BORDERING THE FUTURE: RESISTING NEOLIBERALISM IN THE BORDERLANDS

Joe Bandy
Department of Sociology/Anthropology
Bowdoin College

Abstract

In the last twenty years, and especially since NAFTA, the U.S.-Mexico border has been a site of intensive neoliberal development, particularly in the growth of 2,340 export-processing plants (maquiladoras), ninety percent U.S.-owned. The economic growth this has helped to promote has been both rapid and uneven, and the burdens it has placed on local communities through impoverished conditions of work and life have been immense—no where more so than in Tijuana. Although much of this growth and the associated social and environmental problems have been the subjects of many policy, academic, and journalistic discussions, Tijuana's local community organizations, which have attempted to meet local needs and formulate alternative development paradigms, have not. Based on interviews with community organization representatives in the San Diego/Tijuana region, this text argues that a more complete understanding of these movement efforts to resist neoliberalism, especially the alternative visions for development they construct, are crucial to any understanding of neoliberalism generally, transnational social movements, and more democratic labor and environmental policy. These alternative paradigms differ radically from those promoted by capital and states on both sides of *la frontera*, and potentially offer a more participatory, democratic, and sustainable form of transnational development, for Mexico and all of North America.

Introduction

In 1994, U.S. President Bill Clinton characterized the significance of NAFTA for the U.S.:

> NAFTA was more than a trade agreement, because of the circumstances surrounding its debate, it was a defining moment in our modern history. It was ratified only after a principled and momentous debate over how the United States should enter into the post-Cold War era. . . . Would we hunker down, turn away and ultimately, in my view, suffer a slow and steady decline in our living standards, or would we, instead, take a different path? Would we build new walls where old walls had crumbled, or would we embrace eagerly the challenges of a new and rapidly changing economy?. . . . Our vote on NAFTA was our answer to that question. We chose to embrace the world. It is for us now to shape what kind of world we will live in (1994).

Indeed, NAFTA represents to many observers a definitive marker of a post-Cold War triumph of global capital, and the beginning of a twenty-first century economy characterized by greater regional and global integration of markets. From Wall Street to the villages of Chiapas, Mexico, NAFTA seems to be an example and a test for a revived ethic of modernization and a new era of economic relations between the North and South (Cypher, 1993: p. 87; del Castillo V., 1996: pp. 32–6). But who is this privileged "we" to which President Clinton referred as the shaper of our new world, and what differences, what divisions does it mask? Clearly, while Presidents Clinton and Salinas heralded the dawn of a post-Cold War era of cooperation and prosperity, in which Mexico would enter the "First World" and the U.S. would return to its role as global hegemon, various representatives of the North American left were raising their voices in opposition. The U.S. and Canadian fair trade movements, environmentalists, unions, immigrant communities, and human rights advocates contested the neo-classical faith in free trade. They highlighted the anti-democratic and immiserating effects of a globalization defined by mobile capital and clientele nation states. Similarly, the Mexican left, including anyone from defectors from the ruling party, the PRI (the Party of the Institutional Revolution), to the postmodern guerrillas of the EZLN, decried NAFTA as a "death sentence" both for the Mexican people and the historic aspirations of the 1910–20 revolution (Marcos in Benjamin, 1995: p. 67). More recently, from the Seattle protests against the World Trade Organization to Mexican labor movements against privatization, from the United Students against Sweatshops (USAS) to Mexican teachers' and women's movements which have acted to preserve public services, there is an increasingly vocal resistance to economic liberalization.

If Clinton was correct about anything, it was that the implementation of NAFTA represented a defining moment for the future of this hemisphere and the rise of "neoliberalism," a term that has come to embody the development policies and ideologies of a broader global transformation—popularly referenced as "globalization." Neoliberalism, as the political-economic zeitgeist of the late twentieth century, encompasses both faddish generalizations and transformative policies. As a discursive construct, neoliberalism is an appeal to several (neo)classical traditions, including the progressive tendencies of undistorted free markets, the faith in the democratizing and plural effects of unfettered commerce, and a (neo)conservatism which advocates market-based solutions to social problems and which fears the backwardness of the welfare state. Neoliberalism represents a re-application of modernization theory

in which market liberalization of developing economies, in a trajectory best exemplified by the U.S., is the primary index of evolutionary progress, of democratization, and of a "takeoff" to modern mass-consumption societies. This clearly has been evident in the rhetoric of global financial circles, from U.S. Treasury Secretary, Lawrence Summers, who heralded the way in which NAFTA has allowed Mexico, and indeed all of Latin America, to ride a "rapid escalator to modernity" (Henwood, 1995: p. 3), to the Council of the Americas which more recently touted the successes of NAFTA in promoting Mexico's "democratization" (1999: p. 21).

At the level of practice, neoliberalism represents a policy agenda that has emerged from a structural convergence of two historical trends. On the one hand, since the late 1960s, nations of the South increasingly have embraced export-oriented industrialization, a policy that has sought to attract capital investments in manufacturing in the hopes of sponsoring broad social development through spillover industries (such as supplier networks and financial services), updated technological imports, job training, limited taxation, and increased wages. Typically, these investments have found their home in the form of duty-free export-processing zones with state-of-the-art production facilities and large pools of low skill labor. On the other hand, since the debt crises of the early 1980s, transnational financial institutions and their political advisors have imposed conditions of "austerity" on developing countries through structural adjustments of national debt, including the political "reforms" of privatization, deregulation, cuts in social spending, currency devaluations, and wage freezes (Rosen and McFadyen, 1995: p. 15; Gereffi, 1996: p. 93). Neoliberalism therefore, has functioned to increase the influence of Northern capital and private interests in the developing world, while constraining the power of governments to organize socioeconomic policy and regulate or redistribute capital. Indeed, as modernizationist thought prompted critiques by dependency and world-systems theory, neoliberalism also has generated a wide array of opposition and criticism, building upon prior schools and refracted through new economic processes. In these critiques, the social costs of intensified commercialization, uneven development, and authoritarian clientele states are the primary subjects of analysis; and despite the absolute levels of economic growth, the implications for economic equality, environmental health, and political democracy have frequently been negative (e.g., Escobar, 1995; Smith and Böröcz et al., 1995; Amin, 1997; Chalmers et al., 1997; Greider, 1997; Veltmeyer, Petras and Vieux et al., 1997). For Mexico, far from accelerating a "takeoff" into a modern liberal

political economy, liberalization may be regarded as the beginning of a contradictory phase of development. This is one that is characterized by some political liberalization and greater growth in commerce and industry, but it also is characterized by greater class polarization, resource depletion, and delegitimation of the nation-state—provoking popular movements and state reactions (Gentleman et al., 1987; Gilly, 1990; Meyer et al., 1990; Roett, 1993; Centeno, 1994; Cook et al., 1994; Cornelius et al., 1994; Casta eda, 1995; Morris, 1995; Warnock, 1995; Aitken, 1996; Oppenheimer, 1996; Otero, 1996; Bruhn, 1997). Indeed, if liberalization perspectives originally arose in the U.S. as part of Cold War imperatives towards economic hegemony (So, 1990: p. 17), their rebirth today in the form of neoliberalism occurs in a post-Cold War era characterized by capital that is relatively unrestrained and a developing world that has fewer alternatives to dependencies on foreign capital. For Arturo Escobar, this neo-modernization posits one universal capitalist model for the global economy while producing an archetypal Third World subject who possesses only problems which may be solved through foreign intervention and liberalization (1995: pp. 9, 62). Neoliberalism in North America, therefore, in signifying official hopes for global democracy and economic prosperity, normalizes many exploitative practices that build on a legacy of imperial relations of the world system.

But to fully examine the effects of neoliberalism for working people, in all of its complexities and contradictions, it is necessary to investigate a local site that has been the subject of neoliberal experimentation—the U.S./Mexico border. As the only border in the world between a developed post-industrial nation and a developing country, *la frontera* has been a space defined by successive imperial wars and economic transgressions, and by a process of gatekeeping that selectively regulates the flows of people, culture, and capital between members of the core and periphery of the world system. Anzaldúa defines the border as an "open wound" that speaks, on the one hand, of the pain of divided Mexican communities and their ambivalent post-colonial identities, and on the other, of the hope and possibility of dialogue and reconciliation through a creative hybridity and a multi-cultural landscape (1987). The borderlands represent a hybrid economic zone as well, half way between a disenchantment with unrealized modernity and a postmodern arena of hyperactive commodity and investment cycles. It signifies a *mezcla* (mixture) of different economic eras—pre-modern labor relations in agricultural and sweatshop sectors, modern Fordist industrialism in Taylorized mass assembly, and post-Fordist forms of flexible produc-

tion, communications, and commercialism (McCaughan 1993: 16–18; Pe a 1996: pp. 25–55). This uniqueness has been made possible through the early establishment of export-processing plants—*maquiladoras* —in 1965, and the subsequent development of the border as a "laboratory" for neoliberal development (Canclini in Barrera, 1996: p. 191). In this experiment with liberalization, the border has become an arbitrary but profound dividing line in the global division of labor, defining a difference in legal entitlements for workers and investors, levels of regulatory oversight, and the value of labor and currency—a difference that enables high profitability, rapid industrialization, and uneven distribution. In this way, the border continues to serve as a staging ground for U.S. capital interests in Latin America and the Pacific Rim, and a pivotal economic axis between North and South.

As this regional economy has developed over the last thirty years—and especially since the mid-1980s—few cities have witnessed as much of a growth in population, *maquila* investments, and social problems as Tijuana. Not only is it the border's fastest growing city and the global capitol of home electronics assembly (replacing Hong Kong) (de la Rosa 1997), but it is also home to the largest number of maquiladoras of any city (Instituto Nacional de Estatística Geografía e Informática [INEGI] in CJM 1999: p. 12) and, with San Diego, over half of the border's burgeoning population. Infamously, it also is home to the largest number of non-unionized workers, among the most toxic waterways and soil, and the most unregulated urban development of any border city. However, as in any context of rapid social upheaval, Tijuana is also home to a growing number of community movement organizations that, more than parties and government officials, have represented local maquila workers and their communities as they grapple with the effects of neoliberal development in their everyday lives. Through extended interviews with an all but exhaustive sample of Tijuana community organizers from environmental and labor organizations, as well as selected government officials and corporate managers, this investigation seeks to understand two interrelated issues: the lived effects of neoliberalism in the borderlands as told by the communities who work there, and the alternative forms of development they envision in their attempts to resolve social problems in the region. Discussion of these issues will help to weigh official claims for neoliberalism against workers' stories, to reveal the still significant role of grievances in shaping social movements, and to explicate alternative visions of development in the borderlands and throughout the world.

