

AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL

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SUDAN

Stakes in the war

China's state oil company, Malaysia's Petronas and Canada's Talisman head the list of international companies building Khartoum's oil industry. The supply and logistics companies are mainly from Europe; that has helped Khartoum's diplomacy and war efforts enormously.

CONGO-KINSHASA 3

Slow, slow

The West is offering Joseph Kabila a trade-off: if he takes the Lusaka accord seriously, they will put pressure on Rwanda and Uganda to pull back their troops and rebel allies. After a meeting with mediator Ket Masire, Kabila has promised to start the Congolese national dialogue which armed and unarmed oppositionists demand.

GAMBIA

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Jumping Jammeh

Despite worsening corruption, rigged elections and the killing of 14 demonstrators last year, President Jammeh has defied censure and negotiated a debt write-off with the IMF and World Bank. He's in no hurry for political reforms.

ZAMBIA

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Third time unlucky

President Chiluba's bid for a third term is in trouble. It's splitting the ruling MMD and could still get snared in constitutional wrangles and it has given the opposition a powerful new rallying call.

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South Africa, Kenya, Ethiopia & Benin

Spooky; sick roses; Meles wins; and election masquerade.

Opening new fronts in the oil war Petrodollars are financing Khartoum's diplomacy and its war against the south

The Khartoum regime's drive to become a major oil producer is systematically killing Sudan's southern citizens and destroying their homes. Backed by Western and Asian companies, this is proceeding apace, despite a growing but ineffectual chorus of international condemnation. Khartoum's current dry-season offensive is distinguished from others by an intense focus on oil, as the National Islamic Front government fights to extend the investors' grip on installations and concessions, and its own grip on power. (Though the NIF now calls itself the 'National Congress', with **Hassan Abdullah el Turabi's** 'Popular National Congress' as the 'opposition', Sudanese still call the whole thing the '*Jebha*' (Front), including 'El Turabi's faction', AC Vol 41 No 4).

The Western oil companies, if not the Asian ones, are working overtime on their images. Talisman, lead company in the consortium now pumping out some 200,000 barrels per day (bpd), is **Canada's** largest independent energy supplier. It has hired **United States'** public relations firm Hill and Knowlton (once champion of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International) and has created a social responsibility unit to demonstrate its good intentions. Now it has launched a newsletter, 'HOPE', which proclaims how Sudan pipeline project staff get human rights training, and parades an upcoming ethical audit. A casual reader might infer that Talisman is more interested in building schools and clinics than in extracting oil in a war zone.

Corporate contributions to peace and development

Sweden's Swiss-based Lundin Oil, which operates in war-torn **Congo-Kinshasa**, also touts its social responsibility. 'We believe that contributing to the economic development of the area improves the chances of peace and the conditions of the local population,' says **Ian H. Lundin**, son of founder **Adolf Lundin**. 'Our presence has provided employment opportunities, mobility and access to fresh water. We also plan to establish medical and educational facilities for the local communities.' But, as a series of independent reports confirms, most of the local people have been driven away or killed, so the beneficiaries are government-approved migrants. Some 'safe' areas are fast being settled by farmers from the north (as happens in Nuba areas).

Dinka and Nuer people around the Heglig and Unity fields north of Bentiu came under heavy attack in the mid-1980s and the 1990s. Unity is Block 1, Heglig is Block 2. A 1,600-kilometre pipeline from Heglig to the Red Sea was completed in September 1999, opening the way for exploration in Nuer Western Upper Nile, which has been devastated ever since. The latest onslaught is directed against a wide swathe of Eastern Upper Nile, where a new consortium headed by the **China** National Petroleum Company (CNPC) began exploration in Block 3 this month.

The concession covers 72,400 square km., mainly of the Upper Nile region, where government-backed militias controlled by Commander **Biel Chuol** from Longochok have driven off tens of thousands of southerners in recent months. United Nations' officials and southern church leaders fear a catastrophic famine this year as a result. The UN said 600,000 people face starvation; others say double that number are threatened.

The offensive in Eastern Upper Nile reached new heights in January. Government militias coming from Adar, where there is an operational oilfield, attacked Dhowanyawa village near Guelguk. In the south, militias can consist of the government's People's Defence Forces (PDF); press-ganged youths and Islamist zealots; the southern forces of politicians coopted by Khartoum, often temporarily; and the government-paid *Murahileen*, Arabic-speakers from the north-south border areas out for booty and adventure. Local chiefs say that the villages of Tenyakak, Mangok and Kolegit were then attacked and their people chased towards Udier by militiamen. The chiefs said the attacks began at night and that government forces, some on camels, avoided the barracks of **Riek Machar Teny Dhurgon's** Sudan Popular Defence Forces (SPDF), now again at odds with the NIF government, in order to target civilians. Tenyakak lost at least 57 people in the attack.

The UN's Operation Lifeline Sudan has put the area off-limits; a relief worker outside the OLS

A stake in the oil war

Foreign companies benefitting from the oil bonanza include:

The pipeline: built by the **China** National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), the line consists half of Chinese pipe, half of pipes supplied by the Europipe Consortium (mainly **Germany's** Mannesmann, **British** Steel (now Chorus) and a **French** company). Denim Pipeline Construction Limited and Roll'n Oil Field Industries, both of Calgary, **Canada**, contracted for some oilfield and pipeline work.

Pumping stations were manufactured by Weir Pumps of Glasgow, which was retrenching until this work came along. Weir's first contract, in January 1998, was estimated to be worth around US\$50 million. Weir hints that the second contract was far less valuable. The new pumping stations could boost the line's capacity, now about 250,000 barrels per day, or serve a new parallel line if output reached 400,000 bpd.

Equipment and operational support from Britain's Rolls Royce PLC (not to be confused with the car maker, now German). Allen Diesel, part of the same group via Rolls Royce Power, has supplied '34 diesel engines to pump oil along the national pipeline and for power generation purposes'. Rolls Royce also says it supplies 12-20 expatriate engineers at any one time. Its local partner is DAL Engineering.

Firefighting equipment is courtesy of Britain's Angus Fire.

