

Soviet Music in the International Arena, 1932–41

Soviet musical life underwent radical transformation in the 1930s as the Communist Party of the Soviet Union began to play an active role in shaping artistic affairs. The year 1932 saw the disbanding of militant factional organizations such as the RAPM (Russian Association of Proletarian Musicians) which had sprung up on the 'musical front' during the 1920s and had come to dominate Soviet musical life during the period of the first Five Year Plan (1928–32). 1932 was also the year that saw the consolidation of all members of the musical profession into centralized Unions of Soviet Composers. Despite such comprehensive administrative restructuring, however, it would be a mistake to regard the 1930s as an era of steadily increasing political control over Soviet music. This was a period of considerable diversity in Soviet musical life, and insofar as a coherent Party line on music existed at all at this time, it lacked consistency on a great many issues. One of the principal reasons for the contradictory nature of Soviet music policy in the 1930s was the fact that the conflicting demands of ideological prejudice and political pragmatism frequently could not be reconciled. This can be illustrated particularly clearly through a consideration of the interactions between music and the realm of foreign affairs.

Soviet foreign policy in the musical sphere tended to hover between two stools. Suspicion of the bourgeois capitalist West, together with the conviction that Western culture was going through the final stages of degeneration, fuelled the arguments of those who wanted to keep Soviet music and musical life pure and uncontaminated by such Western pollutants as atonalism, neo-classicism and the more innovative forms of jazz. However, cultural nationalism could cut both ways, and the desire to beat

the West at its own game led to a policy of encouraging Soviet participation in Western music competitions and promoting Soviet music in the West, as a means by which to demonstrate the natural superiority of the Soviet system in every walk of life. Although sweeping generalizations were a characteristic feature of Soviet rhetoric, 'the West' was not in fact regarded as a homogeneous entity, and distinctions were drawn between different foreign interest groups. Thus, links were forged between Soviet composers and left-wing music organizations in various countries, even where a broadly negative view was taken of the government of the country concerned.

Conflicting pressures played an important role in the shaping of all aspects of Soviet foreign policy at this time. Hitler's rise to power prompted a shift away from the strategy followed since the Rapallo pact of 1922 of maintaining friendly relations with Germany while at the same time exploiting antagonisms between capitalist countries in order to stave off the possibility of the Western powers uniting against the Soviet Union. Although Litvinov's pursuit of collective security dominated the foreign policy agenda for most of the 1930s, dissenting voices could still be heard. The orientation towards Germany, a policy that had been initiated by Lenin, remained something of a tradition among certain groups within the Kremlin, and intermittent attempts were made to revive the old alliance. Stalin himself held hostile views towards the outside world, and although he was willing to accept that the Soviet Union could not afford to maintain an isolationist stance, xenophobic attitudes nevertheless surfaced periodically in Soviet dealings with the West. The Comintern followed its own line in foreign policy throughout this period, a line which changed direction dramatically in the mid-1930s, as revolutionary internationalism gave way to the strategy of the Popular Front: an attempt to create a united front with socialist parties, directed against fascism. Elements of all of these different policies can be detected to varying degrees in aspects of Soviet policy towards music in the international arena. A survey of this kind does not, therefore, simply hold intrinsic interest for the historian of Soviet music; it can also throw light on some of the wider issues of Soviet politics during this period.

This article, which is based on a wide variety of archival materials as well as on contemporary published sources, will examine two aspects of the interactions between music and foreign affairs

in the Soviet Union. The first of these is the various attitudes taken towards Western music and musical life by Soviet policy makers, bureaucrats, composers and musicians; and the second is the different ways in which Soviet musicians became involved with the wider world of international musical affairs. The article will seek in particular to explore the extent to which modern Western music infiltrated the Soviet Union during this period and to identify the key aims of Soviet policy in the sphere of international music. The 1930s have tended to be regarded as a period of regimentation and isolation in Soviet musical life.¹ The intention here is to test how far this was indeed the case, as well as to analyse the motivating factors that lay behind the Soviet decision to engage with the world of international music.

Perceptions of Western Music and Musical Life

Attitudes towards contemporary Western music and musical life were shaped by several factors. Political prejudice against the countries involved, particularly on the part of Party decision makers, tended to generate an automatic bias against modern Western music. Many composers, including those who held or came to hold leading positions in the Composers' Unions, were more open-minded where the question of Western influences was concerned, even though they had to bow to political pressure at times and eliminate or camouflage such influences in their own work. The degree to which Soviet musicians and music policy makers were aware of current trends in Western music and performance practice is worth exploring, as an indicator of how far attitudes in this field were based on actual exposure to the music concerned, and how far they stemmed from simple bias.

Although there were fewer international contacts in the 1930s as compared with the previous decade, Western music — including popular music — continued to infiltrate the Soviet Union through a variety of different routes. Foreign musicians continued to visit the Soviet Union even during the second half of the decade, and the repertoire they brought with them provided their Soviet hosts with a valuable introduction to new Western works. Alan Bush (1900–95), for example, conducted four concerts of contemporary English music in Moscow in the autumn of 1938, which included his own music, as well as works by Vaughan

Williams, Ireland and Bax.² Western jazz bands, such as the Czechoslovak Ziegler's Jazz Revue, which toured the Soviet Union during 1934–7, brought recent repertoire and performance styles with them, sometimes winning very favourable reviews in the Soviet press.³ When compared with the period of the New Economic Policy, during which high-profile composers such as Hindemith, Berg and Honegger came to visit the Soviet Union and modern Western works were promoted by the Association of Contemporary Music (ASM), the 1930s were considerably more isolated with respect to international musical developments. A fair degree of contact was nevertheless maintained. The fact that a number of foreign conductors — some of them émigrés from Nazi-occupied territory — were offered engagements with Soviet orchestras, often on long-term contracts, also helped to increase awareness of contemporary foreign music among Soviet musicians.⁴

Tours of a long- or short-term nature by foreign musicians brought mixed propaganda for the Soviet Union, as the visitors gave varying reports of their impressions on their return home. The Lithuanian pianist Balis Dvarionas (1904–72), who visited Russia in 1933, subsequently gave several interviews to newspapers in Lithuania in which he expressed his enthusiasm for the Soviet Union and its musical culture.⁵ Paul Robeson (1898–1976), who made a number of trips to the Soviet Union during the 1930s, giving concerts of spirituals and protest songs, offered extremely positive assessments of Soviet life and, in particular, of Soviet nationalities policy. He even had his son educated in a Soviet school between 1936 and 1938.⁶ On the other hand, the German émigré conductor Heinz Unger, who worked with the Leningrad Radio Orchestra from 1933 until 1937, later wrote a book that was damning in its criticism of the way in which — as he saw it — musical affairs were controlled in the Soviet Union. He described the atmosphere surrounding the 1936 anti-formalism campaign as 'like being back in the Germany of 1933'.⁷ In 1937, in the atmosphere of heightened xenophobia generated by Stalin's Terror and as part of the measures taken to combat alleged sabotage in Soviet musical life, foreign conductors working in the Soviet Union were expelled. In a letter to the Soviet ambassador to Austria dated 23 September 1937, Platon Kerzhentsev, the head of the state Arts Committee, presented this move as having been prompted by the low quality of

the work carried out by many of these conductors.⁸ The director of the Moscow Philharmonia expressed the opinion in a memo to the Arts Committee in April 1938 that foreign conductors had tended to take a disparaging attitude towards Russian classical composers and to drop their works from the repertoire.⁹ The policy of refusing to invite foreign conductors to work in the Soviet Union only lasted for one season, however, and from September 1938 invitations were extended to several prominent Western conductors including Toscanini, Walter and Klemperer.¹⁰

Correspondence with foreign composers and music associations was a means by which Soviet composers were able to acquire the scores of recent Western works. The correspondence conducted between the Moscow Composers' Union foreign affairs department and various groups and individuals in different countries was intended as a means of facilitating the international exchange of repertoire, and it is interesting to note that the list of works received from abroad by the Moscow Composers' Union in 1933 included Stravinsky's *Symphony of Psalms*.¹¹ At the level of individual contacts, Nikolai Miaskovsky (1881–1950) was able to acquire from Sergei Prokofiev (1891–1953), when the latter was living in Paris, several scores by contemporary Western and Russian émigré composers, including Poulenc, Ravel, Rachmaninov and Stravinsky.¹² Foreign jazz records were likewise brought to the Soviet Union through unofficial channels: Western diplomats sometimes proved a useful source of such material, and records were also occasionally brought in by Soviet officials who were permitted to travel abroad, as well as being smuggled in illegally by black marketeers.¹³ The music on these records could then be transcribed for Soviet jazz bands to use.

Opportunities for Soviet composers to sample Western musical life at first hand were rather more restricted in the 1930s than they had been in the previous decade. Besides the various composers — such as Rachmaninov — who had received permission to travel abroad in the early years of the Soviet regime and had never returned, some Soviet musicians had been sent abroad in the 1920s for the express purpose of studying Western musical techniques. In 1926, Leopold Teplitzky was sent to Philadelphia to master new trends in American jazz, and similarly Aleksandr Veprik (1899–1958) visited Germany, Austria and France in the course of a five-month *komandirovka* in the spring of 1927, during which he studied Western methods of musical education

and instrumentation.¹⁴ In the 1930s, however, most composers had to gain their knowledge of contemporary trends in Western music by means other than personal experience gained from foreign travel.

