Peacekeeping: Let the Conscripts Do the Job

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Introduction

OVER THE LAST DECADE, the evolution of peace support operations (PSOs)[1] has presented the military with considerable challenges. The events that followed the interventions in Bosnia, where peacekeepers were taken hostage, and Somalia, where peacekeepers were involved in a vicious conflict with local warlords, have prompted analysts to investigate how and why soldiers who leave their country on a peace mission return completely disillusioned. In an attempt to find answers and solutions, we have analysed a number of tragic events and learned many lessons. However, what has clearly emerged in the last ten years is that soldiering and peacekeeping are two quite separate activities. Combat training and, more generally, military training are not enough in operations with features and characteristics that are very different from those of war.[2] The old dictum that peacekeeping is not a soldier's job but soldiers are the only ones who can do it needs to be reviewed.

This article investigates Italy's participation in PSOs from the intervention in Lebanon with the Multinational Force (MNF) in 1982 to the deployment of a peacekeeping mission in Mozambique in 1993–94, a period during which Italian military contingents were composed of conscripts. Since the Italian troops performed well in PSOs, the article will try to identify the factors that contributed to this result. My conclusion is that the conscripts' military culture and personal motivations were of great importance in determining the positive approach that Italian peacekeepers took towards their humanitarian duties.

Michael Williams noted that, if peacekeeping is to be a major commitment for Western armies, 'some aspects of military training must be reviewed' as 'skills needed for peacekeeping differ from those necessary for combat'.[3] In addition, Christopher Dandeker and James Gow maintain that 'certain types

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of soldier do not make very good traditional peacekeepers'. According to the two scholars, military units such as the British Parachute Regiment and the US Army 82nd Airborne Division, which are strongly focused on combat skills, are probably not suited to PSO tasks.[4]

In peace operations over the last few decades, what has become clear is that soldiers / peacekeepers operate in a fuzzy environment, without clear boundaries between friends and enemies. Often there are no enemies at all, and combat-trained soldiers with long assignments feel degraded because they are not doing what they are trained to do. In addition, they often have to refrain from using force, even when faced with life-threatening situations. The soldier / peacekeeper role has shifted 'from antagonist to stander by, from player to referee'.[5] Therefore, a peacekeeper today is not only required to be a good soldier but also a diplomat, a communicator and something of an anthropologist. Despite the great importance of training, more emphasis should be placed on identifying the appropriate motivation needed – in the context of a new military culture – for a soldier / peacekeeper to contribute successfully to PSOs.

In my analysis, I use John Mackinlay's categorization of peacekeeping operations in relation to their force composition. Mackinlay identified three different force levels with different 'military capabilities and limitations', but also with very different functions: high-level forces deployed for enforcement 'do not act with the aggressor's consent or impartially towards it'; mid-level forces are deployed to protect civilians and assist in advancing a peace process, so force 'must be used impartially to uphold the mandate and not in a punitive spirit'; and, finally, low-level forces, which Mackinlay calls a 'supervisory presence', have military duties to 'witness, supervise and monitor'.[6] This article considers mid- and low-level operations, and argues that conscripts who volunteer for these peacekeeping operations are not just strongly motivated, but have the best approach towards their military / humanitarian duties and often the best disposition towards local populations. Armies that have a long tradition of conscription, 'a system of compulsory enrolment of civilians into the armed forces',[7] develop a less aggressive military ethos than professional armies. Their military culture, where the use of force is perceived as a last resort and strictly in self-defence, is not a serious obstacle to achieving good working relations with locals or civilian peacekeepers. However, high-level enforcement operations, such as those in Korea, the Gulf and Kosovo, with features very similar to limited wars, require the employment of professional soldiers.

