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Scholarship in an era of anxiety: the study of international politics during the Cold War*

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To analyse an academic field of study in a particular era assumes two things: (1) that a particular era has properties that distinguish it clearly from predecessors and successors, and (2) that a field of study necessarily reflects or takes on a colouration of actual social conditions. Both assumptions are arguable, but the first is less contentious than the second. The Cold War was in many ways a distinct era, an era of anxiety caused by nuclear weapons, and an era in which diplomatic and military ideas, practices, and norms differed in significant ways from those prior to 1945 and after 1989. There were significant continuities, of course, but one would have little difficulty drawing compelling contrasts between the major characteristics of international politics in the 1920s and those of the 1950s.

The second assumption raises the question whether a field of inquiry does or can rise above current diplomatic, military, and economic contexts to uncover underlying 'logics' and patterns that transcend time, place, and personality; or whether it is condemned to be little more than a shorthand characterization of an age or an apologia for state policies or the status quo. The answer is probably both. E. H. Carr's classic, *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, suggests this. It was an effort stimulated by failures of both policy and of analysis. The book sought to get it right in the sense of a reasonable isomorphism between the observer and the world of diplomacy, security, and war, *and* policy prescription. But what Carr wrote was not confined to the analysis of diplomatic currents in the late 1930s. His book was at once a polemic, an intellectual history, a chronicle of the underlying diplomatic problems of his era, and a prescription for better theory and better policy.

The study of international politics during the Cold War years—roughly the late 1940s until the late 1980s—reflected national priorities and troubling security problems, but except in its explicit policy guise, it was not subordinate to daily headlines. There was a disciplinary dialogue that went on in academe that was fuelled by debates over the adequacy of concepts, methodology, and intellectual purpose.[1]

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[1] The primacy of intellectual discourse over context as explanation for the development of a field is argued by Brian C. Schmidt, 'The Historiography of Academic International Relations', *Review of International Studies*, 20 (October 1994), pp. 349–67. For the argument that theoretical renderings in the field are formed by both ideology and diplomatic context, see Torbjørn L. Knutsen, *A History of International Relations Theory*, 2nd edn (Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1997), esp. ch. 9.

The comments that follow necessarily 'lift' a period of systematic thinking about international politics from the much longer context of a disciplinary history.[2] However, the questions we ask about a field at any given time are generic. Typical questions might be: how do we identify continuities and changes from what preceded? After identifying criteria, what are the main patterns of thought or discourses in a period? Which explanatory locations ('levels of analysis') predominate? And if a field of study is a social–academic construction, who defines it, who establishes the orthodoxies, which discourses predominate, and what is left out?

Several of these questions have been raised and analysed in a variety of publications dealing with the development of the field.[3] There is no need to repeat that material, particularly by identification of schools of thought. Instead, the approach here will ask a number of questions about the field during the era of anxiety and provide brief answers. These are *W* questions: what to study, where to study, study by whom, why study, how to study, what not to study, and what was left out?

What should we study?

Theoretical renderings of international politics have always been animated by normative concerns. Historically, analysts have concentrated on the sources of war, the prerequisites of peace, and the conditions necessary for stability, order, and justice. Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant, Bentham, Wilson, or Carr, were all ultimately concerned with understanding the sources of fear, insecurity, and conflict and explicitly or implicitly showing necessary changes to ameliorate those problems. No matter what their methodological proclivities or the structure of their analyses, thinkers have engaged in a common form of inquiry. It is, first, *diagnostic*—locating the sources of constructed social problems—and, second, *prescriptive*—outlining solutions to the problems that have been identified and explained in terms of etiologies.

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[2] Schmidt criticizes many recent renditions of disciplinary history for legitimizing contemporary intellectual positions ('presentism'). I employ Hobbes, Rousseau, and others not to establish, as Schmidt suggests, a 'false sense of coherence and continuity' (p. 356) but to show that Cold War era normative concerns in IR theory were similar to those that preoccupied certain historical figures. Rousseau and Kant read Hobbes (and each other) and were engaged in a 'discourse' on the sources of war and the conditions of peace—just as Morgenthau and Waltz were. Morgenthau invoked Hobbes (via Niebuhr) in the first chapter of his famous text. Waltz' *Theory of International Politics* probably would have been very different had the author not fully studied Rousseau's writings on war. Stanley Hoffmann acknowledged that the works of Rousseau and Kant inspired his own scholarship—and thus constitute part of the history of the field. See Stanley Hoffmann, 'A Retrospective', in Joseph Kruzel and James N. Rosenau (eds.), *Journeys through World Politics: Autobiographical Reflections of Thirty-four Academic Travelers* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989), p. 275. For an analysis of the continuity of analytical themes, see Jürgen Martin Gabriel, *Worldviews and Theories of International Relations* (London: Macmillan, 1994). The view that there is no continuity or discourse between generations separated by two or more centuries does not agree with the evidence. There is a 'classical tradition' that is continuous in the normative problem to diagnose, the perceived images of the world, the nature of actors, and other matters.

[3] K.J. Holsti, *The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory* (London and Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985); William C. Olson and A. J. R. Groom, *International Relations Then and Now: Origins and Trends in Interpretation* (London: HarperCollins Academic, 1991); Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach, *The Elusive Quest: Theory and International Politics* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1988); Torbjørn Knutson, *A History of International Relations Theory*; Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski (eds.), *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Miles Kahler, 'Inventing International Relations: International Relations Theory after 1945', in Michael W. Doyle and G. John Ikenberry (eds.), *New Thinking in International Relations* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), pp. 20–53; Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner, *Tombstones and Milestones: International Organization and International Relations Theory, 1968–1998* (forthcoming).

International politics scholarship during the Cold War did not alter these intellectual practices and priorities. The problem of international conflict and the search for security provided a significant portion of the intellectual agenda for the field, just as war and fear had suggested the problems for Hobbes, Rousseau, and Kant. The core of the field did not change, although perhaps the sense of urgency and insecurity wrought by the possibility of nuclear annihilation was more profound than had been the case in other eras. One result was the development of a new subfield, variously named strategic studies, security studies, conflict resolution, or defence studies. Questions of security, weapons development and deployment, and strategy became the preserve of scholars and the denizens of government-funded think tanks. In these areas, the nexus between scholar and military officials, and between the university and the government became firmly established. Although the story has not yet been told fully, probably the relationship helped to modify government policies toward caution, for the traditional proclivity of military planners is to win wars. The essential requirement of deterrence theory, as spelled out by academic specialists, was, in contrast, to prevent wars. The subfield was thus an applied science, where the connection between diagnosis and prescription was clear, firm, and explicit.

For the broader field of international politics, the 'what to study?' question was answered in several ways. At the most abstract level, theorists needed to develop a conception of the entire international arena. Three major conceptualizations resulted: systems, societies of states, and transnational relations.

The systems concept was a metaphor borrowed from both plumbing and 'general systems theory', where actors and agents are interconnected in complicated ways, but also in which there are various regulatory mechanisms that bring stability or homeostasis. Morton Kaplan[4] provided the most abstract formulation of a system as relationships between variables. Charles McClelland, Herbert Spiro, and Richard Rosecrance[5] developed the idea in more concrete historical forms. They searched for similarities and differences in the actions of agents that had system-wide repercussions. The main thrust of this type of theoretical endeavour was to locate the sources of system stability and instability ('disturbance'), or chronic war.

Innovations in these works were not only the levels of abstraction, the technical vocabulary they employed, or the relevance of metaphors, but also the attempt to portray a totality made up of numerous parts. In the 1930s, the study of international politics had been foreign-policy oriented.[6] The purpose was to locate generic sources of government behaviour. These included nationalism, geographic location, population, ideologies, and the like. The system perspective, in contrast, aggregated the actions of at least the major powers, assuming that they produced system-wide consequences. In Kenneth Waltz' terms,[7] these studies were reductionist

[4] Morton Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (New York: Wiley, 1957).

[5] Charles A. McClelland, *Theory and the International System* (New York: Macmillan, 1966); Herbert J. Spiro, *World Politics: The Global System* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1966); Richard Rosecrance, *Action and Reaction in International Politics* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963).

[6] Frank Simonds and Brooks Emeny, *The Great Powers in World Politics* (New York: American Book Co., 1935).

[7] Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison Wesley, 1979), ch. 3.

(system characteristics are defined by the actions of its components). But at least they acknowledged that outcomes, whether peace, war, stability, or order, are produced by the totality of foreign-policy actions. The turn from foreign policy to systems has withstood the test of time. Most contemporary renderings of international politics, or global politics, continue to see a whole made up of numerous interacting parts.

The conceptualization of international politics in terms of systems never delivered a general theory, however. Whether of the reductionist or structural versions, it left out too much. Reductionist versions ended up with a tautology: revolutionary (e.g. unstable) systems are caused by revolutionary states. Waltz' structural version, despite its powerful explanations about why the system reproduces itself, why wars and balances of power recur, and why states seek autonomy and are concerned with issues of relative gains, cannot explain more. Apparently—given the numerous criticisms of Waltz—most analysts want to know or understand more than just these questions, important as they are.

The influence of the Cold War was not revealed directly in conceptualizations of an international system, but rather in identifying key variables that explained variation in the incidence of crises and wars. The major debate was whether bipolar or multipolar power configurations were more likely to lead to war or peace.[8] There was no definitive, empirically based outcome of the numerous examinations, but the position that bipolarity is more conducive to stability was argued forcefully, though only on logical grounds, by Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer.[9] Both of these analyses reflected a not very well concealed enthusiasm for American Cold War policies. On the other hand, these debates can also be seen as a continuation of an old discourse on the balance of power that goes back to the eighteenth century. As in other areas of 'what to study?' the Cold War gave an immediacy to the issue but did not originate the problem.

Within the systems literature there was also disagreement whether systemic characteristics such as the distribution of power or degrees of polarity mattered more than the domestic attributes of states. Adherents of the view that the nature of polities is critical to an understanding of war and peace outcomes—a position that generated considerable empirical research—eventually carried the day because they discovered strong correlations between war and democracy. The 'democratic peace' literature that emerged in the 1980s proved an effective challenge to the less robust findings of those who linked power distributions or polarity to variations in war incidence or system disturbance.

