, especially those business groups who organized to take advantage of the generous federal subsidies provided through the federal urban renewal legislation, via the Housing Acts of 1949 and 1954 (Squires 1989; Weiss 1980; Kleniewski 1984; Mollenkopf 1976; 1983, pp. 87–90). Yet empirical studies of postwar urban renewal and business mobilization have downplayed the considerable local variations in (1) the institutional structure of city planning and redevelopment operations, and (2) the political struggles between urban planners and growth coalitions over the control and implementation of the growth agenda through local redevelopment policy. This historical case study permits examination of changes in the structure and organization of city planning and redevelopment efforts, and political struggles between growth coalitions and city officials over the implementation of the growth agenda. My goal in part is to move beyond documenting the fact of growth and the presence of growth coalitions in local politics, and explain how local processes link up to external socioeconomic conditions and political forces, an important "up-link" in the growth machine heuristic (Molotch 1999).

The Urban Renewal program was a federally subsidized program of slum clearance and urban redevelopment established through the Housing Acts of 1949 and 1954 (see Gotham and Wright 1999 for an overview). These housing acts empowered local communities to create redevelopment authorities with the legal power of eminent domain to acquire privately-owned land for slum clearance and redevelopment.[1] The impetus for the legislation came from central city businessmen and real estate interests who mobilized to push for comprehensive planning and downtown revitalization to bolster declining central-city property values and make cities more appealing as centers of private investment in light of suburban development that was attracting business away from the central city (Von Hoffman 2000; Hays 1985, chapter 7; Teaford 1990; Wilson 1966; Mollenkopf 1976; 1983; Savitch and Thomas 1991). As scholars recognize, the urban renewal program contributed greatly to clearing vast areas of slum housing in many U.S. Central Business Districts (CBDs), replacing low-rent residential housing with high rise-office towers and luxury apartments (Gans 1962; Hirsch 1983; Squires, Bennett, McCourt, and Nyden 1987; Feagin and Parker 1990, chapter 9). Although attacking substandard housing conditions was used to justify the urban renewal program, very few resources were used to improve

deteriorated or dilapidated housing or "renew" slum neighborhoods (Teaford 2000; Greer 1965, p. 3; Jacobs 1961; Hartman and Kessler 1978; National Commission on Urban Problems 1969, p. 153). Nationally, the program destroyed thousands more units than it replaced and dislocated tens of thousands of small businesses and residents (Friedland 1982, pp. 81, 85, 195; Bayor 1989; Gans 1962; Jacobs 1961; Weiss 1980; Kleniewski 1984). In 1974, the federal government discontinued the urban renewal program amid widespread urban protest and neighborhood discontent surrounding the destabilizing effects of the program on inner city communities (Von Hoffman 2000; Teaford 2000; Hirsch 1983; Weiss 1980).

I begin by discussing the mobilization of local business elites in the late 1930s and 1940s to reform city politics (e.g., end boss rule) and make local government more conducive to private sector revitalization demands and progrowth initiatives. I investigate the response of downtown business elites and real estate interests to the specter of urban decline, the institutional transformation of urban planning activities after 1940, and the initial slum clearance legislation that enabled local government to create a public agency (i.e., housing authority) with the legal power to condemn and demolish blighted housing. I then examine the sources of conflict between the city manager's office and downtown elites over the design and implementation of slum clearance and urban renewal in the post-Second World War era. Throughout the paper, I use the narrative concepts *path dependency* and *policy feedback* to identify the determinants of key policy adoptions at particular historical moments, and explore the impact of political conflicts between city officials and business elites in shaping and delimiting future growth policy options. I analyze the feedback effects of past redevelopment conflicts and institutional arrangements on subsequent growth strategies to show how changing growth agendas and growth coalitions emerge not only in response to new socioeconomic conditions but also on the basis of previous local growth policies.

Growth Coalitions and Growth Politics

Recent research acknowledges the pervasive influence of progrowth coalitions in local politics and decision-making, evidence and conclusions consistent with the growth machine approach to urban politics and growth policy. As developed by Molotch (1976) and Logan and Molotch (1987), the growth machine approach argues that a "growth machine" made up of an array of real estate and banking interests

dominates and controls the urban redevelopment process. The desire for "growth" creates a consensus among a wide array of actors and elite groups, no matter how divided they may be on a specific issue or policy. Proponents of the growth machine approach suggest that growth coalitions are prevalent throughout local government because (1) city leaders seek to sustain growth to maintain governmental services and fiscal health, and (2) local businesses become involved in local policies to maintain and increase their profitability by influencing and shaping the city's regulation of land-use, tax and employment policy, and provision of services. The formation of coalitions in pursuit of growth permeates all facets of local life, including the political system, as well as local utility companies, unions, media, and cultural institutions such as professional sports teams, theaters, symphony orchestras, and universities (Molotch 1976; Logan and Molotch 1987). The advantage of the growth machine approach, according to Molotch (1999), is that it provides a powerful heuristic to understand the effect of urban change at the social psychological level (a "down-link" to everyday experience), the connections between the local, the state, the economy, and global dynamics (an "up-link" dimension), and the transformation of settlement space outside the United States (a comparative "across-link").

Over the last two decades, much research has investigated the role of progrowth coalitions in the formulation and specific character of local redevelopment drives. In a comparative analysis of growth coalitions in Houston and Milwaukee, Fleishmann and Feagin (1988) found that the composition and strategies of growth coalitions varied significantly over time. Bennett, et al. (1988) charted the demise of Chicago's North Loop Redevelopment project and the emergence of a historical preservationist movement as a signal that the city's growth machine was "on hold." Deleon's (1995) study of San Francisco and Calavita's (1992) examination of San Diego in the 1980s emphasized the historical contingency of growth strategies, policies, and outcomes. From these and other studies we find that local politics and the pursuit of "growth" is shot through with conflict all multiple levels: from struggles over the use of public monies to finance large-scale redevelopment projects to the role of local government in engineering growth or containing the negative consequences of past growth initiatives. Not all pro-growth coalitions use the same strategies to influence local politics and policy and the balance power in any community is contingent upon a variety of local and external conditions. The theoretical and empirical literature recognizes that different cities can embrace different "growth" strategies (pro-growth, managed growth, slow-growth, no-growth, anti-growth) and not all support

the same kinds of growth (population growth, manufacturing versus tourism-based growth, downtown revitalization versus outlying residential development, and so on).

In recent years, scholars have focused on the role of government or the "local state" in shaping urban redevelopment. Some scholars argue that local governments are dependent on the national and global economy (Dear and Clark 1981, pp. 1278–83; Clark and Dear 1984) whereas others argue that local institutions remain critical for promoting growth (Friedland, Piven, and Alford 1977). While scholars recognize that "local and national politics matter in determining the strength and mode of growth machine dynamics" (Molotch 1993, p. 29) there is no consensus on how they conjoin, how they are mutually reinforcing, or whether research should "start with the local details and build up" (Molotch 1999, p. 255) or eschew "bottom-up methodology" and examine wider economic and political forces and processes to understand local conditions (Jessop, Peck, and Tickell 1999, pp. 142, 144). Most empirical research in urban sociology embraces the former, more inductive and agency-centered focus to concretely situate actions, events, and processes in broader historical contexts (see Gotham and Staples 1996 for a review). For example, in a case study of the Tenderloin district in San Francisco, Robinson (1995) showed that the role of the local state is both a strength and weakness of progrowth forces. On the one hand, the existence of an activist government can unify a growth coalition and engineer growth through a variety of land-use and regulatory mechanisms (tax concessions, low-interest loans, grants, infrastructure development, and so on). On the other hand, an activist government can be a vulnerability for the growth coalition when a "less supportive government arises as a response to a cognitively mobilized slow-growth movement" (p. 485). With the rise of a slow-growth, no-growth, or anti-growth coalition, elected officials, city agencies, and planning commissions can then become "tools to control capital and institutions" (p. 485) and, in turn, can profoundly affect the character of growth strategies and the selection of growth policies.