Those who were given the opportunity for foreign travel were usually sent either as performers, as in the case of a trip to Turkey in 1935 by Shostakovich (1906–75) and Prokofiev's regular concert tours of Europe and America, or as jury members at international competitions.¹⁵ Plans, supported by the Commissariat of Enlightenment (Narkompros), for a Soviet delegation — including the Party official and one-time director of the Moscow Conservatoire Boleslav Pshibyshevsky, the Leningrad musicologist Boris Asafiev (1884–1949), Miaskovsky and Shostakovich — to participate in the International Music Congress held in Florence in the spring of 1933 foundered due to indifference on the part of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs.¹⁶ Alan Bush's appeals for Soviet composers to join and play an active role in the International Society for Contemporary Music (ISCM) also fell on deaf ears. Composers' Union officials expressed concern as to the political tendencies held by the majority of members, the role of the ISCM in fascist countries, the issue of whether or not Richard Strauss was a member, and the involvement of White Russian émigrés in the society.¹⁷

Instances of concerts of modern Western music held in the Soviet Union in the 1930s are surprisingly numerous. The Composers' Unions organized occasional review evenings during which contemporary Western works were played, and a series of lectures on the history of opera given in 1932–4 by Mikhail Ivanov-Boretsky (1874–1936) included discussion of works by Schoenberg, Berg and Hindemith.¹⁸ While one might have expected that the performance of such works would have been phased out altogether in the restrictive and xenophobic atmosphere which accompanied the anti-formalism campaign of 1936, this was not in fact the case. A meeting of the Arts Committee Music Board in August 1936 resolved to include the most interesting works by Western European modernist composers in the forthcoming concert plan of the Moscow Philharmonia, and a cycle of new chamber works by composers such as Krenek, Hindemith, Schoenberg and Poulenc was included in the 1936/7 concert plans of the State Philharmonia and the Radio Committee.¹⁹ It thus appears that a fair degree of autono-

my was available to lower-level decision makers working in this field. One would suspect, however, that such leeway was the result either of accidental oversight on the part of higher organs of control, or of the fact that music was not felt to be sufficiently important to warrant the careful surveillance conducted in other fields of artistic culture. The likelihood of its having been the outcome of a deliberate decision to pursue a liberal policy towards the use of contemporary Western music in Soviet concert programmes seems decidedly remote.

While the bulk of RAPM's programme had been widely condemned in 1932, their hostility towards modern Western music was not perceived as an exaggeration. Although such music was performed publicly in the Soviet Union during the 1930s, the Composers' Unions, Narkompros and the Comintern Revolutionary Music Bureau were almost universally critical of developments in contemporary Western music. Exceptions were made only in the case of works by certain left-wing Soviet sympathizers. Statements issued by the Composers' Unions tended to advocate a critical attitude towards music by bourgeois Western composers. Rather than calling for its wholesale acceptance or outright rejection, composers were expected to examine this music and utilize only those aspects that could prove constructive in the development of Soviet music, while discarding its harmful and decadent elements.²⁰ In the most notorious statement of Stalin's own attitudes towards music, issued in 1936 with the criticism of Shostakovich's opera *Ledi Makbet Mtsenskogo Uezda* (*Lady Macbeth of Mtsensk*) published in *Pravda* only two days after a visit by Stalin, Molotov, Mikoyan and Zhdanov to see the opera at the Bolshoi Theatre, the composer was attacked for his perceived use of contemporary Western musical techniques.²¹ The article condemned Shostakovich's use of an 'intentionally dissonant' musical language, with borrowings from jazz, which suited only the 'perverted tastes of formalist aesthetes' and the bourgeois public abroad.²² The official line on the use of contemporary Western musical influences by Soviet composers could not have been laid down more clearly.

Soviet ideological critiques of Western music were coloured by their views of the impact that a capitalist environment could have on composers and their music. Viktor Gorodinsky (1902–58), the music journalist and Party official, was a keen analyst of Soviet music and its place in the modern world. He argued in an

article written in 1932 that the intellectual impoverishment of the bourgeoisie was reflected in the music of capitalist countries. Since capitalism was unable to provide any new forms of creative inspiration, composers directed their energies either into neo-classicism — a movement that Soviet commentators tended to characterize as backward looking and ‘unprogressive’ — or towards the decadent formalism of atonality and abstraction.²³ Soviet critics tended to be less than precise in their conception of the exact nature of atonality, and preferred to make sweeping generalizations about how atonal music encapsulated the ‘disintegration of the integrity of musical self-consciousness, characteristic of the ideology of the modern bourgeois West’, rather than subjecting modern compositional techniques to more detailed analysis.²⁴ They were not alone in making such sweeping judgements. One German review of the première of Berg’s atonal opera *Wozzeck* in 1925 described the music as ‘truly frightful . . . the nastiness and lack of justification of the polyphony breaks even Schoenberg’s own world record . . . The work is a catastrophe in our musical development.’²⁵ It is intriguing to note that Nazi critics tended to describe the use of atonal musical techniques as symptomatic of ‘degeneracy and artistic bolshevism’.²⁶

Neoclassicism and atonality were not the only trends in modern Western music that came in for criticism by Soviet commentators. Works such as Krenek’s *Jonny Spielt Auf*, which cannot be said to fall into either category but which made considerable use of jazz influences as well as machine music techniques, also came under fire in the 1930s. This opera had been produced in Leningrad in 1928 and attracted a number of reviews that described it as revolutionary and progressive. Only five years later, however, critics were arguing that it had been quite wrong to canonize this work and that it in fact constituted a ‘slander against the revolutionary proletariat and its movement’.²⁷

One of the standard Soviet criticisms of Western composers was that they wrote their music for élite audiences: music ‘for the few’ rather than ‘for the many’. Krenek, for example, was attacked on the grounds that he strove ‘to make music the property only of the chosen few’, and this was taken as evidence of deep ideological crisis in the West.²⁸ The January 1936 *Pravda* editorial on *Lady Macbeth* argued that the opera had achieved success with bourgeois audiences abroad through its appeal to their ‘distorted tastes’. Reviews of Shostakovich’s works prior to

1936 had commented on the influence of Western modernism on his music, and it was claimed at the ensuing discussions in the Composers' Unions that Shostakovich had been corrupted by his exposure to works by Stravinsky, Berg, Krenek and Hindemith during his student years in 1920s Leningrad, and that he had strayed onto an 'erroneous path' when he allowed his work to become influenced by Western compositional techniques.²⁹ Gorodinsky, speaking at an Arts Committee debate on the subject of Soviet opera in March 1936, claimed that Shostakovich had been 'raised on German expressionism' and that *Lady Macbeth* had been strongly influenced by Alban Berg.³⁰

Despite such attitudes, however, positive appraisals of modern Western music by Soviet composers were fairly widespread, particularly during the first half of the decade. Glière and Shostakovich both called for an increase in the number of Western works performed in Soviet concerts, claiming that it was vital that Soviet composers should study Western techniques and learn from the most recent music being produced.³¹ Mikhail Druskin (1905–91), a musicologist at the Leningrad Conservatoire, was a regular reporter on musical events in Germany and an enthusiastic champion of the work of left-wing German composers such as Hanns Eisler (1898–1962).³²

One previously little-known incident which offers an interesting illustration of the different views held by musicians and Soviet officialdom towards contemporary Western music is the attempt made by Eisler and the Leningrad musicologist Ivan Sollertinsky (1902–44) to persuade the authorities to invite Arnold Schoenberg to settle in Moscow following his expulsion from Germany in 1934. Sollertinsky — the most outspoken advocate of Schoenberg's music in the Soviet Union — had been keen that the composer should be invited to visit the USSR in 1932.³³ In a short pamphlet on the composer, written in 1934, Sollertinsky characterized Schoenberg's twelve-tone system as a deeply expressive and innovative attempt to push out the boundaries of musical language. In addition, with a nod in the direction of political correctness, he expressed the belief that life in the Soviet Union would enable the composer to overcome his rarefied brand of aestheticism and become an active supporter of world proletarian revolution.³⁴ This view was not, however, shared by Narkompros officials. In his reply to a letter from Eisler, Boris Krasin, the Narkompros Music Inspector, stated

that although the Soviet authorities recognized Schoenberg's talent and his high standing in the musical world, they were concerned by the 'decadent' nature of his most recent work. Moreover, they feared that if, as had been proposed, Schoenberg were to take up a teaching post in Moscow Conservatoire, he could have a most undesirable influence on young Soviet composers.³⁵

During the anti-formalism discussions in Leningrad in 1936, Shatilov, the head of the Arts Committee Board of Musical Institutions (*Upravlenie muzykal'nykh uchrezhdenii*), argued that the recent proposal by Leningrad professors that invitations be extended to exiled German composers to move to the Soviet Union were mistaken. In his view, these composers displayed in their work the 'emptiness of the dying class', the bourgeoisie, and could therefore have nothing of value to offer the Soviet state.³⁶

Sollertinsky was one of those who publicly recanted his support for modern trends in Western music in 1936, although his speech at the meeting of the Leningrad Composers' Union in February of that year was clearly delivered under duress. He characterized his earlier endorsement of the music of Alban Berg — he had for a long time championed *Wozzeck* as a suitable model for Soviet opera composers to emulate — as a serious error of judgement. Nevertheless, he claimed that one of the reasons why he had been drawn to Berg's music was out of sympathy with those composers who had been ostracized by the Nazis, and he maintained that he had never defended Shostakovich's opera *Nos (The Nose)*, or Krenek's music.³⁷ Other musicologists who followed his lead included Iulian Vainkop, who confessed to having occupied a formalist position in 1927 when he had penned an apologia for Stravinsky.³⁸

There were some Soviet composers who continued (to a greater or lesser extent) to espouse the virtues of Western music even in the aftermath of the anti-formalism campaign of 1936. Prokofiev was one composer who continued to maintain the view that Soviet music could only be enhanced by the assimilation of new Western techniques. His assertion at an Arts Committee Music Board meeting in August 1936, that young Soviet composers lagged behind the West by forty years and needed to master Western techniques in order to catch up, marked him out as a 'Westernizer' in such matters.³⁹ This stance came in for official condemnation in the following year, when Kerzhentsev criticized

him in a speech delivered at the Moscow Composers' Union in April 1937 for allegedly suggesting that the mastery of Western techniques was essential in the quest to create a new Soviet style in music.⁴⁰ The former RAPM composer Viktor Belyi (1904–83) was, somewhat surprisingly, another person who supported calls to increase Soviet exposure to contemporary Western European music at the August 1936 meeting. This move was surprising given that, quite apart from his RAPM credentials, Belyi had made some particularly pointed attacks on Western music in 1933 when he condemned atonalism and jazz, which he described as one of the 'means by which the bourgeoisie deaden the psyche of the working class'.⁴¹ Nevertheless, in his 1936 speech, Belyi remarked that the Soviet Union had now 'reached the stage of musical culture where we hardly need to fear infection or suppression by the musical culture of Western composers'.⁴² Other participants at this meeting argued that it was essential to perform contemporary Western music so that Soviet composers could make an educated decision about whether or not it was the correct path for them to follow.