On the Frontier of Neoliberal Development

Throughout the last thirty years, Mexico's northern border has become a "national window case" for development as Mexico has faced north to attract U.S. investors and resolve its debt crisis (Fernández-Kelly, 1983: pp. 23–4). Signaled by President Portillo's suspension of foreign debt payments in 1982, Martín de la Rosa, the former General Director of Tijuana's Municipal Development Planning Committee (COPLADEM) recalls that the 1980's was a time in which Mexico's export-oriented development agenda was consolidated and the maquiladora program became more than a mere enclave economy, but instead, the focal point of Mexican industrialization (1997; also see Kamel, 1988: p. 18; Sklair, 1989: p. 10). Less than twenty years later, according to Marco A. Valenzuela, president of the National Council of Maquiladora Industry Exports (CNIME), the growing maquiladora sector is responsible for $42 billion of the nation's $110 billion in foreign sales (La Botz 1998a). And since NAFTA (1994–99), the number of maquilas on the border has increased from 1,787 to 2,340, with the maquila labor force almost doubling from 546,433 to 1,060,217 (INEGI in CJM 1999: p. 12). Much of this development is due to the growth of Tijuana. Because of Tijuana's proximity to California ports and markets, it has become an ideal site for investors from both the U.S. and Asia—especially manufacturers of consumer electronics, auto parts, and plastics—who seek global competitiveness through lower costs of labor, infrastructure outlays, taxation, and regulatory compliance (Warnock, 1995: p. 57; Moody and McGinn, 1992: p. 9). In only eighteen years, Tijuana has become the centerpiece of the most recent wave of maquiladora growth, doubling in size to approximately two million citizens and facing rapid surges in urbanization (de la Rosa, 1997). Because a new maquila opens every business day (Bustamante, 1997), official statistics are inaccurate, but most agree that Tijuana is home to approximately 700 of the border's 2,340 maquiladoras, employing a total well above 100,000 workers (A. Hernández, 1996; Warnock, 1995: pp. 56, 60–1; Gereffi, 1996: pp. 85, 96). Today, Tijuana boasts an official unemployment rate of near zero percent and the largest proportionate middle class of any Mexican city (de la Rosa, 1997), but this rapid growth has not come without severe growing pains.

As the border has become a locus of low costs and high profits in global commodity circuits, it also is a space that enables a very uneven distribution of wealth and development across class, gender, ethnic, and national lines. The contradictions of uneven development are glaring

and ubiquitous to any border traveler. Within mere feet of one another, one may witness globally competitive multi-million dollar maquila facilities and, surrounding them, *colonias* (unincorporated subdivisions) of impoverished workers living in shanty homes with dirt floors, exposed sewage, and no services (see also Barry, Browne, and Sims, 1994: pp. 17–8). Speaking with workers, explanations for this contradiction are not hard to find. Although, maquila wages are typically equal to the Mexican national average of five dollars per day, inflationary trends so close to U.S. consumer markets, recent peso devaluations which have reduced real wages by as much as seventy percent (Tong 1996; Muller 1996), a historic lack of effective unionization, and a highly employed but insecure labor pool plagued by 40–90 percent turnover per year all have been factors that combine to make basic subsistence extremely difficult to achieve (SCMW, 1996: p. 1). In the words of Silvano, a maquila worker from Matamoros, "We can't survive on current wages. If we buy one thing, we have to give up something else. On 285 pesos a week [currently about $30], we can't even eat badly" (interview, October 1996). According to Ruth Rosenbaum, in her market-basket survey for the San Antonio-based Coalition for Justice in the Maquiladoras (CJM), *before* the December 1994 peso devaluation the average maquila worker had to work forty-five minutes to purchase a loaf of bread, sixty-nine minutes for a pound of rice, seventy minutes for a dozen eggs, eighty-seven minutes for a pound of chicken, and almost two and half hours for a gallon of milk (1996). This situation has worsened since the devaluation, leaving typically no income with which to purchase housing, utilities, education, or job training, much less the leisure commodities such as radios and TVs many workers diligently produce everyday in the maquilas (Luna 1997). Meanwhile, many workers are aware that their low pay and hazardous work conditions translate to higher profits for investors. Saving at least $25–50,000 per worker per year by relocating to the border (CJM, 1993a: pp. 3, 7, 17–8), corporate investors were able, in 1995 alone, to sweep up over $750 million in profit, well over three times the total amount the entire border maquila workforce took home that year (SCMW, 1996). Members of the independent October 6th union in Tijuana claim that "foreign owned companies are now able to pay 400% less in wages than they were 5 years ago," before NAFTA (1999).

Further, the few resources that the Mexican government diverts from export processing towards social relief are far from enough to compensate for the basic deprivations suffered by a growing urban populace, presenting an overwhelming number of social crises for the region

(de la Rosa, 1997). Survival strategies therefore include squatting on unused land, full familial participation in the workforce (often including children under legal working age), informal sector work in the local tourist economy (including food service, crafts, and sex work), and in many cases, temporary or permanent immigration to the United States. Clearly, the official nationalist promises of high wages and job training in export processing have not been realized by most working people, leaving many profoundly impoverished and overworked. With levels of financial desperation mounting, social problems become increasingly commonplace, such as alcoholism and drug addiction, family fragmentation, domestic violence, juvenile delinquency, and crime, especially in the lucrative underground economy of the drug trade. However, when speaking with workers about what they regard as the primary social problem, most reference those that are rooted in the labor process, especially where women workers predominate, and in the despoliation of the natural environment—non-coincidentally two of the principle issue areas addressed in the debates over NAFTA.

In a poignant presentation to a meeting of border community representatives, Claudia, a maquila employee and activist, summarized the feelings of powerlessness many workers seem to feel: "We bring tapes in from Japan and assemble cassettes. They say we work together, but this is a lie. Everything is done on machines and assembly lines. The speed is tremendous. The twenty thousand pieces of machines work us, we don't work them" (1996). Indeed, in the deregulated workplace of neoliberalism, manufacturers take advantage of a long forty-eight hour Mexican workweek by creating fast-paced and unsafe conditions. Reports of work-related health problems are so common as to be almost an irrefutable common sense in the border's weary working class culture. Workers routinely complain of profound physical exhaustion after only a few years of intensive work, carpal tunnel syndrome resulting from fast repetitious labor, varying degrees of eye strain including blindness, environmental diseases caused by toxic exposure and inadequate safety provisions, reproductive system failures, and industrial accidents that have been permanently disfiguring, debilitating, and in some cases, fatal. In one of the more extreme cases, managers at Dae Wan, a subcontractor for Hyundai, removed laser safety guides from machines that aid workers in bending sheet metal because they felt they slowed production. The costs of this speedup for workers were devastating, since this disregard for safety resulted in permanently severed fingers, hands, and even arms—mutilating workers and yielding a devastating impact on their families' future income (Cota, 1996). In fact, one of the

primary reasons for such a high employee turnover rate is worker health problems. This high turnover, along with speedups, little unionization, minimal if any worker control over the labor process, and low compensation, create intensive experiences of worker alienation.

Many community representatives argue that this collective devaluation of workers' lives, not to mention their low cost and high profitability, has been possible only through a systematic devaluation and discipline of a predominantly female workforce. Women represent 65–70 percent of maquila employees (Fernández-Kelly, 1983: pp. 8–10; Warnock, 1995: p. 62), largely because many women on the border, and indeed the world over, have viewed maquila employment as a means for greater financial independence in a modernizing workforce (Ong, 1987: pp. 87–105). However, in addition to reporting an even greater incidence of the many problems male workers face, especially repetitive motion injuries and toxic exposure, women in the maquilas receive only sixty-five percent of their male counterparts' wages and face a segregated labor market of more menial and labor-intensive tasks advertised as "*sólo para mujeres*" (only for women) (Human Rights Watch, 1996: p. 14; Bustamante, 1997). Maquila managers, despite a lack of evidence, explain this to be a result of women's dexterity and "nimble fingers" (Bustamante, 1997), their tendencies not to resist managerial control, and their unwillingness to promote labor strife because they feel "responsible to their families" (Tong 1996; see also Sklair, 1989: p. 171; Benería, 1989: p. 251; Gilbert, 1995: p. 70; Safa, 1995: p. 130). Additionally, women suffer added hardship through sexual abuses at the hands of male supervisors, including objectification, harassment, violations of privacy and reproductive freedoms, job blackmail for sex, and even rape (Valadez, 1996; H. Hernández 1996). There have been well-documented cases of women workers being locked in detention rooms as punishment for taking breaks and being slapped for laughing (Tong, 1997), and women at the maquila of U.S.-based Sheller Globe encountered a sign reading, "It's Company Policy: Either work hard or look good in a tight sweater" (CJM 1994a). And in recent years, Human Rights Watch has documented over thirty-six cases of pregnancy testing in companies including Zenith, AT&T, TRW, and Sunbeam-Oster, a practice personnel managers use to deny jobs or fire workers, on the grounds that they are less productive (Human Rights Watch 1996: pp. 19–27; Valadez 1996; Carmen Valadez and Reyna Montoya, 1996; Cota, 1997). Maquila worker Claudia states that this harassment continues once you are employed, "When we work, we have one month of training. They give each woman a pregnancy test, and if she is not [pregnant], she can remain on the job. At the end of

training, she is given another test, and if pregnant, she can be fired, even when she works well" (1996). These experiences provide clear evidence of a state of abusiveness that exists for many women workers, revealing a generalized devaluation of women's bodies and work, but also a condition of terror that promotes conformity and labor discipline in exploitative conditions. Over time, this manipulation of gender differences for greater profitability functions to lower the labor and living conditions for all workers, regardless of gender, race, or national citizenship.