According to Logan, Whaley, and Crowder (1997), scholars have typically viewed the local state as a "limiting force" in the effectiveness of no-growth or anti-growth forces, or a "stabilizing force" for pro-growth coalitions, "maintaining a predictable tilt in favor of development proposals despite minor shifts in the governing coalition" (see also Goetz 1994; Horan 1991; Calavita 1992). Yet this view of the local state has been subject to criticism from scholars who argue that the growth machine approach has failed to consider the efficacy of local political

structures and formal politics (Logan, et al. 1997), and neglected to specify the connections between the local state and the national state (Kirby and Abu-Rauss 1999, pp. 214–5; Jessop, Peck, and Tickell 1999, p. 159). Much research has examined how a growth coalition can unify otherwise disparate groups of investors and capitalists through the ideology of "growth" but few studies have focused on the role of the state in unifying or dividing a growth coalition. For Kirby and Abu Rass (1999, p. 215), "the local state is in large measure defined as the locus of growth and of the political issues that surround it." Thus, "while the growth machine represents the processes of development, introduction of the local state focuses attention upon the contexts of that development." Many scholars link the process of urban development in the United States to a system of juridically fragmented and politically divided metropolises. This politically and institutionally fragmented system has created a series of political opportunity structures from which business elites can exercise political influence on policy making. Thus, in the arena of growth policy, the political power of business elites does not derive from some autonomous political capacity on the part of the business community, but is "licensed by the state; it is the power of a strategic-structural position within a broader political system" (Jessop, et al. 1999, p. 159). In this paper, I examine the role of local institutional arrangements and city agencies in unifying and stabilizing a growth coalition, and facilitating the adoption of some growth strategies and policies rather than others.

Although empirical research is beginning to recognize variations in the influence and effect of progrowth coalitions on local politics, few studies have documented the locally- and historically-specific sources of variation in the composition and operation of a growth coalition. Moreover, few scholars have clearly identified the specific political, organizational, and historical and cultural factors that explain how and why cities pursue some growth strategies rather than others. As Logan, Whaley, and Crowder's (1997, p. 610) recent empirical overview acknowledged, "Few researchers have attempted to study explicitly the internal workings of progrowth coalitions, the various roles played by their different members, the tactics these actors employ, the conflicts that develop among them, or the variation in the efficacy with which various progrowth actors attack their task." We can contrast this lack of research on progrowth coalitions with the many case studies and comparative studies of anti-growth coalitions and opponents of growth (Swanstrom 1985; Vogel and Swanstrom 1989). More important, generalized statistical analyses of large data sets or reanalyses of secondary

sources have dominated scholarly research on growth politics. In most variable analyses, growth strategies and the growth coalition are treated as an independent variables and analysis proceeds to examine the outcomes or consequences of growth politics. In contrast, this study treats growth strategies and policy as dependent variables and investigates the impact of changes in local governmental structures, institutional arrangements, political struggles between city officials and business elites on the formulation and implementation of urban redevelopment and renewal efforts.

Method and Data Sources

This historical examination of the growth politics and urban renewal in Kansas City combines a case study method with the narrative techniques developed in recent years by historical sociologists, social historians, and other scholars.[2] Specifically, I use the narrative variant of *path dependency* to uncover the historical dimension of a local setting and display the important events and actions that shaped local growth conflicts between city officials and growth coalitions over the design and implementation of urban redevelopment initiatives. Path dependency narratives, according to Aminzade (1992, p. 462), refer to the notion that for any given sequence of events, "past choices and temporally remote events can help to explain subsequent paths of development and contemporary outcomes. It suggests that decisions made at a particular point in time delimit future options." Social historians and historical sociologists such as Aminzade (1992), Abbott (1992; 1990), Griffin (1993; 1992), and Haydu (1998) among others, have analyzed sequences of events to explore how collective action in the past and at specific places shapes future collection action, networks of action, human agency and social structure. David's (1985) initial work showed how the adoption of the awkward QWERTY keyboard during the late nineteenth century, despite the proliferation of competitive and more efficient designs, locked the typewriter industry into a trajectory that affected the subsequent training of bookkeepers, secretaries, clerks and typists, and office managers. Pedriana and Stryker's (1997) analysis of the events leading up to the 1969 revised Philadelphia Plan shows how the language and values incorporated into past policies provided a set of "cultural" or "symbolic" resources that set in motion a path-dependent sequence of events that continues to shape equal employment policy and politics. These and other empirical accounts suggest that scholars consider how past events "feed forward" (1997, p. 638) by shaping subsequent events,

enabling some actions while constraining others, and transforming political structures, capacities, and interests.

In recent years, historical sociologists have emphasized the importance of examining path-dependent sequences of programs and policies—policy feedbacks—to identify the determinants of key policy adoptions at a given historical moment, explore actions not taken, and explain the durability of subsequent policy trajectories through time. Skocpol's (1988) work on the historical development of New Deal and Great Society legislation, Weir's (1988) historical analysis of U.S. employment policy, and Quadagno's (1990) study of the social conflicts surrounding the debate over Nixon's Family Assistance Plan (FAP) illustrate how historical sociologists use the term "policy feedback" to capture the contingent, yet cumulative and constraining, effects of past policies on subsequent political processes and social conflicts. Once enacted, social policies can reshape the organization of the state itself, affect the goals and alliances of social groups involved in ongoing political struggle, and lock events into a stable trajectory that then becomes difficult to escape. Probing for the feedback effects of past actions and events on subsequent policies and events reveals how changing political agendas and alternative possible alliances emerge not only in response to new socioeconomic conditions but also on the basis of previous policies.

The narrative account of growth politics provided in this paper uses an "eventful" conception of temporality (Sewell 1996) to explain how the cumulative effect of actions and events can increasingly constrain or facilitate future growth strategies, growth policy, and affect the formation or dissolution of growth coalitions in a given locality. The advantage of a narrative analysis is that it joins sequentiality and contingency to highlight the transformative power of events and the role of human agency in explanatory accounts (Haydu 1998; Somers 1996; Stryker 1996, p. 307; Gotham and Staples 1996). My effort is to situate social action and social structures in their historical and local contexts to develop a historical grounded sociological explanation of the urban redevelopment process occurring in time and through time. Griffin (1995, p. 1248) suggests that historical time is part of the "context in which societal arrangements have personal and collective meaning and causal efficacy." Time is the context in which social action occurs, social relations are challenged as well as institutionalized, and collective meanings and memories are created, maintained, and changed (Aminzade 1992).

I use data from three major sources to examine historical variation in growth conflicts and strategies, and the local implementation of postwar urban renewal. First, I examined public documents and planning

reports issued by the City Plan Commission, the Housing Authority of Kansas City, Missouri (HAKC), Kansas City's Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority (LCRA), and the Kansas City, Missouri City Development Department, among other agencies.

Second, I searched three local newspapers (e.g., the *Kansas City Times*, *Kansas City Star*, and the *Kansas City Call*) and a number of local archives for material about growth politics and urban renewal. Third, I accessed every weekly issue of the *Kansas City Realtor*, the official publication of the Kansas City Real Estate Board, from 1925 to 1985 (the last year published) for data on the local real estate industry, growth coalitions, and the role of business elites in redevelopment efforts. I consulted newspapers and archival data to acquire greater familiarity with the city and to identify the important decisions, key actors, and groups involved in growth coalitions, growth conflicts, and the local implementation of urban renewal. I also gathered newspaper articles to examine the general publicity and media attention surrounding various urban renewal and redevelopment drives.

