



# Lebanon's Islamists and local politics: a new reality

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*ABSTRACT* *The participation of Islamist groups in their countries' parliamentary elections has been a topic of focal concern for writers in the last two decades. Yet scant attention has been paid to Islamist groups and local politics. Given the Islamist assumption that the very nature of local politics or municipal work—the provision of services to the community—is a fundamental tenet of faith, Islamists have developed a vested interest in local politics. In other words, the functions and powers of local governments have drawn the attention of some Islamist groups for the importance of subordinate-level power sharing as a new means for the Islamisation of all aspects of society. Any assessment of Islamist groups and local politics requires an analysis of their role in municipal elections, covering their political strategies, programmes, alliances and campaign committees. This study systematically analyses Lebanon's major Islamist groups and local politics, in particular Hizbullah and al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyyah.*

The 1998 municipal election, which was held for the first time in 35 years, was the first local election in which Lebanon's Islamic movements participated. While their participation in the parliamentary elections of 1992 and 1996 had given them the opportunity to gain a foothold in the Lebanese political system, the municipal election gave them the opportunity of coming into power in several important cities and towns. This new reality pushed the Islamists to develop a stake in the system and a vested interest in local politics. Even if we consider the use of the ballot box by the leadership of Lebanon's Islamists as tactical or opportunistic, there is reason to believe that the process of local politics will transform this opportunistic commitment to a more substantive one. For the very nature of municipal work—provision of services to the community—is a fundamental tenet of faith, and such work emphasises the successful Islamisation of all aspects of society, a goal that the Islamists have emphasised since the late 1980s, instead of their commitment to the violent overthrow of their regimes.

Although more than 20 Islamist groups exist in Lebanon, the Islamic movements' participation in the municipal election was limited to two organisations. These are: Hizbullah (The Party of God), and al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyyah (The Islamic Association). In contrast to other lesser Islamist groups which have remained dependent on an individual religious leader or tribal character in their

activities and existence, these two large Islamic movements have enjoyed organisational and political functions similar to those performed by political parties.<sup>1</sup> However, this did not prevent some of these lesser groups, such as the Ahabash (Society of Islamic Philanthropic Projects), Harakat al-Tawhid al-Islami (The Islamic Unity Movement) and Islamic Amal, from either symbolically participating in the elections or supporting Islamist candidates close to them.

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### **Islamist groups and political participation**

There has been substantial scholarly work and heated debate on Islamist groups and political participation. Almost all studies on political parties have argued that parties whose doctrine has taken on a religious character, among them the Islamic movements, are neither able to develop a visible party structure nor able to perform the political functions carried out by Western democratic or socialist parties.<sup>2</sup> More specifically, some analysts believe that Islamist groups, commonly referred to as 'fundamentalist groups', are inherently extremist, despite differences among them. For this school, there is no point in making a distinction between extremists and those that are moderates because Islamic movements aim at creating an Islamic state through violence and ensuring that Muslim rule be executed. They might, for tactical reasons, modify or suppress both these aspirations but they do not abandon them. Furthermore, the same school believes that the promotion of the democratic process, through a single-minded emphasis on elections, runs the risk of furthering Islamic inroads into centres of power that may be counterproductive with regard to Western interests and may even increase political instability. According to this school, Islamist groups cannot become loyal opposition parties because those who are in actual control are not individuals who believe in political rules, but are people who believe in religious principles that ban the exercise of democracy.<sup>3</sup>

Whereas the analysis of the above school has often led to the automatic conclusion that Islam and democracy are incompatible, another school argues that, since the 1980s a significant number of Islamist groups, if not a majority, have participated in parliamentary and municipal elections. For this school, Islamist groups have become leading opposition parties in countries like Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Yemen, Kuwait and Pakistan.<sup>4</sup> It is the opinion of this school that a critical distinction between extremists and moderates or pragmatists needs to be made. Alongside the extremists groups there are moderate Islamic movements that are social and political forces—engaging in education and social welfare, running clinics and hospitals. They have participated in the political system and categorically accepted pluralism in a similar way to the communist parties' experience in Western Europe after World War II. For the analysts of this school, although Islamist groups might use the ballot box to come to power and then use undemocratic means to hold on

to it, in dealing with the practicalities of politics—competing with other Islamists and with secularists for votes—Islamists will be forced to rethink and transform their ideology.<sup>5</sup>

While there are some factual elements that might support both arguments of the above schools, three important observations ought to be made, which have been ignored by the two schools. First, there is a relationship between the strategy and means used by Islamist groups to achieve their goals and the level of intensity of crisis conditions in their societies. Put hypothetically, the more intense the political, social and economic crises, coupled with oppression of Islamists, the more likely Islamists are to resort to the violent overthrow of their regimes. Accordingly, these groups are, ideologically and strategically, in constant confrontation with their political systems, where secrecy and invisible organisational structures are the dominant features of their activities. On the other hand, the nearer the solutions to the crises, coupled with a policy of co-optation of Islamist groups, the more likely Islamists are to resort to a gradualist-pragmatic strategy instead of revolution and violence. Accordingly, the confrontation between Islamist groups and the system is less marked; here Islamist political activities are carried by a visible party structure and known political leadership. If in this regard political or 'fundamentalist' Islam means the Islamisation of state and society through the use of revolutionary strategy, the gradualist-pragmatic strategy is the rejection of revolution and violence for working within the system.<sup>6</sup> The focus of such a strategy for the purpose of successful Islamisation of all aspects of society becomes the practical side of social and political affairs, rather than ideological controversies.<sup>7</sup>

There is yet another observation pertinent to Islamist groups and political participation: the relationship between the Islamists' social welfare services—education, health care and housing—and the level of political participation. It appears that Islamist groups who provide social welfare services to the community are more likely to develop a high level of interest in local politics than those who do not give such services. Given the assumption that the nature of municipal work—provision of social services to the community—is a fundamental tenet of faith, Islamists have struck at the heart of the traditional *zuama* (bosses) clientalism that has persisted in one form or another for over 100 years.<sup>8</sup> By providing social services, Hizbullah and the Jama'ah, for example, were able to bypass the politics of patronage and to overcome this particular feature of Lebanese politics. As a result they boosted the size of their constituency and were able to perform well in local elections.

Yet a third observation needs to be made with regard to Islamists and local politics: the functions and powers of municipalities. Such functions and powers vary from one institutional form of government to the other. Contrary to a unitary form of government, municipalities in a federal form enjoy effective autonomy in the provision of education, health care, public works and above all tax-revenue raising powers. Such a federal system is more favourable to Islamist groups than a unitary form in which the functions and powers of municipalities are controlled by the central government. Thus, the institutional form of government is of direct importance to the power that might be gained by Islamist groups at the local level.

It appears therefore that, in dealing with the practicalities of politics, Islamists will be forced to rethink their ideology and transform their strategy.