Rome and PSOs: Deploying Conscripts

International events in the early 1990s led to a proliferation of peacekeeping missions, but none of the major powers had developed a doctrine or even a

model applicable to these new commitments. The international community wrongly believed that a handful of blue helmets could intervene and solve tensions and turmoil all over the world. When they could not, the use of force could be seen as a justified move. This belief showed evidence of great naïveté among politicians and UN bureaucrats. Not enough attention was given either to the domestic and international dynamics in which UN soldiers were going to be deployed or to how they could alter these dynamics with positive or even negative consequences. Certainly, there was little consideration of the psychological impact that peacekeeping duties might have on soldiers.[8]

The events in Somalia in June 1993, when Pakistani blue helmets were attacked and 23 of them killed, took the major powers by surprise. Even more astonishing was the counter-attack by General Aideed's militia against a US rangers' operation to arrest him in October 1993. For hours, scores of rangers were pinned down under Kalashnikov fire, waiting to be rescued from an ambush. Yet the final blow came when the world's major television networks broadcast the images of a US soldier's mutilated corpse being dragged down the streets of Mogadishu by a Somali mob. Initially, it was difficult to understand how a humanitarian mission could have led to such violence. According to General Michael Rose, peacekeepers in Somalia crossed the 'Mogadishu line' – 'the line that separates peacekeeping from war fighting'[9] – causing an angry reaction from warlords. But Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst maintain that the landing of 30,000 soldiers in Somalia was a serious interference in the clan dynamic from the beginning; therefore, the 'Mogadishu line' was crossed the moment US soldiers were sent in.[10] Actually, the initial impact of this massive deployment was extremely beneficial: the show of force contributed to the establishment of some sort of order in a very unstable country. As long as the troops deployed in Mogadishu accepted playing a tough but impartial role, they had the respect of all Somali factions. Problems began when force was used to a higher degree than necessary, giving Somali warlords the impression that the blue helmets were taking sides. Michael Rose made it clear that 'to use more force than that which is prescribed by the bounds of peacekeeping, especially in order to pursue war fighting goals, is to cross the line which separates non-combatants from combatants'.[11] This is the irreconcilable paradox of the majority of today's peacekeeping missions: combat-trained soldiers are asked to act as non-combatant soldiers and to perform duties which go against their training and, more importantly, their vocation. Therefore, the deployment of military units equipped with an excessive combat ethos can have a negative impact on an entire operation.[12]

By the early 1980s, we had already seen that different national troops participating in the same peace operations and with similar tasks reacted to life-threatening situations with different levels of force. Differing national interpretations of mission mandates produced different results in terms of the effectiveness of interventions.[13] The most obvious example of this was the

second deployment in Lebanon of a Multinational Force (MNF II) composed of approximately equal contingents of US, French and Italian soldiers, with a symbolic participation by British troops.[14] At the end of the mission, the French and US contingents had to count their losses in the hundreds; the Italians, on the other hand, lost only one man, while 70 were wounded. The area of Beirut in which the Italians were deployed was as difficult as any other sector of the city. Their main task was to protect the local population and restore normality in the assigned area, and this task was performed largely by conscripts, who had a very low combat ethos, if any. At that time, all Italian privates were conscripts, though officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) were professional soldiers. The Italian soldiers had no special preparation beyond the normal basic training that all Italian conscripts received at that time. Yet, as Marianne Heiberg and Johan Jørgen Holst observed, the Italian contingent deployed in Lebanon 'operated as part of the local environment and it became an active element in restoring normal living conditions. Its soldiers were provided with the training required to acquaint them with the cultural, political and social situation of the people among whom they worked.... The Italians carefully nurtured contact with the ordinary citizens and the political leaders in their area.'[15] In contrast, as Tamara Duffey noted, US and French peacekeepers, considered the most ambitious peacemakers, were 'those most removed from the individuals and groups between whom they wished to establish peace'.[16]