The question of whether jazz should essentially be regarded as having its roots in the music of oppressed black slaves or whether — on the contrary — it symbolized the decadent culture of Western capitalist society was never resolved by Soviet critics to anyone's satisfaction. The idea that there could in fact be two wholly separate types of jazz — the jazz of the bourgeois salon and authentic 'proletarian jazz' — received the official seal of approval from Kerzhentsev in December 1936.⁴³ This was one way of addressing the problem. Subsequent years witnessed a proliferation of attempts by composers to distance themselves from Western influences and create a wholly new genre of 'Soviet jazz'.

Rejection of Western style jazz was not in any way a new departure in 1937: Maxim Gorky's 1928 article 'On the Music of the Gross' had attacked jazz as a specifically Western genre, and Soviet jazz musicians frequently came under attack if they were seen to be adhering too slavishly to Western models.⁴⁴ Composers were expected to do their bit to help 'oust the old foxtrot repertoire with accessible, light, beautiful, healthy . . . Soviet dance music'. An article in praise of the composer of light music, Isaak Dunaevsky (1900–55), which appeared in the Leningrad arts journal *Rabochii i Teatr* in 1937, commented on the fact that

while the composer's early music-hall work had made uncritical use of Western techniques, he had since then successfully overcome this weakness and had become one of the main architects of Soviet jazz.⁴⁵ In 1938, the head of the foreign affairs department of the Moscow Composers' Union wrote to one of his correspondents in the United States requesting him not to trouble himself with sending any American jazz scores, on the grounds that 'we are no longer so very much interested in this kind of music, as many of our composers have already learned to write themselves jazz music, and our orchestras mostly perform our native jazz productions'.⁴⁶ Perhaps the most striking comment on the difference between Soviet and Western jazz was made by Mikhail Druskin in 1937, when he remarked that Soviet jazz was distinctive in that it did not attach any particular importance to improvisation.⁴⁷

Despite such attitudes, a number of prominent figures in the world of Soviet jazz nevertheless continued to advocate a more cosmopolitan approach. In a speech delivered during a discussion of jazz in the Leningrad Composers' Union in January 1937, the jazz musician and film star Leonid Utesov (1895–1982), who counted himself as a 'Sovietizer' rather than a 'Westernizer' where jazz was concerned, argued that Soviet jazz should base itself on the best American and European models, in order to assimilate the high technical standards of Western jazz.⁴⁸ Dunaevsky himself also advocated familiarization with Western models, drawing a distinction between 'cheap' imported foxtrots and tangos, and the music of George Gershwin and Duke Ellington which he regarded as being worthy of study.⁴⁹

This survey of Soviet awareness of Western music in the 1930s indicates that Sheila Fitzpatrick's assertion that after 1936 'contemporary Western music was no longer performed in public in the Soviet Union . . . Soviet music entered a period of isolation from the West' is unfounded.⁵⁰ While she is clearly correct to argue that Party and government officials would have preferred to limit the amount of modern Western music performed in Soviet concert halls, nevertheless the extent to which such officials were able to translate policy into practice was limited. However much RAPM activists, as well as those who spearheaded the anti-formalism campaign of 1936, may have wished to curtail it, contact with the West continued even during the second half of the 1930s. Although there was no group in Soviet

musical life of this period comparable to the ASM with its outspoken advocacy of Western musical techniques, and although Soviet composers faced many obstacles in their attempts to keep abreast of developments in Western music, it is clear that they received considerably more exposure to Western music than has previously been supposed.

Soviet perceptions of Western music were coloured to a considerable degree by their views of the Western world in general, and of the impact that a capitalist environment could have on music in particular. In articles and speeches on the subject, frequent references were made to the plight of unemployed musicians in the West, to the lack of creative inspiration enjoyed by Western composers, and to the fact that, with the ongoing economic crisis in the West and the accompanying decay of capitalist culture, the best and most progressive representatives of the bourgeois intelligentsia were joining the struggle of the proletariat.⁵¹ This interpretation was strengthened by the testimony of left-wing Western music commentators, many of whom went on the record to proclaim their support for the Soviet Union and its treatment of composers and musicians.

Articles about musical life in foreign countries became a regular feature of the Soviet musical press in the 1930s, with a substantial section of the Moscow Composers' Union journal, *Sovetskaia Muzyka*, devoted to musical developments and events abroad. Reports received from left-wing composers and critics such as Henry Cowell and Elie Siegmeister in the United States tended to focus on the 'progressive' aspects of their country's music, while reports from Soviet critics elaborated in detail on the supposed crisis in bourgeois music.⁵² Articles compiled by Soviet critics from reports in the foreign press included coverage of Thomas Beecham's speech in which he described the British government as 'an active enemy of art and music', William Kerridge's description of the Soviet Union as a 'paradise for artists', and the comments made by a foreign musician at the Ysaÿe violin competition in Brussels in 1937 that David Oistrakh (1908–74) was fortunate to come from a state which cared about musicians, because young musicians in capitalist countries could not even dream about the conditions in which their Soviet counterparts lived and worked.⁵³

The fact that the leaders of the Nazi regime in Germany made little attempt, for the greater part of the 1930s, to conceal their

contempt for Soviet communism could not but have a bearing on Soviet views of modern German music. Mikhail Druskin, the Leningrad musicologist, wrote regular reports on German musical life for the Soviet press, in which he described the more notorious incidents of Nazi music policy.⁵⁴ An example of the lengths to which anti-German attitudes in musical affairs could go is provided by the case of Vadim Borisovsky (1900–72), a professor at the Moscow Conservatoire and the viola player in the Beethoven quartet. His reference book on music for the viola, written jointly with a German music librarian, Wilhelm Altman, was issued in a German edition in 1937. In January 1938 the book became the subject of a scathing attack in *Pravda*, in which Borisovsky's collaboration with Altman was described as 'suspicious', and he was accused of being an accomplice of fascism. In this case, the excessive vigilance displayed by the critic Georgy Khubov was not upheld by the Party leadership, and Borisovsky was rehabilitated following an investigation undertaken by the Sovnarkom (Council of People's Commissars) secretariat.⁵⁵ Attacks on academics who published their works abroad became quite common in 1936–7, as such 'enemies' were 'unmasked' and accused of perpetuating pre-revolutionary 'traditions of servility' towards the West.⁵⁶

Following the signing of the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact in August 1939, relations between the Soviet Union and Germany became distinctly more cordial. Shortly after this event, the film director Sergei Eisenstein was commissioned to produce *Die Walküre* at the Bolshoi. The first night was held on 21 November 1940, but the work was withdrawn after only six performances when the Nazi invasion of June 1941 made the staging of works by Wagner in Soviet opera houses politically unacceptable. A new production of *Lohengrin*, which received its spectacularly badly timed première on 17 June 1941, was withdrawn almost immediately.⁵⁷ The connection between music and politics in Soviet Russia could not have been more explicit.

Émigrés

A discriminating approach was adopted by the Soviet authorities towards émigré Russian composers and musicians. A report on musical affairs delivered to the Kul'trop (culture and propa-

ganda) department of the Party Central Committee in 1932 drew a distinction between the so-called ‘reactionary’ émigrés who had taken foreign citizenship, such as Stravinsky, Rachmaninov, Tcherepnin and Kussevitsky, and those who were sympathetically inclined towards Soviet power but for various reasons had been reluctant to return to live in the Soviet Union. This last group included Prokofiev, Krein, Medtner, Malko, Glazunov, Grechaninov and others.⁵⁸ A VOKS report dating from 1932 stated that the activity of Russian composers living abroad was under special investigation, as it was hoped that a way might be found of encouraging some of these figures — Medtner and Prokofiev in particular — to return to the Soviet Union.⁵⁹

Soviet musicians and critics put forward various arguments regarding the position of Russian émigrés in the West: a student of the Moscow Conservatoire *rabfak* (workers’ faculty) argued in a letter to Stalin in April 1932 that the bourgeois world, in its present period of disintegration, was using the ‘trash’ (specifically Rachmaninov, Stravinsky and Prokofiev) which had been ‘rejected by the October Revolution . . . [to] . . . sing of its decay’.⁶⁰ Observation of the careers followed by Russian émigrés led many to the conclusion that life in the West tended to have a stultifying impact on the artistic muse. In an article written in 1937, the critic Bogdanov-Berezovsky offered a review of the development of Soviet music over the previous twenty years and commented that of the composers who had left, most had either sensed the ‘absence of creative air’ in the West and been ‘drawn back’ to the Soviet Union (such as Prokofiev), or their musical output had declined dramatically (as in the cases of Rachmaninov and Glazunov).⁶¹

Prokofiev’s reasons for returning to the Soviet Union seem to have been connected mainly with economic and material considerations. He had left Russia in May 1918 and made his first return trip in 1927, when he completed a two-month concert tour of Russia and Ukraine. From 1932 his visits became increasingly regular, and in the late spring of 1936 he managed to persuade the Moscow City Council to provide him with a luxury flat on the Garden Ring. The ease with which he had been able to organize concert engagements in the Soviet Union stood in sharp contrast with the situation that prevailed in Western Europe and the United States, where the Depression had made musicians’ lives increasingly difficult.⁶² Prokofiev’s return constituted a signifi-

cant propaganda coup for the Soviet authorities, and he enjoyed a number of privileges not shared by his colleagues. Most notably, he was permitted to travel abroad, and he made lengthy concert tours of Europe, the United States and North Africa between 1936 and 1938.