Municipal Reform and the Fall of the Pendergast Machine

In the decades before 1940, the political machine of Boss Thomas J. Pendergast controlled the Kansas City, Missouri city government (Dorsett 1968; Reddig 1947). Pendergast entered politics in 1915 and spent the next two decades expanding and consolidating his power over city politics. By the early 1930s, Pendergast had almost complete control and influence over the city and the Democratic Party in Missouri due to that large blocks of votes he could deliver at election time that could make or break candidates seeking office (Brown and Dorsett 1978, p. 199; Dorsett 1968). Pendergast's privileged position in the party also earned him considerable respect from national party leaders, such as Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who after his inauguration in 1933 granted the machine boss complete control over all New Deal federal programs in Missouri (Schnell, Collings, and Dillard 1991). Generous federal grants through the Public Works Administration (PWA), the Civil Works Administration (CWA), and the Works Projects Administration (WPA) brought thousands of new jobs to Kansas City and paid the construction of costs for many new downtown skyscrapers, including the Jackson County Courthouse, the Municipal Police Building, City Hall, Municipal Auditorium, and a new convention center and a baseball stadium (Reddig 1947). Federal aid combined with local public works projects initiated

under the city's "Ten Year Plan" of 1931 helped create more jobs, build playgrounds and parks, and redevelop waterways and boulevards.[3] By the early 1930s Pendergast's power over local and state politics had become so influential that journalists and politicians infamously referred to Kansas City as "Tom's Town" (Brown and Dorsett 1978, p. 202).

Pendergast's power began to erode after the local media revealed that many of the machine's votes in the 1934 local elections came from "ghosts," voters whose names appeared on cemetery headstones and vacant lots. A public outcry combined with an upsurge of labor militancy and a protracted fiscal crisis during 1936 and 1937 spearheaded the development of a "unified business community that brought considerable force into the anti-Pendergast ranks" (Brown 1958, p. 3). Representatives of the Chamber of Commerce, the Manufacturers Association, the Clearing House Association, and the Kansas City Real Estate Board took the lead in publicizing the abuses of the political machine and cultivating public opinion to demand its ouster. Much of this business mobilization against Pendergast was in response to his vehement pro-labor stance. Much to the chagrin of local business elites, Pendergast frequently championed the cause of the American Federation of Labor and called for rapid and widespread unionization of local workers in many occupations. After 1935, the machine boss supported the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union in a suit against the Donnelly Garment Company, which had tried to prevent unionization of its workers. However, more disclosures of wrongdoing in 1938 and 1939, combined with reports of financial mismanagement, embezzlement, and voter fraud seriously weakened Pendergast's hold over state and local politics. His indictment for tax evasion in April 1939 hammered the final nail in the coffin of the political machine (Dorsett 1968, pp. 10–24; 1975; Reddig 1947, chapter 6).

Less than a month after Pendergast's conviction, business leaders mobilized to form the nonpartisan "Forward Kansas City Committee," a growth coalition made up of fifty business leaders under the direction of R.J. DeMotte, President of the Chamber of Commerce; Vincent O'Flaherty, President of the Real Estate Board; and other banking and real estate elites (Brown 1958, pp. 3–4; *Kansas City Star.* 4/28/39). Renamed the "Citizens Committee" in 1940, this business-led reform movement seized control of the city, electing John Gage as mayor and winning seven of the eight council seats in the municipal elections in 1940, a dominance the Committee would hold through the end of the 1950s. Emboldened by their overwhelming election victory, city reformers set out to transform the machinery of local government, adapting

machine ward organizations to the interests of business reformers, building public support for reform government, and, most important, publicizing the merits and necessity of long-range and comprehensive city planning and urban revitalization.[4]

That same year the newly elected city council appointed L. Perry Cookingham as city manager, a post he would hold through 1959, and assigned him the task of reorganizing the City Plan Commission. This included centralizing city planning activities, installing full-time professional planners, and convincing the public of the necessity of comprehensive and long-term planning and redevelopment. Before 1940, city planning in Kansas City tended to be ad hoc, piecemeal, and uncoordinated, with most of the planning and infrastructure development undertaken by city departments directly responsible for improvements. At the behest of the newly elected city council Cookingham reorganized the City Plan Commission to include the city manager, the directors of the public works, water, and welfare departments, the president of the Board of Park Commissioners, and a set of professional planners under his direction (City Plan Commission 1941, p. 8).

The motivation for reorganizing the City Plan Commission stemmed from the perception among Cookingham and other political and economic elites that decisive action was need to combat increasing central city deterioration and urban decay. Throughout the 1930s, a host of urban problems plagued Kansas City including stagnant population growth, decentralization of people and industry, and urban blight (*Kansas City Realtor*. 1/29/30, pp. 2–3; 9/17/30; 9/24/30, p. 2; 10/7/31, p. 2). The economic onslaught of the Great Depression took its toll as the manufacturing, trade, retail, and housing figures painted a dismal picture of financial and industrial collapse. During the 1930s the number of persons employed in manufacturing in fell from 58,000 to 51,000 while the value added to industrial products dropped from $280 million to $148 million. From 1930 to 1939, wholesale business production declined from $415 million to $292 million at the same time retail sales plummeted from $350 million to $224 million (Spletstoser and Larsen 1987, p. 21). The decay of the downtown was evident in figures showing that in the ten-year period after 1935 there had been a loss of 6% in assessed valuation in the Central Business District compared with a 0.5% loss in the entire city (City Plan Commission. October 1947; Anderson, J. 1957, p. 128). The local housing industry had virtually collapsed during the Great Depression, with less than 3950 total housing starts from 1930 to 1940, compared with 19,991 starts from 1910 to 1919, and 35,569 during the boom years from 1920 to 1929

(City Plan Commission 1941; *Kansas City Realtor*. 5/18/32, p. 3). It was these menacing figures and trends that alarmed city officials and business elites who saw physical obsolescence and economic depression as tantamount to the incipient decline of the urban core.

Growth Conflicts and the Origin of Urban Renewal

According to historical sociologists, narrative is a useful analytic tool for connecting events and constructing sequences of events to explain historical change and stability (e.g., trajectories) (Abbott 1990; 1992; Aminzade 1992; Haydu 1998; Somers 1996; 1998; Gotham and Staples 1996; Quadagno and Knapp 1992; Griffin 1992; 1993; 1995). The explanatory logic of a narrative account emphasizes how contingencies and conjunctures guide historical development and how events, as singular happenings grounded in time, can transform social structures. Sewell (1996) suggests that events trigger social change by altering the social structures that shape, enable, and constrain action. This emphasis on the transformative power of events highlights the importance of understanding history as made up of "cascades of events" (Abbott 1991, p. 227) that can profoundly shape meanings people assign to their social surroundings, alter relationships and connections among powerful actors, and affect the pace and direction of historical change. According to Griffin (1993, p. 1098) "[t]o locate an action in the sequence of a narrative and link the action to the narrative's previous actions, for example, is one way to understand what 'caused' the action and thus to 'explain' its occurrence" (see also Quadagno and Knapp 1992; Haydu 1998; Roth 1989). Non-historical sociological explanations are comparative and generalizing, and not temporal in their logic (Griffin 1993, p. 1099). Narratives, on the other hand, are intrinsically temporal in both construction and explanatory logic and "take the form of an unfolding, open-ended story fraught with conjunctures and contingency, where what happens, an action, in fact happens because of its order and position in the story" (p. 1099).