According to Richard Nelson, the first military engagement of the MNF took place on 28 August 1983, when US marines and Lebanese soldiers came under fire from automatic weapons. In the days that followed, one marine and four French soldiers were killed.[17] In reality, the first MNF clash happened a few months earlier, on 15 March, when an Italian squad of the San Marco Battalion was attacked while out on patrol. One soldier was killed, and three injured. During the retaliatory operation that 'Italcon' (the code-name for the Italian contingent) launched in response to this, two soldiers from the paratrooper brigade were also wounded. Italcon commanders learned a number of vital lessons from these events. To begin with, launching a retaliatory operation in a difficult urban guerrilla scenario, such as the one in Beirut, can provoke a dangerous escalation of tensions that may be difficult to control. Indeed, retaliatory attacks should never be considered in peacekeeping missions. PSOs are extremely atypical military operations: a number of deaths in minor skirmishes must be expected and regretfully accepted. It might take time for the casualties to be metabolized by the peacekeepers, but it is imperative not to compromise the entire mission by launching retaliatory operations. The 'diplomatic' aspect of the PSOs in which the military are involved should never be jeopardized. The military deployed in the field must be able to respond firmly and toughly on the spot to any attack, but should never initiate punitive actions. After its 1983 experience in Lebanon, Italy has deployed its troops with

armoured vehicles and tank support in all difficult situations, with the exception of Operation Pelican in Albania, even when other countries, such as the USA in Somalia until October 1993, have provided their troops with only light equipment.

The lesson from Lebanon was extremely beneficial for the Italian armed forces. Rome promoted a process of modernizing its defence sector, but did not change its recruiting system, which continued to be based on conscription. Therefore, when Italy in autumn 1991 launched Operation Pelican in Albania,[18] the large majority of the 5,000 unarmed troops sent there were conscripts. The deployment of mostly logistic troops in the Eagles' Country for a two-year period was extremely peaceful. Yet the weeks before Pelican began were characterized by high tension, caused by clashes between Italian police and Albanian emigrants, who, from the early months of 1991 onwards, disembarked on the southern coast of Italy in growing numbers. The dramatic broadcasts of those clashes by Italian television networks had a deep effect on the Albanians who saw them. Even so, Rome opted for a light deployment, as requested by Tirana in the agreement signed with the Italian government on 26 August 1991. This was more appropriate for the mission – delivering and distributing aid – despite the uncertainty of the situation in which Pelican military personnel were going to operate. The activities in Albania provided further confirmation of the good performance of conscripts. The tasks performed by the Italian forces were only indirectly related to their military status: they organized convoys, reached inaccessible villages, offered health assistance – in simple terms, they acted as a humanitarian NGO. At the end of the mission, nearly all of the military personnel involved (91.8%) believed that the mission had been useful or extremely useful for locals, while 81.8% were ready to join other missions abroad.[19]

It is obvious that this high satisfaction rating is not just the outcome of performing mission duties, but has to be placed in a wider context through an examination of the composition of the troops involved. For the conscripts, joining Operation Pelican was a short-term commitment, but, more than this, it was an opportunity to leave behind the boredom of the barracks. They could embark on new and exciting experiences, get to know new places and earn good money, especially in comparison with the poor salary that they were used to receiving. The presence of these elements led to a positive evaluation of the mission by Pelican's military personnel and to an appreciation of their duties. The question now is: how many combat-trained soldiers would have 'enjoyed' such a mission?

It would be correct to assume that combat-trained military personnel would feel degraded performing duties in which the military aspect is minimal. Because of Operation Pelican's unique features, there are no comparable data on the participation of professional soldiers in similar operations; a comparison can only be made with monitoring missions and traditional peacekeeping

duties. The US Army has deployed some of its best troops with the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai, following the principle that 'the best soldiers are the best peacekeepers'. However, despite the fact that the majority of soldiers deployed in the Sinai believed that they had been the best choice, many thought that six months in the desert was a waste of their training and 'less than appropriate for the best combat/warrior units'.[20] Combat-trained soldiers associate traditional peacekeeping 'with some degree of discord between self-expectations related to their combat training and the demands placed on them as peacekeepers'.[21]