### From revolutionary to gradualist–pragmatic strategy

The crisis conditions in the Arab world—defeats by Israel, the failure to achieve balanced socioeconomic development, political oppression, maldistribution of wealth and the disorienting psychocultural impact of Westernisation—were exacerbated in the Lebanese sectarian context by problems inherent in the system itself. For example, the structural imbalance between Christians and Muslims, as symbolised by the 6:5 ratio in favour of the former, was a cause of the 1958 and 1975 civil wars. Other factors contributing to Lebanese instability during the 1960s and 1970s were the fighting between Israel and Palestinians and the proxy war fought by Arab countries on Lebanese soil. These catalysts have shaped the political dynamics of Islamic militancy in Lebanon, which received further reinforcement from the victory of the Muslim cause in Iran.<sup>9</sup>

The convergence of these intense crises in a divided society produced a Islamist groups in the late 1970s. Groups such as Hizbullah, the Islamic Jama'ah and others found themselves ideologically and strategically in constant confrontation with the Lebanese political system. Ideologically, Lebanon's Islamist groups wanted to return to the correct path of Islam through creating an Islamic state. The targets of the emerging Islamist groups included Lebanon's political system as well as external foes like Israel and the West. Strategically, they opted for the use of revolution and violence to achieve their goals. Such strategy prompted Lebanon's Islamist groups to foster militancy and to create an invisible organisational structure to lead their activities. While Hizbullah, for example, created al-Jihad al-Islami (Islamic Holy War) and al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya (the Islamic Resistance) as its main fighting organs, the Jama'ah erected Qwat al-Fajr (the Dawn forces) to run its militant activities.<sup>10</sup> Because of the heterogeneity of the Muslim community the Islamist groups developed along geographical and sectarian lines, with Sunnis in organisations such as the Jama'ah and the Ahabash, and Shia in Hizbullah, Islamic Amal and others. Although the Shia Hizbullah and the Sunni Jama'ah had agreed on creating an Islamic order, they disagreed on the main pillars of that order. Whereas Hizbullah adopted Khomeini's theory of *Wi layat al-Faqih* (governance of the religious jurist), al-Jama'ah rejected Hizbullah's religious model of clerical leadership. The Jama'ah believes in achieving an Islamic order based on the *Shari'a* (Islamic sacred law) through *Jihad* of the heart (spiritual struggle), *Jihad* by word (education and propaganda) and *Jihad* by hand (economic, political and military action).<sup>11</sup>

However, in dealing with the practicalities of politics, Hizbullah and the Jama'ah in particular were forced to rethink and transform their revolutionary strategy into a gradualist–pragmatic one. Three main reasons stood behind this transformation. First, the 1989 Tae'f Accord brought about a solution to some of Lebanon's crisis conditions. Among the various Muslim constituencies, both Sunni and Shia religious establishments supported the confessional equity formula under the accord. Equally important, the Tae'f agreement, which called

for Syria to help the Lebanese government spread its authority over Lebanese territory, made Syria the key player in Lebanese politics. The support of the Muslim religious establishment and Syria for Lebanon's re-emerging confessional system represented an antithesis to the ideological goals of Islamist groups—ie the establishment of an Islamic order.<sup>12</sup> Second, Iran's strength in Lebanon began to decline soon after Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani became president of the country in 1989. He charted a more pragmatic course, one opposed by militant factions led by Ali Akbar Muhtashami and Hassan Khroubi. With the radicals eclipsed, the most militant factions in Lebanon also lost power.<sup>13</sup>

The Syrian influence in Lebanon and the decline of Iran's militant factions had the effect of forcing Hizbullah and the Jama'ah to work within the Lebanese political system.<sup>14</sup> Doing this had necessitated an unprecedented transformation from revolutionary strategy into a gradualist—pragmatic strategy, similar to the one followed by the Muslim Brethme in Egypt, Jordan, the Gulf and the Jamia'at al-Islah (Reformist society) in Kuwait.<sup>15</sup> Both Hizbullah and the Jama'ah admitted the lack of practical conditions for the establishment of an Islamic order. They called for dialogue with the Christians, accepting the reality of Lebanon's confessional system; in fact they submitted to governmental decrees on public discipline.

They also ceased activities that belonged to the state, whether of a public or security nature.<sup>16</sup>

Third, the very process of providing social welfare services instituted a process of increasing the constituency of Islamist groups. Both Hizbullah and the Jama'ah managed to increase their constituency by providing significant social welfare services. Hizbullah runs three hospitals, over 17 medical centres and a commercial network that includes supermarkets, petrol stations, department stores and construction companies. The Jama'ah offers similar social services, though less sophisticated than those Hizbullah provides.<sup>17</sup> The logic of social welfare services to the community has provided a further pure for a gradualist-pragmatic strategy, in place of the Islamists' commitment to the violent overthrow of Lebanon's political system. This was borne out by their participation in the parliamentary elections, which had given them symbolic representation in the Lebanese parliament. Hizbullah's representation amounted to just eight seats in 1992 and seven seats in 1996 (out of 128 parliamentary seats). As for the Jama'ah, it won three seats in 1992 and one seat in 1996. Despite the limited parliamentary representation of both Hizbullah and the Jama'ah, they have categorically accepted Lebanon's consociational democracy that allows pluralist political groups to operate. In fact, the participation of Lebanon's Islamist groups in the 1998 municipal elections must be viewed through the overlay of Lebanon's pluralistic system, and the very nature of Islamist social welfare services that made it possible for them to perform well in the municipal elections.

In addition, the functions and powers of municipalities in Lebanon drew the attention of Hizbullah and the Jama'ah to the importance of subordinate-level power sharing. Although Lebanon is of a unitary form, it is famous for its weak mechanism of central government. However, the 1997 law (legislative

decree 118) reinforced the concept of autonomy and decentralisation, at least on paper. The law stipulates the following functions and responsibilities as being within the jurisdiction of the municipal council: adoption of the municipality's annual budget; the determination of taxes and fees; management of municipal funds; the establishment of slaughterhouses; town planning and the arrangement of public transport; accepting gifts for the municipality; naming streets; developing natural resources; overseeing electrical power projects; ensuring fire and rescue services; and drafting and promulgating laws and regulations governing employees of the municipality.<sup>18</sup>

The same law also stipulates that municipal functions are primarily financed from: taxes and fees on rental values of built property; licenses for and taxes on hotels, nightclubs, cinemas, restaurants and fees for advertising; taxes and fees collected by the state for the municipalities, such as surtaxes on built property, business profits, inheritance fees, petrol taxes, etc; and surtaxes and fees collected by state agencies or private concerns, such as on telephone and electricity bills or on tobacco products.<sup>19</sup>

Despite the elaborate infrastructure of the local administration, by virtue of control over the purse strings the Ministry of Interior exercises considerable authority. In fact, Hizbullah and the Jama'ah were the first to stand up and support an administrative reform bill—awaiting the approval of the Lebanese parliament—that grants municipal councils more effective and meaningful functions and powers.