The second innovation was perhaps less intellectually innovative but richer in theoretical, historical, and policy implications. This is the concept of a society of states, that is, a collectivity whose members are related in more profound ways than mere propinquity or interaction, as systems theorists would have it. A society of states, according to Hedley Bull,[10] is held together by common aims (preservation of states), common institutions such as law and diplomacy, and a common fate. In the 1970s and 1980s the idea of a society of states spawned an interesting research agenda that, among other areas, explored how the European-based society of states expanded ultimately to encompass the world[11] and compared historical societies of states such as those of ancient China and Greece, with the European experience.[12]

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[8] Alan Ned Sabrosky (ed.), *Polarity and War* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985) and Daniel S. Geller and J. David Singer, *Nations at War: A Scientific Study of International Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), ch. 6.

[9] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, ch. 6; John Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War', *International Security*, 15 (1990), pp. 5–56.

[10] Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society* (London: Macmillan, 1977).

For some, neither the concept of a system nor the concept of a society of states was sufficiently rich in detail and did not reflect the myriad of activities that tied not only states, but also societies, together. In today's parlance, both world images were state-centric. There is more to international politics than the practices, stratagems, and problems of states. Modern technology has made relations between societies or individuals as important as relations between governments. John Burton[13] developed a cobweb world model that placed heavy emphasis on the sociological aspects of international relations. His work was a foundational source, though not always acknowledged as such, of the efforts to expand the scope of the field to include 'transnational relations.'[14] This effort appeared mainly a narrative enterprise, where relations between non-state actors are described in great detail. In fact, that was its main shortcoming. The field was not ready to pile up an ever-increasing collection of descriptive studies that examined, for example, the relations between Canadian provinces and American states, between Scandinavian trade unions, or between cities in different countries. The proliferation of these studies seemed to be headed toward a theoretical void, and while mention of non-state actors began to appear in most international politics textbooks of the era, they did not displace the state-centrism of the systems and society of states conceptualizations of the world.

There were two other answers, during the Cold War, to the question of 'what should we study?' in international politics.

The 'forces' of nationalism, ideology, and geography that had been identified in the 1930s as the sources of foreign policy were obviously deficient from an explanatory point of view. Not all societies that were nationalist necessarily pursued predatory foreign policies, and not all ideologies were virulent. There was no necessary connection between sources and conduct. Classical figures in the field who put forward portraits of political personality were also unable to explain the great variations of foreign-policy behaviour. Hobbes' and Rousseau's political psychology were as insufficient as Hans Morgenthau's political man who ceaselessly seeks power, either to defend or to extend his domains. System-oriented theories simply ignored the personal sources of policy: the logic of the international system forces states-persons, whether saints, sinners, or bullies, to behave within strict limits imposed by the external environment.[15] The elements of free will and choice in these approaches were minimal In the 1950s, foreign-policy analysts therefore turned to the study of decision-making on the premise that it is not broad social 'forces' or some *a priori* definition of human nature that determine foreign-policy interests and actions, but the goals, values, 'images' and definition of state interests of those who make policy.

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[11] Gerrit Gong, *The 'Standard of Civilization' in International Society* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); and Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds.), *The Expansion of International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).

[12] Martin Wight, *Systems of States* (Leicester: University of Leicester Press, 1977); and Adam Watson, *The Evolution of International Society* (London: Routledge, 1992).

[13] John Burton, *World Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972).

[14] Robert Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (eds.), *World Politics and Transnational Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972).

[15] K.J. Holsti, 'Along the Road to International Theory', *International Journal*, 39, 2 (1984), p. 350.

Foreign-policy analysis thus took a phenomenological turn. This was a change toward a more explicitly scientific (formally causal) enterprise but the normative element never lurked far below the surface. The original theoretical thrust for this approach came from the work of the Sprouts [16] and the path-breaking essay by Richard Snyder and his colleagues.[17] Ole Holsti[18] wrote the first case study employing the approach. It became a classic and served as the prototype for succeeding efforts of the same genre. Robert Jervis' *Perception and Misperception in Internationl Politics*[19] demonstrated that a variety of psychological mechanisms could help to explain faulty policies, how they were rationalized, and how they led to deterrence failures, crises, and wars. Subsequent works[20] emphasized group and bureaucratic sources of misperception and faulty decision-making procedures. The message was clear: if you alter decision-making procedures to incorporate, for example, 'multiple advocacy'—an airing of all views and options—the probabilities of making poor decisions could be decreased.[21]

This area of study was influenced by the wish to prevent foreign-policy failures. In an era of nuclear weapons, when the fate of societies hung in the balance, the studies seemed to suggest that there was no room for the kinds of follies and errors that had typified European diplomacy in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Instead of examining 1930s-style impersonal 'forces'—about which one can do little—or major abstractions such as systems or societies of states (which also cannot be manipulated) the study of decision-making has direct policy implications. We should explore decision-making because we can promote better policy.

The Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, one of the most dramatic confrontations of the Cold War, provided a major impetus for further development of decision-making studies; indeed, it promoted a sub-subfield of *crisis* decision-making. The original formulations of the Sprouts and Richard Snyder and his colleagues were designed to promote foreign-policy studies in general, but by the early 1960s the focus shifted to crisis decision-making, a study not of generic or comparative foreign policy, but of American foreign policy in high-threat situations. The literature on the Cuban missile crisis is extensive and fascinating for both conceptual and historical reasons, but it never generated a subsequent comparative field. More generic, comparative studies on crisis behaviour emerged in the late 1950s from the Stanford Studies on International Conflict and Integration under the leadership of Robert North. These culminated in the early 1970s with an explicitly comparative literature based not only on the Cuban episode, but also on the events of August 1914.[22] This literature raised questions about the assumption of rationality in realist thought; it demonstrated the relevance of social psychology to policy-making studies; it showed how decision-making styles and processes can both lead to and help prevent catastrophes; and it emphasized the capacity for learning and change, an important item in the liberal theoretical agenda of the 1970s and 1980s. The Stanford Studies also underlined the importance of examining foreign-policy-making in the context of bilateral and multilateral diplomatic relationships rather than as just the elaboration of a country's ends and means.

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[16] Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, *The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965).

[17] Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, *Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics*, Foreign Policy Analysis Project Series No. 3 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954); and Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck and Burton Sapin (eds.), *Decision-Making: An Approach to the Study of International Politics* (New York: The Free Press, 1962).

[18] Ole R. Holsti, 'The Belief-System and National Images: A Case Study', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 6 (1962), pp. 244–52.

[19] Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

[20] Cf., Irving Janis, *Victims of Groupthink* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972).

[21] Alexander L. George, 'The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy', *American Political Science Review* (September 1972), pp. 751–85; and Alexander L. George, *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980).

Foreign policy is ultimately a relationships with others, and in the absence of an authority which can arbitrate contending points of view, it is essentially a bargaining relationship. 'What to study?' thus should also include an understanding of how states bargain, particularly in conflict situations. The normative thrust of the very large literature on bargaining is not how to win, but how to avoid destructive outcomes or bargaining 'failures'. The relationship to deterrence is obvious, but how to make deterrence effective in real life is not so simple as theoretical cost/benefit/risk analyses might suggest.[23] This problem spawned an extensive literature that was given immediacy by the risks involved in the Cold War. Interest has not waned with the end of that protracted conflict because of the proximity of theoretical understanding to better (e.g. safer) policy for any government. It is as relevant today in the context of India–Pakistan or Greece-Turkey relations as it was during the Cold War.

While these answers to the question 'what to study?' differed substantially in their level of analysis, the conceptualization of actors, the degree of abstractness, or the methodologies they employed, they had in common the normative concern with war, conflict, instability, and disorder. They shared a view of international politics as a domain in which rivalry, competition, conflict, and violence are frequent if not the normal state of affairs. There was a common assumption that if we can better understand the dynamics of international politics through high quality diagnosis we may be in a position to do something about the risks of systems that go awry, of foreign policies that lead to wars, of decisions that lead to disasters, and of bargaining strategies that lead to escalation. We should study these matters, ultimately, to have a better world.

But while these problems informed the mainstream of international political studies during the Cold War, they did not monopolize the field. In 1748, Montesquieu wrote: 'The natural effect of commerce is to lead to peace . . . Commerce has spread knowledge or the mores of all nations everywhere; they have been compared to each other, and good things have resulted from this.'[24] International politics is not only about conflict and war. Like Janus, it has another side, the side of cooperation, mutual benefit, and welfare opportunity. This aspect of the field is not to be confused with idealism, which remained alive in the World Order Models Project (WOMP) during even the darkest days of the Cold War, but it has a similar diagnostic and normative thrust: what are the conditions of peace, cooperation, and order?

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[22] For the example of the Cuban crisis, see Graham Allison, *The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972); for a summary of the comparative study, see Ole R. Holsti, *Crisis, Escalation, War* (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1972). For general essays on crisis decision-making, see Charles F. Hermann, *Crises in Foreign Policy* (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969).

[23] For a comprehensive review of the development of this literature, see Richard Ned Lebow, 'Beyond Parsimony: Rethinking Theories of Coercive Bargaining', *European Journal of International Relations*, 4, 1 (March 1998), pp. 31–66.

[24] Montesquieu, *The Spirit of the Laws*, translated and edited by Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller, and Harold Samuel Stone (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 339.

David Mitrany[25] originally paved the way for an expansive research agenda that went under the name of 'integration'. The European Coal and Steel Community and, later, the European Economic Community, provided the impetus for numerous studies that tried to locate the sources of economic and, possibly, political integration. Researchers argued over appropriate methodologies and ultimately foundered over the problem of the dependent variable, that is, what is it that should be explained? Political integration, economic integration, cooperation, or peace? While there was no consensus on these matters, the work on integration solidified the place of the cooperative dimension of international politics in textbooks and in the theoretical approaches to the field. The pile of studies was an implicit reminder that the realist version of international politics that focused on security, conflict, and war was incomplete. Perhaps the most important theoretical contribution came from Karl Deutsch.[26] In his work on integration of communities (not necessarily states), he demolished one of the pillars of realist thought from Rousseau to Morgenthau: the idea that sovereignty (and when multiplied, anarchy) necessarily creates security dilemmas between states. In his concept of the 'pluralist security community' Deutsch outlined the conditions under which two or more states can coexist without facing security dilemmas. The consequence of sovereignty, in other words, is as likely to be cooperation as conflict.