In more assertive missions, professionals have shown a great degree of restlessness, and in Somalia the attitude of combat-trained soldiers significantly contributed to the failure of the mission. The first problem for Restore Hope was the large variety of military contingents that joined the mission, who brought with them not only different training standards and equipment, but also different military cultures. This diversity can be accepted in a peacekeeping mission characterized by a high level of stability, but Mogadishu was not the best environment to deploy troops that would deal with Somali warlords in a non-uniform manner while still remaining within the UN mandate. The problem became more obvious after June 1993, when UN soldiers began directly targeting one warlord, Mohammed Aideed. Exactly why Pakistani peacekeepers seized Aideed's Radio Mogadishu is still unanswered, but their response to the Somali militia's fire was undisciplined and resulted in the killing of civilians, which caused an angry reaction from the Habr Gidir clan.[22] In the subsequent hunt for Aideed, the USA employed some of its best soldiers, with the well-known tragic results. Superbly trained rangers suffered 12 fatalities in one ambush and had to give up the search for Aideed.

In the months during which tension between Somali warlords and UN troops was of great concern, the Somali militia also ambushed two checkpoints controlled by Italian soldiers. On 2 July 1993, militiamen and civilians, supported by snipers, launched attacks against checkpoints Ferro and Pasta in which three soldiers were killed. General Bruno Loi, the Ibis commander, stressed that, when the attacks began, Italian troops were extremely well supported by armoured vehicles, heavy guns and helicopters. However, he added,

> we could not open fire against civilians despite the fact that gunmen were hiding among the crowd. With the kind of support we had we could have killed a huge number of people. We did not want that. We did not hesitate to use our guns when we identified isolated snipers. In this situation conscripts behaved in an excellent way, always keeping calm and under control. They fully understood the meaning of the mission.[23]

In the hours that followed, the headquarters of the United Nations Operation in Somalia ordered Loi to take back the checkpoints that had fallen under Somali control, yet the Italian general was adamant about avoiding further senseless deaths. With Rome's approval, Loi successfully negotiated with

Somali elders in the area, and on 9 July the Italians regained control of Pasta and Ferro. Loi's decision was severely criticized by UN officials. However, it did not take long to understand that in peace operations a strong emphasis must be placed on 'diplomatic' instruments before the implementation of full military options. The entire period of deployment in Somalia, and the events of July in particular, were an important test for the Italian conscripts, who proved that they possessed the military skills that allowed them to perform combat duties properly when under attack, without excessive use of force.[24]

At the end of 1992, after playing a significant role in the peace process in Mozambique,[25] Rome agreed to send an army brigade to this southeast African country, to be deployed as part of the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ). For decades, the situation in Mozambique had been one of conflict between the ruling party FRELIMO and the opposition party RENAMO. At the end of the 1980s, the Archbishop of Beira, Jaime Gonçalves, successfully promoted a peace process, based on mediation, between the two factions; the positive outcome of this process was consolidated in November 1990 with the Treaty of Rome. The Italian ambassador in Maputo, Manfredo Incisa di Camerana, was appointed director of the Joint Verification Commission, which included representatives from RENAMO, the Mozambique government, Italy and nine other states.

The Italian participation in ONUMOZ, code-named Albatross, comprised 1,000 troops, of whom 70% were conscripts.[26] ONUMOZ received little media coverage: media attention was focused on the dramatic events in Somalia, while troops deployed in Mozambique performed their duties in such a manner that major incidents were avoided. The tasks of the soldiers of Albatross were to protect the Beira–Chimoio railway link between Mozambique and Zimbabwe, to cover truck convoys and to secure oil facilities. Considering the immediate outcome and the relative stability of Mozambique to this day, ONUMOZ was a successful mission. For Rome, it was a further demonstration that conscripts could be considered the most positive element of Italian participation in PSOs.