### **Pragmatic programmes, alliances and campaign committees**

The gradualist-pragmatic strategy of each of Hizbullah and the Jama'ah was reflected in their programmes, alliances and campaign committees. While Hizbullah religiously sanctioned this strategy under the pretext of 'winning in the political halal [what is permissible]', the Jama'ah sanctioned the same strategy in the name of 'co-operation in the halal with others'.

The new strategy provided Hizbullah's and the Jama'ah's candidates in the villages, towns and cities of Lebanon's six governorates, with the opportunity to offer comprehensive programmes of practical rather than ideological nature. To appeal to the voters, Hizbullah's and the Jama'ahs programmes placed greater emphasis on the economic, social and developmental aspects of the various municipalities, particularly the most deprived. They introduced their candidates on a non-sectarian basis, emphasising honesty and seriousness in their municipal work. Such an attitude was reflected clearly in Hizbullah's slogan, which declared that 'municipal work is a religio-legal designation which requires providing the people with the best models of services'.<sup>20</sup> In a similar way, the Jama'ah stressed that 'the civil service is both trust and service to the people'.<sup>21</sup>

For its part, Hizbullah's programmes for the municipalities in the southern suburbs of Beirut (Ghobairi and Borj al Barajneh), the South, Nabatiyyeh, Beirut and the Bekaa, excluded pure ideological platforms, with the exception of new statements reminding the electorate of the Islamic resistance activities against Israel in South Lebanon. The party emphasised its experience in social welfare

activities, which it has provided since its formal inception in 1985. In contrast, Hizbullah's rival Amal has neither provided programmes nor any vision for municipal work. In brief, Hizbullah's programmes emphasised the following:

- 1 encourage the citizen to play a more active role in the selection process of development projects;
- 2 increase the functions and powers of municipalities in the provision of education, health care and socioeconomic affairs;
- 3 involve qualified people in development projects;
- 4 finance development projects from both municipal revenues and donations;
- 5 exercise control over public works and prevent embezzlement;
- 6 renovate the physical and administrative structures of municipalities and provide them with computer facilities.<sup>22</sup>

However, Hizbullah's programmes completely avoided specific statements on services related to tourism like alcoholic beverages, gambling and nightclubs. These are considered in Islam '*Muharamat*' or forbidden. Intentionally or not, the avoidance by Hizbullah was not meant to undermine the religious sanctions of the principle of '*Muharamat*'. Rather, politics for Hizbullah became purely utilitarian rather than ideological or religious.

The most important goals of the Jama'ah programmes can be summarised as follows<sup>23</sup>:

- 1 support balanced development;
- 2 provide services to people for less cost;
- 3 decrease municipal fees and lift the taxation pressure off citizens' shoulders;
- 4 develop the municipalities' infrastructures for each region;
- 5 abolish 'night clubs', and Beirut's horse-racing track and transform the latter into a public park to carry moral and social problems;
- 6 make efficient use of public schools and support the Arabisation of their programmes.<sup>23</sup>

Despite some similarities between Hizbullah's programmes and those of the Jama'ah, the latter's programmes were more explicit than Hizbullah's in their rejection of tourism-related services such as nightclubs, alcoholic beverages and gambling. The Jama'ah made sure that the call for the spread of Islamic values among people ought to be clearly reflected in its municipal programmes, for the purpose of increasing Islamic awareness.<sup>24</sup>

### *Electoral lists and alliances*

The electoral lists and alliances formed by Hizbullah and the Jama'ah not only confirmed the adoption of a gradualist-pragmatic strategy, but in most instances it put utilitarian politics over ideological considerations. The principle of maximising gains and minimising losses formed the backbone of their political behaviour, a behaviour that was essentially rational and not different from that of Western political parties. Calculating the sizes and strengths of all contestants, Hizbullah and the Jama'ah produced three kinds of electoral lists. First, the party list included party members only. Second, the mixed list included party members

and friendly independents. Third, the coalition list included party members and other political parties.

Table 1 shows that Hizbullah's party lists were dominant in its strongholds, in particular the municipalities of Borj al-Barajneh and al-Ghobeiri (known as Beirut's southern suburbs) in the district of Baabda, and the Ba'albeck-Hermel districts. Thanks to the party's strength in these municipalities; its leading role in provision of social services; and the widespread respect for its Islamic resistance activities against the Israeli occupation, the party felt that it was not in need of political alliances to win elections in the villages and towns of these districts.<sup>25</sup> For example, Hizbullah rejected a coalition list drawn up by speaker Nabih Berri and former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri. They both teamed up in a campaign to isolate the influence of political parties through promoting consensus lists of largely neutral candidates, a position that was completely unacceptable to Hizbullah. As the attempt to form a joint list failed, Berri and Hariri backed an alliance list from large families such as al-Khalil, Kanj, Kazma, Farhat and Raad. However, it turned out that Hizbullah had a party presence in these families which rendered the Berri-Hariri-backed list inefficient and weak in its attempts to stand in the way of Hizbullah, who won the elections.<sup>26</sup>

In the South, Amal traditionally dominated, and the movement's leader, Nabih Berri, was seen as the patriarchal advocate of the Shiite community within Lebanon's state machine. In an attempt to curb Amal's domination, Hizbullah formed electoral lists that varied from mixed to coalition lists. For example, the party's mixed lists dominated in the districts of Marjaayoun, Bint Jbeil and Sidon. However, in some front-line villages of Bint Jbeil, such as Shakra, Deir Qanoun al-Nahr, Yater and Kafra, which were considered the Islamic Resistance strongholds, Hizbullah resorted to party lists instead.<sup>27</sup> But in the districts of Nabatiyyeh and Tyre, where the Democratic Socialist Party of former speaker Kamel Ass'aad (known as Assaadiis) and the Communist Party both had some power, Hizbullah opted for coalition lists with these parties.<sup>28</sup> Likewise, in some of the party's stronghold front line villages such as Jbaa', Kfarfila, Arab Salem, Zoutar al-Gharbiya and Zoutar al-Sharqiyeh, Hizbullah formed its own party lists.<sup>29</sup>

The tendency to form coalition lists was even greater in the city of Beirut. Hizbullah joined 'Beirut's Accord List', which was formed by Hariri. The list included parties who were ideologically and politically in disagreement with Hizbullah, such as Hariri's Future Trend, the Lebanese Kataeb (Phalange) party, the Lebanese Forces, al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyyah, Amal movement, al-Tashnak, and the supporters of deputy Tamam Salam.<sup>30</sup> Hizbullah justified such a coalition with rivals out of the desire to 'maintain sectarian balance'.<sup>31</sup>

