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Institutions of Civil Society:
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Abstract

This study examines the impact of civil society institutions, introduced by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), measured by concepts of political culture and public participation (political behavior), on the quality of politics measured by the level of corruption (power structure) and social discrimination (clusters of social structure) in Kyrgyzstan and Russia. The inquiry also aims at revealing the relationship between these variables. Three major research strategies are used: (1) a qualitative and quantitative analysis of country-level data, (2) cross-national case studies and 3) survey in the form of interviews and questionnaires (field research). Data has been also collected from archives, published reports, newspapers and other primary and secondary sources. The major focus of this study is on the units of analysis such as non-governmental organizations. It is based not only on original official and academic material but also on over 100 interviews and 300 questionnaires with leaders of the national and regional elite from both Kyrgyzstan and Russia.

1 Introduction

In this study I attempt to evaluate the impact of factors that influence the level of development of civil society institutions and to make a comparative analysis of Russia and Kyrgyzstan.

This study addresses the questions of development of civil society institutions and democracy. *The intentional background* is to produce knowledge about how to enhance the development of civil society institutions in order to strengthen democracy, pluralism, checks and balances of power. *The major research question* is to examine whether the "quality" of civil society has an influence on quality of politics. The emphasis is principally on socio-political, economic and cultural features of civil society institutions.

Since about 14 years the idea of developing a strong civil society as a central societal objective has guided national political interests of Russia and Kyrgyzstan. Presently, the concept of civil society is probably the most prominent and widely used conceptual framework for assessing the situation in Russia and Kyrgyzstan. Considering empirical operationalization of civil society, one can highlight different approaches and components. Nevertheless, the general feature of all concepts is the *focus on the individual*. On the other hand, several other concepts appeared within the last 10-15 years with the *focus on social qualities* such as spread of equality, freedom, quality and structure of the social relations within a society.

I am interested to investigate how the institutions of civil society like non-governmental organizations (NGOs) try to reduce the level of corruption and discrimination in Russia and Kyrgyzstan because it's all about the situation in which people live, measured by concepts like the equality, freedom, quality and structure of the social relations within a society. This all has consequences on their individual situations.

The ideas of *social capital* and *good governance* mostly belong to the second approach and are among the successful models that reflect this discussion and attract political attention both at the national and international levels. Against this

background in research I restrict myself to the second approach. Nevertheless there is no clear difference between two approaches, since the second is obviously focused on the individual in specific respects, whereas the first is the same, only not in a specified way.

First, an attempt is made to operationalize and measure civil society through these concepts. Second, with relevance to the latest social developments, the **objectives** of given research are to reveal the major existing concepts and theoretical approaches of civil society with which I will work, and to determine its inherent dimensions.

Third, this study explores the changing role and functions of voluntary associations, intermediary organizations and other social movements in transitional societies. It concentrates on Russia and Kyrgyzstan and on their situation with respect to the development of civil society. The recent research findings indicate that the structure of voluntary associations and intermediary organizations throughout these countries has changed significantly and their membership levels and relevance to democratic decision-making have grown.

The ultimate objective of my research is to produce scientifically relevant knowledge available to the political and social science research community. The research is based on analysis of writings of leading specialists in their field and will be tested by empirical evidence, and several data quality checks from validation to verification will be employed.

The aim of my research is to reveal the theory that is important for practical application, and to give some kind of <u>practical</u> advice (e.g., on how to improve the effectiveness and functioning of NGOs, political parties and other civil society institutions). Of course practical advice presupposes good <u>theoretical</u> knowledge, so that is why I want to aim at theory.

The overall objective of the study is to digest the relevant literature and distil a conceptual framework, which is useful for research purpose. The purpose of this study is to give a theoretically informed diagnosis of Russia and Kyrgyzstan with respect to the development of civil society:

- The respective state of affairs,
- The path to this state,
- The assessment of stability, problems etc.
- The prospects.

This study focuses only on the analysis of the attributes of civil society and does not analyze the level of democratization of Kyrgyz and Russian societies, nor do I intend to make any comparison or analysis of emerging democratic societies in the whole Central Asian region or Newly Independent Countries (NIC) / Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The study concentrates only on analysis of the performances of three attributes of civil society in Kyrgyzstan and Russia based on the data of public opinion surveys conducted by author in 2003-2004 and independent international organizations in different years in the Kyrgyzstan and Russia. In this paper I consider the attributes of civil society in the countries so as to measure its development. The main approach employed in this paper is secondary and primary analysis of data. This particular type of research design is chosen in view of collecting the less biased data. I have used primary and secondary data on non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and their development since 1990 in Kyrgyzstan and Russia. The main sources for the data are the National Libraries of the Kyrgyz Republic and Russian Federation, the Kyrgyz and Russian National Statistics Committee, and international offices of OSCE and UNDP in Kyrgyzstan and Russia. The data can also be found on the web sites of the Central Asian NGO Network, the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute of Johns Hopkins University, the OSCE, the UNDP Kyrgyzstan and Russia, the Institute of War and Peace Reporting, the Kyrgyz and Russian Governments, the Internews Kyrgyz Republic, the Centre of Public Opinion Study and Forecast, and the Soros Foundation in Kyrgyzstan and Russia.

Both primary and secondary data collection approach was chosen because the amount of available information for secondary data is rather limited. As a result the findings may lack a high degree of validity. The main disadvantage of the chosen method is the quality of the data used, which is limited by the questions asked by

others. Secondary data I have used for my research are collected by different kinds of organizations, mostly for political rather than academic purposes. This fact can affect the results and findings of the research as surveys suffer from some political biases and the preferences of data collectors. The chosen method of data analysis for the paper aims to allow the objective of the research to be fulfilled and contribute to a deeper understanding of the processes happening in Kyrgyz society. It will certainly not be possible, however, to make definitive conclusions from the findings of my research about the whole society in general. Nevertheless, I believe that the results obtained by using this research method can give a meaningful idea of what is happening.

The arrangement of the chapters of the paper has been determined by its purpose. Chapter One is Introduction to the whole study, explaining the importance of this study and reasons for selecting relevant case studies. The Second Chapter is the literature review and conceptualization and provides a general idea and description of the development of the attribute of civil society that will be considered, that is, non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Chapter 3 establishes the system of measurements and indicators employed by this study. Chapter 4 explains the relevance of study and statement of problem. It introduces the research questions, research hypothesis / theoretical framework and research objectives. To overcome the complexity around the term of civil society, this study was concentrated and limited to NGOs in order to examine what role the NGOs play in combating corruption and discrimination. Chapter 5 represents the method used for data collection throughout the field research and evaluation afterwards. Chapter 6 analyzes and compares the empirical evidence of as a result of two field-research stages in Russia and Kyrgyzstan and secondary data collection. The chapter sets out the situation in the both countries, analyzing the extent of participation of the citizens through NGOs. It assesses the extent to which citizens of the country used attributes of civil society to participate in the political life of the country. This chapter is also considering how much the fifteen-year period influenced the freedom of people and changed the attitudes of the citizens to politics through participation in non-governmental organizations. Chapter 7 introduces the public opinion survey conducted in these countries and its results. The conclusion analyses the results of both case studies through comparing the development and involvement of all three attributes of civil

society in political life of the countries. It goes on to analyze the changes, if any, and how much they influenced the establishment of civil society in Kyrgyzstan and Russia.

1.1 Choice of Case Studies

This study examines the impact of corruption and discrimination on the development of civil society in two relatively different and similar countries, one of which is regarded as developing (Kyrgyzstan) and another one is considered to be in transition (Russia).

Kyrgyzstan and Russia have been chosen as case studies due to the fact that both of them are ethnically divided and highly corrupted. Both of them have rapidly growing number of NGOs. The influence of NGOs in Russia is weaker, compared to Kyrgyzstan. On the other hand, Russia has evident economic and political advantage over Kyrgyzstan. Both of the countries have very tight relationship at historical, cultural, political and economic levels.

This study tries to reveal the major differences between the political processes in Kyrgyzstan and Russia and shows what kind of role do the NGOs play in stabilizing these processes. Comparison of findings of this study enables to highlight the factors general to all public policy areas. Since this study makes comparison of these given case studies, it will make it possible to represent the common picture between the processes of establishing civil society in both countries.

2   General Discussion, Literature Review and Conceptualization

<u>Objectives of the chapter:</u>

The objective of this chapter is to reveal the role of civil society and its theoretical relevance, to identify what is important theoretically and explain the theoretical problem itself.

This chapter aims at describing a context for the proposed inquiry and to explain why it is important and relevant. Therefore it examines and clarifies the relationship between the previous research undertaken on this topic and suggested research. It should also demonstrate the distinction of proposed investigation from previous work in this area of study. This chapter reveals thoughtful arguments of others to incorporate them into the research project and justify it.

The objective of the conceptual work is to establish indicators that are able to capture grassroots community level civil society features, and even more specifically, that capture improvements in linkages between the community and municipal government (attitudes, interactions, results).

There is a number of worth-mentioning books and articles, written about civil society, appeared in 2005, as in the previous years. Some of them should be particular interest to scholars, practitioners, students and the broad public, interested in the Eastern Europe and Central Asia.

This year, 2005 many publications seemed to center on three major topics: 1) what exactly is civil society? 2) how the effectiveness and the impact of civil society can be measured? and 3) how this information for promoting the goals of the civil society sector can be used?

Open Society Institute published an outstanding overview of the legal issues hindering to Non-Governmental Organizations. That is the second edition of

Guidelines for Laws Affecting Civic Organizations,[1] among other several practical legal resources issued this year as well.

In addition, a set of papers analyzing the cooperation between government and civil society organizations, was published in 2004 by the Social Economy and Law Journal (SEAL). Definitely, this is a timely and hotly debated topic by academic and political circles, given recent events around the globe.

The notion of civil society has definitely become popular in the last few years as events have drawn an attention to this sector. Nevertheless, one will probably get as many responses to the question on how this concept can be identified as individuals asked from major donor organizations, governmental institutions, the mass-media, or simple people on the street. The definition looks rather simple at first glance, but highlighting a precise approach has proven quite complicated. In fact, even the most prominent contributors on that topic came to conclusion that no one definition actually reveals the concept sufficiently, as shows a review of articles and books which attempt to give interpretation of the term of civil society.

Michael Edwards in his work on *Civil Society*[2] reveals three ways of identifying explicitly what civil society is and how it affects the world. He comes to a simple result: there is no one definition.

Edwards identifies this sector according to three different theories:

- civil society as *part of a society*,
- civil society as a *kind of society,*
- and civil society in the *public sphere*.

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[1] Leon E. Irish, Robert Kushen and Karla W. Simon, *"Guidelines for Laws Affecting Civic Organizations,* OSI, New York, 2004.
[2] Michael, Edwards, 'Civil society', *The Encyclopedia of Informal Education*, 2005. Retrieved December 15th, 2005 (www.infed.org/association/civil_society.htm)

Further in his work he makes a statement that all three definitions contribute to identification and interpretation of what civil society is, but no one theory is regarded as comprehensive.

The first approach argues that civil society can be understood as *associational life*, one that captures several different groups and helps bring individuals together to help identify and resolve community demands while creating a feeling of reciprocal identity.

While this observation does happen in reality, Edwards argues that it is often difficult to distinguish these groups from other entities (government agencies, for-profit organizations and religious movements) and also that associational life can actually curb and deter individual and diverse thinking.

Civil society is regarded as the *good society*, according to the second concept, one that constitutes a combination of norms and values, by acting to implement the preferred outcome, and assists to reach them. Furthermore, this concept contributes to comprehension of meaning of civil society, but it also has some disadvantages. For instance, it is indicated that civil society organizations are in a greater extent involved in problems that affect a particular group, rather than the society in general. In addition, the values and norms of the society can be influenced equally or even stronger than civil society organizations, by different units, such as government structures, enterprises, and even families.

Another way of defining civil society as *public sphere* is considered in the concluding hypothesis. The public sphere is regarded as a place to discuss and argue issues in support of building more perfect society. Edwards points out in other two theories that there is some legitimacy to using this term to help understand precisely what civil society is but it is not complete.

Another book, edited by Rupert Taylor, titled *Creating a Better World: Interpreting Global Civil Society*,[3] tries to reveal the functions performed by civil society.

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[3] Rupert, Taylor, Creating a Better World: Interpreting Global Civil Society, Kumarian Press, 2004.

This book concentrates on the understanding and implication of civil society at the universal level as can be seen from the title. Taylor and his co-authors make an effort to promote "a more sociologically informed interpretation of global civil society and its transformative potential . . ." [4]

Particularly, Taylor insists on re-consideration of norms into the notion of universal civil society, pointing out that "at a subjective level, the intent of global civil society is to confront neoliberal globalization and create a better world through advocating a fairer, freer, and more just global order. . ." [5]

Another book, introducing diverse approaches to the role of civil society along with critical studies of its democratization is *Civil Society in Democratization*, edited by Peter Burnell and Peter Calvert.[6]

One of the major arguments of this book is that civil society in Central and Eastern Europe now has a role in the maintenance of liberal-democratic political systems and free market economies.

Two articles concentrate on democracy-building efforts to influence the growth of civil society in the Central and Eastern Europe. In the first monograph, "*Democratization in Bosnia: The Limits of Civil Society Strategies,*" David Chandler[7] points out that democratic institutions will only develop after the establishment of a vital civil society sector, and proposes that the top-down approach of international regulators, like the OSCE mission in Bosnia, and the bottom-up approach of civil society have not complemented each other, but produced future contradictions.

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[4] Taylor, *Creating a Better World: Interpreting Global Civil Society*, 2004, p.4
    Retrieved June 5th, 2005(http://www.kpbooks.com/pdf/creating.pdf)
[5] Taylor, 2004, p.4
[6] Peter, Calvert and Peter, Burnell, *Civil Society in Democratization.* London: Frank Cass, 2004.
[7] David, Chandler, Democratization in Bosnia: The Limits of Civil Society Building Strategies', *Democratization*, Vol.5, No.4, 1998, p.78-102.

In *"Building Civil Societies in East Central Europe: The Effect of American Non-governmental Organizations on Women's Groups,"* Patrice McMahon,[8] examines the relationship between American NGOs and women's groups in Russia, Hungary and Poland. Her final conclusion is that the effect of American organizations may actually have a negative influence on the other NGOs in these countries.

As one can conclude the concept of "civil society" ranges from the Roman Catholic Church in the United States (where roughly 30% of Americans are Catholic) to a local trade union, to a local flower arranging club, to the high theory of Hegel and Weber. Although the exact definition of 'civil society' is problematic, the notion, which originated in Europe, has been taken up by political leaders and scientists all over the world in the last 20 years, as a key to political, economic and societal success.

It is very problematic to give precise definition of the term "civil society" due to its complexity, different and contrary interpretations. Nevertheless, it was determined as a key to political, economic and societal achievement in the last 20 years throughout the world by political elites and academic circles. The notion of civil society originated from the Western Europe. Representatives of Scottish and Continental Enlightenment, such as Adam Ferguson, in the second half of the eighteenth century identified it as a realm where the citizens got together to express and protect their own interests and wishes. They expressed the views that "civil society consisted of a complex of stable interactions among "free, equal and independent" male individuals, whose properties are secured politically through their subjection to a state which monopolizes the process of formation, administrating and enforcing laws."[9] The rise of private property, market competition and bourgeoisie were very relevant to these new ideas.

The works of Hegel established the basis for modern tendency to make a rigid distinction or dichotomy (not drawn by Ferguson) between the state and civil society,

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[8] Patrice C., McMahon, Building Civil Societies in East Central Europe: The Effect of American Non-governmental Organizations on Women's Groups. In: Democratization, vol. 8 no 2, 2001, p. 45-68.

[9] Krishan, Kumar, "Civil Society: An Inquiry Into the Usefulness of an Historic Term", *British Journal of Sociology, 44(3):375-95,* 1993.

according to Chris Hann.[10] Civil society is conceived as a historically produced sphere. A mosaic of private individuals whose transactions are regulated by civil law and are not directly dependent on the political state itself, was pointed out by Hegel.[11] Marx continued the ideas of Hegel. He described civil society as a historical phenomenon, characterized by particular forms of relations of production, class divisions and struggles. His critical theory of civil society is only oriented to its system of production. But he does not consider such a very important dynamics of other forms of civil life as households, voluntary associations, professions, communications media and disciplinary institutions such as schools, prisons and hospitals. His theory of civil society is introduced as classes and relations to production and regarded as economic form created by the bourgeoisie.

Alexis de Tocqueville is considered to be a key figure in the modern "liberal-individual approach", as "a democrat who extolled the virtues of the 'habit of association', according to Chris Hann.[12] Tocqueville introduced a term of "political society", identifying political associations such as local self-government, juries, parties and public opinion. He emphasized on the role of the population in the matters of government and power.

There have been many definitions given to the concept but so far no one has developed a universally accepted systematic theory of civil society. According to Cohen and Arato's view the current discourse of civil society has focused precisely on new, generally non-class-based forms of collective action oriented and linked to the legal, associational and public institutions of society.[13] Nowadays civil society is defined in terms of mediating institutions between state and family. As the main idea and the basis of what is commonly called civil society they see a society with an ideal sphere of freedom and association; independent and voluntary activity of citizens. Generally recognized civil society activities include non-state activities like trade union activities, participation in protest groups, church and religious activities,

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[10] Christopher, Hann and Elithaberth, Dunn (eds.), *Civil Society: Changing Western Models*. London and New York: Routledge, 1996.
[11] Kumar, "Civil Society", p. 379.
[12] Christopher, Hann and Elithaberth, Dunn (eds.), *Civil Society: Changing Western Models*. London and New York: Routledge, 1996, p. 4.
[13] Cohen, Jean and Arato, Andrew, "Introduction" in *Civil Society and Political Theory*, Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press 1994, p. 1-26.

membership in neighborhood and community associations and campaigns, charity work, and participation in political parties.

In the West liberal politicians and theorists consider the role of civil society to be crucial in the transition from authoritarian to democratic societies. They believe that democracy needs civil society through non-state activities, groups, parties and organizations to create sufficient checks on state power. Social scientists in many countries enthusiastically support it as an ideal model of social organization. They see the concept of civil society as an expansion of popular political participation through the introduction of competitive elections and formation of political parties. Civil society implies the encouragement and development of citizens' participation in the public sphere. For more than seventy years the former soviet countries experienced a political system where there was a single party political monopoly, which dominated the electoral system, decided all key appointments, directed the work of government and controlled mass media. Since the beginning of the 1990s when the Soviet Union broke up, fifteen new independent countries have appeared.

During the last decade, Russia and Kyrgyzstan, like all the other post-soviet countries, have experienced a dramatic transformation from communist party monopoly to a multiparty system, from centralization to separation, and from state ownership to a mixed economy. Each of the newly emerged countries has chosen its own way of development, although all declared that they would build democratic societies. The first step towards democracy made by them was the introduction of competitive elections: one of the most widely recognized attributes of democracy in the world. In Bruce Parrot's view the introduction of competitive elections as a means of selecting a country's governmental leaders is a watershed in the transition to democracy, because electoral rules can decisively affect the prospects for the survival of particular parties and sometimes for the survival of the entire country.[14] By 2003 Russia and Kyrgyzstan have held several parliamentary and presidential elections since fall of communism.

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[14] Dawisha, Karen and Parrott, Bruce (eds.), *Conflict, Cleavage, and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1997, p. 15.

John Anderson, exploring the development of civil society in Kyrgyzstan in his article "Creating a framework for Civil society in Kyrgyzstan", suggests that the creation of a "modern" civil society requires the emergence of five supportive contexts: political, economic, regulatory, informational and cultural.[15] Based on this view, one can say that we are considering the political and informational contexts of the development of civil society in the country.

I am using Norbero Bobbio's approach to the definition of civil society given in "Democracy and Dictatorship" for this study, in order to analyze, examine and compare the existence and functioning of the attributes of civil society in Kyrgyzstan and Russia. According to Bobbio in his work, civil society is the complex of relations not regulated by state. It allows economic, social, ideological and religious conflicts to originate and occur so that state institutions have the task of solving them either by mediating or by preventing or repressing them.[16] First, as agents of civil society he names "social classes or, more broadly, the groups, movements, associations and organizations that represent them; as well as class organizations there are interest groups, associations of various types, ethnic emancipation movements, civil rights groups, women's liberation, youth movements and so on". Then, he names political parties, which according to his view "have one foot in civil society and another in institutions. In fact, one of the most frequent ways of defining political parties is to show that they perform the functions of selecting, aggregating and transmitting demands originating in civil society and which will become objects of political decisions".[17] Finally, he includes in the sphere of civil society the phenomenon of public opinion, which is "understood as the public statement of agreement or dissent concerning institutions, which circulates through the press, radio, television and so on. Moreover, public opinion and social movements develop together and influence each other". He thinks that "without public opinion the sphere of civil society loses its typical function and disappears".[18]

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[15] John, Anderson, "Creating a Framework for Civil Society in Kyrgyzstan", *Europe-Asia Studies*, 52:1, 2000, p. 77-93

[16] Norberto, Bobbio, "Civil Society" (Ch 2), in *Democracy and Dictatorship.* P. Kennealy, trans., Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1989, p. 22-43.

[17] Bobbio, *Democracy and Dictatorship*, p. 25.

[18] Bobbio, *Democracy and Dictatorship*, p. 26.

One major attribute which is non-governmental organizations is analyzed in this study, based on the above given definition. Bobbio's definition seems the most appropriate to describe the process of establishing civil society in Kyrgyzstan. Under communist rule, most kinds of voluntary participation and the freedom to form independent associations were banned. Instead there were forms of compulsory mass participation directed from above. Public opinion was never free from censorship and control of the party. In Habermas's view citizens' act as a public when they deal with matters of general interest without being subject to coercion, with a guarantee that they may freely assemble and express and publicize their opinions. When the public is large, this kind of communication requires certain means of dissemination and influence; today newspapers, periodicals, radio and television are the media of the public sphere. The term "public opinion" refers to the functions of criticism and control of organized state authority that the public exercises informally, as well as formally during periodic elections.[19] Analyzing the extent to which the given attribute have been established in the Russian Federation and Kyrgyz Republic since independence one can see how far the country has succeeded in establishing civil society.

In order to examine the effectiveness and usefulness of the attribute of civil society in Kyrgyzstan and Russia I compare the process establishing non-governmental organizations starting from 1990 up till present. Reality will be compared with established theory.

2.1 Types of Civil Society Organizations

What are the structures and organizations of civil society? Civil society organizations can be ranged and described as follows[20]:

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[19] Jurgen, Habermas, "The Public Sphere" in S. Seidman (eds.), *Jurgen Habermas on Society and Politics: A Reader*, Boston: Beacon Press 1989, p. 231-6.

[20] James, Manor and Mark, Robinson & Gordon, White, *Civil Society and Governance*. 26 August 1999. Retrieved June 1st, 2001 (http://www.ids.ac.uk/ids/civsoc/public.doc)

- *Social/recreational organizations.* These include youth clubs/teams/associations; sports/recreational associations; students' associations; associations of school/college graduates; clubs which bring together mainly urban elites (both recreational clubs such as country clubs or urban clubs, and 'service clubs such as Rotary).

- *Interest-based (including occupational) organizations.* Small business associations; associations of largest firms, banks, etc.; professional/occupational associations; trade/labor union; prosperous or small farmers' associations; rural laborers' associations.

- *Service provision organizations.* Associations which concentrate in service provision to (large or small) social groups.

- *Self-help (often community-based) organizations.* Urban neighborhood associations; cooperative societies; savings clubs or credit unions; non-governmental development organizations (NGDOs) which foster self-help among small groups or communities; other developmentally-oriented grassroots organizations.

- *Advocacy groups.* Environmental associations (including those dealing with common property resources); womens' associations; issue-based pressure groups (representing children, disabled people, immigrants, etc.).

- *Cultural/religious/'ethnic' organizations.* These include religious associations; 'tribal', caste or other such associations; linguistic group/literary/cultural associations; associations which seek to promote the beliefs, culture or identity of a 'primordial' group.

- *Social movements* (usually -- in contrast to all six of the types above -- quite large entities which may have little organization, or may have large memberships with an organization at the core). Religious movements, 'ethnic' or other parochially based (linguistic, 'tribal', caste, etc.) movements; other social movements.

- *All the other types of organizations* that do not fit to given above definitions.

2.2 Political Culture/Social Capital as properties of Civil Society

Relevant for the development and vitality of civil society associations seem to be the following features of a political system: *Education/economic equality, culture, power structure and rule of law.*

What is the causal relationship between the social capital and civil society? Features explaining the link between culture/social capital and civil society are:

- *Education / Economic Equality*
- *Culture*

What is the connection between civil society and power structures/good governance? Features explaining the link between the concept of good governance and civil society:

- *Power Structure*
- *Rule of Law*

Civil society is the network of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), social capital is the feature of public goods. There is a connection, but these are different things. Social capital is a requisite for civil society, on the other hand, civil society is a part of social capital. If we look at the social capital we have all things/attributes like culture, education and economic equality.

Features describing the link of culture and social capital towards civil society are:

Education, economic equality:
 The higher the minimal level of education and the less marked economic inequality, the better for the development of civil society, since civil society consists not in the existence of just some associations, but in a complex network of overlapping associations which includes all parts of society.

Culture:

To the extent that there is consensus that diversity and conflict are not symptoms of societal illness but rather of societal vitality, civil society institutions can flourish. This includes some amount of religious self-restraint: Only as long as it is generally considered as wrong to impose one's own convictions on other people, however intense these convictions might be, a civil society is possible.

Political culture ranks a special place in this theoretical framework. Political culture is one of the central research themes in contemporary political science, but political scientists remain divided on its meaning. Almond and Verba[21] say that "political culture is the pattern of individual attitudes and orientations toward politics among the members of a political system. It is the subjective realm that underlies and gives meaning to political actions."

Since the *Civic Culture* the concept of political culture and quantitative cultural studies have been a recurring source of debate, and a recurring source of new research initiatives. Recently there have been claims we are experiencing a renaissance of political culture research as new evidence emerges that "culture matters".

This study examines the development of the political culture in Russia and Kyrgyzstan and its relationship to democratic development. What are the cultural prerequisites of democracy, what aspects of political culture facilitate democratic politics and governmental performance, and what forms and reforms a political culture?

This given research is limited to the study of political culture of certain groups. There are two critical groups: 1) governmental officials, judge, etc.; 2) Political victims of corruption and discrimination. Here political culture is divided on two major pairs: 1) authoritarian / democratic culture; 2) dependent / civil culture.

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[21] Gabriel A., Almond, and Verba, Sidney, The Civic Culture. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1963.

The concept of political culture is useful for this study since it is one of the central elements of civil society. Political culture is part, or one of the measurements of participation of the people. They agree or disagree with the political system. If they disagree, the political system has no stability and does not exist very long. The thesis is that not only the institutions make the political system strong and stable but there should be also a positive public opinion. The forms of political culture are reading newspapers, participation in the public life (though the parties, etc). Political culture is identified in empirical terms by the question: do you agree with the democracy? There are many indicators to measure whether the people agree or disagree with the political system. Political culture is an attitude, measured also by the questions like: do you have trust in politics, democratic institutions, parliament, etc?

Civil society consists of the groups and organizations, both formal and informal, which act independently of the state and market to promote diverse interests in society. *Social capital*, the informal relations and trust which bring people together to take action, is crucial to the success of any non-governmental organization because it provides opportunities for participation and gives voice to those who may be locked out of more formal avenues to affect change.

While individual groups form the building blocks of civil society, the conceptual value of social capital lies in the extent and density of relations among groups as well as the synergy between civil society, state and market.[22] Therefore, social capital is an integral part of civil society at the micro and macro levels. Civil society is not a constant, rather it is continuously evolving and its roles vary in different contexts and at different levels of economic development. Trust and willingness to cooperate allows people to form groups and associations, which facilitate the realization of shared goals.

The conceptualization of civil society regards social capital as one of the major dimensions for its description. On the other hand, civil society is one of the major

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[22] "What is Civil Society?" The World Bank Group. Retrieved May 2nd, 2005 (http://www1.worldbank.org/prem/poverty/scapital/sources/civil1.htm)

sources for existing social capital. According to findings of Grootaert, Bastelaer[23] and Rose[24], in Russia, the *informal networks* of social capital are the most important source of income security. The concept of social capital refers to topics like a sense of belonging and solidarity between individuals or groups, the density and quality of relationships and interactions between them, their mutual feelings of commitment and trust due to the common values and norms, which are supposed to be the fundamentals of a society. "The social capital of a society includes the institutions, the relationships, the attitudes and values that govern interactions among people and contribute to the economic and social development. Social capital, however, is not simply the sum of the institutions which underpin society, it is also the glue that holds them together. It includes the shared values and rules for social conduct expressed in personal relationships, trust, and the common sense of "civic" responsibility, that makes society more than a collection of individuals. Without a degree of common identification with forms of governance, cultural norms, and social rules, it is difficult to imagine a functioning society."[25]

According to Grootaert[26], Immerfall[27] and Narayan[28], social capital has the feature of a public good, but not as a private property of a single person.