The Port Sudan Marine Terminal (Beshayir) gave work to **Argentina's** Techint International Construction. Concessions:

Blocks 1 and 2 (Heglig and Unity) are operational. They involve CNPC 40%, **Malaysia's** Petronas Karigali 30%, Talisman 25%, Sudan National Petroleum Co. (Sudapet) 5%.

Block 3, Adar Yale (operational, expanding): Gulf Petroleum Corporation-Sudan: Gulf Oil (**Qatar**) 46%, CNPC 23%, Thani Corporation (**United Arab Emirates**) 23%, Sudapet 8%.

Block 5a, south-east of Bentiu (testing): International Petroleum Corp./Lundin Oil 40.375%, Petronas 28.5%, **Austria's** OMV 26.125%, Sudapet 5%.

Block B and the 'Papyrai' block in Bahr el Ghazal (suspended since 1985) held by TotalFinaElf (France, **Belgium**).


Lundin (**Adolf Lundin** holds 25 per cent) operates as Lundin Sudan Ltd. OMV's wholly owned subsidiary is OMV (Sudan) Exploration GmbH. Royal **Dutch Shell** (Britain, Netherlands) has refined and sold fuel since colonial times. It's now under NGO pressure for selling it to the Sudanese armed forces: it says it doesn't 'discriminate between customers'. Army and government spokesmen boast that local oil boosts military purchases and helps their war effort.

described the attack: 'Parents who had fled the shooting and in the ensuing chaos could not find their children, children running and not finding their parents, people who arrived naked having been stripped and beaten, people who were caught and tied up in a hut which was set on fire.'

Relief officials and chiefs agreed that the aim of the offensive was to drive civilians from the Guelguk area, to allow oil exploration to proceed unimpeded. OLS sources, not allowed to speak out, privately say they believe the offensive also aims move out the relief agencies who might report the atrocities (a tactic used in the Nuba Mountains).

Government militias attacked Mading, north-east of Nasir, and buried anti-personnel mines inside the compound of one non-governmental organisation, outside the Primary Health Centre and at a water point. At Uleng, militiamen sprayed the empty compound of a US refugee agency, the International Rescue Committee, with machine-gun and rocket fire, shouting: 'We're going to take UN workers!'

Taban Deng Gai was the elected governor of Unity State (ex-province) but fled for his life under threat from the army last year. He



told *Africa Confidential* that the government had budgeted US\$10 million dollars for militias in the current offensive. A Nuer from Upper Nile, Taban Deng became Minister of State for Roads in the national government when he left Unity. He said he had asked for southerners to benefit from the oil through jobs and roads but was refused. Soon after his defection, two of his regional ministers, **Louis Keah Madut** (Engineering Affairs) and **Chuo Dekier** (Social and Cultural Affairs, a Muslim) were killed, reportedly on the orders of a senior minister. Taban claimed that before defecting from Khartoum in January, he had attended a meeting at military headquarters, when it was decided to pay each militiaman 50,000 Sudanese pounds (\$20, well over a month's income in rural areas) for every operation in which he participated and £Sud700,000 compensation if his horse or camel were killed. He said oil money made such payments possible. The real prize was booty. 'Any cattle is his. Any child fallen captive is his.' This helps explain the current revival of the slave trade.

Campaigners against foreign investment in Sudan's oil industry say that some of the money financing the war in Eastern Upper Nile could come indirectly from **British** Petroleum, now joined with the USA's Amoco. BP Amoco, which is the first oil company to sign the UN Declaration of Human Rights (after being criticised in **Colombia**), has announced investment of \$1 billion in PetroChina, a subsidiary formed by CNPC as a vehicle for raising money on international stock markets. Now CNPC has taken a 23 per cent stake in the concession in Eastern Upper Nile. PetroChina is an important source of funds for its operations. So BPAmoco now is under pressure to sell its shares in PetroChina but it has told the campaigners there is a 'firewall' between PetroChina and CNPC. In fact the heavy control of information about Chinese state companies such as CNPC makes drawing any conclusions problematic.

Southern opposition to the government's oil offensive has been weakened by factional fighting. Just as it has fuelled northern divisions in the National Democratic Alliance, the NIF has split southerners along ethnic lines, especially among the Nuer of Upper Nile-Bahr el Ghazal. The SPDF's **Peter Parr** gets his guns through the government militia of General **Paulino Matip**; **Peter Gadet**, a former commander under Matip, fights in the anti-government Sudan People's Liberation Army. The feud between them dates back to 1999, when Gadet was blamed by the SPDF for devastating Leer, Riek Machar's home-town. Last year, in Block 5a south-east of Bentiu, government troops and militias cleared the way for a 100-km. road between Lundin Oil's supply-base at Rub Kona and its wells at Thar Jath. Parr's forces in the area resisted and forced Lundin to suspend its operations in February 2000, citing 'logistical difficulties' but failing to mention the war. Sources in the SPDF have told us Matip offered Parr ammunition for the fight against his old enemy Gadet. With Parr beaten back, the government won a double victory: opposition to Lundin's oil road melted away and fighting between Nuer factions continued to drive people out of oil-rich Western Upper Nile.

Gadet told *Africa Confidential* he had sought reconciliation with Parr. He said he had sent two commanders with a 50-man escort to talk to Parr within weeks of his defection from Matip in 1999 but Parr's forces killed them all in the SPDF-controlled village of Koch. A European aid agency says its members saw the bodies. Gadet said he ordered a second peace delegation to turn around in mid-journey some months later, after being warned of another trap. The blood-feud is now beyond control. Senior SPLA sources say that their Chairman, Colonel **John Garang de Mabior**, contacted Gadet by radio to urge him to cease his attacks on Parr but Gadet cut the radio connection.

Redrawing the map

Lundin Oil has completed its Rub Kona-Thar Jath road, which offers government forces a new route into inaccessible areas of Western Upper Nile. Local chiefs have reported segments of pipe being transported south to Thar Jath, which needs an extension to the Heglig-Port Sudan pipeline. Having depopulated the route in a year-long offensive (documented by Christian Aid in a new report on the war, *The Scorched Earth*), Khartoum is now changing the map. Confirming Lundin's discovery of a new field with a proven capacity of 4,620 bpd, **Hassan Ali el Tom**, Under-secretary in the Ministry of Energy and Mining, said last week that the new field was 'in northern Sudan, on the border with the south.' In fact the field, south of Lundin's original wells at Thar Jath, lies deep in southern territory where Nuer ownership was never disputed until oil was discovered.

