

# Long-term bandwagoning and short-term balancing: the lessons of coalition behaviour from 1792 to 1815

DANIEL J. WHITENECK

**Abstract.** Recent literature in International Relations has argued that the absence of ‘balancing’ behaviour by European states during the Napoleonic Wars from 1798 to 1815 calls into question current explanations for the presence or absence of such behaviour in international relations. This literature has argued that: (1) Napoleonic France presented a significant threat to the stability of the international system; (2) European states did not balance against this threat from 1798 to 1813, and subsequently balanced only after Napoleon’s defeat in Russia in 1812; (3) members of the system possessed adequate power to balance successfully against this threat; and (4) since European states engaged in co-opting, rewarding, avoiding, or bandwagoning behaviour towards the French threats to the system, a new explanation for the absence of balancing behaviour is required. Each of these four points can be refuted by: taking a longer time perspective of the international system during the period in question, expanding state motives to include interests other than security, using a long cycle model of coalition leadership by a global leader, recognizing the constraints faced by European states in their choices of balancing or bandwagoning behaviour under threats from France, and taking into account the role of innovation and change in a period of global war.

## 1. Introduction

Do coalitions naturally occur among states in a multipolar system when one state threatens the stability of the *status quo*? What holds together a coalition in such a system? How can we explain the behaviour of states which, faced with a security threat, choose not to balance against that threat? These questions, as well as others, have been raised in articles by Paul Schroeder in many historical articles and in his work, *The Transformation of European Politics 1763–1848*, and by political scientists like Randall Schweller and Richard Rosecrance and Chih-Cheng Lo in the December 1996 issue of the *International Studies Quarterly*.<sup>1</sup> Rosecrance and Lo, in ‘Balancing, Stability, and War: The Mysterious Case of the Napoleonic International System’, argue that the absence of balancing behaviour by European states in the face of security threats by Napoleonic France seriously diminishes the theoretical validity of traditional ‘balance of power’ maxims; that in the face of

<sup>1</sup> Randall Schweller, ‘Bandwagoning for Profit’, *International Security*, 19:1 (1994). Randall Schweller, ‘New Realist Research on Alliances: Refining, Not Refuting, Waltz’s Balancing Proposition’, *American Political Science Review*, 91:4 (1997). Paul Schroeder, ‘Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory’, *International Security*, 19:1 (1994). Paul Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics 1763–1848* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994). Richard Rosecrance and Chih-Cheng Lo, ‘Balancing, Stability, and War: The Mysterious Case of the Napoleonic International System’. *International Studies Quarterly*, 40:4 (1996).

overwhelming threats, states are just as likely to bandwagon, or 'hide', as to balance.<sup>2</sup>

This article offers: (1) a different historical interpretation of the period in question, one that does not separate out the specific Napoleonic Era as unique, but grounds it within a larger historical perspective of the period of global warfare; (2) an explanation for the coalition behaviour of European states beyond balancing or bandwagoning for security interests; and (3) a more general statement about coalition creation and leadership by Great Britain presaging the rise of the Pax Britannica of the nineteenth century.

A perspective that looks at the global wars from 1792 to 1815 as a part of a larger process, allows us to see a long-term trend of states bandwagoning with the global leader in the face of a strong challenge to the evolving system. Great Britain's leadership of five coalitions against France from 1793 to 1815 was the culmination of an evolutionary process that had begun in the middle of the 1700s. Evolutionary theories in the social sciences rely on an examination of myriad forces at work in a system as it changes through innovation, competition, and learning.<sup>3</sup> Coalitions are the vehicles for selecting and retaining those innovations which solve global problems, and then promoting them to the larger group of states in the world system. Evolutionary theories acknowledge the role of long-term consequences and foresight in solving global problems.<sup>4</sup> In global politics this long-term process takes years, as states put forward solutions to problems generated by systemic changes. States engage in intense political action, including coalition creation, to build support for their solutions. The survival of the solutions is tested in global wars, and the solutions are implemented after victory by the global leader. Axelrod has clearly demonstrated that, given time and experienced interaction among actors, learning and cooperation can take place among self-interested actors. Systems are capable of being transformed through the clustering and strengthening of cooperative actors.<sup>5</sup> Durable coalition creation over time is a characteristic of competitions among states vying for leadership. States have different sets of value priorities and causal assumptions about reaching them, and operate in a system that has a basic set of agreed-upon rules, a distribution of resources, a shared sense of fundamental sociocultural values, and a common recognition of the issue at stake. Deciding which actors will be partners or rivals depends not only on resources, but also on the extent to which values, and causal assumptions, are shared.<sup>6</sup>

Can coalitions survive over time to effect systemic changes under these circumstances? The existence of feedback on past interaction successes and the ability to gradually expand a coalition from a core group to other 'natural' allies, are important factors in coalition durability. Coalitions are created out of a number of possibilities through a process of bargaining in which all parties have likely had repeated interactions over many years in which learning can take place and

<sup>2</sup> Rosecrance and Lo, 'Balancing, Stability, and War', p. 497.

<sup>3</sup> George Modelski, 'Is World Politics Evolutionary Learning?', *International Organization*, 44:1 (1990) and 'Evolutionary Paradigm for Global Politics', *International Studies Quarterly*, 40:3 (1996).

<sup>4</sup> Jon Elster, *Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1989), pp. 42–51.

<sup>5</sup> Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic, 1984).

<sup>6</sup> Paul Sabatier, 'An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Change and the role of Policy-Oriented Learning Therein', *Policy Sciences*, 21:4 (1988), p. 132.

uncertainty can be reduced.<sup>7</sup> This process can take many years. States must share broad value priorities and policy objectives. They must reduce uncertainty by assessing past performances in alliances, trade relations, the conduct of war, and peace negotiations. States aspiring to leadership gradually accumulate partners in the solution of global problems as inclusion or exclusion from coalitions make apparent the costs and benefits available to states.

Instead of balancing power, coalitions that solve global problems are not merely 'minimum-winning'. To survive over time and accumulate enough power to move the system off equilibrium to a new paradigm, coalitions are formed where, '... the participants prefer the strongest possible alliance, that is, the one which gives the group the best chance of victory against the opposition'. Scott Flanagan summed up this framework in two questions; (1) which coalition is capable of winning? and (2) which coalition do potential members want to join?<sup>8</sup> These questions can cause states to rationally join larger than minimum-winning coalitions. Situations characterized by uncertainty and a lack of perfect information make it possible for states to join a large coalition as a guarantee. Such conditions characterize global warfare. During periods of global war, the use of new innovations (strategic and technological) also create conditions of uncertainty under which coalition decisions are made. Instead of looking strictly at the actions of states balancing against a threat to the stability of the European system, can we look at coalition decisions as a part of a whole; an element in an overall state strategy to achieve broader interests than just 'balancing'? States have preferences on issues from territorial security and integrity to domestic welfare and external trade. Their preferences are not fixed and are open to change as they respond to the evolving world system.