Integration studies both in their reformist and in their theoretical guises went out of fashion in the early 1970s, but the cooperative aspect of international politics did not cease to command attention. The conditions for cooperation and peace took on new colours variously named interdependence, neo-liberal institutionalism, international regimes, or learning through epistemic communities.[27] While much of the theoretical debate during this time pitted realists against liberals of various persuasions, efforts were made—quite in the spirit of Carr—to synthesize the two approaches or at least to reconcile the primacy of national interest with cooperative outcomes. During the 1970s, liberals also became more interested in security issues and explicitly began to adopt realist concepts and vocabulary even to the analysis of non-security issues. The results were mixed and theoretically problematic.[28] It may be more fruitful to acknowledge that the assumptions and main concepts of the realist and liberal traditions in international thought represent two sides of international politics and that attempts to synthesize them only confuse the issue.

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[25] David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System* (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1966).

[26] Karl W. Deutsch, *Political Community at the International Level: Problems of Definition and Measurement* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1954); and Karl W. Deutsch, *et al.*, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967).

[27] Edward L. Morse, *Modernization and the Transformation of International Relations* (New York: The Free Press, 1976); Robert O. Keohane, 'International Institutions: Two Approaches', *International Studies Quarterly*, 32, 4 (December 1988), pp. 379–96; and Peter Haas (ed.), *International Organization* (Special Issue on Epistemic Communities), 46 (1992).

[28] Robert M. A. Crawford, *Regime Theory in the Post-Cold War World: Rethinking Neoliberal Approaches to International Relations* (Aldershot, Hants.: Dartmouth, 1996).

The liberal side of the coin of international politics gained prominence during the later Cold War years and perhaps dominated the field in the 1980s.[29]

The concern with cooperation and international institutions was an important antidote to the pessimism of realism, not only because it sought to explain a happier side of the relations between states but also because it diverged from the crude material explanatory mechanisms of war/security theory. In realism, the interests of states were under-theorized. They emerged either from power capabilities or from responses to external threats. In Morgenthau's version, for example, state interests ranged from self-abnegation to drives for world domination. Aside from capabilities or responses to threats, however, nothing explained this wide variation.

In contrast, liberal approaches to the question introduced the importance of learning. Liberal theories challenged the static, repetitious characterization of international politics portrayed in realism. Explaining interests thus became a major theoretical problem to unravel. By emphasizing the possibilities of learning through interaction, liberal theories opened up the possibility of change. Toward the end of the Cold War period, this theoretical innovation led directly to the social constructivist approach to the field[30] which argued that state interests are highly variable and constructed through a combination of ideas, roles, and interaction patterns. This meant that states were not inevitably ensconced in perpetual security dilemmas, that there were ways to avoid the most dangerous consequences of anarchy and sovereignty, and that through learning and cooperation, new forms of international regulation and governance were possible. Liberal approaches to the field ultimately made four notable contributions to the study of international politics: the importance of commerce in generating habits of cooperation; the crucial role of interactions in defining interests; the link between democracy and peace; and the possibilities of progressive change.

The normative agenda of liberal approaches to international relations emphasized reciprocity, cooperation, peace, and order. But what was taking place within Western Europe during the Cold War was not a global phenomenon, much as integration and neo-liberal institutionalists liked to pose their puzzles and explanations in universal terms. By the late 1960s, many expectations about the developing countries were not being borne out by economic and other quality-of-life statistics. While, roughly speaking, realists were concerned with security and conflict and liberals examined the sources of cooperation, the question of equity and justice was not a prominent value underlying these analyses. From the perspectives of the Third World, the Cold War and its attending threats were not nearly so immediate as the problems of economic development. The figures pointed to a morally intolerable condition: the gap between living conditions in the industrialized countries, including the socialist states, and the developing countries was growing exponentially. Nostrums of 'nation-building,' foreign aid, foreign investment, and a host of United Nations-sponsored activities were not bringing anticipated results.

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[29] A comprehensive survey of the various strands of liberalism in international relations theory is in Mark W. Zacher and Richard A. Matthew, 'Liberal International Theory: Common Threads, Divergent Strands', in Charles Kegley (ed.), *Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), pp. 107–50.

[30] See Nicholas Onuf, *World of our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations* (Columbus, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1989).

Dependency theory provided yet another possibility to the question 'what to study?' The answer was the sources of underdevelopment and the conditions that perpetuate it. Both were located in the global capitalist system. The development of the West had underdeveloped the south,[31] and the economic structures built during the eras of colonialism and imperialism remained in place. These siphoned surplus value from the peripheries to the centres, and while formal colonialism had retired, the old structures of domination and exploitation, propped up by foreign aid, military assistance, advertising, and cultural imperialism, remained in place.[32] As with the studies on war/security and peace/cooperation, here was a clear diagnostic exercise motivated by normative concerns of equity. The diagnosis then led to prescriptions that seriously challenged liberal conventional wisdom about the supposedly mutual benefits of trade, interdependence, and transnational relations. Dependency theory introduced a number of novel perspectives on international politics. Like some versions of realism, it was systemic; behaviour in the components of the system was explained by the structural properties of the entire system. Second, it explicitly linked elements of Marxism and Leninism to the study of international politics. Third, it posited concerns of equity above those of security and conflict or peace and cooperation. It raised economics or the search for profit rather than fear as the prime motivator of political action and structures. Also in contrast to realism and liberalism, following Marx, it implicitly *praised* conflict since dependency structures could not be torn down through pacific means. Finally, dependency theory analytically downgraded the behaviour of states in favour of classes, transnational relations, and sectors.

During the heydays of the Cold War, then, the field was characterized by three distinct sets of normative concerns or discourses that answered the 'what to study'? question: (1) security, conflict, and war; (2) cooperation and the conditions for peace; and (3) equity, justice, and the sources of international inequality. While from an American-centred point of view, realism may have predominated,[33] a broader perspective suggests the prominence of the second and third normative discourses. International theory in these years was never an intellectual monolith or 'orthodoxy'. Even with the high risks and threats occasioned by the Cold War, other normative concerns drove competing research programmes.

Where to study?

By 'where', I do not mean the choice between the groves of academe. The 'where' refers to the implicit or explicit area of analytical concern, that is, geographic location. Theoretical statements about the quality, logic, or major characteristics of international politics usually have been couched in universal terms. For Hobbes and Rousseau, the universe of relations between states was, of course, European. This focus did not change for the next two centuries. A few textbooks in the field prior to and after World War I offered chapters on colonial government or imperialism,[34] but the view of these phenomena was from the centres. The peripheries were objects of action, but seldom agents.

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[31] Andre Gunder Frank, 'The Development of Underdevelopment', in James Cockroft (ed.), *Dependence and Under-Development* (New York: Doubleday, 1972), pp. 3–17.

[32] Johan Galtung, 'A Structural Theory of Imperialism', *Journal of Peace Research*, 8 (1971), pp. 81–117.

[33] Domination of the field in the United States by realism is empirically supported in the important study by John A. Vasquez, *The Power of Power Politics: A Critique* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1983).

These intellectual habits did not change significantly during the Cold War. The universalism of Morgenthau, Bull, Wight, Waltz, and of integration and interdependence theorists, was notable. Since their characterizations of international politics focused almost exclusively on the activities of the great powers—indeed, Bull lifted them to the status of an international institution[35] and Waltz declared that a theory of international politics is a theory of great power behaviour[36]—other states were deliberately left out by virtue of not being great powers (China was, perhaps, a marginal exception). The field of security studies was particularly deficient in its concern with the security problems of Third World states. This field focused primarily on problems of deterrence and nuclear deployments, but in the late 1960s a literature on 'sage brush wars', 'low intensity conflicts', and 'guerrilla war' began to appear. The impetus here came from the perceived threats of communism. Hence, while Malaya, the Philippines, and Vietnam became the objects of study, wars in Burma, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, Sudan, and Eritrea—to mention just a few—were ignored. With the end of the Cold War, analysts suddenly and inappropriately discovered 'ethnic [sic] wars', as if they were a new phenomenon that had appeared on the landscape because of the end of the Soviet–American rivalry. Intellectual myopia or Eurocentrism had helped to lead to both policy disasters and a deficient security studies field. Theoretical approaches to international politics hardly fared better. The essential elements of realism, integration studies, interdependence, and liberal institutionalism were supposed to be universal, but in fact they described or diagnosed relations primarily within and between the OECD countries, and between the Cold War protagonists. Where were classical European-style arms races in Africa? Where were stag hunts and security dilemmas in the Caribbean or Central America? Where was balancing behaviour or bandwagoning in South America? Where were the harmonious consequences of interdependence in South Asia? Where was political integration in Southeast Asia?[37] Indeed, the essential actor in all theories of international politics during the Cold War—the state—was assumed rather than problematized, whereas in many areas of the world, it was and remains *the* problem. International politics as a theoretical study during the Cold War, as it had been in earlier decades, was a grounded in European history and relegated the rest of the world to a lower ontological status, indeed to one that was characterized by considerable overgeneralization, if not ignorance. Dependency theory was in part a response to this problem.

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[34] The most important English-language non-theoretical treatment of imperialism remains Parker T. Moon *Imperialism and World Politics* (New York: Macmillan, 1926).

[35] Hedley Bull, *Anarchical Society*, ch. 9.

[36] Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, pp. 72–3.

[37] K.J. Holsti, 'International Theory and War in the Third World', in Brian Job (ed.), *The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), pp. 37–62; and K.J. Holsti, 'International Relations Theory and Domestic Wars in the Third World: The Limits of Relevance', in Stephanie Neuman (ed.), *International Relations Theory and the Third World* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), pp. 103–32.

Who studies?