Christian Aid has called on foreign companies to suspend investment and involvement in oil immediately. It said the companies were complicit in the NIF's war, crucially because they rely on security forces responsible for human rights abuses and have failed to investigate those abuses. It said this failure encourages the government to believe it enjoys impunity. Belatedly, the opposition umbrella, the NDA, echoed these calls on 21 March. In February, the Presbyterian Church of the United States joined others in recommending divestment from Talisman. Ottawa's concern is growing – unlike, it would appear, most European governments, whose companies are doing well out of the oil boom. Euro-governments argue the war is another reason for 'constructive engagement' with the NIF.

So the oil campaign comes mainly from Western NGOs but it is growing. Former Swedish Prime Minister **Carl Bildt**, currently in the media spotlight in **Macedonia** as UN Special Representative to the Balkans, is on Lundin's board. Last week, pressed by journalists, he acknowledged that reports of abuses surrounding oil exploitation in

Block 5a were 'partially correct'. Then citing an issue 'of principle', the head of the Consular Department of Stockholm's Foreign Ministry (and foreign policy advisor to Bildt when he was Premier), **Jonas Hafström**, resigned from the board of Rostock Oil, which Swedish media say is Lundin's **Russian** operation. Lundin sent **Christine Batroch**, an investigator whom it said had human rights credentials, to Block 5a. As we went to press, it was due to hold an emergency board meeting to review the situation.

Khartoum is determined to press ahead, however. It has sold oil concessions across the south, as far as the **Ugandan** border, in opposition-controlled areas. This will only exacerbate the war and its human cost.

CONGO-KINSHASA

Slow, slow

Western powers like Joseph Kabila but that doesn't mean a quick peace

Peace on the ground is no nearer in Congo-Kinshasa since **Laurent-Désiré Kabila's** murder on 16 January but the diplomats are smiling more (AC Vol 41 No 4). Son and successor President **Joseph Kabila** has been favourably received in Western capitals, notably by the 'contact group' of **Belgium, Britain, the United States and France**. The Western powers are offering Kabila II a trade off: if Kinshasa takes the Lusaka accord seriously – which means talking to United Nations mediator **Ketumile Masire** and not obstructing the deployment of UN observers – then the West will lean on **Rwanda and Uganda** to pull their troops back and rein in their sponsored rebel factions. Washington has already started sending 'frank messages' to Kigali and Kampala about their obligations under Lusaka and the diplomatic and other consequences should they flout them. Britain's Foreign Secretary **Robin Cook** gave Kabila a similar message: 'Comply with Lusaka and we're ready to help you'.

Kabila II's understated style went down well in Washington and Paris last month. He seems more flexible and pragmatic than his father. Clearly he's happier talking to foreigners than addressing the obstacles he faces in local politics. Even if Kabila wanted to comply fully with the Lusaka accord, he lacks the political authority to do so. For all the foreign plaudits, Kabila II's legitimacy as President is still disputed by many Congolese.

Who's running Kinshasa?

So most diplomats are still confused about who is running Kinshasa. The powerful civilian voices are Interior Minister **Gaëtan Kakudji**, Foreign Minister **Léonard She Okitundu**, Minister of State in the Presidency **Pierre-Victor Mpoyo** and former Ambassador to **Cuba Godefroid Tchamlesso** (see Box). **Angolan** President **José Eduardo dos Santos** is pulling fewer of the strings since some of Luanda's friends – such as Colonel **Eddy Kapend** – have been under arrest (AC Vol 41 No 5). Yet Luanda's military clout remains indispensable for Kinshasa. **Zimbabwe's** influence is growing again: Harare's parliamentary Speaker and former spymaster **Emmerson Mnangagwa** has skilfully insinuated himself into the new order in Kinshasa. Strategic planner Mpoyo meets and consults with Zimbabwean businessman and Mnangagwa-ally **John Bredenkamp**, who is leading the charge of Afrikaner investors (from Zimbabwe and **South Africa**) into Congo. 'It's the Afrikaner renaissance!' joked one source close to the discussions.

On 16 March, Kabila was welcomed at the European Commission, whose **Italian** President, **Romano Prodi**, announced that aid, stopped

in 1992 after a massacre at Lubumbashi University, would start again. The Commission said it would at once contribute 28 million Euros (US\$ 25.2 mn.) for rehabilitating Congo's justice system, starting with help for the courts and publication of court records. In early March, the European Community Humanitarian Office released E35 mn. to meet urgent needs. Prodi promised about E50 mn. more (from E120 mn. in funds already allocated) if there were positive results from the meeting on 18 March between Kabila and Masire, the ex-President of **Botswana** who is to facilitate an inter-Congolese dialogue.

Those lobbying hard for aid range from Laurent Kabila's former fans, such as **Pierre Galand** (former head of Oxfam-Belgium), through socialists to the Hutus' Catholic supporters. The Belgian government organised a Belgian-Congolese meeting on 16 March, which brought together Foreign Minister **Louis Michel**; the two junior ministers concerned with aid, **Eddy Boutmans** and **Annemie Neyts**, at the Ministry of Foreign Trade; and the Governor of the *Banque Nationale de Belgique*. On Kabila's side were Central Bank Governor **Jean-Claude Masangu**, Culture Minister **Juliana Lumumba** (daughter of the murdered **Patrice**) and Foreign Minister She Okitundu.

In Brussels, Kabila met **Javier Solana**, head of the EU's infant foreign and security policy. We understand that the EU's envoy in the Great Lakes region, **Aldo Ajello**, in Kigali at the time, was discussing disarmament and demobilisation of the 'negative forces' - Angola's *União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola*, the former *Forces Armées Rwandaises*, the *Interahamwé*, **Burundi's Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie** and various Ugandan rebels, etc.

Kett meets Kabila

Before resuming aid, the EU wants a firm date for the first meeting of the inter-Congolese dialogue between the government, the rebels, the unarmed opposition and 'civil society'. On 18 March Kabila had a good meeting with Masire. Kabila Senior used to reject Masire as one-

sided; this time, Masire spoke of an 'identity of views'. This seems to be the 'substantial progress' that France and Belgium want to see before increasing aid. The unarmed opposition, and **Azarias Ruberwa**, Secretary General of the rebel *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie* (RCD, backed by Rwanda), say the Franco-Belgian stand encourages Kinshasa to keep on demanding that Joseph be acknowledged as transitional head of state.