Similarly, Tijuana communities cite a generalized despoliation of living conditions due to environmental destruction which signifies that the border, if not all of North America, may become a "pollution haven" for industry (Bullard, 1993: p. 19). While one maquiladora manager argued that environmental pollution is the *chupacabra* of free trade discussions (literally, "goat sucker," a mythic vampirish creature that preys upon humans and their livestock), since it is merely a folktale that has grown from paranoia (Bustamante, 1997), citizens of the borderlands tell of profound destruction that stretches far beyond anxious hallucinations. The border has become home to the most toxic waterways in North America, including the New River and the Rio Grande (Lewis, Kaltofen, and Ormsby, 1992: pp. 68–9), infertile and eroding soils, noxious air emissions, and astronomically high rates of infectious disease, cancer, and birth defects (CJM, 1993a: pp. 54–9; CJM, 1993b). Inadequate and underfunded infrastructure—such as homes, roads, landscaping, water and waste facilities—make the impoverished colonias of Tijuana more frequent victims of disease and natural disasters such as floods, earthquakes, droughts, and fires (Shields, 1995: p. 22; Ganster, 1997). Toxic accidents of local chemical, plastics, and industrial manufacturers have become so commonplace that law suits and cleanup costs have found their home in the corporate calculus of cost-benefit analyses. Whether it is immediate health and safety problems or long-term dilemmas of non-sustainability in the borderland ecosystem, its rapid industrialization under successive decades of export-oriented development has exacted a level of environmental damage that has made it the most devastated ecosystem in Mexico (Farquhar, 1995: p. 1), and threatens to turn the entire border into a "doomsday" landscape (Barry, Browne, and Sims, 1994: p. 171). In the words of Mary Kelly, director of the Texas Center for Policy Studies, NAFTA has relegated "border environmental issues to a high-profile sideshow, long on promises, but very short on meaningful changes and enforceable commitments to action" (Barry, Browne, and Sims 1994: 173). Indeed, if chupacabras do exist in the borderlands, they might resemble the many transnational

corporations that have descended upon the region, sucking natural resources and labor value from workers who serve them. But ecocide is no isolated Mexican event, since environmental crises migrate back and forth across the border in water, air, and soil—in the words of environmental justice activist, José Bravo, "completely unpoliced by the Border Patrol" (1997). Most interviewed, like many scholars of development (e.g., Martinez-Alier, 1987; Adams, 1990: p. 113; Guimar es, 1991; Barry and Sims, 1994: pp. 3–4), argued that neoliberal developments are incompatible with long-term ecological sustainability and health, not because the extraction and pollution of natural resources are unfortunate byproducts, but because they are central factors in the externalization of costs and the foreign control of Mexico's resources.

Despite billions of dollars in investment in export processing over the last thirty years and many official promises to the contrary, neither the extensive growth of the region nor the profits gained from the maquiladoras have resulted in a diversified or autonomous Mexican economy, sustainable wages and living standards, gender equity, democratic governance, or a healthy and thriving natural environment. Members of local community organizations thus focus their critiques on political autocracy and corruption, extractive export processing, predatory corporations, and violations of democracy and human rights. More abstractly, these commentaries frequently reference an "imperialism" or "(neo)colonialism" as terms appropriate to the levels of exploitation experienced under neoliberal development, where repressive states and foreign capital interact to make poverty, gender discrimination, and toxic landscapes facts of life. Aurora Pelayo of CAFOR stated that the efforts of the state and federal Mexican governments to facilitate foreign investments at the expense of local communities was in essence a rebirth of the nineteenth-century dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz, who expropriated peasant land for U.S. investors and engaged in repressive policies against resisters (1996). Other community leaders from the border have confirmed that neoliberalism is a new form of imperialism (Bravo 1996; Browne 1996; Valadez 1996; Pelayo 1997). In the words of the 1994 Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) candidate for Tijuana's municipal presidency, Alfonso Hernández,

> The maquila is part of this savage capitalism that globalization has brought to Mexico and particularly to the border area. The general profits of the maquiladoras return to their countries of origin, in contrast to the low wages of employment and the national industry. It appears they want to dismantle the national industry and turn the nation into one huge maquiladora (1996).

Sentiments such as these extend the work of authors such as Sivanandan (1980: pp. 26–30) or Miyoshi (1993: pp. 741–8), who argue that neoliberal forms of development have made export processing zones into the "new colonies" of the world order. The current period, far from making such discussions of imperialism atavistic, remind us that North America was shaped by multiple imperial histories, and that the contemporary decline of the Cold War and U.S. economic hegemony has been a time of imperial reassertion through a "disciplinary neoliberalism" (Gill, 1995: pp. 1–3). Yet in this imperialism, unlike those that have gone before, nation-states are facing increasing subordination to the interests of private capital, placing downward pressure on governmental oversight and eroding democratic accountability. As NAFTA, the WTO, and potentially the FTAA emerge as global constitutions of neoliberal development, one can argue that the border is a microcosm of a new world order—or in Guillermo Gómez-Pe a's words, a "new world border" (1996)—populated by private transnational capital and rentier states.

It is this set of grievances against export processing and this analysis of neoliberalism that have become the primary frames that orient the actions of community movements on the border. Movements for labor, women's, and environmental justice have utilized these frames to mobilize new members, to build coalitions with other groups, to strategize and motivate action, and to confront corporate and governmental powerholders—in short, to shape a movement identity. Indeed, it is not merely the existence of material resources that have mobilized these movements, but the profound immiseration of the border, in combination with the political culture of movement activists, that have served as the backdrop to this unique collective action.

Border Movement

> The present dismantling of authoritarian regimes in Latin America, the end of communism and the consequent displacement of revolutionary projects, the processes of redemocratization, and the new dynamics created by the effects of the mass media and transnational economic arrangements: these are all developments that call for new ways of thinking and acting politically (Latin American Subaltern Studies Group, 1993: p. 110).

> The real imperatives of our time thus imply the reconstruction of the world system on the basis of polycentrism (Amin, 1993: p. 89).

It is almost a truism within social movement literature that structural contradictions or strains in a society provide an impetus for social

movements to emerge. Thus it is no coincidence that, during a period in which neoliberalism confronts us with the dreams of universal modernization and the realities of uneven development, movements—left and right—are proliferating. According to Wignaraja, "these new movements are emerging out of the peculiar contradictions within societies and cultures in transition. . . . from contradictions and weaknesses that are appearing in the role of the state and/or in the particular division of labour resulting from the intervention of transnational capital" (1993: p. 19). Indeed, a plurality of new social movements have emerged which seem to turn away from the state as a guarantor of social well-being and modern progress, and in so doing, problematize the totalizing ideologies of modernism (Garner, 1994: pp. 430–1) with their economic tendencies towards cultural homogenization and consumerism (Habermas 1989). From fair trade populisms to the media activism of gay and lesbian movements, from the postmodern guerrilla war of the Zapatistas to U.S. militia groups and their backlash against rural poverty, North America is witness to a broad range of movements that problematize the state as a source of democracy and seek to create new civil societies to represent their interests. Throughout Latin America as well, earlier movements centered on modernizing or overcoming dependency through working class endeavors for national liberation are being transformed into polycentric entities, highlighting the multiplicity of actors and public spaces in which democracy and economic justice may be sought (Castells, 1983: pp. 327–8; Slater, 1985: pp. 6–7; Escobar and Alvarez, 1992: p. 3; Calderón, Piscitelli, and Reyna, 1992: pp. 24–6; Wignaraja, 1993: pp. 6, 26; Escobar, 1993: p. 34; Foweraker, 1995: pp. 24–5). While both appropriating and resisting the new institutional structures of a neoliberal economy, these debatably "new" social movements generally possess more decentralized organizations and more flexible constituencies, as well as a greater focus on identity as a terrain of struggle, the creation of new public spheres of debate, and coalition-building across differences.

Borderland movement organizations are no exception, since they have engaged in innovative practices to respond to the social crisis of neoliberalism and facilitate the emergence of new models of development. Practically, the independent labor and environmental justice movements of borderland communities have worked to promote transnational movement networks, locally-designed opposition research, rights education, precedent-setting legal activism, multidimensional corporate campaigns, labor-community solidarity, and structures of representation that emphasize participatory democracy. These areas of movement activity may be

categorized into two dialectically intertwined but analytically distinct domains. One is that of defining a democratic organizational process and powerfully inclusive movement through consciousness-raising, the mobilization of new members, as well as inter-organizational and transnational coalition-building. In these relatively early stages of borderland movement work, this has been the predominant area of activity for several reasons: 1) the lack of public education regarding legal rights and social critique, 2) the need to develop shared analytical and ideological frameworks among movement participants, especially across borders, and 3) the dire need for working citizens to develop the emotional resolve and the bonds of trust required to pursue their demands in the face of repressive tactics used by state and corporate actors. The second area of organizational activity entails more direct action strategies which seek economic and environmental justice from the state and from transnational corporations through law suits, public letter campaigns, the organization of independent unions, strikes, boycotts, protests, stockholder resolutions, and the normative pressures of transnational standards of corporate conduct. Both domains of activity, upon close analysis, reveal emergent visions for an alternative to neoliberalism in the borderlands and a new hemispheric model of radically democratic transnationalism. However, because it is beyond the scope of this essay to discuss all areas of borderland movement work, the following will focus largely on the second set of strategies, their potentials, and their shortcomings.

Transforming the State of Development

One central organizing principle of border movements has been the expansion of governance structures—nationally and transnationally—that can protect workers and the environment from the effects of liberalization. Despite growing skepticism about the possibilities of making clientelist and authoritarian governments accountable to democratic process, and thus the temptation to abandon the state as a source of redistributive justice or regulatory oversight, most activists from both sides of the border regard the Mexican and U.S. governments as central to the achievement of justice. Not only do they have overt mandates and institutional structures that are designed to represent public interests and shape economic conditions, but there are geographic and financial limitations on the ability of capital to flee or retaliate against government (Storper and Walker, 1989). Therefore, although tensions exist among borderland environmental and labor organizations regarding

the extent to which state institutions should take priority over grassroots mobilization and direct action against corporate actors, especially at the early stages of movement growth, most activists interviewed regard the state as an undeniably vital point of pressure. That said, even though both environmental and labor justice organizations articulate this position, the state has been more of a target of cross-border environmental movements than labor organizations. This is because of several factors: Mexico has had relatively strong labor laws (if unenforced) but has been in need of environmental legal activism to construct new legal code and regulatory bodies; unlike unions, environmental organizations have made few direct inroads into corporations, rendering the state more important than the workplace; and since NAFTA, governments in both nations have made greater investments in bodies designed to preserve transnational environmental health than labor conditions, presenting political opportunities for state-based change in environmental policy. Thus, the specific tactics of appealing to and expanding state power vary across movement sectors. But generally four state-based tactics for reform have been prominent.