However, in mid-1995, the Italian armed forces began a transformation of their recruiting system. The idea that professional soldiers were better peacekeepers also began to gain momentum: during Operation Alba in Albania in 1997, the proportion of conscripts was about 20%, but the entire Italian military contingent deployed in Bosnia from 1995 onwards has been composed of professionals. More recently, 600 professional Italian soldiers joined INTERFET, the UN International Force East Timor mission. In October 2000, Rome finally decided to 'suspend' conscription, so that by 2008 the Italian armed forces would be smaller in size, better equipped and completely composed of professional soldiers.[27]

Assessing the Contribution of Italian Conscripts to Peace Support Operations

Over the 20 years that Italy has been involved in peace missions, conscripts have clearly played a key role. In Beirut, Mogadishu, Maputo and Tirana, under different mandates, the performance of conscripts was extremely good. Marianne Heiberg and Johan Jørgen Holst, in their comparative study of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the MNF, observed that 'the extreme restraint which UNIFIL has generally exercised with regard to the use of force has often resulted in frustration and bitterness among soldiers who are trained in the offensive spirit of traditional military operations. Conscripts often seem to manage the peacekeeping tactics better than professional soldiers.'[28] As Fabrizio Battistelli wrote, this 'organisational backwardness [conscription] helped the Italian military to meet the demand on it for soldiers to perform its post-modern missions'[29] – and with positive results. An explanation can be found in the motivation of conscripts who join PSOs.

At the same time, it must be taken into consideration that modern 'mass' armies normally develop a distinct, and possibly 'soft', military culture. US Air Force Lieutenant-Colonel Karen Dunivin has stated that 'military culture is characterized by its combat, masculine-warrior (CMW) paradigm. First, the military's core activity, which defines its very existence and meaning, is *combat*. Military structures and forces are built around combat activities.... The second element of the military's culture paradigm is the *masculine-warrior* image.'[30] In mass armies, conscripts represent an important element of civil society, and while they accept military organization during the period in which they serve, they do not develop a strong 'warfighting' ethos and probably never consider themselves warriors or combatants. As a result, they find it easier to establish spontaneous and effective contacts with the local populations in PSOs. General Michael Harbottle has emphasized that conscripts were able to establish good relations with local populations since their civilian background made it 'natural' for them to relate to their counterparts in the community in which they had been deployed: 'This particular advantage can pay dividends and was very evident in Cyprus where UNFICYP [United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus] detachments were deployed throughout the island, in town and villages. The affinity was something which the professional, despite his undoubted qualities, could not match; for it is not normally a quality acquired on the parade ground or at staff colleges.'[31]

It has been written that the Italian soldier is considered by many to be the 'best peacekeeper',[32] but the truth is that, so far, the motivation for Italian soldiers has been different from that of other colleagues. For Italian conscripts, joining a peacekeeping mission was an opportunity to receive compensation greater than what they would have received in any job performed by civilians

of the same age.[33] It was also an opportunity for having an uncommon experience or, to put it bluntly, an adventure.[34]

These two elements are determined by the fact that the reference group for conscripts is their civilian peers. With these motivations, the 'affinity' emphasized by Harbottle and good military/peacekeeping training, conscripts perform well in PSOs. They do not get trapped in the logic of 'friend or foe', since they do not see the use of force as the natural approach of soldiers/peacekeepers when faced with life-threatening situations. Conscripts are more enthusiastic than professional soldiers when performing humanitarian tasks. According to Harbottle, a conscript

> does have two significant advantages which fit him admirably for peacekeeping responsibility. He is a volunteer who has made a formal undertaking to serve a specified number of tours on peacekeeping operations for periods of six months at a time. His, then, is a voluntary commitment. But more important, he is a civilian in uniform and enjoys a much closer affinity to the local population than his professional opposite numbers, because at home he is one of them in terms of employment – a factory worker, farmer and smallholder, chemist, village shopkeeper, garage hand. This makes it natural for him to relate to his counterparts in the community where his peacekeeping duties take him.[35]

The best composition for peacekeeping units, therefore, is one in which both professionals and conscripts participate: a warrior together with 'probably a called-up reservist who has completed his conscript commitment'.[36] Professionals provide an important mix of training, experience and discipline, which are important factors in the well-organized conduct of operations. Conscripts, who have civilian backgrounds and a range of interests quite different from that of professional soldiers, can offer significant additional skills to military leaders.