The case of Aleksandr Glazunov (1865–1936) provides a particularly interesting example of the ambiguous attitude of the Soviet authorities towards émigré composers. Unlike Stravinsky, who left Russia before the war, or Rachmaninov, who left shortly after the Revolution, Glazunov remained at his teaching post in Leningrad Conservatoire until 1928. He was sent to Vienna in June of that year as a member of the jury for an international competition of composers, and followed this with a tour of several Western European cities. Illness caused him to lengthen his stay, and although he claimed he was making plans to return to Leningrad on more than one occasion, these plans were never carried through.⁶³ In a letter to Kerzhentsev at the Arts Committee written after Glazunov's death in March 1936, the composer Yury Shaporin (1887–1966) pointed out a number of inconsistencies in the official reaction to the event. While the death attracted barely a mention in the Soviet press, with none of the official TASS telegrams which normally followed the death of a highly regarded artistic figure, the brief notice of his death in *Izvestiia* still referred to him as a 'People's Artist', which implied that he had not been wholly rejected as an esteemed representative of Soviet culture.⁶⁴ While admitting that Glazunov had committed a number of 'politically tactless' errors in making speeches and writing articles criticizing aspects of Soviet life, Shaporin nonetheless insisted that these should not constitute sufficient cause to deny him a proper obituary.

The vehemence of Soviet attacks on Stravinsky is hardly surprising, given that Stravinsky himself never troubled to hide his hostility towards the Soviet regime, writing in a letter of 1933 that 'my negative attitude towards communism and Judaism . . . is a matter of common knowledge'.⁶⁵ An article on the composer that appeared in *Sovetskaia Muzyka* in the same year described him as the 'artistic ideologue of the imperialist bourgeoisie'.⁶⁶ His works did receive occasional performances in the Soviet Union during this period: a 1935 editorial in *Sovetskoe Iskusstvo*, for example, commented that the State Phiharmonia had widened its repertoire to include works such as Stravinsky's *Svadebka* (*Les*

Noces).⁶⁷ Such events were nevertheless liable to ruffle feathers in some quarters: the decision by the Leningrad Philharmonia to include works by Stravinsky in the programme of the final concert in their festival of Russian classical music in March 1938 provoked an article in *Sovetskoe Iskusstvo* entitled ‘Ignorance or Political Blindness?’, which condemned the decision to number music by this ‘fascist émigré’ and ‘leader of formalism in music’ among the Russian classics, and described it as an ‘insult to the patriotic feelings of the Soviet people’.⁶⁸ It seems unlikely that the decision to include Stravinsky’s works in the programme was simply the result of an oversight by Philharmonia concert organizers, and one cannot help but wonder whether or not this move was in fact an attempt to reassert Leningrad’s reputation as the centre of modern art in Russia, a reputation which had been so roundly criticized by Muscovite critics in 1936. Artistic rivalry between the two capitals went back a long way.

Engagement with the West: International Competitions

Soviet involvement in international musical life took various forms. As with Soviet sport diplomacy and foreign policy more generally, musical contacts with Western countries were pursued for a number of different reasons: to help improve relations with bourgeois states, to strengthen international proletarian solidarity, and to enhance the Soviet Union’s standing on the world stage.⁶⁹ These aims were pursued through Soviet involvement in international performance competitions; foreign tours made by Soviet musicians; the propaganda of Soviet music in the West; and the activities conducted by the music section of the Communist International.

The decision by the authorities to permit Soviet musicians to participate in international performance competitions paid huge dividends in terms of enhancing the Soviet Union’s image abroad. The Russian conservatoire tradition of providing rigorous training of musicians to a very high standard went back several decades before the revolution, and émigré musicians such as Milstein, Horowitz and Piatigorsky won high regard in the West and helped to promote a very favourable image of Russian standards of musical training. Soviet involvement in international competitions began in 1927, with a delegation sent to the first

Chopin piano competition in Warsaw. Of the four Soviet pianists — including the twenty-one-year-old Dmitry Shostakovich — who were sent to Warsaw, Lev Oborin (1907–74) took the first prize and Grigory Ginzburg (1904–61) the fourth.

It is clear that the authorities were well aware of the political significance that Soviet victories in international competitions could have. In choosing which pianists to send as participants to the 1932 Warsaw piano competition there was much debate over whether extra-musical considerations should play a part in the selection criteria. Great pride was expressed in the fact that the delegation finally chosen included one member of the *Komsomol* and two candidate members of the Party, one of whom (Abram Lufer [1905–48], who emerged as the highest-placed Soviet contestant, taking fourth prize in the competition overall) was the son of a construction worker.⁷⁰ The jury involved in the selection procedure also debated whether or not to include the Armenian pianist Andriasian in the delegation as a token non-Russian in order to demonstrate the flowering of national artistic cultures in the Soviet Union, although this idea was eventually rejected.⁷¹ The failure of the Soviet pianists to gain any of the top three prizes in Warsaw in 1932 was perceived by Soviet participants to be the result of bias on the part of the Polish jury and press. When in the end the first prize was won by a Russian émigré, Aleksandr Uninsky, Soviet sensibilities were particularly offended by what they described as a ‘White-guardist demonstration’ during the prize-giving, when a basket of white flowers decorated with a three-coloured ribbon — a tsarist symbol — was presented to the victor.⁷²

In the second half of the decade, Soviet fortunes at international music competitions soared. David Oistrakh and the thirteen-year-old Busia (Boris) Goldstein (1921–87) took second and fourth prizes at the Warsaw violin competition in March 1935, and Yakov Flier (1912–73) and Emil Gilel’s (1916–85) came first and second at the Vienna piano competition in June 1936. The year 1937 saw victories both for Soviet pianists, when Yakov Zak (1913–76) and Roza Tamarkina (1920–50) won first and second places at the third Chopin piano competition in Warsaw, and for violinists, when five out of the top six prizes were carried off by Soviet players at the Ysaÿe violin competition held in Brussels in March of that year. In an article on the competition which appeared in the *Manchester Guardian*, it was

remarked that ‘this musical success did more than years of Communist propaganda to win sympathies for Soviet Russia, in whom many Belgians and others have now discovered for the first time, and somewhat to their surprise, a civilized country!’⁷³ The Soviet victories in 1937 received massive coverage in *Pravda*, and the 2 April edition featured a large picture of David Oistrakh on the front page. The Soviet ambassador to Belgium commented that the success ‘represents not only a victory for individual artistes. It represents a grandiose international victory for our country. The jury’s decision is a recognition of the huge cultural achievements of our great motherland.’⁷⁴

Correspondence between the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and Molotov in 1937 indicated the considerable importance that the Soviet authorities attached to such victories. Lists of members of the proposed delegations of musicians to be sent to Vienna in 1936 and Brussels in 1937 were submitted by Kerzhentsev to Stalin and Molotov for authorization.⁷⁵ Proposals to send a group of Soviet pianists to the 1938 Ysaÿe competition in Brussels were supported in a statement from an official at the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, which asserted that not only would victory bring further international recognition of Soviet achievements, but also that Soviet participation could assist in the development of cultural relations with Belgium.⁷⁶ In fact, the 1938 Ysaÿe competition gave rise to a renewal of the concern that had been expressed in 1932 about anti-Soviet bias against competitors. It was claimed by a Soviet diplomat in Brussels that the Belgian press had been lukewarm in its comments on the Soviet performances, and rumours abounded of a conspiracy by the competition organizers to avoid a repetition of the events of the previous year, when the entire Soviet delegation had reached the final. The fact that Gilels and Flier managed to win first and third prizes at this competition was therefore given even more prominence back home, and a report from a Soviet diplomat in Belgium to the Arts Committee stated that ‘it is impossible to overestimate the political significance of our latest success’, coming as it did at a time ‘when other countries are actively conducting anti-Soviet propaganda’.⁷⁷

Although proposals were put forward at various times during the 1930s for the Soviet Union to host an international competition of its own, none of these plans ever came to fruition. In 1932, in the wake of the second Warsaw piano competition, a plan

was drawn up which recommended that a Beethoven competition be held in Moscow in the following year. It was intended that this competition should serve as a demonstration of Soviet standards of fairness, and should be the antithesis of the Warsaw competition, at which political considerations were said to have entered the musical arena. The proposal was approved by VOKS, but plans never got beyond the drawing board.⁷⁸ In 1935, Heinrich Neuhaus drew an unfavourable comparison between the methods employed by Soviet and foreign jury members at performance competitions, commenting that whereas in Soviet competitions the jury would conduct a careful discussion of each performance, in Warsaw this had not been the case, and discussion only took place where there was disagreement over the marks to be awarded.⁷⁹

Foreign Tours

As with participation in international competitions, Soviet musicians were sent abroad on tour partly as a means by which to cement political alliances with individual countries. In 1926 a Narkompros official had described foreign concert tours as serving 'not only as a means for strengthening cultural ties with foreign states, but also as a notable part of our external trade'. For this reason it was felt necessary to regulate such ventures through a central institution.⁸⁰ According to a ruling made in 1934, negotiations for tours had to be conducted through VOKS, and visits tended to be conducted on an exchange basis, with musicians sent to and from countries with which the Soviet Union maintained friendly relations.⁸¹ The trip to Turkey mentioned above, which took place in May 1935 and included Oistrakh and Shostakovich in the Soviet delegation, was a return visit following the tour made by a group of Turkish musicians to the Soviet Union in April 1934.⁸² Cordial relations had developed between the two countries in the aftermath of the First World War, when both countries had been left in a weak and isolated position, and the special relationship had been sealed by a treaty signed in 1921.⁸³

The conclusion of non-aggression pacts with France and Czechoslovakia in May 1935, which formed part of Litvinov's collective security policy, brought cultural contacts in their wake.