The first strategy for transforming the state is that of articulating and gaining corporate signatories to transnational codes of conduct for human rights, labor conditions, and environmental protection. The early 1990s saw the emergence of a populist discussion of standards for corporate citizenship due to several influences. First, during the formation of the EC, the efforts by British and German labor movements to institute social charters provided inspiration for local groups to form similar documents in North America, as based in international labor law and the United Nation's Universal Declaration on Human Rights. Second, a universalist human rights discourse and the presence of community-based pedagogies of empowerment, both of which highlighted the importance of consciousness-raising education around global citizenship rights, were essential in motivating a discussion about the normative constraints on corporate citizens. Third, border organizations were developing critiques of free trade principles and government clientelism through their association with fair trade groups such as the Alliance for Responsible Trade (ART) in the U.S., the Action Canada Network (ACN), and Mexico's Red Mexicana de Acción Frente al Libre Comércio (RMALC). When accompanied by the interests and experience of other non-governmental organizations such as the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), the Environmental Health Coalition (EHC), the AFL-CIO, Mexico's Frente Auténtico del Trabajo (FAT), and Canada's Mujer a Mujer, just to name a few, border organizations had the support needed

to begin to build consensus around common platforms. Lastly, Mexico's left opposition party, the PRD, was highly influential in pre-NAFTA debates by articulating more detailed and comprehensive proposals for fair, not free, trade. Although many grassroots organizations in the borderlands are too skeptical of the incorporating or co-opting powers of the state, the consequent ineffectiveness of electoral campaigns, and the local accountability of national parties, PRD discourse of state reform has been influential on the border—particularly that of the PRD's Municipal President of Mexico City, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas:

> The exploitation of cheap labor, energy and raw materials, technology dependency, and lax environmental protection, should not be the premises upon which Mexico establishes links with the U.S., Canada, and the world economy. . . . We cannot be satisfied with the kind of future that would emerge from a simple economic liberalization. This would extrapolate present trends and exacerbate present vices (1992: p. 95).

More specifically, his suggestions have included: the generation of greater backward linkages and more differentiated development in the maquila sector; greater compensation to Mexico for the use of its labor and resources; the upward harmonization of environmental standards; the subsidization of Mexican adjustment costs by foreign investors; an equal and binding process of dispute resolution; and liberalized guest worker arrangements; and most relevant to this discussion, a social charter that would standardize real wages, work conditions, bargaining rights, and occupational safety and health standards (Cárdenas, 1992: pp. 96–8). These influences promoted an interest among border organizers for, at the very least, a statement of principles to which corporate citizens could be held accountable.

The primary result of this was the January 1991 publication of the Standards of Conduct by the Coalition for Justice in the Maquiladoras (CJM), ratified by its fifty member (at the time) roster of unions, human rights organizations, ecumenical groups, environmental movements, and fair trade associations (Mika, 1995). Drawn more specifically from existing Mexican and U.S. law, as well as the labor standards of the International Labor Organization (ILO) of the U.N., they include: 1) adherence to all federal environmental regulations in the mitigation of water and air pollution; 2) compliance with U.S. OSHA and Mexican health and safety standards, including adequate safety training; 3) provisions of fair wages, reasonable hours, and safe conditions; and 4) corporate obligations to recognize the responsibilities they have to their local communities, not merely their global shareholders (CJM, 1994b:

p. 4). Many criticisms are possible: there is certainly room to debate the definition of such language as "fair wages," these principles are relatively meaningless outside of a more progressive NAFTA with stronger side accords, and ultimately, they rely upon the voluntary compliance of corporations. However, most activists believe that the Standards of Conduct have served a strategic and historic purpose as a normative statement of principle for an emergent cross-border governance structure, and a rallying point for an emerging consensus around the basic needs that exist among border communities. It thus has provided a strategic basis for cross-border coalition building among movement groups and it has given a redistributive focus to action campaigns.

A second strategy is litigation against private offenders under environmental or labor protections already existent in U.S. or Mexican law. Typically, local communities and activist organizations work together to organize legal representation and scientific documentation in coordination with direct actions such as protests or letter campaigns. Although there are more cases of abuse than border communities can afford to litigate or the courts can feasibly hear, strategic legal activism has been successful in pressuring for mitigation and compensation. In isolated but significant cases, these strategies have set precedent for cross-border law enforcement. One form of litigation is in the enforcement of transnational law or agreements made between trade partners, most commonly in forums north of the border. Another form is aimed at holding U.S.-based corporations accountable to Mexican labor or environmental law in U.S. courts. The latter has been practically necessary due to the reluctance of Mexican authorities to challenge the privileges of foreign investors. But more abstractly, it has begun to establish a basis for new transnational law that would apply to corporate actors wherever they may locate, and thus provide a countervailing pressure against downwardly harmonized living conditions. More immediately, these cases have provided some restitution for, and recognition of, communities suffering from labor and environmental violations.

One historic case was that waged by a group of environmental organizations against the toxic practices of the Alco Pacifico corporation. From 1987 to 1991 Alco Pacifico, a Los Angeles-based salvage company, operated a secondary lead smelter in the El Florido industrial park in Eastern Tijuana. The plant imported leaden auto batteries from the U.S., reconditioned them, and returned them to the U.S. for sale. Due to bankruptcy and complaints from labor, human rights, and environmental activists who protested the release of 33,000 tons of lead slag into surface and ground water, the smelter was abandoned in 1991 with

no clean-up (Luna, 1996a). Under the 1983 La Paz Agreement between the U.S. and Mexico, any corporation shipping hazardous chemicals across the border for production is legally responsible for returning all of the waste generated from this production to the chemicals' country of origin. As the EPA and many local communities along the border will testify, this agreement is poorly respected and enforced, and Alco Pacifico was no exception. A San Diego State University study found twenty-nine of sixty-one samples of soil from colonias near the smelter to have concentrations equal to or greater than the one thousand parts-per-million level considered a hazardous waste by the Center for Disease Control (CDC) (Environmental Health Coalition, 1994: p. 1). More glaringly, Jaime Cota of the Worker's Information Center in Tijuana (CITTAC) reports that nearby cattle ranchers found extremely high levels of lead in the milk of their cows (1997). Indeed, scientific evidence merely confirmed what community residents had argued was obvious to the naked eye when standing adjacent to the site, since the lead slag made the earth turn a luminous white.

The affected colonia approached the Environmental Health Coalition (EHC) and the Southwest Network for Economic and Environmental Justice (SNEEJ), both based in San Diego, and asked for assistance, and they promptly dedicated scientific, legal, and organizing resources to facilitate a community-based strategy for redress. Representing the community, the EHC and SNEEJ used a combination of law suits and protests against Alco Pacifico, as well as consultation with the California EPA, its Mexican counterpart, Secretaría de Desarrollo Social (SEDESOL), and the U.S.-Mexico Border Progress Foundation (USMBPF). This coalition of interests then mobilized the support of David Eng, District Attorney for the Environmental Crimes Division, Los Angeles, to prosecute the parent corporation and another company, RSR Químico, for illegal transport of hazardous waste materials. This resulted in a $2.5 million settlement which Eng agreed to forward to the Mexican government for cleanup, minus $200,000 for litigation fees (Luna, 1997). Through the original contacts of the EHC and its grassroots organizing this community's problems were tested, publicized, and brought into an international forum for settlement. While other less community-based environmental organizations in the region attempted to minimize the toxic damage and urged the colonia to "cope with the situation," the EHC and SNEEJ worked with community residents to receive a cleanup settlement (Saxod, 1996; Luna, 1996a). There were problems, however: the settlement was admittedly a fraction of the amount needed to perform a thorough cleanup; the Mexican government reluctantly chose to

spend only a portion of the monies by funding a substandard job of waste management; and thus the community received little ecological rehabilitation (Luna, 1996b; López, 1997). Despite these difficulties, two positive outcomes are evident. First, the very difficult legal issue of documenting the sources, levels, and effects of toxic releases was shown to be far from insurmountable if only the local knowledge and commitment of community residents is involved. Second, by holding a company liable for damages done abroad in its home country's court of law, it demonstrates one possible avenue for holding corporations accountable to an emerging normative consensus around transnational environmental health standards.

Even though many have lauded this type of victory, many border movements recognize that environmental, labor, and human rights laws should be extended and enforced in all nations affected by neoliberal development, not merely those that serve as home base for transnationals. Thus, a third state-based strategy has been public pressure for new legislation and enforcement in Mexico. While Mexican labor law is often more protective, if unenforced, than U.S. labor law, its environmental regulations are far less developed. Hence, one principal piece of legislation needed in Mexico has been a federal right-to-know law, obligating corporations and government to inform the public about environmental risk. This has been a cornerstone of legal activism since the Mexican public's right to know about toxic abuses is a fundamental condition of any development of popular ecological consciousness, any democratic planning around environmental sustainability, any future environmental legislation, and any resistance to the toxic effects of deregulation and privatization (López, 1997; Bravo, 1996; Luna, 1996; Zeuner 1996). More immediately, it is an essential basis for any prevention of toxic exposure and the preservation of public health. Michael Gregory, Director of Arizona Toxics Information, summarizes the democratic importance of right-to-know law:

> Like democracy, of which it is a major component, right to know is open-ended. . . . The test in a democratic society should be, not what does the public have a need for, but what does the public not have a right to know, and . . . what information, if any, can we be sure will not be useful to members of the public in defending ourselves from the dangers of our technologies (1997).

Many organizations united in support of public lobbying for a right-to-know law, but arguably the most successful right-to-know activist in San Diego/Tijuana has been Laura Durazo of the Proyecto Fronterizo

de Educación Ambiental (PFEA), who was partly responsible for the federal implementation of right-to-know legislation in Mexico in 1996. Developed from broad democratic principles of public accountability and environmental planning discussed at the U.N. Conference on Environment and Development in 1992 (the Rio Summit), borderland environmental organizations were instrumental in ensuring at least formal legal mandates that corporate and public actors must make toxic risks known to the public. As Durazo summarized, "We simply brought the issue up [with local communities] and found people frightened, found people scared, found people as ignorant and unknowing as we were, and with nowhere to go because it's confidential information. . . . [W]e just felt that it was important that we begin to shed some light on the matter" (1997). This legislation does not necessitate the strengthening or enforcement of environmental law in Mexico, but it does promote the beginnings of a legal framework in which there is greater corporate accountability to public health. And although it does not mitigate the economic desperation and general lack of education that keep many workers focused on earning a pay check and relatively indifferent to the risks of pollution, this legislation can allow for greater public awareness and monitoring of health risks. As an example, the PFEA is currently working with many regional environmental groups on a "toxic release inventory" to be used to normalize enforcement of federal legislation along the border (Durazo, 1997). Thus for the PFEA, the ultimately successful pursuit of right-to-know legislation in Mexico was merely the beginning of a campaign to implement emergent transnational standards for environmental health and sustainable development in Mexico.