Peace support operations over the last decade have demonstrated how important the role played by soldiers/peacekeepers is at all levels. The behaviour of soldiers and junior officers has often been crucial in determining the outcomes of various missions. When dealing with civilians, a very strict military approach has been shown to be counterproductive. One of the most difficult tasks for peacekeepers today is to understand, and deal properly with, different cultures. Training must not be the only response to this need. Peacekeepers who can best deal with different cultures are those who have civil society as a reference group. These do not consider their institutional belonging, being part of the army, as a barrier to relations with the 'outside world'.

Italian conscripts participating in PSOs have played a significant role in establishing good relations with locals. The most notable case was the creation of Radio Ibis in Mogadishu in the early months of Operation Restore Hope. The spontaneous creation of the radio station came about because of the desires of the military personnel of the Italian contingent, who were forced to spend a significant part of their time inside a compound, to establish a contact with the 'outside world'. The station began broadcasting thanks to several

conscripts who had previous experience working for small radio stations in Italy. Despite limited technical support, Radio Ibis managed to reach a large number of people, and it immediately became clear how popular and important this instrument was when even Somalis began broadcasting on the same station. The impact of Radio Ibis, with its qualities of improvisation and spontaneity, was far greater than that of a similar, but more professional, initiative undertaken by the Joint Psychological Operations Task Force of UNITAF (United Task Force in Somalia) in Mogadishu.

Finally, the presence of conscripts in the Italian armed forces has been vital in preventing the creation of an aggressive military culture in which 'combat, masculine-warrior' elements are strong. From the end of World War II, the conscription period was gradually reduced until it lasted for only ten months. This period is just about enough to train a soldier, but certainly not enough to create a 'warrior'. Thus, civilian features remain strong among conscripts. At the same time, the fact that NCOs and commissioned officers have had to deal with civilians in uniform, who also rotated frequently, has prevented the Italian armed forces from developing a tough and aggressive military culture. Military leaders at all levels have dealt with different generations of civilians, who have brought their era's values and culture into the armed forces.

Following Rome's recent decision to 'suspend' conscription, the Italian example has become a valuable test case. It will enable us to understand how important conscripts have been and to see how Italian military culture will change when the armed forces are formed only of professionals. It is crucial for Italy to continue its commitment in the area of international humanitarian intervention, so that the professional soldiers understand that peace support work is a higher priority than the traditional 'defence of national borders'.

Conclusion

Throughout the 1990s, intense debates over conscripted and professional armed forces developed in several European countries. Spain, France, and Italy have opted for abolishing or suspending conscription. These decisions were taken as a result of strong social pressure and clear military preferences. With the end of the Cold War, it has become increasingly difficult to ask young men to spend a year of their life training for a war that appears more and more unlikely. At the same time, it has become clear that the key features of future wars will be those of recent limited conflicts, where the main requirements were focused on high technology, rapid reaction and professionalism; such requirements would severely challenge conscript armed forces.