One representative of the unarmed opposition reckons Belgium wants to bring the Kinshasa regime in from the cold, since that would favour the interests of Walloon businessmen in Congo (notably **George Forrest**, Belgian Chairman of the state mining company, *Gécamines*). Similar business-friendly pressure comes from the USA; on 18 March, State Department Spokesperson **Richard Boucher** demanded that Rwanda and Uganda persuade the 'Congolese rebel factions' under their influence to pull back their troops, as specified in the Kampala and Harare disengagement plans. RCD spokesman **Tryphon Kin Kiey Mulumba** says that his movement, like the other armed rebel movements and the unarmed opposition, does not accept that Joseph Kabila should take part as head of state in the inter-Congolese dialogue. He wants a transitional president to be jointly chosen by all parties to the dialogue.

There are other grounds for doubting the ceasefire. The UN Observer Mission in Congo (MONUC) criticised the attack, on 12 March in Equateur Province, by **Jean-Pierre Bemba's** Ugandan-backed *Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo* on a vessel on the Ikelembe river belonging to the *Forces Armées Congolaises* (FAC). Some of the participants do not wish to start withdrawing.

In Eastern province, there is tension between the MLC and the RCD-Goma, which since November has captured more than 100 km. of territory between Kisangani and Banalia, to get control of diamond mines. Similar motives are behind the fighting between the RCD-Goma and **Roger Lumbala's** RCD-National (also backed by Uganda)

Generals, tontons and kidogos

Two months after his father's death, President **Joseph Kabila** has reshuffled his government and his staff officers, around the figure of his 'uncle' **Gaëtan Kakudji**, a cousin of the late **Kabila Senior** who is now Minister of the Interior. On 8 March, he announced that Lieutenant General **Sylvestre Lwetsha** (from Kivu and 75 years old) remains Chief of General Staff, head of all the services; he was formerly a MaiMai fighter but now has no influence over the Kivu rebels. His number two, Brigadier Gen. **Dieudonné Kayumbe**, was trained at Saint-Cyr military academy in France and served in **Mobutu Sese Seko's** army; he gives up the job of deputy Minister of Reconstruction.

Command of the army goes to Gen. **François Olenga** (Western Kasai), whose father was a guerrilla with Kabila Snr. Maj. Gen. **Liwanga Mata** remains head of the navy; he and his CoS, Col. **Damas Kabula** (North Katanga), also served under Mobutu. The airforce goes to Gen. **John Numbi** (N. Katanga) who has no military training and once lost a battle alongside Kabila Junior in Katanga. Gen. **Delphin Muland** (Lunda from South Katanga) gets the purely symbolic job of Inspector General of the *Forces Armées Congolaises* (FAC).

There is little promotion for Lunda officers. To replace the arrested Col. **Eddy Kapend** (Lunda) as the President's aide-de-camp, Joseph K appointed Col. **Jean-Pierre Moya Dongo**, from Bunia in Eastern Province. The President didn't object to the arrest of Gen. **Jean Yav Navesh**, another Lunda who commanded the 7th military district, which covers Kinshasa.

South Katanga is also poorly represented in the new cabinet, named on 12 March. The new head of the National Intelligence Agency is **Kazadi Nyembwe** (W. Kasai), formerly director of Cohydro, a state company with the sole right to import petroleum products; he is the only 'tonton' who

knew Joseph as a small boy in **Tanzania**. The new director of the President's Office, **Théophile Bemba Fundu** (Bandundu), formerly Governor of Kinshasa, is said to be a hawk. Another hawk is **Vangu Mambweni** (Bas-Congo), the President's political/diplomatic counsellor.

The other team members are: **Evariste Boshab Mbudj** (W. Kasai), professor of constitutional law and now deputy head of the President's Office; **Mariette Kalavani** (Nandi, N. Kivu), advisor for social and cultural affairs; and **Charles Bushiri Deschryver** (mixed-race, Kivu), in charge of the President's private aircraft and his associate in the Hewa Bora Airways firm, named after Kabila I's former rebel base.

The special advisor for presidential security, **Jean Mbuyu**, used to work on human rights for the United Nations, then served Kabila Snr. (who introduced summary military tribunals). He was then in the office of the present Justice Minister, **Mwenzé Kongolo**, who keeps his job; both are Luba from Katanga, like Kabila and Kakudji.

The President's choices show little change. The key man is 'Uncle' **Pierre-Victor Mpoyo** (Luba from the Kasai-Katanga border), an old ally of Kabila, Kongolo and Kakudji. A consummate commercial strategist, MPoyo is determined to block any attempt by the Copperbelt Katangese to challenge the mining agreements he has made with **Zimbabwean** business interests such as **John Bredenkamp**. Equally, he wants to shore up those with **Namibia's Aaron Mushimba** and with George Forrest International, a group whose Belgian chief, **George Forrest**, is Chairman and Managing Director of *Gécamines*, the state copper and cobalt company. MPoyo, Kakudji and Mwenzé are wary of any constitutional change which might reduce their influence and even lead to cancellation of these commercial arrangements

around Bafwasende. The contract which grants equity in *Gécamines'* lucrative *Groupe Central* to a group of Zimbabwean investors led by Bredenkamp makes it unlikely that Zimbabwe's forces will leave soon.

Many observers expect that MONUC will be left to patrol a 30-km. corridor between the two sides' forces, neither of them in a hurry to leave Congo. This is all the more probable since no quick progress is expected either with disarmament of the 'negative forces' or with the inter-Congolese dialogue.

Anyway, the unarmed opposition has little confidence in Kabila's enthusiasm for reconciliation and democratisation. In Kinshasa on 12 March, the leaders of five parties (the *Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social*, *Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution 'fait privé'*, the *Parti Démocrate Social Chrétien*, *Forces Novatrices de l'Union Sacrée* and *Mouvement National Congolais-Lumumba*) boycotted a meeting of the preparatory committee for the inter-Congolese dialogue. First, they want Decree 194 cancelled, saying it places unacceptable restrictions on political parties. Kabila says only that the decree is a matter for negotiation. Like much else, that could take a long time.