The analysis of social capital at the *micro level* (as a rather narrow concept) is traditionally referred to Robert Putnam as one of the most famous contributors in this

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[23] Christiaan, Grootaert, Thierry, Bastelaer, Understanding and measuring Social Capital: A Synthesis of findings and Recommendations from the Social Capital Initiative. The World Bank 2001.

[24] Richard, Rose, Getting Things Done in an Anti-Modern Society: Social Capital Networks in Russia. The World Bank Nov. 1998.

[25] Social Capital Initiative (SCI), World Bank: The Initiative on Defining, Monitoring and Measuring Social Capital. Overview and Program Description. Social Capital Initiative Working Paper, No. 1.- Washington, D.C. 1998.
Retrieved February 15th, 2002 (http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/scapital/wkrppr/index.htm)

[26] Christian, Grootaert, "Social Capital: The Missing Link?" In: World Bank, *Expanding the Measure of Wealth: Indicators of Environmentally Sustainable Development.* Washington, D.C. 1997. Retrieved February 17th, 2002
(http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/scapital/wkrppr/index.htm)

[27] Stefan, Immerfall, Sozialkapital in der Bundesrepublik. Thesen zu Konzept und Grössenordnung. In: Perspektiven gesellschaftlichen Zusammenhalts. Empirische Befunde, Praxiserfahrungen, Messkonzepte. Ed. By E. Kistler; H.H. Noll; E. Priller. – Berlin: Ed. Sigma Bohn 1999, p. 121-128.

[28] Deepa, Narayan, "Bonds and Bridges: Social Capital and Poverty." Policy Research Working Paper 2167. Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network, World Bank, Washington, D.C. 1999. Retrieved February 19th, 2002
(http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/scapital/library/narayan.htm)

field of scholarship.[29] In his book on civic, "horizontal" associations in Italy, Putnam defines social capital as features of social organization, such as *networks* of individuals or households, and the associated *norms, values* and *trust*, that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit. Putnam originally envisaged these externalities as being only of a positive nature, but he and others have since recognized that negative externalities can result from interpersonal interactions, as demonstrated by certain interests groups or, in extreme cases, malevolent groups such as the Mafia in Italy or the Interahamwe in Rwanda. In such situations, social capital benefits members of the association, but not necessarily nonmembers or the community at large.

James Coleman[30] used the broader approach to the concept of social capital, at *meso level*, considering both horizontal and vertical organizations "a variety of different entities with two elements in common: they all consist of some aspect of social structure, and they facilitate certain actions of actors - whether personal or corporate actors - within the structure". He implicitly considers relations among groups, rather than individuals. This definition expands the concept to include vertical as well as horizontal associations and behavior within and among other entities, such as firms. Vertical associations are characterized by hierarchical relationships and an unequal power distribution among members.

Douglass North[31] and Mancur Olson[32] represent the most comprehensive approach (*macro level*) to the social capital, implying the formalized relations and structures of macro-institutions, such as political regime, the legal, judicial, court systems, and civil and political liberties. Taken in that terms, "civil society" is a **part** of a society's **social capital**.

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[29] Putnam, Robert, Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital. In: *Journal of Democracy* 1995, 6 (1), p. 65-78

[30] James, Coleman, "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital." *American Journal of Sociology* 94 (Supplement) 1988, p. 95–120.

[31] Douglass, North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. New York: Cambridge University Press 1990.

[32] Mancur, Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities. New Haven: Yale University Press 1982.

Immerfall[33] provides a clear distinction between all these levels, as represented in the Figure 2.1:

Micro level: interpersonal relations, such as family, friends, and neighbors;

Meso level: intermediary association and organizations, such as clubs, firms, and political parties;

Macro level: Societal formal institutions, such as political regime, the rule of law, civil and political liberties.

Figure 2.1 Dimensions of Social Capital

Source: Scheme is partly adapted from Grootaert and Bastelaer.[34]

Measurement is often more advanced and sophisticated for structural social capital.

2.3 Civil Society and Good Governance

The notion of *good governance* is a another distinct concept apart from the term of *social capital.* There is a causal relationship between the two: civil society encourages/stimulates good governance; and good governance makes civil society strong/growing. There is again a positive feedback between these two like civil society add social capital and social capital as a requisite of civil society.

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[33] Stefan, Immerfall, „Sozialkapital in der Bundesrepublik. Thesen zu Konzept und Grössenordnung„ E. Kistler, H.-H. Noll und E. Priller (eds.), Perspektiven gesellschaftlichen Zusamenhalts. Empirische, Befunde Praxiserfahrungen, Messkonzepte(Edition Sigma, Berlin), 1999, p. 121-128.

[34] Grootaert, Bastelaer, Understanding and measuring Social Capital: A Synthesis of findings and Recommendations from the Social Capital Initiative. The World Bank, April 2001.

Features describing the link of culture and social capital towards civil society have been described in the section on "Political Culture / Social Capital as Properties of Civil Society". They were: *Education, economic equality* and *culture.*

Features of political system revealing the causal relationship of civil society and good governance are:

Power structure:

is the political segment dominating or confined? This means:

To what extent can people trust the political power to refrain from intervening into civil society even if the power itself is challenged by developments there? If the freedom of association is respected by those who wield political power only where it has no possible political consequences, civil society will remain weak.

Rule of law:

is the political power strong enough and willing to enforce the rules of the game in the civil arena? Partly this requirement conflicts with the first requirement, since a strong political power is of course more tempted to be a meddlesome power.

Conclusion:

Most of these factors are complex syndromes which can only partly be operationalized in quantitative terms. Indicators for educational achievement and economic equality are least problematic here. Cultural and religious variables are probably the toughest to operationalize. Political variables are in between; examples are: Do governments after lost elections step down typically, sometimes, rather not? Can acts of political authorities be challenged in the courts, with what consequences? Can political and judicial decisions be bought?

Alternative approaches to understanding of the concept of civil society are well represented through the notion of *good governance* regarded as an overall performance of the government. In the frame of external assistance aid policy to the Central Asia, the donor countries like Britain consider accountability of government

versus civil society and public institutions as a basis of good government. Germany and the USA emphasize on existence of independent and institutionalized judiciary, Sweden focused on official administrative effectiveness. [35]

German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) since 1990 till present has developed the official system of key indicators for measuring performance of good governance in the Central Asia. Those are:

- *respect for human rights*;
- *participation of the population in the political process*;
- *adherence to the rule of law*. [36]

German contribution on these three areas is to help overcome socio-economic problems and deficits with regard to democracy and the rule of law, as well as to stabilize the region.

One of the major aims of good governance is to prevent *corruption,* that reached the incredible scales in Russia and Kyrgyzstan as well as in other former USSR countries. *Transparency International* (TI)[37], the German world's leading non-governmental organization fighting corruption for the purpose of its indices focuses on corruption in the public sector and defines it as the abuse of public office for private gain. The surveys used in compiling the Corruption Perception Index tend to ask questions in line with the misuse of public power for private benefits, with a focus, for example, on bribe-taking by public officials in public procurement. The sources do not distinguish between administrative and political corruption.

Transparency International publishes several databases (indices) for measuring corruption:

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[35] Bernhard, Trautner, *Necessary Domestic Conditions for Effective External Assistance to Central Asia*. Presented to the workshop of the Center for OSCE-Research "Dialogue on Co-operation and Coexistence of Cultures and Civilizations in the OSCE Region" 22nd to 24th November2002 in Hamburg. Retrieved May 2nd, 2002 (http://www.bernhard-trautner.de/CORE_2002.pdf)
[36] German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). Retrieved May 1st, 2002 (http://www.bmz.de/en/topics/konzeptzentralasien/)
[37] Transparency International (TI). Transparency International the global coalition against corruption. Retrieved October 15th, 2004 (http://www.transparency.org/)

- *Corruption Perceptions Index* 2002 (CPI) is a new index that ranks countries in terms of the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials, politicians, business people, academics and risk analysts, and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). High and low range in this survey provides the highest and lowest values of the different sources. Survey sources for the TI Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 2002[38] from the pool of 102 countries estimates the level of corruption in Russia as 1.5-5.0, that means a very high degree of corruption. While some countries in transition from communism – most notably Slovenia, which has a cleaner score than EU member countries Italy and Greece – are perceived to be increasingly less corrupt, many countries in the former Soviet Union remain ridden with corruption. "The recent steps by President Vladimir Putin to introduce tax reforms and new laws fighting money-laundering are beginning to show the prospect of a lessening in perceived corruption in Russia," explained Peter Eigen, "but the CPI 2002 indicates that Russia has a long way to go and remains seriously corrupt, together with Uzbekistan, Georgia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Moldova and Azerbaijan, all of which score less than 3 out of 10." [39]

- *Bribe Payers Index.* These surveys are comprehensive studies on bribe-paying in international trade. It looks at key factors influencing corruption, covers unfair business practices, assesses the readiness of the private sector for the new ban on bribing foreign public officials and includes the Industrial Sector Ranking. In setting the framework for the Bribe Payers Index (BPI), TI was advised and guided by a Steering Committee of leading international experts in the fields of corruption, econometrics and statistics.

- *National Survey on Corruption and Governance (NSCG)*. Transparencia Mexicana, the national chapter of TI in Mexico, launched its National Survey on Corruption and Governance (NSCG) and its Corruption and Governance Index (CGI) in November 2001. The Corruption and Governance Index (CGI) ranks both the public services and the 32 states in the country. It gives us a comprehensive look at how common it

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[38] *Corruption Perceptions Index* 2002 (CPI), Berlin, August 28, 2002. Retrieved September 3rd, 2004 (http://ww1.transparency.org/cpi/2002/cpi2002.en.html)

[39] *Corruption Perceptions Index* 2002 (CPI). Transparency International the global coalition against corruption. Retrieved May 28th, 2004 (http://www.transparency.org/cpi/2002/cpi2002.sources.en.html)

is to pay a bribe for services and in which states of the country the problem is more acute.

Corruption originates from the Latin term *corruptus*, and implies bribable, immoral, venal, illicit, vicious, improper, etc. Meriam Wesbster's Collegiate Dictionary[40] identifies corruption as "the act of corrupting or making putrid, decomposition or disorganization, in the process of putrefaction; deterioration" as "the act of corrupting or of impairing integrity, virtue, or moral principle; the state of being corrupted or debased; loss of purity or integrity; depravity; wickedness; impurity; bribery." As one can see, the major element of corruption is the violation of integrity and laws. However, the there are many other factors violating integrity and laws, like crime, trickery, deception. Most commonly, corruption is identified as "sale by government officials of government property for personal gain" [41] and "use of public office for private gains".[42]

Nevertheless, corruption involves in everyday life not only the public or governmental officials, but also non-governmental organizations, business companies as well as rank-and-file people. The term of corruption is relevant to different kinds of actors and organizations from non-governmental, private or public sectors. Definition of corruption has very broad understanding. In general meaning, corruption can be identified as a violation of formal rules of the game by actors for their private gains.

The problem of corruption is growing from day to day and is especially relevant to the developing and transitional countries, like Kyrgyzstan and Russia, accordingly, due to their failing governance and economics breakdowns. Corruption was named by James Wolfensohn, the president of the World Bank, as the cancer with which international community must deal if it wants to achieve sustainable development.

A survey of 3,600 firms in 69 countries carried out for the *1997 World Development Report* provides further evidence of the widespread existence and negative effects of corruption. As noted in the report:

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[40] *Meriam Wesbster's, Collegiate Dictionary,* Massachusetts: Merriam-Webster, Incorporated, 1996.
[41] Andrei, Shleifer and Robert, Vishny, "Corruption," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics,* 108 no. 3, August, 1993, p.599.
[42] Pranab, Bradham, "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues," *Journal of Economic Literature* 35, no. 3, September, 1997, p. 1321.

The survey confirmed that corruption was an important — and widespread — problem for investors. Overall, more than 40 percent of entrepreneurs reported having to pay bribes to get things done as a matter of course. Further, more than half the respondents worldwide thought that paying a bribe was not a guarantee that the service would actually be delivered as agreed, and many lived in fear that they would simply be asked for more by another official. The consequences of corruption often do not end with paying off officials and getting on with business. Government arbitrariness entangles firms in a web of time-consuming and economically unproductive relations. [43]

The importance of the growing problem of corruption was underlined by the World Bank *Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Report* [44] in the following way: "Corruption is of growing concern to donors, nongovernmental organizations, and governments and citizens in developing and industrial countries alike."

There is enough empirical evidence from social science literature that corruption and development are inversely interrelated. Hellman et al.[45] stated that the effect of corruption on development is one of the major obstacles to political and economic transition in the CIS countries. The scales of corruption there are enormous. According to the Table 2.1, Central Asian countries and Caucasus are distinguished by high level of corruption, weak democratic institutions and lack of transparency.

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[43] *World Development Report 1997.* The State in a Changing World. World Bank Oxford University Press, p. 36.

[44] *Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Report*, September, 1997, p. 1. Retrieved July 25th, 2001 (http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/corruptn/coridx.htm)

[45] Joel Hellman, Geraint Jones, Daniel Kaufmann, and Mark Schankerman, "Measuring Governance, Corruption, and State Capture: How Firms and Bureaucrats Shape the Business Environment in Transition Economies," *The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper*, no. 2312, 2000, p. 19.

Table 2.1 Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 2003

World Ranking	Country	CPI Score	High-low range
33	Estonia	5.5	4.7-6.6
41	Lithuania	4.7	3.0-7.7
53	Belarus	4.2	2.0 -5.8
78	Armenia	3.0	2.2-4.1
86	Russia	2.7	1.4-4.9
100	Kazakhstan	2.4	1.6-3.8
100	Moldova	2.4	1.6-3.6
100	Uzbekistan	2.4	2.0-3.3
106	Ukraine	2.3	1.6-3.8
118	Kyrgyz Republic	2.1	1.6-2.7
124	Georgia	1.8	0.9-2.8
124	Azerbaijan	1.8	1.4-2.3

Note: CPI ranges between ten (highly transparent) and zero (highly corrupt). The full sample includes 133 countries worldwide.[46]

Kyrgyzstan, Georgia and Azerbaijan are the most affected by corruption countries in the CIS out of this range. Kyrgyzstan ranks 118th place in the pool of 133 countries worldwide. Russia is ranked as number 86 as less corrupted in comparison to the Central Asian countries and Caucasus.

It should be pointed out that Kyrgyzstan, mostly known as "Island of Democracy" and one of the most transparent and democratic courtiers in the CIS area proved to be one of the most corrupted and failed to create effective governance, a system of accountability and a market economy. Corruption became a legitimized part of the daily life. This opinion is supported by numerous reports and surveys conducted by international and local organizations and research centers.

One of the most interesting surveys is performed by the Center of Public Opinion Studies and Forecast in 2001 under support of the UNDP. There were 2100 participants of the survey, including 1200 ordinary people, 300 white-collar workers, 300 businessmen and 300 law enforcement workers.

Respondents were asked about their opinion on how they would rank Kyrgyzstan in terms of corruption scales. 40 percent scaled it as one of the most corrupted counties in the world; 14 percent believed that it was more corrupt than other countries; 78 replied that Kyrgyzstan has equal or higher levels of corruption in comparison to

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[46] Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 2003. Transparency International, October 15, 2004. Retrieved August 1st, 2001 (http://www.transparency.org/)

other countries.[47] Findings of the survey indicate that 29.2 percent (majority of participants) explained corruption as the reason of weakness of authorities and as an obstacle to economic reforms. The term of corruption was interpreted in different ways: 21 percent associated it with bribery, 14 percent linked it to mafia, 12 percent as abuse of power, 10 with stealing, 10 graft and 10 with "pushing necessary people."

Table 2.2 demonstrates that corruption exists on all levels of social life and different actors are involved there (government, private and public sector). Corruption and bribery is practiced everywhere: at schools, hospitals and for any clerical services.

Table 2.2 Instances of Giving and Taking Bribes in Kyrgyzstan in 2000

During last three years you bribed or were extorted, when you had:	Entrepreneurs (%)	Office Employees (%)
To get hired	63	40
To enroll your child in a school	58	50
To enter a university	85	73
To be in a hospital	82	75
To turn in a military registration office concerning conscription in army	100	70
To be asked or be under investigation	100	100
To obtain a flat (apartment)	58	59
To get residence registration or permission	67	53
To get permission to buy a land/build on it	77	73
To register a firm or prolong a permission	46	88
To obtain a contract for government projects	69	57
To obtain a contract for commercial projects	70	75
To pay taxes and submit tax declaration	44	70
To pass customs procedures	97	88
To obtain driving license and pass safety inspections	66	81
To break traffic rules and be arrested by police officers	100	100

Note: The sample size for entrepreneurs is 1200 and the sample size for office employees is 300.[48]

Generally, 70 percent of office employees and business representatives replied that they bribed.

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[47] E. Ilibezova, L. Ilibezova, N. Asanbaev, and G. Musakojaeva, "The Public Opinion Poll on Corruption," Conducted by the Center of Public Opinion Studies and Forecasts, Bishkek, 2000, p. 20. Retrieved October 15th, 2004 (http://www.undp.kg/english/publications.phtml)
[48] Ilibezova "The Public Opinion, p. 20

2.4 Discrimination

The indicator of discrimination serves as a measurement of the level of tolerance between individuals and groups in politics. This is a quality that especially indicates how civil society "looks" like. Being a governance issue, indicator of discrimination is important for identifying the potential of different groups to participate and to be competitive in political processes.[49]

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR, Article 2) says, that "everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty." Indicator of discrimination emphasizes justice and equality in the way state and society work together as well as explains the relationships of citizens between each other. The most important question here is: "To what extent is there discrimination in politics".

Nevertheless, understanding and interpretation of this variable needs deeper insight on how these principles are realized in Kyrgyzstan and Russia. It is also can be supposed that discrimination stimulates the growth of civil society, because those being discriminated get together and unite to fight it. Nevertheless, a country with low level of discrimination may score low on other indicators in the civil society for other reasons.

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[49] Goran Hyden, Julius Court and Ken Mease, World Governance Survey Discussion Paper 4, July 2003 Retrieved May 16th, 2004
(http://www.odi.org.uk/wga_governance/Docs/WGS_4_Civil_Society.pdf)

3 Measurement and Indicators

Three major variables (first two dependent and the last independent) drawn from the literature review will be measured in this study:

- *Corruption* (Indicators of Transparency International and Freedom House)
- *Social discrimination* (European System of Social Indicators)
- *Public engagement* (European System of Social Indicators).[50]

The concept of civil society can be measured and operationalized in the context of *social capital and good governance approaches* as it was discussed previously. Social capital can be measured by means of qualitative, quantitative and comparative research methodologies. In this research I restrict myself to the second and third tools.

One of the best examples of comparative study is introduced by Putnam[51], where he investigated social capital in Northern and Southern Italy, in terms of degree of civic involvement. The latter was measured by voter turnout, newspaper readership, membership in choral societies and confidence in public institutions. Putnam validates data from various sources against the findings of the General Social Survey, widely recognized as one of the most reliable surveys of American social life.

Grootaert and Bastelaer[52] suggest several useful proxies for measuring social capital in a policy oriented manner:

- *Membership in local association and networks.* This indicator refers to the structural social capital (See Figure 1) and consist of counting the associations, networks and membership of population.

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[50] *European System of Social Indicators.* German Social Science Infrastructure Services. Retrieved April 25th, 2002
(http://www.gesis.org/en/social_monitoring/social_indicators/EU_Reporting/eusi.htm)
[51] Robert, Putnam, with Robert, Leonardi, and Raffaella, Nanetti, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1993.
[52] Grootaert, Understanding and measuring Social Capital.

- *Indicators of trust and adherence to norms.* These indicators measure the behavioral social capital and require asking respondents about their expectations and experiences with behavior requiring trust. Key questions are about the extent to which households received or would receive assistance from members of their community or network in case of various emergencies (for example, loss of income or illness).

- *An indicator of collective action* by group of individuals in provision of various services. This indicator is measured by underlying social cohesion, for instance, the extant to which the cooperation is not imposed by an external force, such as the government.

The indicators system in this inquiry is generated and adjusted to the needs of research in comparative study from the following well-known and reliable sources:

- *General Social Survey*,
- *European and German System of Social Indicators,*
- *Corruption Perception Index* developed by *Transparency International,*
- *Freedom House Indicators*
- *World Values Survey*[53]*,*
- *Social Capital Initiative* (administered by the World Bank),
- *Human Development Index (HDI)* developed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2000).

The relevant international indicators fit perfectly into the purpose of study and would allow for a comparative ranking of Russia and Kyrgyzstan in terms of their performance in civil society. Moreover, the use of selected indications would help to fill a serious gap in empirical research and provide critical information alongside other measures of civil society.

The integrated system considers dimension of civil society across several selected and relevant basic life domains:

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[53] World Values Survey. Retrieved April 10th, 2002 (http://wvs.isr.umich.edu/)

- social, political participation and integration
- labor market
- leisure, media and culture (applicability will be considered)
- households and families (applicability will be considered);

All the listed above life domains are relevant to examination of the level of civil society.

Note: most probably at the final stage the study will be restricted to the first one or two life domains due to the limited scope of research.

The following measurement dimensions influence the level of civil society and social capital, as can be drawn from the literature review:

- social and political activities and engagement/integration
- availability of social relations
- quality of social relations
- quality of societal institutions

These aspects are operationalized for various above listed life dimensions (see Tables 3.1 – 3.3).

The domain of "social, political participation and integration" includes all the broad issues of social relations and engagement outside the own household community such as availability of relatives and friends, frequency of contacts and support within those personal networks, membership in organizations, integration in the public sphere such as volunteering and political activities.

The domains of "labor market" and "households and families" deal with activities and social relations within one household or family respectively at the working place.

The domain-specific measurement dimensions are further differentiated by subdimensions and further on, by one or several indicators. The final result will be to compose a list of relevant and valid indicators for measuring civil society. These indicators will be used for field research in a cross-national perspective, comparing

Russia and Kyrgyzstan. It worth mentioning that all the system of dimensions, subdimensions and indicators will be tasted by empirical means, and afterwards, verified or falsified.

According to the German System of Social Indicators, the Indicators for the life domain *"Participation"* are[54]:

- *Voter Turnout at the Federal/local Elections.*
Definition: Percentage of those eligible to vote who voted in the last federal/local parliamental and presidential elections.
Source: Statistical data

- *Percentage of Political Party Members* (According to the Welfare Survey)
Definition: Percentage of respondents aged 18 or above that declared to be a member of a political party. The question will be posed: "Would you be willing to join or become active in a political party?" Percentage of those who responded "I am already a party member".

- *Rate of those strongly interested in politics*
- *Rate of unionization*
- *Rate of members of associations/clubs*
- *Percentage of voluntary workers*
- *Satisfaction with democratic institutions*

Indicators for the life domain "*Education*":

- *Percentage of university students*
- *Public spending for education*

This system of quantitative indicators is used in a parallel way with the second system of indicators developed specially for questionnaires.

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[54] *The German System of Social Indicators: Key Indicators 1950 – 2001.* EU Reporting. Towards a European System of Social Reporting and Welfare Measurement. Retrieved April 1st, 2002 (http://www.gesis.org/en/social_monitoring/social_indicators/EU_Reporting/index.htm)

Table 3.1 Dimensions and Indicators of civil society: Domain "Social-Political Activities and Engagement/Integration"

Dimension	Measurement Dimension	Subdimension	Indicators
Social and Political Activities and Engagement/Integration	Civic engagement in Public Realms	Political participation	Political interest
		Engagement in Social Organizations	Volunteering in the charitable realm
		Church/Religious Activities	Regular attendance of church
Quality of societal Institutions	Perceived quality of political institutions	–	Trust in political parties
			Satisfaction with democracy and civil society
	Perceived quality of social institutions		Trust in charitable organizations
	Perceived quality of church/religious institutions		Trust in church/religious organizations
Availability of social relations	Membership in organizations	Membership in political organizations	Membership in a political party
		Membership in social organizations	Membership in social organizations
		Membership in church/religious organizations	Membership in church/religious organizations

Source: This table is partly adapted from the European System of Social Indicators.

Table 3.2 Dimensions and Indicators of civil society: Domain "Labor market"

Dimension	Measurement Dimension	Subdimension	Indicators
Social and Political Activities and Engagement/Integration	Participation in the area of working life	Membership in job-related organizations	Membership in labor/trade unions
			Membership in professional organizations
		Co-determination of company decisions	Employees with right of co-determination
			Companies with a workers' council
			Employees Represented by a workers' council
Quality of societal institutions	Perceived quality of trade unions	–	Trust in labor/trade unions

Source: This table is partly adapted from the European System of Social Indicators.

Table 3.3 Dimensions and Indicators of civil society: level of minorities oppression/social discrimination/heterogeneity

Dimension	Measurement Dimension	Subdimension	Indicators
Social discrimination / Oppression of minorities	Concerning position in a society / Social status Ethnicity/Race (Ethnic conflicts, National discrimination) Gender disparities	–	Rate of representation in national parliaments Rate of people repudiating minorities (foreigners and/or people of a different race, social status and gender); Level of violence against foreigners Differences in income level (if woman and man do the same job but woman get less paid) Access to higher education (quotas for black people, sexual minorities)

Source: This table is partly adapted from the European System of Social Indicators.

4 Relevance of Study / Statement of Problem

The question of whether and how 'Civil Society' might evolve in countries like Kyrgyzstan and Russia is timely of obvious political and also scientific importance. The situation with civil society and human rights problems in the formerly communist countries is in a number of ways worse than it was before 1989. The political dynamics of many states like these indicate a trend towards disrespect for religious, ethnic, and national minorities; increasing police brutality that seems to reflect policy rather than merely lack of education and reform; continuing manipulation of judicial and electoral systems as part of a massive pattern of corruption; and other violations of human rights principles. With democracy faltering and poverty deepening, most of the citizens of these countries have not greeted the "New Millennium" with much hope.

On the other hand, as civil institutions working to encourage governments to respect international and local human rights norms, promoting the embrace of civil society values among populations, and cooperating together in solidarity across borders, there is a hope that democratic practice proclaiming the dignity of every person since ancient times will be at least partly implemented.

Problem:
As one can see, the existing literature does not provide clear indications for the factors influencing the level of development of civil society institutions. The existing literature and knowledge on civil society are mostly western-oriented. In cases of Kyrgyzstan and Russia the comparative perspective is neglected. There is also very little knowledge in the synthesis of empirical evidence regarding these countries. This research attempts to fill in this gap through the comparative perspective and to show that used approach adds more value to the knowledge on civil society than the existing literature has now.

The literature review introduced in this research reflects the academic literature, as well as official and unofficial documents (governmental policies, reports, news articles, etc.) that tackle the problem being investigated. All of these materials are arranged to expose the primary assumptions, concepts, and theories that strengthen

their claims and set the stage for the methodology of the research that is being described.[55]

Right after the breakdown of the Soviet empire in 1991, Russia and Kyrgyzstan announced their independence, established their own constitutions and declared the new course on promoting civil society and human rights. Very often Kyrgyzstan was call by Western Europe and USA as an "Ireland of democracy" or "Second Switzerland". "The formation of civil society remains the primary task of the state. To develop a dialogue between the state and the strengthening structures of civil society is our aim for the future" stated Askar Akayev, former president of the Kyrgyz Republic, during round-table assembly "Power and Society" of numerous political parties and non-governmental organizations.[56] As to Russia, while Vladimir Putin has promised to keep Russia on a market path, his critics worry about his commitment to Russia's young democracy. The institutions of a broad civil society – NGOs, the press, political parties and free associations are not yet well developed. The rule of law has not been well entrenched. And these weaknesses are, in part, a legacy of the Soviet police state of Putin's early career, when the Communist Party had a monopoly on power.

There are different problems and process in each of these countries. Therefore, the aim of this study is to analyze, evaluate and compare the process of evolving civil society there.

4.1 Contribution to the Field of Study

As it is anticipated, my contribution to this given area of research is to considerably revise the picture of politics in Russia and Kyrgyzstan that has emerged over the last five years, as a political system that is changing direction from the hypothetically more "democratic" years of the Yeltsin's administration to the more centralized and dictatorial one of the Putin's regime. Akaev's regime over more than fifteen years has similarly gradually changed from initially declared open democracy to the corrupted

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[55] Stringer, Ernest T, *Action research: A handbook for practitioners* (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 1999.

[56] *Slovo Kyrgyzstana*, June 9, 2000

and authoritarian government, consisting of his so-called presidential family members.

My assumption is that the environment for building civil society, and therefore, democracy, continues to exist at the local levels in Russia and Kyrgyzstan and, therefore, may be improved, as demonstrated by the emerging activity of NGOs and their increased, positive relationships with regional-level political authorities. Accordingly, increased regional authority corresponds to improved effectiveness of NGOs in Russia and Kyrgyzstan.

The policy implication of such a result includes a change in perceptions of what is going on in Russia and Kyrgyzstan today. It should become clear that the conditions for democracy are also getting more favourable and improving in those countries, if Western political elites become persuaded that civil society there is emerging and is accompanied by a premium placed upon bargaining, compromise, and lobbying on the part of NGOs as they communicate to government. Such a perception of politics in Russia and Kyrgyzstan should have a moderating effect on Russian-Western European relations by shifting the preliminary conclusions upon which policy is built (from a view of Russia and Kyrgyzstan as a highly centralized, unresponsive state to one of them as the states in which the basic democratic processes of bargaining and compromise exist). During times of tension between USSR and Western world, such a view can help to prevent more conflicts. During times of cooperation, a view like this can actually boast the achievement of better relations.