In the summer of 1936, the Soviet Radio Committee choir made a tour of Czechoslovakia, and a Czech choir made an exchange visit to the Soviet Union at the same time. The Soviet choir tour was reported to have been a great success, and the enthusiastic response of Czech and Slovak audiences was described by the deputy chair of the Radio Committee as an illustration of ‘the great sympathy and interest which the Czech masses hold towards the Soviet Union’. He expressed the hope that the interest generated in the local press would help to popularize Soviet repertoire abroad. He further claimed that the Soviet performances of Russian folk songs would help demonstrate to the Czechs and Slovaks the ‘correct’ method of arranging such songs for choirs: preserving the true essence of the folk melodies without any of the ‘formalist elaborations’ allegedly introduced by foreign singers.⁸⁴ A tour by the Red Army ensemble to France in the following year was hailed as a major triumph, and it was reported that the bourgeois audiences had been so impressed by the high standards displayed by the choir that they were even moved to applaud a performance of the *Internationale*.⁸⁵

Exporting Soviet Music

A Sovnarkom resolution of February 1934 emphasized the importance of popularizing Soviet music in foreign countries, and proposed various measures intended to help the promotion of Soviet works abroad. Among the main proposals were included recommendations that VOKS should put out brochures on Soviet composers in foreign languages, submit articles on Soviet music for publication in the foreign press, and set up a system for supplying scores of Soviet works to foreign orchestras and opera companies. *Inturist* was expected to include Soviet works in its music festivals; the state music publishing house Muzgiz was called upon to issue special editions of Soviet music (on higher-than-usual quality paper) for export; and further proposals were aimed at increasing exports of recordings of Soviet music and the number of radio concerts including Soviet works to be broadcast on international wave-bands.⁸⁶ The degree to which these proposals were implemented successfully is open to doubt. A letter from an Agitprop official to the head of the foreign radio broadcasting service in 1940 complained that insufficient airtime was

assigned for the performance of Soviet works or for recitals by Soviet performers, and that the radio was generally failing in its duty to advertise the achievements of the Soviet Union in music.⁸⁷ The importance of demonstrating the talents of young Soviet musicians to foreign visitors had also been stressed in an *Inturist* memorandum of 1936, which had emphasized the importance of providing high quality concerts of Soviet music for tourists. Since foreign journalists and critics frequently numbered among the tourists visiting Moscow, programme compilers were urged to use these occasions as an opportunity to promote Soviet artistic culture. They were encouraged to arrange performances by young virtuosi who had received their training entirely during the Soviet period, as well as by groups of folk musicians from the non-Russian republics.⁸⁸

The exchange of scores with foreign music associations was another means by which new Soviet music could be promoted in the West. Concern was expressed by some Soviet officials, however, at the choice of music to be sent, especially once it became clear that Western musicians viewed some of the more avant-garde works composed in the 1920s as somehow representative of Soviet music.⁸⁹ A letter written by Norman Demuth from the Royal Academy of Music in London to the Moscow Composers' Union foreign affairs department in May 1937 provides a telling indication of the way in which certain foreigners perceived the development of Soviet music. He commented that the music which had been sent to him at the Royal Academy was 'far less advanced in idiom than we had expected', and expressed surprise that Myaskovsky's music seemed to be popular in the Soviet Union, 'it being from our point of view rather old-fashioned'. He was also surprised that no works by Aleksandr Mosolov (1900–73) had been sent, since in Britain, he remarked, Shostakovich and Mosolov were generally believed to be the two figures most representative of Soviet Russia.⁹⁰

The question of whether Western tastes should be taken into account when selecting the works of Soviet music which should be promoted abroad became a contentious issue in April 1937, when Prokofiev declared, in a speech delivered in the Moscow Composers' Union, that foreign audiences were generally unimpressed by the works of Soviet music that they heard. Prokofiev was in fact making a general point about how, in rejecting contemporary Western musical influences, Soviet composers

risked getting stuck in a time warp and never producing anything new, and he also indicated the discrepancy between the rapid pace of Soviet development generally, and the relative conservatism of its musical output. Kerzhentsev, however, interpreted the speech in a slightly different way. ‘Of course’, he replied,

... when we export crabs or bacon abroad, then certainly we must take account of the tastes of the consumer. But when we are displaying our country’s art, then such criteria are inadmissible. We must display not the works that foreigners will like, but those which are characteristic of our socialist country . . . We must have a very critical attitude towards the criterion of Western taste.⁹¹

Not only was the choice of music to be sent abroad a contentious issue for Soviet bureaucrats, but the question of which countries should be used as showcases for Soviet music could also be politically problematic. Soviet decision makers were faced with a dilemma in 1938 when an application was received in the Arts Committee from the Royal Opera Theatre in Rome, requesting permission to produce Shostakovich’s opera *Katerina Izmailova* in Italy. The Soviet Embassy in Italy was placed in an awkward position, because Ferrero, the conductor who had made the initial request, was one of the few representatives of the Italian artistic world to maintain relations with the Soviet Embassy, and he had even visited Moscow in 1936. With the exception of the crisis over Abyssinia in 1935, Soviet relations with Italy had been relatively amicable since the signing of a non-aggression treaty in September 1933, and ideological differences had not been seen as an insuperable obstacle to peaceful co-existence. Nevertheless, the proposal to produce this opera in a fascist country, a work, moreover, which had — under its alternative title of *Lady Macbeth of Mtsensk* — been condemned in *Pravda* only two years previously, proved too much for the Arts Committee leadership to stomach. The matter was eventually resolved in the autumn of 1938, nine months after the original application had been made, following consultation with Shostakovich. No doubt mindful of the criticism to which his opera had been subject two years earlier, and anxious to avoid any possible attacks in the future, Shostakovich replied with a categorical refusal to sanction the proposed production. This negative stance was backed up by Khrapchenko, the acting head of the Arts Committee, and the opera score was never sent to Italy.⁹²

Another interesting example of the diplomatic complications

which could ensue from proposals to send Soviet musical works for performance abroad is provided in the case of Myaskovsky's Twenty-First Symphony. This work was completed in 1940 and was dedicated to the Chicago Symphony Orchestra, which was celebrating its fiftieth anniversary that year. Myaskovsky had a long history of collaboration with this orchestra, and its chief conductor Frederick Stock had visited the Soviet Union in the previous year at the invitation of the Composers' Union. Although Myaskovsky's decision to dedicate his symphony to this orchestra was not felt to detract in any way from the merits of the work, VOKS officials nevertheless expressed concern in a memorandum to the Central Committee that this circumstance could give rise to diplomatic complications, should the work — as had been proposed — be awarded one of the recently established Stalin prizes. It was pointed out that such an award 'could be considered a demonstrative gesture by the Soviet government towards America', something that was regarded as deeply undesirable at that particular time.⁹³ In the event, VOKS' concerns seem to have been unfounded. The symphony received its première on 26 December 1940 in Chicago, and was awarded a Stalin prize in 1941 without causing a diplomatic incident of any kind.⁹⁴

The Internationale

Appeals for revolutionary composers of the world to unite did not play a particularly prominent role in the musical world of the 1920s. While one might have expected that groups such as RAPM would have promoted international links with fellow 'proletarian composers' in other countries, they had tended in fact to concentrate more on creating socialist music in one country, rather than seeking to further the cause of world revolution through their art. In 1932 this was to change. The Music Section of the International Association of Revolutionary Theatres (MORT) was set up in February 1932, and a Music Bureau was formed in November of that year, which was to become the main co-ordinating centre for the various associations of left-wing composers worldwide.⁹⁵ Formal sections were set up in the USA, Japan, France and England, and links were created with socialist music organizations in Czechoslovakia,

Austria and the Netherlands.⁹⁶ The board of this organization was composed mainly of Russians, although left-wing émigrés, mainly from Nazi-occupied countries, came to play a leading role as the movement developed. Hanns Eisler, who took over the leadership of the Music Bureau in July 1935, and the Hungarian Ferenc Szabó (1902–69), who played an active role in MORT activities right from the start, were the most conspicuous non-Russians to involve themselves in its work. Proceedings were similarly dominated by Soviet affairs, with particular emphasis given to the need to propagandize Soviet music around the world.