The fourth strategy involves campaigns to invoke or expand the powers of transnational agencies designed to oversee environmental health and labor rights, such as the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), the National Administrative Office (NAO) formed under NAFTA, or the Border Environmental Cooperation Commission (BECC). One example would be the recent case of workers at Han Young, a subcontractor for Hyundai Precision, who suffered from a lack of proper safety training and equipment which led to toxic exposure and industrial accidents. The company also refused to pay profit sharing bonuses that are required under Mexican law (Brown in LaBotz 1998a; Tong 1998). In response, the workers organized with the independent or non-government union coalition, the Frente Auténtico del Trabajo (FAT), and labor support organizations such as the SCMW and the Comité de Apoyo Fronterizo Obrera Regional (CAFOR),

affiliating with the FAT union, Sindicato de Trabjadores Independiéntes de Metal, Acero y Hierro (STIMAHCS), then forming their own independent union named "October 6th." The company did not want to officially recognize the union as a bargaining agent, and neither did the Mexican government, which was fearful of threatening investor confidence and setting precedent for independent unionization in the maquilas. They therefore initiated a campaign of repression, including several tactics: the signing of a "ghost contract" with the Confederación Regional Obrera-Campesina (CROC), a government-funded union incorporated into the ruling party, effectively barring independent representation of the workers; using CROC thugs and police to intimidate, harass, fire, and blacklist activists; disallowing election runoffs between the CROC and STIMAHCS; and, when this was not successful, intimidating voters—a series of tactics which workers referred to as "psychological warfare" (Tong 1998; Faulkner 1997; Bacon 1997). Because of this interference, the Han Young workers had intense resolve to continue their protests, and went on a hunger strike in demand of fair union elections, eventually winning the attention of Senator David Bonior and President Clinton himself. In response to this government interference, a formal complaint was filed under NAFTA's NAO as well as the ILO, which, with the added pressure for a resolution from the executive branch, forced the Mexican government to recognize the union, making it the *first formally certified independent union in the Mexican maquiladora sector*. Many, including the union's activists themselves, argue that the NAO, like the NAAEC, is far too limited in its resources, its inclinations to hold corporate actors accountable, and most importantly its legal capacities to resolve disputes since it is only empowered to initiate "ministerial level consultations" between national labor departments. In fact, since the formal recognition, Han Young has continued to resist October 6th representation by firing and bribing organizers, hiring replacement workers, and speeding up production—with the relative indifference of the Mexican government and no action by the NAO (*Labor Notes* 1998; Levinson 1999). However, the NAO was used successfully in concert with local direct actions to set a valuable precedent of formal certification by a liberalizing government and at least the potential of democratic union representation, not to mention it has empowered other workers in similar predicaments to begin new campaigns.

Similarly, institutions designed to oversee the environmental health of the border, such as the EPA, the Border Environmental Cooperation Commission (BECC), and the Commission for Environmental Cooperation

(CEC) have been asked to take more extensive regulatory roles. As an example, the BECC, a sister institution to the North American Development Bank (NADBank), is designed to provide loans for projects that reduce environmental costs of economic integration under NAFTA, and thus has been a target of many proposals by local border communities. Primarily, these projects have been aimed at improving the infrastructure on both sides of the border to manage the rapid growth in potable water and sewage treatment needs, and because all funding is in the form of loans, these projects typically are aimed at earning a profit to repay debt. Valuable projects have been funded and built, despite the accelerating growth of the region and the demands on infrastructure. Yet, its low congressional funding, its relative neglect of toxin source reduction in maquilas themselves, its interests in profit-making projects, and its limited accessibility to the majority of non-professionalized border citizens who have little experience writing viable project proposals have made many regard it as, at best, ineffective. At worst, some claim it is a public relations effort at "greenwashing" by making NAFTA appear sustainable, all the while the funding of infrastructure effectively subsidizes corporate cleanup efforts and provides a means for the corporate externalization of pollution costs. Thus, many border environmental organizations have attempted to mobilize public pressure to make the BECC and NADBank more accountable to grassroots needs and interests, but with little substantive changes to date.

Practicing Resistance to Export-Processing

Overall, these endeavors to create or expand the institutions of governance, despite their ongoing centrality to long-term movement goals, are often met with frustration and skepticism—especially due to the considerable repressive forces of clientele states, as well as the gradual or compromising effects of bureaucratic policy change. Further, most of these strategies would have been unsuccessful without the accompaniment of direct action campaigns. Thus, an extremely important fifth set of strategies of resistance to neoliberalism is the more direct action against foreign investors, particularly through union-community solidarity efforts across borders and their corporate campaigns.

It is not an uncommon or new strategy for unions and labor support organizations to use the leverage of withheld labor or corporate campaigns to make capital accountable to worker interests. But possibly the primary contribution of border labor organizations so far has been the combination of union-community solidarity and transnational

organizing—the local and the global (Bandy 1997). Only through cross-border bonds of solidarity and coordinated transnational pressure has it been possible to exert leverage against increasingly mobile transnationals, to reduce the threat of capital flight and consequent job extortion, and to fill the gaps of regulatory oversight vacated by deregulated government. The historic bi-national character of the border has enabled a very localized sense of global economic processes, and thus local communities possess a deepening consciousness of global citizenship. Among labor organizations, this solidarity not only has made progressive unions from both countries more active and relevant to the locality of the borderlands, but also it has fostered a more transnational, multi-issue, and social movement orientation among them. These efforts have enabled workers and activists in the U.S. to come to terms with tendencies towards protectionism and paternalism, while granting greater hope among Mexican communities for the democratization of the Mexican labor movement (Bandy 1997). For instance, through associations with grassroots feminist organizing, national and transnational union organizations have become more accountable to women worker's experiences of labor and sexual exploitation—in the domestic sphere and on the factory floor—strengthening the labor movement's inclusiveness and democracy. Indeed, border labor organizing has been an example of the possibility for combining difference and unity in cross-border work, by regarding differences and conflict as part of an open democratic process (Mika, 1995), as well as by focusing on commonalties as points of coalition and strategic action (Ojeda, 1996). In spite of the usual fissures that can emerge in the face of overwhelming powers of repression, a desperate lack of resources, and the frustrations derived from the protracted struggles to reach the most minimal goals, it is this difference-in-unity and the transnational solidarity it provides that is responsible for the resolute but open commitment of organization members.

This coalitional solidarity, however, is realized only through the active resistance of community-based labor support organizations—such as the SCMW, Grupo Factor X, the CJM, and CAFOR. They act as movement brokers or conduits between labor unions throughout North America and local workforces and community groups. The primary goal of these support organizations is the facilitation of new community movements and transnational solidarity campaigns, building effective strategies and a growing power base at local and transnational levels. This work has been based on several tactics. First, community education has been focused on literacy and the right to organize, and through peer

education and some external consultation by human rights lawyers, occupational health and safety inspectors, unionists, and women's activists. Designed to raise consciousness and give workers a sense of legal and moral entitlement, it is also a means to identify and facilitate the growth of community leadership. Typically, due to a common fear of repression, their educational and leadership training—*capacitación*—work is conducted in a clandestine fashion, until the community is willing to openly contest the power of private or government interests through direct action strategies—a tactic well known to guerrilla movements throughout Mexico. Second, they have been instrumental in organizing worker-to-worker exchanges and conferences in which unionists and other movement activists from North America (and increasingly those from Japan, Korea, and Central America) discuss common experiences, collaborative action agendas, and how to share financial and information resources more extensively. In these different forums, one way by which cross-border alliances have been strengthened has been through the involvement of Latino and Chicano activists. This has occurred organically for a variety of reasons—greater ethnic and linguistic identification, familial or national ties across borders, common histories as immigrants or colonized subjects, similar racial or class experiences vis-à-vis U.S. corporations, and more generally, a greater Latin-ization of North America. These exchanges have been especially important in elaborating more formal organization-to-organization ties which becomes the basis for a third tactic, emergency response networks, in which crises of labor or environmental abuses may be publicized rapidly and fax/letter campaigns, or potentially more direct forms of action, may begin. In this communication network, the internet is becoming an ever more important means by which information is disseminated and events publicized, yet obstacles exist in the form of limited computer literacy and resources with which to obtain and use the technology.

However, whether by e-mail, phone, or letter, enhanced communication has resulted in a fourth strategy, the corporate campaign. Although there have been many corporate campaigns in recent history, from the CJM's successful endeavors to make Stepan Chemical halt its toxic dumping in Matamoros, to the Han Young case mentioned above, one of the more instructive examples is that initiated by a strategic collaboration between the United Electrical Workers (UE) and FAT, beginning in 1997. A connection facilitated by the work of labor support groups such as the CJM, the UE and the FAT have developed deep and ongoing ties through specific campaigns, especially in their resistance to the sexual harassment, low wages, and unsafe working conditions

suffered by workers in the ITAPSA maquila of the Connecticut-based auto parts manufacturer, Echlin Inc. (Rosen and Smucker 1998). In response to workers' interests in resisting these and other abuses, such as the beating of ITAPSA protestors at Echlin's American Brakeblock plant north of Mexico City (Kincaid 1998), the national unions organized workers throughout Echlin's plants in Mexico, the U.S., and Canada (Rosen and Smucker 1998). As in the case of the October 6th workers at Han Young, Echlin workers were met with intimidation and harassment by the company and the government-backed union, the Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicanos (CTM). Citing the need for solidarity, UE Director of Organizing, Robert Kingsley, argued, "We must meet corporate exploitation across borders with union solidarity across borders" (Gilmore 1998). Thus, the UE-FAT alliance began by proposing stockholder resolutions to Echlin's board and, with the support of other unions throughout the auto industry (including the Teamsters, UNITE!, the United Paper Workers, the United Steel Workers of America, and the Canadian Auto Workers), filed formal NAO complaints against Echlin's disregard for worker's rights to organize. Throughout late 1997, these actions were followed by protests and sympathy actions in cities across North America, including Echlin's headquarters in Connecticut. In the words of UE organizer Mary McGinn, "As a three-country alliance, one of our goals is to prevent the company from pitting us against one another . . . and we are now committed to supporting our Mexican partner, the FAT. . . . This . . . [is] an on-going alliance to strengthen all of our hands at the bargaining table and in organizing Echlin workers in all three countries" (La Botz 1998b).

