Opposition Welcomes Government Security Warnings On The Philippines

Media Statement - 28 November 2002

But questions remain over the Howard Government's previous assessment of the al Qaeda terrorist threat to Australian and other Western interests in the Philippines

The Federal Opposition supports the Government's decision to temporarily close the Australian embassy in Manila and its travel warnings to Australians about non-essential travel to the Philippines.

Although the Opposition has not yet received an intelligence briefing on the specific nature of this most recent security alert, it will be seeking one in Canberra when Parliament resumes. In the meantime the Opposition has no reason to doubt the basis of this most recent announcement by the Government.

However the Opposition has some fundamental questions for the Government on other aspects of the security threat to Australian and other western interests in the Philippines.

These questions arise from the report by Dr Zachary Abuza on al Qaeda's South East Asian network – which Australian officials have confirmed as authoritative.

The key findings in Dr Abuza's report on al Qaeda's network in the Philippines are:

• Al Qaeda was providing financial support for the local Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) from 1995-6 onwards (see page 13);

• Osama bin Laden's brother-in-law Mohammad Jammal Khalifa has been active in the Philippines since 1991 when he was sent there to establish a "permanent al Qaeda network" (see page 14);

• Al Qaeda placed a large number of instructors in MILF camps from the mid-1990s on – not just to help the MILF – but also for other jihadis in the region as well (see page 18);

• Al Qaeda has also had significant links with the other Islamic terrorist splinter organisation, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) from 1994 (see page 22); and

• Dr Abuza's assessment is that the "greatest threat to the Philippines in terms of international terrorism does not come from Abu Sayyaf or the MILF but in the continued presence of independent cells of al Qaeda operatives, who are networking to counterparts throughout the region". Dr Abuza goes on to identify five such cells (see page 35).

The Abuza report has been available since February 2002.

The fundamental question the Abuza report raises is that in the period prior to yesterday's terrorism alert in the Philippines, and more particularly in the period prior to the Bali bombings, what assessment did the Australian Government make of the threat to Australian and other Western interests in the Philippines from al Qaeda and other terrorist organisations? Additionally, what was the Australian Government's assessment about when these terrorist organisations began to change their priorities from so-called hard targets (diplomatic and military) to so-called soft targets (civilian) in the Philippines?

It is clear from this and other reports that al Qaeda had been active in the Philippines and other parts of South East Asia for between five and ten years prior to September 11. Given Australia went to war against al Qaeda in Afghanistan shortly after November 2001, the very serious question of when the Australian Government actually concluded that Australians were much more likely to become the targets of al Qaeda operatives already well established in the region must be answered by the Government.

If the Howard Government did in fact make such an assessment - then what action did they take on the basis of that assessment?

These and similar questions about al Qaeda's previous operations in Indonesia and Malaysia (and Australia's knowledge of those operations) must be answered in the current review of Australian intelligence being undertaking by Inspector General Bill Blick.