The common theme here is not power distribution but shared interests across the spectrum. At all levels of political activity, they are important to coalition creation. As the level increases, so too does the problem of the range of differences between the interests of actors, especially sovereign states. The solution to the problem is to generalize the shared interests and attitudes and to narrow the issues at stake to one or two that are of overriding concern. The success of this process rests with those who aspire to global leadership and their challengers.

The formation of coalitions that are durable and larger than minimum-winning is facilitated by the role of dominant actors, be they individuals, parties, or states. A dominant actor is one, '... without which a majority can not be formed ...',<sup>9</sup> and one that '... has ideological superiority over its rivals by creating and widening the consensus ...'.<sup>10</sup> In world politics, dominant actors are those states whose ascend-

<sup>7</sup> Mack Shelley, *The Permanent Majority: The Conservative Coalition in the United States Congress* (Birmingham: University of Alabama, 1983), p. 5 and John Kessel, *Presidential Campaign Politics: Coalition Strategies and Citizen Response* (Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press, 1980), p. 35. Matthew Laver and Nicholas Schofield, *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe* (New York: Oxford University Press 1990), p. 215.

<sup>8</sup> Jerome Chertkoff, 'Sociopsychological Theories and Research on Coalition Formation', in Sven Groennings (ed.), *The Study of Coalition Behaviour* (New York: Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1970). Scott Flanagan, 'Models and Methods of Analysis', in Scott Flanagan (ed.), *Crisis, Choice, and Change: Historical Studies of Political Development* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1973).

<sup>9</sup> Greg Luebbert, 'A Theory of Government Formation', *Comparative Political Studies*, 17:2 (1984), p. 247.

<sup>10</sup> Gary Goldberg, 'Patterns of Coalition Formation and Types of Party Systems', *Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies*, 8:2 (1983), p. 373.

ancy is based on creating consensus around solutions to global problems, who are able to attract allies because of their relatively open political, social, and economic systems, and who possess the politico-military power which makes them indispensable to achieving victory in global coalition warfare. Successful coalition leaders facilitate compromise among coalition members, develop a coalition culture of accommodation and consensus, and create a supranational elite that identifies with global interests as opposed to national interests.<sup>11</sup> This process can be implicit, especially when explicit arrangements are difficult to obtain or difficult to explain to particular constituencies. This leadership increases coalition legitimacy as it increases credibility and attracts partners who might otherwise not join. In world politics, legitimacy is difficult (if not impossible) to obtain. States are reluctant to compromise, make coalitions, or risk sovereignty and security. The acceptance by states of another state's objectives and methods when coalitions are created and global warfare is waged is essential to leadership in world politics.

## 2. The international system at the time of Napoleon

Rosecrance and Lo base their analysis of the international system in the period 1798–1815 on Schroeder's landmark 1994 book *The Transformation of European Politics 1763–1848*, noting that the bandwagoning behaviour dominated the statecraft of threatened powers during the Napoleonic Era.<sup>12</sup> The first point of contention is that the global wars which began in 1793 and lasted until 1815 can be seen as a whole, which cannot easily be separated into distinct conflicts dependent upon who was the leader of any particular state. Political scientists from across the spectrum of theoretical perspectives have made this case before. From realists and neorealists like Robert Gilpin, to economic determinists like Immanuel Wallerstein, to the long-cycle models of George Modelski and William Thompson there has been agreement that this was a hegemonic struggle which consumed the best part of a quarter-century.<sup>13</sup> They are supported in this reading by some historians of the period. Michael Broers holds that the idea of a France of 'natural frontiers' took hold during the Revolutionary Era and continued into the Napoleonic reign. Stuart Woolf argues that '... before Napoleon's coup, France's relationships with Europe had already been set'. 'The struggle between France and Great Britain dated back to long before the Revolution. Its imposition on the entire continent was a direct extension of France's determination to exploit France's military hegemony to open up markets for French manufactures'. And Christopher Hall writes that French threats to the Low Countries, beginning in 1793, were a key point for British

<sup>11</sup> Thomas Baylis, *Governing by Committee: Collegial Leadership in Advanced Societies* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1989).

<sup>12</sup> Rosecrance and Lo, 'Balancing, Stability, and War', p. 482.

<sup>13</sup> Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1981), Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System III: The Second Era of Great Expansion of the Capitalist World-Economy 1740–1830* (San Diego: Academic, 1984), Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987), George Modelski, *Long Cycles in World Politics* (Seattle, WA: University of Washington, 1987) provide ample support for this thesis from a range of perspectives. Each author points to this period of global warfare as a continuous struggle for hegemony/leadership which launched Great Britain into the Pax Britannica from 1815 to 1873.

involvement in continental warfare for the next twenty-two years.<sup>14</sup> The actions of European states must be assessed in the context of their actions throughout this entire period of warfare. At stake over this period was nothing less than the future of the world economy, the nature of governing relations in dominant states, the fate of colonies and dependent states around the globe, and the political-military leadership of the European-centred international system.

This period of warfare was preceded by dramatic changes in the agenda of world politics. The international system was being shaped by the Industrial Revolution, which prompted significant shifts in the economic, political, and military relations among states. The systemic change from mercantilism to commercial capitalism was being driven by a British-led trading community that spread from Europe to the Levant and North America from 1740 to 1794.<sup>15</sup> The differential impact of the revolution on the states in Europe resulted in Great Britain's dominance in the leading economic sectors of textiles, steam, and iron manufactures.<sup>16</sup>

States in Europe were responding to a threat first posed by Revolutionary France. The system was not 'stable', but evolving toward a new system. Which direction that evolution took was important to the interests of its member states. The 'liberator declaration' by the French Revolutionary 'Committee of 19' in November 1792 was accompanied by moves to open the Scheldt to commerce (in violation of the treaties ending the wars of Louis XIV), as well as efforts to liberate Holland. Faced with this aggression, Britain assembled a coalition which included Holland, Spain, Portugal, Naples, Hesse, and the original combatants against France, Prussia and Austria: in short, most of the states which were members of the trading community established over the previous fifty years. French innovations and abilities to mobilize mass armies in France and in occupied territories added a new dimension to European warfare. The responses of other powers would have to be innovations of such a nature as to counteract the French advantage. These innovations would have to happen during a global struggle between European powers mindful of their precarious positions and long-standing conflicting continental interests. The innovations included the enhanced role of debt and finance played by the Bank of England to finance British and allied war efforts, integrated allied commands, amphibious warfare on a continental scale with mass armies, and maintaining new trading relations as the war raged alongside the changes brought by the Industrial Revolution.