In Kansas City, the purpose of municipal reform was to eliminate corruption and machine politics from the business of city management and restructure city government to make it more hospitable to private sector growth initiatives and revitalization demands. Much of the reform movement that swept city government in the late 1930s and 1940s centered on installing and utilizing planning experts and civil servants within the reorganized council-manager form of city government. A significant feature of this government form was the ability of the city manager,

as appointed by the city council, to develop the budget and policy recommendations, approve long-range urban planning initiatives, and work in concert with the City Plan Commission and other city agencies. The dissolution of the Pendergast machine and the entry of the reform government laid the foundation for establishing a "business-like" city government to take the initiative in promoting economic growth and redevelopment. In a 1943 speech, Cookingham emphasized that "We want a planned program which will provide the essential needs of the community worked out on a good, substantial, business-like basis." In this speech he stressed the advantages of adopting a growth strategy of slum clearance and redevelopment of the CBD to "be planned and administered in such a way as to make life more pleasant, more profitable, and more healthful, and more secure."[5] While city officials, urban planners, and business elites agreed that the clearance of slums was necessary for promoting growth and economic development, there was some disagreement over how slum clearance should proceed and who should control the implementation (Gore 1973).

The entry of the reform government and the business-led reorganization of the City Plan Committee established the political conditions for the creation of the Housing Authority of Kansas City (HAKC) in July 1941, an agency with the legal power to acquire and clear slum areas. During the Pendergast era, City Manager H.F. McElroy deliberately excluded Kansas City from taking part in state and federal statutes that gave authority to local municipalities to create housing authorities because "I am opposed to slum clearance in the first place because we have no slums" (Webster 1949, pp. 29–30; *Kansas City Star.* 3/13/46). In contrast, city reformers and planners in the 1940s envisioned using federal funds to create an agency with legal powers to redevelop deteriorating areas. As early as January 1940, Cookingham and business elites from the Downtown Committee were discussing the feasibility of establishing an agency to condemn property and clear slums. Established in late 1939, the Downtown Committee represented a growth coalition of about one hundred real estate elites and downtown business firms including the Building Owners and Managers Association, the Chamber of Commerce, and the Merchants Association, among others. Throughout the first six months of 1940, the Committee worked with the staff of the City Plan Commission to draw up the legal amendments for state enabling legislation to create a housing authority (Gore 1973, pp. 28–31). In June 1940, the Committee voted to support the introduction of a bill in the Missouri state legislature that would permit the city to participate in the federal slum clearance program,

established through the Housing Act of 1937 (*Kansas City Times*. 6/8/40, p. 8). Through the lobbying efforts of Cookingham and the Downtown Committee, the state government passed legislation in 1941 authorizing Kansas City to establish a housing authority with the power to acquire land and construct segregated low-income housing projects.[6]

Less than a year after its creation, the HAKC was forced to suspend its nascent plans and operations due to national mobilization for the Second World War. The HAKC resumed its activities in March 1946 amid much protest from Missouri state legislators and real estate elites who opposed government intervention in the local housing market (Webster 1949, pp. 29–30). Because of legislative resistance and business opposition, the Missouri state legislature failed to amend the enabling act for slum clearance in 1949. By this time a concerted political conflict between Cookingham and the Downtown Committee had arisen over who should control the implementation, site selection, and pace of slum clearance (Anderson 1957; Gore 1973). While the Downtown Committee supported the idea of slum clearance, using the legal power of local government to acquire and clear land (i.e., eminent domain), members were firm that they should carry out redevelopment and construction privately, rather than by a public housing authority. In contrast, Cookingham was adamant that a city agency under his oversight and control should implement and control slum clearance and redevelopment. Moreover, while Cookingham supported the construction of public housing for those displaced by slum clearance, the Downtown Committee bitterly opposed to any state-run effort to build public housing for low-income residents (*Kansas City Realtor* 5/25/44. "Public Housing"; 12/7/44. "Postwar Housing"). Thus, although Cookingham and the City Plan Commission took tentative steps in the 1940s to establish a permanent housing authority to clear slum neighborhoods, these efforts led nowhere because of the opposition from the Downtown Committee. Allegiance to private sector sovereignty over slum clearance was unflinching as the Committee was reluctant to invest power in a public agency such as a housing authority to combat slum conditions and build low-income housing (Gore 1973, pp. 26–38).

By the early 1950s, the legality of government acquisition of private land for public purpose (eminent domain) had survived challenge in the Missouri courts and a public relations campaign launched by the Downtown Committee was working to popularize the supposed merits of organizing public-private partnerships to clear slums (Brown and Dorsett 1978, pp. 239–245; Anderson, J. 1957, pp. 35–64). In 1953, the state of Missouri created the Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority

(LCRA) for planning and administering local urban renewal activities including slum clearance of blighted neighborhoods according to the Housing Acts of 1949 and 1954. While the preamble to the Housing Act of 1949 called for a "decent home and suitable living environment" as the official goal of federal policy, the Downtown Committee looked to the Act as a policy mechanism for eliminating blighted land-uses surrounding the CBD and using federal subsidies to engineer downtown growth. The purpose of the LCRA was to select a site, declare it "blighted," use the power of eminent domain to buy the land, and then clear it for reuse to attract private developers by pricing the land below its market value (Civic Research Institute 1963; City Development Department 1967). The LCRA's acquisition and redevelopment of blighted property was based on the expectation that physically clearing deteriorating areas and providing public subsidies for private redevelopment could reverse urban obsolescence (City Development Department 1969, pp. 20–22). In theory, the LCRA would transfer the acquired property to new owners who would redevelop the land for private uses that were in the public interest. In essence, the legal powers of government property acquisition and condemnation were united with the development resources of the private sector to transform existing land-uses and create and subsidize the local redevelopment industry.

Unlike the HAKC, the city government established the LCRA as a separate legal entity not directly responsible to Cookingham but to its own board composed of leaders of the business community (Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority 1969). With the creation of the LCRA the HAKC underwent an organizational transformation as its administrative staff was consolidated into the LCRA and city council redesigned the housing authority to administer the public housing program (Gore 1973, p. 35). Following the aims of the federal urban renewal legislation, the LCRA was to direct federal money to local urban renewal projects to aid in downtown revitalization and redevelopment. From the beginning there were competing interpretations of what urban renewal and slum clearance should be doing for the city, including the actual purpose of the program (e.g., neighborhood rehabilitation, slum clearance, public-subsidization of private growth) and who should control the local implementation of the program. While Cookingham had supported the creation of a government clearance authority under his control, he gave in to business interests who demanded that an extra-government agency, under the leadership and control of Downtown Committee, carry out the formulation and implementation of urban renewal and slum clearance (Bohanon 1971, pp. 63–4). These cumula-

tive actions effectively insulated the LCRA from city hall and public scrutiny while establishing the mechanisms for the growth coalition to exercise political power over urban renewal. The conflict between Cookingham and the Downtown Committee over the control of slum clearance was a political struggle over the leadership and control of the growth agenda, with the Downtown Committee gaining the upper hand.

In sum, by the early 1950s, the Kansas City, Missouri city government now possessed a series of new powerful land use-actors for translating the growth agenda into action. The City Plan Commission was to analyze and plan for future growth and development while the LCRA was to designate "blighted" areas, take the land by eminent domain, clear it, and sell it to private developers (City Plan Commission 1956; Cookingham 1954; 1956; 1957; 1958). The reorganized HAKC was to administer the public housing program, including building and managing low-income and elderly housing projects. The federal government supplied two-thirds of the $80 million to finance Kansas City's urban renewal activities from 1953 through the end of the 1960s. However, while the federal government provided the bulk of the funding, important decisions about site selection and size, and project cost and duration were left to LCRA officials working with the Downtown Committee, renamed the Downtown Redevelopment Corporation (DRC) in 1952 (Bohanon 1971; Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority 1969). Federal officials played a decidedly subordinate role, leaving key decision making to the LCRA while supplying vast financial resources for urban redevelopment.[7] The significance of urban renewal legislation was that it provided the federal financing and subsidies as well as established the formal mechanisms that enhanced the control of downtown business elites over the direction of urban redevelopment and growth policy.