Part of the explanation for the limited geographical scope of international politics lies in the people who performed the diagnoses, painted the portraits of the essential characteristics of international politics, and offered solutions to pressing problems. For the most part, international politics as an academic field, organized departmentally, existed primarily in English-speaking countries, and its theoretical aspects were developed exclusively in those domains. I have covered this problem elsewhere,[38] and Stanley Hoffmann has offered an incisive analysis of the reasons why the field flourished particularly in the United States.[39] A combination of policy-problems, the close relationship between academics and the government, the professionalization of the field, and American leadership during the Cold War help to explain American academic predominance.[40] Hoffmann was correct to chastise Americans for parochialism, but his dismissal of non-American contributions to the field needs to be queried. The commanding figures in the field during the era of anxiety included many non-Americans, and thus Hoffmann's characterization of it as an 'American social science' was not entirely accurate.[41] Aside from citing one major French contribution—by Raymond Aron—Hoffmann acknowledged only the works of Carr and Dahrendorf in his survey of the field. This was hardly an adequate or comprehensive review. He failed to mention major contributions from scholars in the United Kingdom, for example.

The 'where to study?' question was influenced by American government involvement in the world. Academic analysis focused heavily on Europe and on Asian and Middle Eastern centres of rivalry and conflict. Other areas of the world were left primarily to regional or country specialists. As suggested, regional dynamics and security problems were not incorporated into theoretical renderings of the field.

As for the rest of the world, international politics as a separate academic field either did not exist or, where it was reasonably well-developed, as in Japan or India, its practitioners focused on national problems and rarely sought to set those within larger theoretical contexts. Indians were preoccupied with non-alignment, Koreans with reunification, and Japanese with status, trade, and regional security issues. In a few other locales, however, there was considerable work of note. Many conflict resolution theories, as well as systematic empirical work, originated in Scandinavia and Israel. True, many of the underlying analytical models came from American sources, but there was a considerable amount of theoretical innovation as well. Johan Galtung's extensive corpus is one prominent example. Raymond Aron's *Peace and War* is another. If we look at the entire field during the Cold War era, however, the conclusion remains that the theoretical agenda was set primarily in American and British institutions, with prominent appendages appearing in Australia, Canada, and Scandinavia as well. But this conclusion does not tell the whole tale, for during the 1980s a major assault on the field emerged primarily from Continental intellectual sources. More on this below.

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[38] K.J. Holsti, *The Dividing Discipline*.

[39] Stanley Hoffmann, 'An American Science: International Relations', *Daedelaus*, 106, 3 (1977), pp. 41–60.

[40] See a further elaboration in Miles Kahler, 'Inventing International Relations'.

[41] Hoffmann's argument is more accurate if it refers primarily to the extent and pattern of funding, the relationship between scholars and government, and the organization of academic departments and schools.

Why study international politics?

Here we enter the domain of theoretical functions. I have already alluded to the diagnostic function: theorists wish to understand the sources of socially constructed problems such as war, order, justice, equity, reciprocity, or quality-of-life issues. This should be sufficient justification for any major scholarly enterprise, but it is not complete.

A second function of theory is to make a vast field, characterized by innumerable facts, trends, anomalies, structures, agents, and behaviours, more intelligible. Or, as Torbjørn Knutsen suggests, theories *enlighten*.[42] Diverse data have to be made comprehensible in some way. This can be done by developing concepts, by locating, constructing, or establishing patterns that transcend time, location, and personality, and by generalization. Through these operations, detail and randomness get washed out (see below), but comprehension, often in a causal sense, increases. Understanding grows in rough proportion to abstraction. Thanks to monuments of scholarly work by Quincy Wright, Hedley Bull, Karl Deutsch, Hans Morgenthau, Harold and Margaret Sprout, or Kenneth Waltz—to name just several major contributors to the field during the Cold War years—we learned a good deal that did not come to mind simply by keeping up with the daily news. Each of the works contained major flaws—some indeed creating a growth industry of criticism—but all made readers and analysts think about things in ways they had not thought before. They were not only creative enterprises; they helped others to create.

Nevertheless, many were convinced that the theoretical efforts of the early Cold War years were deficient in many ways. They could not, in fact, make the world more *authoritatively* intelligible because many were logically or empirically slipshod. And indeed some were. Assumptions were often unexamined. Generalizations were offered without compelling evidence (certainly not an appropriate criticism of Karl Deutsch or Quincy Wright!). Some texts contained contradictory propositions; for example, that balances of power help create wars, while later claiming that they prevent them.[43] Some textbooks were unashamedly prescriptive, showing, for example, how best to fight the threat of communism. A particularly annoying habit, critics suggested, was the propensity to select evidence to support generalizations, without making any effort to systematize data so that the generalizations might be based on a reasonable empirical foundation. A third function of theory, then, is to *improve* the quality of knowledge, that is, to give it more authority. This could be done in part through traditional means of logical analysis, as Hedley Bull suggested: '. . . the [theoretical] enterprise is concerned . . . with theoretical construction: with establishing that certain assumptions are true while others are false, certain arguments valid while others are invalid, and so proceeding to erect a firm structure of knowledge'.[44] Here, Bull suggests another function of theory: criticism. Virtually all theoretical contributions during the Cold War were critiques of existing knowledge as well as creative enterprises.

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[42] Torbjørn Knutsen, *A History of International Relations Theory*, p. 1.

[43] See the critiques of the balance of power concept by Ernst B. Haas, 'The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda?' *World Politics*, 5 (July 1953), pp. 442–77; and by A. F. K. Organski, *World Politics* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958).

[44] Hedley Bull, 'International Relations Theory 1919–1969', in Brian Porter (ed.), *International Politics 1919–1969* (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 32.

Quality-of-knowledge concerns do not complete the list of theoretical functions. The scholarly enterprise is also based on curiosity, on the needs for more precise information, more isomorphic models of phenomena, more refined classifications (taxonomic work), enhanced conceptual clarity, and better appreciation and understanding of historical perspectives on the field. International politics does not differ in these regards, and a good deal of its theoretical development is derived from such concerns. Inis Claude Jr.'s *Power and International Relations* and Ernst B. Haas' analysis of the balance-of-power concept were classic efforts at conceptual clarification.[45] The intellectual history of our field—defined, refined, and often reinterpreted—offers other areas of development that highlight continuities, themes, and new departures. Ian Clark's *The Hierarchy of States: Reform and Resistance in the International Order* is just one of several examples.[46] Many important contributions have not been mentioned, but the purpose here is only to point out that intellectual curiosity, the search for more precise and authoritative knowledge, and providing intellectual roots for a discipline are important elements of an answer to the 'why study?' question.

In the early 1980s emancipation became a major answer to the 'why study?' question. Emancipation was both political and intellectual. Out of Europe came a number of figures, some refugees from Marxism, others major amenders of that faith, and still others prominent critics of what came to be known as the 'Enlightenment project.' If problems originally posed by Hobbes, Rousseau, Bentham, Kant, the Mills, Marx, and their twentieth-century descendants comprised the core of the field during the early years of the Cold War, toward the end of the period the advocates of critical theory, post-structuralism, and other posts-, anchored their criticisms of the field in the ideas of Habermas, Bourdieu, Foucault, Nietzsche, and Gadamer (to mention only the more prominent), most of whom wrote nothing about international politics, or of Gramsci, who did have an interest in the field.[47] Since this area has developed most fully in the period since the end of the Cold War, it is not appropriate to explore it at length. But in terms of our category, 'why study?', it is important to emphasize that this area of inquiry (with a few notable exceptions such as Robert Cox) has not been fundamentally concerned with understanding the world of diplomats, merchants, and warriors, but with attempting to question and/or destroy the foundations of positivist-based exercises. There are two main reasons for intellectual emancipation. The first is the conviction that conventional approaches to international theory are based on a positivist epistemology that implicitly validates existing conditions. Kenneth Waltz' *Theory of International Politics* stimulated the first systematic attack[48] on realism as essentially a political project that is not only intellectually flawed (as many others had argued previously) but normatively dangerous. To view and explain world politics in utilitarian, economist, mechanistic and structural terms, as Waltz did, leads the analyst implicitly to say that because the world is this way, this is the way it ought to be. The accusation against Waltz was multi-layered, but was really centred on the question of change. According to Waltz, in a system of anarchy the only significant change is between multipolar and bipolar power configurations, with the latter as the preferred layout because it reduces the probabilities of major war. Ashley and many subsequent critics charged that the purpose of inquiry should be to show how to escape all war-producing systems, not just how to fine-tune existing systems. We need to emancipate ourselves from Waltz-like projects because of the necessary connection between thought and practice. International theories are not just abstract playthings of academics. Their elaboration has political consequences and thus the answer to the question 'why study' is ultimately to demolish all intellectual projects that sustain the *status quo* and other evils in the world.

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[45] Inis L. Jr. Claude, *Power and International Relations* (New York: Random House, 1962); and Ernst Haas, 'The Balance of Power', pp. 442–77.

[46] Ian Clark, *The Hierarchy of States: Reform and Resistance in the International Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); see also Torbjørn Knutsen, *A History of International Relations Theory*.

[47] For a review of the intellectual pedigree of various contemporary approaches to theories of international relations, see Vendulka Kubalkova, 'The Twenty Years' Catharsis: E. H. Carr and IR', in Vendulka Kubalkova, Nicholas Onuf, and Paul Kowert (eds.), *International Relations in a Constructed World* (Armonka, NY and London: E. M Sharpe, 1998), pp. 25–57.

[48] Richard Ashley, 'The Poverty of Neorealism', *International Organization*, 38(2) (1984), pp. 225–86.

The second reason for emancipation is to rid ourselves of another pervasive danger, the idea that we can understand the world through general theories and 'meta-narratives' that in fact hide a world of flux, contradiction, paradox, and complexity under cloaks of generalization and disciplinary orthodoxy. To be truly liberated intellectually, and thus ultimately in a political sense, is to acknowledge uncertainty and to eschew all projects that reek of 'sovereign voices' and intellectual closure. Because of the close connection between knowledge and power, it is critical to question, query ('interrogate' is the preferred jargon), and unmask all knowledge claims no matter on what basis they are made. Scholarship *is* politics, and in the 1980s the critics were convinced that the positivist-based theoretical enterprise was, at heart, a political project.