Rosecrance and Lo conclude that Britain, Russia, and other European states threatened by France possessed a decisive advantage in power resources, that France posed an unambiguous threat to the stability of Europe, and that the military-technical environment favoured strategic defensive dominance (which should lead to defensive balancing behaviour). Under these conditions, traditional balancing

<sup>14</sup> Michael Broers, *Europe Under Napoleon 1799–1815* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), p. 13. Stuart Woolf, *Napoleon's Integration of Europe* (New York: Routledge Press, 1991), pp. 19 and 31. Christopher Hall, *British Strategy in the Napoleonic War 1803–1815* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), pp. 83–5.

<sup>15</sup> Daniel Whiteneck, 'Epistemic Communities and Global Leadership in World Politics: Great Britain and the Liberal Trading Community 1740–1792', *Journal of World-Systems Research*, 2 (1996).

<sup>16</sup> Francois Crouzet, 'The Sources of England's Wealth: Some French Views in the 18th Century', in P. L. Cottrell and D. H. Aldcroft (eds.), *Shipping, Trade, and Commercial Essays in Memory of Ralph Davis* (Leicester: Leicester University, 1981), and Fernand Braudel, *The Perspective of the World: Civilization and Capitalism 15th–18th Century* (New York: Harper and Row, 1984), p. 566.

behaviour should have occurred, but, according to the authors, no such behaviour took place. It is this mystery that Rosecrance and Lo seek to explain.<sup>17</sup> France was at a decisive disadvantage in terms of power resources. In addition to the figures on the distribution of global warships, men under arms, and *per capita* levels of industrialization, one can cite ‘hard power’ sources such as a superior ability to raise revenues for war fighting and coalition support, greater access to global wealth and colonial support, and the ability to convert technological innovations in steam and iron manufactures into military advantages. There was also a ‘soft power’ advantage for Britain. The British did not threaten the territorial and political integrity of European states. They had demonstrated past coalition leadership in the global wars against Louis XIV, and throughout the 1700s. Their relatively more democratic political system attracted the attention of potential continental allies and admirers like Montesquieu and Voltaire. Any strategic defensive advantage for Britain and her allies was limited and difficult to implement because of the political and geographic landscapes of Europe. Rosecrance and Lo argue that Britain’s seapower ‘could best use its energies peripherally or in a blockade’ and its financial power ‘could have bankrolled Napoleon’s enemies and supported their armaments and troops’. This is exactly what Britain did for 22 years between 1792 and 1815.<sup>18</sup> For the same period of time, the French governments were able to take advantage of interior lines of communication and transportation, newly conquered resources, and innovations such as the *levée en masse*. The politics and economics of coalitions, though superior in potential resources, were pitted against the centralization and direction of a single threat. The politics of coalition had to overcome long-standing political and territorial differences among potential members (that is, Russia and Prussia, The Italian States and the Hapsburg Empire).

France did pose the only significant threat to the stability and security of other European states. But it was more than a security threat posed by the France ruled by Napoleon. France was a challenger for global leadership in every realm. It offered a political model that was revolutionary and destabilizing to continental states. The governments of both Revolutionary and Napoleonic France took repeated economic actions that disrupted the emerging liberal trading community created by Britain and its continental partners.<sup>19</sup> In more traditional security interests, France’s actions in the Low Countries, and on its eastern borders, threatened the carefully crafted territorial, dynastic, and political arrangements that had been the result of the Wars from 1688–1713, 1741–48, and 1756–63.<sup>20</sup> The idea of a French ‘natural hegemony’ in Western Europe was at the core of the last generation-long conflict in Europe, the

<sup>17</sup> Rosecrance and Lo, ‘Balancing, Stability, and War’, p. 482.

<sup>18</sup> George Modelski and William Thompson, *Seapower and Global Politics 1494–1993* (Seattle, WA: University of Washington, 1988), p. 71; and George and Sylvia Modelski, *Documenting Global Leadership* (Seattle, WA: University of Washington, 1987), p. 280 and Joseph Wiener, *Great Britain: Foreign Policy and the Span of Empire 1689–1971, A Documentary History* (New York: Chelsea, 1972), p. 200.

<sup>19</sup> Simon Schama, *Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1989), p. 184; Ernst Heckscher, *The Continental System: An Economic Interpretation* (Gloucester, UK: Peter Smith, 1964), p. 22 and Richard Bentley, *The Journal and Correspondence of William, Lord Auckland* (London: Private, 1861), p. 300.

<sup>20</sup> Peter Mackesy, ‘British Diplomacy and the French Wars 1789–1815’, in H. T. Dickinson (ed.), *Britain and the French Revolution 1789–1815* (London: Macmillan, 1989); Modelski and Modelski, *Documenting Global Leadership* p. 254 and Joseph Wiener, *Great Britain: Foreign Policy and the Span of Empire*, p. 152.

wars of Louis XIV from 1688 to 1713. This idea was not born with Napoleon, and opposition to it was not the creation of wartime governments in London and St. Petersburg. The France of 'natural frontiers' envisaged by the Revolutionaries of 1792 was little different from that envisaged by Napoleon in 1799 and Louis in 1688. All were unacceptable to the other major powers in Europe.

### 3. History

At the heart of the theories about bandwagoning and hiding and balancing during the Napoleonic Wars is the history of the period. If it can be demonstrated that the behaviour of European states was determined, not by a choice to side with France for potential gain or to sit out the surrounding warfare in the hope of picking up the rewards later, but that the behaviour was determined after threats, bullying, and defeats in battle, then the theory of bandwagoning with France is weakened. Political scientists, like Rosecrance and Lo, rely heavily on Schroeder's landmark work to buttress their arguments. I believe that Schroeder's own timelines from his work, and the work of others, can be interpreted to give a different reading of the actions of French aggression, British coalition-building, and the behaviour of threatened continental states. This ambiguity calls into question the conclusions that are reached by Schroeder and by others.