The section of research questions and hypothesis follows logically from the literature review. The intellectual problems I may help solve through this research are described in the following sections.

4.2 Research Questions

The major research question is: Does the "quality" of civil society have an influence on the quality of politics? And if it has not: what could be the reasons? For instance: whether the number of NGOs makes better governance or whether it might be instead their quality and so on. To what extent do civil society organizations have an

influence on politics? This question further differentiates into sub-questions: 1) Do they matter? and 2) Does the quantity or quality matter more?

Quality of civil society is measured by the number, quality of NGOs and number of participants. The major sub-variables are *political participation* and *political culture*. The most important questions here are: How strong is the political participation? How many people participate in NGOs? These are both qualitative and quantitative indicators. Quantitative data is used to back up my qualitative data.

Quality of politics is identified in terms of governmental efficiency. The major indicators for it, used in this study, are the level of corruption and discrimination in the society.

As to the academic impact of this study, I make an effort to change the prevailing pattern of analyzing politics of Russia and Kyrgyzstan from elite studies, that is, studies of politics at the local level, to the national level. Within that context, I attempt to identify the answers to several questions: What are the factors that influence the durability or decline of NGOs in Russia and Kyrgyzstan? What factors help to guarantee or hinder the achievements of these groups in meeting their objectives? How do studies of individual NGOs in Russia and Kyrgyzstan help to get us acquainted about more general, social science theories of group dynamics and the development of civil society? How does the development of these groups in Russia and Kyrgyzstan compare to the development of such groups in Western countries? This research has helped to begin to answer the above questions in ways that will be summarized in final conclusion.

Other interesting questions are:

- What is the relationship (causal link) between the independent variables *of public participation, political culture* and dependent variables of *corruption* and *social discrimination?*

- To what extent is there discrimination and corruption in politics? According to Goran Hyden, "as a governance issue, the level of discrimination is an important indicator of

the potential for different groups to enter the political process. Here is referred to distinction according to race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status".[57]

- In which areas are the NGOs more successful, where do they work, and what did they achieve? What role do they play for society? How to assess the "quality" of their politics?

- What are the relationships between NGOs and the state; between NGOs and international donors?

- How great is the success of NGOs in both countries? How to examine their outcome? And how strong their projects are? Success of the NGOs can be best identified in terms of whether they are accepted or recognized by the government, if they are partners with the governmental organizations or remain in the permanent conflict, if they are successful in international arena, if they succeeded to show the world that the state is corrupt, for instance. Strength of the projects can be best measured by the results achieved, amount of benefits and services provided to the local people, etc. Success of NGOs should be also differentiated in both cases with relevance to location of NGOs. Is it located in the capital or periphery?

- What are the links of NGOs to clan systems? This is especially relevant question for Kyrgyzstan, where the Northern and Southern parts of the country permanently fight for the political and economic power.

4.3 Research Hypothesis / Theoretical Framework

The research hypothesis is introduced in the following theoretical framework:

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[57] Goran Hyden, Julius Court, and Kenneth Mease, *Making Sense of Governance. Empirical Evidence from 16 Developing Countries.* Boulder, London 2004, p. 225.

Figure 4.1 Theoretical Framework

Civil society is our independent variable. Under civil society we consider number and quality of NGOs, as well as number of participants. Quality of politics is our dependent variable. It is measured by the concept of good governance and operationalized in terms of the level of corruption and discrimination.

The concept of civil society is operationalized in terms of the *Social Capital* and *Good Governance* concepts. As far as the relationship is clearly mediated here, there will be considered intermediate variables such as degree of influence of NGOs on public opinion and governmental structures, as well as degree of (in)dependence of

governmental structures (namely, power structures), level of independence of the courts, and other.

First of all, as it was found out, there is no direct relationship between civil society and quality of politics. There is only mediate relationship, which is explained by the degree of influence that NGOs have on governmental structures. Therefore, the stronger the NGOs are, the higher civil-political culture, the higher degree of influence on governmental structures. But when the level of influence is increasing, under some conditions, governmental structures reduce corruption, improves quality of politics, etc; under other conditions governmental structures attempt to decrease this influence, become more independent both from the population and NGOs, or the most possible, simply repress the NGOs. At the first look, it seems to be that the more NGOs, the better the politics is. But it can be also completely another way around: under appraisal of NGOs, the governmental structures increasingly try to decline their influence. Therefore, we have a feedback relationship that negatively influences the NGOs. This is the first cycle.

The second cycle is the waves of democratization that lead to further betterment of politics, and therefore, reduction of corruption and discrimination.

What else is important here? This is a final and major causal factor: if here we have a political culture (civil or dependent), than on the other hand we have authoritarian and democratic political system. Democratic culture is more dependent and more responsible; therefore, authoritarian regime is more independent from the NGOs.

However, there is also a potential problem of endogeneity in this theoretical framework. Quality of politics might be measured by quality and quantity of civil society organizations.

We should also make sure that we do not have the same indicators on both sides of the equation. As long as we ask what societal factors (like participation) influence the "development" or "quality" or "level" of civil society (again measured at least in part by participation), we are in permanent danger to confound dependent and independent variables.

If instead we take civil society as our input and quality of politics as our output (which may of course feed back on its input) we have two clearly distinct concepts. And it has the advantage of being directly connected to the puzzle described in the very first paragraph: Why is it that we have all kinds of civil society features in Russia in Kyrgyzstan (independent variable) and still find growing disrespect for minorities, growing police brutality and so on (dependent variable)?

The construction of this theoretical framework is based on the major factor: the development and growing magnitude of number of NGOs in Russia and Kyrgyzstan. Civil society organizations became one of the most important driving forces in political realm since 1980s, when the democratic transformations started. Various groups, stimulating and increasing public participation and standing for citizens' needs and demands, were created since that time. There are different kinds of NGOs, such as human rights protection groups, female organizations, ecological, anti-military, youth (students) movements, etc. Many of these NGOs are promoting institutional and legal reforms, claiming the governments to have more accountability. The issues of good governance, increase of corruption and discrimination are becoming more and more meaningful, than ever before. The problem of corruption and discrimination is constantly growing in these countries. There is a serious challenge for NGOs to combat this problem, since they are in many cases corrupted and tend to discriminate others too. Now the NGOs try demand and put into practice their right to monitor and criticize the governmental actions. These organizations have also succeeded in mobilizing and putting together previously fragmented groups. Gradually, the NGOs started to serve as an unconventional way to political parties for political involvement and representation.

NGOs in Russia and Kyrgyzstan often try to introduce themselves as different -- organizationally, strategically, and morally--from political parties. Typically, NGOs have emphasized their newness to the political system, as a popular response to decades of corrupt parties that would shake up the system and provide new prospects and challenges for the representation of citizen's demands. Therefore, very often they tend to represent themselves as the honest, nonhierarchical, and more representative alternative to political parties. Although civil society has served as a

breeding ground for new political leadership, much of that leadership has tended to emphasize its distinctness from the old political class and political structures.

In general, these NGOs, standing for "quality of politics" symbolize an important trend in responding to new demands and problems, that Russia and Kyrgyzstan confront now.

4.4 Research Objectives

Procedure:

In order to address the above listed questions, this research will:
- operationalize the level of corruption, social discrimination and citizen participation in policy influence through the concept of social capital and good governance as the response variables;
- identify the most promising explanatory approaches in order to advance them;
- specify, on the basis of theoretical analysis, falsifiable empirical hypotheses and test against the data from Russia and Kyrgyzstan;
- trace the process of civil society development by means of a qualitative and partly quantitative inquiry.

Major research objectives in the given research are:

- To identify what intellectual and practical-political consequences it could have if we had satisfactory answers to the main research question.

- To assess the "quality" of politics in Russia and Kyrgyzstan.

- To examine the success and the outcome of NGOs in both countries. To describe relationships between NGOs and the state; NGOs and international donor-organizations.

- To reveal and compare the levels of civil society institutions' development in Russia and Kyrgyzstan by means of cross-national comparison methods.

- To reveal mechanisms, common features and differences of civil society institutions' building in the context of politico-economic, social, cultural and international changes, to survey the materials of appropriate historical periods of these states. The historical cases have been chosen by the principle of contrast levels as the cases of the most successful and the worst periods of civil society's development.

- To specify the various conditions and processes that promoted or blocked civil society institutions' development and explain how political, economic, cultural, geopolitical factors and their combinations may promote further progress of these institutions. To identify possible mechanisms in democratization and to specify likely conditions affecting their emergence and concatenation. These conditions can modify democratic institutions enhancing or diminishing their development or perhaps eliminate it entirely.

- To give the detailed description, e.g. *"measurement",* of the situation and its change and path, to give tentative theoretical interpretation of this picture - where it might lead to etc. The inquiry might also lead to theoretically sound debate about causes and prospects of the situations described. This debate is sound if it rests on an interpretation of the data received which uses as fully as possible the relevant theoretical knowledge we have so far.

- To consider relationship among several variables.

5 Method

5.1 Introduction

The Method section of this study describes the steps that have been undertaken to address the hypotheses and / or research questions. For this reason the Method part follows from the statement of the problem in much the same way as research questions follow from the literature review. The objective of this chapter is to present a comprehensive and explicit description of the particular measures or steps to be undertaken. The proper method of this study is generated by precise considerations of the research questions.

The primary role of this given research is to link the theoretical and empirical levels of study. Empirical research is necessary as far as theories need the support of data in order to remain viable. The methods I propose to use to answer my question, prove my point, or gain more detailed and sustainable knowledge are described below.

The research design of this study is based on combination of *quantitative and qualitative design*. Qualitative implies that the data are in the form of words as opposed to numbers.[58] Quantitative study is the use of statistical methods for looking at relationship and patterns in order to express them with numbers. Statistics is the way to represent the data about complex relationships briefly. The proposed approach is a combination of (quasi)-experimental designs and quantitative data with quantitative methods and data.

The benefit and applicability of it is to assess a huge amount of data using standardized scales and measures in the field of (experimental) study and after that to arrange open-ended interviews with a subset of the original sample to receive a clear picture of the subject in question. However, qualitative design is the major method of this study.

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[58] Erik Kjell, Rudestam, & Rae R., Newton, Surviving your dissertation: A comprehensive guide to content and process. Newbury Park, CA: Sage 2001.

The method chapter is based on both qualitative and quantitative methods and is necessary to justify the operationalization of the dependent variables. It consists of the following parts: Subjects/Participants, Instrumentation/Measures, Procedures, Statistical/Data Analysis.

The field-research was implemented in two stages: preliminary and basic. Preliminary stage was conducted in 2003 in Russia (3 months) and basic stage in 2004 both in Russia and Kyrgyzstan (4 months). Work in Kyrgyzstan was organized as a field-research stay at the United Nations Organization.

As a result of two field-travels from both Kyrgyzstan and Russia I equally received:

- *300 completed questionnaires*
- *100 interviews*

The preliminary stage was used to test the questionnaires and therefore to make necessary corrections, to identify potential partners and experts for the survey, to collect the secondary data.

During my second field trip, I focused mostly on interviewing bureaucrats, clerks and governmental officials rather than on NGOs and political parties, as in the first field trip. It enabled me to receive more unbiased information from "two sides of the medals" on development of civil society institutions in Russia. This strategy was used in order to examine the role and influence of the state institutions and bureaucracy in building civil institutions and the ongoing reform processes.

There are six areas in which the second trip added value to what the first trip has brought about:

- ***New Groups of respondents.*** I was interested in getting "the other side of the coin" into the picture. During the first trip I focused on public NGOs, while during the second travel I added the groups of bureaucrats, clerks and governmental officials. The reasons and expectations of using this approach were to receive and compare

the opinion of two opposite groups of the society. This strategy was used in order to examine the role and influence of the state institutions and bureaucracy in building civil society institutions and the ongoing reform process.

- **New Questions.** There was a case that during my interviews and upon analyzing the results I found out that there are things which could be important but which are not included in the first questionnaire. Therefore, the row of questions on corruption, national and ethnic discrimination was substantially broadened and improved.

- **Improved questions.** As it was mentioned in the field report, some of my questions irritated some respondents or caused misunderstanding. This happened in particular where questions touch political feelings (questions on corruption, on the quality of democracy, on discrimination, on nationality etc.). This kind of questions often caused highly emotional discussion or the expression of fear of respondents. The solutions I wanted to try during the second trip were the new wording of the questions which have been troubling, changing the focus of the question, or substituting the question by another one.

- **New case studies.** This time I intended to visit other research sites in Russia, covering new geographical areas, and to spend almost half of the time in Kyrgyzstan. The first field trip was conducted only in Russia. It enabled me to make a comparative analysis between the regions of Russia and to compare Russia with Kyrgyzstan, as stated in the main objective of my Thesis.

- **New data.** The data received from the first trip was clarified and filled in the missing data.

- **New publications** were made after the field trip. Two articles were published in December 2003 after the first travel.

5.2 Sampling: Subjects and Participants

The subjects are informants or participants in the study, organizations or events, documents or even the whole society. The notion "participants" in normally used in

studies of human beings.[59] The purpose of this part of the Method chapter is to explain why and how the relevant units or analysis were selected. It consists of the *sampling design, locating subjects* and describing the *appropriate number of subjects.*

The *research sites* chosen for the field-research were the major cities of Asian (namely Siberian) part of Russia: Tomsk, Omsk, Barnaul, Gorno-Altajsk, Krasnoyarsk, Novosibirsk, etc.

In Kyrgyzstan the work was conducted in cities representing both Northern and Southern regions (Bishkek, Tokmok, Karakol, Naryn, Talas, Osch, Toktogyl, etc.). Interviews and questionnaire distributions were also arranged with respondents from many other big cities all over Russia and Kyrgyzstan during active participation in the conferences, seminars, workshops and other events.

Reasons for selecting given research sites:

These research sites were selected mainly for two reasons:

First of all, this study envisages case study method to understand the sequence of the problems. According to Ragin[60], a case-oriented approach works well when the number of relevant cases with the same number of negative cases is manageable.

Secondly, *manageability* — a concept that is often used for conducting social science research is another reason to choose these particular research sites.

When determining the number and composition of the experts and practitioners, their knowledge in specific areas and professional experience, profession, position, and competence in these given research problems were taken into account. A total number of 400 questionnaires were sent out and 300 were completed. In most cases the questionnaire was handed in to the expert and then, several days later, the

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[59] Rudestam, Surviving your dissertation: A comprehensive guide to content and process, p.78.
[60] Ragin, Charles C., The Comparative Method. Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987

expert returned the filled-out questionnaire. In some cases the questionnaire was filled out following an interview.

It should be noted that guaranteeing full confidentiality was very important for the survey. In 10 cases, the experts agreed to answer the questions only under the condition of total confidentiality (i.e., without writing their names on the questionnaire). In 8 cases it was impossible to receive the answers even under observation of this condition (this explains the discrepancy between the number of questionnaires distributed and filled out).

Overall participants of the survey can be grouped in the following way:

- Leading political and social scientists, leaders of public opinion, experts, analysts, rectors, professors and lecturers of the universities in Siberia;

- Representatives of German and international organizations, foundations and diplomatic missions like: Generalkonsulat der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Bosch Stiftung, Entwicklungsgesellschaft Novosibirsk (EGN/GTZ), Delegation der Deutschen Wirtschaft, Europäische Bank für Entwicklung, Tacis, American Councils, Soros Foundation (currently, Open Siberia Foundation), Press Development Institute, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (several scholarship holders), Gorbachev Fund, Rotary Club, Siberian Civic Initiatives Support Center (Inter-Regional Public Foundation);

- High-ranking officials from the government, city and regional administration, political advisors to the governors, regional Councils of Deputies, Council of Federation and Federal Assembly;

- Editors-in-chief, political and economic reviewers, correspondents and journalists from the leading federal, regional, local mass media and Internet portals (including a journalists working for the BBC and CNN);

- Activists of non-governmental, non-commercial, educational, cultural, arts, youth, medical, sports organizations, civil movements, and church-related organizations;

- Heads of information agencies from the local, city, regional and federal administrations and authorities;

- Leaders of the major political parties and parliamentary members of local, regional and federal levels;

- Public and private (economic) interest groups (business companies, trade unions, associations of entrepreneurs);

- Public relations specialists and political technologists;

- Specialists of several Centers for analytical and sociological research.

When assigning experts to categories, their current position and activity as well as their working experience during the five years prior to the survey was taken into account. Since some of the experts' positions changed during the time considered for the survey, they may be assigned to two (and in two cases – to three) categories at the same time. Respondents were selected from a cross section of persons representing different perspectives on issued concerned. They should have been at least thirty-five years of age and should have had significant experience in public life.

As it was already indicated, overall 300 respondents, both from Russia and Kyrgyzstan, participated in this survey. The major sampling rules were following:

- Population - 80 respondents across the whole countries. Here I used the method of stratified random sampling. Population was stratified according to the territorial-administrative division, type of living place and gender. Selection of households was done by routing sampling. The results received are representative on the level of the country (South and East in case of Kyrgyzstan).

- High-ranking governmental officials and civil servants – 40 respondents. Here I created general set of basic organizations that have the cases of spread of corruption. The following structures were included into the survey: Parliament,

administrations of the President and Prime-Minister, ministries, district and city administrations. Different position levels of the respondents were taken into account during the process of sampling. Direct selection of the respondents who were interviewed has been randomized.

- Business people – 20 respondents. The general set included basic areas of entrepreneurship (such as services, industry and trade), that are potentially confronted with the cases of corruption and discrimination in governmental structures.

All the other categories of participants were selected also on the basis of random sampling.

The expert group included representatives of the following categories:
- Long-standing parliamentarians – 20 respondents;
- Senior judges and lawyers – 10 respondents;
- Respected academics, consultants, researchers and policy advisers– 20 respondents;
- Heads or senior officials of NGOs – 20 respondents;
- Heads and senior members of international organizations and diplomatic representatives – 20 respondents;
- Editors and senior reporters in the media – 40 respondents.

5.3 Instrumentation and Measures

This part reveals the choice of precise measures to be used and how they will measure the variables defined in the research questions and hypotheses. The *suitability of measurement* should reflect the conceptualization in a way that is compatible with authors' position. The measurement characteristics are *reliability* (capability of a measure to provide with reliable results), *validity* (specifies that a measure is consistent with the purpose of measurement) and *structure* (number and meanings of subscales of the selected measurement).[61] With regards to

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[61] Rudestam, Surviving your dissertation: A comprehensive guide to content and process, p. 82.

administration and scoring the measures, the chosen measures are self-administered and will be mailed out with request to "fill out the box that is the most appropriate to your understanding". The instrumentation/measures describe the test items and the meaning of each subscale, the explanation of high and low scores, including the measurement characteristics of each subscale.

Basically the interviews and questionnaires will be used to reflect and focus debate about the major research questions of the study, as well as to receive a textual and numerical data.

There are two main reasons for undertaking specifically *cross-national comparison*. The first of these concerns the empirical testing of explanatory hypotheses that purport to transcend national boundaries. If macro-level characteristic *A* is hypothesized to 'explain' macro-level characteristic *B*, than countries which possess *A* should be more likely to exhibit *B* than countries which do not possess *A*; and so on. A second reason is what can best be described as substantive illumination. The central purpose of this sort of inquiry is to enhance understanding of one country by reference to experiences of others. The purpose of my comparison in this context is to identify the minimum set of institutional characteristics that differentiate the 'successful' civil society from unsuccessful.

5.4 Data Collection Methods and Procedures

This section provides a precise explanation of the steps taken to contact the persons who were interviewed or asked to fill in the questionnaire, obtain their collaboration, and manage the measurement instruments. The objective of this part is also to provide information of when, where, and how the data were collected. It should also elaborate the subsequent stages of the research.

Given research design basically relies on the standard data collection tools like semi-structured, qualitative interviews with the use of voice recorder (individual and focus group) and questionnaires, open content and document analysis surveys, participant and non-participant observation scales, secondary analysis of individual aggregate

data and comparative analysis the relationship between continuous variables, comparative case-study, use of statistics, and archival data.

In the mailing survey as one of the data collection methods I implemented the following steps:

- establish the personal contact. If it is not possible, mail pre-contact letter including a stamped, self-addressed envelope (or send an e-mail).
- 1 week later mail survey packet.
- 2 weeks later mail follow-up survey for non-respondents. First and second steps were the same for arranging interviews.

A diary and journal to reflect impressions, reactions, and other meaningful events were used during the whole period of the field research, especially for participant observations. After completing an analysis of interviews the informants were contacted again to get acquainted with the whole written narrative and conclusions drawn from this information. This was necessary for validating the correctness and reliability of the findings.

The methods used were suitable for exploring the research question and constitute valid sources of data for dissertation research.

The design basically relied on the standard data collection tools like semi-structured, qualitative interviews with the use of voice recorder (individual and focus group) and questionnaires, open content and document analysis surveys, participant and non-participant observation scales, secondary analysis of individual aggregate data and comparative analysis of the relationship between continuous variables, comparative case-study, use of statistics, and archival data.

Basically the interviews and questionnaires were used to reflect and focus debate about the major research questions of the study, as well as to receive a textual and numerical data.

5.5 Intended Data

Primary data was obtained by means of *focus-group discussions*, semi-structural (semi-formal) *questionnaires* and *interviews*. The target groups and individuals were representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), political parties, public and private (economic) interest groups (trade unions, associations of entrepreneurs), civil movements, church-related associations, mass-media, music or singing groups, sport clubs; well-known political and social scientists, experts and analysts.

Questionnaires

Two different sets of questionnaires were used during the field-research. One set was prepared for Russia and another for Kyrgyzstan. Allthough the structure and questions were the same for providing comparative analysis, the suggested answers to some questions were specially designed for each country. For example, questions referring to national minorities. This is because Russia and Kyrgyzstan have different ethnic and national compositions. Questionnaires were primarily prepared in English and afterwards translated in to Russian. Russian has the status of official language in Kyrgyzstan. All participants of the survey spoke either English or Russian. Therefore, respondents had a choice of language. When the survey was completed, all the answers were translated into English, in order to standardise and facilitate the data processing and analysis.

Work with the questionnaires was built on the following stages:

- Translation of the questionnaire into Russian and its multiplication;
- Determination of the circle of experts to be targeted for the survey;
- Receipt of completed questionnaires;
- Computer processing of the questionnaire data;
- Preliminary analysis of the collected results and preparation of the report.

On the whole, the experts and practitioners perceived the questionnaire with great interest and appreciation. Among the most significant comments on the questionnaire and survey procedure the following should be noted:

- The questionnaire does not discuss directly the role of international development organizations; especially in Kyrgyzstan, the role of these organizations is very significant in many aspects;

- There is no direct question on the problem of separation of powers;

- A number of comments point out that the wording of some questions does not differentiate between de jure and de facto (for example, a law may have been adopted and made compliant with the international standards but in practice it is either not enforced or not fully observed);

- Some experts believe that the questionnaire should have included a direct question on the role and mechanisms of participation of mass media and other civil society institutions (in addition to NGOs), as well as on the role of lobbyists.

Interviews

Key-informant and expert interviews provided a source of documentation that was especially important for the given studies. In each city or town the open-ended interviews were arranged with key participants. Individuals were selected on the basis of their specific knowledge about the subject of research or their active engagement in politics and public life. These were the experts from international organizations and consulting agencies, as well as leaders of political parties, NGOs, trade-unions and well-known journalists. By doing this sampling I attempted to approach for interviewing representatives of different social structures, organizations and contrary thinking schools. I used uniform interview protocol for receiving less-biased and comparable information about the major trends and dynamics of the society development.

The major topics covered in the interviews were concentrated on the development of non-governmental organizations, public participation, corruption and discrimination. However, I always tried to adjust the interview to the informant's expertise and experience in particular issues.

The information received from the interviews also refers to the relations between different organizations, important facts and narratives about the high and low levels of social mobilization, the effects and consequences. The interviews were strongly

linked to the previous research for this study. Like all forms of data, the quality of interviews is enhanced when they are scrutinized with relevance to other forms of data. I conducted archival research and documented previous studies for creating the preliminary profile before conducting interview. If the participant revealed the information that was absolutely new for me, I reviewed the archives and local newspapers for neutral confirmation and more reliable documentation.

Secondary data collection was performed by means of documentary, literature and bibliographical research in governmental institutions and non-governmental organizations as well as public libraries of visited cities. Relevant newspaper articles, governmental laws, programs and charters of NGOs and political parties were analyzed in the framework of content-analysis. Social Science Panels and databases were also scrutinized.

Primary and secondary data was collected in close cooperation with international organizations like Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation, GTZ, United Nations Organization, OSCE, IHRW (International Human Rights Watch), Soros Foundation, American Council, etc.

5.6 Statistical/Data Analysis

After completing both field-research stages, the data was processed in SPSS data format to enable statistical analysis and therefore provide qualitative data.

5.7 Limitations and Delimitations

Limitations of the study are introduced to narrow the problem, methods and theoretical framework of the study. Delimitations, in its turn, involve limitations on the research design that are imposed intentionally. These delimitations restrict the participants (organizations and institutions of civil society) to which the results of the study can be generalized.

This inquiry considers basically two kinds of civil society institutions: Non-governmental organizations and political parties in Russia and Kyrgyzstan. Out of

many existing approaches only two approaches are used to measure and compare the development of civil society institutions: social capital and good governance.

Another limitation is that I don't use the same scheme of questions in the questionnaire for both societies. Only some questions are identical and others not. That depends on a special situation in the countries. Because of different situations in the countries I can't put the same set of questions over these countries.

6 Empirical Evidence

6.1 Russia

Figure 6.1 Map of Russian Federation

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6.1.1 Current Situation

6.1.2 State structure and domestic policy

Russia has been going through a difficult process of social and economic transition ever since the beginning of the 1990s. Economic and social decline and the lowering of living standards have for many people been the defining experiences of the past decade. Moreover, the crisis of August 1998 dashed many people's hopes of prosperity. President Putin has been trying to stabilize the situation ever since assuming office at the beginning of 2000. He is endeavoring to find a political and economic road to development which will recreate Russia's old internal and external strengths. Putin has taken important steps towards a market economy, so far placing the emphasis on strengthening centralized state power structures and creating a uniform legal area as a prerequisite for economic recovery. Human rights protection

and the consolidation of democracy and the rule of law, in contrast, have not as yet been visible priorities.

The President has far-reaching powers: thus he has been able to ambitiously extend his position ever since his clear victory in the elections of 26 March 2000, relying to a great extent on the old presidential machinery and the old Government, Petersburg economic liberals and security structures. Putin's popularity remains high after five years in office.

6.1.3 Parliament

The majority in the Duma has remained loyal to Putin since it was reconstituted in January 2000. He has the support of the "Unity" group (Yedinstvo). The party, founded in the autumn of 1999 to back Putin, has assumed the mantle of "party in power" and has attracted a large section of the regional elites. By creating a union of Yedinstvo and Otechestvo and involving other groups of the political centre in an informal coordinating council, both the President and the Government were able to further extend their political basis. The two parties formally merged in December 2001. The Communist Party (CPRF) remains the largest group in the Duma, but has lost its blocking minority. It still has the highest number of members and the best organizational structures. The party regards itself as opposing Putin's economic and social legislation rather than the President himself. The Union of Right Wing Forces and Yabloko are attempting to make a name for themselves as the advocates of a liberal economic course, but have little influence.

6.1.4 Social Situation

Russian society is still unstable: while the general mood has been more optimistic since Putin's assumption of office, social destitution, corruption and crime are still creating a climate of uncertainty. Democratic institutions and the rule of law on the other hand still seem very weak. Human rights violations - some severe - still frequently occur, and not only in Chechnya, according to reports by Russian and international non-governmental organizations.

6.1.5 Media

The Russian media suffers from lack of profit and investment as well as political and economic dependence. They therefore still have to rely on an infrastructure that dates back to Soviet times. The public share of the media market is very high: the three biggest TV stations - ORT, RTR and NTV - are directly or indirectly controlled by the Government. The last supraregional anti-government TV channel, TV6, was closed down at the end of 2001. The independence and profile of its successor are still unclear, but it looks as though the new channel will be somewhat kinder to the Government. As for the print media, there are no real national papers and the often relatively sophisticated Moscow Garden Ring papers are rarely available in the regions. Freedom of the press is, however, far greater in Moscow than in the regions or with regard to electronic media. Most Russian media consumers are constantly concerned with the question of ownership and hidden interests. Continued economic recovery, increasing advertising budgets and consequently the media's economic independence are expected to bring improvements.

6.1.6 Cultural Policy

The cultural scene and education system in the Russian Federation are currently in a period of transition. Disintegrated structures and the lack of public money can only partially be offset by initiatives by the people directly involved and support from those around them. Given these circumstances, some remarkable things are being achieved. Russia's claim on the one hand to be part of the European culture and on the other to be a cultural nation thanks to its specific traditions (particularly orthodoxy) is backed up by a high level of culture and education.