In July 1998, the NAO stated that the company had actively harassed, intimidated, and abused its employees; created work conditions that were dangerous and denied workers' rights to union representation; and that the government allowed an atmosphere of intimidation to persist. The NAO therefore recommended ministerial consultations between the U.S. and Mexico's Departments of Labor (La Botz 1998b). Before Echlin had a chance to meet workers' demands, it was bought out by Dana, Inc., and the new boss seemed the same as the old boss. Mexican labor attorney, Arturo Alcalde, stated, "Dana continues to intimidate and harass workers at the ITAPSA plant in Mexico, denying reinstatement to the fired workers and threatening those still in the plant that if they try to change to a different union the plant will close" (Enagonio 1998). Dana even went so far as to close its Irvine Friction plant and move operations elsewhere in the U.S., in what many workers believe was an

ultimately unsuccessful retaliatory action designed to pit Californian employees against their Mexican counterparts (Bacon 1998b). Like the Han Young case, the conflict continues in the face of a company that is willing to use its power to deny basic human needs, and a permissive government. Yet, this case reveals that the strategic intervention of labor support organizations in facilitating union-community and union-to-union solidarity is central to the endeavor to hold transnational corporations accountable. The UE-FAT alliance succeeded in brining public attention to labor abuses; it built more efficient and transnational organizational frameworks for future campaigns; and it solidified a cross-border unity of rank-and-file unionists that withstood job dislocation.

Bordering on the Future

By way of conclusion, two central questions remain to be discussed. First, beyond mere moral claims to a radically democratic and transnational society, what coherent alternative vision or development model—if any—serves as the basis for these strategies? In analyzing these five strategies, it appears that the general model that has emerged calls for a transnational political economy that resembles some compromise between a liberal regulatory state in the Keynesian tradition, or a democratic socialist mixed economy. The former is most evident in strategies for greater regulation of corporate abuses, the expansion of minimal labor and environmental protections, and capitalist investments in compensatory infrastructure or entrepreneurial projects, like expanded and more democratic versions of the BECC or the NAO. More normatively, the former is also evident in the demands for corporate responsibility to a global citizenry, in which explicit legal regulations serve the purpose of mitigating the most destructive effects of liberalization. Border movement organizations ritually articulate that maquiladora export processing and increased trade in the global economy are not necessarily or universally problematic for wages, living conditions, or the respect for human rights, suggesting at the very least that the neoliberal state needs to be more redistributive and a guarantor of democracy and even development. These minimal goals preoccupy most long-term strategy discussions within border movement coalitions, and are the basis on which day-to-day actions are justified to a global public.

The democratic socialist model of development is less detectable in these strategies, since successful engagement with official state institutions and discourses often prohibits such direct or potentially revolutionary declarations, and indeed mandates the public use of more

moderate claims in the language of modern liberalism—regulatory oversight, human rights, democratic representation, government expenditure, social welfare, and good corporate citizenship. Also, at this stage of mobilization and in the face of repressive counter-movements, the powerlessness of working communities is such that more revolutionary efforts against clientelist governments or open anti-imperialist denouncements of corporations are not always safe or practical. Further, more revolutionary socialist or nationalist tendencies of the Cold War decades are, as the Zapatistas bear witness, not completely effective in a new global economy with new roles and powers for state institutions and transnational capital. However, at the level of social critique and among their constituents, especially in Mexico where the discourse of revolution is more common, many activists and community members readily make strong feminist, populist, anti-racist, and Marxist analyses. Also, in the practice of organizing, whether it is in local community groups or in transnational coalitions, there is powerful consensus around the discourse of empowerment, a respect for difference, and processes of participatory democracy that stretch far beyond more pluralist or liberal models. Most notably, in the fair trade agenda expressed by border groups such as the CJM: a North American coalition government structure that firmly regulates the private sector for more gradual and even development, a labor force with as much mobility and power to organize as capital, high standards for global living conditions and human rights, a sustainable and differentiated Mexican economy, a respect for national political traditions and cultures, a border that is more a space of coalition and cooperation than a militarized barrier, and a radically democratic and transnational civil society. Thus in this combination of a populist liberalism and a democratic socialism, the most common and practical emphasis of border movements is one of radical democracy.

The second remaining question might be, how may this model and its strategies be evaluated, and what are their limitations as they confront a dynamic and powerful neoliberalism in the twenty-first century? Clearly, in a more thoroughly globalized economy than ever it is difficult to find standard bearers for any transnational structure of economic regulation and redistribution. The U.N., Bretton Woods institutions, and various regional security organizations may be invoked to provide some basis for an evaluation, and indeed their very existence has enabled border movements to have a global vision. But none of these has had the institutional imperatives or the capacity to succeed in doing what border movements are struggling to accomplish: holding national governments and transnational corporations accountable to principles of fair

trade, economic equity, participatory democracy, and environmentally healthy development. Indeed, the presence of border movements highlights an absence of such transnational governance institutions. At the close of the twentieth century, we find ourselves in a situation where our globalizing economy is demobilizing governance structures and their abilities to offer restrictions, regulations, or redistribution of resources—promoting a world order in which poverty and profits are on the rise. Thus, it has been incumbent upon movements outside official institutions—community groups, churches, non-governmental organizations, and even popular culture producers—to pressure for this governance from the margins of the world system. The standard, therefore, for evaluating emerging borderland movements for labor and environmental justice are not coherent and well-established, and thus the success of these movements must be measured with a working set of criteria constantly in need of qualification and expansion.

Surely, if we were to measure the success or failure of border movement organizations on the basis of whether they have achieved the goals of a lasting transnational democracy and system of justice, they would be an undeniable failure. The continuing growth of maquiladora export processing, the unstable underdevelopment of the Mexican economy, and the abuses experienced by workers and the natural environment are continuing apace. Neoliberal institutions therefore have not only persevered, but seem to be thriving in the face of this community-based resistance. And why not? Most of these organizations—and indeed communities—have only been in existence for less than ten years, with a great amount of basic mobilization work such as education and leadership training yet to accomplish. The regional levels of repression and poverty are sufficient to produce desperation and resignation among large numbers of the population, as well as a suspicious avoidance of anyone who, like their delegitimated officials in government and official unions, seeks to speak in their name. Creating coalition among communities within and between nations who have had little interaction and history of cooperation can be a difficult and sporadically successful endeavor that spans generations, with many setbacks and conflicts, even in an area as fertile with cultural hybridity, bilingualism, and transnationalism as the border. Distrust, whether it is a reaction to historically patronizing and stereotypical discourses about the Mexican Other, or whether it arises from anxieties about U.S. imperial intervention, can be hard to set aside in the hope of fruitful cooperation. Legal or direct action gains against corporate abuses can be piecemeal and compromised. Education and material resources are also in short

supply. Indeed, due to the relative powerlessness of these groups, their primary focus has been on the networks of crisis response in which the worst and most immediate of corporate abuses are challenged. Hence, more proactive and preventative campaigns that work extensively towards new structures of financial investment, trade policy, social spending, or civil society, are far from practical at present. Therefore, is it any wonder that the visions articulated by border movements sometimes lack clarity and coherence, that coordination between movements at times seems to be overwhelmed by fragmentation, and that their political impact has yet to be felt on Wall Street, in Washington D.C., or in Mexico City? The opposition to neoliberal development is an Herculean task that requires movements to have greater coherence and support, across borders of nations and politics.

But success might be measured differently. The theories and practices of worker empowerment, however emergent and developing, are taking a more definite shape, and the commitment of North American labor and environmental movements to the realization of radically democratic process reveals the outlines of new alternatives. As they develop and the general political-economic crises of neoliberalism mount, these strategies may begin to pressure more successfully for non-exploitative wages, healthy/safe workplaces, worker participation in policy, gender equality, sustainable environmental conditions, and greater mutual accountability between local and global political processes in both nations. But even now, gains may be observed. Border communities are growing in number and in their resolve to resist, not to mention in their cooperation with one another, especially as political crises for the PRI and independent unionization grow in Mexico, and as AFL-CIO leadership appears more open to movement organizing. In their actions, border communities have extended governmental oversight of, and received settlements against, corporate crime. New proposals for transnational governance and development have developed that are guiding principles and organizing objectives for movements in the future. Coalitional efforts across borders and issues have broken down barriers of race, language, ethnicity, nation, and gender in the creation of a movement with an inclusive and more multi-dimensional critique of neoliberal development regimes. And this breadth of action has not sacrificed much to depth insofar as labor and environmental interests have coalesced around strategic campaigns, serving as a model for global and local movements simultaneously. Possibly their most poignant success has been the facilitation of education and leadership, through a community-based pedagogy of empowerment and local/global research on social crises, promoting a

sense of global citizenship and social entitlement that could be a model for many settings in the world system. Indeed, through their participation with the AFL-CIO and fair trade organizations, there has been a sensitization to global economic consequences of neoliberal policy, in small measure an influence on the mobilization of one of the largest protests in U.S. history, the Seattle demonstrations against the WTO.

More abstractly, if borderland endeavors for participatory democracy and social justice have any long-term impact on the redistribution of social power—like many new social movements—it will probably be through the cumulative and gradual processes of democratization (Foweraker, 1995: p. 112). Their contribution to this democratization rests primarily in their ability to create coalitions of unity-in-diversity, uniting various factions of the North American left into a common dialogue and thus enhancing the capacities of communities throughout the continent to envision a radical democracy, what Laclau and Mouffe define as an "egalitarian imaginary" (1985: p. 168). This vision of democracy is a populist form that embraces not merely formal political participation of citizens, but a redistribution of political, economic, and cultural power to maximize the principles of mutuality and equality (Trend, 1996: pp. 8–9). Far from a vision that reduces democracy to the liberal market, an aesthetics of diversity, or an atomized public sphere—all of which are constituent elements of neoliberal development—border movements embrace a radically inclusive yet flexible form that may be the type of politics best suited for the long-term resistance to neoliberalism. Borrowing from Michael Ryan, "[I]t is possible to combine a sense of commonality amid diversity, firmness of resistance, and aggressivity of attack with a plurality of different struggles. . . . without submitting to a point of authority that abstractly and formally mediates their differences into an identity of power" (1982: pp. 216–7).

But what makes this practice of radical democracy most interesting is its extension to the transnational arena. Through painstaking and deliberate coalition-building across borders, these movement organizations are facilitating a new grassroots transnationalism in which national and transnational social movement organizations are collaborating in the construction of new visions of development and new standards for a global economy—a globalization from below (Boulding, 1991: p. 789). Dirlik has argued, "In the age of flexible production, we all live in the borderlands. Capital, deterritorialized and decentered, establishes borderlands where it can move freely, away from the control of states and societies but in collusion with states against societies" (1994: p. 87). However slowly and piecemeal, border movements are helping to expand

and redefine citizenship in this neoliberal era, and they are providing an impetus for replacing development models based on dependency, clientelism, and underdevelopment with a "differentiated globalism" (Waterman, 1993: pp. 1, 45, 53, 57; Boulding, 1991: p. 798). The confrontation between the hegemony of neoliberal development regimes and *fronterizo* movements for a radical democratic transnationalism present us with a temporal border between two possible futures—a world order based in polarization and violence, another rooted in cooperation and democracy. Which one we choose will determine the course of the next century. But what is clear is that border movements are just one, albeit important, site for a growing transnational resistance to neoliberalism and the opening of a new public space in which we may have more critical and empowering dialogue about the future we want.