Schroeder deals with the First Coalition (1792–97) led by Great Britain by arguing that France was militarily weak and had lost all its main allies and influence in Europe.<sup>21</sup> According to Schroeder, when French innovations in military power and resource mobilization became felt on the battlefield after 1793, other states in Europe started to bandwagon or avoid conflict.<sup>22</sup> On the contrary, it was French conquest of the Low Countries and the Rhine territories, the defeat of Austrian forces, and heavy losses suffered by Prussia that led to the break-up of the First Coalition. And even after this stunning military revolution, when France threatened Spain, Spain did not choose to bandwagon. Spain was given the choice of 'join or die', not a choice but an act of submission to a coercive act by an aspiring hegemon. Stuart Woolf concludes, 'if France proved unable to achieve peace because of her continuously expanding ambitions, her enemies were equally incapable of defeating her decisively'. He is supported by Michael Broers who found that French hegemonic aspirations of 1792–94 were inseparable from Napoleon's conception of hegemony in 1799. Charles Ingrao argues that the First Coalition's failure to stop the French bid for hegemony was a result of the French revolution in ideology and on the battlefield, while the allies were busily fighting the wars of 1763. This is a perfect explanation of the conflicting powers that each side brought to bear in the war. French innovations in mass armies and ideological warfare supported an ambitious drive to extend its 'natural frontiers', while British naval supremacy could not defeat such massive land power, and continental allied armies had not yet made the adjustments to mass armies and the financial resources to support these would not be available for some years to come. Broers argues that Prussia quit the war in

<sup>21</sup> Schroeder, 'Historical Reality', p. 121.

<sup>22</sup> Schroeder, *Transformation of European Politics*, p. 150.

1793 after suffering losses in the Low Countries and the Rheinland. Such a decision was not based on the desire to bandwagon with France or 'hide' from the conflict, but was a reaction to the actual warfare already taking place.<sup>23</sup>

The Second Coalition, lasting from 1798 to 1802, was mobilized by the British and included, Austria, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire. Did Prussia bandwagon? Schroeder describes the German territory as a 'power vacuum', with the minor states near the Rhine, 'subject to French exploitation'. There is no evidence that Prussia sided with France or accepted side payments to hide. Prussia was still reeling from its defeats of five years earlier. It had barely begun to rebuild after the wars from 1756 to 1763, and a generation later it was being asked to once again bear the brunt of fighting a major war. It had not yet adapted its professional army to the new innovations sparked by the French *levée en masse*, and was not to do so until nearly the end of the Napoleonic Wars. The fate of Austria in the Second Coalition was decided by the Battle of Marengo in June of 1800. This was followed by the French victory at Hohenlinden in 1801. Austria's defeat led it to ask for an armistice resulting in the Convention of Alessandria.<sup>24</sup> The presence of French troops 40 miles from Vienna was an added incentive for the Austrians to accept the French offer 'under the gun'. Britain attempted to deal with this situation by redirecting trade and economic benefits to Hamburg (Prussia) and Trieste (Austria) with significant results.<sup>25</sup> The British were trying to exercise coalition leadership at this time by brokering a deal between Austria, Prussia, and Russia on the issue of Poland. The break-up of the coalition owes much to this negotiation, rather than any actions by France to split up the coalition. Also in 1800 Russia abandoned war with France, not because it was offered anything by France, but because in Schroeder's words, '... this volte-face, to be sure, owed much to Paul's violent and erratic impulses'. Paul's assassination in 1801 ended all hopes of an alliance with France, while Alexander's ascension to the throne ushered in a time of internal reforms and withdrawal from the wars of Europe. Reactions by Spain and Portugal to French actions on the Iberian Peninsula are also rooted in conquest, not in side payments or threats. France carried Spain with her on the Portuguese conquest because Napoleon offered Spain the same choice of 'join or die' that had been offered by Revolutionary France. The hegemonic aims of the two governments were not dissimilar from those of Louis XIV a century earlier. This is not a free choice for bandwagoning. Portugal quickly sued for peace once it had been invaded, not when offered side payments to leave the British alliance.<sup>26</sup>

The Treaty of Amiens in 1802 that followed this spate of Napoleonic empire-building was desired by both parties as they sought to consolidate their gains, France in Europe and Britain overseas.<sup>27</sup> This treaty was doomed, so long as

<sup>23</sup> Woolf, *Napoleon's Integration of Europe*, p. 19 and Broers, *Europe Under Napoleon*, pp. 13–14. Charles Ingraio, 'Paul W. Schroeder's Balance of Power', *The International History Review*, 16:4 (1994), p. 700.

<sup>24</sup> Jeremy Black, *European Warfare, 1660–1815* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 184. Broers, *Europe Under Napoleon*, p. 29.

<sup>25</sup> Francois Crouzet, 'Wars, Blockade, and Economic Change in Europe 1792–1815', *Journal of Economic History*, 24:3 (1964) and Wiener, *Great Britain: Foreign Policy and the Span of Empire*, p. 152.

<sup>26</sup> Schroeder, *Transformation of European Politics*, pp. 215–25.

<sup>27</sup> Wiener, *Great Britain: Foreign Policy and the Span of Empire*, and Peter Mackesy, *War Without Victory: The Downfall of Pitt 1799–1802* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984).