The narrative variant of path dependency organizes events into temporal and explanatory sequences by not only identifying decisions and conditions that constrained future options but by exploring alternative paths that were not taken. The early decision by city manager McElroy not to have Kansas City participate in the nascent public housing program established a path dependent sequence of events that constrained future options, choices, and decision-making. In many cities, public housing provided a partial answer to the problem of freeing inner city land for private development. The Housing Act of 1937 empowered local communities to create local housing authorities with the legal power of eminent domain to acquire privately-owned land for slum clearance and rehousing (McDonnell, 1957; Bauman, 1987, pp. 40–42). By the mid-

1940s, a number of cities and states had passed legislation to enable local governments to designate, acquire, and clear "slum" areas and sell the land to private developers. Yet slum clearance proved an elusive growth strategy in Kansas City, Missouri until the early 1950s with the passage of the Housing Acts of 1949 and 1954. Once the slum clearance was chosen as the preferred growth strategy, the decision foreclosed future options and locked the local redevelopment industry into a trajectory that had a profound and enduring effect on the sociospatial transformation of the CBD and everyday life for residents living in the city.

Downtown Revitalization and the Consolidation of the Growth Coalition

The empirical and theoretical literature on growth coalitions and growth policy points to the division of growth-promoting activities among different levels of government, and the organization and functions of city agencies as critical sites that affect the rate and direction of growth (for an overview see Logan, et al 1997). Fleischmann and Feagin (1988, pp. 211–12) maintain that while each level of government has its own administrative organization and electoral base, the "programmatic and financial links between them can have significant effects on the development strategies employed by progrowth coalitions." According to Friedland, Piven, and Alford (1977, p. 459), "policies which affect the rate and direction of urban economic growth are more likely to be decided at a metropolitan-wide, regional, or national level" than the local level. In contrast Fainstein and Fainstein (1983, pp. 248–50) argued that while the level federal funding and the structure of funding are "necessary to create the setting" for engineering growth, it is local government that actively promotes redevelopment and selects against some growth strategies rather than others. Lauria (1999) has recently described a series of mechanisms that account for transformations in growth strategies and policy including, among others, local institutional arrangements, divisions within the growth coalition, and changes in federal funding and business subsidies.

In the case of urban renewal and growth politics in Kansas City, the creation of the LCRA was critical for establishing the institutional, financial, and legal base for promoting growth through slum clearance. The council manger system of local government and the legal precept of eminent domain were the mechanisms that unified the growth coalition around the issue of slum clearance, legitimating private control of public resources, and providing the "up-links" (Molotch 1999) connect-

ing the local growth coalition with the state and federal governments to fund urban renewal and enact favorable state-level regulations. The fact that the LCRA had virtually no public accountability and was composed of members drawn from the local business community effectively reduced the probability that major redevelopment decisions and land-use changes would become a matter of public dispute. Unlike Chicago and other cities (Bennett, et al. 1988), Kansas City's initial postwar urban renewal projects were not fitful nor were they locally divisive. In the early years, there was much grassroots support for slum clearance and urban renewal from groups such as "Residents for Renewal" and the "Men of Action," as well as from the Greater Kansas City Urban League and the African American newspaper, the *Kansas City Call*.[8] The two mainstream newspapers, the *Kansas City Times* and *Kansas City Star* gave supportive accolades, report-after-report and editorial-after-editorial triumphing the resurgence of the downtown and the "business war on the slums" during the 1950s and 1960s.[9]

By the late 1950s, Kansas City's downtown was bustling with the signs of revitalization and growth. The roar of bulldozers and the clamor of wrecking balls echoed throughout the central business district as local officials and real estate elites championed the virtues of the business movement to save the downtown. From 1953 through 1969, the LCRA launched eighteen urban renewal projects, most of which were designed to clear neighborhoods on the north, east, and south sides of the downtown and convert these residential areas into industrial and commercial land-use (Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority 1954; 1969). During this time, urban renewal affected over 5100 acres of land and uprooted thousands of residents living in the downtown core. According to the LCRA's own figures, the agency displaced more than 4400 people through urban renewal, 1783 African Americans and 1960 whites. Of those urban renewal projects reporting data on numbers of displaced African Americans and whites, 48 percent of those displaced were African Americans while whites made up 52 percent of displacees. LCRA data also show that the agency displaced 755 businesses including laundries, repair shops, groceries, garages, ice yards, bakeries, junk shops, and other small businesses.[10] In 1966, the LCRA converted all ongoing urban renewal projects into the Neighborhood Development Program (NDP), a comprehensive program of neighborhood redevelopment where planning and budgetary priority was shifted away from financing and clearing individual parcels of land toward redevelopment of entire areas of the city (City Development Department. September 1969b).

In Kansas City, the convergence of federally subsidized urban renewal

and comprehensive revitalization reshaped business-government relations in the post-World War II era. Through the LCRA, the pro-growth coalition worked to establish and legitimize a public-private partnership of business elites and redevelopment officials dedicated to carrying out a growth strategy of slum clearance and downtown redevelopment, a pattern of business influence and dominance over public policy replicated in Chicago, Philadelphia, Boston, Atlanta, San Francisco, among other cities.[11] Al Harmon, Executive Director of the LCRA from 1954 to 1974, and James Kemper, President of the Downtown Committee from 1940 through 1960s, were two of the most important leaders of the growth coalition. Both pressed hard for state and federal resources to fund urban renewal, and to coordinate slum clearance activities with large-scale expressway building. The Downtown Committee in operation since 1940, established the base from which downtown business interests formed the Downtown Redevelopment Corporation in 1952 (Cookingham 1954; City Plan Commission 1956; *Kansas City Star*. 2/22/53. "Tells of City Pattern"; 7/3/55. "Slum War is On," p. 7E). The membership of the DRC included 50 members composed of executives in the real estate, banking, retailing, and the hotel and entertainment industries. Other groups affiliated with the DRC included the Building Owners and Managers Association, the Citizens Regional Planning Council, the Hotel Association, the Core Development Corporation of the Chamber of Commerce, the Westside Redevelopment Corporation, and the Merchants Association. The business-run DRC worked closely with LCRA in the planning of specific urban renewal projects, feasibility studies, and economic analysis. These planning and redevelopment efforts were designed bolster downtown property values, including the construction of better shopping facilities, and more office and parking space in the downtown area.

The Demise of the Pro-Growth Coalition

By the end of the 1960s, growth politics in Kansas City, Missouri, involved new actors, agencies, and strategies not present during the first two decades years following the Second World War. Several factors stimulated the demise of the pro-growth coalition and established the conditions for the emergence of a new, loosely organized, coalition. The first was the spatial transformation of the metropolitan area. In 1970, over a half million city residents lived in 316 square miles sprawling more than three counties. Two decades earlier in 1950, approximately 457,000 residents lived in only 81 acres. Obviously, urban renewal had

not halted the exodus of people from the urban core as city leaders had hoped during the 1940s and 1950s. What population growth that had taken place had occurred in the suburban areas beyond the boundaries of the city. Despite the clearance of people and buildings during the 1950s and 1960s, the establishment of a new convention center (Bartle Hall), and the creation of a system of expressways converging on the CBD, by 1970 Kansas City had clearly become a city where the downtown carried little meaning for most of the metropolitan area's residents.

A second major factor was the rise of African American electoral power and the erosion of white dominance over the city's political institutions. The African American population in the city increased from 55,682 in 1950, to 83,130 in 1960, to 112,120 by 1970, a 49.3 percent increase during the 1950s and a 74.1 percent increase during the 1960s. During this time, the percentage of African American residents almost doubled, going from 12 percent in 1950 to more than 22 percent by 1970. Census data also show that from 1950 to 1970, more than 92,000 white residents left the city limits of Kansas City Missouri, equal to more than one-fourth of city's white population. School enrollment figures also showed the dramatic effects of white flight as the percentage of African American students reached a majority (50.2 percent) in the Kansas City, Missouri School District (KSMSD) during the 1969–1970 school year.