Richard Ashley, James Der Derian, Jim George, Robert Cox, and R. B. J. Walker made major interventions along these lines. The main outlines of the debate these critiques engendered about the time of the deconstruction of the Berlin Wall are summarized in a useful synthetic exercise by Joseph Lapid.[49] This brief excursion into late Cold War developments in the field is placed in the 'why study?' category rather than 'what to study?' because it was oriented primarily toward an epistemological/political purpose rather than to shed light on the substance of the field. It was at once an intellectual demolition derby and a project of liberation, but only rarely devoted to helping us understand substantive issues such as those raised in more 'orthodox' versions of the field.

The full story of the migration of Continental philosophy to the study of international politics has not been told. Cold War context is an insufficient explanation because the first salvos of those who sought intellectual emancipation were fired during the contrasting eras of détente and the 'second Cold War.' The development of critical studies was more importantly fed by other disciplines, internal debates, novelty, and a broad pessimism deriving from disillusion with 'modernism'. Yet, it is difficult to envisage these currents of thought successfully migrating to the field in the 1950s or 1960s. The declining threat of nuclear war thus may be part of the explanation.

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[49] In his 'The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era', *International Studies Quarterly*, 33(4) (September 1989), pp. 235–54.

How to study?

The question of the functions of theory is closely connected to the problem of how to approach the subject(s), that is, how to do research and how to develop knowledge. For example, one of the prime reasons knowledge should become more reliable, according to J. David Singer,[50] is to provide sound advice to those who are responsible for making and applying foreign and defence policies. But scholarship in general should have the goal of being 'sound', 'rigorous', and 'unbiased', no matter for what purposes it is designed. This is what sets it off from legal argumentation or journalism. Presumably few scholarly works will have any authority (e.g. they will not become part of the current wisdom, conventional or otherwise) unless they are grounded in evidence. In the West, at least, scholarship no longer can appeal to God, Marx, or some higher spirit for validation. These are replaced by logic and evidence.

But how one applies logic and evidence is not beyond dispute. Let me quote a passage that evaluates the quality of international politics scholarship in the 1940s and 1950s:

> The laws of international politics to which some 'realists' appealed in such a knowing way appeared on closer examination to rest on tautologies or shifting definitions of terms. The massive investigation of historical cases implied in their Delphic pronouncements about the experience of the past had not always, it seemed, actually been carried out. The extravagant claims made by some of them turned out to rest on assumed authority rather than on evidence or rigorous argument. Indeed, not even the best of the 'realist' writings can be said to have achieved a high standard of theoretical refinement: they were powerful polemical essays—brilliant and provocative in the case of Carr, systematic and comprehensive in the case of Morgenthau, learned and profound in the case of Wight—but the theory they employed was 'soft', not 'hard.'

One might think that the author of this methodological critique was an American enthusiast of the behavioural revolution. In fact, it was Hedley Bull.[51]

Those who considered themselves social scientists wanted to go further than Bull. They sought to create a science of international relations (or politics) that could meet a number of tests of reliability, including empirical verification, logical consistency, and reproducibility. This attempt to bring reliability to the field went under the poorly chosen name of 'behaviouralism', somehow implying that what predecessors of the field had been concerned with was not behaviour. The 'behavioural revolution' was primarily, if not exclusively, an attempt to improve the quality of knowledge and to correct some of the problems Bull listed above. As with most reform movements, there were sects, schisms, and censures. There was a special vocabulary that sought to demarcate the new fraternity from the old. 'Rigour', 'models', 'data', and 'laws' were in; judgement, history, impressions, and feelings were out. Values were data, not impulses that drove research. A true science of international politics was the great end which was to be achieved through collecting reliable data, replication, and cumulation. International politics was to become modelled upon physics and chemistry, not on history, philosophy, or jurisprudence.

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[50] J. David Singer, 'The Responsibilities of Competence in the Global Village', *International Studies Quarterly*, 29 (September 1985), pp. 245–62.

[51] Hedley Bull, 'International Relations Theory 1919–1969', p. 39.

Much energy was expended in the repartee sparked by the behavioural revolution. Indeed, for much of the 1960s and 1970s, debate concentrated on matters of method rather than of substance. I have argued elsewhere[52] that the behavioural revolution did not inaugurate a new way of looking at the world, a new paradigm (to use later jargon), or a new set of normative problems. It revolved around the ways one generates knowledge. Positivist methodologies have theoretical implications—a standard position today—but the essential positions in contention during the Cold War involved questions of reliability rather than 'what to study?' issues or epistemology. The debates were largely exclusionist in the sense that few of the protagonists were prepared to acknowledge the contributions of the others. Among the casualties of the methodological Cold War was a whole generation of American graduate students excused from studying history, law, and foreign languages so that they could enter as experts into discussions of statistical method. Emphasis on honing research skills, including quantitative analysis, is to be applauded, but not necessarily when it replaces history, law, and languages.

Toward the end of the era of anxiety, the methodological wars largely dissipated. Search for the holy grail of a science of international politics had been abandoned, the promises of high-order causal explanations went largely unfulfilled, and it was clear that, despite some notable exceptions, the field was not built on an agenda of cumulation.[53] Scholars of international politics did not often duplicate the working patterns of chemists and physicists. Theoretical individualism, the reputational rewards accruing from novelty, the changing diplomatic agenda, lack of funding, faddism, and boredom with the canon, among other reasons, militated against science. The work pattern of scholars looked much more like informal groups or networks toiling in a common problem-area such as integration in the 1960s, dependency theory in the 1970s, and the democratic peace in the 1980s. There is theoretical debate, empirical exploration, methodological contestation, and eventually some pattern of increased understanding emerged. But this was seldom a general theory in the scientific sense. This understanding then became a general part of the overall field's lore, incorporated as reasonably common knowledge. For example, we do not have a formal theory of foreign-policy decision-making, but we do have a repertoire of insights and understanding about the sources of policy-making pathologies and individual misperceptions. Our students can read that in reasonably authoritative textbook accounts and use it as a foundation for further work.

Overall, the behavioural revolution heightened sensitivity to questions of research design, to the importance of systematic evidence to test propositions and hypothesized connections, to clearer recognition of the normative foundations of problem identification, and to the limits of formal causal explanation. And as Bull's quotation suggests, the traditionalists were not immune from these currents. While dismissing much of the formal scientific work as mediocre and regressive, Bull acknowledged areas of progress such as a 'decline of innocence' that marked the scholarship of the 1920s and 1930s, an awareness of much intellectually 'shoddy' work, and a general concern for logical rigour and precision.[54] Whatever the ultimate evaluation, the great methodological debates of the Cold War years were necessary and of lasting significance.

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[52] K.J. Holsti, *The Dividing Discipline*, ch. 2; Schmidt disagrees strongly with this position. See Brian C. Schmidt, 'The Historiography of Academic International Relations', pp. 349–68.

[53] This is the argument in Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach, *The Elusive Quest*. Areas of notable cumulation included studies on crisis decision-making, alliances, international regimes, correlates of war, and the democratic peace literatures.

But the search for greater rigour or a scientific version of the field was not just an abstract discussion of methodology. It was, more broadly, an attempt to free the field from the shadow of the Cold War. In the 1960s, in particular, there was a sense that too much writing that was passed off as scientific scholarship was really policy promotion. Too many scholars, as some textbooks of the era demonstrated, were advocates rather than students. Partisanship sometimes paraded as science. Perhaps these people even compounded the dangers of the Cold War. By adhering to certain standards of scholarship that emphasized data, comparison, and empirically based generalization, the practices of partisanship and demonization could be undermined and the study of the *real* sources of threat to the world could be uncovered wherever they were found. Actors, processes, systems, and variables suggested a clinical rather than partisan approach to the field. The Cold War thus helped to energize a formally scientific scholarly enterprise.

What not to study?

Several areas of inquiry were developed into research programmes, but were ultimately abandoned for lack of progress or declining interest. The study of political integration, a major theoretical preoccupation during the 1960s and 1970s, waned significantly after Ernst Haas declared it an intellectual dead-end.[55] There were methodological and conceptual problems, including lack of consensus on what exactly was to be explained, that is, ‘what is integration?’. But the demise of integration was not essentially a technical problem. These studies, despite their universalist pretensions, were confined primarily to Europe. Yet, many of the characteristics associated with European integration were typical of all OECD countries. Moreover, since the theoretical study of European integration was primarily an American craft, the Americans were in a sense outsiders looking in. With the development of the concept of interdependence, and an accompanying argument that international relations were in the midst of a transformation,[56] a more generic subfield could be developed, one in which the United States played a leading role in driving the transformation. Interdependence studies colonized integration. The focus of research thus changed: the purpose was no longer to explain European integration processes, but to use those processes to test the explanatory capacities of rival realist and liberal/interdependence theories. In the theoretical realm, then, Europe moved from being an object of study to being a test case of more generic theories of international politics.

The field of comparative foreign policy was also abandoned. The theoretical platform for comparative foreign-policy analyses was largely developed by Richard Snyder and his associates, and by James Rosenau.[57] There was much enthusiasm for the field, particularly in the area of data gathering. But early promise faded. Some genuinely comparative efforts did appear, including studies of foreign-policy change,[58] numerous inquiries into decision-making and leadership styles,[59] and perhaps most uniquely, Bahgat Korany's important comparative study of foreign-policy-making in the Middle East.[60] But these early comparative endeavours were not followed up. A major literature review incorporating an extensive bibliography provides clues that help explain the demise of the field.[61] The problem was that most of the work was not comparative, and most theoretically inspired efforts used the United States as the sole model or example for analysis. But the United States is hardly a modal country. Its policy-making procedures and problems are far too unique to serve as a basis for generalization. Of the 228 bibliography items in Hudson's list, I found only 24 (10.5%) to be explicitly comparative or focused on a country other than the United States. But few of these met even minimum criteria for the development of a comparative foreign policy field. These include:

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[54] Hedley Bull, ‘International Relations Theory 1919–1969’, pp. 50–2.

[55] Ernst Haas, ‘The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory’ (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1975).

[56] Morse, *Modernization and the Transformation of International Relations*.

[57] James N. Rosenau, ‘Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy’, in R.B. Farrell (ed.), *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics* (Evanston, Ill: The Free Press, 1966), pp. 27–92.

