Howard Government's Massive Intelligence Failure On Bali Kevin Rudd - Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Security

Media Statement - 13 July 2004

An FBI report warning that al Qaeda and JI were planning to target bars, cafes or nightclubs frequented by westerners in a number of South East Asian countries (including Indonesia) was passed on to a number of South East Asian governments in 2002 – but not Australia.

Ten months before 12 October 2002, Bali bombings’ mastermind Hambali met with terrorists in Thailand to plan their operations. One of those terrorists, Jabarah, was captured in the first half of 2002 and subsequently interrogated by the FBI.

The FBI's report of this interrogation said Hambali was planning to conduct bombings in bars, cafes or nightclubs frequented by westerners in a number of South East Asian countries, including Indonesia. It was dated 21 August 2002 – six weeks before the Bali bombings.

This FBI report was sent to various South East Asian Governments, but not Australia.

This is a stunning intelligence failure on the part of the Howard Government given its continued claims that it has the strongest possible security and intelligence relationship with the United States.

If that relationship was so strong, why did Australian security and intelligence authorities not receive this critical report? And why did the Australian government fail through its South East Asian intelligence networks to pick up the content of this report?

The Government claims this report didn’t matter. But the Bali Senate inquiry revealed that during 2002 the Government received eight separate intelligence assessments from ASIO and ONA warning of a heightening al Qaeda/JI threat to Australians in Indonesia.  This included a specific ONA warning to Downer in June 2002 that Bali was an "attractive" JI target.

The report would have provided critical reinforcement to the Australian Government that key al Qaeda/JI operatives in South East Asia were embarked on a campaign against not only political and military targets, but western civilian and tourist targets as well – specifically bars, cafes and nightclubs.

Mr Downer refuses to answer why he failed to incorporate any of these warnings into the 27 separate travel advisories, embassy bulletins or global travel bulletins he disseminated to the Australian public in the period from 11 September 2001 up to the Bali bombings.

At an absolute minimum the Australian public deserved to know that Australian tourists were also the potential targets of al Qaeda/JI operations at known tourist destinations.