Accompanying these dramatic racial population shifts was the emergence of a loosely based protest movement of civil rights organizations committed to ending racial discrimination and increasing African American electoral strength and political power on the local level. During the early 1950s, the local branch of the NAACP and the Community Committee for Social Action (CCSA) began widespread picketing of downtown merchants and amusement parks to protest discriminatory public accommodations policies.[12] In May 1962, seven grassroots leaders formed Freedom, Inc., the city's first African American political organization. Through the efforts of Freedom, Inc., Bruce Watkins and Earl Thomas were elected to the city council in March 1963, becoming the first African American members of the Kansas City, Missouri City Council (Piliawsky 1991). Other notable victories by local African American politicians in elections for the city council, school board, and state government during the 1960s ended the political dominance that the white-run Citizens Committee had held over city government since 1940 (Piliawsky 1991).

A third major factor was a series of structural changes in the local

economy. One major structural change was a decline in number of businesses operating in the city limits from 1967 to 1977. During this time, there was a drop from more than 20,000 businesses in the city to nearly 16,000, a 22 percent decline. Employment trends in the CBD told a similar story: from 1963 to 1976, total employment in CBD dropped 19 percent, from 61,144 in 1963 to 49,585 by 1976.[13] There were other serious indicators of economic ill health. Capital expenditures in the city fell between 1967 and 1972 by 10 percent while leaping in the suburbs by nearly 75 percent. Retail sales in the city grew only about 40 percent in the same period, while the increase for the metropolitan area was 86 percent (*Kansas City Star*. 8/14/77. "City Faces Shrinking Share of Business," p. A1). Another major structural change was the shift from a manufacturing economy to a service sector economy. According to data collected by the Missouri Division of Employment, in 1980 service sector jobs began to outnumber manufacturing jobs in the metropolitan area. However, it was not until 1983 that service sector jobs provide more income for area residents. That year 20.8 percent of all income earned by workers in the metropolitan area came from service sector jobs, eclipsing manufacturing income by 20.5, according to data gathered by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (*Kansas City Times*. 12/5/88. "KC's Economy," p. A1).

A fourth major factor that explains the demise of the growth coalition was the rise of a powerful coalition of neighborhood activists dedicated to halting the clearance of people and the destruction of neighborhoods through urban renewal. By the late 1960s, neighborhood groups and civil rights organizations in Kansas City had banded together to mount protests against the destabilizing effects of urban renewal and segregative relocation activities, a process duplicated in many cities including Boston, San Francisco, New Haven, Pittsburgh, and Philadelphia, among others (Mollenkopf 1978; Hartman and Kessler 1978). During the late 1960s through the 1970s, the Missouri Commission on Human Relations, the City's Temporary Advisory Commission on Housing (TACH), the City's Model Cities agency, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) cited the LCRA for numerous and repeated violations of federal regulations and civil rights statutes in its relocation program.[14] Based on a series of investigations, in June 1973, HUD found that the LCRA was violating the 1964 and 1968 Civil Rights Acts for engaging in discriminatory relocation activities.[15] Because of the LCRA's discriminatory activities, HUD threatened to refuse to the fund the city's 1974 Neighborhood Development Program (NDP) for all urban renewal activities unless the city assumed responsibility for

all relocation services.[16] Later that month, HUD, the LCRA, and the city entered into a cooperative agreement by which the City assumed responsibility for urban renewal relocation through the newly formed Central Relocation Agency (CRA).[17]

By the middle 1970s the focus of city redevelopment policy had shifted, as did federal policy, away from the large-scale slum-clearance characteristic of urban renewal (von Hoffman 2000; Teaford 2000; Weiss 1980; Mollenkopf 1978; Kleniewski 1984). Intellectual attacks against the program from liberal social scientists such as Jane Jacobs (1961) and Herbert Gans (1962), and conservatives such as Martin Anderson (1964), combined with grassroots opposition in many cities created the political context in which a federally-subsidized local growth strategy of slum clearance was no longer possible. In 1974, the federal government effectively ended the urban renewal program replacing it with the new Community Development Block Grant Program (CDBG) and later the Urban Development Action Grant Program (UDAG) in 1978. In Kansas City, many of those who established the growth agenda during the early 1950s had exited the scene by the late 1960s. By the early 1980s, a new group of business elites had emerged to form a new and rather loose coalition. The emerging leaders came from a broader occupational background, comprising the heads of such diverse industries as Hallmark Cards, United Telecommunications/U.S. Sprint, H & R Block, Yellow Freight, and Marion Laboratories (Thomas 1990). While the major focus of the new growth coalition was on commercial and office space in the CBD, the new actors embraced new strategies for promoting downtown growth, including the use of the CDBG program, generous tax abatements, tax increment financing (TIF), industrial revenue bonds, and use of nonprofit organizations. Today, these various strategies remain central to the city's growth agenda to promote economic diversification, advance the interests of locally-based headquarter firms, and to court large transnational corporations (TNCs) to enhance the city's competitive advantage in the global hierarchy of places.

Conclusion

In their assessment of two decades of research on growth politics, Logan, Whaley, and Crowder (1997, p. 609) lament the lack of empirical studies that document the sources of historical variation in strength and capacity of growth coalitions. The findings of this historical case study suggest that the strength and capacity of a local growth coalition, including its agenda-setting power and veto influence over

the redevelopment process, is contingent upon historical variation in the institutional arrangement of local redevelopment and planning efforts, and programmatic and financial links between national and local governments. In New York, Boston, and San Francisco, urban planning and redevelopment were centrally controlled, designed, and implemented under the close guidance of Robert Moses, Edward Loge, and Justin Herman, respectively (Caro 1975, pp. 707, 1005–25; McQuade 1966, pp. 259–77; Hartman 1974, pp. 48–51). In Kansas City, however, urban planning and redevelopment were institutionally fragmented and unconnected. The business-controlled LCRA controlled the formulation and implementation of urban renewal while urban planning activities were programmatically uncoordinated and bureaucratically divided among the City Plan Commission, the HAKC, City Development Department, and the Neighborhood Development Department, among other bureaucracies (City Plan Commission 1944; 1948; Cookingham 1957; 1958).

As this study suggests, local institutional arrangements are critical for understanding the power and influence of growth coalitions because local state structures represent the sites at which planning and redevelopment are implemented and political conflicts are mediated. Under certain historical conditions, state agencies can provide the institutional mechanisms for growth coalitions to exercise political control over the design and implementation of growth policy. The council-manager form of city government combined with a fragmented planning and redevelopment apparatus rendered city agencies relatively autonomous from popularly elected officials, relatively unaccountable to the urban public at large, and susceptible to the outside power and influence of the Downtown Committee. Extra-local conditions and macrostructural factors are important in providing the "context" and establishing political and economic conditions for the success and implementation of some growth strategies rather than others (Smith and Feagin 1988). Yet macrostructures of the state and economy are not determinant. Local politics matters in determining the strength and mode of growth machine dynamics (Molotch 1993, p. 29).