As in the southern suburbs of Beirut and the district of Hermel, Hizbullah opted for party lists in the districts of Baalbeck with the exception of the city itself. Nevertheless, the city of Baalbeck has traditionally been the main bastion and the focus of the party's social services network. Hizbullah's attempts to form a party list conflicted from the very beginning with the city's sectarian make-up. Beside the Shiite majority, the city included Sunnis and Christians as well. Equally importantly, the city's political forces, such as Sheikh Sobhi Tufayli's

TABLE 1  
Types of Hizbullah lists by municipal electoral district of some of Lebanon's provinces

Types of electoral list	Districts of the province of Mount Lebanon (southern suburbs)			Districts of the provinces of the south and Nabatiyyeh			Province of Beirut		Districts of the province of Bekaa	
	Borj al-Barajneh	Ghobeiri	Marjaayoun	Sidon	Tyre	Bait Jbeit	Nabatiyyeh	City of Beirut	Baalbeck	Hermel
1) Party lists (party members only)	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+
2) Mixed lists (alliance of party members and independents)	-	-	+	+	-	+	-	-	+	-
3) Coalition lists (alliance of party members with other political parties)	-	-	-	-	+	-	+	+	-	-
					Communist Party and Kamel Ass'ad's Social Democratic Party (known as Assaadis)		Communist Party and Kamel Ass'ad's Social Democratic Party	Hariri's Future Trend, el-Kataeb Party, Lebanese Forces, Amal, and al-Jama'ah		

Notes: + = the presence of the type of electoral list  
 - = the absence of the type of electoral list

Source: Author's data, compiled from various reports by Lebanese newspapers and magazines between May and June 1998.

Ansar (Supporters) Allah—a faction which had defected from Hizbullah in 1997—the Syrian Social National Party, Hizb al-Baath, and the Amal movement, presented another major obstacle in the way of forming an alliance list.<sup>32</sup> As negotiations failed between Hizbullah and the political forces and the leading figures of large Sunni and Christian families, the party formed a mixed list that included independent Sunni and Christian candidates from small families. The deadlock faced by Hizbullah in the city had to do with the fear of many Christians and Sunnis for the future of tourism in the city. For many of them, the prospect of a Hizbullah victory at the polls meant the death-knell for the local tourism industry.<sup>33</sup>

As for the Jama'ah's electoral lists, Table 2 shows somehow a similar pattern. Thanks to its political strength in the villages and towns of the districts of el-Chouf (Iqlim al-Kharoub), Tripoli, al-Qalamoun, al-Minyeh and al-Diniyeh, the Jama'ah formed party lists which included their own party members and supporters. For example, in some of Iqlim al-Kharoub's major towns, such as Barja and Kutermaya, the main bastions of the Nasserites, Walid Jumblat's Progressive Socialist Party, and the Communist Party, the Jama'ah successfully formed party lists. However, the Jama'ah rejected a joint list proposed by Hariri, which had tried to curb their power in these towns.<sup>34</sup> In Shehim, the largest town in the Iqlim, which was difficult for one party to get hold of, the Jama'ah formed a mixed list that included leading figures of the town's large families against the Hariri backed list.<sup>35</sup>

Yet party lists formed by the Jama'ah were more dominant in Tripoli, al-Qalamoun and al-Minyeh-al-Duniyeh. In Tripoli, for example, where the Jama'ah enjoys widespread Sunni support, both Sunni former prime minister Omar Karami and Hariri tried to contain the political strength of the Jama'ah. Each proposed a joint list that ignored the Jama'ah's real electoral strength. As both offers were turned down, the Jama'ah formed an incomplete party list of aspirants for the 24-seat municipality which included four from the Jama'ah and one each from Islamic Inqaz (Salvation) Front, the Islah (Reform) Association, the Islamic Tawheed (Unicity), the Gawth (relief) Association and the Salafiyeen (Fundamentalists). All these groups are considered the Jama'ah's closest affiliates.<sup>36</sup>

As for the districts of Akkar, West Bekaa and Zahle, the Jama'ah was not in a position to form party lists here. Because of family feuds in the villages and towns of these districts, mixed lists were made up of alliances with dominant families. Only in Banin and Fnaydik villages in the district of Akkar did the Jama'ah succeed in forming party lists, thanks to its political strength there.<sup>37</sup> Yet in the city of Baalbeck, the Jama'ah lacked a constituency and took no part in the city's municipal elections.

Despite the considerable strength of the Jama'ah in Beirut and more importantly, in Sidon, the logic of maximising their gains was clearly illustrated by their acceptance of Hariri's joint lists, Hariri having enjoyed some political leverage in both cities. The alliance with Hariri and other political forces was justified by the Jama'ah's leaders as a purely electoral move and proportional to the size of its constituency in both cities. Furthermore, the refusal of Hariri, during his tenure, to sign the civil marriage law which the then Council of

TABLE 2  
Types of al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyyah's electoral lists by municipal electoral district of some of Lebanon's provinces

Type of electoral list	Districts of the province of Mount Lebanon		Districts of the province of the north			Districts of the province of the south		Province of Beirut	Districts of the province of Bekaa	
	Oada' el-Shouf (Iqlim al-Kharoub)	Tripoli	al-Qalamoun	el-Mina'	al-Minyeh al-Diniyeh	Akkar	Sidon			City of Beirut
1) Party lists (party members only)	+	+	+	-	+	-	-	-	-	-
2) Mixed lists (alliance of party members with close friends and families)	+	-	-	+	-	+	-	-	+	+
3) Coalition lists (alliance of party members with other political parties)	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	-
							Hariri's Future Trend and Bizri clan	Hariri's Future Trend, Hizbullah, Amal, Lebanese Forces, el-Kataeb		

Notes: + = the presence of the type of electoral lists

- = the absence of the type of electoral lists

Source: Author's data, compiled from various reports by Lebanese newspapers and magazines between May and June 1998.

Ministers approved, was considered by the Jama'ah an Islamic ideological gain.<sup>38</sup>

This justification of the Jama'ah's gradualist-pragmatic strategy, however, was not convincing to Sheikh Maher Hamoud—he broke with the Jama'ah in 1979 and formed the Association of Muslim Clergy in 1982. He attacked the alliance with Hariri, and reminded the Jama'ah that its victory in Iqlim al-Kharoub, Tripoli, al-Qalamoun, al-Minyeh and al-Diniyeh councils had received no backing from Hariri. In Sheikh Hamoud's opinion, such a victory would not have been possible without the support of the Islamic trend and the Muslims in general.<sup>39</sup>

### *Campaign committees*

The campaign committees—better known among political parties including the Islamists as the 'electoral machines'—were extremely active during the elections. Structuring the vote was the most important political function performed by Islamist groups, particularly the campaign committees of Hizbullah and the Jama'ah. Their efforts to structure the vote ranged from simple allocation of party labels to the conduct of large-scale educational and publicity campaigns. Also, their social welfare networks were active during the elections and provided the voters with services, food, water and transportation.