The main tasks of the movement were described as being to create a revolutionary united front in international music, to develop mass organizations at the grass-roots level and to attract talented ‘fellow traveller’ musicians to work with these groups. The Bureau aimed to unmask fascist ideology in music, and to encourage composers to write works, particularly vocal pieces, which could serve to strengthen the class consciousness of the labouring masses and unite them for revolutionary struggle. The Music Bureau conducted a number of different activities in pursuit of these objectives. These included publishing collections of revolutionary songs with translated texts; commissioning articles on various aspects of the international revolutionary music movement for publication in Soviet and foreign music journals; organizing amateur workers’ choirs and orchestras in different countries, and sending out materials for their use; monitoring the musical activities conducted in fascist countries; and planning international music festivals and olympiads.⁹⁷

The period 1932–6 in many ways saw a significant shift away from Bolshevik fundamentalism in Soviet policy, both at home and abroad. The end of the first Five Year Plan had seen the rehabilitation of bourgeois specialists and fellow travellers, and Litvinov’s collective security policy, launched in response to Hitler’s rise to power in Germany, went against the traditional Soviet strategy of exploiting antagonisms within the capitalist camp. The policy of the Popular Front, formally adopted by the Comintern in 1935, promoted co-operation between the Soviet Union and Western social democratic parties against the threat of fascism. The MORT Music Section was intimately connected with these policies, and it worked to forge links with fellow-traveller musical organizations and non-revolutionary workers’ music groups, as well as adopting the rhetoric of the Popular

Front. With the shift away from collective security and towards isolationism in Soviet foreign policy in 1936, it is hardly surprising that MORT came to be regarded as surplus to requirements.

The year 1936 saw the liquidation of MORT as an independent association. It was claimed by Shcherbakov, in a memorandum of the Department for Cultural and Enlightenment Work of the Party Central Committee (Kul'tpros) to Molotov, Kaganovich and Ezhov dated February 1936, that the institution, under the leadership of the German theatre director Erwin Piscator, had become a refuge for all kinds of suspicious elements. Eisler, who at this time held the post of head of the Music Section, was attacked as a 'Western formalist', who had allegedly denied the value of classical music and believed that Soviet music had lost its class content. The Music Section itself came in for particular criticism on the grounds that its leaders had contravened express instructions that the MORT delegation to the ISCM Festival held in Prague in September 1935 should not claim to constitute a 'Soviet delegation'. The two German émigrés who made up the delegation, Eisler and Raikhenbakh, had gone one step further than this and took it upon themselves to invite the ISCM, in the name of the Soviet government, to hold its next festival in Moscow. This display of excessive independence on the part of the MORT Music Section proved its undoing, and it was formally disbanded, with its functions transferred to the foreign affairs department of the Moscow Composers' Union.⁹⁸

Even after the liquidation of the Music Bureau in 1936, musicians continued to maintain a presence on the international political stage. The Spanish Civil War was seized upon as a perfect opportunity for Soviet composers and musicians to demonstrate solidarity with their embattled Spanish comrades, and great efforts were put into writing inspiring marching songs to send to the front. Such aid seems to have been appreciated in some quarters, as the director of the Valencia Conservatoire and the chief conductor of the Valencia chamber orchestra sent an appeal to Soviet composers in the summer of 1937, requesting that they write symphonic works dedicated to the Spanish Communist Party and the Popular Front.⁹⁹ Soviet musicians were also active, giving benefit concerts to aid the widows and children of Spanish partisans.¹⁰⁰

The overall level of contact between the Soviet Union and the Western musical world during the 1930s was rather greater than many historians have previously assumed. This was due mainly to the fact that, where the politics of musical diplomacy were concerned, pragmatic considerations tended to take precedence over purely ideological concerns. Although Soviet decision makers generally regarded the outside world with disfavour and took a broadly antagonistic view of contemporary Western musical developments, it proved impossible to stifle all contacts, and political pragmatism often made the forging of links with Western musical life seem not simply inevitable, but even desirable. Richard Kraus's analysis of the Chinese ambivalence towards the piano is interesting in this regard: the Chinese authorities have long disliked the instrument on principle, as they regard it as a symbol of Western musical culture, but they have nevertheless enjoyed the prestige which Chinese victories in international piano competitions can bring.¹⁰¹ Similar ambivalence can be detected on the part of Soviet officials towards Western musical life.

Despite such ambivalence, however, the international profile of music as a largely non-verbal art form made some sort of engagement with Western musical life almost inevitable. Participation in the international musical arena served not only to heighten the prestige of the Soviet Union but also to assist those Soviet composers and musicians who wished to keep in touch with Western musical developments and — in some respects — to bolster international proletarian solidarity. The first of these goals was given the highest priority by music policy makers, and they met with significant success in some quarters. The campaign to display the achievements of Soviet culture to the benighted Western bourgeoisie prompted considerable admiration for the Soviet system among a number of Western composers and musicians as well as with members of the general public in foreign countries.

Changes in the direction of Soviet foreign policy as a whole tended to have an impact on musical diplomacy, and thus the shifting patterns of Soviet avoidance of and engagement with Western musical life fluctuated in a manner that seemed at times to be inconsistent. The move towards isolationism in foreign policy from the end of 1935 was to find its reflection in the anti-formalism campaign of 1936, and the changing relationship with

Germany during 1939–41 brought musical developments in its wake. While this close interrelationship between the spheres of culture and politics in the Soviet Union had a significant impact on the development of Soviet music in the 1930s, the inability — or unwillingness — of politicians and bureaucrats to forge a single, coherent Party line where music was concerned was a crucial factor in shaping the diversity of Soviet musical life during this period.

Notes

I would like to thank the British Academy for funding the research on which this article is based, and I am grateful to John Barber, Stephen Lovell, David Saunders and Peter Tregear for their comments on earlier versions of this article.

1. See for example Boris Schwarz, *Music and Musical Life in Soviet Russia, 1917–1980* (Bloomington 1983), 110.

2. *The Musical Times* (London), November 1938, 864. G. Shneerson, 'Alan Bush v Moskve', *Sovetskoe Iskusstvo* (Moscow), 22 September 1938, 2.

3. S. Frederick Starr, *Red and Hot: The Fate of Jazz in the Soviet Union, 1917–91* (New York 1994), 123–5; Mikhail Druskin, 'U istokov dzhaza', *Sovetskoe Iskusstvo*, 17 August 1935, 3.

4. Foreign conductors working with Soviet orchestras in this period include the Germans Oskar Fried (1871–1941) and Heinz Unger (1895–1965), the Austrian Fritz Stiedry (1883–1968), and the Hungarians Georges Sebastian (1903–1989) and Eugene Szenkar (1891–1977). Frid, 'Prozhitoe — perezhitoe', *Muzykal'naia Akademiia* (Moscow), no. 4 (1992), 11–21.

5. Report on the principal measures of the VOKS Music Section, January to April 1933, GARF (Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii), fond R-5283 (VOKS — Vsesoiuznoe Ob'edinenie Kul'turnoi Sviazi s Zagranitsei [All Union Association for Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries]), opis 12, dela 223, list 6 ob. st.

6. Martin Duberman, *Paul Robeson* (London 1989), 208–10.

7. Heinz Unger, *Hammer, Sickle and Baton: The Soviet Memoirs of a Musician* (London 1939), 224. Unger had also worked in the Soviet Union during the 1920s. For Soviet reactions to this book, see the correspondence between Alan Bush and Grigory Shneerson, May 1939, RGALI (Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Literatury i Iskusstva), f. 2077 (Union of Soviet Composers), op. 1, ed. khr. 9, l. 149.

8. Report: 'On the Measures Taken to Liquidate the Consequences of Sabotage in Musical Institutions of the Union, 1937', RGALI f. 962 (Arts Committee), op. 3, ed. khr. 190, l. 49; Letter Kerzhentsev to Lorenets (Soviet Ambassador to Austria) 23 September 1937, RGALI f. 962, op. 10s, ed. khr. 23, l. 18. An exception was made in the case of Oskar Fried. In a letter to Schoenberg dated 8 December 1937, Fritz Stiedry wrote: 'I have been kicked out of Russia just as I

was kicked out of Germany in 1933.' Peter Heyworth, *Otto Klemperer: His Life and Times*, 2 vols (Cambridge 1996), II, 71.

9. Letter, Lazarenko (Director, Moscow Philharmonia) to Nazarov (Arts Committee), 4 April 1938, RGALI f. 962, op. 3, ed. khr. 396, ll. 43–7.

10. Letter, Khrapchenko (Arts Committee) to Molotov, 15 September 1938, RGALI f. 962, op. 3, ed. khr. 367, ll. 17–19. Klemperer had already visited the Soviet Union in 1936. These particular invitations were not taken up.

11. Letter, Ferenc Szabó to Alan Bush, 29 October 1936, RGALI f. 2077, op. 1, ed. khr. 9, l. 6; 'Spisok not inostrannykh kompozitorov poluchennykh iz-za granitsy', *Biulleten' Soiuz Sovetskikh Kompozitorov* (Moscow), no. 1 (1933), 10.

12. *S.S. Prokofiev i N.I. Miaskovskii: perepiska* (Moscow 1977), 369, 372–4, 380–1, 431, 439.

13. Starr, op. cit., 109, 118–20.

14. V. Bogdanov-Berezovsky, *Aleksandr Moiseevich Veprik: ocherk zhizni i tvorchestva* (Moscow 1964), 26; Letter, Veprik to Cherniak, 28 August 1932, RGALI f. 645, op. 1, ed. khr. 352, l. 8; Starr, op. cit., 66–70.

15. Prokofiev's concert tours continued for several years after his return to Moscow in 1933. His last foreign trip took place in 1938.

16. Letters, Bubnov (Narkompros) to Kaganovich, 7 March 1933, Arkad'ev to Bubnov and Epstein, 15 February 1933, RGALI f. 645 (Narkompros: Glaviskusstvo), op. 1, ed. khr. 139, ll. 59–70. Krestinsky, the Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, was said neither to oppose nor support the proposal. An Arts Committee proposal to send a group of composers and conductors, including Samosud, Dzerzhinsky and Kabalevsky, to the Salzburg festival in July 1936 also failed to win the necessary support at high levels: Letter, Kerzhentsev to Andreev and Ezhov, 2 July 1936, RGALI f. 962, op. 10s, ed. khr. 15, l. 98.