These valid considerations do not, however, take into account the new roles of the military, and particularly its increasing involvement in PSOs, which has

often produced a need to deploy peacekeepers, not warriors. If participation in PSOs is to continue to be one of the key roles of the military, it is important to identify conditions that can lead to success. It is not enough to conclude that an exclusive focus on combat training is inadequate, if not inappropriate. The whole debate on conscription and professionalism should be seen in the context of the new military tasks, since it is military cultures themselves, in which the combat ethos may be more or less dominant, that can determine the results of PSOs. Stephen Ryan advocated a deeper investigation of this context in order to understand 'why certain contingents in certain locations seem better at peacekeeping than others'.[37] Answering this question is a great challenge considering the diversity of states and military cultures that have contributed to PSOs. What is clear, however, is that the argument based on the strong performance of conscripts in PSOs cannot be easily dismissed. And this is not only because many senior officers in different situations have praised conscripts for their contribution to peacekeeping tasks, but also because the Italian case shows strong evidence of the positive contribution of conscripts in peace missions.

To conclude, however, that conscription per se is the only answer would make this analysis a superficial one. It is interesting to note that, for decades, the great majority of young people in Italy accepted conscription reluctantly. The more educated they were, the more they perceived compulsory service as a waste of time. But, when conscripts were offered the possibility of participating in PSOs, the majority started to see conscription in a different light. Several other factors in the Italian case ensured that the participation of conscripts in PSOs has been positive. First, since the end of the World War II, Italy's military culture was formed by a popular army in which the combat ethos remained low. This situation was born out of Italian society's reaction to the Fascist culture, in which militaristic factors were overemphasized. Second, Italian soldiers have acted according to their perception of Italy's role in international affairs – the role of a medium power with limited aims. Finally, an important point has been the social composition of the Italian armed forces. Since the 1980s, fewer young people avoided conscription, so the Italian armed forces became representative of a broad variety of social segments; this situation indeed helped to create a unique spirit in which different cultural backgrounds merged. Regretfully, to this day there are no studies about the implications of this situation on Italy's military culture, but it is quite clear that the coexistence of different cultural views became one of the strengths of Italy's armed forces, distinguishing its military culture from those based on 'combat, masculine-warrior' elements.

This distinction has been particularly evident in PSOs. Analysis of the Italian case shows that the most successful peacekeepers have been those who found their motivations mostly in the civilian sphere and not primarily in the military culture. This leads to the conclusion that professionals, even with the

most advanced and fine-tuned training, are not necessarily better than conscripts. There are certainly many peculiarities in the Italian experience. In fact, it is only in the last few years that the Italian armed forces have discovered the need to adopt a more formal approach to PSOs and to possibly develop a doctrine. Therefore, the Italian case cannot be put forward without qualification as a model for peacekeeping force composition. However, what this analysis does suggest is that more investigation is required to understand which aspects of different military cultures can offer the best combination of motivations to make successful peacekeepers.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

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1 According to Philip Wilkinson, PSO 'was a term first used by the military to cover both peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, but it is now used more widely to embrace in addition those other peace-related operations which include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacebuilding and humanitarian assistance'. See Philip Wilkinson, 'Sharpening the Weapons of Peace: Peace Support Operations and Complex Emergencies', in Tom Woodhouse & Oliver Ramsbotham, eds, *Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution* (London: Frank Cass, 2000), pp. 63–79, on p. 71. A detailed description of PSOs is provided in John Mackinlay, ed., *A Guide to Peace Support Operations* (Providence, RI: Brown University, 1996).

2 Brett Litz, a psychologist at the Behavioural Science Division of the National Center for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, Department of Veterans Affairs, Boston, MA, maintained that 'on the one hand, peacekeeping, in principle, requires observation and monitoring of politically guaranteed peace accords. Peacekeepers in this rather ideal context are like an impartial and neutral police force, a role that can be at odds with the combat soldier's ethic. On the other hand, as repeatedly demonstrated in practice, peacekeepers are exposed to ongoing, unpredictable and uncontrollable life-threat akin to a special type of warzone. Peacekeeping under these circumstances requires both the offensive and defensive capability of trained combat soldiers. However peacekeeping under tenuous and dangerous conditions also requires impartiality, neutrality, and a great deal of patience and restraint, qualities that are not typically endorsed in the doctrine of military affairs. Clearly then a key psychological demand of peacekeeping is role conflict.' See Brett Litz, 'The Psychological Demands of Peacekeeping for Military Personnel', *Clinical Quarterly*, Winter 1996, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 2–8, on p. 7.