- A consensus on critical questions to ask (the criterion of centrality);
- Examination of a sufficiently large number of cases, that is, countries' foreign policies (the criterion of representativeness);
- Agreement on major analytical categories and how to connect them (the criterion of conceptual consensus); and
- and, Using concepts, categories, and typologies that foster rather than hinder comparative analysis (the criterion of comparability)[62]

Lack of concern for these criteria and the ultimate abandonment of this subfield is unfortunate because comparative studies in domestic politics are moving ahead. An increasing number of country and area experts will probably take over the comparative foreign-policy field, but this is one area where collaboration rather than colonization would be a preferred route.

Finally, we have to acknowledge the abandonment of the great project of developing a 'grand' theory of international politics/relations. No matter what the criticisms against Morgenthau or Waltz, they were able to accomplish a great deal more than most analysts would even dream of doing. The scope of their theorizing was immense and the questions for which they sought answers were compelling. Morgenthau wanted to locate the sources of conflict, the typical forms of behaviour in systems of power politics, and the efficacy and difficulties of policies of prudence in a domain dominated by insecurity. Waltz was committed to answering big questions as well: why wars and balances of power recur, why states seek autonomy and relative gains, and why the states' system reproduces itself. There is nothing trivial about these issues, and while they reflected in part the normative concerns of an age which saw the systematic predation of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, Imperial Japan, and Soviet Russia during the 1930s, and the Cold War, they are of enduring significance. While most scholars have abandoned the single-theory scientific project, they continue to situate themselves within broad theoretical traditions that provide coherence and a record of cumulation and progressive problem-solving, that is, evidence of a *systematic* dimension to the field.

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[58] K.J. Holsti *et al.*, *Why Nations Realign: Foreign Policy Restructuring Since World War II* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1982); Kjell Goldmann, *Change and Stability in Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). Declaring this subject obsolete may be premature. A major resuscitation effort is Jerel A. Rosati, Joe D. Hagan, and Martin W. Sampson III (eds.), *Foreign Policy Restructuring: How Governments Respond to Global Change* (Columbus, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1994).

[59] Cf., Margaret G. Hermann, 'Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders', *International Studies Quarterly*, 24 (1980), pp. 7–46.

[60] Bahgat Korany and Ali Hillal Dessouki (eds.), *The Foreign Policies of Arab States* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984); See also Bahgat Korany (ed.), *How Foreign Policy Decisions are Made in The Third World* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986).

[61] Valerie Hudson, 'Foreign Policy Analysis Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow', *Mershon International Studies Review*, 39, supplement no. 2 (1995), pp. 238–309.

[62] K.J. Holsti, 'The Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy: Some Notes on the Pitfalls and Paths to Theory', in David Wurfel and Bruce Burton (eds.), *The Political Economy of Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia* (London: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 9–10.

By the 1970s, détente was in the air, economic policy problems were commanding more attention, and publics were becoming more aware of environmental degradation. Although the nuclear arms race was still a menace, other causes, ideas, and areas of exploration became fashionable. The normative problems of war, peace, and security, or cooperation and interdependence could no longer monopolize the field. Competition from concerns of equity and the environment helped to expand the field in new directions. The dynamics and logic of stag hunt scenarios were no longer relevant to these new areas—or so it was claimed. Experimental and conceptual work demonstrated that insecurity, conflict, and defection (war) are not the only consequences of prisoners' dilemma situations.[63] And a precipitous decline in the incidence of interstate war rendered the fear and security problem less compelling. Finally, the search for a single, scientific theory of international politics was abandoned because the expectation of cumulative progress did not materialize across all subjects in the field. It was confined primarily to the study of crisis decision-making, deterrence, alliances, international regimes, the correlates of war, and a few other areas.

What was left out?

By contemporary standards, the study of international politics during the Cold War was not sufficiently self-reflective in the philosophical sense. Debates about theory and the scientific method did not go beyond technical issues, important as those might be. Epistemological and ontological issues were not engaged. The philosophers of the social sciences won the day and propelled the methodological outlines of research programmes. Those who did not wish to become formal modellers or quantitative wizards at least began to pay more attention to the requirements of sound evidence and inference. Abstract models, while not always up to empirical validation, nevertheless offered many insights. We use the analogies of prisoners' dilemma, stag hunt, and chicken in the field's everyday vocabulary, and they lurk suggestively behind the detailed narratives of international conflicts reported in the media. But positivism has its limits, and by adopting it as the main epistemological approach to the study, certain things were necessarily left out.

The relationship between ethics and politics was initially one of them. It did not disappear, but during the height of the Cold War it was a problem taken up mostly by scholars outside the field (e.g. Michael Walzer) and diverse individuals who examined the difficult problem of the ethics of nuclear war. Only in the 1980s did it reappear as a major theme in the study of international politics in general. It did so in two ways. First, as suggested in the work of Andrew Linklater,[64] there was the problem of diverse and conflicting conception of the human community and, specifically, how individuals bear responsibilities and derive sustenance from them. Linklater's work was largely responsible for reintroducing to the international relations' literature important themes initially raised by sources as diverse as the Stoics and Karl Marx. It highlighted the fact that International Relations is not just a narrow, technical field converging upon issues made prominent by the Cold War—as important as these were—but raised a number of critical problems that link the individual to the larger philosophical issues of 'what is and should be the nature of political community?'. A similar theme, though handled differently, emerged in Nardin's[65] important analysis of the fundamental distinctions between the nature of community within a state and between states. This problem takes on increasing significance in the post-Cold War era as forces of both fragmentation—ethnic politics, for example—and integration (in the form of a growing 'international civil society') become more salient.

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[63] Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, 1984).

Second, the normative dimensions of all theories of international politics were brought out most explicitly—though only after the end of the Cold War—in Chris Brown's *International Theory: New Normative Approaches* (1992) and Nardin and Mapel's edited volume on the various traditions of ethical reasoning in IR theory.[66] Both volumes have helped to resuscitate a dimension of the field that had been discredited by the unsatisfactory realist–idealist debates of the 1930s and 1940s and discarded by the proponents of science in the 1950s and 1960s. It may be significant, however, that most of the authorship in this analytical tradition is English and the work is not yet incorporated among the field's major developments, as reported by contemporary American analysts. Yet, by the end of the Cold War, the idea that international politics, like all politics, is necessarily both a diagnostic and a prescriptive enterprise had been re-established to the point that in many graduate programmes, particularly in England, it was blended in with other approaches or became a distinct subfield.

International law was another casualty. It is not a field that lends itself to quantification and formal modelling, and yet it is an important institution of international politics. Indeed, it is so important that it distinguishes a society of states from a conglomeration of independent political units.[67] During the Cold War, international law experts—with some major exceptions such as Quincy Wright, Richard Falk, and Charles Kegley—became divorced from international politics. The separation was reflected administratively as well. Many political science departments sloughed off their international law courses to faculties of law. Here, one suspects the spillover effect of the Cold War, for there seemed to be little law-like behaviour between the main Cold War protagonists, and thus academics assumed that it was of only marginal importance everywhere. Georg Schwartzenberger, an international lawyer by training, penned an influential textbook of the early Cold War period in which he characterized law in essentially instrumental and expedient terms.[68] His analysis reflected concerns about aggression rampant in the 1930s and Soviet post-war behaviour. He had some difficulty reconciling his conception of a society of states with what he saw around him. The role of norms as sources of and constraints upon behaviour re-emerged as a focus of study only in the later years of the Cold War.[69] Up to that time, they tended to be viewed as epiphenomena.

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[64] Andrew Linklater, *Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations* (London: Macmillan, 1982).

[65] Terry Nardin, *Law, Morality, and the Relations of States* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983).

[66] Chris Brown, *International Theory: New Normative Approaches* (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester, 1992); Terry Nardin and David R. Mapel (eds.), *Traditions of International Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

[67] Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, pp. 8–16.

From comparative foreign policy, through security studies, to international relations theory generally, the developing countries were left out as theoretical or ontological agents. Despite the universalism of grand theoretical projects, from realism to liberal institutionalism and others, researchers simply assumed that all states face similar problems in similar ways. Balances of power, arms races, alliances, security dilemmas, stag hunts, interdependence, cooperation, and wars were never portrayed as regional phenomena, or as phenomena that grew out of distinct histories and cultures. One would observe them in any anarchical system.

The foreign-policy behaviour of many states in non-Cold War locales did not always approximate, indeed often veered far from, those models. This was seldom recognized in international politics scholarship during the Cold War. Countries in the peripheries were portrayed primarily as arenas of great power competition. But if one had bothered to examine many of these areas in their own terms, they would have uncovered so many anomalies that the universalist pretensions of international politics theorists and security analysts would have come under serious question. Recognition of the problem began to appear in the 1980s[70] but received only systematic treatment after the end of the Cold War.[71] In an over-reaction to universalism, post-Cold War analysts now accept as conventional wisdom the ‘tale of two worlds’ thesis[72] that the industrial heartland of the world is increasingly a zone of peace and all the characteristics associated with interdependence, while the peripheries are zones of turmoil, violence, and instability—a characterization that is badly at odds with the evidence. As far as the developing countries are concerned, then, their academic treatment ran the gamut from systematic ignoring during the early years of the Cold war to over-generalization toward the end of the era.