17. Letters between Alan Bush and Ferenc Szabo, November 1936–March 1937, RGALI f. 2077, op. 1, ed. khr. 9, ll. 8–27. Despite Bush's reassurances concerning all of these issues, the Composers' Union remained aloof from the ISCM.

18. These lectures were organized by the Rabis (Union of Arts Workers) Arts University. Union of Soviet Composers: Calendar for September 1933, RGALI f. 2743 (Pavel Lamm), op. 1, ed. khr. 263, l. 60; 'Muzykal'nyi dnevnik', *Sovetskoe Iskusstvo*, 29 March 1934, 4; 'Khronika', *Biulleten' Soiuz Sovetskikh Kompozitorov*, no. 4–5 (1934), 21; *M.I. Ivanov-Boretskii, stat'i i issledovaniia*, ed. by T.N. Livanov (Moscow 1972), 30. Ivanov-Boretsky had been a member of the Moscow Conservatoire Red Professors' cell during the 1920s.

19. 'Kontsertnyi sezon', *Sovetskoe Iskusstvo*, 5 September 1936, 3; Concert plan of the State Philharmonia and All Union Radio Committee for 1936/7, RGALI f. 962, op. 5, ed. khr. 25, l. 86.

20. V.I. Tobol'kevich, ed., *Itogi pervoi godovshchiny postanovleniia TsK VKP(b) o perestroike literaturno-khudozhestvennykh organizatsii: sbornik statei Leningradskogo soiuz sovetskikh kompozitorov* (Leningrad 1933), 99; *Muzykal'nyi Almanakh: sbornik statei* (Moscow 1932), 9; V.I. Gorodinsky, ed., *Muzykal'nyi front SSSR: 1-e mezhdunarodnoe muzykal'noe soveshchanie: doklady, vystuplenii i rezoliutsii* (Moscow 1933), 57.

21. For further details of this episode, see in particular Sheila Fitzpatrick, *The Cultural Front: Power and Culture in Revolutionary Russia* (Ithaca 1992), 183–215, and Leonid Maksimenkov, *Sumbur Vmesto Muzyki: Stalinskaia kul'turnaia revoliutsiia, 1936–1938* (Moscow 1997).

22. 'Sumbur vmesto muzyki', *Pravda* (Moscow), 28 January 1936, 3.
23. *Muzykal'nyi Almanakh*, 10.
24. Gorodinsky, op. cit., 118.
25. Douglas Jarman, *Alban Berg: Wozzeck* (Cambridge 1989), 69.
26. Erik Levi, 'Atonality, Twelve-Tone Music and the Third Reich', *Tempo* (London), 178 (1991), 17–21.
27. Gorodinsky, op. cit., 57–8.
28. 'Molodye kompozitory za rubezhom', *Sovetskoe Iskusstvo*, 30 October 1938, 2.
29. M. Grinberg, 'Nepreodolennye soblazny: avtorskii kontsert Dm. Shostakovicha', *Sovetskoe Iskusstvo*, 14 March 1933, 3; Stenographic report of the general meeting of composers, devoted to the discussion of the articles in *Pravda* 'Sumbur vmesto muzyki' and 'Baletnaia fal'sh', 10 February 1936, RGALI f. 962, op. 5, ed. khr. 38, ll. 18–20 ob. st.
30. Stenographic report of the meeting to discuss questions in connection with the *Pravda* articles, 14 March 1936, RGALI f. 962, op. 3, ed. khr. 71, l. 64.
31. Article by Glière, 'Muzyka stroiushchegosia sotsializma: Muzykal'no-tvorcheskii front k XVII s"ezdu partii', RGALI, f. 2085 (Reinhold Glière), op. 1, ed. khr. 357, l. 25 (no date); D. Shostakovich, 'Schast'e poznaniia', *Sovetskoe Iskusstvo*, 5 November 1934, 7.
32. Tobol'kevich, op. cit., 56–8.
33. Protocol of the meeting on drawing up the plan for inviting foreign musicians for the 1932/3 season, held 19 May 1932, GARF f. R-5283, op. 12, ed. khr. 222, l. 11 ob. st.
34. I.I. Sollertinsky, *Arnol'd Shenberg* (Leningrad 1934), 49.
35. Correspondence between Krasin (Narkompros Music Inspector), Eisler and Bubnov, September to December 1934, RGALI f. 962, op. 5, ed. khr. 5, ll. 40–49 ob.st. Soviet musicians themselves were divided over the proposal: Genrikh Litinsky (1901–85), head of the Conservatoire Faculty of Composition, was against the idea, whereas Heinrich Neuhaus (1888–1964) supported it in principle.
36. Stenographic report of the speech by Shatilov at the discussion in the Leningrad Conservatoire on artistic questions, 8 April 1936, RGALI f. 962, op. 5, ed. khr. 43, ll. 3–4.
37. *The Nose* had come under attack from RAPM critics in 1930. Stenographic report of the meeting of the Leningrad Composers' Union Board with the active membership (second day), 22 February 1936, GTsMMK (Gosudarstvennyi Tsentral'nyi Muzei Muzykal'noi Kul'tury imeni M.I. Glinki), f. 296, d. 478, l. 17 ob. st.
38. Meeting of the Leningrad Composers' Union Board with the active membership (third day), 25 February 1936, GTsMMK, f. 296, d. 481, l. 44.
39. Prokofiev himself explicitly rejected such a label. Stenographic report of the session of the Artistic Council of the Board of Musical Institutions with academics, professors and performers for discussion of Shatilov's report about the tasks of workers on the musical front, 31 August 1936, RGALI f. 962, op. 5, ed. khr. 42, l. 60.
40. Speech by the chairman of the Arts Committee to the active membership of the Union of Composers about the work of the Union, 9 April 1937, RGALI f. 962, op. 3, ed. khr. 268, ll. 13–16.

41. This speech had been delivered at the inaugural meeting of the Music Section of the International Association of Revolutionary Theatres. Gorodinsky, op. cit., 118.

42. RGALI f. 962, op. 5, ed. khr. 42, l. 45.

43. Kerzhentsev, 'O muzyke', *Pravda*, 4 December 1936, 4.

44. 'O muzyke tolstykh', *Pravda*, 18 April 1928, 2. The Varlamov ensemble was criticized by Gorodinsky for following Western models too closely: Gorodinsky, 'Legkii zhanr v muzyke', *Rabis* (Moscow), no. 7 (1934), 6–8 (8).

45. 'O sovetskom tantse', *Sovetskoe Iskusstvo*, 23 April 1936, 1; M. Yankovsky, 'Master narodnoi pesni'. *Rabochii i Teatr* (Leningrad), no. 1 (1937), 12–13.

46. Letter, G. Shneerson to G. Braverman, 22 September 1938, RGALI f. 2077, op. 1, ed. khr. 19, l. 50 (Original in English).

47. Stenographic report of the discussion of jazz in the Leningrad Composers' Union, 18 January 1937, RGALI f. 2062 (Isaak Dunaevsky), op. 1, ed. khr. 331, l. 22.

48. RGALI f. 2062, op. 1, ed. khr. 331, l. 39 ob. st.

49. I. Dunaevsky, 'Sovetskomu dzhazu — novyi repertuar', *Muzyka* (Moscow), 6 March 1937, 5; RGALI f. 2062, op. 1, ed. khr. 331, l. 35.

50. Fitzpatrick, *The Cultural Front*, 207.

51. Gorodinsky, op. cit., 49; *Mezhdunarodnaia Muzyka* (Moscow), no. 1 (1933)

1. Gorodinsky also claimed that Soviet musicians were far more aware of developments in the West than their Western colleagues were of musical trends in the Soviet Union.

52. For example, Genri Koul' (Henry Cowell), 'Muzyka v soedinennykh shtatakh Ameriki', *Sovetskaia Muzyka*, no. 7 (1934), 3–19; Eli Zigmesteier (Elie Siegmeister), 'Muzykal'nye zametki: (pis'mo iz N'iu-Iorka)', *Sovetskaia Muzyka*, no. 6 (1935), 80–3. Iulian Krein, 'Muzykal'naia zhizn' Parizha', *Sovetskaia Muzyka*, no. 4 (1935), 107–11.

53. 'Muzyka v Anglii', *Sovetskoe Iskusstvo*, 23 October 1934, 3; 'Za rubezhom: V. Kerridzh o sovetskikh kompozitorakh', *Sovetskoe Iskusstvo*, 5 January 1935, 1; *Moskovskaia gosudarstvennaia filarmonia: muzykanty — komsomol'tsy Moskvy* (Moscow 1938), 43.

54. Such as the campaign against Hindemith: M.D., 'V fashistskoi Germanii', *Sovetskaia Muzyka*, no. 6 (1935), 83–5.

55. G. Khubov, 'Podozritel'noe sodruzhestvo', *Pravda*, 4 January 1938, 4; Vladimir Bez' 'iazychnyi, 'Vadim Borisovskii — novoe poeticheskoe imia', *Sovetskaia Muzyka*, no. 1 (1930), 86. Bez' 'iazychnyi speculates that the outcome of this case might have been influenced by personal intervention on the part of Molotov, who was a second cousin of the composer Skriabin and had played the violin in his youth.

56. Robert C. Tucker, *Stalin in Power: The Revolution from Above, 1929–1991* (New York 1992), 571.

57. Rosamund Bartlett, 'The Embodiment of Myth: Eizenshtein's Production of Die Walküre', *Slavonic and East European Review* (London), 70 (1992), 53–76; Bartlett, *Wagner and Russia* (Cambridge 1995), 271–82. See also V.A. Nevezhin, 'Sovetskaia politika i kul'turnye sviazi s Germaniei (1939–1941 gg)', *Otechestvennaia Istoriiia* (Moscow), no. 1 (1993), 18–34.