References

Adams, W.M. 1990. *Green Development: Environment and Sustainability in the Third World.* New York: Routledge.

Aitken, Rob. 1996. "Neoliberalism and Identity: Redefining State and Society in Mexico." in Aitken et al. eds. *Dismantling the Mexican State?* New York: St Martin's Press.

Amin, Samir. 1993. "Social Movements at the Periphery." In P. Wignaraja ed. *New Social Movements in the South. Empowering the People*. New Jersey: Zed Books. Pp. 76–100.

———. 1997. *Capitalism in the Age of Globalization. Management of Contemporary Society*. Atlantic Highlands, Zed Books.

Anzaldúa, Gloria. 1987. *Borderlands/La Frontera. The New Mestiza.* San Francisco: Aunt Lute Books.

Bacon, David. 1997. "Maquiladora Workers Elect Their First Independent Union." Campaign for Labor Rights Action Alerts. www.summer-sault.com/~agj/clr/alerts/david_bacon.html. (October 10, 1997).

———. 1998. "A Plant Closes in Revenge for Cross-Border Organizing." in *Mexican Labor News and Analysis*. 3(22): December 16.

Bandy, Joe. 1997. "Reterritorializing Borders Transnational Environmental Justice Movements on the U.S.-Mexico Border." *Race, Gender, and Class*. 5 (1): 80–103.

Barrera, Eduardo. 1996. "The U.S.—Mexico Border as Post-NAFTA Mexico." In E.G. McAnany and K.T. Wilkinson eds. *Mass Media and Free Trade. NAFTA and the Cultural Industries*. Austin: University of Texas Press. Pp. 187–220.

Barry, Tom, Harry Browne and Beth Sims. 1994. *The Great Divide. The Challenge of U.S.-Mexico Relations in the 1990s*. New York: Grove Press.

Barry, Tom and Beth Sims. 1994. *The Challenge of Cross-Border Environmentalism. The U.S.-Mexico Case.* Albuquerque: Resource Center Press.

Benería, Lourdes. 1989. "Gender and the Global Economy." In A. MacEwan and W.K. Tabb Eds. *Instability and Change in the World Economy*. New York: Monthly Review. Pp. 241–258.

Benjamin, Medea. 1995. "Interview: Subcomandante Marcos." In E. Katzenberger ed. *First World Ha Ha Ha! The Zapatista Challenge*. San Francisco: City Lights. Pp. 57–70.

Boulding, Elise. 1991. "The Old and New Transnationalism: An Evolutionary Perspective." *Human Relations* 44 (8): 789–805.

Bravo, José. 1996. Personal interview. Organizer, Southwest Network for Economic and

Environmental Justice and Environmental Health Coalition. San Diego. July.
———. 1997. Personal interview. Organizer, Southwest Network for Economic and Environmental Justice and Environmental Health Coalition. San Diego. February.
Browne, Harry. 1996. "BECC Backs Factory Outlet, Dodges Key Questions." *BorderLines*. 4 (11). December.
Bruhn, Kathleen. 1997. "The Seven Month Itch: Neoliberal Politics, Popular Movements and the Left in Mexico." Pp. 144–69. In D. Chalmers et al. eds. *The New Politics of Inequality in Latin America: Rethinking Participation and Representation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bullard, Robert. 1993. "Anatomy of Environmental Racism and the Environmental Justice Movement." In R. Bullard ed. *Confronting Environmental Racism. Voices from the Grassroots*. Boston: South End Press. Pp. 15–36.
Bustamante, Alejandro. 1997. Personal interview. Former President of La Asociación de las Maquiladoras Mexicanas (AMM) and current Director of PLAMEX Telecommunications. Tijuana. February.
Calderón, Fernando, Alejandro Piscitelli, and José Luis Reyna. 1992. "Social Movements: Actors, Theories, Expetations." In A. Escobar and S.E. Alvarez eds. *The Making of Social Movements in Latin America. Identity, Strategy, and Democracy*. Boulder: Westview. Pp. 19–36.
Cárdenas, Cuauhtémoc. 1992. "Continental Development and Trade Initiative." In J. Cavanagh et al. eds. *Trading Freedom. How Free Trade Affects Our Lives, Work and Environment*. San Francisco: Institute for Food and Development Policy. Pp. 95–9.
Casta eda, Jorge G. 1995. *The Mexican Shock. Its Meaning for the United States*. New York: New Press.
Castells, Manuel. 1983. *The City and the Grassroots. A Cross-Cultural Theory of Urban Social Movements*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Centeno, Miguel Ángel. 1994. *Democracy Within Reason. Technocratic Revolution in Mexico*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
Chalmers, Douglas A., et al., Eds. (1997). *The New Politics of Inequality in Latin America. Rethinking Participation and Representation*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Claudia. 1996. Personal statement. Coalition for Justice in the Maquiladoras Annual Meeting, Tijuana, October 24–27th.
Coalition for Justice in the Maquiladoras. 1993a. *The Human Face of Work. Human Rights, Democracy and Working Conditions in Mexico*. San Antonio: CJM.
———. 1993b. *The Issue is Health. Toxic Samplings, Environmental Conditions and Health Concerns along the U.S./Mexico Border*. San Antonio: CJM.
———. 1994a. *CJM Newsletter*. 4(4).
———. 1994b. *Annual Report*. San Antonio: CJM.
———. 1996. *Purchasing Power Fact Sheet*. San Antonio: CJM.
———. 1999. *CJM Newsletter*. 9(1): 12.
CONEPO. 1998. "Baja California y sus Municipios, Proyecciones de Población 1997–2000." www.baja.gob.mx/organizacion/conepo/tabla7.htm. (March 25, 1999).
Cook, Maria Lorena, Kevin J. Middlebrook, Juan Molinar Horcasitas. Eds. 1994. *The Politics of Economic Restructuring. State-Society Relations and Regime Change in Mexico*. San Diego: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego.
Cornelius, Wayne A., Ann L. Craig, and Jonathan Fox. Eds. 1994. *Transforming State-Society Relations in Mexico. A National Solidarity Strategy*. San Diego: Center for U.S.-Mexico Studies, University of California.
Cota, Jaime. 1996. CITTAC presentation. Coalition for Justice in the Maquiladoras Annual Meeting. Tijuana, Baja California, Mexico. October.
———. 1997. Personal interview. Coordinator of Centro de Información para Trabajadores y Trabajadóras. Tijuana. May.
Council of the Americas and The U.S. Council of the Mexico-U.S. Business Committee 1999. *NAFTA at Five Years*. Washington, DC: Council of the Americas. P. 21.

Cypher, James M. 1993. "Estimating the Impact of the U.S.-Mexican Free Trade Agreement on Industrial Labor." In M.F. Bognanno and K.J. Ready eds. *The North American Free Trade Agreement: Labor, Industry, and Government Perspectives*. Westport: Praeger. Pp. 85–96.

De la Rosa, Martín. 1997. Personal interview. Former General Director of Tijuana's Municipal Development Planning Committee (COPLADEM). February.

del Castillo V., Gustavo. 1996. "NAFTA and the Struggle for Neoliberalism: Mexico's Elusive Quest for First World Status." in G. Otero ed. *Neo-liberalism Revisited. Economic Restructuring and Mexico's Political Future*. Boulder: Westview Press. Pp. 27–42.

Dirlik, Arif. 1994. "The Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the Age of Global Capitalism." *Critical Inquiry* 20: 328–56.

Durazo, Laura. 1997. Personal interview. Director of Proyecto Fronterizo de Educación Ambiental. Tijuana. February.

Enagonio, John. 1998. "No 'White Knight' Found in Mexican Workers' Struggle; Auto Supplier Dana also Slashing U.S. Jobs after Echlin Buyout." in *Mexican Labor News and Analysis*. 3(20): November 16.

Environmental Health, Coalition. 1994. "American Company's Pollution Threatens Mexican Residents." *Toxinformer: A Quarterly Publication of Environmental Health Coalition.* 12: 1–2.

Escobar, Arturo and Sonia E. Alvarez. 1992. "Introduction: Theory and Protest in Latin America Today." In A. Escobar and S.E. Alvarez eds. *The Making of Social Movements in Latin America. Identity, Strategy, and Democracy*. Boulder: Westview. Pp. 1–18.

Escobar, Arturo. 1993. "Imagining a Post-Development Era? Critical Thought, Development and Social Movements." *Social Text* 31/32: 20–56.

———. 1995. *Encountering Development. The Making and Unmaking of the Third World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Faulkner, Tina. 1997. "Tijuana Maquiladora Workers Go Independent." in *BorderLines* 5 (10).

Farquhar, Doug. 1995. "Bordering on Disaster: the U.S.-Mexico Border is an Environmental Mess, and NAFTA is Creating Even More Challenges for America's Southwestern States." *State Legislatures* 21: 30.

Fernández-Kelly, María Patricia. 1983. *For We Are Sold, I and My People. Women and Industry in Mexico's Frontier*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Foweraker, Joe. 1995. *Theorizing Social Movements*. Boulder: Pluto Press.

Ganster, Paul. 1997. "Environmental Implications of Population Growth in San Diego-Tijuana." Presentation at "Sustainable Development in San Diego-Tijuana: Environmental and Social Consequences of Economic Integration" conference. Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, UC San Diego. May.

Garner, Roberta. 1994. "Transnational Social Movements." *Peace Review. A Transnational Quarterly* 6: 427–34.

Gentleman, Judith. 1987. *Mexican Politics in Transition*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Gereffi, Gary. 1996. "Mexico's 'Old' and 'New' Maquiladora Industries: Contrasting Approaches to North American Integration." in G. Otero ed. *Neo-liberalism Revisited. Economic Restructuring and Mexico's Political Future*. Boulder: Westview Press. Pp. 85–106.

Gilbert, Helen. 1995. "Exposing the Myths: Organizing Women Around the World." *Labor Research Review*. 23 (Spring/Summer): 69–76.

Gill, Stephen. 1995. "The Global Panopticon? The Neoliberal State, Economic Life, and Democratic Surveillance." *Alternatives* 2: 1–49.