The Russian education system is suffering from the lack of government support; the financial crisis is most serious in universities and schools. Educational structures have to be more self-sufficient today than ever before and have managed to stabilize their situation to a certain extent. The Education Ministry is trying to implement forward-looking reforms designed to strengthen the autonomy of local education structures.

6.1.7 Development of NGOs in Russia

There are many different and usually contrary views of experts, expressed on the state of civil society in Russia. Their differences are caused by various evaluation criteria in the first place. Experts with classical ideas about civil society are quite pessimistic about the whole thing. For example, mi, leading Russian scholar in the field of economic sociology, believes that civil society in Russia is in "its lowest", nearly embryonic stage. A different viewpoint is held by pragmatists-representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGO) - and theorists who think that the establishment of a civil society in Russia is significantly different from the American and West European patterns.

Though some Russian non-governmental organizations were founded under Leonid Brezhnev's or Yuri Andropov's rule, the institutions of civil society started to form no more than 10 or 15 years ago. It should be noted that civil society is a relatively new notion for Russia. Fifty-five percent of respondents polled by the Foundation for Public Opinion[62] in April 2001 replied that they were hearing about it for the first time. Thirteen percent of respondents managed to name the main characteristics of civil society: observation of civil rights and liberties (9%), an ability of citizens to influence politics (3%), the priority of citizens' concerns over state interests (1%).

One can claim it with absolute confidence that Russian citizens have exercised their right to create independent public organizations. Non-governmental organizations that were initially set up for political purposes are switching over to social issues. Non-governmental organizations operate in such spheres as legal and social protection of citizens, education, culture, recreation, health and environmental protection, economics, local self-government, science, technology, ethnic and international relations, etc.

The Institute for the Study of Civil Society[63] has estimated that out of more than 300,000 officially registered non-governmental organizations only about 30,000 are really operating. They employ about one million people, including fulltime employees and those who work on contracts. About 90% of active non-governmental

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[62] Foundation for Public Opinion. Retrieved May 7th, 2003 (http://www.publicagenda.org/)
[63] Institute for the Study of Civil Society (CIVITAS). Retrieved October 2nd, 2003 (www.civitas.org.uk)

organizations attract volunteers. Nearly twelve percent of these organizations have more than fifty volunteers.

Speaking about positive trends in the Russian "third sector", one should not forget about its distinctive features.

What should be remembered in the first place is that a considerable number of non-governmental organizations have a weak influence on public life in the country as a whole, mainly for the following reasons. Firstly, the activity of many efficient non-governmental organizations is targeted at relatively small and narrow groups of population. Secondly, an "information vacuum" has filled the space around civil society institutions. This can largely be explained by the media's lack of interest in the "third sector". According to a sociological survey carried out by the Public Opinion Foundation (September 2001), only 27% of the Russians know or have at least heard about the existence of non-profit organizations in their regions. Nineteen percent of the respondents were relatively aware about the work of non-governmental organizations in other parts of Russia. It is not surprising that a lack of information about these organizations undermines people's confidence in their activities.

Civil organizations are financed in a unique and specific way. Since most Russians lack money to finance their work, non-governmental organizations live on donations and contributions granted by foreign and (much more rarely) Russian businesses and banks. Most donations in the West come from individuals. Naturally, most non-governmental organizations have limited opportunities to hire personnel. Therefore, their backbone is formed by dedicated professionals. On the weakness of civil society institutions in Russia was written by Michael McFaul[64] in his book entitled *Russia's Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin.*

Some specific features of Russian mentality can also be regarded as a factor restraining the development of civil society. When confronted with infringements on civil liberties, most Russians are passive and do not try to defend their rights because they do not believe in the eventual success of their "struggle for justice" or fear that this struggle will bring more losses than benefits. Besides, numerous public opinion

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[64] McFaul, Michael, *Russia's Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin*, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001, chapter 9.

polls have revealed that the Russians have a vague idea about their rights. A widespread opinion is that knowing them is not necessary. Nevertheless, ordinary citizens often complain about their rights being violated by bosses, housing and utilities services, policemen, traffic inspectors, social security workers, etc.[65]

Interaction between non-profit organizations and the authorities has been an acute problem until recently. A positive step towards its solution was taken in November 2001 when representatives of nearly 3,000 regional and 435 Russian non-governmental organizations gathered for a Civic Forum in the Kremlin. That unprecedented gathering was attended by representatives of state power bodies and local self-government, journalists, experts and international observers. The Forum was addressed by Russian President Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov.

Non-governmental organizations in all Russian regions delegated their representatives to the Forum. However, villages and small towns sent fewer delegates than cities and medium-sized towns. That disproportion reveals the dependence of the level of social activity on the type of a populated territory.

The Civic Forum raised a wide range of problems linked to the "third sector's" interaction with state and commercial structures and worked out some ways off towards their solution. "We've always viewed Russia as a system of state power bodies and an economic organism. But Russia is, above all, a home to people who live in it. Their prosperity and decent lives should be the authorities' main task," Russian President Vladimir Putin said in his annual Address to the Russian Federal Assembly. "A policy built on the state's honest and open relations with society will prevent us from repeating previous mistakes and will be the main precondition for a new "public agreement".[66]

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[65] Steven M., Fish, "The Dynamics of Democratic Erosion," in Richard Anderson, M. Steven Fish, Stephen Hanson, and Philip Roeder, (eds.), *Postcommunism and the Theory of Democracy* , Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001, p. 54–95.

[66] Vladimir Putin, Speech for the Fight against Corruption, First Session of the Council under the President, 12 January 2004. Retrieved March 15th, 2004 (http://www.president.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2004/01/12/2044_59046.shtml.)

Civil society in Russian have constantly tried to survive throughout the 1990s, after achieving a peak of popular mobilization and political influence in 1991. *The 2004 NGO Sustainability Index* estimated that more than 300,000 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were established during this decade. The NGO sustainability scores for 2004 have slightly enhanced in comparison to 2003, which may at first look seem to be difficult to notice. On the other hand, it worsened more notably comparing to 1998. In 2004, the president Putin continued to execute policies that created a "managed" civil society that paralleled Russia's "managed" democracy. As part of this process, the Russian Government has questioned the legitimacy and usefulness of foreign aid to strengthen civil society development. It resulted in enlarged inspection by police and tax authorities of some foreign funded NGOs. Being approved, the proposed draft amendments to the Tax Code, enforced registration requirements on all types of grants, and created even more complicated problems to the work of foreign donors and recipient NGOs.

By the end of 1990s, marked by the shift of power from Yeltsin to Putin, civil society in Russia was fragile, atomized, apolitical, and heavily reliant on Western assistance for support. Yeltsin left his office in the atmosphere of the NGOs being neglected. In contrast to Yeltsin, Putin believes that NGOs are still a threat to his power. The Glasnost Public Foundation reported in its publication "*Russian Authorities Force Organizations to Become Underground*", that by enforcing new registration procedures and rigid tax laws, Kremlin has required thousands of NGOs to close. The authorities also put into practice to harass and jail the NGO leaders considered be not loyal to the regime or which are too politicized.[67]

State control over the distribution of grants from foreign donors was tightened by implementing the legislation that was initiated by Pro-Kremlin members of parliament.[68] The government has devoted massive resources to the creation of state-sponsored and state-controlled NGOs in order to force independent NGOs to the margins of society. Only those NGOs, loyal to the state policy and not engaged in politics were selected for state transfers and cooperation.

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[67] Sarah E., Mendelson, "Russians' Rights Imperiled: Has Anybody Noticed?" *International Security* 26, Spring 2002, p. 39–69.
[68] Anfisa, Voronina, "A Filter for Grants: The state will decide which donors are acceptable," *Vedemosti*, translated and redistributed by WPS Monitoring Agency, 23 July 2004.

Kremlin administration continues and even strengthens persecution of Western donor organizations and civil society groups. The AFL-CIO's field representative in Moscow was declared *persona non grata,* the Peace Corps was tossed out, the OSCE office in Europe in Chechnya was closed down, the offices of Open Society Institute[69] and the National Democratic Institute were inspected by the police.

The Russian NGO sector constantly continues to experience troubles with raising sufficient financial resources. After introducing the new tax system, the Open Society Institute, a major international donor for civil society organizations, had to leave Russia. Other contributors are also reducing their activities or restraining their focuses to particular areas. Lack of tax incentives to support corporate and individual charity also depressingly influenced the NGOs. Unfortunately, people do not have enough income and willingness to contribute to NGOs due to the absence of a considerable middle class, compared to Western democratic countries.[70]

Small but increasing number of countrywide corporations delivers support to NGOs, regardless of the lack of legal incentives for charity. Generally, the interest of business community in supporting the NGO sector financially has increased. Financial support to NGOs is more frequently offered by the municipal and regional governments. Authorities considerably raise public sector resource for local civil initiatives by financing yearly grant competitions for NGOs in more than 20 regions of Russia. Free office space, telephones, and/or office staff are in many cases provided to NGOs by local authorities. It should be noted, that the NGOs develop not equally across Russia. NGOs in Far East of Russia are still at the beginning of establishing relationships with local and regional governments, although authorities in the regions of Volga and Siberia have increased their support of NGO undertakings.

There is a constant problem for NGOs to find steady financial resources, taking into account contrary interests and priorities of funders. Organizations working on practical and "safe" issues such as education, or where the target groups are children

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[69] Soros Foundation. Soros Foundation, supporting public administration, health and education reform, and culture. Retrieved September 23rd, 2003 (http://www.soros.kg)

[70] Henry, Hale, Michael, McFaul, and Timothy, Colton, "Putin and the 'Delegative Democracy' Trap: Evidence from Russia's 2003–04 Elections," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 20, 4 (Fall 2004), p. 285–319.

or veterans, or providing social services are more frequently supported by the private companies and authorities, rather than those engaged in politically sensitive themes, such as women's rights, human rights, or environmental organizations. Any project that addresses social accountability, as it is seen from President Putin's speeches, has become popular, while overtly political activities have become off limits. Generally, in comparison to the situation of several years ago, when foreign donors were the primary source of funding for many groups, currently most of NGOs have a greater diversity of funding opportunities.

Meeting with heads of more than 30 NGOs was arranged by Putin in June 2001. The organizations chosen to invite to the meeting, however, included stamp-collecting, gardening, educational, cultural, and sports organizations; surprisingly, there were no one of most influential NGOs invited. The same situation occurred in November 2001, when Vitaly Ignatenko (Russian Press Institute), Eduard Sagalayev (National Association of Television and Radio Broadcasters), and Aleksandr Lyubimov (new head of the Media Union) formed a new journalists' union, Mediasoyuz. It was sanctioned by the Kremlin in order to counterbalance the "oppositionist" Russian Journalists' Union. Journalists working for state-owned or state-loyal mass media are members of this newly emerged organization.[71]

The negative consequences for civic engagement of the state had the weakening of the State Duma as an independent political institution. This institution has conventionally been more open to communication with civic groups than the Kremlin. Putin established civil chamber at the regional level to serve as listening posts for societal complaints and suggestions. Nevertheless, this institutional innovation is regarded by most NGO leaders as nothing more than another method of cooptation.

6.1.8 Public Engagement

The following text describes the findings and conclusions with regards to the respective state of affaires, path to this step, assessment of stability, problems and prospects with regards to public engagement in Russia.

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[71] Aleksei, Makarkin, "Sovet Federatsii: novyi sostav, novyye problemy," in Rostislav Turovskii, ed., *Politika v regionakh: gubernatory i gruppy vliyaniya [Politics in the regions: governors and interest groups],* Moscow: Tsentr politicheskikh tekhnologii, 2002, p. 53–75.

According to the polling data by the WPS Monitoring Agency[72], only 14% of Russians think that Russia is a democratic state. 54% replied that there is no democracy in the country, and 60% believe that their votes will not change anything.

- However, the number of **NGO**s, different kinds of mass-media and political parties is increasing constantly and rapidly, people are more willing to be engaged in politics and public life and less reluctant to criticize the government.

The number of NGOs in Russia has increased dramatically over the last decade (now around 300,000 according to the Ministry of Justice).[73] Nevertheless, their ability to affect government decision making is still very limited. There were, for instance, numerous attempts to outlaw human rights organisations such as the group Unified Europe, Glasnost, the Union of the Committees of Soldiers' Mothers of Russia, and the Disability Center for the Social Rehabilitation of Children, because of their efforts to monitor the conduct of governmental institutions.

The diversity of NGOs ranges over the entire spectrum known from other countries, with an emphasis on the charitable sector where more than 70,000 organisations exist in which about 2.5 million Russians are active and which provide services to more than 30 million people. The majority of staff members and volunteers are female. Organisations that don't have close ties to the state normally are very short of funds to perform their activities.

Level of Civil Activity in the Siberian Region: Over a half of the polled by me NGOs in the Russian regions and most interviewees from the government authorities, local governance bodies and regional businesses described civic activism as low and rather low. Two thirds of mass poll respondents noted the low level of civil participation in the solution of social problems in the city and region. Evaluation of civil activism in East Siberia and Trans-Baikal region is more optimistic than in West Siberia in this regard, according to the *Annual Report, 2004 (Reporters Without Borders).*

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[72] WPS Monitoring Agency. Retrieved June 27th, 2005 (http://www.wps.ru)
[73] Department of Justice of Russian Federation. Retrieved June 7th, 2003 (http://www.minjust.ru/)

- The second meaningful trend is the development of **political parties and associations**. According to the "Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, Russian Federation State Duma Elections, 7 December 2003", by 2003 about 200 parties of various types were created in Russia. But after the Duma with the backing of Kremlin approved a process of over-registration in 2001, very few of the parties are deemed to survive this rigid process. If the party doesn't meet the certain criteria, it can be prohibited by the Supreme Court.

<u>Observations and conclusions:</u> The major national political parties are not properly represented in the political life of provinces in Russia. Parties are underdeveloped, with leader-centric affaires, rather than create vibrant groupings that unify people around common beliefs and programs. Many local policy makers frequently exchange, hide or discard the party labels. Political parties in Russia are very unstable and contradictory in terms of the program, ideology and often have rather short living cycle. Normally they disappear right after elections but gaining some seats in the parliament.

- Another type of civil society institutions that showed significant growth are **religious organizations**. Within the last 10-15 years there appeared - practically from scratch - 18,000 parishes, 460 monasteries, 5 theological academies, 23 seminaries, 21 theological schools, and 2 orthodox universities. More than two-thirds of respondents replied that they are believers.

As a case study here introduced the obstacles for Civil Participation in the Siberian Region.

Focus group discussions identified the following barriers for the stronger civil participation in the region:

- They neither do have integral concepts of the present-day Russian society and the tendencies of its development, nor do they have ideas of their place and role in it. "Belonging" to the Russian society is perceived simply and only as living in the national state, as being a Russian.

- There is visible lack of trust in most economic and social institutions. Discussants, in assessing their experience with different non-government and economic institutions, interpret the working of them as mainly the pursuit of self-interest of the persons who represent the respective institution (this could be a matter of culture: people are used to distrust and being sceptical to activity of any group because they distrust the government in general).

The polled regional and local government officials also said that regional authorities and the population have different interests. Sometimes this is interpreted as an absence of clear efforts targeted at addressing the social problems by the regional authorities; sometimes it is as the consequence of different time preferences of officials (long term) and the public (short term).

Regional differences of NGOs development in Siberia and Far East: Local NGOs tend to say that the third sector is better developed at the regional level than at the federal level in terms of transparency, accountability and cooperation with the media. Regional NGOs are not as diversified in their activities as Russia-wide nonprofits.

According to the Jonathan Weiler[74], unlike NGOs working in East Siberia and Trans-Baikal regions, West Siberian NGOs provide higher scores to the NGO development in terms of transparency for control, staff professionalism, diversity and number of operating NGOs. East Siberia and Trans-Baikal regions give higher scores to the level of cooperation with the media and local authorities, and the ability to focus efforts in the most important fields. Thus, the polled NGOs in Siberia and Trans-Baikal regions give relatively high scores to the third sector development level.

Development Prospects for NGOs: The polled NGO staff named the following as the most important problems that would determine the further development of the third sector in Siberia: (i) level of cooperation with the local governments and the media; and (ii) the people's confidence in the non-profits. The respondents think that regional NGOs' technical equipment remains a relevant issue.

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[74] Jonathan, Weiler*Human Rights in Russia: A Darker Side of Reform,* Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2004.

Development of fundraising and fee-based services, cooperation with the national NGOs and foreign donors are of moderate importance for advancing the NGO sector in the region.

Conclusions:

The major conclusions that can be drawn from observation of NGOs are that the Russian population is rather sceptical about the work of these organisations. Most of the respondents reported that the most difficult obstacles to the Russian long-term NGO sector are the economic constraints and the absence of significant incentives in current tax laws.

6.1.9   Role of the NGOs in Combating Corruption

Corruption and extortion are among the biggest problems in Russia. Most of the respondents replied that they were asked or offered bribes (to get a driving license, for instance). The Moscow-based research foundation Computer Science for Democracy[75] founded in 1990 is one of the first Russian NGOs. INDEM promotes the ideals and values of democracy through assistance in development of civil society and consultancy to Russian public officials and government bodies. In its activities, INDEM addresses a wide range of issues: anticorruption, justice assistance, governance reform, political, ethnic, federalist and regional issues, international cooperation, etc. For research purposes INDEM develops unique sociological, statistical, and IT methods. In its study of 2002 INDEM reported that business people pay $33 billion in bribes every year. 60% of business owners and half of ordinary citizens replied that paying the bribe was a "necessary" part of their lives. Patients in the hospitals and clinics paid $600 million in 2001, in conditions of nominally free medical system. $520 million people paid for university admissions in the same year.

The problem of corruption is not only a feature of Russia; it has a global character. Today there is a lot of literature and information on it. There are also new forms of anticorruption activity appeared. Here is a number of problems, which should be solved in the nearest future by joint efforts:

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[75] INDEM ("Information Science for Democracy"). Retrieved November 15th, 2003 (www.indem.ru)

- The role of the state and civil society in struggle against corruption first of all depends on features of established corruption situation in Russia. What does this role imply? Now almost nobody argues, that corruption in modern Russia has systematic character. It means, that it reflects *steady enough system of public attitudes*. There is a wide-spread public opinion that without corruption people do not imagine their life and the state without corruption injections can not function normally. Moreover, today experts speak about the so-called corruption networks which have entangled the state bodies and individuals on vertical and horizontal levels. Law enforcement bodies even mark the new form of criminal cases in the form of the organized corruption (when several persons from different law-enforcement bodies cooperate). More and more people start to profess corporate corruption morals. Thus, the continuous corruption networks are provoking corruption behavior.

Here are some figures and the facts. Report of the Representative on Human Rights in the Russian Federation[76] for 2004 identifies the high level of corruption of administrative and legal institutes, a wide circulation of corruption, including the judiciary. According to expert estimations, even in legislative power there is an illegal market of corruption services. So, cost of submitting the bill for consideration by the State Duma today ranges between 250.000 and one million dollars. There is a dangerous tendency of replacement and substitution by militia of criminal groupings, controlling the average and small business. 60 % of the profit from smuggling goes to the authorities "working" with the smugglers and law-enforcement structures.

The given list can be continued. The new book of the Vladivostok Center for studying the organized crime *"Problems of Struggle Against Development of Criminal Market"*[77] represents interesting results of several sociological surveys.

- Struggle against corruption today is repeatedly declared in Russia, but in reality inadequately carried out. From the side of the state we observe actually only *imitation of struggle against corruption* on all levels of authority. As to the civil society – it has not been formed yet, because its elements are still developing. One of these elements is the system of so-called Public Chambers – created according to the law

[76] Representative on Human Rights in the Russian Federation. Retrieved May 26th, 2004 (http://www.ombudsmanmo.ru)
[77] Problems of Struggle Against Development of Criminal Market", Vladivostok, 2005.
[70] Russian Public Opinion Research Center. Retrieved November 25th, 2003 (http://www.wciom.ru/)

since April 7, 2005. Therefore to speak about a real role of the non-governmental organizations in struggle against corruption it now possible only in the way of assumptions.

- There are many talks today about the anticorruption policy. There are even textbooks and special trainings and workshops. But there is no prudent, consecutive anticorruption policy of the state yet. *The real policy of the state* in itself *has to certain degree the corruption character,* e.g. is carried out in the interests of those involved in corruption. Even the present legislation seems to be corrupted. It implies legal propositions which objectively provoke bribery or serve the interests of bribe-takers.

- Another important question: what consequences will the further growth of corruption have? First of all the close relationship of corruption with criminality, especially including the organized crime.

Russian Public Opinion Research Center[78] has recently conducted the survey with the central question: "Ordered assassinations very often remain not opened. What do you think is the reason for that? " It should be pointed out, that almost half of the respondents (48%) make a connection between low crime detection with the high level of corruption in law enforcement bodies, that, most probably, corresponds to the reality.

Corruption threatens not only the national security, it may cause further disintegration or failure of the state. What could be done at this point? First of all there should be developed a strategy for anticorruption actions. This would enable to achieve the maximal transparency of power attitudes and decisions. There should be maximum objective delivery of information to the citizens about all the cases of corruption and the maximum of information transparency of the state federal, regional and municipal structures. Municipal structures are, as it is known, the least corrupted environment. In this regard the concepts and bills of recently created Public Anticorruption Committee, headed by Alexander Arinin, director of Institute of Federalism and Civil

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[78] Russian Public Opinion Research Center. Retrieved November 25th, 2003 (http://www.wciom.ru/)

Society[79] represent a special interest. The main purpose of these documents is to guarantee transparency and information openness of the state structures.

The Vladivostok Center for Research on Organized Crime[80] identified the following anticorruption strategy: - development and realization of the state strategy fighting corruption, including problems of interaction between state bodies and non-governmental organizations; - creation of public anticorruption institutions (coalitions, associations, etc.); - formation of anticorruption public consciousness (aversion of corruption).

In order to realize the anticorruption mechanisms the Center recommended to create of special advisory councils and working groups on struggle against corruption at federal and regional legislative, executive and supervising authorities, including the commission on fighting corruption at the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation.

Combating corruption means to approve new quality of a life, the order and social justice. It also means to establish a civil society; a society of free, responsible and creative people.

Vladimir Putin constantly demonstrated his willingness to fight the corruption. During the St. Petersburg Summit of May 2003 he declared that the following steps should be taken:

– "sign, ratify and implement UN and Council of Europe conventions on corruption, including ratification and implementation of the UN Convention against Corruption

– participate in anti-corruption work, and to cooperate on the fight against corruption within the Council of Europe, including through participation in work in GRECO once the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption has been ratified

– cooperate with relevant elements of civil society to fight corruption

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[79]Public Anticorruption Committee. Retrieved March 3rd, 2003 (http://www.stopcorruption.ru)
[80] Role of the State and Civil Society in Combating Corruption. Round Table, Vladivostok Center for Research on Organized Crime. Institute of Law, Far-East State University. April 14, 2005. Retrieved May 11th, 2005 (www.crime.vl.ru)

– exchange experience in the field of the fight against corruption, and take additional measures through further incorporation of anti-corruption elements in national legislation and practices." [81]

During Putin's Speech on January 12 ,2004 at the First Session of the Council under the President for the Fight against Corruption he also called for combating systemic corruption within Russian politics and in the government, the economy, and the judiciary.[82] In 2003 he called for legislation prohibiting bureaucrats from engaging in entrepreneurial activities and restricting those who leave civil service jobs from working in areas formerly under their supervision. To date, however, these proposals remain little more than affirmations of intent.

Corruption Perceptions Index 2004, administered by the Transparency International placed Russia at 90 out of 146 countries, with a score of 2.7 (10 being "highly clean" and 0 being "highly corrupt"). Russia was ranked at 70th out of 104 nations, as it was reported by the World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Report 2004–2005, which used corruption as a scale in its investigation. According to the Global Competitiveness Report 2004-2005, corruption in Russia remains on a high level comparing to other countries of the world.

Peter Baker in his article at Washington Post[83] entitled *"Putin's Kremlin Asserting More Control of Economy"* made a statement that Russia has an extremely high level of major corruption (as opposed to petty bribes), which is strongly linked to the oil and gas production and other exported natural resources. Oil and gas companies are becoming more and more control by Putin and his government. The most notorious corrupt act, sanctioned by the state in 2004 was the arrest of Yuganskneftegaz, the most beneficial asset of the Yukos oil company, and its following relocation into the Kremlin administration. The major oil and gas firms are headed now by high-ranking officials from the Putin's administration. The noticeable reason for corruption and

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[81] President of Russia. Official Web Portal. Retrieved July 15th, 2004
    (http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/88030.shtml)
[82] Vladimir Putin, Speech for the Fight against Corruption, First Session of the Council under the
    President, 12 January 2004. Retrieved March 15th, 2004
    (http://www.president.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2004/01/12/2044_59046.shtml.)
[83] Baker, Peter, "Putin's Kremlin Asserting More Control of Economy," *Washington Post,*
    9 July 2004, A14.

bribery has occurred due to the merging of the state and the most profitable industries in Russia. Therefore, high oil prices have created incentives for stronger state interference in this strategic sector of the economy. In addition, Russia does not have sufficient rules requiring officials to publicize their property and revenue, making it even easier for the bureaucrats to hide criminal profiteering.

Successful practices in reducing corruption in Russia

In Russia, schools typically request money from parents each year allegedly to enhance educational programs, repair/maintain school buildings, and obtain equipment and supplies, etc. Technically, such requests are not legal. Parents typically comply fearing retribution toward their students. There is little or no feedback to parents on how these out-of-budget funds are actually used or managed on a school-by-school basis. Under small grants to NGOs in Samara and Tomsk, Russia in 2002, an activity was initiated to assess parental attitudes and to work with particular school districts to make the planning and expenditure of these budgets more transparent and generate more parent participation in the budgeting process. As a result of extensive lobbying with school administrations, the out-of budget funds in several schools are now open and transparent, and parents are getting involved in how the monies should be spent.[84]

6.1.10 **Policy Recommendations for Preventing Corruption in Russia**

Freedom House in its report *"Countries at Crossroads 2005: A Survey of Democratic Governance"* recommends the following steps to be taken in order to combat corruption:[85]

- "Senior government officials should not be allowed to serve in management capacities in companies owned by the state.

- All government expenditures and revenues, including transfers between regional and federal authorities, must be made public and preferably posted on the Web.

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[84] Management Systems International, 2002.
[85] *"Countries at Crossroads 2005: A Survey of Democratic Governance",* Freedom House.

- Anticorruption NGOs must be granted greater access to government procedures and information. A serious freedom of information law must be passed and enforced.

- Creating more permissive conditions for the expansion of both a free press and powerful opposition parties are reforms necessary for more effectively fighting corruption in Russia."

6.1.11 Discrimination in Russia

<u>Social Discrimination:</u>

Social discrimination in Russia exists in two major dimensions: with regard to national and gender attitudes.

- National: The rise of the groups with extremists views appears to be growing in Russia within the last 10-15 years. Particularly, anti-Semitism has grown among youths, along which a more general rise in xenophobia. Moscow Helsinki Group reported that the most frequently targeted are Roma, Mesketian Turks, Jews, and individuals from the Caucasus. The local administrations remain anti-Semitic in many Russian regions, and state-run local TV companies are trying to avoid the discussion of the problem. Direct observation and interviews showed that members of national minorities in most cases feel that they are discriminated in many ways, while the respondents who belong to the national majority mostly denied these views.

- Gender: Numerous respondents, in particular female respondents, reported that women have rather limited opportunities to participate in politics, especially at the national level. In Duma elections of 1999, only 34 women (7.7%) received the seats, in comparison to 11% in 1995. Generally only 10-12% of females are represented in political parties. Viktor Tolokonsky, the governor of Novosibirsk Oblast, has proposed to elaborate the legislation that would create a quota system for female legislators at the oblast level in party list voting. The Rostov-based women's group Soglasie has called for a gender quota of 70% on party lists for regional and national elections. Group activists claim that about 53% of the electorate in Russia are females.

Over the past few years, anecdotal evidence and the reports of non-governmental monitoring organizations have noted an increase in discriminatory practices and violence against racial/ethnic minorities on the territory of the Russian Federation. One effect of discriminatory practices has been the precarious legal status of a large number of former Soviet citizens who previously resided legally in the Russian Federation, but who have been considered illegal migrants since the entry into force in 2002 of the Federal Laws on Russian Citizenship and on the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens. Other human rights problems include racially selective inspections and identity checks by law enforcement targeting people from specific minorities, including those from the Caucasus and Central Asia and Roma minority, and numerous reports that residence registration is used as a means of discriminating against certain ethnic groups.[86]

Article 19 of the Russian Constitution stipulates that everyone is equal before the law and prohibits any restriction of rights on the grounds of race, ethnicity, national origin, or language – an "equal rights" provision that is reproduced in the civil code, criminal code, labor law, and administrative legislation. However, there exists no specific, binding anti-discrimination legislation that defines discrimination (not to mention the distinct meanings of "direct" or "indirect" discrimination) nor a list of legal mechanisms, judicial or otherwise, for redress of harm caused by discriminatory treatment.