Hizbullah's organisational structure formed the backbone of its campaign committee's activities in reaching the electorate. The Islamic health organisation, for example, provided free transportation for those who wanted to vote—in particular the sick and the elderly. Under the supervision of the party's central committee, campaign committees started their work five months before the date of the elections. The main task of this central committee was to estimate the size of the electoral base. Other subcommittees, such as the public relations committee and the central media committee, were derived from the party's central committee. The media central committee handled publicity and mobilisation of voters, using the party's own radio station (al-Nour) and television (al-Manar). All information and election results were accumulated and analysed by a group of experts in Hizbullah's main headquarter.<sup>40</sup> Hizbullah's campaign committees consisted almost of 600 full-time party members, paid \$600 each per month, and had hundreds of volunteers.<sup>41</sup> In the absence of legislation on limits of funds, Hizbullah's campaign committee spent over \$500,000 in the Borj al-Barajneh and al-Ghobairi elections alone. The source of their funds was the party—which in turn is financed by Iran.<sup>42</sup>

Despite the sophisticated mechanism used by Hizbullah's campaign committee, it suffered some malfunction. For example, the campaign committees, underestimated Berri's popularity in the South, and further underestimated the role of the Sunni community in the city of Baalbeck.

The campaign committee of the Jama'ah was less centralised in comparison with Hizbullah. This has to do with the politically decentralised organisational structure of the Jama'ah. With the exception of the question of negotiating alliances, the Jama'ah's secretary general and the president of its politburo directly supervised the negotiation process. It is, however, left to each branch or

cell of the Jama'ah in the electoral district to organise its campaign committees structures. For example, while negotiating a joint list between the Jama'ah and Deputy Bahia Hariri—sister of former prime minister Hariri—the head of the politburo Dr Sheikh Ali Amar represented the Jama'ah in the negotiations. Once the alliance was announced, it was left to the Jama'ah's branch in Sidon to organise its campaign committee and other related matters.<sup>43</sup>

The Jama'ah's campaign committees were formed in villages, towns and cities from party members and supporters and were not necessarily connected to each other in the manner of Hizbullah's campaign committee. The nature of their activities during the elections as no different from at of Hizbullah's. However, their techniques in terms of structuring the vote were different. For example, one interesting technique applied by the Jama'ah's campaign committee to estimate the size of the electorate was the 'trial-run day'. The trial-run day is usually assigned one week before the official day of the elections. Party members, supporters, friends and families were called upon by the Jama'ah's campaign committee to vote in specified voting centres similar to the ones assigned for the official elections. On that day, the Jama'ah's campaign committee became very active and the participants were provided with means of free transportation, food and water. At the end of the process, the ballots were counted and an assessment of the electorate size was made. Trial-run, which resembles a simulation process, permitted them to estimate their electoral strength, as well as to correct any flow in the process. This technique was applied in Iqlim al-Kharoub, Sidon and Tripoli, as witnessed by the researcher.

### The election results

Although the election results might not necessarily confirm that the Islamists have succeeded in winning the majority of Lebanon's municipalities, they showed that Hizbullah and the Jama'ah were able to win several important municipalities. Coming to power in the municipal councils of several important cities and towns meant that working within the system had not only guaranteed their survival, but made the Islamisation of all aspects of society feasible.

While Hizbullah won a considerable number of the municipalities with a Shiite majority, al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyyah won significantly in municipalities with a Sunni majority. Only the number of municipalities and seats won by each party are reported, because the Lebanese ministry of Interior excluded from its official reports voting figures obtained by candidates. Thus, analysis of the results will be based on the number of municipalities and seats won by Hizbullah and the Jama'ah.

#### *Hizbullah: a major political force*

The municipal election ballot was the first time Hizbullah and Amal had directly competed against each other. In the 1992 and 1996 parliamentary elections, both parties featured on joint lists and neither one was in existence during the municipal elections of 1963. The Party, however, was able to perform very well in the 1998 municipal elections, thanks to its social welfare services.

TABLE 3  
**Distribution of municipalities and seats in some  
of Mount Lebanon's districts among Hizbullah and  
Amal**

<i>Municipalities of Mount Lebanon's districts/no of seats</i>	<i>Hizbullah</i>	<i>Amal</i>
1) Baabda (Borj al-Barajneh, 18)	18	0
2) Baabda (Ghobeiri, 21)	21	0
3) Aley (Kayfoun, 21)	21	0
4) Shouf (Joun, 15)	15	0
5) Jbeil (Lasa, 15)	15	0
Total	5 90	0

*Source:* Figures obtained from *Al-Ahd*, 29 May 1998, pp 9, 10, 11; see also *Ashira*, 1 June 1998, pp 14-15.

In the southern suburbs of Beirut (Borj al-Barajneh and Ghobeiri), and in the municipalities of Mount Lebanon province, with an overwhelmingly Shiite population (Kayfoun, Joun and Lasa), Hizbullah won a landslide with a total of 90 seats, in contrast to Amal which won nothing (see Table 3). This victory was not surprising for the Hizbullah controlled towns, particularly Borj al-Barajneh and Ghobeiri. These two major coastal towns have been under Hizbullah's influence for over 10 years, particularly after Amal's loss, in a bloody fight, of the southern suburbs to Hizbullah in 1989. More importantly, the social, educational and health services that Hizbullah provided to many of the families in the suburbs and other districts have made it a widely respected party. This was a position that Amal had strived to achieve during its control of the southern suburbs.

In the provinces of Nabatiyyeh and the South, Table 4 shows that, even though Hizbullah did not win overwhelmingly as in Beirut's southern suburbs, the results indicated that Hizbullah is now a potent threat to Amal in its traditional stronghold. In fact, Hizbullah expected to win Nabatiyyeh and the South after its landslide victory in the southern suburbs.<sup>44</sup> However, both Amal and Hizbullah tried to put their own spin on the election results. While Speaker Berri claimed that out of 75 contested municipalities Amal won 51, Hizbullah's deputy in the Lebanese parliament claimed that out of 68 municipalities contested by both parties, Hizbullah won 33 and 35 went to Amal.<sup>45</sup> The conflicting claims centred around the fact that each party added to its own actual gains the number of the disputed municipalities.

However, after re-assessing the election results of the contested municipalities between Hizbullah and Amal, it was found that, of the 97 municipalities in Nabatiyyeh and the South, competition occurred only in 74 municipalities. The

TABLE 4  
**Distribution of municipalities and seats in the provinces of Nabatiyyeh, south and Bekaa by Hizbullah and Amal**

<i>Province</i>	<i>Hizbullah</i>	<i>Amal</i>
Nabatiyyeh	11 (97 seats)	12 (94 seats)
South	11 (122 seats)	27 (231 seats)
Bekaa	18 (224 seats)	9 (158 seats)
Grand total (excludes the number of seats in 12 disputed municipalities)	40 (443 seats)	48 (483 seats)

*Source:* Figures obtained from various reports in *Al-Ahd*, 12 June 1998, pp 11–12; *As-Safir*, 9 June 1998, p 9; *An-Nahar*, 16 June 1998, p 11; and unpublished reports by Hizbullah.

remaining 23 are Christian municipalities where no competition occurred between Amal and Hizbullah. Out of the 74 municipalities, 39 were won by Amal and 22 by Hizbullah. Of the remaining 13 municipalities, 11 were claimed by both of them, one was a split, and another was won by a coalition of Communists and Nasserites (see Table 4). Since it was impossible to confirm either claim in the 11 disputed municipalities, the decision by the researcher was to omit them from the total number of seats and municipalities won by each party.