Another omission in the field was the problem of change. One possible exception to the generalization was work by Robert Gilpin.[73] It developed a broad set of factors, including technology, that influenced the texture of international politics, but the outcomes were narrowly confined to system-wide wars in which great powers replaced each other in hegemonic positions. Overall lack of concern with the problem of change derived from the one-dimensional assumptions of realism, the idea that anarchy has only a limited range of consequences and that these will repeat themselves at least until the demise of the Westphalian states system. It may also have been a reflection of the glacial pace of movement that occurred in the diplomatic–strategic realms of the Cold War until the 1970s. It was, finally, a consequence of the constructs and data-generating activities of formal science. Scientists search for regularities, usually formulated as correlations. As Singer noted,[74] when scholarship moves from description to explanation and/or prediction, 'we become automatically involved in the search for correlation.' But as A. L Burns[75] pointed out in an effective critique, dynamic change is typically irregular and seldom appears as a trend. It can emerge in aggregate data as an anomaly, but anomalies are difficult to deal with in searching for correlations. For example, the projections at the turn of the last century, based on regularities and trends of trade, investment, increasing war casualties, tourism, education, and democratization, led Norman Angel in 1909 to predict the declining possibility of war.[76] August 1914 proved him wrong. Hitler represented a similar anomaly, one that raised even more fundamental problems about generalization in international politics. For his combination of will, racism, and long-range plans for a new world order blew away the theoretical significance of sociological trends. Theories that place systemic causes above individual actions—which is what all theories of international politics must do—insufficiently accept the freedom of human choice and the consequences of will. The search for regularities *necessarily* reduces individuals and the fundamental changes they can cause, to inferior causal status and in some versions, to no status at all. This is not a general condemnation of scientific method—it is a cost of generalization—but it does alert us to one of its most important limitations. Both realist and dependency approaches were essentially static. Dynamics occurred only within clearly defined structures and limits. Of the various theoretical traditions during the Cold War, only liberals were essentially concerned with the problem of change. Indeed, progressive change is a *leitmotif* that pervades all studies of international cooperation. Since the end of the Cold War, the study of change—often underspecified, however—has become ubiquitous. During the era of anxiety, it was not a prominent focus of the field.

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[68] Georg Schwartzenberger, *Power Politics* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1941, New York: Praeger, 1951).

[69] Friedrich V. Kratochwill, *Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On The Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International and Domestic Affairs* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); and Onuf, *World of Our Making*.

[70] Cf., Bahgat Korany, ‘Strategic Studies and the Third World: A Critical Evaluation’, *International Social Science Journal*, 38 (1986), pp. 547–62.

[71] Robert Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Mohammed Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995); and K.J. Holsti, *The State, War, and the State of War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

[72] James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, ‘A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in Post-Cold War Era’, *International Organization*, 46 (Spring 1992), pp. 467–92; and Max Singer and Aaron Wildawsky, *The Real World Order: Zones of Peace, Zones of Turmoil* (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1993).

[73] Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981).

The last omission is perhaps the most difficult to understand or account for. In an era sometimes called 'the age of ideologies', most of the major diagnostic strategies neglected to examine, as an empirical question, the role and functions of ideas in foreign policy and international politics. The reigning approaches to the field were ultimately materialist, defining actor interests in terms of power, security, economic welfare or, as in the case of dependency approaches, greed and profits. Realists, liberals, and dependency analysts offered different explanations of the origins of actor interests, but they commonly ignored the ideas around which interests are defined. The issue of purposes in neo-realism and systems approaches was solved simply by stating that they can range from self-abnegation to the search for world domination. Comparative foreign-policy analysts never reached a consensus on what, aside from actions and strategies, foreign policies are. Liberals tended to emphasize economic gains. Lack of interest in ideas as major sources of behaviour was rather peculiar at a time when Sino-Soviet relations were in a critical state over major ideological issues, when the rhetoric of American foreign policy was imbued with, though not dominated by, Wilsonian formulae, and when many Third World governments were promoting their vision of a more equitable economic order. Remarkably, the first volume in the field to be explicitly focused on the role of ideas in international politics did not appear until 1993.[77]

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[74] J. David Singer, *Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence* (New York: The Free Press, 1968), pp. 1–2.

[75] Arthur Lee Burns, 'Scientific and Strategic-Political Theories of International Politics', in Brian Porter (ed.), *International Politics, 1919–1969*, pp. 60–1.

[76] Norman Angell, *The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relations of Military Power to National Advantage* (London: Heinemann, 1909).

Critical theorists and post-modernists who were highly critical of neo-realism's utilitarianism and materialism did not offer much in the way of alternatives. In some of their works of the late 1980s, identity replaced interest as a motive or goal for action. The question, they suggested, should no longer be 'what do we want', but 'who are we?'. This move may have reflected the identity politics that were rampant in some countries more than observed behaviour in the international realm. Identity concepts do not offer greater analytical precision than traditional notions such as 'national interest'. Nor is there much evidence to suggest that, for example, Brezhnev, Mao, Carter, Begin, DeGaulle, or Thatcher spent sleepless nights worrying about who they or their countries were. While a few have recently begun to take the role of ideas in international politics seriously, at the end of the Cold War era it remained significantly under-theorized.

Evaluation

Were there unique characteristics to the study of international politics during the Cold War? Was there progress in the field?

At least three unique characteristics are noteworthy. The first directly reflects the Cold War, particularly the problems raised by nuclear weapons. The others bear traces of the diplomatic–military environment, but are not directly related in a formal, causal sense. They arise from theoretical debates largely detached from political context.

Security studies as a subfield of international relations developed as an explicit response to the incorporation of nuclear weapons in the arsenals and strategic planning of the major powers. Prior to World War II strategic studies had been dominated by professional military figures, or by individuals whose primary careers had been in armed forces. After 1945 the field became dominated by political scientists/international relations scholars. But it also included a number of important disciplinary migrants from economics (Thomas Schelling and Kenneth Boulding) and from mathematics and the physical sciences (Oskar Morgenstern and George Rathjens). It was the problem rather than the discipline that mattered.

Security studies during the Cold War era differed in many ways from preceding efforts. The purpose of analysis changed from studying the dynamics of war and the role of weapons in overall strategy to specifying the necessary and sufficient conditions for effective deterrence. The theme changed from 'how do we win a war' to ‘how do we prevent a war?’. The diagnostic and prescriptive functions of theory were closely linked. The analytical approaches included logical analysis, analysis through metaphors such as the Prisoners’ Dilemma, rational choice theory, studies of perception and misperception incorporating insights and evidence from social psychology, and bargaining theory.

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[77] Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (eds.), *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993).

This subfield reflected international relations’ normative concerns with the problem of peace, conflict, and war. Crises over Berlin in 1948 and again in 1958 and 1961, and over Cuba in 1962, provided an immediacy to the normative problem that overshadowed all other concerns of the age. Any of those crises, and several others, might have ended in nuclear war. These problems gave rise to strategic and decision studies that buttressed the realist characterization of international politics as a realm of dangers and threats, and pointed out the need for constant vigilance against adversarial probes. There was little in Cold War crises, rivalry, diplomacy, and strategy to suggest that international politics were anything more than zero-sum bargaining relationships taking place within an environment of formal anarchy. The arms race sustained the security dilemma construct, much to the ire of peace movements which could not fathom why governments spent increasing sums on arms instead of peaceful pursuits. In brief, many of the behavioural patterns of the Cold War almost perfectly fit the realist image of international politics. If one did not understand the logic and practices of the Cold War, the texts by Hans Morgenthau and George Schwartzenberger, among others, certainly cleared up loose ends and gave a reasonably persuasive rendition of ‘what was going on’ between Moscow and Washington, or between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

And what did international relations theory give to security studies? The subfield borrowed from many disciplines, including social psychology, economics, and history, but the entire theoretical substructure came from the classical tradition of international relations: the actors are states; they compete for power; there is no overarching authority that can compel states to promote some ‘community interest’ (as some early analysts of the United Nations contended); in a system of anarchy, security is a scarce commodity; in attempting to defend themselves, states necessarily create security threats for others; and national interest/security is a prime normative value that must be enhanced to provide the possibility for the political community to pursue the good life. Welfare and other values necessarily are subordinate to the protection of political independence, sovereignty, and security. Security studies, in brief, were concerned ultimately with a wide spectrum of normative problems that far transcended technical questions of weapons technology or deployment. It is no accident that some of the era’s most prominent theorists of international politics were also analysts of international security issues. A few, like Hedley Bull and Joseph Nye, served in security-related government portfolios.

A second unique characteristic of the era, starting in the early 1970s, was the broadening of the theoretical agenda. In the 1920s and 1930s only two interrelated problems—the conditions of peace and the sources of war—oriented the field. This continued in the 1940s and 1950s, but already in the late 1960s traces of discontent over the predominance realist characterizations of international politics began to appear. The early forays of what later came to be known by some as the ‘English School’ began to appear, most notably in the work of Martin Wight.[78] The zero-sum and materialist assumptions of realism were scrutinized and found wanting in the institutional and legal aspects of international politics. Within common cultures, at least, norms and institutions (in the broad sense, not to be confused with organizations) temper power politics so that diplomatic relations begin to take on the characteristics of a society or at least a *Gesellschaft*. In Europe, the old universalist tradition never died with the formation of states. The community component of the *respublica Christiana* lived on in the thinking of Grotius, Vattel, Burke, and even Metternich. Europe was, alternatively, a 'family', a 'republic', a 'community of princes' and other organic metaphors. The idea that the decisions of the Concert of Europe became the 'law of Europe' (Metternich's term) implied that international politics on the continent were much richer in social and normative elements than was implied in realist lore. Martin Wight and Hedley Bull, among others, resurrected an older tradition of thinking that was more consistent with the totality of European diplomatic history and less influenced by the perversities and anomalies of the 1930s and 1940s which had served as the background for the works of Carr, Morgenthau, Schwartzenberger, and others. The general tenor of the 'English School' was more consistent with an era of détente than of repeated military crises and serial aggressions.

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[78] Martin Wight, *Systems of States*.

The theoretical agenda also broadened to include concern with the collaborative characteristics of international relations. This began with studies of European integration, expanded in the 1970s to include all aspects of 'interdependence' and international political economy. Liberal international theory, whose roots go back to Bentham, Mill, Cobden, and Woodrow Wilson, made a stunning comeback, perhaps also reflecting the lessening Cold War tensions associated with the era of détente. Though deriving from Marxist origins, dependency theory added the problem of equity and welfare to the purview of the field.

By the 1980s, quality-of-life issues emerged from environmental concerns, and the first claims from feminists began to appear. By the end of the Cold War, the normative claims of inclusion into the field of international relations had proliferated to such an extent that it was no longer possible to talk of an intellectual 'core' or set of coherent problems that gives the field its distinct character. The claim that the internal–external distinction was little more than a social construct with no ontological basis led inevitably to the claim that international relations no longer exists as a distinct field of inquiry,[79] much less a discipline.