Napoleon followed a simple rule illustrated by the quote, 'Switzerland, so far as France is concerned, must be entirely French, like all countries on the borders of France'.<sup>28</sup> Napoleon backed this up with a military threat to invade Switzerland and a settlement was imposed on it in May 1802. This was rapidly followed by the annexation of Piedmont in September and the occupation of Parma in October. These actions effectively ended the peace of Amiens and the war with Britain resumed in May of 1803.<sup>29</sup> By this time, Austria has been exhausted by almost ten years of continuous warfare. It was too weak to face France on the front lines, even as part of coalition. The Iberian Peninsula was, in effect, occupied territory, as was Northern Italy, the Rheinland, Belgium, and Holland. Prussia remained a power '... solely by France's permission'.<sup>30</sup> Only Great Britain and Russia remained standing to face Napoleon and Russia was searching for ways to check French power. It is here that Britain and Russia were disadvantaged by geostrategic position and raw numbers of troops or ships were useless. Britain's weakness was that to deal with the French innovations and ability to mass armies on a continental scale, it must land a force large enough to fight a battle immediately. This was not technologically or logistically possible until 1944, given the resources available to a naval power. The other option was to work with continental allies to create a safe haven in Western Europe where a force of continental size could be massed to fight the French forces and drive them back inside French borders. Napoleon's conquest of the Low Countries and Iberia and Northern Italy made this impossible, until such time as Napoleon's Continental System created conditions ripe for British coalition-building in 1806. Russia's weakness was that it was at the other end of Europe from France and that it was hemmed in by suspicious smaller powers who were wary of granting it access to the heart of Europe to do battle with France. Russia's army may have been large, but it was technologically and logistically inferior to the armies of Western Europe and it could only carry on coalition warfare with help from Britain. Even under such conditions the British, Russians, and Austrians came together to fight Napoleon. British subsidies again induced Austrian cooperation and Russia agreed to a defensive alliance with Austria without extorting concessions to the East. France's victory at Ulm in 1805 started the alliance toward defeat for a third time. Vienna was occupied, with Russian forces arriving too late. The Russians gave battle in December but were defeated at Austerlitz. Napoleon's victory at Austerlitz in 1806 knocked Austria out, forcing her to sue for peace in the Treaty of Pressburg, and dealt a serious defeat to Russia.<sup>31</sup> Austria's defeat enabled Napoleon to bring the German states of Bavaria, Baden, and Wurttemberg into the French orbit. These states were not allies of France. Their rulers were, '... forced to collaborate in the Emperor's wars and to submit to his economic policies. This imperial system was a political, military, dynastic, and economic federation of very unequal states.'<sup>32</sup> France maintained its army in Central Germany, at German expense, confronting Prussia, '... with an overwhelming military threat, forcing it to choose between total dependence or fighting for its life'.<sup>33</sup> Faced with this the

<sup>28</sup> Schroeder, *Transformation of European Politics*, p. 233.

<sup>29</sup> Woolf, *Napoleon's Integration of Europe*, pp. 23–24.

<sup>30</sup> Schroeder, *Transformation of European Politics*, p. 238.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 289. Black, *European Warfare, 1660–1815*, p. 185.

<sup>32</sup> Woolf, *Napoleon's Integration of Europe*, pp. 26–7.

<sup>33</sup> Schroeder, *Transformation of European Politics*, p. 303.

Table 1. *Countries leaving British-led coalitions against France.*

Prussia	1793	Losses in Rheinland campaigns
	1800	Conflicts over Polish territorial split
	1806	Defeat at Battle of Jena
Austria	1800	Defeat in Northern Italy and Hohenlinden
	1806	Defeat at Battle of Austerlitz
Russia	1800	Ascension of Anglo-phobic Tsar Paul
	1807	Defeat at Battle of Friedland
Portugal	1801	Invasion and Occupation
Spain	1793	Threat of Invasion
	1801	Occupation

Prussians fought, only to be destroyed at the battle of Jena. Before Austerlitz and Jena the Prussians had been willing to side with the allies. After these crushing defeats the Prussians accepted their position as a satellite state within the French hegemony. Also in 1806, France threatened to annex the Batavian Republic, resulting in the ascension of Napoleon's brother to the throne, and Naples was conquered and a peace treaty signed putting Naples under the Napoleonic Empire.<sup>34</sup> All of these events managed to turn the Napoleonic gaze eastward and put Russia directly under the guns. Did Russia bandwagon? No, Russia was defeated at the Battle of Friedland in 1807, and it was only then that the Tsar concluded a humiliating peace to save the army and the country from revolt or dissolution. According to Black, 'Friedland had left the Russians so battered that they needed time to recoup losses and rebuild the army'. These defeats of Austria, Prussia and Russia were of a new order. They were not defeats of small professional armies of a few thousand, but were, as H.M. Scott notes, 'overwhelming defeat, after which further resistance was all but impossible.'<sup>35</sup>

These are examples, not of recruiting allies, building coalitions, offering side payments, or bullying. These are examples of aggression and conquest by an innovative and powerful challenger for global leadership. Napoleon was not aiming at hegemony in Western Europe, but replacing Great Britain as the dominant global power, using Europe as a power base.

Table 1 summarizes the text above by showing that, in the face of French aggression, five out of seven states went to battle rather than bandwagon. It was only after crushing defeats that these states signed treaties with France that removed them from anti-France coalitions or moved them into compliance with the Continental System imposed by Napoleon in 1807. Faced with the situation in 1807, Great Britain fought on almost alone, not through the free choice of other European powers, but through the use of force by one state challenging its global position. To make that challenge, France instituted a system which would guarantee its own destruction. The nature of the relationships between continental powers and Britain as the world leader and continental powers and France as a potential leader were illustrated by the Continental System. Schroeder acknowledges that the French

<sup>34</sup> Owen Connelly, *Blundering to Glory: Napoleon's Military Campaigns* (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1987), p. 94.

<sup>35</sup> Schroeder, *Transformation of European Politics*, p. 320. Black, *European Warfare, 1660–1815*, p. 185. Hall, *British Strategy in the Napoleonic Wars 1803–1815*, p. 81. H. M. Scott, 'Paul W. Schroeder's International System', *The International History Review*, 16:4 (1994), p. 677.

system was a ‘... vast experiment in colonialism within Europe ...’, founded on military power and economic exploitation. This is supported by Woolf’s assessment that the Continental System and the blockade, ‘... implied indefinite French presence across the Continent, until such time as the states and societies of Europe would recognize their debt to France by accepting its political and economic hegemony, and Great Britain would be forced to capitulate. Britain would be deprived of continental allies, not by their decision to bandwagon with France, but by their defeat and subjugation within the French-dominated system. Russia, the most powerful potential ally of Britain, ‘... had been forced to accept French domination of most of Europe at Tilsit on 1807’.<sup>36</sup> Without Russia, it would be difficult for Austria and Prussia to face France after all their past defeats.