GAMBIA

Jumping Jammeh

Corruption and vote-rigging draw attention to the President's election plans

It is easy to break Western precepts of good governance and still haul in international aid. President **Yahya Jammeh**'s regime shows how. In December, the International Monetary Fund relieved Gambia of debt worth US\$91 million, despite worsening government corruption, rigged elections and the killing of 14 demonstrators last year (AC Vol 41 No 8). Now opposition parties are campaigning internationally for free elections and foreign governments are looking more closely at the Jammeh order.

Jammeh has banned many leading politicians from this year's national elections and those eligible to stand face harassment and detention. The real winner of the 1996 elections, the United Democratic Party's **Ousseinou Darboe**, sought refuge in the **Senegalese** Embassy for fear of assassination. Two years earlier, Jammeh had seized power in a bizarre coup against the elected government of Sir **Dawda Jawara**, whom he accused of corruption and nepotism. None of Jawara's officials has been charged with any offence but all save a couple are banned from politics.

Jammeh's officials say the presidential election will be in October, with the National Assembly elections in January 2002. Yet the local government polls scheduled for last November have been postponed indefinitely because of 'problems with constituency boundaries'. Bishop **Solomon Johnson**, the Electoral Commissioner, doubted this, as did others, and took the government to court. In December, he was fired and replaced by **Gabriel Roberts**, who ran the dubious elections of 1996.

Nobody expects free elections like those last year in Senegal and **Ghana**, since nobody believes Jammeh and his Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction could win a free poll. The APRC's thuggish youth wing – formerly the July 22 Movement – is ready for action in marginal constituencies. Under the command of **Baba Jobe**, who operates out of the presidency, the **Libyan**-trained youth wing is the APRC's enforcer. Last June, the UDP's Darboe asked for police protection after an ambush by the youth wing. His request was turned down and he was arrested, along with 24 UDP supporters.

Darboe has since been improbably charged with murdering one of the militants of the 22 July Movement who had laid an ambush for a group of Darboe's supporters. It seemed at first that the government hoped to divert attention from squabbles among its security officers. Now it seems Jammeh wants to use the murder charge to disqualify Darboe – easily the country's most popular politician – from the elections. Some securocrats are still quarrelling but all key positions are under the control of Jammeh's tiny Jola ethnic group: Army Chief of Staff **Babacar Jatta**; Minister of Interior **Ousmane Badji**; Military Commander **Momodou Badji**; Director of the National Intelligence Agency **Abdullie Koujabi**. Grotesquely, Jammeh condemns Fula and Mandinka politicians for engaging in ethnic politics.

The President's poverty trap

Poverty, official corruption and insecurity worry Gambians more. The government has rejected the findings of its own Commission of Inquiry into the killing of 14 demonstrators, mainly students, last April. Jammeh's officials claimed the Commission hadn't investigated events leading up to the killings; the Justice Secretary and Attorney General, the deeply unpopular **Pap Cheyassin Ousman Secka**, led the government's charge against the inquiry. Then Secka, once described as 'more Jammeh than Jammeh', was sacked on 30 January and replaced by a member of the officially criticised Commission, **Joseph Joof**.

The affair rattled the judges. The senior judge who conducted the inquiry, **Ousman Jammeh**, was reportedly sacked; Chief Justice **Felix Lartey**, a Ghanaian, was pressured to resign – then withdrew his resignation several days later after the presidency had assured him that political pressure on the bench would cease once the furore over the report had died down.

The Commission named several Police Intelligence Unit officers in connection with the killings. Many blame the feared National Intelligence Agency. The government has tried to stifle the debate but its rejection of the Commission's report has strengthened the opposition campaign for the repeal of the decrees: Number 45, which set up the National Intelligence Agency and allows for detention without trial; Nos. 70 and 71, which muzzle the press and civil society; and No. 89, which bars politicians of the Jawara era from elections. Worse may be to come: the government's proposed Media Commission, comprised of Jammeh appointees, will have the powers of a court to suppress publications and prosecute for sedition.

The Commonwealth Secretary General, **Don McKinnon**, was in Gambia on 19-20 February to remind Jammeh that he had agreed to repeal Decree 89 last November. McKinnon, like others, was assured the decree would be repealed and free elections would be prepared. He told Jammeh that Gambia would remain on the watch-list of the Commonwealth Monitoring Action Group until the oppressive decree was rescinded. Gambia got another wrist slap from Commonwealth ministers when they met in London on 18-19 March: he was again told to repeal Decree 89 'well before' this year's parliamentary and presidential elections. However, the Commonwealth didn't give a deadline for the decree's repeal nor did it threaten sanctions if Jammeh ignored the request again. **Britain** is also applying pressure.

Unless Jammeh makes the reforms well before the October polls, they won't be recognised as legitimate. That doesn't worry the Jammeh regime unduly: on 4 March, Attorney General Joof said that the 'government was not in a rush to repeal Decree 89'. Joof and Jammeh may reckon that another six months on the Commonwealth watch-list are preferable to lifting the ban on popular politicians, especially in Mandinka areas, where there is plenty of support for

Jawara's banned People's Progressive Party. Jammeh may rescind Decree 89 a few weeks before the presidential election, leaving his opponents little time to rebuild their political networks.

Gambians in Britain and the **United States** are stepping up pressure on Jammeh. Their 'Movement for the Restoration of Democracy' organised a meeting of banned and unbanned oppositionists in the House of Commons in London on 28 February. Former PPP minister **Omar Jallow** and several others came from Banjul for the meeting, which was organised with a group of British Labour members of parliament led by **Diane Abbot**, **John McDonnell** and **Jeremy Corbyn**. A second meeting there is planned in April. This would try to work out a common coalition platform for the elections, something that's easier to do in Westminster than in Banjul. Also in the background is 76-year old Sir Dawda, living in exile in Sussex.

However, Jammeh has brought into his camp a couple of old-regime politicians - Jawara's former associate **Buba Baldeh** and PPP veteran **Lamin Nafa Saho**, who is set to be the APRC candidate for his home area of Central Baddibu, in a by-election on 31 March. **Musa Ngado**, National Reconciliation Party member for Kiang North, is under pressure to cross the floor, though the NRP's parliamentary leader, **Hamet Bah**, keeps up the public confrontation from his Upper Saloum power-base. APRC politicians claim they have won over thousands of former UDP supporters in key constituencies such as Lower Fulladu West.