During the Cold War era of anxiety, then, the field evolved from one which was theoretically and normatively concentrated on the peace and war problems to one which, by 1989, was either unravelling into a cacophony of competing normative and epistemological claims of exclusiveness—the pessimistic view—or liberating to include a whole range of new subjects reflected in a rapidly changing world. The functions of theory also proliferated from diagnosis, prescription, conceptual clarification, and concerns with the reliability of knowledge, to include emancipation.

The final element unique to the Cold War era can go under the general term 'professionalization'. This was particularly pronounced in the United States where the subfield became institutionalized in departments of political science, with even a few schools offering Ph.D. degrees in the field. A Master's degree in International

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[79] Cf., Terry O'Callahan, 'The Real World of Normative Theory in International Relations', Department of Politics, University of Adelaide, South Australia (mimeo), 1996.

Relations was fairly common in graduate schools. The International Studies Association, appearing in the late 1950s in the west coast of the United States, by the 1970s was an organization of more than 2000 encompassing members from many countries, disciplines, and specializations.

In an age of relativism, exponential growth of normative problems, decline of immediate military threats (in the OECD world primarily), and epistemological preoccupations, it may seem quaint or irrelevant to raise the issue of progress. For many, such a stance reeks of the optimism of modernism, the faith of science, or the naiveté of liberalism. Already in the 1970s, Stanley Hoffmann[80] expressed pessimism about progress that has today become a conventional theme of contemporary critical studies: 'What was supposed to be a celebration of creativity [behaviouralism] seems to have degenerated into a series of complaints.' International politics' scholarship in the early years of the Cold War began with a sense of optimism and hope despite the state of the world. With professionalization, recognition of the field as a legitimate social science—at least in the United States—and new tools of research, the slipshod, current affairs, and partisan approaches of the 1930s through the 1960s would be replaced by theoretically-inspired and empirically validated 'hard' knowledge that could serve as the basis of both a general theory of international politics and sound policy advice. Ferguson and Mansbach[81] on the eve of the Berlin Wall's deconstruction declared both aspirations to have failed; few dissented from their judgement. Shortly after, a major assault on positivism began and epistemology replaced methodology as the prime area of non-substantive concern. For some, an escape from the substance of the field into the arcane terminology of post-modernism offered new hope—or was it the expression of despair? This was the ultimate put-down on the scholarly work of a generation: there is nothing intrinsically worth studying, generalization is intellectual totalitarianism, analyses are mere texts, emancipation takes precedence over knowledge, and the life-stories of African market women are more important to the field than all the ideas, actions, plans, and policies of governments.[82] Nietzsche and Foucault replaced Hobbes, Rousseau, Mill, and Marx as the founts of enlightenment about the ideas, practices, and norms of international politics.

But a stance of despair is not warranted as the ultimate evaluation of the field during the Cold War era. Abandoning the 'grand' theory project and recognizing the limitations of methodologies which place quantification as the ultimate fount of knowledge are not adequate indications of failure. Let me suggest a test for those today who share the pessimism of post-modernism, or any who question the notion of intellectual progress on whatever grounds. Examine one of the several textbooks on international politics available in the 1930s or 1940s, then compare it with a contemporary one. Some of the differences, suggesting progress, include:

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[80] Stanley Hoffmann, 'An American Social Science', pp. 59.

[81] Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach, *The Elusive Quest*.

[82] The claim that 'orthodox' theories of international politics 'marginalize' certain classes of people and their everyday experiences rests on the valid point that one of the costs of generalization is knowledge of the particular. It cannot be any other way. Ryszard Kapuscinski summarizes the dilemma well: 'The language of . . . political discourse forces out, from the mass media and, what is worse, from our memory, the vocabulary with which one can express his private problems, personal drama, individual pain . . . And yet it is impossible to avoid this abstract approach. One can present the enormous scale of . . . unfolding events only through language and concepts that are general, synthesizing—yes, abstract—all the while remaining aware that time and time again one will fall into the trap of simplification and statements easily undermined.' See Ryszard Kapuscinski, *Imperium*, translated by Klara Glowczewska (Toronto: Vintage Canada, 1995), pp. 308–9.

1. Greater theoretical awareness, that is, placing descriptive narratives in the context of theoretical questions rather than as ends in themselves.
2. More sensitivity to theoretical debates in the field and demonstrating how different theoretical positions highlight different aspects of international practices and institutions.
3. Greater reliance upon systematic rather than anecdotal evidence.
4. Employment of generic analytical devices, such as Prisoners' Dilemma, to show the underlying logics and similarities of, for example, conflict situations.
5. Deployment of a variety of concepts that expand the repertoire from just conflict or national interest. These include as typical examples, 'free-riders', 'chicken' games, the requirements for effective deterrence, the 'demographic transition', interdependence, dependence, international regimes, misperception, and many others that were not part of the field's lexicon in the 1930s.
6. Broader scope of the field to include the roles non-governmental organizations play in diplomacy and agenda-setting, the vast areas of international collaboration that eventuate in international regulation, regimes, or even 'governance', international environmental problems, and the like.
7. Firm empirical knowledge about major trends in war, conflict management activities of international organizations, trade, commerce, communications, and investment.
8. Development of the concept of power, away from its crude determinism in the 1930s, to complicated sets of bargaining relationships in which greater 'power resources' do not always predict to victory.

Would one choose a textbook of the 1930s as a suitable teaching vehicle today? The obvious choice is not based solely on the argument that the predecessors of the 1930s or 1940s were concerned solely with the headlines of the day. Some were, but most authors recognized that a field of study is more than factual reporting of the week's or year's events, and that there is a set of theoretical issues and problems that is generic to international politics and that distinguish it from other fields. A textbook, one decade after it was written, should be more than a historical curiosity. Yet, most of the efforts of the 1930s were dated within a decade. Many textbooks of the early 1980s, in contrast, can be read with considerable intellectual profit today. Theoretical offerings of the 1960s and 1970s serve many contemporary intellectual purposes and are foundations for all scholars who represent themselves as experts on international politics. Perhaps it is because of their success—the way their major ideas have become part of the ordinary vocabulary of international politics' discourse—that we tend to take their work for granted.

The field during the Cold War was not devoid of ethnocentrism, sectarian and intolerant in-fighting, geographical myopia, and a host of other shortcomings. There were intellectual dead-ends, and some areas were, perhaps prematurely, abandoned. Some of the efforts at quantification were regressive in the sense of trivializing important problems or excluding major areas of the field such as international law. The syndrome of doing things only one way (e.g. my way) is as much a characteristic of the field today as it was in the heyday of the 'behavioural' revolution. The confusion between international politics and international relations (or world politics) remains, although most undergraduate students seem to have no difficulty understanding the differences. There is no shortage of problems in the field.

A litany of shortcomings is not, however, a general indictment or an indicator of lack of progress. There is little compelling evidence that the body of Cold War era scholarship was simply an apology or justification for American national interests.[83] The behavioural revolution was an explicit attempt to divorce analysis from partisanship. There were in fact few critics of established policy as compelling as Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan, Hedley Bull, or David Singer, all major theorists of the era. The claim that positivism—or, more broadly, empiricism—was regressive also challenges the idea of progress, but aside from the renewed study of the normative and legal dimensions of international politics the alternatives to empiricism have not provided much enlightenment on the substantive problems of the field. Over the time period in question, scholars became more scholarly, though not necessarily more philosophical. They acknowledged the need for more reliable evidence, many coming to appreciate the classical traditions that set the main issues and problems in the field; and most welcomed new and novel ways of posing both old and new problems. Substantive studies in the areas of decision-making, state formation, bargaining, international regimes, the democratic peace, dependency relationships, among others, deepened the field in its historical, theoretical, and empirical dimensions. And all of this was not just 'for' some political or national programme, as Robert Cox[84] and numerous other critics have declared. The normative foundations of international relations' scholarship have been acknowledged above, but we also have to re-emphasize that scholarship derives from curiosity, a human drive to create better understanding of complexities, from the desire to solve puzzles, and from a critical attitude toward official policy. Seeking conceptual clarity, taxonomic work, examining the logic of situations and previous theoretical constructs, and scholarly criticism in general is not necessarily 'for' some political programme. Scholarship has its own standards, requirements, and goals. It does not need a political project to animate them.

The Cold War affected scholarship in many different ways, but it did not dominate it to the exclusion of other impulses. Realism as a philosophical and positivist rendering of the essential characteristics of international politics owes its origins as much to both a classical tradition of thinking and to the serial aggressions of the 1930s as it does to the diplomatic and strategic behaviour typical of the Cold War years. That realism became a predominant representation of international politics during part of this era should come as no surprise because much of what observers saw in the practices, ideas, and norms of Cold War rivalry and competition fit reasonably well with the texts of Carr, Morgenthau, Schwartzenberger, and others. The areas of crisis decision-making, bargaining theory and deterrence, and security studies in general demonstrated most explicitly the nexus between the Cold War and scholarship. The dangers and threats of Soviet and American behaviour lent an urgency to studies which had as their underlying purpose not only increasing knowledge but making the world a safer place. As these threats began to wane during the era of détente, and as the Western economies became increasingly integrated, the cooperative side of international politics began to assume more theoretical prominence, although it had never disappeared even during the height of the Cold War. By the 1980s, despite a resurrection of Cold War-type behaviour (e.g. the shooting down of KAL 007, the ‘Star Wars’ programme, Nicaragua, and the like) the field developed many new ideas, directions, and debates. Some were inspired by new normative concerns such as the environment; others derived from debates within the discipline, and the ‘post’ movement searched for inspiration in the works of Continental philosophers who had no interest in wars, cold or otherwise. Our excursion thus suggests that while context matters, seemingly in direct proportion to the perceived intensity of threat or fear, it is not a sufficient explanation for the development of the field. Scholarship has its own mores, demands, and foibles. Academics do not need major international trends to animate their debates and to search for more reliable knowledge. Scholarship is a part of the world, but is also a world of its own.

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[83] Hoffmann argued in 1977 that American policy-makers used scholarship *after* it was produced; thought preceded policy. Later, policy and scholarship, particularly in security studies, became entwined and blended, invigorating each other. Stanley Hoffmann, 'An American Social Science', pp. 47–8.

[84] Robert Cox, 'Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory', in Robert Keohane (ed.), *Neorealism and Its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), pp. 204–55, especially p. 207.