The increasing popularity of narrative analysis in historical sociology and related sub-fields represents the latest attempt to developed theoretically informed and historically grounded explanations that are sensitive to sequence, contingency, and temporality (see Gotham and Staples 1996 for an overview; Abbott 1991; 1995; Griffin 1995; Isaac 1997; Tilly 1981; 1985; Isaac and Griffin 1989; Stryker 1996; Somers 1996). A narrative analysis of growth politics and redevelopment offers several advantages over omnitemporal and variable-based analyses. First, by empha-

sizing the interconnectedness of human agency and social structure, narrative can capture people as they experience their everyday circumstances, thereby allowing the analyst to uncover and understand the motives and decisions of key actors and networks of actors surrounding the formulation and implementation of growth policy. Second, narrative enables the researcher not only to grasp how growth strategies and policies constrain or empower social action at any point *in time*, but it provides a powerful heuristic to identify and represent crucial actions, sequences of events, and groups and institutions as they emerge and change *through time* (Griffin 1993; Somers 1996; Abbott 1992; Aminzade 1992). Third, narrative helps contextualize or ground the analysis of growth politics in historical and local context, enabling the analyst to construct temporally delimited causal inferences and generalizations about growth strategies and redevelopment policy. Fourth, the narrative concepts of path dependency and policy feedback illuminate how past actions and policies can shape subsequent policy choices, enabling some actions while constraining others, and transform political structures and institutional capacities (Haydu 1998; Aminzade 1992). The narrative analysis developed in this paper points to how contingent events and changes in the institutional structure of urban planning and redevelopment can have profound consequences for the agenda-setting power of a growth coalition, the success or failure of growth coalitions in translating their agenda into public policy, and the programmatic orientation of local growth policy.

One major advantage of the growth machine heuristic is that it provides a powerful means of linking local processes and external forces. Harvey Molotch (1999) has recently called for more agency-centered research that "elaborates the mode of up-linkage" (p. 254) for understanding the connection between production of local space and large-scale structures. Most scholarly efforts to understand the political economy of postwar urban redevelopment have embraced a top-down perspective, typically viewing urban renewal as "housing" program that originated with the "federal" government. Yet a number of critical scholars including Kleniewski (1984), Sanders (1980), and Hays (1985), among others, contend that urban renewal was never a single, national program that usurped the private sector, as Anderson (1964) and other researchers contended during the 1960s and 1970s.[18] Hirsch (1983; 1993) and Weiss (1980) have shown how urban renewal programs were largely initiated and carried out by local business and real estate oriented groups with the assistance of federal subsidies and local government. As this paper has pointed out, downtown real estate and other business elites

not only helped the frame the laws under which renewal proceeded, but they controlled the character, location, and pace of redevelopment efforts. Rather than a "federal bulldozer"(Anderson 1964) or a "housing" program imposed on cities by the federal government, urban renewal provided generous subsidies to the local authorities to facilitate privately-led downtown revitalization. As locally run and implemented, urban renewal reflected the prerogatives and interests of local business elites who used the program to implement their growth strategy of slum clearance. By beginning with local details and building up (Molotch 1999, p. 255), we can see how changing growth agendas and coalitions can arise not only in reaction to changes in federal policy and funding and macro-level socioeconomic changes, but also on the basis of past growth strategies, growth policies, and redevelopment efforts on the local level.

Notes

1. The 1949 and 1954 Housing Acts provided federal funds for local redevelopment authorities to designate "blighted" areas, acquire and clear land, and then sell the land to private developers or local housing authorities for public housing. Title I of the Housing Act of 1949 provided federal subsidies for property acquisition and clearance while requiring one-to-two thirds of the site preparation be financed by the federal and local government. The Housing Act of 1954 changed the name of the program from "urban redevelopment" to "urban renewal" and required each city to submit a Workable Program detailing its plan of clearance, demolition, and redevelopment. The 1954 Act intended projects to be "predominantly residential" but in later years this requirement was waived altogether for projects that would benefit universities, hospitals, business parks, and industrially depressed districts (Barnekov, Boyle, and Rich 1989, pp. 38–9; Gelfand, 1975, pp. 151–6, 275–6; Hays 1985, chapter 5; Kleniewski 1984; Weiss 1980; Wilson 1966).

2. In recent years, scholars have championed narrative as a valid mode of causal explanation that takes into account sequentiality, temporality, and contingency (Abrams 1982; Abbott 1990; 1992; Aminzade 1992; Griffin 1992; 1993; Gotham and Staples 1996; Haydu 1998; Quadagno and Knapp 1992; Sewell 1996; Somers 1998; Stryker 1996). Narrative refers broadly to action-oriented approaches to socio-historical inquiry that assume that social reality happens in sequences of events that both constrain and enable social action (Griffin 1993, p. 1097; Isaac 1997, p. 9). Despite their different empirical applications, Abbott's (1992) notion of "narrative posivitism," Aminzade's (1992) "analytic narrative," Stryker's (1996) "strategic narrative," Sewell's (1996) "eventful narrative," and Somers' (1998) "causal narrativity," denote a form of explanation based on "contextual causality" (Abrams 1982, p. 314) where the emphasis on conjuncture and contingency takes precedence over universality and predictive law in fashioning historically intelligible explanations (Abbott 1990; 1992; Somers 1998, p. 81). While scholars recognize that narrative can be a useful tool for constructing causality (see Mahoney 1999 for an overview), there have been few empirical examples of narrative appraisal in sociological research (see Gotham and Staples 1996 for an exception).

3. Mann 1935; Chamber of Commerce 1938; Dorsett 1975; Conrad H. Mann. "The 10–Year Plan." Address before the Kansas City Real Estate Board. 5/15/31. *Kansas City Realtor* 5/13/31, p. 1; 5/15/31.

4. Brown and Dorsett 1978; Perry, J.W., Ralph DeMotte, and R.E. McDonnell. 10/13/39. "What Kansas City Needs to Go Forward." Address before the Kansas City Real Estate Board; *Kansas City Realtor.* 3/21/40, p. 3.

5. Speech by L.P. Cookingham before the Westminster Congregational Church. 9/5/43 (excerpt appears in Anderson 1957, p. 25; City Plan Commission. 1943; 1947).

6. *Kansas City Times*. 1/30/40. "For A Slum Plan"; 6/8/40. "For Slum Action," p. 8; *Kansas City Star*. 1/25/40. "A Housing Issue"; 4/11/41. "New Slum Area Drive," p. 2; 6/28/41. "Housing Act In," p. 3.

7. *Kansas City Times*. 2/25/59. "East Side Project to Aid City Growth." p. 17; 4/28/59. "City Impresses Urban Leaders"; 5/2/59. "Praise Kansas City Renewal Projects," p. 4A; 8/18/60. "Program Seeks to Outrun Blight," p. 5; *Kansas City Star*. 7/20/58. "City's Fringe to be Altered"; 1/3/60. "Kansas City's Battle on Blight is a Major Feat"; 9/24/58. "Urban Plan as Model"; 9/26/58. "Kansas City: Blueprint for Urban Renewal"; 10/1/58. "City Faces Great Era"; 1/4/59. "City Hums, With Help," p. G1.

8. November 1956. "Relocation is a Human Relations Job, Kansas City Says." *Journal of Housing*. Vol. 13, No. 10; January 1966. "Citizen Participation in Renewal." *Journal of Housing*. Vol. 23, No. 1; 12/26/65. *Catholic Report*. "Inner City Resident Group Asks Rehabilitation, Stepped Up Services"; City Planning Department. November 1966, pp. 16–18; Urban League of Greater Kansas City. April 1955; January 1957; *Kansas City Times*. 4/16/55. "Tension in Slum Areas"; *Kansas City Star*. 4/15/55. "Focus on Racial Views"; 4/16/55. "The Urban League Looks Ahead"; *Kansas City Call*. 4/25/58. "Kansas City—Now and Then the Changing Scene," p. 19.