Jammeh has said he favours *Sharia* (Islamic law); some think he is currying favour with backers from northern **Nigeria** and **Kuwait**, who are financing public works in Banjul; the Imam of State House mosque, **Abdullie Fatty**, is close to **Saudi Arabian** religious conservatives. The deputy UDP leader, **Lamin Waa Juwara**, recently warned Jammeh that *Sharia* would kill tourism and cut Western aid. Juwara suspects Jammeh of wanting a Libyan-style government, with no parties and no elections. Jammeh is active in the Libyan-sponsored Community of Sahelo-Saharan States, which held its third annual summit in Khartoum, **Sudan**, on 12-13 February.

How to pay for the pilgrims

Jammeh personally committed himself to sending 20 pilgrims from each administrative region to Mecca and Medina on the annual pilgrimage, the *Hajj*; opposition figures suggest that the bill will be met from links to diamond-running out of **Sierra Leone**. APRC dignitaries who lobby for funds for Arabic-language religious instruction include members of the Council of Elders, set up by Jammeh to co-opt religious leaders.

Abroad, things have been moving against Jammeh. His old pal **Babani Sissoko** (known as 'Babanding' in Banjul), a **Malian**-based businessman and airline proprietor, is wanted by legal authorities in several countries and rarely leaves the Bamako suburbs. Links between Jammeh's regime and **Charles Taylor**'s in Liberia provoke more interest. **Ansoumane Jobe**, a brother of Jammeh's security advisor Baba Jobe, is one of Taylor's top securocrats: the two Jobes were trained in Libya. Gambian army officers freely admit that some of their personnel (serving and retired) have freelanced in Sierra Leone for Taylor's militias and the rebel Revolutionary United Front.

Gambia produces no diamonds but has become a major exporter, mostly of gems smuggled from rebel-held areas of Sierra Leone. Last year, Jammeh's government didn't respond to questions from the United Nations team investigating the region's diamond smugglers. In 1998, **Belgium** recorded imports from Gambia of 449,000 carats, valued at \$78 mn. The volume fell by half in 1999 and 2000 but half is still a lot of money for Banjul's gemocrats.

Nigeria's President **Olusegun Obasanjo** sees Jammeh as a jumped

up lieutenant putschist and friend of Obasanjo's gaoler, the late General **Sani Abacha**. Obasanjo advises Jammeh to do as he is asked by CMAG (chaired by Nigerian Foreign Minister **Sule Lamido**). Obasanjo's censure didn't stop the British-based Nigerian soccer star **John Fashanu** going to Banjul in mid-February to give football kits to the Jammeh Foundation.

Senegal's President **Abdoulaye Wade** distrusted Jammeh's peacemaking gestures in Casamance and his friendship with **Guinea Bissau**'s late army chief, Gen. **Ansoumane Mane**. Mane helped smuggle arms to the Casamance separatists, with finance from the cannabis trade. Mane's death and the new peace deal in Casamance undermine Jammeh's regional position. That might explain Jammeh's meeting with Wade on a rare trip to Dakar on 19 March.

Gambia's economy is surreal. The IMF, desperate to show its readiness to relieve debts, approved \$91 mn. in relief under its Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative and so rescued the Finance Ministry from impending crisis. The 2001 budget projects a surplus of 280 mn. dalasi (\$20 mn.), after a 15 per cent rise in current expenditure (which Finance Secretary **Famara Jatta** is expected to spend in key electoral areas). Yet the dalasi has weakened sharply in recent months, on the back of a 16 per cent drop in tourist arrivals and major disruption to the groundnut trade. Still, with a tricky election coming up, Jatta will be expected to produce some economic magic - with some help from Jammeh's shy foreign friends.

ZAMBIA

Third time unlucky

The President's plan to stand again divides the nation and his party

President **Frederick Chiluba**'s bid for a third term is in trouble, with three quarrelling factions in the ruling Movement for Multi-party Democracy (AC Vol 41 No 24). The ultra-loyalists to 'the Boss' (Chiluba's preferred sobriquet, although there are plenty of others) want him to have five more years without conditions. Others back a third term only if Chiluba guarantees to step down soon after the election to let them in. The remaining MMD activists insist that the constitution be respected and that Chiluba must relinquish the presidency.

For now Chiluba's closest allies are: Minister for Lusaka Province, **Sonny Mulenga**; Minister for Northern Province, **Daniel Kapapa**; Home Affairs Minister, **Peter Machungwa** and **Nkandu Luo** at Transport and Communications.

Two ministers have been purged on presidential orders: the outspoken Local Government Minister, **Ackson Sejani**, and deputy Home Affairs Minister **Edwin Hatembo** were sacked for not 'respecting authority'. Chiluba's loyalists physically attacked Agriculture Minister **Suresh Desai** and Legal Affairs Minister **Vincent Malambo** at the MMD conference in Southern Province last month. MMD thugs are playing the xenophobic card, demanding the repatriation of independent member of parliament for Lusaka Central **Dipak Patel** to **Canada** for trying to impose 'foreign ideas' - even though he was born and bred in Zambia. Minister without Portfolio and Chiluba ally **Michael Sata** told Patel in parliament that 'even the Congress Party changed the constitution', which was taken as a jibe against Patel's Indian ethnicity.

Chiluba is losing his grip on the factions. The national Vice-President, General **Christon Tembo**, who wants the presidency for himself, insists that Zambia must be governed by its constitution,

meaning that presidents serve two terms maximum. Backing Tembo, the MMD Vice-President and Education Minister, Gen. **Godfrey Miyanda**, says Chiluba should lift the ban, imposed two years ago, on 'unauthorised' MMD candidates campaigning for the party's presidential nomination – a rule that clears the deck for Chiluba's third-term bid. Tembo and Miyanda might back a third term if Chiluba could be firmly committed to step down after the election, making way for fresh blood, meaning them.

There are reports that Chiluba-loyalists suggested a trade-off; they back a constitutional amendment allowing him to stand for a third term and he backs an amendment giving the national vice-president the right to succeed if the president resigns or dies and to serve for the rest of the presidential term. The present law is that the vice-president must hold fresh elections within three months.