In theory, the Constitution is an act of direct effect, and its equal rights provisions can be directly applied by a court. However, lawyers are not accustomed to seeking – nor are judges accustomed to sanctioning – the application of constitutional provisions in ordinary courts. Judges, defense lawyers and the Russian public are not familiar with discrimination as a concept of law. In a number of cases where discrimination occurred, complainants have failed to argue it, confining themselves to the "substantive" right at issue (i.e., denial of residence permit, employment dismissal, refusal to grant refugee status). In such cases, the courts' legal reasoning does not reach the question of whether persons were treated differently in similar situations.

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[86] UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination Concluding Observations CERD/C/62/CO/7, March 2003.

Though international treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) can be used in domestic courts, lawyers and judges rarely cite them in practice.

Russian lawyers are, however, increasingly turning to the European Court of Human Rights. In the last two years, applications from Russia to the Court have exceeded 10,000, outnumbering those from any other country in the Council of Europe. During this period, however, only 14 cases from Russia were ruled admissible. Clearly the demand for skilled human rights litigation in Russia is matched by the need for training and strategic thinking in the use of domestic and regional human rights instruments. The Court in Strasbourg has generated case law in areas, such as police brutality, that matter to discrimination's victims. Additionally, the evolution of European Union law—particularly the adoption of prohibitions against discrimination on grounds of race and gender and in the field of employment—also offers additional tools to antidiscrimination litigators seeking to call upon European norms.

The grave discrimination that minority groups suffer in Russia requires urgent remedies. There is almost no experience in the human rights community of litigating discrimination as such, and a tremendous need to build these capacities so that the legal system may become an effective anti-discrimination tool. Systematic documentation of the problem, necessary to prove discrimination, also does not yet exist. The challenge will be to develop appropriate documentation and build Russian NGOs' capacity to use this as a basis for litigation. To meet this challenge, the Justice Initiative is developing a number of projects.

The most important Russian NGOs working in the area of preventing discrimination are: the Center for Development of Democracy and Human Rights, the Foundation for Civil Society, JURIX, Memorial Human Rights Centre, Moscow Helsinki Group, Roma-Ural, the SOVA Institute of Research, plus additional NGOs on a project specific basis. The Justice Initiative's partners also include additional NGOs on a project specific basis.

Conclusion on Discrimination: An important information has been often revealed as the outcome of cordial conversations rather than formal interviewing. Direct observation and interviews showed that participants of the research have mostly contrary opinions with regards to the points of my interest, depending on their social status and role in the society. Representatives of national minorities, for instance, in most cases complained that they are discriminated in many ways, while the respondents who belong to the national majority mostly denied these views.

6.1.12 Research Findings and Conclusions on Russia

In order to receive a broad impression and individual perceptions on the importance of civil society development in Russia I managed about 3*00 questionnaires* and *100 interviews* (1-2 hours each one) with representatives of non-governmental organizations, political parties, local politicians and authorities. Very often interviews were scheduled in pursue of some key information on the very specific topics with the relevant experts. In order to establish better relationships with the local community and to gain original experience I participated in many assemblies and meetings.

Here are the following conclusions as a result of my field-research and literature research in Russia:

- My major conclusion is that evidence of dedicated leadership and enthusiastic members are among the most sufficient factors and driving forces that enable to continue NGO activity for a long run.

- The second conclusion is that regional level factors, particularly encouraging attitudes and actions from oblast governments, have helped significantly in generating NGO successes and, consequently, in establishing NGOs as element of the regular political life in the European part of Russia and several big cities in Eastern part, like Novosibirsk, Krasnoyarsk and Vladivostok. Support from local, municipal, city government or central government from Moscow proved to be less significant factor in promoting NGO activity compared to oblast-level support. It should be also pointed out, that local business groups are becoming one of the most important and growing source of financial support for NGOs. The so-called "corporate

triad" scheme seems to be the most prospective and preferential for many NGOs, which includes governments and business as their priority cooperation partners.

- Thirdly, national-level influence does not predominantly exist in NGOs among the majority of cities in Russia, with a couple of exceptions concerning women's organizations. Active, financial or material support of national-level institutions builds civil society from "above," confirming my previous expectations. Therefore it does not create much of incentive for grass-roots initiatives. Legal status, including tax status, of civil groups is crucial for their survival. Therefore the national-level legal context, in which these groups exist, needs more investigation for future research. In spite of the recent attacks and pressure on civil society, surprisingly, most of the NGOs are grateful to President Putin for his verbal support to NGOs over the last five years. Many NGO leaders consider that his statements have helped to create a positive environment for NGO activity and are an example of positive influence from the government.

- Finally, conducted interviews showed, the most successful NGOs are those, that managed to receive grants form international charitable foundations and donor organizations. Large amount of their funding comes from German organizations, American (for example, USAID) the Dutch Government, Soros Foundation (which left Russia because of the tax pressure from the Russian government), the World Bank, and other international donor organizations. Level of international influence is still more important, rather than national or local, to many NGOs. It becomes evident, that without such a support, most of the groups I interviewed would not survive. Nevertheless, there was a sufficient number of other groups that did not have significant international grants. The following conclude is that the international level highly competitive to the regional level factor in provision of financial support to the NGOs.

- The inspection of my materials shows that the state of affairs with corruption, social discrimination and limited access to public engagement are among the major key problems to development of modern Russian society. Very often respondents, mostly foreigners rather than local people, expressed more pessimism than optimism in solving these obstacles.

- Many public interest groups and NGOs seem to be a kind of just self-serving staff, but not being altruistic. But it also could be a matter of culture: people are used to distrust and being sceptical to activity of any group because they distrust to the government in general. Secondly, I found that the civil society institutions in Russia are mostly encouraged from outside by Western donors rather than by local initiatives.

Lessons learned

The preliminary questionnaires were tested during the first field trip and improved by the second round of field-work. I have learned for my research during consultations with the Russian experts that questionnaires and terminology are in a great extend Western-biased. Therefore, their advice was to adjust and modify the questions to Russian conditions. It also has a theoretical meaning in comparing the development of civil society in Russia and Western countries.

6.2 Kyrgyzstan

In terms of democratization, among the post-Soviet countries,
the Kyrgyz Republic – and I put it quite reasonably –
is one of the leading countries.
And I do not want to minimize my personal role in this process.

- Askar Akaev, President of the Kyrgyz Republic, CSIS,
Washington, D.C. September 24, 2002

Figure 6.2 Map of Kyrgyzstan

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Figure 6.3 Map of Kyrgyzstan

The first section gives a general idea and description of the development of the attributes of civil society that will be considered: that is, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and mass media in the republic. The second section analyses the results of the parliamentary election in 1995 by looking at the participation of the

corresponding elements of civil society. This section sets out the situation in the republic, analysing the extent of participation of the citizens through NGOs and political parties and the reflection of the vents by the mass media. It assesses the extent to which citizens of the country used attributes of civil society to participate in the political life of the country. The third section of the chapter analyses the results of the parliamentary election in 2000, considering how much the five-year period between the two elections influenced the freedom of press and changed the attitudes of the citizens to politics through participation in political parties and non-governmental organisations. Analysis of the most recent elections of February 27, 2005 is introduced as well. The conclusion analyses the results of both elections through comparing the development and involvement of all three attributes of civil society in political life of the country. It goes on to analyse the changes, if any, and how much they influenced the establishment of civil society in Kyrgyzstan.

6.2.1 Background

Historically the ancestors of the modern Kyrgyz were the Turkic tribes of the Altai and Irtysh, the Mongols and the ancient people of the Tian Shan. By the end of the 18th century they had developed an ethnic consciousness, which was linked to a common territory around the Tian Shan Mountains and to a nomadic and semi-nomadic economy. Their traditional political and social relations did not extend beyond family, clan, and tribe. The country lacked the fundamental elements of modern polity, a sense of statehood and nationhood. The Kyrgyz had little experience with democratic institutions and values, political parties, parliament, elections or the intermediary institutions associated with a civil society. State institutions began to arise in recent centuries. In the late 19th century Kyrgyzstan was divided between the Russian Empire in the North and the Kokand kingdom of the Uzbeks in the South. Before the Soviet period they defined themselves as members of clans linked directly by blood or marriage or in more recent times as Muslims.

The creation of the Soviet State with its emphasis on nation building and state formation had in some respect a positive influence on Kyrgyzstan. One can consider that Soviet rule allowed the development of the necessary pre-conditions of the modern state and nation. The Kyrgyz acquired for the first time their own political

community. Formed originally in 1924 as a Kara-Kyrgyz autonomous region within the Turkestan republic of the USSR, in 1936 it emerged as a single political unit - the Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic. The creation of the Kyrgyz Soviet Republic provided the residents of the country with many symbols and rituals of statehood. It became one of the five nominally sovereign republics in Central Asia. The Kyrgyz became politically active in the Soviet era through elections and party membership though public participation under communists lacked the essential elements of democratic mobilisation, such as openness and competitiveness. In the words of Kyrgyztsan's most famous novelist Chingiz Aitmatov, given by Eugene Huskey in his article "Kyrgyzstan - the Fate of Political Liberation", "the Soviet past, with all its difficulties and suffering, prepared us for the surprising opportunity to suddenly receive as a small nation the status of a state and the world recognition".[87]

6.2.2 Current Situation in Kyrgyztsan and Elections of March 2005: After Tulip Revolution

Popular uprising of March 2005 put to an end the fourteen-year governance of the president Askar Akayev, who gradually became a supporter of the "hard hand" and authoritarian politics. It was a new challenge for political and economic development. Nevertheless, new leaders confront very serious and complicated problems. If the situation will go out of control and the population will understand that nothing has changed after the break out, apart from the rotation of the elite, Kyrgyzstan will have even stronger destabilization than it is now.

After gaining the power in 1991 as a result of Kyrgyzstan's independence, Akaev seemed to be an excellent president: open-minded, prudent, strong supporter of political changements and open market economy. He actively encouraged achievement of certain degree of political transparency and boostered economic reforms, at least in comparison with other Central Asian countries. Nevertheless, after being reelected in 2000, that caused many arguments, he started pursuing the course of more authoritarian governance. Therefore, his rates of popularity sharply dropped down.

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[87] Karen, Dawisha and Bruce, Parrott, (eds.), *Conflict, Cleavage, and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1997, p. 266.

Apart from many other problems, he could not prevent growth of corruption and set up effective governance and rule of law. On the contrary, political system was more and more influenced by the power of Akaev's family and not numerous group of followers. *Relationships based on corruption, established as a tradition around his family, became the major reason for his failure.*

Akaev managed to coupe with challenges by involving new influential persons in the elite and conducting frequent repressions against his political rivals. His major competitor, former Vice-President Felix Kulov, was accused in corruption affaires and put into prison in 2001 and was kept there until March 2005. The most significant mass-media, excluding several oppositional newspapers, was nearly totally controlled by the government.

After the accident in 2002, when six persons were killed as a result of confrontation with the police in Southern Aksy district, Askar Akaev hardly was able to keep the political power. Although this led to appraisal of waves of mass protests and demonstrations for several months. However, the government did not learn any lesson and it seemed to be that Akaev was loosing any relationship with reality, proposing unrealistic programs, and did not recognize the threat of nation-wide social-economic crisis. His positions were traditionally much weaker on the South of Kyrgyzstan, and he started loosing popularity even on the North of the country. Differences between Southern and Northern parts of Kyrgyztsan have always played an important role in political life, although were often exaggerated and served as a subject to manipulation.

Expulsion of Askar Akaev was not absolutely unforeseen or unpredictable. He lost not only the trust and wide support of the population but gradually was also loosing the support of major national and regional elites, who were unsatisfied with the growing corruption and that the presidential family established control over the economy. There were numerous warnings that unfair elections will probably lead to

the national crisis and collapse.[88] But Akaev and his assistants were sure about their ability to control the situation and suppress opposition.

Akaev did not succeed to establish basic state institutions. When mass demonstrations started, after parliamentary elections in February, it became very soon clear that the state was extremely weakened and that very few representatives of elite were prepared to support him. Finally, the old regime collapsed just in a few hours.

Threat of political coup, occurred in 2005 in Kyrgyzstan, was mostly related to the circumstance that parliamentary elections were conducted in February, and presidential elections – in October. Under the constitution of Kyrgyzstan, Akaev was supposed to resign, but the public opinion was that he will try to keep dominant position of his family in political and economic spheres.[89]

Cases of other post-soviet countries, where the change of leadership already took place, let to increase of pressure on Akaev. Presidents of Georgia and Ukraine, possessing power for a long time and accused of corruption and authoritarian regime, were overthrown by peoples' opposition. All these events caused anxiety among presidential family, but her members drew wrong lessons, making an argument that, broadly used particularly in Russia, that all these coups mentioned above, were inspired and financed by the United States, and they would not take place without external assistance. Akaev started openly criticizing American politics and putting more pressure on the NGOs financed by Western countries. Although NGOs and civil society had only limited influence on the events of March 2005.

One of the most crucial problems for Akaev was the fall into wide disfavour and unpopularity, especially in rural areas and south of Kyrgyzstan, as well as growing dissatisfaction among elites with the role that his family played in business and politics. His wife, Mairam Akaeva, has always been blamed for superfluous

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[88] Crisis Group Asia Report N°81, *Political Transition in Kyrgyzstan: Problems and Prospects,* 11 August 2004.
[89] Crisis Group Asia Report N°37, *Kyrgyzstan's Political Crisis: An Exit Strategy*, 20 August 2002. Crisis Group Asia Report N°22, *Kyrgyzstan at Ten: Trouble in the "Island of Democracy"*, 28 August 2001.

interference in affaires of government, especially, in matters of official appointments. His children got involved in making political career. Elder daughter Bermet and elder son Aidar, who already became influential informal leaders in business and politics, decided to stand for parliament, in order to legitimize their shadow influence and set up a base for rising as new political leaders in the future. Bermet established pro-governmental party, *Alga Kyrgyzstan!*, which as it was supposed would dominate during elections and would provide effective political control of Akaev's family even in case of presidential resignation. Other relatives and close friends of his family also got involved into the election campaign.

As a political leader Akaev always demonstrated excellent strategy, repeatedly overplaying the opposition. Nevertheless, adoption of new electoral system, elaborated to provide easier control of presidential family over the parliament, was his serious strategical mistake. Elections of deputies for unicameral parliament were arranged according to the new system in 75 single-mandate constituencies. Previously, elections were held on party lists and single-mandate constituencies, and there were more deputies, divided into an upper (45 deputies) and a lower chamber (60 deputies). The problem was that under new system of elections, political parties played almost no role (only 18 percent were proposed on party lists), and only the routine problems of local significance had major influence on electoral process. Such a system of elections was mostly favoured by representatives of local powers, entrepreneurs and informal leaders, where some of them had strong connections to criminal groups. They could effectively use kinship and clan relationships in constituencies of their place of residence.

Local entrepreneurs, some of them with rather disputable and shadowy reputation, were supposed to struggle the opposition candidates following the principle that money would have more influence on the electorate rather than opposition ideals. There was also arranged large-scale change relocation of constituencies in order to ensure the necessary final results of elections. The map of constituencies, elaborated by the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) and approved by the parliament, was changed in numerous cases, to make sure that certain candidates would benefit from kinship relationships.

As it became clear later on, adoption of new electoral system was a crucial mistake. In small, single-mandate constituencies nearly any candidate could bring 1000 supporters onto the streets. Therefore, many centers of protests emerged during electoral campaign. Candidates who considered that their defeat on elections was a consequence of dishonest play, were able to mobilize friends, relatives and neighbours in their support.

Moreover, the reduction of number of seats in the parliament from 105 to 75 pushed many representatives of political elite to contend against each other. Consequently, many influential political leaders could be outstripped from the parliament that would cause strong dissatisfaction of them and rank-and –file voters with the results of elections.

Accumulated problems, related to corruption and degradation of social-economic situation and ineffective governance became a long-term precondition that the majority of population, particularly, from the poor, more conservative South, protested against Akaev. The increasing role of the Akaev's family and possible resignation of many influential political leaders from participation in political process after end of elections caused anxiety among members of elite. However, presidential family continued to be sure that it would be able to keep monopoly over political and economic power. Partly such a confidence was caused by under-estimation of opposition power.

During preparation to presidential elections, that should take place in July 2005, there are several key problems to be solved by new leaders of Kyrgyzstan, that will determine movement of Kyrgyzstan to democratic development:

- necessity to conduct political reforms, in order to eliminate the disbalance, existing between the Akaev's system of centralized presidential power and weak state institutions;

- threat of economic crisis, that can be strengthened by the problem of collecting taxes and weak governance;

- dangerous situation, appeared due to unauthorized capture of lands, illegal
  settlement in the houses and remaining problems in the area of land tenure; and

- increasing threat to security from criminal groups, possessing economic and
  political power (Crisis Group Asia Report N°97, *Kyrgyzstan: After Revolution,* 4
  May 2005).

6.2.3 Ways to overcome the crisis: position of a civil society

The discussion forum "Open Kyrgyzstan"[90] is a transparent and open form of public discussion of the most important social events and upcoming governmental decisions. It represents some kind of think-tank consisting of NGO representatives, mass-media and public figures. The participants discussed the position and role of civil society in overcoming the political and economic crisis of March 2005 in Kyrgyzstan (the original source is Russian; translation into English is made by Igor Kustov). Making an introductory overview, here are the major points of view that participants expressed on the problem discussed:

- Process of stabilization should continue not only from the social point of view, but also as a recovery of economic situation, trust of a civil society to the institute of authority.

- Civil society and the state authorities should operate in the same direction. Another question is whether we can find such a dialogue in the given conditions.

- It is necessary to develop some formats and procedures of interaction of the state with a civil society, to strengthen them in order to avoid in the future what already happened.

- Civil society, political parties, mass media, non-governmental organizations should introduce their own way of development. This is because, if we do not make this work

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[90] Ways to overcome the crisis: position of a civil society. "Open Kyrgyzstan". Retrieved March 12th, 2003 (http://www.open.kg/ru/thema_discus/them_all/them_1)

today, tomorrow we will be offered only one variant which we would not be able to change.

- Today the country needs a political will and a strong leader. The presidential elections will become a decisive moment. Namely now politicians should unite for the sake of stabilization, instead of struggle for official armchairs.

Here I introduce the citations of the major participants on the position of a civil society in overcoming the crisis of March 2005 in Kyrgyzstan:

Abdykaly Imanaliev **(**Chairman, Association of Banks): "As to the problems-solving which the state confronts, they should be divided into two main stages. First – society should become consolidated before presidential elections, i.e. to put all efforts on it. We saw, how the last parliamentary elections influenced the society up to such a degree, that people have started to divide on clans and territories. This circumstance needs to be eliminated, because the future presidential elections should be held in another format. I consider, that three months allocated on preparation for presidential elections, is a very small term because we will not choose again the right president; people simply will not have time to understand who is who.

The second stage is the elaboration of strategy of the further development of the country which will be already reflected in programs of candidates in presidents. In this issue namely the civil organizations should help to understand an essence of these programs and to give an assessment, so that people could understand too. You should be aware that many deputies were selected not by a principle of their programs, but depending to whom and how much money they have paid."

Asia Sasikbaeva (Director, International Center Interbilim): "I consider too, that mass-media should be independent. First of all, national TV should be transformed into public. It is necessary to reconsider the whole working policy of KTR, its maintenance and formats, because today it has no rating. The majority of people in Kygryzstan watch the Russian TV. Moreover, it is necessary to create the possibilities to those who would like to open the new TV, new channels. I know, there are many existing problems here: there is a special commission which decides on whom to allocate the

channels and whom to refuse. I think, that all these questions should be urgently reconsidered, to make them appropriate. We should not simply speak about democracy, but actually work in this direction. I consider, that namely mass-media are one of the main tools in establishing democracy.

The second direction is that all governmental structures should conduct consultations with civil society, to discuss and get an advice."

Sultan Mederov (public figure, member of Social Movement "Zhany Bagyt"): "I think, that stability is necessary not only for a legislative branch of authority, but also for executive, first of all. I am very pleased that marauding which took place, was stopped by common efforts. Process of stabilization should continue not only from the social point of view, but also as a recovery of economic situation, trust of a civil society to the institute of authority. In this connection the legislative branch of authority now has great problems. Thus the legislative norms, in my opinion, should consider not only foundations of statehood, but also quickly adjust a number of problems, take measures for creation of conditions of expansion and strengthening economic potential of our country, to improve an investment climate. This question is vital: it is important to establish Kyrgyzstan as an open country and to involve as much as possible investments. We advertised ourselves a lot, but in reality have done nothing."

Emil Umetaliev (Chairman of the Congress of Business-Associations): "We have a very good chance to consolidate a society: it is necessary to convoke urgently the constitutional summit and it should incorporate both the best representatives of public movements and civil society. This summit should give a new vector of political strategy taking into account the experience which we have gone through. We need the common vector, the unified orientation. I offer concrete measures.

First of all, we urgently need to establish party democracy. 75 deputies are already elected, but I think, that it is necessary to double the number in order to counterbalance the parliament by the representatives of the party organizations, who would be elected by the whole population, but not represented by clans, tribes and

small territories. Certainly, these people should be adhered to concrete programs and ideas which will be supported by the population.

Secondly, we should legalize the role and presence of opposition as authority and in public life, to give them the legitimate rights, including an opportunity to form and supervise counting chamber so that the selected government could dispose national money, and the opposition would have legitimate rights to control use of these means.

Thirdly, I would support the decision which was proposed by Assembly of Representatives of Mass-Media so that all the mass-media should become private or public. Mass-media should be separated completely from the state bodies, especially from the government, including KTR and information agency "Kabar". It concerns both district and regional mass-media.

The next step is to focus public attention on the Tax Code. Taxes are a part of the property of the person, engaged in economic activity and which voluntary, in agreement with a society are transferred to the state. Withdrawal of this part should be optimized in a way that each honest person would voluntary contribute to the state. It is impossible to have these taxes at such a high level as it is today, that causes shadow economy, corruption, reduces competitiveness of fair businessmen and leads to dishonest competition. Moreover, our state becomes non-competitive in relationship with other countries. Therefore, having minimized the taxes and having made administration in favour of the businessman, instead of the bureaucrat, we shall receive much more money in treasury. I am speaking here about protection of medium and small business. If they will not be forced to resist the tax inspectors, then they will be more active, productive in participation of establishing a fair civil society.

Finally, having optimized the tax code, we should protect teachers, doctors, pensioners, in a word, all those who depend on the state budget."

Elena Pahomova (Director, Public Fund to assist the development of the right infrastructure and the juridical education): "Civil society and the state authorities

should operate in the same direction. Another question is whether we can find such a dialogue in the given conditions.

Position of civil society is only to assist in finding the dialogue between the state authorities and to help them within the limits of those resources which are available for us, e.g. to try to operate in one direction. Probably, all conflicts happen because civil society develops in its own direction or so to say using its own resources, e.g. on the money of international organizations and their interests, and the state carries out its own objectives. It looks like there is no interaction between them. The position of civil society will be really successful only when we realize this dialogue and in this process it will be possible to develop some mechanisms on which the civil society will really promote the development of Kyrgyzstan.

Another question is whether we are able to establish such a dialogue in the given conditions, while civil society and the state structures are two institutes which are very distinct from each other. In my opinion, it is difficult to establish such a dialogue, and everything depends not only on the procedure of development, but also on experience of interaction."

Melis Eshimkanov (public figure): "I call the present government, new deputies, and opposition to sit down at the negotiations table, to develop uniform strategy, to sign up the memorandum of a general armistice with all political forces and regional leaders. It happened what should have happened.

I do not think that now the situation has been stabilized, on the contrary, the anxiety soars in air. We should even invite former supporters of Askar Akaev, his ministers, e.g. we should think of how to rescue the country. Let us the OSCE to mediate. We should be now above personal ambitions. If the country will be torn up internally, we can lose the country."

Shamal Maichiev (media-representative): "First of all it is necessary to organize presidential elections. This is the first and most important problem for normalizing life of the society as a whole. There will be a president, there will be a guarantee of our Constitution. And as to the current activity, the executive power works, there is a

prime-minister, and the parliament starts working. I think, that the first month they will spend on various organizational issues, and then they should start with primary legal acts that they consider to accept during this period.

Another important moment - the role of mass-media in a society. Journalists should serve as watch-dogs of democracy. Mass-media should be separated from the state. The population should have an access to the information, mass-media – an opportunity to distribute it easily and not to be prosecuted for that. Unfortunately, it turned out that the authority controlled the governmental mass-media, and the majority of population received information only from them. Therefore the primary objective is to separate mass-media from the state, in particular, national TV (KTR) as a public agency. What kind of television it will be, it should be discussed. Newspapers should be also private. The market should define the ways of survival."

Kanat Kasimaliev (Coordinator of legal projects, Center for public technologies): "At present the civil society is in the process of establishment. Creation of voluntary teams, reaction to the occurred events - is the formation of civil society. And we should not permit, that by the time when the situation in the state is normalized, the civil society again remains not at affairs. It is necessary to stake out this place, to develop some formats and procedures of interaction of the state with a civil society, to strengthen them in order to avoid in the future what already happened. In my opinion, this is very important. Our center now also is engaged in it. We plan to continue our work in a direction of development of these formats of interaction and we invite everybody who wishes to take part in this discussion."

Alexander Tretjakov (Kyrgyz-Russian Slavonic University): "Any crisis is a place and time to make a brake and to comprehend, what we did, and to build up the future, but not to cry and suffer. And in this sense the civil sector should be united and develop programs, offer them to the government and realize them together. We already have enough mature society to do that.

One of our current problems – to stop the crash of a society with relevance to political and territorial attributes. Actions of self-organizing of a society in teams, NGOs and

other organizations should be supported. They should be supported as a process which is opposite to the split of a civil sector. Now all of us are participants of these events. There should be no separation – here were marauders, and there were revolutionaries. All this was ours. And all it is a place of work of a civil society."

Elena Voronina (International Center "Interbilim"): „NGOs should have been involved at once, from the very first days, when these events took place. The objectives of NGOs in a crisis situation are to provide the actual information and to do it operatively, to react to all changes that are going on in Bishkek and Kyrgyzstan, and to deliver this information to our target groups, which in their turn should distribute it on their territory and communities.

Therefore, today the task of the journalists as well as the non-governmental organizations is to collect, analyze, and to distribute the information as broadly as possible in the form of leaflets, bulletins, simple phone calls, e-mails.

The second task of the NGOs until stabilizing of the environment is to monitor the situation. Many human rights organizations are already engaged in monitoring and provide information to the organizations on which the decision-making depends.

The third objective is to offer alternative ways out of the existing situation. The civil society, political parties, mass media, non-governmental organizations should introduce their own way of development. This is because, if we do not make this work today, tomorrow we will be offered only one variant which we would not be able to change."

Kalandarbek Alihonov **(**Public organization "Oli Somon"): "Our public association joined the structure of Association of citizens "Responsibility" where we hand in hand decided to help our citizens, to the Staff of civil volunteer corps. We have already started to distribute leaflets about our association, about granting a free-of-charge legal aid to those who suffered from marauding. Today there are already existing organizations which have agreed to help us. This is the Center of clinical juridical education at the Kyrgyz-Russian Slavonic University, Public Fund of Legal Aid, the Moscow Bar Association and others. The legal aid consists of rendering primary

consultation to the victims, to help them in making up applications and registering other documents for submission in judicial instances.

Our representatives had a meeting with Mayor of Bishkek city where they discussed issues of coordination of actions in rendering a legal aid to the victim and issues of credit payments delays to the banks. This is the second direction of our activity."

Maral Mambetalieva (journalist): "Askar Akaev has to be paid homage. The republic has been well presented on a political arena. Kyrgyzstan was associated with the "island of democracy". This was in the beginning. But what was observed afterwards? Personally, I have nothing against Akaev neither as a citizen, nor as a journalist. But there is always an environment. I consider, what namely this environment has led us to the situation that we have now. Certainly, it is awful, that change of authority has occurred in this way. And what do we have today?

All politicians are now busy with the pulling of ropes of authority and unanimously speak, that it is necessary to recover national economy. But the same idea was spoken out in Akaev's time. The ideas that were spoken out were correct, but in practice they were not realized. And now we have the same problem. The ancient philosopher stated, that the most terrible is a disappointment and uncertainty. Our people are in confusion. I see that when I talk to the people. In my opinion, today the country needs a political will and a strong leader. The presidential elections will become a decisive moment. Namely now politicians should unite for the sake of stabilization, instead of struggle for official armchairs."

6.2.4 Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)

The Law on Public Associations adopted in 1991 encouraged the development of the NGO sector in the country. By today the Central Asia NGO Network, supported by Counterpart Consortium, holds 2914 NGO profiles in the Central Asia and 1010 in Kyrgyzstan (as of May 2005).[91] NGOs are involved in different kinds of activity including advocacy/civil participation, agriculture, business, charities and foundations,

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[91] Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). Retrieved December 11th, 2003
(http://www.cango.net.kg/)

women, youth and children, disabled and veterans' organisations; cultural, ethnic, educational, and sport associations and other voluntary societies. Below the data, introduced in Table 6.1, taken from the Central Asian NGO Network web site database show the percentage of the NGOs' activities by sector.