This was in direct contrast to the liberal trading community that Britain had been building for fifty years. It was also in direct contrast to the British idea of a continent of independent, sovereign states, which Pitt had laid out in his first war message to Parliament back in 1793 and which had been at the heart of British continental policy for the past one hundred years.<sup>37</sup> Napoleon’s challenge led to political and economic rebellion almost immediately. By 1808, British armies were in place on the Iberian Peninsula. By the next year they had a foothold in Sicily. The commitment of British troops to continual land warfare in Europe was an important step in the creation of the coalition that would eventually end the French bid for hegemony. This helped reopen traditional trade routes and convince potential continental allies that Britain was determined to lead coalitions until Napoleonic France was back inside its 1793 borders.<sup>38</sup> Austria agreed to rearm with significant British subsidies and in 1809 Austria and Prussia declared war on France. Russia was still reeling from the defeat of 1807 and was unable to help the continental powers. France defeated them at Wagram in July of 1809 and imposed peace on them in the Treaty of Vienna. This was the last time that France was able to impose a peace settlement on the continental allies. It left France with two enemies still standing, Britain and Russia. France was unable to defeat the British on the Peninsula as Spain and Portugal returned to the British side. Britain’s commitment to a continental campaign with Wellington leading over 150,000 British troops paid off. Napoleon decided to knock Russia out of the war before dealing with Britain. He took his main armies out of Central Europe and headed east to deal with a Russia that was returning to the British side. The British-Russia axis, now with a favourable geostrategic position, was at the heart of the final coalition that defeated France.

#### 4. Alliance behaviour in the face of the threat

According to Rosecrance and Lo, Napoleon’s threat can be separated out from this larger struggle that had been waged since 1792–93. Between the overwhelming power

<sup>36</sup> Schroeder, *Transformation of European Politics*, p. 391. Woolf, *Napoleon’s Integration of Europe*, p. 25. Black, *European Warfare 1660–1815*, p. 186.

<sup>37</sup> Edward Aspinall and E. Anthony Smith, *British Historical Documents* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1957), p. 557.

<sup>38</sup> Hall, *British Strategy in the Napoleonic Wars 1803–1815*, pp. 77–81.

and side payments offered by Napoleonic France, continental states failed to balance. The behaviour of potential balancers from 1798 to 1813 is characterized as the outcome of a series of iterated dynamic games between the potential balancers and the aggressor. They conclude that the bandwagoning, co-opting, rewarding, or avoiding behaviour by balancers was the result of Napoleonic strategies of side payments and threats.<sup>39</sup> They argue that Schroeder's conclusions regarding bandwagoning, 'hiding', and 'transcending' behaviours offer a superior explanation to the traditional balancing arguments put forward. States in the Napoleonic Era did not balance against threat as predicted by Walt, or against power as predicted by neorealists like Waltz. They also did not balance against the 'desire to avoid losses' predicted by Schweller.<sup>40</sup>

Instead of a static game between two potential balancers (for example, Austria and Prussia) based on the classic Stag Hunt suggested by Jervis,<sup>41</sup> Rosecrance and Lo describe balancing behaviour under the Napoleonic system as a Stag Hunt game determined by the outcome of games between the aggressor and the potential balancers over time.<sup>42</sup> In traditional Stag Hunt, potential allies fail to form coalitions because their incentives not to cooperate result in individual gains which outweigh the costs of joining a coalition in an uncertain war and the sharing of rewards in the case of an uncertain victory.

In this altered game, the decision of a potential balancer to join a coalition or not, C or D, is affected over time by the victories of the aggressor which reinforce its threats, P, as well as by rewards, R, offered by the aggressor to the balancer for not joining the coalition. The preferences for the aggressor are therefore  $PD > RD > PC > RC$  and the preferences for the potential balancer are  $CR > DR > CP > DP$ . Repeated victories by the aggressor make any threats extremely likely to be carried out. According to the authors 'When the threat is extremely high ... nations wish to find a way out, if they can'. The success of Napoleonic France between 1798 and 1812 is then explained as the result of a number of dynamic games between balancers and aggressors where the offer of rewards for not joining British-led coalitions, combined with extremely high threats, lead to solutions where DR is the outcome. The authors explain that this was possible because it is a tolerable (authors' italics) outcome in the face of Napoleonic threat, the absence of a British presence on the continent, and the distribution of rewards to potential balancers with their own aspirations.<sup>43</sup>

Instead of a Stag Hunt game determined by the power and actions of the aggressor, I propose that the actions of Continental powers faced with the French threat were determined by the actions, not of the aggressor (France), but of the coalition leader (Great Britain). This hypothesis can be supported by the historical evidence of coalition warfare of the entire 1792–1815 period. When Great Britain's actions and policies are factored in, the preference ordering for a potential balancer becomes clear (Figure 2), and long-term balancing takes place against the French threat.

<sup>39</sup> Rosecrance and Lo, 'Balancing, Stability, and War', p. 490.

<sup>40</sup> Schroeder, *Transformation of European Politics*. Steven Walt, *The Origin of Alliances* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1987). Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979). Schweller, 'Bandwagoning'.

<sup>41</sup> Robert Jervis, 'Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma', *World Politics*, 30:1 (1978).

<sup>42</sup> Rosecrance and Lo, 'Balancing, Stability, and War', p. 493.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 491–6.

	Aggressor (France)	
	Offers to Reward	Threatens to Punish
	Balancer	Balancer
	R	P
Does Not Join Alliance	(3,3)	(2,4)
Balancer D Joins Alliance	(4,1)	(1,2)
C		

Figure 1. Game between aggressor and balancer without British leadership.

	Aggressor (France)	
	Offers to Reward	Threatens to Punish
	Balancer	Balancer
	R	P
Does Not Join Alliance	(3,3)	(1,4)
Balancer D Joins Alliance	(2,1)	(4,2)
C		

Figure 2. Game between aggressor and balancer with British leadership.

In the first game, Austria, or any continental power, does not have a dominant strategy, with both C and D being equal. If we hold the preferences of Austria and France equal and if we add Great Britain to the game then the payoffs for Austria and other potential continental powers change dramatically. Austria, as well as other continental powers, do have a dominant strategy historically, they oppose French hegemony and prefer joining a coalition led by Great Britain. The problem for the continental powers, other than Russia, is that they are weaker than France individually or in a non-British led coalition. Austria's strategy, and the strategy of other potential balancers is conditional: if Great Britain is actively engaged in opposing France, then the weaker continental powers will cooperate and balance; if Great Britain is not actively engaged in opposing France (despite what might be a formal state of war), then the weaker continental powers will hide.