58. Materials for a conversation with Dinamov (Kul'trop), 1932, RGALI f. 2743, op. 1, ed. khr. 263, ll. 15–16.

59. Report of the VOKS Music Section, January to November 1932, GARF f. R-5283, op. 12, d. 223, l. 25.

60. Letter, M. Alekseev to Stalin, 7 April 1932, RGALI f. 645, op. 1, ed. khr. 352, l. 25.

61. V. Bogdanov-Berezovsky, 'Bor'be stilei v sovetskoi muzyke', *Rabochii i Teatr*, no. 9 (1937), 27.

62. Negotiations to organize a concert tour of the United States fell through in the spring of 1935, when his American agents, Haensel and Jones, were unable to arrange sufficient concert bookings. Letters, Haensel and Jones to Prokofiev, 7 February 1935 and 5 April 1935, Prokofiev Archive (Goldsmiths College, London), File 39, 121-3, 302-4.

63. A.N. Kriukov, *Aleksandr Konstantinovich Glazunov* (Moscow 1984), 128-34. On one occasion, according to Shaporin, he even commissioned his agent in Leningrad to put his flat in order and buy him some goats, because his French doctor had ordered him to drink goats' milk for his health. Letter, Shaporin to Kerzhentsev, 30 March 1936, RGALI, f. 2643 Yury Shaporin), op. 1, ed. khr. 184, l. 3.

64. RGALI f. 2643, op. 1, ed. khr. 184, ll. 1-7.

65. Richard Taruskin, *Defining Russia Musically: Historical and Hermeneutical Essays* (Princeton 1997), 458.

66. Arnol'd Alshvang, 'Ideinyi put' Stravinskogo', *Sovetskaia Muzyka*, no. 5 (1933), 90-100 (90).

67. 'O kontsertnoi praktike', *Sovetskoe Iskusstvo*, 11 August 1935, 1.

68. 'Nevezhestvo ili politicheskaja slepota?', *Sovetskoe Iskusstvo*, 2 March 1938, 4.

69. Victor Peppard and James Riordan, *Playing Politics: Soviet Sport Diplomacy to 1992* (London 1993), Chapter 2.

70. Report on the USSR's participation in the International Chopin Competition, GARF f. R-5283, op. 12, d. 219, ll. 19-24.

71. Appendix to the Music Section protocol, 22 December 1931, GARF f. R-5283, op. 12, d. 222, ll. 21-2.

72. Correspondence with the Directorate of the Chopin Competition in Warsaw, GARF f. R-5283, op. 12, d. 219, ll. 13-15.

73. 'Ysaÿe Prize: World Competition at Brussels: Russians' Success', *Manchester Guardian*, 5 April 1937, 12. In an interesting juxtaposition, a letter from Trotsky condemning the Soviet regime and giving details of the Piatakov-Radek show trial appeared on a later page of the same issue of the newspaper.

74. Blestiaschchii uspekh sovetskikh skripachei na mezhdunarodnom konkurse v Briussele', *Pravda*, 2 April 1937, 1.

75. Letter, Kerzhentsev to Stalin and Molotov, 3 April 1936, RGALI f. 962, op. 10s, ed. khr. 14, l. 106.

76. Letters, Litvinov (Narkomindel) to Molotov, 5 January 1937, Veinberg (Narkomindel) to Kerzhentsev, 23 November 1937, RGALI f. 962, op. 10s, ed. khr. 23, ll. 68-75. The Queen of Belgium, in conversation with a representative of the Soviet government, had expressed the hope that Soviet pianists would participate in the 1938 competition (Letter, Veinberg to Kerzhentsev, 25 December 1937, *ibid.* 1. 60).

77. Letter, Veinberg (Narkomindel) to Nazarov (Arts Committee), 24 June 1938, RGALI f. 962, op. 10s, ed. khr. 30, ll. 22-3.

78. Protocol of the Music Section of VOKS, 29 May 1932, Protocol of the Commission on the organization of an international Beethoven Competition in the USSR, 27 June 1932, GARF f. R-5283, op. 12, d. 222, ll. 9–10 ob. st. The sincerity of Soviet claims that they would maintain unimpeachable standards of fairness is somewhat open to doubt.

79. ‘Triumf sovetskoi muzykal’noi kul’tury: Varshavskii konkurs: beseda s prof. G. Neigauzom’, *Sovetskoe Iskusstvo*, 23 March 1935, 2. Neigauz had been a member of the Warsaw jury.

80. Letter, Iakovlev (Narkompros) to Sovnarkom, 1926, GARF f. A-2306, op. 69, d. 733, ll. 26–7.

81. Correspondence with VOKS on concert work abroad: Plan of foreign work for Soviet theatre and music for 1934, RGALI f. 962, op. 5, ed. khr. 5, ll. 8–10 ob. st.

82. ‘Turetskie muzykanty v Moskve’, *Sovetskoe Iskusstvo*, 23 April 1934, 4; *Sovetskoe Iskusstvo*, 23 May 1935. VOKS claimed that such cultural contacts were a significant factor in the strengthening of world peace.

83. Adam B. Ulam, *Expansion and Co-existence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917–67* (London 1968), 168 and 288.

84. Report, M. Kokorin (Deputy chair of the Radio Committee), ‘On the Choral Capella Tour to Czechoslovakia’, 1936, RGALI f. 962, op. 10s, ed. khr. 15, ll. 71–4.

85. Letter, Gishfel’d (Paris) to Potemkin, 26 September 1937, RGALI f. 962, op. 10s, ed. khr. 23, ll. 28–33.

86. Sovnarkom Resolution No. 2278: ‘On Measures for Organizing the Distribution and Performance of Works by Soviet Composers, 28 February 1934’, GARF f. R-5283, op. 12, ed. khr. 239, ll. 1–3.

87. Letter, D. Manuil’sky to Aleksandrov (Kul’tpros), 23 November 1940, RGASPI (Rossiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sotsial’no-Politicheskoi Istorii [formerly RTsKhIDNI]), f. 17, op. 125 (Agitprop), d. 11, ll. 46–50.

88. Letter, Zaidner and Bogomazov (Inturist) to Boiarsky (Arts Committee) and Kuliabko (State Philharmonia), 20 June 1936, RGALI f. 962, op. 5, ed. khr. 25, l. 55.

89. Report on Mosolov’s *Zavod* by the Narkompros Music Inspector, Grinberg, 29 November 1931, RGALI f. 645, op. 1, ed. khr. 193, l. 2.

90. Letter, Norman Demuth (Royal Academy of Music) to Ferenc Szabó and Grigorii Shneerson, 1 May 1937, RGALI f. 2077, op. 1, ed. khr. 9, ll. 40–1.

91. ‘Vystuplenie na sobranii aktiva soiuza kompozitorov (Konspekt)’, *Prokofiev o Prokofeve: stat’i i interv’iu* (Moscow 1991), 154–7.

92. Letters, B. Stein (Soviet ambassador to Italy) to the Arts Committee, 19 January 1938, Kanishevsky (Arts Committee International Office) to Shtein, 22 March 1938, Report from Kanishevsky, 14 September 1938, Shostakovich to the Arts Committee Board of Musical Institutions, 27 September 1938, Khrapchenko (Arts Committee) to the Soviet Embassy in Italy, 17 October 1938, RGALI f. 962, op. 10s, ed. khr. 30, ll. 10–11 and 44–7.

93. Report, V. Kernenov (VOKS) to G. Aleksandrov (Kul’tpros), 13 December 1940, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 11, l. 101.

94. G. Shneerson, ‘Vstrechi s N. Ia. Miaskovskim’, in *N. Ia. Miaskovskii: stat’i, pis’ma, vospominaniia*, ed. by S. Shlifshstein (Moscow 1959), 326–35.

95. Report: ‘Results of the First International Music Conference, November

1932', RGASPI f. 540 (International Association of Revolutionary Theatres), op. 1. d. 21, ll. 54–7.

96. The Section claimed to have informal links with countries as far afield as Australia, Chile, Canada, Trinidad and China: G. Shneerson, 'Internatsional'naia sviaz', *Muzykal'naia Samodeiatel'nost'* (Moscow), no. 4 (1934), 14–15.

97. *Mezhdunarodnaia Muzyka*, no. 1 (1933), 1–3; Plan of work of the International Association of Revolutionary Theatres for July to December 1933, RGASPI f. 540, op. 1, d. 47, ll. 99–109. MORT officials were enthusiastic advocates of Soviet participation in international music festivals, although their recommendations were often ignored.

98. Letter, Shcherbakov (Kul'tpros) to Kaganovich, Ezhov and Molotov (copied to Kerzhentsev), 22 February 1936, RGALI f. 962, op. 10s, ed. khr. 14, ll. 87–90; Alan Bush, 'The ISCM Festival at Prague', *The Musical Times*, October 1935, 940–2. The proposal to hold the 1936 festival in Moscow was rejected in any case, as it had already been arranged that it should take place in Barcelona. Szabó took over as the head of the Moscow Composers' Union department for foreign affairs.

99. 'Prizyv k sovetskim kompozitoram', *Muzyka*, 6 August 1937, 1.

100. 'Bol'shoi teatr — ispanskomu narodu', *Sovetskoe Iskusstvo*, 23 September 1936, 1; Letter, Pankratov-Gorskii (Arts Committee of the Northern Caucasus) to *Sovetskoe Iskusstvo*, 31 October 1936, RGALI f. 672 (*Sovetskoe Iskusstvo*), op. 1, ed. khr. 6, l. 28.

101. Richard Curt Kraus, *Pianos and Politics in China: Middle-Class Ambitions and the Struggle over Western Music* (New York 1989).

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