Table 6.1 NGOs by Sector in Kyrgyzstan

		#	%
I	Children/Youth	302	12.2
II	Women	236	9.6
III	Education/Science	212	8.6
IV	Families/Pensioners	166	6.7
V	Charities and Foundations	152	6.1
VI	Human Rights	146	5.9
VII	Business	145	5.9
VIII	Health	129	5.2
IX	Agriculture/Farmers	128	5.2
X	Disabled	126	5.1
XI	Ecology	120	4.8
XII	Media	86	3.5
XIII	Other sectors combined...	508	20.6
	Total:	**2456***	100

* An NGO may be found in multiple sectors

Source: Counterpart International, Inc. 30.04.2005

Based on the information received from the webmaster of the web site, the NGOs were distributed questionnaires on which to indicate their sectors of activities before the creation of the database. Many NGOs indicated up to 20 sectors of activities but only one had to be chosen as a primary sector. Therefore, there are often cases when NGOs combine together several activities: the Children/Youth sector may join sectors such as Women, Education/Science, Health, Disabled, and Families/Pensioners. As one can see from the table, Children/Youth, Women and Education/Science sectors prevail in the NGOs' activities. These NGOs provide different types of assistance including protection of mothers and children's rights, training of unemployed women, protection of interests of and support to disadvantaged young people, giving educational and cultural support to disabled children and orphans who cannot go to secondary school. Other examples include creating a temporary refuge and telephone help-line for women who have experienced violence, providing them with medical-psychological consultation, establishing informative advisory centres on legal and social protection of mothers,

and organising work on prevention of drug addiction, prostitution, and criminality among the teenagers and youth.

Business and agriculture sectors of NGOs are also important for Kyrgyzstan as a country experiencing the transition from state ownership to private property. These NGOs provide people with material and moral support for their initiatives for self-employment and the small business development; they promote reforms in agriculture and alleviate unemployment by providing temporary jobs for workers of reorganised or closed enterprises.

The "other" NGO sector includes activities such as Advocacy/Civil participation, Professional Associations, Legal, Sport, Refugees, Ethnic and Cultural. Kyrgyzstan is a multiethnic country and people associate not only out of interest and need, but also because of national and cultural traditions. This has led to the formation and approval of a whole range of public associations based on ethnic origins. There are 65 ethnic and cultural centres listed in the NGO database. One of them is a public organisation uniting 28 ethnic associations into the National and Culture Centre, which aims to solve problems of the national minorities in the republic. Each ethnic centre has claimed that keeping their language, culture, tradition, national character and self-awareness can help to achieve inter-ethnic harmony in the country.

The NGOs are not equally distributed in the country. In the Table 6.2 below one can see numbers of NGOs by region. (Data from the Central Asia Network NGO database)

Table 6.2 NGOs by Region in Kyrgyzstan

		#	%
I	Chui	323	31.9
II	Osh	258	25.5
III	Jalal-Abad	144	14.2
IV	Issyk-Kul	144	14.2
V	Talas	72	7.1
VI	Naryn	67	6.6
	Total:	**1010**	100

Source: Counterpart International, Inc. 30.04.2005

The table shows that more than one third of the total number of the NGOs are located in Chui region, the northern part of the country, where the capital is situated, and about one quarter are in the Osh region, the southern part. While in the remote Naryn region this number is the lowest. In order to facilitate the development of the NGOs' network there are NGO rural support centres established in the republic, including Bishkek, Jalal-Abad, Kara-Balta, Naryn and Karakol (see Figure 6.4 below).

Figure 6.4 Regional Map of Kyrgyzstan

It is very difficult to judge the size of the NGOs as the number of members given in the database varied from one to ten persons. To this question the web master has replied that the number of the members entered in the database depends on the information provided by the NGOs. Basically, they provide information about the management and paid staff.

There is also a question about the date of establishment of NGOs. There are two different dates given in the database: the first is the date of foundation and the second is the date of its registration in the Ministry of Justice. The gap between these two dates can be from one month to one year or sometimes more. This fact perhaps shows that NGOs are still not provided with an adequate legislative and legal basis. The attitude of the state to the NGO sector can be characterised as passive, or at best as taking a monitoring role. In addition, certain elements of double-regulation are imposed by the state on NGOs.

Active participation of all social groups in any given society is important, especially for those groups most vulnerable during the transition period. Formation of an organisational and social environment supportive of civil society becomes possible when individual and collective rights are protected by the state and the impact of economic policy on social development is considered in policy planning. State agencies in the Kyrgyz Republic to date have not gained enough experience in forming social partnerships with voluntary organisations. This lack of experience has caused difficulties in understanding and realising the full potential of NGO-state partnerships. During the initial period following Independence from 1991-95, NGO organisations carried out various activities on a non-profit basis. Now more and different types of activities are being pursued by NGOs. The motivation of most NGO members has changed as well.

As the idea of the NGOs as an attribute of civil society has only been recently brought to the country it is understandable that the development of the NGOs heavily depends on external funding. There are currently about twenty international NGOs active in the country including the UN system agencies such as UNHCR, IOM and UNICEF; also, there are the most active and known like the Soros Foundation, supporting public administration, health and education reform, and culture; Helvetas, working on the environment (particularly the mountains) and village development all over the country; Mercy Corps International involved in rural micro-credit and social insurance, especially, in the south of the country and Counterpart Consortium taking an active part in the NGO development all over the country.

Ideally NGOs should serve as an important institutional link involving the people of the country in making decisions about the quality and quantity of measures offered by the Government. This should result in the people taking responsibility themselves for implementation and management of Government initiatives. According to UNDP Assessment of the NGO Sector in the Kyrgyz Republic there are a few NGOs in Kyrgyzstan who have a good understanding of their role in participatory development. The majority of NGOs, however, lack conceptual clarity about their role. They are not able to articulate clearly the very nature and purpose of social or other forms of intermediation and why and how they are effective institutions for this intermediation. The NGOs see themselves more in a position of power and authority,

argue that they work "for" people (not with people), and often describe the relationship between themselves and people as "we" and "them". Many NGOs do not inform the local community of their activities, nor do they explain their mission. These NGOs see themselves as "providers" of services and people as "recipients" of services.

However, in addition to political parties, NGOs can oversee development programmes initiated by the Government and influence authorities to promote more effectively the interests of the people. The development of NGOs in the Kyrgyz Republic is especially critical because recent reforms and the emergence of a private sector have destroyed much of the former system of public and social regulators. Over the past several years, this social stratification of society has led to the emergence and arrival of numerous local and international charity organisations. In addition, donor organisations have introduced new social development techniques designed to involve the general population more actively in social development activities. As a result, new voluntary organisations are providing direct assistance to targeted population groups, although more than one third of these NGOs are based in the capital, Bishkek. It is quite significant that the remaining NGOs are based outside of the capital. A commonly accepted definition of an NGO is an organisation whose basic activity is to provide direct development support and services to its members or beneficiary social groups. The rural NGOs serve as major partners of the state in implementing national programmes. These NGOs are of particular effectiveness in implementing programmes for poverty alleviation, healthcare and education system reform. Given the harsh effects of the transition period, there are many opportunities for the creation of productive partnerships between NGOs and local authorities to overcome the problems of social rehabilitation in these areas. However, many existing NGOs, together with many state agencies, still do not have a clear understanding of their potential role as partners in the field of development. They have not yet been able to specify effective objectives and methods of social mediation. It is necessary to utilise NGOs to support society's adaptation to new conditions of co-operation between the population and administrative structures. The participation of NGOs, for example, in the preparation of socio-economic development programmes at the district and region levels should be more seriously considered.

According to the UNDP National Human Development report for the Kyrgyz Republic 1999, the degree of participation of citizens in the public activity through NGOs as one of the agents of civil society is considered to be an essential factor determining the level of development of society.

6.2.5 Mass media

According to the data on mass media from the Kyrgyzstan Development Gateway[92], in Kyrgyzstan more than 500 mass media are registered, out of which 111 are state-owned, 4000 are private and 75 are independent TV and radio broadcasting companies. This fact shows that the way of development chosen by the country has opened great opportunities for the development of sources of mass information. The increasing number of various periodicals testifies to the growing achievement of true freedom of speech in the Kyrgyz society.

That said there have been times when influential people, including several parliamentary deputies, have urged the president to rein in the press, after the media described them in a negative light. In 1997 there was a marked increase in harassment of journalists of the well-known newspaper *ResPublika*.

"Zamira Sydykova, editor-in-chief of *ResPublika*, as well as Alexander Alyanchikov and Tamara Slasheva, of the same newspaper, are among those who have been convicted under articles 128 and 129 of the Criminal Code since 1996. They were charged with libel for criticising authorities. Their sentences ranged from being banned from practising journalism to imprisonment. Although pardoned according to the presidential amnesty, any new article considered libellous, as well as any article written before the amnesty but not yet incriminated, will give rise to new criminal charges either under the old Criminal Code or the new Code entering into force in January 1998. They will then be considered as recidivists. In the new Criminal Code Articles 128 and 129 of the old Code, however, have been maintained, with minor modifications, such as the

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[92] Kyrgyzstan Development Gateway. Mass Media. Retrieved April 11th, 2004
   (http://eng.gateway.kg/media)

reduction of imprisonment terms and increase of the fines. Deputies of the legislative assembly had a chance to abolish criminal libel, but the majority felt that this would lead to anarchy. Noting that such limitations of free speech could be violating the constitution; it was argued that libel was not protected speech. Therefore, libel remains a crime in Kyrgyzstan".[93]

By contrast the OSCE Report on Media in the Kyrgyz Republic as of 1999 says, "the country has managed to develop and follow a relatively liberal domestic policy. The atmosphere for the media has improved greatly since the 1997 criminal libel trials. Overt political pressure is rare and the government is generally accountable to the media".

Today many periodicals, radio and TV channels work under market conditions of comparatively high competition that causes them commercial and financial difficulties. Because there is no censorship some mass media in search of sensationalism often distort the facts, and give a biased interpretation of the events.

But readers, radio listeners, and TV-viewers of Kyrgyzstan are already skilled in choosing the periodicals and channels they rely upon. This kind of process makes Kyrgyzstans' mass media look for new ways of development and pay more attention to the professionalism of their journalists, editors and technicians. Approximately twenty newspapers publish in Bishkek, the capital. The national government owns four newspapers. Two of those, *Slovo Kyrgyzstana* and *Nasha Gazeta*, are Russian-language newspapers. The others, *Erkin Too* and *Kyrgyz Ruuhuu*, are in Kyrgyz. Local governments and other government agencies also publish their own newspapers. The national government owns and operates a news service, *Kabar*. *Vecherniy Bishkek* is one of the independent papers published in Bishkek, and has the largest circulation at between fifty and eighty thousand copies. Major independent Kyrgyz-language newspapers include *Asaba*, *ResPublika*, and *Aalam*.

The national government owns one television station and two radio stations. Each regional government also operates its own television station, although these stations

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[93] OSCE Implementation Meeting on Human Dimension Issues Warsaw, Freedom of statement and Free Media 1997.

broadcast only a few hours per week. Four independent television stations and seven independent radio stations broadcast from Bishkek. One television station broadcasts in Karakol, one in Naryn (eastern part of the country), four in Osh, four in Jalal-Abad (southern part of the country) but none in Talas (western part of the country). Since 1998, in addition, a semi-independent television station, *KOORT,* has begun operating in Bishkek. This company won a coveted VHF channel and the rights to sell national and local advertising on the two Russian networks, *RTR* and *ORT*.

In the Kyrgyz Republic there are also media owned by ethnic minorities. Programs in minority languages, such as Uzbek, Dungan, Karakalpak and Tajik are aired on government radio and television.

Although the Kyrgyz government currently has the most favourable policy toward the media in Central Asia, problems for the media may arise in the future if the economic situation continues to deteriorate. Associations of journalists and other local organisations have played a relatively minor role in influencing governmental policy or in defending freedom of the press. For that reason, the media in the Kyrgyz Republic continue to be at risk. Many of the media are already bordering on bankruptcy. A decrease in the number of independent media, especially in the regions, would have an adverse effect on the development of democracy in the Kyrgyz Republic.

6.2.6 Parliamentary Elections of 1995

The 1995 parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan were the first competitive elections in the political history of the country. The election was intended to become a significant stage in the process towards democratisation of the Kyrgyz society through selecting the leaders of the country's government in a transparent and open environment. The new parliament was elected based on the new electoral law adopted in October 1994. The old single chamber parliament of 350-members was replaced by a smaller two-chamber parliament of 105 members. A 35-seat Legislative Assembly and a 70-seat People's Assembly were to meet twice a year. The new parliament was expected to be more professional and competent and more willing to follow the President's democratic and reform programme. According to the Chairman of the

Elections Committee, Markil Imbraiv, the names of 936 candidates were submitted in the voting ballots to compete for the 105 seats in the new parliament. The turnouts in the two rounds of the election were 76% and 65% respectively. The remarkable thing about the election was its democratic openness to all citizens and to all parties and public movements that expressed their wish to participate in creating a new parliament of the country. This election was the first lesson in democracy for Kyrgyz society.[94]

The election also attracted the attention of the international observers. Approximately 60 observers from OSCE/ODIHR monitored the election throughout the country. Observers had access to almost all polling sites and received all necessary information from polling officials. It was concluded that these elections could be considered as generally reflecting the will of the people. They reported that freedom of information and association had not been curtailed; political parties were organised and functioning freely, and there was a general sense that authorities were serious about implementing democratic reforms, in particular in the field of elections.[95]

It was hoped that the new parliament, with its new form and composition, would perform its duties competently and honestly and make a break with the corruption of the old parliament. There were also claims that the basis for participatory democracy had been established in the country. By that time Kyrgyz society had already enjoyed such features of civil society as NGOs, political parties and mass media. Freedom of speech, information and associations - vital conditions for democratic elections - came straight after independence. In order to analyse how actively citizens of the newly emerged country participated to establish democratic and civil society, in the first competitive election, it might be useful to consider the involvement of NGOs and political parties and mass media in the election.

Although of all the Central Asian republics Kyrgyzstan maintained the liveliest mass media, the coverage of public affairs was not yet strong enough in 1995. There was no countrywide daily newspaper. Only a handful of publications could boast a

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[94] Slovo Kyrgyzstana, June 9, 2000

[95] The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. International Election Observation Mission. Elections to the State Duma in the Russian Federation. 7 December 2003. Retrieved December 23rd, 2004 (http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2003/12/1629_en.pdf)

circulation large enough to make them financially viable. The government had an indirect influence over most publications as the only printing company. It also had a monopoly over newsprint, apart from one opposition paper that had its own source of supply. Many journalists and their publishers practised self-censorship, not wishing to antagonise government authorities. People all over the country were getting most of their information from television, as it was the most accessible medium and the main source of information for about 60% of the population. Often people were not satisfied by the quality of news in the media because of the lack of solid information.

From the very beginning the media took an active part in the election marathon. All candidates were allowed 10 days before the start of the election to buy time slots on TV and advertisements in newspapers. The campaign took place in a generally peaceful atmosphere. However there were some problems caused by attempts of the government to interfere with public opinion. The Chairman of the Elections Committee, Markil Imbraiv, blamed opposition newspapers *Res Publika, Asaba, DeloN* and the National Television and Radio Company for giving candidates an opportunity to express their views and criticise the dishonesty of their opponents and their trials of bribing voters (*Slovo Kyrgyzstana*, March 1995). During these elections politicians once again proved that the road to power was built on support from newspapers, radio, and television. They tried to control the critically persuasive broadcast media and, often, the print media as well. There were many "strongman" leaders and would-be strongmen, whose fortunes in elections depended on mass media support. They regarded it as tool with which to maintain or wrest electoral advantage and popular backing. There were attempts of bribery, patronage, and intimidation, the outright payment of cash, the promise of jobs to relatives, and financial and other pressures exerted for positive coverage in the mass media. That said, compared with those days of Soviet power, some progress had been achieved in the public sphere in Kyrgyzstan. Since the collapse of communist rule there had been many efforts to build independent media through a pluralistic press and increasingly privatised broadcast outlets. Yet compared with international standards of press freedom, the media situation remained rather bleak.

The strength of a state depends on the extent of their active participation in political life. It means participation of citizens in the political life of the society through

associations such as NGOs and political parties. Unfortunately the majority of citizens in Kyrgyzstan did not see NGOs as organisations they could join to express their political views. As the idea of NGOs was imported and supported from abroad many people in the country considered them as organisations to help people in need or to protect the environment. At that time Kyrgyz society was experiencing, like all developing democracies, the lack of the institutional capacity to support the management of elections, to organise political parties, or to expand citizens' knowledge about electoral and political processes. No visible party based opposition had yet appeared in the country. Many of the political parties, as well as NGOs, that existed at that time remained undeveloped. They failed to present clearly defined interests or elements of society. Their presence indicates the existence of political mechanisms to allow citizens to replace government leaders through competitive elections.

In Kyrgyzstan new political parties and movements have been able to form and register without prejudice over the years prior to the 1995 elections. Despite the fact that development of political parties was upheld in Kyrgyzstan they failed to establish truly national parties. They managed to create only small parties often headed by leaders from definite regions; they lacked a clear programme or social basis and were not stable. Political parties were among the biggest losers in the elections. Out of all 936 candidates standing for election, a mere 161 had party affiliations. The thirty social movements and thirteen parties that took part in the elections were unable to field a full slate of candidates across the country. Only the Communist party, which claimed nation-wide membership, managed to field more than twenty candidates. Many smaller parties were able to participate in the election in fewer than 10 of the 105 constituencies. Finally only one third of the deputies elected in the new Parliament represented political parties. The table 6.3 below shows the results of the election.

Table 6.3 Results of Parliamentary Elections 1995

N	Name of party	Seats in the Parliament
1	Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan	14
2	Party of National Renewal "Asaba"	4
3	"Unity of Kyrgyzstan"	4
4	"Ata-Meken" (Fatherland)	3
5	Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan	3
6	Democratic party "Erkin Kyrgyzstan" (Free Kyrgyzstan)	3
7	Republican Party	3
8	Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan	1
9	Agrarian Party	1
10	Democratic Party of Women of Kyrgyzstan	1
11	Agrarian Labour party of Kyrgyzstan	1
12	Democratic Party of Economic Unity	0

Source: Author's own data

The Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan largely consisted of businessmen and regional administrators and was the most successful in the election obtained 14 seats in the new parliament. The nationalist party Asaba, which opposed any concessions being made to the Russian population, gained 4 seats. Both Erkin Kyrgyzstan, the most prominent offshoot of the Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan, and Ata Meken (Fatherland), the centrist party, which expressed willingness to support the government, obtained three seats.

The results of party representation in the new parliament prove that voters did not have clear sense of party identification. Despite the fact that political parties were organised and functioning freely and there was a pluralist and multi-party system, none of the parties won more than a few seats in the parliament. Parties' participation in the election was weak and people's attention to them was not high. They preferred to vote for personalities. The importance of the elections was as an opportunity to choose new representatives and national leaders of the country. Elections were not merely a necessary condition for democracy but a means of testing the country's democratic health.

Despite the positive evaluation of the elections by the international observers as the most democratic in Central Asia, they were not as open and fair as had been

expected. The electoral law was badly drafted and weakly enforced and there were cases when officials ignored and violated its provisions. Due to changes in institutional design in the Kyrgyz Parliament there was a reduction of ethnic minorities and as a result they emerged from the elections with a low level of representation. According to Eugene Huskey the Kyrgyz president, Askar Akaev, adopted an approach that was close to consociational democracies, which aimed to establish broad coalitions that include representatives from all of the country's major constituencies. The main idea is to create at least the appearance of a grand ruling coalition that integrates all major social groups. This approach is most likely to be found in smaller countries with diverse ethnic, linguistic and religious communities like Kyrgyzstan.[96] Based on the results on the election one can say that unfortunately the new elected parliament was not a real reflection of the heterogeneous society of the country. Women and most ethnic minorities were underrepresented in the new parliament. Only 5 of 105 parliamentary deputies were women. Only four out of 80 different ethnic groups in Kyrgyzstan were represented in the new parliament. There were four Russian, eight Uzbek, one German and one Karachai.

Considering the results of the 1995 parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan one can have doubts about the further development and strengthening of democracy through attributes of civil society in Kyrgyzstan.

Electoral rules played directly into the hands of regional political and economic establishments. Clan and tribal ties in Kyrgyz politics remained strong. The president of the country, Askar Akaev, in an interview given to the national Kabar news agency stated that the election results, despite their outcome, were a first step on the way to democracy since for the most part they had been conducted in accordance with the adopted electoral law. In order to maintain national harmony the president proposed a system of proportional representation to reflect the multi-ethnic population of the country. He also proposed to give a quota system to women.[97]

Although the holding of the first competitive election was an important step forward in the development of democracy in Kyrgyzstan, a number of factors indicated that the

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[96] Dawisha, Conflict, Cleavage, and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus, p. 254.
[97] Bilingual newspaper "*Erkin Too*", February 2, 1995.

development of a fully transparent election system in Kyrgyzstan was still undergoing evolution. The results of the election revealed that as in other former Soviet countries, political parties did not yet play an important role in the political life of Kyrgyzstan. Although active and registered to participate in elections, most parties were small and had few followers. More people were likely to follow a strong personality than a weak party. Although many supported a multi-party system for competition in elections, few joined a political party, or any other non-governmental organisation. Women were particularly inactive and women's groups were formed to recruit, advise, and campaign for women candidates in the next parliamentary elections.

Despite the favourable reports of outside observers, there were problems with the electoral system. During the parliamentary elections, there were reports of widespread vote buying, ballot stuffing, and other election fraud. Voter identification was not always correctly applied and family or proxy voting took place especially in rural areas. Whilst polling site officials were well acquainted with democratic voting procedures, they sometimes made allowance for traditional habits of multiple voting, perhaps under pressure to reach the 50% threshold needed to validate the election. Voters were usually unsure about voting procedures. What people wanted in particular was better enforcement of the electoral laws, better monitoring of elections and equal and fair conditions for all candidates – factors that were lacking in the elections.

The 1995 parliamentary election was the first trial for nascent attributes of civil society; political parties and associations as well as for public sphere as freedom of speech and information were vital conditions for democratic elections.

The 1995 parliamentary elections were marked by procedural violations and illustrated that the low level of political culture remained one of the most profound barriers to democratisation in Kyrgyzstan. Traditions of civil society had shown little evidence of taking root in a society dominated by mixture of family, clan, regional and ethnic loyalties.

6.2.7 Parliamentary Elections of 2000

In February 2000 Kyrgyzstan for a second time conducted parliamentary elections as an independent country. The parliamentary elections were a critical event in the democratic development of the Kyrgyz Republic. From the beginning the parliamentary elections were expected to be more advanced. This time they were regulated by the new 1999 Election Code and the 1996 Constitution, amended in 1998. There was a newly introduced mixed electoral system used to elect the two-chamber parliament of 105 members. Out of the 60-seat Legislative Assembly 15 members were to be elected on a proportional basis from the national party list and the remaining 45 members from 45 single mandate constituencies on a majority basis. In order to get a seat a party must win 5% of the votes. In the 45-seat People's Representative Assembly all members were elected from 45 single mandate constituencies. These changes to electoral legislation were intended to provide the potential to increase competition and party representation and to strengthen the role of civil society in of the country.

The Chairman of the Central Election Commission, Sulaiman Imanbaev, announced that parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan had been held in a democratic way. According to him, a new, democratic parliament had been formed in the country.[98] Presidential press secretary Osmonakun Ibraimov announced that President Askar Akaev praised the results of the elections, saying that they had been held in a democratic spirit. According to Ibraimov, there were no major irregularities during the elections.[99]

According to the team of the OSCE observers, led by Marc Stevens, however, the Kyrgyz authorities did not fulfil their commitment to organise fair parliamentary elections and the elections were neither democratic nor fully lawful. There were a series of decisions preventing parties and candidates from competing in the election on a fair and equal basis. The authorities interfered in the election campaign and the courts ruled mostly against the opposition candidates. The 2000 parliamentary elections damaged the democratic image of Kyrgyzstan.

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[98] Bilingual newspaper "*Erkin Too*", April 14, 2000.
[99] *Vecherniy Bishkek* – newspaper in Kyrgyzstan. February 2000.

This time, together with international observers, the local NGOs also took an active part in monitoring the elections. The leading role was played by the Coalition of NGOs for Democracy and Civil Society. The Coalition of NGOs For Democracy and Civil Society is an independent and neutral union of more than 150 organisations and groups working to establish democratic and civil society in the Kyrgyz Republic. The Coalition's activities through regional organisations have allowed it to grow into a very strong institution with motivated and experienced staff, a network of NGO members, and thousands of volunteers. The Coalition of NGOs was founded in December 1998, when 55 NGOs, formerly united in the Forum of NGOs, restructured the organisation and registered with a different name to reflect a new mission. The mission of the Coalition was to provide civic education programs, training of election commission members and observers, and most importantly, to participate in monitoring the election processes in the republic to evaluate their legitimacy and integrity. Starting in March 1999, the Coalition carried out its first educational program focused on civic participation, organising meetings in Osh, Karakol, and Bishkek to discuss several legislative bills such as the Election Code and Ethics Law. From June to August 1999, the Coalition familiarised more than 10,000 citizens with the new Election Code and the functions of local council deputies through large public meetings. The Coalition carried out monitoring of the 1998 referendum and the local elections in October 1999. It has become one of the most important NGOs' associations in the country and is a major influence, in communication with the Presidential Administration, Parliament, regional and local government, and international donors. The Coalition aims to foster dialogue and strategic partnerships between the civil society, government, the private sector and international donors.

In December 1999 and January 2000 the Coalition began conducting a voters' education programme focusing on the upcoming 2000 parliamentary elections. It developed and distributed three educational newsletters in 4 languages, leaflets in 3 languages, and posters with a total circulation of more than 300,000 copies. It also trained 2,000 independent observers and 3,000 candidate observers. There were 180 observers in the 45 election districts, monitoring pre-election procedures. Over 2,000 people monitored the first round of elections on February 20th, and 1,000 monitored the second round on March 12th. Based on the reports of the NGOs'

Coalition observers the comprehensive final report was created. It included the main findings and conclusions of the monitoring program. According to the final report of the NGOs' coalition there were cases when in many districts local authorities provided favourable conditions for some candidates and pressured election commissions. In several districts work against opposition candidates was directly authorised and managed by the highest officials of the Presidential Administration and Government. Unfortunately, these widely documented pervasive election abuses prevented a positive evaluation of the elections. This despite the fact that overall the scale and quantity of violations of Election administration decreased in comparison with the previous parliamentary elections. The authorities are appealing to the international community and to local human rights interests to be tolerant to a developing democracy, claiming that democratisation is a continuing process. The civil society, however, is sufficiently informed and developed not to accept such a position. The overwhelming majority of Kyrgyz citizens not only knows their rights belonging to them by birth and under the Constitution of the Republic but they recently have started to assert them. Kyrgyz citizens increasingly demand that the Government should respect and adhere to the Constitution and international law on democratic governance and human rights. Most of the state employees, members of elections commission, judges and journalists want and can work honestly in accordance with democratic laws of the country. Never in the history of independent Kyrgyzstan has such a vast majority of the nation trusted in the democratic form of government as the only possible way for the peaceful development and economic prosperity of Kyrgyzstan. The NGO Coalition insisted that most of the events and decisions that limited participation of opposition and impeded the citizens to exercise their constitutional rights in full were planned and orchestrated by the highest authorities. It claims that during the elections leaders of the country violated principal international commitments of our republic and chose to ignore brutal and systematic infringement upon the main rights and freedoms of citizens. The state machine's actions showed complete futility of appealing to the rule of law and to the judicial branch. The NGOs' coalition noted that international observers judged the elections as simply a mere setback for Kyrgyz democracy. The coalition, as representatives of the Kyrgyz civil society, however testified that damage to democracy was tremendous and almost irreparable. Precedents were established for dispersal of

peaceful demonstrations, unfair court rulings, and complete disregard for the law and human rights. The space for democracy was almost physically decreasing.

The final report was submitted to the Central Election Commission, political parties and deputies of the parliament with recommendations on improving the election system of Kyrgyzstan and increasing its transparency and integrity. According to the final report of the NGOs' Coalition the 2000 elections to the parliament were not conducted in a free and fair environment. The electoral rights of citizens, freedom of press, speech and assembly, and several other principal constitutional rights were abused.