The third, discreet, faction is led by **Boniface Kawimbe**, one of those tipped as Chiluba's successor. A founder of the MMD, Kawimbe defeated the incumbent Lusaka Chairman, **Sonny Mulenga**, at last month's provincial elections. He works closely with Major (retired) **Richard Kachingwe**, another anti-third-term senior party official. Their allies include Deputy Information Minister **Fidelis Mando**, former Lusaka Mayor **Fisho Mwale** and many of the party's young Turks. Legal Affairs Minister Malambo, who is Chiluba's lawyer and possible heir, has said he would not support a constitutional amendment: 'The constitution is the only shield we have against the natural ferocity of the human species and tendencies for self entrenchment.' He said nothing had happened since 1990 to change his view on the 'absolute need' to limit the number of presidential terms.

Frederick's four hurdles

The next big battle will be at the MMD national convention, whose delegates were elected last month. Of the nine provinces, only Lusaka and Southern passed resolutions opposing calls to amend both the party and national constitutions to accommodate Chiluba's third term. Chiluba's ministerial allies are backed by 73 district administrators. Yet his success depends on his grip on the party, which is slackening. The President must still leap four hurdles:

1. The National Executive Committee (NEC) must endorse the third term and place it on the agenda for the national convention.
2. The issue must be formally placed on the agenda.
3. If the convention agrees, the party constitution must be changed and the cabinet must agree on a bill to change the national constitution.
4. Such a bill would need two-thirds of the votes in parliament if Chiluba is to stand this year.

Plenty of his local and regional allies tactfully suggest he should give up. **South Africa's** President **Thabo Mbeki**, visiting Zambia last year, thanked Chiluba for having assured him that he would not go for a third term. **Tanzanian** President **Benjamin Mkapa** recently said that leaders should be ready to go when their time was up.

Pressure is mounting among the influential church groups that backed Chiluba in 1991 and 1996. Scores of people on the streets wear green ribbons to show they are against a third term. Every Friday afternoon at 5 p.m., motorists join the campaign by honking and hooting, causing a hullabaloo. On 21 February, hundreds of people attended a conference in the capital organised by the Law Association of Zambia; leading opposition figures, MPs and Catholic priests resolved to campaign against a third term. Some senior MMD members, including party Chairman **Sikota Wina**, were present at the biggest gathering for ten years, reminding people of MMD rallies in 1990 against President **Kenneth Kaunda's** ailing regime.

The MMD is divided but the opposition is confused. Opposition parties, focussing on the third-term debate and busy organising protest

marches, forget to tell voters about their alternative policies and ideas. Attempts to form a working opposition alliance flounder because they can't agree on a leader. On 4 March, for the first time, the main opposition leaders held a joint news conference - but talked mainly about the third term. 'What if Chiluba says he will not stand, what happens to us?' opposition leader **Akashambatwa Lewanika** asked his colleagues. 'This third-term thing might just be a ploy by Chiluba to divert us from real issues.' Many think likewise.

The electoral process is in a mess. Voter registration and constituency boundary-making have not yet started. The opposition ignores these and other unresolved logistical issues. 'Our chances of beating MMD are very slim unless we really and seriously come together. No single party can dislodge the MMD from power,' said **Dean Mung'omba**, leader of the Zambia Alliance for Progress.

The popular choice for leader of a merged opposition would be **Anderson Mazoka**, head of the United Party for National Development (UPND). However, the UPND believes it could defeat MMD without allies. Formed less than two years ago, UPND has put six MPs into parliament and now forms the biggest opposition block. It enjoys huge support in North-Western, Southern, Western and parts of Lusaka provinces and has swallowed up the National Party (NP), the second opposition group with five seats in parliament, in an alliance that will eventually incorporate the NP within the UPND.

Recently Mung'omba of ZAP and former Defence Minister **Ben Mwila** of the Republican Party (RP) dissolved their parties to form the Zambia Republican Party (ZRP), headed by Mwila but without much support. Akashambatwa Lewanika's party, Agenda for Zambia, seems not to exist at all despite having a seat in parliament; it broke out of the initial ZAP alliance and stands alone. The formerly ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP) is engrossed with internal leadership wrangles. Its new leader **Francis Nkhoma** has been suspended, its vice-president has been banned from his official duties and other party members seem to have given up. A new party council meeting has been called to iron out differences and elect a new leader, probably **Tilyenji Kaunda**, son of ex-President KK.

Amid the third-term debate and the factional splits, the economy is melting down. The kwacha has fallen to 3,700 to the US dollar from about K1,300. Hospitals desperately need drugs, diseases such as cholera kill scores of people every day. The much delayed privatisation of the state-owned copper mines was so mismanaged that it has cost Zambians hundreds of millions of hard-earned dollars; new reports indicate that its precious cobalt was so sold so cheaply that the government may have lost a further US\$150 million. Economic disaster should help the opposition's cause but its obsession with Chiluba's third term puts alternative policies in second place.

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SOUTH AFRICA

Spooky

A discreet row has blown up about a newly launched intelligence agency - Ukukhula Security Services - which draws much of its expertise from a group of apartheid-era spies from Orion Professional Management. In turn, OPM is controlled by Strategic Resource Corporation, the holding company of private military firm Executive Outcomes (EO). Sources close to the government's crack Scorpions' investigative unit say that OPM's expertise in counter-espionage could threaten the effectiveness of state surveillance operations.

OPM's apartheid-era spies, many of whom were 'positively helpful' in the 1994 political transition, have repositioned themselves as private-sector spooks and have been chasing contracts with the SA Revenue Services and National Intelligence Agency (AC Vol 42 No 5). According to Ukukhula's prospectus, one of its original investors was an African National Congress empowerment outfit, Ubambo Investment Holdings. Ubambo was the main local element (with a 20 per cent holding) in the Cell C consortium which last month won the country's third cellular telephone licence (AC Vol 42 No 4).