3 Michael Williams, 'Civil–Military Relations and Peacekeeping', Adelphi Paper no. 321 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 71–72. Williams stated that 'appropriate military education and training is essential if peace support is to be effective.... Greater emphasis should be placed on the "softer" aspects of military science – managing

resources, civilian control, human rights – while maintaining adequate technical warfighting skill' (p. 72).

4 Christopher Dandeker & James Gow, 'Military Culture and Strategic Peacekeeping', in Erwin Schmidl, ed., *Peace Operations Between War and Peace* (London, Frank Cass, 2000), pp. 58–79, on p. 64.

5 Fabrizio Battistelli, Teresa Ammendola & Maria Grazia Galantino, 'The Fuzzy Environment and Postmodern Soldiers: The Motivations of the Italian Contingent in Bosnia', in Schmidl (note 4 above), pp. 138–160, on p. 138.

6 John Mackinlay, 'Improving Multifunctional Forces', *Survival*, vol. 36, no. 3, Autumn 1994, pp. 149–173, on pp. 157–158.

7 John Whiteclay Chambers II, 'Conscription', in Trevor N. Dupuy, ed., *International Military and Defense Encyclopedia* (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1993), p. 640.

8 According to Brett Litz, 'historically, there has not been much apparent need for considering the psychological demands of peacekeeping'. See Litz (note 2 above), p. 3.

9 Michael Rose, *Fighting for Peace: Lessons from Bosnia* (London: Warner, 1998), p. 271.

10 Walter Clarke & Jeffrey Herbst, 'Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 75, no. 2, March–April 1996, pp. 70–85, on p. 74.

11 Michael Rose, 'The Bosnia Experience', in Ramesh Thakur, ed., *Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain* (London: Macmillan, 1998), pp. 135–146, on p. 139.

12 Dandeker & Gow (note 4 above, p. 64) emphasized that 'the deployment of Canadian paratroopers in Somalia in 1994 shows how serious the consequences can be – for Somali society, the reputation of the Canadian military and Canada's civil–military relations – when a unit equipped with an exaggerated warfighting ethos is inserted into an operation for which such an orientation was inappropriate'.

13 Tamara Duffey, 'Cultural Issues in Contemporary Peacekeeping', in Woodhouse & Ramsbotham (note 1 above), pp. 142–168, on p. 147.

14 The deployment of MNF II began in September 1982 and ended in February 1984. In August 1983, Rome had deployed 2,000 troops in Beirut, of whom 1,594 were conscripts.

15 Marianne Heiberg & Johan Jørgen Holst, 'Peacekeeping in Lebanon: Comparing UNIFIL and the MNF', *Survival*, vol. 28, no. 5, September/October 1986, pp. 399–421, on p. 411.

16 Duffey (note 13 above), p. 150.

17 Richard Nelson, 'Multinational Peacekeeping in the Middle East and the United Nations Model', *International Affairs*, vol. 61, no. 1, Winter 1984–85, pp. 67–89, on p. 76.

18 Operation Pelican lasted from 17 September 1991 to 3 December 1993.

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25 The peace process in Mozambique was examined in Roberto Morozzo della Rocca, *Mozambico: Dalla guerra alla pace* [Mozambique: From War to Peace] (Milan: Edizioni San Paolo, 1994); and in Stephen Chan & Moises Vanancio, *War and Peace in Mozambique* (London: Macmillan, 1998).
26 ONUMOZ had a total authorized strength of about 7,000 troops. Operation Albatross lasted from 5 January 1993 to 30 April 1994.
27 By 2008, the Italian armed forces should number 190,000, while currently they total 280,000. It is still uncertain, however, whether it will be possible to achieve this target.
28 Heiberg & Holst (note 15 above), on p. 415.
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