Figure 2 represents a 'Force-Vulnerable Game' in the terminology of Rappoport and Guyer.<sup>44</sup> So long as the potential balancer perceives itself to be vulnerable to French punishment, it will not join the coalition, but when that vulnerability is reduced by the active participation of British coalition leadership in terms of money, material, and the commitment of naval and land forces, the potential balancer can choose to join the anti-French coalition. The outcome for the game now shifts from PD to PC. The dominant French strategy under Napoleon, as it was under Revolutionary France, was to threaten punishment, making a continental power play to the right side of the game. As the aggressive power France held the initiative

<sup>44</sup> Anatol Rappoport and Melvin Guyer, 'Taxonomy of 2x2 Games', *General Systems*, 2 (1966), pp. 203-13.

to choose to punish or reward, and a careful reading of the history of the entire period of warfare shows that France's hegemonic designs on the continent were clearly threatening to the interests of the states of Europe. What had changed was the relationship between the continental power and the leader of the coalitions opposing France. Great Britain's active leadership, providing subsidies and troops and naval power, not just promising them, changed the actions of the continental power. Where it was vulnerable to the force of France, the continental states had now increased their relative power position to France by joining the British coalition. Their vulnerability to French threats was thus reduced, enabling them to take risks. The actions of Austria and Prussia, Portugal, Russia, and Spain are made clearer when one adds Britain to the game.

The decisions of Continental states to engage in actions other than 'balancing' were transitory in nature and not part of a longer process of coalition creation by Great Britain to move the system toward a new structure of economic and political relationships. This is contrary to Schroeder's emphasis on bandwagoning by states in Europe going back and forth between French and British coalitions from 1792 to 1815, and it is supported by the history of the period.<sup>45</sup> If the actions of continental states took place before the threat of war, or before actual battles took place, the bandwagoning or hiding theories would be persuasive, but the record illustrates that the decisions of continental states to sign treaties with France against Britain took place after those states had suffered serious defeats at the hands of French forces. In other words, the actions of continental states were the actions of defeated powers (defeated for the moment), not the actions of states deciding to bandwagon for gain.

## **5. Coalitions: not just against Napoleonic France**

Rather than concentrating on the short-term security interests of states directly faced with imminent invasion and the loss of sovereignty, a broader perspective of coalitions and the conduct of global war focuses on the long-term process of creating new political and economic relationships to address the changes of the Industrial Revolution and the Enlightenment. It focuses on the leadership of Great Britain in fashioning new relationships to meet these problems and how this process created disequilibrium in the system. Alternative political, social, and economic arrangements were put forward by both Revolutionary and Napoleonic France. This process was a struggle for 'hegemony' or 'leadership'. Instead of a struggle lasting from 1798 to 1815, it lasted from 1750 to 1815. Indeed, one could say that the struggle had been waged in one way or another for over a century, dating back to the attempts of Louis XIV to impose a French 'natural hegemony' on Europe. Instead of a strictly European focus, it took place on a global scale, with regard to both economics and warfare. Instead of states facing choices limited to security and territory, states faced choices on security, territory, trade relations, economic development, and the very structure of domestic governments.

Great Britain's efforts to create new economic relationships in response to the changes of the Industrial Revolution resulted in bandwagoning behaviour. For fifty

<sup>45</sup> Schroeder, 'Historical Reality', p. 121.

years before the outbreak of the global wars of 1793–1815, the British fashioned trading arrangements with states throughout Europe. The trading community resulted in new economic relationships and resolved issues of inter-state relations regarding mercantilism, the breaking down of domestic monopolies, and closed colonial systems. Those agreements were built on a more liberal trading ideology emphasizing reciprocity, reduced tariffs, the expansion of merchant rights and power, and the use of the ‘most favoured nation’ (MFN) clause in commercial agreements.<sup>46</sup> The success of this trading community was such that by 1786 it accounted for 54 per cent of world trade and 73 per cent of European trade.<sup>47</sup>

At the same time, the British volume of trade was increasing by 67 per cent, its trade surplus was decreasing from 41 per cent to 28 per cent.<sup>48</sup> Destinations of British imports and exports also shifted to states that were members of the community.<sup>49</sup> Bandwagoning in such instances is the result of ‘the opportunity for gain’. While Schweller’s argument is in response to the security and balancing arguments of Stephen Walt, the basic argument that coalition choices can be motivated by rewards and not threats is a sound one. As Schweller put it; ‘When profit rather than security drives alliance choices, there is no reason to expect that states will be threatened or cajoled to climb aboard the bandwagon, they do so willingly’.<sup>50</sup>

It was this long term process of economic restructuring and coalition creation that was placed in jeopardy by the actions of French governments from 1792 to 1815. France, which had joined the trading community in the 1786 Eden Treaty, became a threat to the emerging political and economic relationships in 1792, not 1798. The actions of Revolutionary France cannot be separated from the actions of Napoleonic France with regard to their impacts on the continent of Europe and the global struggle for leadership of the system. Revolutionary France adopted anti-liberal economic policies that threatened the trading community Britain had laboured to create for fifty years. It pursued a new domestic political arrangement that served as an innovative role model that its government wanted other states to emulate. It pursued security policies that were expansionist on its borders in areas that had great geostrategic importance to Britain, the Netherlands, Austria, and the German States.

The economic policies of the new French government abrogated the Eden Treaty, increasing tariffs, price controls, property regulations, and the repression of the pro-liberal Girondists.<sup>51</sup> These actions within France were coupled with the French decision to open the river Scheldt to navigation and embargo all trade carried on by British nationals within France. The integrated economic system which the British had spent two generations creating (tying together the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, the Baltic, and North America) would be in danger if the nationalistic political and economic policies of Revolutionary France were to be extended throughout Western and Central Europe.<sup>52</sup>

<sup>46</sup> Whiteneck, ‘Epistemic Communities and Global Leadership’.

<sup>47</sup> Walt Rostow, *How it All Began: Origins of the Modern Economy* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975), p. 118.

<sup>48</sup> Aspinall and Smith, *British Historical Documents*, vol. 11, p. 491.

<sup>49</sup> E. B. Schumpeter, *English Overseas Trade Statistics* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1960), p. 17.

<sup>50</sup> Schweller, ‘Bandwagoning’, p. 79.

<sup>51</sup> Heckscher, *The Continental System*, p. 22.

<sup>52</sup> Crouzet, ‘Wars, Blockades, and Economic Change’, p. 567.

Other states in Europe were threatened by the domestic actions of the French government that might serve as a role model for destabilizing their own internal political arrangements. French decrees in 1792 offered support to revolutionary movements in other European states. European states which could support the far-away revolutionaries in the new United States were not ready to cede their own power. A Great Britain which could reach agreement with the government of George Washington and Alexander Hamilton and John Adams (Jay Treaty of 1794), could not find common ground with Robespierre and the Jacobins.