In the province of Nabatiyyeh, the results show that, while Hizbullah backed lists won 11 municipalities, including the city of Nabatiyyeh, Amal backed lists won 12 municipalities. However, the number of Hizbullah and Amal seats in these municipal councils is almost equal (97 to 94 respectively). Such equality of seats is also indicative of the duality of power in the province of Nabatiyyeh. In addition, the victory of Hizbullah in the city of Nabatiyyeh meant breaking the tacit monopoly of Amal in a city that was considered to be difficult to win. In fact, the social welfare services provided by Hizbullah, in particular the services of its *Muassast Jihad al-Bina'* (Holy Reconstruction Institution) made it possible for Hizbullah to win the city's municipal council overwhelmingly. Although the majority of the municipal seats in the province of Nabatiyyeh went to Hizbullah and Amal, the election results indicated that both the independents and families were important electoral powers and won 44 and 40 seats respectively.

As for the province of the South, Berri's stronghold, Amal won 27 municipalities with 231 seats compared with 11 municipalities with 122 seats won by Hizbullah (see Table 4). Although Hizbullah is a structured party with a greater mobilisation capacity than Amal, the party underestimated Berri's southern popularity. For example, in the district of Bint Jbeil, Hizbullah backed lists won only three municipalities. Amal backed lists, on the other hand, won seven

municipalities. As for the number of seats, Amal managed to win 70 to 23 for Hizbullah. Similarly, the election results, in the district of Tyre were a disappointment for Hizbullah, which sought similar results to those in the province of Nabatiyyeh. However, Hizbullah backed lists won four municipalities with no single seat in Tyre, while Amal backed lists won 11 municipalities with a startling victory of 21 seats in Tyre. As for the distribution of municipal seats in the district of Tyre, Amal was ahead of Hizbullah (80 to 63 respectively). The situation for Hizbullah was no better in the district of Sidon. Despite the fact that Hizbullah's social services were significant in the district of Sidon known as al-Zahrani, the Party was not able to undermine Berri's influence there. Amal won nine municipalities and 81 seats to four municipalities and 36 seats won by Hizbullah.

The supposed duality of political power in the Nabatiyyeh and the southern provinces has somewhat changed geographically. As indicated by the election results, Hizbullah won municipalities that were considered Amal's base, such as the city of Nabatiyyeh, Jowaya, Deir elZahrani and Hdata. However, the party lost to Amal either completely or partially strongholds such as the municipalities of Jba'a (the town of Hizbullah's MP Mohammed Ra'ad), Ain Qana, Kfarfila (the town of Hizbullah's deputy secretary general Sheikh Naim Qassim), Zawtar al-Gharbiya, Zawtar al-Sharkiya, Shakra, Yater, Kafra, Deir Kanoun elNahr and Shhour (the town of Hizbullah's MP Mohammad Kassir). In fact, the geographical change of this duality indicates that the size of Hizbullah's electorate has expanded from Nabatiyyeh down to some coastal villages. On the other hand, the party's popularity shrank in frontline towns and villages, which were once considered Hizbullah's main strongholds. This new geographical distribution demonstrates that Hizbullah was surprisingly unaware of the local realities in the south. The party, which possesses the most sophisticated military capability in fighting the Israeli occupation, had misjudged the needs of the people. Other than their need for social welfare services, the people wanted more freedom over their daily activities. Such freedom was better understood by Berri than Hizbullah, who backed lists of families in these frontline villages at the expense of Amal. As a result of this new political geographic map, one is tempted to hypothesise that the farther the people from the battle zone, the higher the popularity of Hizbullah (southern suburbs, Hermel district); the closer to the battle zone, the lower the party's popularity (Jaba', Ain Qana, Kafra, Yater, Shakra, etc).

The election results in the province of the Bekaa, however, showed that Hizbullah is the number one Shiite party, with the exception of the city of Baalbeck (see Table 4). Omitting from the total the disputed municipalities, the party won 18 municipalities, in comparison with nine municipalities won by the Amal backed list. However, they received an equal number of seats in two municipalities. In general, the districts of the province of the Bekaa have proved to be Hizbullah's main strongholds, with 224 seats in contrast to the 158 seats for the Amal backed list. Only in the city of Baalbeck did the results run contrary to Hizbullah's victory in the 1992 and 1996 parliamentary elections.<sup>46</sup> Amal's list of prominent families won 16 out of 21 seats of the city's municipalities compared with five seats won by Hizbullah. Despite the fact that

Hizbullah had the largest individual electoral power in the city—famous for its loyalty to the Islamic resistance—the party had underestimated the role of the families which contributed to Hizbullah's defeat. In the process the party underestimated clan affiliations and the role of Sunnis who felt they were being crushed by the city's Shiite majority. Also, Christian voters were not convinced that Hizbullah would support the city's tourism business as it claimed. In addition, the bloody battle of Bourday (on the outskirts of Baalbeck city) between Sheikh Sobhi Toufayli's faction AnsarAllah and Hizbullah, contributed to weakening the party in the city. As a result, Tufayli's supporters backed Amal's alliance in the city of Baalbeck and won the 12 seats of Brital's municipality—Tufayli's home village and Hizbullah's former stronghold.

As for the elections in the city of Beirut, the result indicated that Hizbullah's candidate Mohammed Sherri won his seat on Hariri's 'Beirut Accord list'. The results were a setback for Amal's candidate, Fadi Shahrour, who lost his allocated seat. One major reason for the defeat of Amal's candidate is that Beirut's Sunni community has not forgotten Amal's manipulation of power when it controlled the city in 1984. In addition, Hizbullah's Islamic resistance, with its 'clean reputation', was more favoured than Amal by many of Beirut's Sunnis.

Finally, the election results also indicated that the districts of the provinces of the south and Nabatiyyeh were not completely polarised between Hizbullah and Amal. Although the southern families and independents sided in the elections either with Amal or Hizbullah, none of these groups could be labelled partisan. While the major southern families recognise Berri's political influence, they do not necessarily abide by Amal's political directives. On the other hand, the independents, who felt they were being crushed by Amal's local politicians, found Hizbullah a better alliance. The results also showed that traditional Shiite leaders such as former speaker Kamel Asa'ad, as well as secular parties (Communist Party, Ba'ath, Syrian Social National Party) had not disappeared completely from the southern political map.