According to the new Election Code in order to participate in the parliamentary election political parties were to observe two important stipulations. First, parties' Charters should foresee participation in the elections of state bodies and second, parties should be registered not later than one year prior to the day of the appointment of the election. By the beginning of the 2000 parliamentary election 15 parties were qualified to participate. Four political parties were clearly in opposition to the Government, the Party of Communists of Kyrgyzstan, the Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan, People's Party, and Ar-Namys (Dignity) Party. They intended to take an active part in the election. Three of them failed to be represented in the new Parliament due to their unfair exclusion from party ballots. The Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan was barred from the election based on the decision of the court. Based on the new legislation the People's Party and Ar-Namys (Dignity) Party were denied registration by the Republican Ministry of Justice although they held the second and the third places respectively after the Party of Communists of Kyrgyzstan in the rating of political parties. Opposition parties and candidates faced a series of obstacles preventing their fair or even actual participation in the election. There were two outrageous cases among other violations during the elections. The first case, Daniyar Usenov, leader of the opposition People's Party and a well-known businessman, running in the election in Bishkek constituency, was barred after the first round of the elections. The reason was a report from his opposing candidate that he had not reported all items of property in his pre-election property and tax declaration. There was an urgent meeting of the regional electoral committee to bar Usenov as a candidate. The Central Electoral Committee upheld this decision. The

second case concerned Felix Kulov, an opposition leader of Ar-Namys (Dignity) Party, prominent politician, former vice-president and ex-mayor of the capital, Bishkek. He was running in Kara-Bura constituency in the western region of the country, Talas. During the second round of election in the constituency independent observers registered cases of systematic fraud and voters' intimidation committed by state and election authorities aimed to defeat Kulov. After the calculation of votes it turned out that Kulov's opponent Sultanov, the head of the Domestic Affairs Management of Talas region, had gathered 54% of votes and Kulov only 41%, which was an obvious falsification of the result. These two cases were the main reason why the election was found non-democratic by international and NGO observers. The prevention of the country's main opposition parties from running in the elections badly damaged the democratic image of Kyrgyzstan.

Finally six political parties were represented among the 15 members elected on a proportional basis from the national party lists in the new Kyrgyz Parliament. The Table 6.4 below shows the results.

Table 6.4 Results of Parliamentary Elections 2000

Name of the Party	% of votes	Number of seats in Parliament
Party of Communists of Kyrgyzstan	27.65	5
Union of Democratic Forces	18.64	4
Democratic Party of Women	12.69	2
Party of Afghan War Veterans	8.03	2
Social Party "Ata-Meken" (Fatherland)	6.7	1
Political Party "My country"	5.01	1

Source: Results of the 2000 Parliamentary Election, *Erkin Too*, April 2000

In the table one can see that the Party of Communists of Kyrgyzstan won the majority of votes but obtained just one seat more than the Union of Democratic Forces. The result was also a real success for the Party of Afghan War Veterans as no one had expected such a level of support. The "My country" party needed only 178 votes extra to reach the 5% to get one seat in the parliament.

In principle there is the freedom of press in the Kyrgyz Republic. In reality the media are still susceptible to structural weaknesses, such as a weak financial base, pressure from the authorities, reliance on a limited number of printing houses, which are largely state owned, and a tendency for political pressure from the authorities to limit criticism. Independent media owners are aware that the authorities can easily order a visit from tax inspectors. As a result the theoretical freedom of press actually operates in a climate of self-censorship.

During the 2000 parliamentary elections the state media clearly exhibited a strong bias towards the government and the president. State-owned Kyrgyzstan TV (KTR) generally met their responsibility to provide free airtime to all candidates and political parties during the pre-election campaign. But TV news broadcasting on this channel exhibited a clear bias in favour of the pro-presidential party of Union of Democratic Forces (UDF), led by Chingiz Aitmatov, as well as clear negative tendencies towards opposition candidates, such as Feliks Kulov and Daniyar Usenov. According to the Final Election Report of the OSCE, the KTR gave some 21% of its coverage to UDF, largely positive in tone. Ar-Namys (Dignity) Party and the People's Party received 5.6% and 2.8% respectively, and it was largely negative. In the main KTR news programme Ala-Too, UDF received 15.6% of coverage, which was largely positive. Ar-Namys received 19.9%, but it was largely negative. Daniyar Usenov, leader of the People's Party, received negative coverage during the second round of elections. He received nearly 8% of coverage but 98% of this was negative. The independent Piramida TV gave 13.8% of its coverage to the People's Party, of which 28.7% was negative. UDF received 10.2%, mainly positive.[100]

Similarly the leading state-owned newspaper *Slovo Kyrgyzstana*, repeatedly claiming that it was open to advertising from any party, gave significant advertising space to the leading pro-presidential parties, such as UDF and the Democratic Party of Women. The UDF received 8% of coverage, which was positive in tone, while Ar-Namys received 8.8%, 90% of which was negative in tone. *Kyrgyz Tuusu*, another government-owned paper, gave 14.4% to UDF and 11.9% to the Democratic Party of

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[100] The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. Kyrgyz Republic, Parliamentary Elections. 20 February and 12 March 2000. Retrieved March 2nd, 2003 (http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2000/04/1384_en.pdf)

Women, in both cases positive in tone, while Ar-Namys (Dignity) received 10.6%, mainly negative. Independent papers, such as *ResPublica* and *Asaba*, which were identified with the opposition, exhibited a bias towards the opposition parties. *Vecherny Bishkek,* one of the most popular newspapers in the country, showed a small tendency to give more coverage to the UDF and the Democratic Party of Women. It also gave extensive and not always negative coverage of the opposition, particularly the People's Party.

Private electronic media through the Internet as an extra way to inform about the election were a novelty of this election. Generally they gave a more diversified account of the election campaign. They covered both opposition and pro-presidential and government parties and candidates. Although private media had a tendency to provide more coverage to the opposition than did the state-owned channels and allowed some criticism of the president, they were not fully free to cover the campaign, due to the limitations mentioned above.

The 2000 parliamentary elections were anticipated with great optimism by Kyrgyz society. For the first time, parliamentary seats were to be distributed to political parties competing in national elections. The people hoped that the new parliament would establish a new political basis, which would build upon the democratic gains made earlier and adequately represent interests of all sectors of the nation's political spectrum. Unfortunately, these hopes were not fulfilled. Does this mean that the country is losing its name as "an island of democracy" in Central Asia? Does this mean that the country is becoming like its neighbouring authoritarian Central Asian countries?

Based on the description given above we may say those attributes of civil society like NGOs, parties and media are still weak. NGOs took an active part in the 2000 parliamentary election. They consolidated to monitor the elections to make them more open and transparent. At the same time it is still very early to say that political parties play significant role in the political life of the country. They remain a weak force in the country, with a limited local base and a very weak national base. The general orientation of the parties could be divided into "presidential" and "opposition". Most candidates were identified as independent on the ballot, highlighting the weak

attraction of parties to the Kyrgyz electorate. Most of the parties do not have clear programmes of their ideas or targets, with the possible exception of the Party of Communists of Kyrgyzstan. Political parties mainly serve as instruments for the party leaders to achieve their ambitions or commercial interests; sometimes they are just group of people who are united based on the common backgrounds. As a result there were 134 candidates from nine political parties and two elective blocs in ballots. None of the elected parties is particularly cohesive and changes in the political orientation can be expected.

As a result the newly elected parliament consists of representatives of 6 parties. Out of 105 members there are 5 women, and 7 Russians, 2 Uzbek, 2 Karachai, 1 Kazakh. The results of the elections were very much criticised. They do not meet international observers' expectations for Kyrgyzstan, which was considered as a democratic model for the former Soviet countries since the first days of its independence. Maybe from the beginning there were too many idealised expectations for the country, failing to take account of its specific character, historical background and level of political culture. Despite its Soviet legacy and a general apathy of citizens toward politicians and government, the country has made improvements in its electoral process. Nevertheless, one of the main conclusions based on the results of the elections is that the citizens are still learning about the democratic process and political parties are still very much in their infancy.

6.2.8. NGOs and Corruption in Kyrgyzstan

Kyrgyzstan is considered to be as one of the most corrupted countries among the CIS members, according to the report prepared by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in April 2003. There is no political will of the government to fight the corruption because the government is corrupted itself. There were numerous declarations of the former president Akayev that corruption is the main obstacle to reforms and needs to be addressed. But nothing changed so far; the situation gradually is getting worse.

Another driving force and powerful resource to fight the corruption and promote the reforms are the public, mass-media and NGOs (which are highly corrupted as well).

Corruption of the ruling family, perceived not only by the elite, but by the population as well, was also an important factor in bringing about these events. Another contributing factor was the expectation of economic improvement, especially in the south of the country. It remains doubtful, however, that the next leader will be able to improve the situation more than President Askar Akaev was able to, since it is a factor of geography rather than economic policy. The South is already receiving disproportional funding from the budget and there are programs in place to facilitate economic development. However, the failure to meet popular economic expectations, particularly in the south, contributed to this movement.

The contemporary development of Kyrgyzstan is characterized by variety of the problems demanding enhanced attention and an effective decision-taking. Corruption is one of these problems representing serious threat to day-to-day activity of political and economic institutes not only at the national level, but also at a level of interaction with other countries. Corruption is also dangerous because it causes recession of trade relations, volume of investments. Lobbying of individual interests in state politics leads to decrease of responsibility, accountability of authorities, reduces financing the key directions of activity of the state. Poor people suffer from corruption most of all.

Finally, corruption leads to formation of a society which is not capable by virtue of internal weakness to live in conditions of democratic governance. Without due counteraction, corruption has a tendency to develop in transnational and therefore becomes a problem not for a single state, but for all mankind.

In this regards, studying the problems of corruption in Kyrgyzstan is an important and timely step initiated by the UNDP Project on Preventing the Crime and Central Administrative Board on combating the organized crime and gangsterism of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Kyrgyz Republic (Corruption in Kyrgyzstan.[101]

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[101] Corruption in Kyrgyzstan. UNDP/Center for Public Opinion Studies and Forecasting. Bishkek 2000.

6.2.9 Legal and Institutional Framework for Fighting Corruption

Kyrgyzstan faced serious problems of corruption in the business sector, government authorities and financial circles since the start of essential reforms of its economic and political system in 1990's. Therefore, Kyrgyzstan was ranked at the 118th place in 2003 and at the 122nd place in 2004, according to Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index.[102]

Corruption is harmful to political and public institutions in a democratic state and has a negative impact on socio-economic development, building of market economy and promotion of investment. Corruption as one of the major threats for the further development of the country had to be acknowledge by the Government of Kyrgyzstan. It was proved that corruption was widely spread in the customs and tax authorities, in the Ministry of Interior and Prosecutor Offices, judiciary, banks and financial credit system of the Kyrgyz Republic, that corruption also flourished in health sector, education and social protection. It was stated at the session of the Kyrgyz Security Council on Measures to Intensify the Fight against Corruption in the Kyrgyz Republic in March 2003, which was devoted exclusively to corruption and anti-corruption issues. It was also reported that 1522 public officials, including officers of tax and customs authorities, law enforcement agencies, social protection and licensing bodies, officials of the central and local government were brought to the court in 2001-2003. Authorities also confessed that Kyrgyzstan did not undertake any significant measures in preventing and combating corruption.

Set of measures aimed at fighting corruption within the system of public administration was adopted by Askar Akaev. In 1997 he approved a three-year state programme for increasing the fight against corruption, which was prolonged for the next three years in 2001. Moreover, in 2003 he adopted the plan on implementation of the National Strategy called "The Kyrgyz Republic – Country of Good Governance". And the UN Convention against Corruption was finally signed in December 2003.

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[102] Transparency International. The global coalition against corruption. Retrieved May 21st, 2004 (www.transparency.org)

Development strategy for fighting corruption, anticorruption preventive measures in public service and enhancement of the anticorruption regulatory and legal framework was supposed to be implemented after approval of Resolution of the Security Council No.2 of 31 March 2003, which has accepted the Implementation Plan of the National Strategy entitled "The Kyrgyz Republic – Country of Good Governance". One of the primary practical steps towards the performance of the Plan, according to the Status Report, was the formation of the National Council for Good Governance (NCGG) under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister. The main purpose of the Council is to work out and execute of tangible instruments for the formation and development of capable and competent system of public administration. In October 2004 the National Council for Good Governance was closed with intention to carry on enhancement of the state anti-corruption policy and reorganization of the activity of the Consultative Council for Good Governance (CCGG). Presidential Decree of February 2004 created instead a new organization - the Consultative Council for Good Governance. The working structure of the National Council for Good Governance - Secretariat to the National Council for Good Governance was transformed into the Secretariat to the Consultative Council for Good Governance.

Committee for Law and Order, the Fight against Crime and Corruption of the Legislative Assembly of Zhogorku Kenesh (Parliament) of the Kyrgyz Republic monitors the functioning of number of significant laws adopted by the legislative authorities. In 2003-2004 the Parliament also adopted Law on the Fight against Corruption, Law on Civil Service and Law on State Procurement. A draft Law on Access to Information, which will replace the current law, is in a process of negotiation by relevant parties (all branches of power, representatives of NGOs and business).

Unfortunately, Kyrgyzstan does not have any special acts regulating investigation of corruption-related crimes. The authorities are describing the status of criminal cases related to bribery as particularly alarming. In 2003 only 88 criminal cases against 97 persons were fully investigated and referred to court (23 cases against 26 persons by the public prosecution authorities), despite the fact that bribery is a highly latent crime. In this regard, evident difference between the actual level of corruption in the

country and the prosecution and conviction rates for bribery and corruption-related offences remains a matter of serious concern.

The information from the Status Report implies a very complex and fragmented system of detection, investigation and prosecution of corruption and corruption-related offences. Rationalisation of Kyrgyz investigative proceedings, adopted in compliance with the international human rights standards of fair trial, could be one of solutions. Kyrgyzstan should accept measures for consolidating efforts on the repressive side of in the fight against corruption as a priority.

Role of the NGOs in combating corruption in Kyrgyzstan is very important. In this regard, one of the specific recommendations of the Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Ukraine was to:

"Expand the application of permanent forms of cooperation (institutionalized councils and the like) between NGOs and the broader public on the one hand and public agencies on the other hand. Institutionalized councils where public officials are present but only NGOs/associations have voting powers are one potentially effective option for ensuring the free expression of public concerns. The decisions of such councils bear advisory character for public agencies. Develop a procedure for the permanent involvement of civil society (not only those represented by particularly active interested NGOs) in policy making." [103]

6.2.10 National/Ethnic Minorities

There were reports of discrimination in the treatment of citizens who were not ethnic Kyrgyz. Minorities alleged discrimination, including from officials at all levels, in hiring, promotion, and housing. The latest statistical data released in August reflected the following ethnic breakdown of the population: 67.4 percent Kyrgyz; 10.3 percent Russian; 14.2 percent Uzbek; 1.1 percent Dungan (ethnic Chinese Muslims); and 1 percent Uighur. Other ethnic groups, including Tatars and Germans, comprised 6.0 percent of the population.

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[103] Review of Legal and Institutional Framework for Fighting Corruption, Kyrgyz Republic. Summary of Assessment and Recommendations. Endorsed on 14 December 2004, p. 12.

Low-level authorities at times harassed and discriminated against Uighurs. Some Uighurs reported discrimination in employment and negative societal attitudes and media coverage of their community, although there was a large number of Uighur-owned small businesses that operated without harassment during the year.

In May 2004, an Uighur representative alleged that unknown persons had threatened him over the telephone and warned him to stop his work with the Radio Free Asia Uighur-language service. Since then he has reported no further threats. The threats were believed to be mostly media driven.

In December 2004, police raided houses in Osh and the Aravan and Nookat districts, where a large Uzbek community resides, following a recent grenade blast in Osh.

The Constitution designates Kyrgyz as the state language and Russian as an official language and provides for preservation and equal and free development of minority languages. Russian-speaking citizens alleged that a ceiling precluded promotion beyond a certain level in government service. They also alleged that some otherwise qualified candidates were disqualified in elections in previous years on the basis of exams, the fairness of which was questioned. The Government did not take any action on a 2002 request by ethnic Uzbeks requesting that Uzbek be granted the status of a state language. However, both Uzbek and Russian are widely used both officially and unofficially. In April, President Akayev signed a new language law requiring, among other provisions, that the President, Prime Minister, Speaker of Parliament, and a number of other unspecified public servants have proficiency in Kyrgyz. However, at the same time the President signed a decree guaranteeing certain rights of non-Kyrgyz speakers and delaying full implementation of the new law until 2015.

6.2.11 Ethnic Minorities in Kyrgyzstan during the events of March 2005

Political opposition undertook several attempts to involve ethnic minorities in the campaign against Askar Akaev. The major chosen targeted ethnic groups were Uzbeks, settled on the South of Kyrgyztan. But the overwhelming majority of protesters during the revolution were ethnic Kyrgyz, most of them inhabitants of the

South of the country, and who were traditionally oriented as more nationalists, in comparison to more multinational North of Kyrgyzstan.

First days after Akaev's defeat, ethnic minorities felt jeopardized in the capital of Bishkek. Koreans, Uighurs and Turks greatly suffered from takeover of the land and plundering. Representatives of Russian speaking population frequently entered in the conflict with ethnic Kyrgyz. Numerous occasional clashes were reported. Flyers containing claims addressed to Kyrgyz people not to buy any kind of private movable and immovable property from Russians, because they "will have to leave the country pretty soon anyway", were distributed, as it was evidenced, in the middle of April in some districts of Bishkek.

However, open hostility luckily did not flare up and such a kind of slogans and provocative clashes did not get support from the overwhelming majority of the population in the capital. Nevertheless, undoubtedly growth of nationalist attitudes was reported. Some of the new governmental top officials were much stronger nationalists than representatives of old government, although they tried to be very cautious while making their public speeches in order not to worsen the situation. Particularly, they made many attempts to reassure the Russian speaking population, while some ethnic Russians started leaving the country, being afraid of new political cataclysms and deepening of interethnic tensions and threats.

6.2.12 Research Findings and Conclusions on Kyrgyzstan

John Anderson in the article "Elections and Political Development in Central Asia" gives Guy Hermit's view that elections should be judged on the extent to which they offer freedom to voters, offer choice among candidates, and the impact on the government – either changing it or leading to amendment of its politics.[104]

Theoretically in both elections the voters were given the freedom to express their will, but in practice it turned out that the authorities could always find a way to control and manipulate the process and the results of the elections through courts and media. It

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[104] Anderson, John, "Elections and Political Development in Central Asia", *The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, 13:4, 1997, p. 28-53

would be hard to describe either of the elections as free and fair. The participation of citizens in the formation of parliament is important for improved dialogue between administrative bodies and the electorate. The most important factor for political development is how representative and accessible the parliament is. The involvement of the people in such an administrative body has great significance in terms of strengthening the links between the state and the electorate.

Each of the elections introduced something new and there was the evolution between two elections from majoritarian system in 1995 to proportional system of voting in 2000. In 1995 the parliament first time was elected as a two-chambered and in 2000 15% quota was given to the representatives of the political parties in the Legislative Assembly. Amendments to the Constitution approved through the 1996 referendum mainly concerned the powers of the parliament and had insignificant effects on the actual electoral system. The issue of parliamentary representation, by contrast, was of primary concern during the 1998 referendum. As a result of this referendum, the principles by which members are elected to both chambers of parliament have been changed. Previously, elections were held using a simple majority, "First-Past-the-Post", voting system. Deputies from each district receiving the most votes were elected. The disadvantage of such a system, however, is that the winner can be a candidate against whom the majority of people voted.

Although to official indicators, the citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic are extremely active voters unfortunately in both elections people tended to "vote out of habit", rather than out of a belief in the value of political participation. The citizens did not trust politicians and did not have a lot of confidence in their constitution. In addition, citizens did not have a lot of information available to help them make choices. This despite the seminars held before the election that were intended to help leaders of non-governmental organisations and private citizens learn more about elections and how to participate in them. Being historically nomadic people the Kyrgyz still have quite a tribal attitude to life. Tribalism is a very vital issue in Kyrgyzstan. There are six regions in the country and everyone knows from which place and tribe he or she originates exactly. Even people who have stayed for all their life in towns and cities can always name their "roots". The most crucial political division in the country is north and south. Every time when there is a political event such as elections the

whole population will be divided into those who support northerners or southerners. As soon as election results are known people can guess who will dominate in the ruling elite of the country, northerners if those elected are predominantly from the north or southerners if predominantly from the south. That is the way tribalism used to work and sometimes still works in the Kyrgyzstan.

That said, the recent events during the 2000 parliamentary elections showed some examples of overcoming the tribal links. Again the case of Feliks Kulov is interesting. Voters from Talas, the western region of the country supported him who is a northerner, from Bishkek, though he was running against a candidate who was originally from Talas region. This time people did not follow the old and often used proverb "better bad one but own than good one but strange". One would like to believe that it was one of the first steps taken to overcome the tribal attitude to politics.

After considering the results of the elections one can say that civil society is still in its very nascent stage. However the network of NGOs and their participation in the everyday life of the Kyrgyz society is becoming more active. They are leading training among the population on elections and citizen's rights in general. They are providing and involving people in socially useful activities such as women's movements, children, disabled, charities and other. According to USAID the increasing community of NGOs in Kyrgyzstan will lead to a more participatory political process. Can the increasing number of NGOs be considered as a positive fact for development of the one of the attributes of civil society? The idea about NGOs the more the better is not really useful to establish a genuine civil society as according to its main idea association of citizens should to be founded on a voluntary basis. There is a wish that establishing civil society institutions will not fail as an unsuccessful campaign.

Political parties emerging in the country can be considered as one of the forms to express electorate's disagreement with the present power. The fact that the well-known politicians decided to establish a party can be considered as a feature of a growing political awareness among the ruling elite. Feliks Kulov is a good example of this, his Ar-Namys (Dignity) Party was established to attract more supporters to his movement although he is a very famous politician among citizens' of the republic as

a "people's general". Voting for parties in the 2000 parliamentary election is the main step ahead for political life of Kyrgyzstan. Although this time people still voted for party leaders but not for parties as a representative of their political views and preferences. This can be considered as an old habit of a single-party ruling system when people had to vote for a representative of one party and there were no great changes in the rule of the country. Political parties are still in the process of maturing. In most cases they acts as movements for protection rights of their members but not as political forces that can lead the country and develop its ideology and political direction. For instance, the Women's party supported by Women's NGOs acts more as a liberation movement mostly emphasising women's problems rather than as a political party. As there are many issues, which are considered by the parliament that are not only concerned with gender: the right to ownership to land, for example. According to Almaz Chukin, former Ambassador of Kyrgyzstan to the United States of America, people should understand that the time of revolutions has finished - now it is time for evolution when we need carefully to build our prosperous future brick by brick. Based on the results of the both elections on can say that political parties are still very passive and not are very active in the political life of the country, as they have not been recognised yet by people nation-wide. People still do not see them as the main mean to express their views and wishes.

Both elections showed that the mass media are still free but have some problems from side of government to express freely their view. At the beginning of the 1990-s the freedom of speech was considered as the highest achievement of the independent Kyrgyzstan. By late 1990-s the authorities could not tolerate the freedom of statement any more. As an example we can see the history of one the main Russian speaking weekly *ResPublika*. Since 1992, the date of its establishment, the paper was the main opposition the government and the president. It was considered as an indicator of the freedom of speech in the country. In March 2000 *ResPublika* was closed. The reason was the huge fine imposed on the paper, which it could not pay. Unfortunately this example does not show developing in a positive way but rather the opposite. Hopefully the sad story of the *ResPublika* is not the logical end of the freedom of speech and the independent mass media in Kyrgyzstan.

It takes time to become politically educated. These ten years since obtaining independence were the first form in the primary school of democratic. The citizens of Kyrgyzstan have learned the alphabet that the freedom of speech and statement and the right to organize and establish voluntarily associations are vital to rule their country. People's eagerness to freedom should not allow politicians to destroy achievements obtained for first year for independence. It is right time when one can still prevent turning back to the life when only selected could speak and the rest had to follow their will. Hopefully all efforts taken by international organizations to cultivate the first seeds of civil society will not be wasted. The citizens of the republic who have once enjoyed freedom of speech and statement will not allow anyone to take it back.

7 Public Opinion Survey on Kyrgyzstan and Russia

7.1 System of Indicators

Indicator – any empirically interpreted characteristic of the research subject, emphasized in accordance with its theoretical scheme.

System of indicators – aggregate sum of interlinked characteristics of object, emphasized with relevance to its theoretical conception.

System of Indicators, introduced in Table 7.1 below, consists of several levels. The upper level (in this paper it is called *Parameters*) features the most general notions and highlights the subject domain. The second level, *Blocks of Indicators,* is more concrete but measurable directly. Its purpose is to show the direction in which the subject domain will be scrutinized. The lowest level, *Indicators,* features direct transfer to indicators that will be measured. Questions from the questionnaire serve as indicators, and possible ways of reply (promptings) are parameters.

Table 7.1 System of Indicators

№	Dimension	Blocks of Indicators	Indicators	№ of question
I	**Development of Civil Society**			
1	Level of civil society institutions' development		Satisfaction with the work of public organizations/associations	1
II	**Level of citizenry participation/public engagement in social-political life of the country**			
1	Social, political activities and engagement /integration	Political participation	Interest in politics	24
			Acquaintance with existence of public organizations in the region (and knowledge about particular organizations)	2 – 13
			Perception of dominating party in the lower chamber of the parliament (State Duma, Zogorky Kenesh)	27
			Membership in a political party	28
		Participation in other groups / organizations	Membership	25
			Time spared/frequency of engagement in group activity	26
		Church/religious activity	Relevance to church/religious public organization	42
		Activity in protecting labor rights	Membership in trade/labor union or any other professional organization	44
			Membership in professional/working council or any other governing body of organization	45
2	Perceived quality of societal institutions	Quality of political organizations / institutions	Satisfaction with the work of democratic institutions, supreme power branches and top officials in the country	14 – 23
		Quality of public/social organizations	Trust in non-political public organizations	34
		Quality of trade/labor unions	Satisfaction with the work of trade/labor unions and professional organizations	46
			Trust in trade/labor unions	47

№	Parameters	Blocks of Indicators	Indicators	№ of question
III	**Rule of Law/Good Governance**			
1	Civil and political rights	Level of corruption in judiciary	Degree of dependence of judicial system from external pressure/influence	76
			Rate of inequality in front of the law	78
		Acceptance/respect of law by citizens of the country	Acceptance/respect of law	79
			Level of tax payments	80
			Bribery and corruption	82
2	Degree of realization of personal freedoms		Freedom of expression/speech	83
			Freedom of association and assembly	35
			Freedom of elections	36
			Fairness of competition among the candidates	37
IV	**Social discrimination/oppression of minorities**			
1	Kinds of discrimination	Political	Violation of personal political rights	52
		Based on gender	Representation in the parliament	54
			Inequality in payment and employment among hired workers	72, 74
		National	Representation in the parliament	53
			Participation in political decision making	48
			Attitude towards national-ethnic minorities in society	58 – 61
		Religious	Participation in political decision making	49
		Based on age	Representation in the parliament	55, 56
		Economic	Inequality in payment and employment	72, 73

Source: Author's own design

<u>Note:</u> This system of indicators refers only to the questionnaire, since it does not use any of the hard data, used in the Chapter 3 on Measurements and Indicators. Therefore, it refers only to a subset of general data. The system of indicators for questionnaire is based on the perceptions, judgments and activities of respondents concerned. Both systems of indicators are used for analyzing and comparing two countries, Russia and Kyrgyzstan.

7.2 Description of questionnaire

The questionnaire is composed of 96 questions. These questions are equally divided into four sections covering different areas introduced in the above system of indicators. There were two separate sets of questionnaires: for Russia and Kyrgyztsan. This is because the questions like "How satisfied are you – overall – with

the democratic institutions, supreme power branches and top officials in your country?" (N 14-23), and "Whom do you consider as the "national minority" in Russia / Kyrgyzstan?" (N 57) and some other questions have different set of predefined answers. The structure of governmental institutions and ethnic-national composition in both countries is rather different and therefore was taken into account. Respondents were asked to rate various issues concerning civil society using different two to six point response scales: as very high, high, moderate, low, very low; or completely dissatisfied, mostly dissatisfied, indifferent, mostly satisfied, completely satisfied. There were also several open-ended questions like "What is democracy in your opinion?" (N 89), "What measures do you think should be taken on federal and regional levels to improve the performance of public organizations and political parties towards the better development of civil society in Russia?" (N 91) and one semi-opened question: "What is the most important in your opinion for development of stable democratic institutions?" (N 90).

In order that I could make effective comparisons over time and across two countries, the survey instrument was a pre-coded, multiple-choice questionnaire. Respondents were requested to answer all the questions. Their answers reflect their experience and perceptions of civil society institutions for their country. I was well aware that these standard questions could not capture the full complexity of civil society issues. Therefore, in addition to indicating which standard answer comes closest to describing respondents' case, they were requested to provide additional comments to better explain the situation in their country. Respondents were also requested to add comments if there occurred important changes in social-political contexts over the last five years, noting the date and nature of these changes. These comments were taken into account when I was analyzing the findings. The questionnaire was filled in by an expert who had sound experience and could answer questions on the main dimensions of civil society in the respective country for the past five years. Such an expert should have been able to complete the questionnaire in about 20 minutes. Every respondent was able to contact me, if s/he would like further clarification on the aims of the project or regarding specific questions.

7.3 Scales of Values/Measurements

The major independent variable, considered in this paper is the level of development of civil society institutions. This variable reflects the satisfaction of respondents with the development of civil society in the country of their residence. The question expressing this variable is codified in the questionnaire in such a way that it can be used for analysis without any other changes.