Gilly, Adolfo. 1990. "The Mexican Regime in Its Dilemma." *Journal of International Affairs* 43(2): 273–90.

Gilmore, Peter. 1998. "Echlin Agrees to Meet with Alliance of Workers from Canada, Mexico, U.S." in *Mexican Labor News and Analysis*. 3(2): January 16.

Gómez-Pe a, Guillermo. 1996. *The New World Border: Prophecies, Poems and Loqueras for the End of the Century*. San Francisco: City Lights Books.

Gregory, Michael. 1997. "Summary: Building for the Future." Presentation. Unison Institute/US EPA Toxics Release Inventory and Right-to-Know Conference. Washington, DC: ATI. September.

Greider, William. 1997. *One World, Ready or Not: The Manic Logic of Global Capitalism*. New York: Touchstone.

Guimar es, Roberto Pereira. 1991. *The Ecopolitics of Development in the Third World: Politics and Environment in Brazil*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Habermas, Jürgen. 1989. *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*. Translated by T. Burger and F. Lawrence. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Henwood, Doug. 1995. "Clinton's Trade Policy." In F. Rosen and McFadyen, eds. *Free Trade and Economic Restructuring in Latin America. A NACLA Reader*. New York: Monthly Review Press. Pp. 27–38.

Hernández, Alfonso. 1996. PRD presentation. Coalition for Justice in the Maquiladoras Semi-annual Meetings. Tijuana, Baja California, Mexico. October.

Hernández, Hortensia. 1996. SIOAC presentation. Maclovio Rojas community meeting. Tijuana, Baja California, Mexico. October.

Human Rights Watch, Women's Rights Project. 1996. *Mexico. No Guarantees: Sex Discrimination in Mexico's Maquiladora Sector*. New York: Human Rights Watch.

Kamel, Rachel. 1988. *'This is How it Starts.' Women Maquila Workers in Mexico*. Chicago: Midwest Center for Labor Research.

Kincaid, Jess. 1998. "Echlin-ITAPSA Workers Beaten at American Brakeblock Plant." in *Mexican Labor News and Analysis*. 3(2): January 16.

La Botz, Dan. 1998a. "Mexico's Labor Year in Review" *Mexican Labor News and Analysis*. 3 (1): January 1.

———. 1998b. "NAO Issues First Health and Safety Decision; Blasts Echlin and the Mexican Government." in *Mexican Labor News and Analysis*. 3(2): January 16.

Labor Notes. 1998. "No End to Han Young's Union Busting." June/#231: 9.

Laclau, Ernesto and Chantal Mouffe. 1985. *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*. London: Verso.

Latin American Subaltern Studies Group. 1993. "Founding Statement." *Boundary 2. The Postmodernism Debate in Latin America*. 20: 55–64.

Levinson, Jerome. 1999. "Certifying International Worker Rights." Economic Policy Institute Issue Brief. Economic Policy Institute. http://epinet.org/briefingpapers/levinson.html. June.

Lewis, Sanford J., Marco Kaltofen, and Gregory Ormsby. 1992. "Border Rivers in Peril." In J. Cavanagh et al. eds. *Trading Freedom. How Free Trade Affects Our Lives, Work and Environment*. San Francisco: Institute for Food and Development Policy. Pp. 68–9.

López, Naachiely. 1997. Personal interview. Director of Movimiento Ecologista de Baja California, AC. Tijuana. February.

Luna, César. 1996a. Personal interview. Former Director of the Border Campaign, Environmental Health Coalition (EHC), San Diego. July.

———. 1996b. Personal interview. Former Director of the Border Campaign, Environmental Health Coalition (EHC), San Diego. November.

———. 1997. Personal interview. Former Director of the Border Campaign, Environmental Health Coalition (EHC), San Diego. February.

Martinez-Alier, Juan with Klaus Schlupmann. 1987. *Ecological Economics. Energy, Environment and Society*. Cambridge: Blackwell.

McCaughan, Edward J. 1993. "Mexico's Long Crisis. Toward New Regimes of Accumulation and Domination." *Latin American Perspectives* 20 (3): 6–31.

Meyer, Lorenzo et al. 1990. "Mexico: Tradition and Transition." *Journal of International Affairs* 43(2).

Mika, Susan. 1995. Personal interview. Former Executive Director and Board President of the Coalition for Justice in the Maquiladoras. March.

Miyoshi, Masao. 1993. "A Borderless World? From Colonialism to Transnationalism and the Decline of the Nation-State." *Critical Inquiry* 19 (4): 726–51.

Moody, Kim and Mary McGinn. 1992. *Unions and Free Trade: Solidarity vs. Competition.* Detroit: Labor Notes

Morris, Stephen D. 1995. *Political Reformism in Mexico. An Overview of Contemporary Mexican Politics.* Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Muller, Angelica. 1996. Personal interview. Plant Manager, MEXHON (Honeywell). Tijuana. July.

October 6th Union. 1999. "Message from the October 6th Union." Campaign for Labor Rights Action Alerts listserv. (June 6, 1999).

Office of the President. 1994. "Remarks by the President on the Eve of the G-7 Summit." Speech presented at the 1994 G-7 Summit. Washington: U.S. White House. June 5.

Ojeda, Martha. 1996. CJM Executive Director Opening Address. Coalition for Justice in the Maquiladoras Semi-annual Meeting. Tijuana, Baja California, Mexico. October.

Ong, Aihwa. 1987. *Spirits of Resistance and Capitalist Discipline. Factory Women in Malaysia.* Albany: State University of New York Press.

Oppenheimer, Andres. 1996. *Bordering on Chaos. Guerrillas, Stockbrokers, Politicians, and Mexico's Road to Prosperity*. New York: Little, Brown and Company.

Otero, Germán Sánchez. 1995. "Neoliberalism and Its Discontents." In F. Rosen and D. McFadyen eds. *Free Trade and Economic Restructuring in Latin America. A NACLA Reader*. New York: Monthly Review Press. Pp. 120–8.

Pelayo, Aurora. 1996. CAFOR presentation. Maclovio Rojas community meeting. Tijuana, Baja California, Mexico. October.

———. 1997. Personal Interview. Director, Comité de Apoyo Fronterizo Obrera Regional. Tijuana. February.

Pe a, Devon G. 1997. *The Terror of the Machine. Technology, Work, Gender, and Ecology on the U.S.-Mexico Border*. Austin: Center for Mexican American Studies, University of Texas, Austin.

Roett, Riordan. 1993. "The Dynamics of Change in Mexico." In R. Roett ed. *Political and Economic Liberalization in Mexico. At a Critical Juncture?* Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Pp. 169–74.

Rosen, Fred and Sam Smucker. 1998. "The Struggle Continues at Echlin-ITAPSA." in *Mexican Labor News and Analysis*. 3(2): January 16.

Rosen, Fred and Deidre McFadyen. 1995. "Introduction." in Rosen and McFadyen eds. *Free Trade and Economic Restructuring in Latin America. A NACLA Reader*. New York: Monthly Review Press. Pp. 15–26.

Rosenbaum, Ruth. 1996. Presentation. Coalition for Justice in the Maquiladoras Semi-annual Meetings. Tijuana, Baja California, Mexico. October.

Ryan, Michael. 1982. *Marxism and Deconstruction: A Critical Articulation*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.

Safa, Helen I. 1995. "Economic Restructuring and Gender Subordination." *Latin American Perspectives* 22 (2): 32–50.

Saxod, Elsa. 1996. Personal interview. Executive Director of the U.S./Mexico Border Progress Foundation. San Diego. July.

Shields, James. 1995. "Border Health Hazards." *Multinational Monitor* 16: 22.

Sivanandan, A. 1980. "Imperialism in the Silicon Age." *Monthly Review* 32: 24–42.

Sklair, Leslie. 1989. *Assembling for Development. The Maquila Industry in Mexico and the United States*. Boston: Unwin Hyman.

Slater, David. 1985. "Social Movements and a Recasting of the Political." In D. Slater ed. *New Social Movements and the State in Latin America*. Amsterdam: Centro de Estudios y Documentación Latinoamericanos. Pp. 1–26.

Smith, David A. and József Böröcz Eds. 1995. *A New World Order? Global Transformations in the Late Twentieth Century*. Westport: Praeger.

So, Alvin Y. 1990. *Social Change and Development. Modernization, Dependency and World-System Theories*. Newbury Park: SAGE Publications.

Storper, Michael and Richard Walker. 1989. *The Capitalist Imperative: Territory, Technology, and Industrial Growth*. Cambridge: Blackwell.

Support Committee for Maquiladora Workers. 1996. "Fact Sheet." San Diego: SCMW.

———. 1998. "Urgent Alert!: Han Young Strike Is Forcibly Set Aside Despite Fed Court Order." San Diego: SCMW.

Tong, Mary. 1996. Personal interview. Director of the Support Committee for Maquiladora Workers, San Diego. July.

———. 1997. Personal interview. Director of the Support Committee for Maquiladora Workers, San Diego. September.

———. 1998. "Two Cases of Cross-Border Organizing." Presentation. "Social Movements Across Borders" conference. Los Angeles: Social and Political Responses to Globalization in Latin America Project (LAREGLO) and Latin American Studies Program, California State University, Los Angeles. April 15.

Trend, David. 1996. "Democracy's Crisis of Meaning." In D. Trend ed. *Radical Democracy. Identity, Citizenship, and the State*. New York: Routledge. Pp. 7–18.

Valadez, Carmen. 1996. Personal interview. Coordinator, Casa de la Mujer/Grupo Factor X. Tijuana. July.

Valadez, Carmen and Reyna Montoya. 1996. Personal interview. Co-coordinators, Casa de la Mujer/Grupo Factor X. Tijuana. July.

Veltmeyer, Henry, James Petras, and Steve Vieux 1997. *Neoliberalism and Class Conflict in Latin America: A Comparative Perspective on the Political Economy of Structural Adjustment*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Warnock, John. 1995. *The Other Mexico: The North American Triangle Completed*. New York: Black Rose Books.

Waterman, Peter. 1993. *Globalisation, Civil Society, Solidarity. The Politics and Ethics of a World both Real and Universal*. Hague: Institute of Social Studies.

Wignaraja, Ponna. 1993. "Rethinking Development and Democracy." In P. Wignaraja ed. *New Social Movements in the South. Empowering the People*. New Jersey: Zed Books. Pp. 4–35.

Zeuner, Nicola. 1996. Personal Communication. Arizona Toxics Information (ATI) representative. August.