#### *al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyyah: a significant victory*

Similarly to Hizbullah, the Jama'ah featured on joint lists in the 1992 and 1996 parliamentary elections. Its role, however, under the name of Jama'at Ubad al-Rahman (Worshippers of the Compassionate) was insignificant during the previous municipal elections in 1963. But the 1998 municipal election, brought the Jama'ah for the first time into a fierce competition with Sunni leaders, as well with as a number of secular parties. Nonetheless, the election results showed the new reality of the Jama'ah's political power.

Contrary to the beliefs of moderate Sunnis that their Islamists are weak, the results indicated that the Jama'ah has proved its political strength inside the Sunni community, with a greater mobilisation capacity and a perceived image of 'honesty and ethical behaviour'. The Jama'ah backed list won a majority of seats in 24 municipalities and almost one-third of the municipal council seats in Sidon and Tripoli (see Table 5). The election results also showed that its strength is widespread across a geographic line running from Sidon, Iqlim al-Kharoub,

TABLE 5  
**Distribution of municipalities and seats in the provinces of Mount Lebanon (Shouf), north and Bekaa by al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyyah and other political forces**

<i>Province</i>	<i>Al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyyah</i>	<i>Other political forces PSP, Hariri, Karami and families</i>
Shouf (Iqlim al-Kharoub)	3 (45 seats)	5 (60 seats)
North	17 (231 seats)	12 (164 seats)
Bekaa	5 (54 seats)	12 (107 seats)
Grand total	25 (330 seats)	29 (331 seats)

*Source:* Figures obtained from *Takrir Aan al-Intikhab al-Baladiyyah* [Report on Municipal Elections] published by the Jama'ah Secretariat's General Office, 25 May 1998.

Beirut, Tripoli, al-Minyeh al-Diniyeh to Akkar in northern Lebanon. The Jama'ah has succeeded in reinstating itself as a strong Sunni Islamist political party and opened a new chapter of political influence in the Sunni community, in both local and national politics.

For the first time in Lebanon's history, the Sunni district of Iqlim al-Kharoub was taken from Druze leader Walid Jumblat's control and came under the influence of Sunni Jama'ah. The Iqlim no longer seems to be a stronghold for Jumblat's Progressive Socialist Party (PSP). The victory of the Jama'ah backed lists in major municipalities of the Iqlim such as Barja, Katermaya and Shehim now poses a potent threat not only to the PSP, but to Hariri's Future Trend as well. In fact, the election results in Iqlim al-Kharoub highlighted the internecine struggles between Hariri's Future Trend and the Jama'ah over the sole representation of the Sunni community. The Jama'ah had accused Hariri of mobilising considerable opposition from traditional Sunni families to block their overwhelming victory in the Iqlim.<sup>47</sup> Despite the coalition between Hariri's Future Trend, PSP and other families, the Jama'ah managed to win overwhelmingly in three municipalities (Barja, Katermaya and Shehim) with 45 seats, as opposed to five municipalities with a total of 60 seats won by the coalition (see Table 5).

As for the province of the north, the election results showed that the Jama'ah scored a major victory in Tripoli and the northern province, winning 17 municipalities with a total of 231 seats, surprising their opponents who won 12 municipalities with 164 seats. In Tripoli itself, one of the Jama'ah's strongholds since 1968, they won eight seats out of the 24-seat municipality in a fierce competition against one list backed by MP Omar Karami (11 seats) and another list backed by former prime minister Rafic Hariri (five seats). In other strongholds such as al-Qalamoun, el-Mina', al-Minyeh al-Diniyeh and Akkar, the Jama'ah lists won overwhelmingly. In fact, traditional Sunni leaders such as Karami, and newly emergent ones such as Hariri, had misjudged the Sunni

electorate. They were surprisingly unaware of the local realities of their Sunni community, in which the Jama'ah has succeeded in the past two decades in penetrating the community and establishing through its social welfare services a solid constituency.

The elections results in the districts of the Bekaa showed that the Jama'ah has not yet overcome the dominance of traditional Sunni families; it won only five municipalities with a total number of 54 seats in comparison to 10 municipalities won mainly by the traditional Sunni families and two municipalities won by the Islamic Trend. In addition, the results demonstrated that the Jama'ah was involved in internecine struggles against the Islamic Trend, which is supported by Sheikh Maher Hamoud as discussed earlier. Even though the Islamic Trend remained behind the Jama'ah, it managed to win 15 seats on al-Qararoun's municipal council, three seats in Kifraya and the 15 seats of Majd el-Anjar's municipal council.<sup>48</sup>

Finally, the results of Sidon and Beirut municipal councils indicated that the Hariri-backed lists could not have won a majority of all council seats without support from the Jama'ah. Equally importantly, the alliance with Hariri gave the Jama'ah an explicit recognition that they were a major political force which could not be ignored. Of Sidon's 21 municipal seats, 12 went to Hariri, five to the Jama'ah, three to Bizri's clan; the remaining seat was won by the head of the rival list, Ousama Saad, deputy secretary general of the Nasserite popular organisation. A similar situation prevailed in Beirut, where the Jama'ah won its allocated seat on Hariri's list.

### **Future prospects**

It can be argued that thanks to a gradualist-pragmatic strategy, Lebanon's main Islamist groups, Hizbullah and al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyyah, have won a considerable number of municipalities and seats. They have succeeded in proving themselves as major political parties in their own respective Islamic communities. They were able to mobilise their electorate and won in many cities, towns and villages which were considered until recently difficult for them to win. While Hizbullah won overwhelmingly in the southern suburbs of Beirut, the districts of Baalbeck (with the exception of its city) and Hermel, it remained number two in the south, exposing the party's shrinking popularity in front-line villages. Al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyya, on the other hand, scored a number of important victories in Lebanon's centres with large Sunni concentrations, such as Sidon, Iqlim al-Kharoub, Beirut, Tripoli and Akkar, presenting a potent threat to traditional and new Sunni leaders.

Despite the success of their gradualist-pragmatic strategy, Hizbullah and the Jama'ah still have ideological problems. They have not yet reached a stage where they can claim a widespread national constituency. People, particularly Christians, are still suspicious of their ideologies, despite their willingness to work within the system. Christian voters in Tyre, for example, voted for Berri's list instead of Hizbullah's because they feared the party's call for an Islamic order. The Jama'ah, on the other hand, has remained a Sunni fundamentalist party. It was unable to mobilise the Christians to vote for its candidates whether

in Tripoli, Beirut or Sidon. In addition, the constituencies of Hizbullah and the Jama'ah are both suspicious of each other's ideological differences.