It is also well connected politically: one Ubambo director, **Shaheen Bawa**, was previously chief director in the NIA's technical division. With a master's degree in electronic engineering from London's Imperial College, she has associates including the South African Defence Force acquisitions chief, **Shamin (Chippy) Shaik** (AC Vol 42 No 3) and his brother **Riaz (Mo) Shaik**, a former spymaster and now Ambassador to Algeria. An Ubambo spokesperson says it has pulled its investment out of Ukukhula because of a 'lack of transparency'. There were allegations of 'unauthorised intelligence gathering' in Congo-K.

Still decidedly on Ukukhula's board is former military Intelligence officer **Jan Cloete**. Another director was **Phaundi David Mabaso**, an associate of former Defence Minister **Joe Modise**, formerly a senior officer of *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (MK), then Secretary General of the MK Veterans' Association. Mabaso died suddenly two weeks ago.

Founded by former Security Police intelligence chief **Alfred Oosthuizen**, OPM has roots in the apartheid security machine. Its original directors included EO's leading lights, **Eeben Barlow**, **Nico Palm** and **Lafra Luytjnh**. Oosthuizen dropped out after a quarrel; in 1997 Barlow and Luytjnh left and Oosthuizen returned to the board as did former Security Police colleague **Riaan Bellingan** and **Louis Coetzee**, once of National Intelligence. At the time of the takeover by Ubambo, Oosthuizen was thought to be OPM's majority shareholder.

OPM has close links to the Associated Intelligence Network, in which former security police are also directors; they include **'Basie'**

Smit (Oosthuizen's director in the Security Police) and Covert Collection Bureau agent **'Slang' van Zyl**. AIN was formed by Johannesburg businessman **Gary Lazarus**, who is seeking a tie-up with the black-owned forensic accounting firm Gobodo.

KENYA

Rose thou art sick

The position of Civil Service chief **Richard Leakey** is threatened by court proceedings alleging that he unconstitutionally intervened in a fraud case against the **Dutch** Bank ABN-Amro. The case also raises questions about the business practices of ABN-Amro, which plans to close its Kenya operations. Leakey and his 'dream team' of incorruptible administrators were appointed after a deal between President **Daniel arap Moi** and World Bank President **James Wolfensohn**, in July 1999 (AC Vol 40 No 16).

Leakey wrote last August to Attorney General **Amos Wako**, recommending that he put an end to legal proceedings against a Dutch former Managing Director of ABN-Amro, **Willem Johan Lemstra**, Dutch businessman **Bernhard Martens**, an Auditor at KPMG Peat Marwick's, **Andrew Douglas Gregory**, and ABN-Amro's credit manager, **Timothy Thagana**. He also asked Wako to stop an investigation by Kenya's Banking Fraud Investigation Department into a loan scam allegedly involving these four men which targeted Rosafric, a Kenyan flower-exporting firm. Such directives to Wako are unconstitutional.

Leakey said the case was causing 'strain on our bilateral relations with the Netherlands' and that ending the investigation 'would be in the national interest'. ABN-Amro apparently conceded that, if the prosecution were dropped, it would stop claiming the 10 million Dutch guilders (US\$4.1 mn.) it claimed it was owed by Rosafric's husband-and-wife owners, **Joyce Muthoni** and **John Nottingham**.

Wako did as Leakey suggested but the bank still wants the Nottinghams' money. The couple want justice from the individuals who, they say, fatally damaged their business. They are launching a private criminal prosecution in Kenya's courts this week, using information from the aborted official investigation; their case is that Lemstra and his associates knowingly charged to Rosafric's account an ABN-Amro loan that was in fact made to another company, Papyrus, controlled by Martens. Rosafric refused to pay this alleged debt and was forced into receivership in 1997. The receivers were KPMG Peat Marwick, whose employee Andrew Gregory handled the audit.

The case could damage the commercial reputation of the Netherlands, whose government last year slashed foreign aid, especially to Kenya, because of 'governance issues'. Leakey (a personal friend of the Queen's father, Prince **Bernhard**) may have acted in what he saw as Kenya's best interests. Whether he acted properly is another question. This could be the slip that Richard Leakey's enemies have longed for.

ETHIOPIA

Meles the winner

It's been a tough few weeks for Prime Minister **Meles Zenawi**. Eritrean intransigence over the United Nations' Temporary Security Zone between the two armies has delayed implementation of the Algiers peace agreement. Meles's critics in the Central Committee of the Tigray People's Liberation Front claim he made peace too quickly last December (AC Vol 42 No 4), missing the chance to destroy Eritrea's army. Defence Minister **Siye Abraha**, **Gabru Asrat**, President of Tigray State, and leading TPLF ideologues **Abaye Tsehaye**, **Tewolde Woldemariam** and **Alem Seged Gebreamlak** called for a tough line and the continued expulsion of Eritrean residents.

At the beginning of March, these hardliners came close to ousting Meles, attacking him for abandoning TPLF principles among other things. The critics called for a congress and issued a nine-page critique of his policies. However, Meles won the support of cadres at a meeting in Mekelle last week. With crucial backing from the military and security services, Foreign Minister **Seyoum Mesfin** and Meles survived the crucial vote at last Sunday's CC meeting, 17 to 12.

Meles has had problems with Siye and the Tigray hardliners before. Three years ago, they ensured Ethiopia's immediate and firm response to Eritrea's invasion. In the mid-1990s, after they had opposed the creation of a national army, Meles tried sending them to Tigray State, making Siye Chairman of the Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray. They won't get another chance. Meles' supporters talk of attempted coups, mentioning corruption. Arrests are possible; a major reshuffle is imminent.

BENIN

Whose masquerade?

The presidential election has turned to farce since two leading candidates pulled out of the second round of voting claiming fraud. President **Mathieu Kérékou** emerged from the first round on 4 March with 47.1 per cent of the vote against 28.9 per cent to his predecessor and former Prime Minister, **Nicéphore Soglo**. Soglo pulled out of the race on 16 March, calling the polls a 'masquerade'. **Adrien Houngbedji**, President of the *Assemblée Nationale*, took 13.5 per cent and pulled out on 19 March.

Soglo said he was incensed by incompetence in the vote-counting, contracted out to two independent agencies. Kérékou's opponent in the second round on 22 March was scheduled to be Prime Minister, **Bruno Amoussou**, who polled 8.59 per cent in the first round. Despite the political and constitutional chaos, a coup, for which Benin was once the world capital, doesn't look likely since Kérékou is a father figure to the army.