Geostrategically, French actions threatened long-held positions of Britain and other states. French moves into the Low Countries threatened British and Dutch interests that had been constant since the days of the Spanish Armada in 1588 and Louis XIV in 1688.<sup>53</sup> Britain's global naval role would have to be curtailed as it devoted more resources and power to the Channel and the North Sea and the Continent. Austria, which was using the Austrian Netherlands as an *entrepôt* and outlet to the burgeoning Atlantic economy was also threatened by French actions in the Low Countries. They, along with the German States, were also threatened by French actions to extend their political and economic power to the Rhine Basin.

All of these factors worked together throughout the early years of the global wars to solidify British leadership of the coalitions against France. British treaties with Continental allies wove together commerce clauses, subsidy arrangements, territorial concerns (none for the British), and coalition army commands. French military triumphs in the Low Countries and along the Rhine and economic actions against the British community, shifted the balance within the British cabinet from those who favored a strictly maritime strategy (Dundas) to those who argued for a greater continental role for Britain in the global struggle (Pitt and Grenville). This answered criticism from continental states that Britain was not doing enough as leader of the coalitions.

From 1798 to 1815, the threat changed from Revolutionary France to Napoleonic France. In the economic dimension, the nationalistic policies were replaced with the Continental System, but the aims were the same. European states falling under French control or threatened with French coercion were to reorient their economies away from the integrated Atlantic system to a French-dominated continental trading community. In the politico-military dimension, Napoleon replaced the revolutionary fervour of the Jacobins with a classic imperial scheme. The results for continental states were the same, however: the destabilization and overthrow of existing regimes and the loss of sovereignty.

## 6. Conclusions

I have sought to explain the actions of states before and during the global wars from 1792 to 1815 by the use of longer-term theories of coalition behaviour and by expanding the focus of the historical analysis beyond the actions of Continental states faced with an overwhelming security threat from Napoleonic France. Different

<sup>53</sup> K. D. H. Haley, *The British and the Dutch: Political and Cultural Relations Through the Ages* (London: George Phillip, 1988).



Table 2. *Coalitions against France, years at war with France 1792–1815.*<sup>54</sup>

Great Britain	22
Russia	13½
Austria	13
Spain	10
Portugal	10
Prussia	8

assumptions and different iterated games can lead to different conclusions about state behaviour. Continental states faced with limited choices not only make their choice based on their own game with the aggressor, but also by evaluating the past games played by the aggressor and the past and future actions of the coalition leader. In those situations, overwhelming French power did not lead to bandwagon behaviour, it led to the conquest of small states by Revolutionary and Napoleonic France and to the subsequent coercion of other states at the point of a gun (cannon, to be precise).

Looking at the historical record for the whole period of ‘the first world war’ allows us to conclude that there were clear preferences among European powers to oppose French hegemonic designs on the continent. This was because states had reaped economic rewards from British leadership for fifty years prior to the wars. This continued during the war and was combined with the significant costs associated with the Continental System. Britain’s potential allies would have to believe that the British would eventually acquiesce to Napoleonic designs when they had consistently fought for over 100 years against any centralizing European power. Successive British governments from 1792 to 1815 had proven that Britain would lead and subsidize anti-French coalitions, conduct a vigorous naval campaign, create an inclusive and profitable trade network for allies, and send troops to engage in continental warfare. She became, in the words of Paul Fregosi, ‘... the steadfast leader, inspire, and paymaster of every coalition that was formed by the panic-stricken royal houses of Europe ...’.<sup>55</sup>

The claims of Rosecrance and Lo that questions of British commitment and the prevention of French attacks made hiding and bandwagoning more likely among continental powers is open to argument. British commitment was evidenced in constant subsidies to allies. Those subsidies went from a total of £9,500,000 from 1793 to 1802, to a total of £23,250,000 from 1803 to 1812.<sup>56</sup>

British commitment was also evident in British land armies on the continent from 1793 to 1798 and from 1808 until the end of the wars in 1815. The British also made colonial concessions throughout the period. When Grenville succeeded Pitt it effectively ended the maritime strategy favoured by Dundas and others, who had argued for the seizure of French and allied bases in the Western Hemisphere and Asia and the abandonment of the continent to France.<sup>57</sup> The prevention of French attacks was more difficult. The difficulties of inter-alliance politics played a role in

<sup>54</sup> Modelski and Modelski, *Documenting*, p. 288.

<sup>55</sup> Paul Fregosi, *Dreams of Empire* (New York: Birch Lane Press, 1990), p. 25.

<sup>56</sup> Mackesy, ‘British Diplomacy and French Wars’, p. 139.

<sup>57</sup> J. E. Cookson, *The Friends of Peace* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1982), p. 65.

this process. When the allies did mount campaigns against Napoleon's armies, the command of allied forces went to Wellington. This was in recognition of Britain's role as leader of the coalitions, Britain's lack of continental ambitions, and the importance of a non-continental commander in maintaining alliance cohesion throughout the conflict.<sup>58</sup>

By taking a long-cycle perspective of the world system and the evolving agenda of world politics, coalition behaviour can be evaluated as long-term bandwagoning behind Great Britain's model for state interactions in the Ages of Industrialization and Enlightenment. This offers important lessons for long-term coalition creation as the global agenda has changed at the end of the Cold War and the onset of a truly global economy. We can also conclude that non-cooperative behaviour in the face of overwhelming power is not bandwagoning, especially when states return to cooperative coalition behaviour at the earliest possible moment. We can conclude that Napoleon's efforts at rewarding states were weak when compared to his ability to punish. The rewards for inclusion in the British-led economic and political community were far greater than those offered by Napoleon's Continental System and the loss of political decision-making power to Paris. It was only Napoleon's ability and credibility to use force that weakened coalition cooperation. This was possible only because of the inherent disadvantages of exercising British coalition leadership from across the English Channel. Napoleon's force was only useful for a short time and only if Britain gave up the struggle. So long as Britain could attract allies, build up forces for specific battles at various continental points, and make effective use of its financial, economic, and naval power to slowly strangle France, the outcome of the global war was fixed in Britain's favour. These are the lessons of Napoleonic France and its challenge to British leadership of the international system that will have application to future global leadership in coalition warfare.

<sup>58</sup> Modelski and Modelski, *Documenting*, pp. 257–83.