Municipal work requires not only a gradualist—pragmatic strategy, rather it requires a compromise within Lebanon's confessional society that might come at the expense of the institutional integrity and ideological objectives of these two Islamist groups. More problematic is the fact that, if these two movements lose their identity as a result of their gradualist—pragmatic strategy, they lose their credibility among the rank and file of their party members and supporters. If, on the other hand, they retain their identity and revolutionary strategy, they will become prone to constant confrontation with the system and others in society. The gradualist—pragmatic strategy might facilitate winning elections, but it will surely not resolve the dilemma of the Islamists' politics. And this dilemma will become even greater in the aftermath of the liberation of the south, where the challenges of peace time are more difficult to deal with than those of war time.

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> For more information on these movements, see A Nizar Hamzeh, 'Islamism in Lebanon: a guide to the groups', *Middle East Quarterly*, September 1997, pp 47–54.
- <sup>2</sup> Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*, London: Methuen, 1978; and Giovanni Santori, *Parties and Party System*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.
- <sup>3</sup> For further discussion see William Zartman, 'Political Islam: can it become a loyal opposition?', *Middle East Policy*, January 1997, pp 74–79; Daniel Pipes, 'Symposium: resurgent Islam in the Middle East', *Middle East Policy*, August 1994, pp 5–8; Bernard Lewis, 'Islam and liberal democracy', *The Atlantic*, February 1993, pp 89–98; Martin Kramer, 'Islam vs democracy', *Commentary*, January 1993, pp 35–42; and Oliver Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994.
- <sup>4</sup> John L Esposito (ed), *Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism or Reform?* Boulder, co: Lynne Rienner, 1997; Mumtaz Ahmad, 'Political Islam: can it become a loyal opposition?', *Middle East Policy*, January 1997, pp 68–74; John Esposito & James Piscatori: 'Democratization and Islam', *Middle East Quarterly*, September 1994, pp 3–11.
- <sup>5</sup> See John Esposito, 'Symposium: resurgent Islam in the Middle East', *Middle East Policy*, August 1994, pp 8–13; Mumtaz Ahmad, 'Political Islam', pp 72–73; and Lisa Anderson, 'Fulfilling prophecies: state policy and Islamist radicalism', in Esposito, *Political Islam*, pp 18–19.
- <sup>6</sup> Richard Dekmijian, *Islam in Revolution*, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995, pp 21, 58.
- <sup>7</sup> *Ibid*, p 222.
- <sup>8</sup> For further discussion on clientalism see Ernest Gellner & John Waterbury (eds), *Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies*, London: Duckworth, 1977.
- <sup>9</sup> Dekmijian, *Islam in Revolution*, p 162.
- <sup>10</sup> Hamzeh, 'Islamism in Lebanon', p 53.
- <sup>11</sup> *Ibid*, p 49.
- <sup>12</sup> For full translated text of the Taif, see *Beirut Review*, Spring 1991, pp 119–160.
- <sup>13</sup> A Nizar Hamzeh, 'Lebanon's Hizbullah: from Islamic revolution to parliamentary accommodation', *Third World Quarterly*, Spring 1993, pp 323–324.
- <sup>14</sup> Hamzeh, 'Islamism in Lebanon', p 53.
- <sup>15</sup> Dekmijian, *Islam in Revolution*, p 58. See also the speech of the politburo member of the Jama'ah al-Islamiyyah, Engineer Abdallah Babiti, *al-Safir*, 15 June 1998, p 3.
- <sup>16</sup> See A. Nizar Hamzeh, 'The future of Islamic movements in Lebanon', in A Moussalli (ed), *Islamic Fundamentalism: Myths and Realities*, Reading: Ithaca, 1998, pp 256–260.
- <sup>17</sup> Hamzeh, 'Islamism in Lebanon', pp 48–49.
- <sup>18</sup> Randa Antoun, 'Municipalities in Lebanon: past and present', *The Lebanon Report*, 4, 1995, p 35. See also Walter Ritscher, *Municipal Government in Lebanon*, Beirut: American Press, 1932.
- <sup>19</sup> Antoun, 'Municipalities in Lebanon', p 37.

- <sup>20</sup> See the declaration of Hizbullah's deputy al-Hajj Mohammed Raad in *al-Nahar*, 11 June 1998, p 5.
- <sup>21</sup> See *As-Safir*, 6 June 1998, p 2.
- <sup>22</sup> Hizbullah's programmes were collected from *al-Ahd* magazine (Hizbullah's mouthpiece) during the municipal election period 24 May-14 June 1998.
- <sup>23</sup> See Zuhair al-Oubaidi, *As-Safir*, 22 June 1998, p 4.
- <sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>25</sup> *al-Shira'*, 1 June 1998, p 15.
- <sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>27</sup> *al-Shira'*, 15 June 1998, p 20.
- <sup>28</sup> *al-Ahd*, 5 June 1998, p 12.
- <sup>29</sup> *al-Shira'*, 15 June 1998, p 15.
- <sup>30</sup> *Daily Star*, 9 June 1998, pp 1-2.
- <sup>31</sup> *Daily Star*, 4 June 1998, p 1.
- <sup>32</sup> *Nahar al-Shabab*, 16 June 1998, pp 28-29.
- <sup>33</sup> *al-Ahd*, 12 June 1998, p 5.
- <sup>34</sup> *As-Safir*, 22 June 1998, p 4.
- <sup>35</sup> See Carol Dagher in *al-Safir*, 22 June 1998, p 2; and al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyyah report number 2, Office of the Secretary General, 25 May 1998.
- <sup>36</sup> See al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyyah report number 3, Office of the Secretary General, 1 June 1998; and Dagher, *As-Safir*.
- <sup>37</sup> See al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyyah report number 5, Office of the Secretary General, 14 June 1998.
- <sup>38</sup> See al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya report number 4, Office of the Secretary General, 7 June 1998; and interview with Zouhair al-Oubaidi in *As-Safir*, 22 June 1998, p 4.
- <sup>39</sup> *Daily Star*, 4, June 1998, p 2.
- <sup>40</sup> see Hassan Krayem 'Elections in the south: the old stage and the reproduction of the story,' (in Arabic), in Paul Salem, *1996 Parliamentary Elections and the Crisis of Democracy* (in Arabic), Beirut: Lebanese Center for Policy Studies, 1998, pp 214-216.
- <sup>41</sup> *As-Shira'*, 8 June 1998, p 8.
- <sup>42</sup> *Daily Star*, 27 May 1998, p 2; see also *As-Shira'*, 8 June 1998, p 14.
- <sup>43</sup> *Daily Star*, 2 June 1998, p 2.
- <sup>44</sup> See the editorial in *al-Ahd*, 29 May 1998, p 2.
- <sup>45</sup> *Daily Star*, 8 June 1998, p 2. See also *Al-Ahd* (Hizbullah's mouthpiece), 12 June 1998, p 11.
- <sup>46</sup> *As-Safir*, 16 June 1998, p 1.
- <sup>47</sup> See interview with Zouhair al-Oubaidi, *As-Safir*, 22 June 1998, p 4.
- <sup>48</sup> See report of the Jama'ah al-Islamiyyah, number 5, Office of the Secretary General.