9. *Kansas City Times*. 6/28/57. "No Time to Back Away from Slum Clearance"; 10/8/57. "Vitality in City Growth," p. 1; *Kansas City Star*. 3/7/56. "Slums on the Retreat"; 8/23/56. "Slum Clearance Achievement"; 11/18/56. "Start Near on Huge City Job"; 10/6/57. "A Big Downtown Stride," p. 3D; 10/7/57. "Hail Vital City Pride," p. 1; 6/1/58. "Out of the Rubble a new Kansas City Rises"; 7/20/58. "City's Fringe to be Altered"; 9/26/58. "Kansas City: Blueprint for Urban Renewal"; 10/1/58. "City Faces Great Era," p. 1; 1/4/59. "City Hums, With Help," p. G-1; 1/3/60. "Kansas City's Battle on Blight is a Major Feat"; 6/27/65. "Fifteen Projects of Large Scope," Section E; 6/27/65. "Coast to Coast, Dream Highway Speeds Travelers." p. 23E.

10. Bohanon. 1971, p. 175; Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority. Report on Urban Renewal Activities, 1955–72. LCRA to HUD, 2/12/73. "Status of Real Estate and Rehabilitation Activities in Kansas City's Uncompleted Urban Renewal Projects." Mid-America Urban Observatory, 2/74; Memorandum from A.J. Harmon, Executive Director and Council, LCRA, to Honorable Charles Hazley, Chairman, Plans and Zoning Committee. 2/12/73. X2814. Box 210. KC 250. Arthur A. Benson, II. Legal Papers. WHMC-KC; X353G. Comparison of Households Relocated by LCRA of Kansas City, Missouri From Clearance Urban Renewal Projects and Households Living in Area Prior to Clearance. Exhibit prepared by Yale Rabin. Sources: LCRA and Central Relocation Agency Annual Reports, Census of Population 1950, 1960, 1970, and Census Block Data. Box 201. KC 250. Arthur A. Benson, II. Legal Papers. WHMC-KC.

11. In these and other cities, downtown development partnerships of private business groups and city agencies led to what Salisbury (1964, p. 786) characterized as a "new convergence of power" of planning experts and economic elites united in guiding the future growth and development of cities (Barnekov and, Boyle, and Rich 1989, p. 43; Cummings 1988). These "business men's government[s]," as historian Carl Abbott (1989) referred to, stressed physical improvements such as downtown revitalization, sports complexes, modern airports, new hotels and convention centers, and opulent office towers (Banfield and Wilson 1963, p. 267; Teaford 1990, pp. 44–81; Squires 1989; Squires, et al. 1987, chapter 6; Darden, Hill, Thomas, and Thomas 1987, chapter 5; Adams, Bartelt, Elesh, Goldstein, Kleniewski, and Yancey 1991, chapter 4).

12. *Kansas City Call*. 12/5/58. "500 Letters Protest Downtown Store Bias," p. 3; 12/5/58. "Women and Department Stores," p. 23; 12/28/58. "Ministers Take Lead in Protest," p. 1; 1/5/59. "Picketing for Our Rights"; 1/9/59. "Prepare for Siege," p. 20; 1/16/59. "Downtown Picketing Into Fourth Week," p. 1; 1/30/59. "Picket Line Continues Despite Snow and Cold," p. 22; 2/13/59. "Results Better than Expected," p. 23; 3/6/59.

"Settle Downtown Issue: CCSA Calls Off Mass March," p. 1; 3/6/59. "A Grand and Glorious Victory," p. 25; 8/7/59. "Law the Most Effective Way," p. 23; 1/22/60. "Kansas City Passes 'Rights' Ordinance"; 1/29/60. "Attack KC Ordinance"; 3/10/61. "Rally of 600 Promises to 'Stop Buying'"; 3/31/61. "End Picketing as CCSA-NAACP, Stores, Agree," p. 22; 4/21/61. "Picket School Board in Fairyland Protest," p. 8; 5/19/61. "Youths Picket at Fairyland," p. 22; 2/2/62. "Jobs the Order of the Day," p. 17; 8/30/63. "CORE Protests Racial Bias at Fairyland Park," p. 3; 8/30/63. "Fairyland Behind the Times," p. 19.

13. Table F-2. "Changes in CBD Employment 1963, 1976." Box 334. KC 250. Arthur A. Benson, II. Legal Papers. WHMC-KC.

14. Commission on Human Relations 1974; *Hospital Hill Conservation Program, et al., Plaintiffs, vs. City of Kansas City, Missouri, et al., Defendants*. Filed on June 19, 1972. RE: Administrative Complaint, Workable Program Recertification. X649C. Box 202; Memorandum from William R. Southerland, Area Director, HUD, to Al Harmon, Executive Director, LCRA. RE: Relocation Deficiencies. 12/27/72. X2813. Box 210; Memorandum from A.J. Harmon, Executive Director and Council, LCRA, to Honorable Charles Hazley, Chairman, Plans and Zoning Committee. 2/12/73. X2814. Box 210; Model Cities Field Review of Kansas City, Missouri. 9/13/71 (survey). Thomas F. Brinton, Assistant Director, Planning and Relocation Branch, HUD. X2819A. Box 210; KC 250, Arthur A. Benson, II. Legal Papers. WHMC-KC. *Kansas City Times*. 6/27/72. "Taylor Invites HUD Study"; 8/4/72. "Citizen Complaint to HUD," p. 5; 3/6/73. "Home Relocation Hearings Mapped"; 3/27/73. "Eight Testify on Relocation"; 3/29/73. "Homeowners Aggravated By Relocation Snags"; 2/20/74. "Dismay at Relocation Program"; *Kansas City Star*. 7/21/72. "Groups Accuse City of HUD Violations"; 9/25/73. "Urban Renewal's Path Dim," p. 13; 8/21/74. "Relocatees Ask $100,000 in Class Action Suit"; 8/25/74. "Family Relocation Job Botched," p. 10A; 1/23/75. "Families Sue HUD for 'Relocation to Poor Housing'," p. 3.

15. HUD concluded that the "LCRA's urban renewal program has contributed to the development and perpetuation of racial housing patterns [and] has and will concentrate large segments of the population by racial . . . characteristics" (Memorandum from Walter Cade, Jr., Equal Opportunity Division, HUD, to William Southerland, Area Director. 6/11/73. Re: NDP Application (10532 Determination). X2817. Box 210. KC 250, Arthur A. Benson, II. Legal Papers. WHMC-KC).

16. Letter from William R. Southerland, Area Director, HUD, to James A. Krushner, Esq., Legal Aid and Defender Society. RE: Workable Program Recertification. Administrative Complaint by Letter. 6/15/73; Letter from Charles B. Wheeler, Mayor of Kansas City, Missouri, to William R. Southerland, Area Director, HUD. 5/18/73; Letter from John L. Taylor, City Manager, to Mr. William Southerland, Area Director, HUD. 5/18/73; Letter from Joseph H. Bruening, Chairman, LCRA, to William Southerland, HUD. 5/18/73. X649D. Box 340. KC 250. Arthur A. Benson, II. Legal Papers. WHMC-KC.

17. A 1975 survey by the CRA found that approximately 80 percent of residents displaced by the LCRA had been relocated into substandard housing (Affidavit of Michael Balmuth. 2/19/76. Vol. 3. Box 25; Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Certification of Class Action. 10/6/75. "Statement of the Case." *Duke, et al., Plaintiffs, vs. HUD, et al., Defendants*. Civil Action No. 75 CV63–W-1. United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri. Western Division. Filed 5/18/73. Vol. 1. Box 25. National Archives-Central Plains Region. Kansas City, Missouri).

18. Many cities did not participate in the program (e.g., New Orleans and Houston) and the meaning of urban "renewal" (e.g., slum clearance, neighborhood rehabilitation, etc.) changed considerably from its inception in 1949 through 1974 (Teaford 2000). The physical shape of the program, its economic benefits and liabilities, levels of funding, site selection, and project duration displayed much local variation (Sanders 1980).

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