7.4 Level of Civil Society Institutions' Development

Public organization is the non-governmental, not-state, non-commercial organization, acting on the public basis, according to laws of the country and organizational charter. Commercial activity or profit cannot be its purpose.

Purpose of the question is to reveal a degree of satisfaction of experts with the development of institutions of civil society in view of the demographic, geographical and other factors influencing opinions of experts.

The value scale is following:

1. Completely dissatisfied   4. Mostly satisfied
2. Mostly dissatisfied   5. Completely satisfied
3. Indifferent

Correlation of this variable with other variables should be considered in this research. In order to analyze it comprehensively one should construct the variables that best reflect the core of social phenomena. Therefore, by use of the constructed system of indicators, we recodify the questions of the questionnaire in such a way, that finally receive the variables indicating namely on political participation, corruption and discrimination.

7.5 Level of citizenry participation / public engagement in social-political life of the country

1.1 Political participation

1.1.1. Degree of personal political participation

Questions N 24, 27 and 28 are used for creating the variable „Degree of personal political participation", as depicted in the following Table.

Table 7.2 Degree of personal political participation (questions N 24, 27, 28)

Interest in politics	Party Membership					
	Yes			No		
Meaning of dominating party →	Yes (it makes difference)	Little difference	No difference	Yes (it makes difference)	Little difference	No difference
Very strongly	1	1	1	2	2	2
Moderately	1	1	2	2	3	3
Indifferent, not interested at all	2	2	2	3	3	3
Negative	2	2	2	3	3	3

Absence of interest in politics means that the respondent is not trying deliberately to receive any information about the events in his country and abroad, does not watch political TV debates, does not observe or monitor the behavior of political power, etc. Presence of strong interest can be identified as participation in social and political life of the country, because *interest* is considered as indicator of participation (see Table 7.1 System of Indicators). Membership in political party justifies the participation in politics but its absence does not imply his apathy to politics. Respondent might not necessarily be a member of the party, but can be actively interested in politics, as well as to be concerned which party has a majority at the parliament (question N27). Based on this background, we constructed the scale of personal political participation of respondent in social-political life of the country. It consists of his interest in politics, membership in political party, and whether it makes any difference for him which political party has a majority at the Parliament (State Duma, Zogorky Kenesh). There are following meanings of this variable:

1. High level of political participation (active participation)
2. Moderate
3. Low

1.1.2 Acquaintance with the existence of public organizations in the region

The second variable in the block of "citizenry participation in social-political life" is "the acquaintance with the existence of public organizations in the region" which also includes knowledge about concrete organizations (questions N 2-13):

1. Unacquainted (did not mark any point and did not name any organization)
2. Abstract knowledge (marked from 1 to 5 points)
3. Concrete knowledge
   3.1. Low (named 1-3 organizations)
   3.2. Average (4-6 organizations)
   3.3. High (> 6 organizations)

1.2. Participation in public organizations

The range of existing public organizations in Russia and Kyrgyzstan is rather broad: these are veterans, youth organizations, female councils, interest and leisure groups, creative unions, sport clubs, etc. Being a member of any public organization and regularly sparing his time to the group activity, a person is getting informed on how these public organizations develop, how they function, how they are financed. Therefore he can see the "backstage life" of public associations and able to evaluate the level of their development "from inside", as introduced in the Table below:

Table 7.3 Participation in public organizations (questions №25, 26)

Members hip	Time spared/frequency of engagement in public activity			
	Every day	Once a week	Once a month	Never
Yes	1	1	2	3
Now	2	2	3	3

1. High estimation of level of development of public organizations   2. Average   3. Low

1.3 Church/religious activity

Use of question on relevance to church public organization (question №42) as an indicator of religious activity is appropriate for the same reasons.

1.4 Activity in protecting labor rights

Activity in protecting labor rights implies the membership in trade union or any other professional organization (question №44) or membership in professional/working

council or any other governing body of organization (question №45). Therefore positive reply to at least one of these questions is considered as an indicator of activity in protecting their labor rights:

1 – 2 times answer "yes" – economically active;
2 times answer "no" – not active.

2.1 Perceived quality of political organizations

2.1.1 Satisfaction with the work of democratic institutions

In order to evaluate the satisfaction with the work of democratic institutions, supreme power branches and top officials (questions №14 – 23) there is a value scale from 1 to 5 in questionnaire:

1. Completely dissatisfied
2. Mostly dissatisfied
3. Indifferent
4. Mostly satisfied
5. Completely satisfied

There is a following point system for evaluating overall satisfaction with the work of all these institutions and power branches. Every answer is assigned the number of points, that correspond to the number of the answer; then the points of answers on questions from 14 to 23 are summarized and the sum is analyzed according to the following scheme (sum of points from 10 to 50 (under condition that all questions are answered)): 10-15 – completely dissatisfied; 16-25 – mostly dissatisfied, 26-35 – indifferent, 36-45 – partly satisfied, 46-50 – completely satisfied.

Therefore, the answer „indifferent" to question №14 is assigned 3 points, "partly satisfied" 4 points, etc. For example, respondent answered "completely dissatisfied" to the half of these ten questions and "indifferent" to the rest of the questions. The overall sum of points is 20, therefore, respondent will be assigned the value "mostly dissatisfied" in the variable "Satisfaction with the work of democratic institutions".

2.2 Perceived quality of public organizations

The quality of public organizations is measured with the help of question №34 on trust to non-political public organizations. The prompting "indifferent" is not considered due to more comprehensive analysis. Therefore, the question is analyzed in the same way as it was codified in the questionnaire, except for a variant of the answer "indifferent".

1. Trust completely   2. Partly   3. Do not trust at all

2.3 Perceived quality of economic institutions

Quality of economic institutions is evaluated on the basis of two indicators – satisfaction with the work of economic institutions, namely, trade unions and other professional organizations (question N46), and trust to them (question N47). The opinion on the quality of trade unions is assigned the following meanings:

1. High quality
2. Average
3. Low

Table 7.4 Quality of economic institutions (questions №46, 47)

Satisfaction with the work of trade/labor unions and other professional organizations	Trust in trade/labor unions			
	Completely	Partly	Indifferent	Do not trust at all
Completely satisfied	1	1	1	2
Mostly satisfied	1	1	1	2
Indifferent	1	2	2	3
Mostly dissatisfied	2	3	3	3
Comletely dissatisfied	2	3	3	3

Therefore, if for example, the respondent does not trust the trade unions, but nevertheless, mostly satisfied with their work, then the quality of trade unions is average in his point of view.

7.6 Rule of Law/Good Governance

1. Civil and political human rights

1.1 Level of corruption in judiciary

The right to have a conviction and sentence reviewed in case of being convicted of a crime can be separately considered among the civil human rights (question №77). In Russia this right is declared in Constitution of 1993: „Everyone sentenced for a crime shall have the right to have the sentence reviewed by a higher court according to the procedure instituted by the federal law, and also the right to plea for clemency or mitigation punishment" (Article 50.3). Every citizen of Russia can use this right, because according to the Article 19, "all people shall be equal before the law and in the court of law" "regardless of sex, race, nationality, language, origin, property or employment status, residence, attitude to religion, convictions, membership of public associations or any other circumstance"[105]. In Kyrgyzstan's Constitution of May 5, 1993, the relevant Articles are 39.1: "A citizen charged with an offence shall be presumed innocent until he/she is found guilty by the sentence of the court, which has come into effect" and 22: "Laws of the Kyrgyz Republic on the rights and freedoms of citizens must be equally applied to all citizens and shall not bestow on anyone privileges and preferences, except those provided by the Constitution and laws for the social protection of citizens"[106].

It means that high-ranking officials and simple citizens should practice the same laws. Therefore, violation of law by both parts should be punished equally (under all equal conditions) regardless of their status (question №78).

The judiciary should be completely independent of outside pressure or influence for implementing the right on equality before the law (question №76). Questions 76 and 78 best reflect the level of corruption in judicial authorities: dependence of judicial system from any other authorities and individuals, as well as inequality in sentences with regards to persons accused, corruption and bribery among the judges. Based on

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[105] Constitution of the Russian Federation. Retrieved September 12th, 2004,
http://www.constitution.ru/10003000/10003000-4.htm;
http://www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/const/ch2.html

[106] Constitution of Kyrgyz Republic. Retrieved December 26th, 2004
http://www.kyrgyzstan.org/Law/constitution.htm#c2c

these questions I constructed a scale in the Table 7.5 that reflects the level of fairness in judiciary.

Table 7.5 Level of corruption in judiciary (questions №76, 78)

Equality/inequality in front of the law	Degree of dependence of judicial system from external pressure/influence			
	Free	Independent in most cases	Partly free	Not free
Always	1	1	2	2
In most cases	1	1	2	2
Rarely	2	2	3	3
Not at all	2	2	3	3

1. Fair
2. Partly fair
3. Unfair

1.2 Acceptance/Respect of Law by Citizens of the Country

Apart from the rule that the state should provide and guarantee the basic human and civil rights, citizens should also respect the laws of the country as well as to pay taxes. It is prohibited to bribe as well as to accept the bribes. Accordingly, the values of the questions №79, 80 and 82 are over-codified in value "acceptance/respect of law" in the following way:

Table 7.6 Acceptance/Respect of Law by Citizens of the Country (questions №79, 80, 82)

Acceptance/Respect of tax laws	Bribery/Corruption					
	Uncommon			Common		
Level of tax payments =>	Yes	Rarely	No	Yes	Rarely	No
Fully	1	1	2	2	2	2
Partly	1	2	2	2	3	3
Not at all	2	3	3	3	3	3

1. Respected completely and almost always
2. Sometimes
3. Rarely

2. Realization of freedoms/rights

Realization of civil freedoms, such as freedom of elections (questions №35 – 37) and freedom of expression/speech (question №83), is measured by constructed variable

"Degree of freedoms realization" with the values from 4 to 12. We use the same point system here as in the questions №14 – 23 (see section 2.1.1). Here are the following values:

4 – 5 points – human rights and freedoms are completely realized
6 – 10 points – partly
11 – 12 points – not realized

№ of question	Completely	Partly	No
83	1	2	3
35	1	2	3
36	1	2	3
37	1	2	3

7.7 Social Discrimination / Oppression of Minorities

Six types of discrimination are considered in this section: political, gender, national, religious, age and economic. First step is to identify if, according to the respondents' opinion, any of these types of discrimination exist in the society where he lives. Then the level of discrimination is identified in the following way: if only one (or two) type is revealed, therefore we consider that the level of discrimination in the certain region is low; if all the six types are identified, then the level of discrimination is very high. It means that many social groups are oppressed. Values of the indicator that measures the discrimination level are the following:

1 – 2 types of discrimination – low level of discrimination;
3 – 4 types – average;
5 – 6 types – high (many social groups are oppressed).

Following is the description of how each type of discrimination is assigned the value "yes" or "no".

1. Political

Political discrimination is measured by the question on violation of political rights (question №52): "Have you got any experience of your human and political rights being violated (participation in political parties, movements, meetings, processions and gatherings)?"

2. Gender

Presence of discrimination on gender basis can be identified by three questions: on rate of females in the parliament (question №54), on inequality in payment and employment among males and females (questions №72, 74). The positive answer to any of the questions №72 or 74, or answer "low" and "very low" rate of females in the parliament (question №54), enables to judge on existence of discrimination in the society, according to the respondent's opinion.

3. National

The major indicators for revealing the national discrimination in this case are questions №48 and 53. Positive answer to the question on exclusion from participation in political decision-making (№48) does not require further proof on existence of discrimination. In the opposite case we consider the answers to the question on the rate of national minorities in the parliament (№53), which are analyzed in the same ways as answers to the question №54 (see previous section). In case if even after these procedures the existence of national discrimination is not revealed, we analyze the questions on attitudes to national and ethnic minorities in the society (questions №58 - 61). At least one answer "their rights are violated" is an evidence of discrimination in the society.

4. Religious

Existence/absence of religious discrimination in the country is identified by the question №49: "Do you think that religious (confessional) groups (minorities) are excluded from the political decision-making?"

5. Based on Age

One can judge on oppression of any age group according to the answers on questions on the rate of youth (question №56) and elderly people (question №55) in the parliament. Even if one of the questions is answered as "low" or "very low" than

there is an age discrimination; other optional answers mean the absence of age discrimination.

6. Economic

Inequality in payment and employment among hired workers is an evidence of economic discrimination. Questions №72 and 73 enable to reveal the existence of such a discrimination in society: at least one positive answer is considered to be a presence of economic discrimination; two negative answers mean the absence.

7.8 Characteristics of the Information Sources

There are two conditional kinds of information sources: *target source* and *non-purpose* source of information. Target sources are created specifically for conducting a certain survey. Non-purpose sources are designed not for a specific survey, but for a broad range of users, and can be used for different purposes. This could be, for example, analysis of the newspaper articles that are issued not to be scrutinized by researchers but for getting informed the readers of certain headings in the newspapers. In this survey there will be used only target source of information – **answers to the questions of survey.**

In order to address the research objectives we conducted the analysis of materials of the sociological survey. 218 persons were questioned altogether, 110 from Russia (Novosibirsk, Novosibirsk region, Chita, Krasnoyarsk and other cities of Siberia) and 108 from Kyrgyzstan.

7.9 General Sampling Features

Almost 60% of respondents have higher education, 18,3% are undergraduates, 6,4% hold PhD or "Candidate of Science". Proportion of males and females in sampling is approximately appropriate to the parent distribution: 46,5% are males and 53,5% are females. It should be noted that the survey was conducted mostly among the people more or less having relationships to the public/civil organizations or mass-media. It

implies that these respondents have more clear ideas or understanding of these organizations, rather than other people. It was a semi-expert oriented kind of survey.

Participants of the survey were: Leading political and social scientists, leaders of public opinion, experts, analysts, rectors, professors and lecturers of the universities; Representatives of international organizations on development cooperation, foundations and diplomatic missions; High-ranking officials from the government, city and regional administration, political advisors to the governors, regional Councils of Deputies, Council of Federation and Federal Assembly; Editors-in-chief, political and economic reviewers, correspondents and journalists from the leading federal, regional, local mass media and Internet portals; Activists of non-governmental, non-commercial, educational, cultural, arts, youth, medical, sports organizations, civil movements, and church-related organizations; Heads of information agencies from the local, city, regional and federal administrations and authorities; Leaders of the major political parties and parliamentary members of local, regional and federal levels; Leaders of non-political organizations; Public and private (economic) interest groups (business companies, trade unions, associations of entrepreneurs); Public relations specialists and political technologists; Specialists of several Centers for analytical and sociological research.

Students and senior pupils were also engaged as the representatives of the most active social group of the population. Youth were 28,6% of the overall sampling. The distinctive feature of youth in comparison to other social groups is incompleteness of primary socialization, as well as those born in 1980s are the first post-soviet generation. Their socialization was influenced by confronting ideas and behavior patters, in environment of mixing cultures and shifted moral values. The opinions and attitudes of such a social group have a great practical value. Students and senior pupil are the growing generation that will be engaged in policy decision-making in a few years. That is why the development of society on great extent depends from the values they have.

Therefore the questionnaires collected from the experts-respondents are considered to have "high quality" answers.

7.10 Results of Comparative Information Analysis on Satisfaction with the Development of Civil Society in Russia and Kyrgyzstan

Statistical methods and operation of SPSS package were used to analyze the data and verify the research hypothesis that "quality" of civil society has an influence on the quality of politics. The major method is *the contingency table analysis (analysis of tables of an interlinking).*

The contingency tables are assigned through the *Crosstabs* procedure. It enables to receive the percentage distribution on groups (package provides frequencies for each table cell), to evaluate the correlation between single values of variables, and provides statistical data in order to verify working hypotheses.

In order to characterize the general intersection of non-qualitative variables, we use the *chi-square test* of the tables. Chi square is a non-parametric test of statistical significance for bivariate tabular analysis (also known as crossbreaks). Any appropriately performed test of statistical significance lets you know the degree of confidence you can have in accepting or rejecting a hypothesis. Typically, the hypothesis tested with chi square is whether or not two different samples (of people, texts, whatever) are different enough in some characteristic or aspect of their behavior that we can generalize from our samples that the populations from which our samples are drawn are also different in the behavior or characteristic.

The satisfaction with the work of public organizations is our major (dependent) variable. The quality of work of different public organizations is highly relevant to the level of democratic development. The greater the part of population satisfied with the work of these organizations, the greater the level of democratic development, because the democracy can not function without its integral elements – public organizations.

Graph 7.1 Distribution of answers to the question "How much satisfied are you – overall – with the work of non-governmental organizations ?" by countries

We can also judge about the democratic development by the public opinion: if the population speaks about the growth of civil society, then its level is really high. Therefore use of variable on satisfaction with the work of public organizations as an indicator for civil society development is justified.

The intersection of the variable "Satisfaction with the work of public organizations" proved to be significant with almost all the other variables, according the results of contingency tables. Chi-square tests are introduced in the attachment №1 only if they are >0,05.

Here is the analysis of created tables.

First we will consider the distribution of major variable. For better convenience we will recode it in reverse order for receiving the following scale:

1. Completely satisfied
2. Mostly satisfied
3. Indifferent
4. Mostly dissatisfied
5. Completely dissatisfied

Distribution of answers to the question "How satisfied are you – overall – with the work of public associations?" is presented on the graph №1. Overall, the answers of respondents both from Russia and Kyrgyzstan are divided almost equally (Fisher's

exact test p=0,553): more then one third replied as "mostly unsatisfied". 2,7% of respondents in Russia are completely satisfied with the work of public organizations; there was not such an answer in Kyrgyzstan. Nevertheless, the majority of respondents in both countries are mostly satisfied with the work of public associations (41,9% and 46,9% accordingly).

In order to increase the importance of received results, given question has been additionally recoded in a three-value scale with the following values (see Graph 7.20 in paragraph 7.15 Major Conclusions and Findings on Public Opinion Survey):

1. High (promptings "completely satisfied" and "mostly satisfied" are merged)
2. Average ("indifferent")
3. Low ("completely dissatisfied" and "mostly dissatisfied").

Distribution of answers to the question "How much satisfied are you – overall – with the work of public organizations?" enables us to compare estimations of experts from two different countries. Thus, significant similarity of expert estimations of a concrete situation in Russia and in Kyrgyzstan was revealed. For example, shares of such experts, who are completely or mostly dissatisfied with activity of public organizations, are almost identical. There are 6,8 % of respondents in Russia completely dissatisfied, in Kyrgyzstan – 6,3 %. Mostly dissatisfied with the work of public organizations in Russia are 36,5 %, in Kyrgyzstan – 37,5 % of all survey participants.

These data are extremely important for understanding the processes of democratic development on the post-soviet area, as far as it evidences the powerful "brake" in the form of negative public opinion (over 40 %) in relation to democratization of a society in both countries.

Shares of experts, mostly satisfied with the work of public organizations, are approximately equal in both countries (in Russia – 41,9 %, compared to Kyrgyzstan with 46,9 %). Thus, "indifferent" to their activity are relatively small groups (in Russia 12,2 % of respondents, and in Kyrgyzstan – 9,4 %).

Such a degree of polarization of experts' opinions about activity of public organizations is probably a consequence of deep internal contradictions in the process of democratization. This process has a strong relationship to the accelerated social differentiation of a society, improvement of social and economic position of some certain groups of the population compared to deterioration of others.

Therefore, if the further social stratification is inevitable, it can be optimized by reduction of a share "completely or mostly dissatisfied with work of public organizations" and increase in a share of those who are "mostly or completely satisfied with their activity". Which factors can influence this process? In particular, to what extent it depends from personal inclusiveness of the person in political activity ("level of political participation"), from knowledge ("awareness on existence of public organizations in the region"), from religiousness, from the social and economic activity, expressed, for example, in "activity to protect the labor rights"? The information for search of answers to these questions is represented in Graphs 7.2, 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5 (see below).

7.10.1 Level of citizenry participation / public engagement in social-political life of the country

1.1 Political participation

1.1.1 Degree of personal political participation

Interesting results are observed while considering variable of personal political participation. All those whose level of the personal political participation is considered to be high according to the constructed scales (these are people who are the party members and strongly or moderately interested in politics), are not satisfied with the work of public organizations. This statement refers both to respondents from Russia and Kyrgyzstan. It can be assumed that persons being the party members are more familiar with activity of theses parties, and therefore are not satisfied with their activity.

It should be underlined that mostly satisfied with the work of public organizations are the people moderately engaged in political participation: 57,1% in Russia and 88,9%

in Kyrgyzstan (Graph 7.2). There is almost equal number of satisfied and not satisfied with the work of public organizations (44,6% и 41,5%) among respondents from Russia who are not strongly interested in politics and are not party members (low level of personal political participation). There are 19,1% of more unsatisfied among respondents in Kyrgyzstan (52,4% against 33,3% of satisfied).

Graph 7.2 Satisfaction with the work of public organizations versus the level of personal political participation

1.1.2 Acquaintance with the existence of public organizations in the region

Relationship between the acquaintance with the existence of public organizations and satisfaction with the development of public organizations in Russia is the following. Among those who knows any popular public organizations in the region (for example, veteran associations, political parties, female councils, etc) and able to recall any names of these organizations, they are more satisfied with the work of these associations rather than those who can not name such organizations. For example, knowledge of six and more names of organizations increases the number of respondents, satisfied with the work of civil society to 12,4% in comparison to those, who know less then six organizations (38,5% and 26,1% accordingly); and declines the number of those who are unsatisfied with the development to 7,1% (53,8% and 60,9% accordingly) (Table 7.7).

Table 7.7 Satisfaction with the work of public organizations versus acquaintance with existence of public organizations in the region (Russia)

Satisfaction with the work of public organizations	Specific knowledge (number of quoted organizations' names)		Total
	1 - 5	6 and more	
High	26,1%	38,5%	30,6%
Average	13,0%	7,7%	11,1%
Low	60,9%	53,8%	58,3%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

There is a reverse situation in Kyrgyzstan: the respondents who can name up till six different public organizations are more satisfied with the work of such associations (Table 7.8).

Table 7.8 Satisfaction with the work of public organizations versus acquaintance with existence of public organizations in the region (Kyrgyzstan)

Satisfaction with the work of public organizations	Specific knowledge (number of quoted organizations' names)		Total
	1 - 5	6 and more	
High	69,2%	33,3%	50,0%
Low	30,8%	66,7%	50,0%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

1.2. Participation in other groups/organizations

As to the participation in public organizations, there is the same tendency both in Russia and Kyrgyzstan. The higher the level of respondent's participation in public life, the higher his satisfaction with the civil society development. Therefore, there are 17,9% of respondents are satisfied with the civil society development among those who have a low level of participation in public organizations, and 67,6% among those who have high level. The same can be referred to Kyrgyzstan, but the difference in curve is slighter in comparison to Russia. (Graph 7.3).

Graph 7.3 High level of satisfaction with the development of civil society Versus participation in public organizations

On the other hand, the low level of participation in public life seems to imply the low level of satisfaction with the civil society development. The number of unsatisfied respondents in Russia is 3,2 times greater than of those who are satisfied (Table 5, Appendix 1); in Kyrgyzstan these indicators are the same – 36,4% (Table 6,).

1.3 Church/religious activity

It was found that relevance to the religious public organization and respondent's satisfaction with the development of civil society institutions in Russia are related in the following way. Among those who belong to any religious organization, answers to the question on satisfaction with the work of public associations are distributed equally – by 33,3%; among those who do not belong to any religious public organization there are more "highly satisfied" and "low satisfied". Their quantity is almost equal - 45,1% and 43,7% accordingly (Graph 7.4).

**Graph 7.4 Satisfaction with the work of public organizations
versus relevance to the religious public organization (Russia)**

There is an interesting situation in Kyrgyzstan: all the respondents who belong to the religious organizations are not satisfied with the civil society development. It could be assumed that the relevance to the religious organization enables these respondents to speak about improper state of public organizations because they have evidence from their own experience. As to those respondents who do not belong to religious organizations, their distribution on rate of satisfaction is almost the same as in Russia. There is an equal number of satisfied and unsatisfied with the civil society development – 48,4% and 41,9% accordingly (Graph 7.5).

**Graph 7.5 Satisfaction with the work of public organizations
versus relevance to the religious public organization (Kyrgyzstan)**

1.4 Activity in protecting labor rights

Membership in trade union or any other professional organization is an indicator of activity in protecting labor rights. Respondents from Russia do not make any significant difference in satisfaction with the civil society development depending on the membership in professional organizations. Both members and non-members are satisfied equally (47,1% among the members of trade unions 43,9% among others), and unsatisfied (47,1% and 42,1% accordingly) (Table 9, Appendix 1).

There are some certain differences in Kyrgyzstan. Those who are not the members of any professional organization, evaluate the civil society development a little bit higher. 52,9% of them are satisfied with the civil society development against 40,0% of those who are members (Table 10, Appendix 1).

2.1 Perceived quality of political organizations

2.1.1 Satisfaction with the work of democratic institutions

According to the method, described in the Chapter 7.3. on Scales of Values/Measurements, we constructed the variable "Satisfaction with the work of democratic institutions". Its distribution is presented on the Graph 7.6.

Graph 7.6 Distribution of variable „Satisfaction with the work of democratic institutions" by countries

As far as in Kyrgyzstan there were no extreme values (completely dissatisfied and highly satisfied), the variable „Satisfaction with the work of public organizations" was re-codified in variable with three values: 1. Low satisfaction; 2. Average and 3. High. After analyzing the constructed variable in contingency with the major (dependent) variable it was found that in Russia the high level of satisfaction with the civil society development is positively related to the satisfaction with the work of democratic institutions. It means, that the highest number of highly satisfied with the civil society development (73,7%) is observed among those respondents who are more than others satisfied with the work of democratic institutions (Graph 7.7).

This highly expected result is not proved in Kyrgyzstan. The satisfaction with the civil society development even lower among the people having high satisfaction with the work of democratic institutions, rather then among those who are less satisfied.

If the data represented in Graph 7.6, evidence the significant polarization of opinions in assessment of work of public organizations, then in the answers of significant share of respondents-experts, participants of survey, such concepts as "satisfaction with the work of democratic institutions and civil society development" caused indifference and lack of interest (40,5 % - in Russia and 40,6 % in Kyrgyzstan). On one hand, these data once again confirm rather high degree of general mentality in the post-soviet space, on the other hand – illustrate, that the given concepts for the majority of the population, including significant part of experts, are too abstract. That is why they do not cause neither negative, nor positive emotions. Moreover, this indifference is accompanied by precisely expressed negative background (completely and mostly dissatisfied with the work of democratic institutions in Russia are 33,8 % out of all respondents, compared to Kyrgyzstan with 40,6 %).

What hypothetical conclusions can be drawn on the basis of these data? First of all, probably, a conclusion about rather insufficient level of development of democratic institutions. Secondly, perhaps, about unavailability or unwillingness of people to realize ideas of development of civil society. In this sense an attempt to modernize and optimize the political system in short historical terms can be turned to utopia and even lead to deeply negative consequences. For example, the growth of social

tensions, socio-political conflicts, etc. In order to prevent these negative consequences, it is important to understand a cause-and-effect relationship between satisfaction with the civil society development and satisfaction with the development of democratic institutions (see Graphs 7.7 and 7.8).

Graph 7.7 Level of satisfaction with the civil society development versus satisfaction with the work of democratic institutions

Graph 7.8 represents a very clear tendency which is relevant only to the respondents from Russia. Graphs of high and low satisfaction with the civil society development have very strong slopes and intersect (Table 13, Appendix 1, refers to this Graph). Diagrams show how strongly the satisfaction with the civil society development is changing: ascending graph (high level of satisfaction) – from 30,4% under the low level of satisfaction with the work of democratic institutions to 80,0% under complete (practically absolute) satisfaction with the work of these institutions; descending (low level of satisfaction) – from 100,0% to 20,0%.

**Graph 7.8 Satisfaction with the civil society development
versus satisfaction with the work of democratic institutions (Russia)**

2.2 Perceived quality of public organizations

Scrutinizing the Tables 14 and 15 (Appendix 1), one can make a statement that the growth of trust to public organizations leads to higher satisfaction with their work. This pattern is valid both for Russia and Kyrgyzstan. Those in Russia who completely trust to non-political public organizations, 85,7% highly evaluate the development of civil society; in Kyrgyzstan – 100,0%.

2.3 Perceived quality of economic institutions (trade unions and other professional organizations)

The variable "quality of trade unions" was constructed on the basis of two indicators – trust in the trade unions and satisfaction with their work. The established variable did not show any meaningful relationship to the dependent variable, despite of numerous over-codifications. Therefore the initial variables were analyzed separately, and it was also required to over-codify them for revealing the significant relationship. The variable "Satisfaction with the work of trade unions (and other professional organizations)" was assigned three values: 1. High (there were included two promptings – "mostly satisfied" and "completely satisfied"); 2. Average ("Indifferent") and 3. Low ("Completely dissatisfied" and "mostly dissatisfied"). All the promptings in the variable "Trust in trade unions" were renamed, and the last two were merged in such a way, that we received the following scale: 1. Highly trust (prompting

"completely trust"); 2. Average (prompting „partly trust"); 3. Low (promptings "indifferent" and "do not trust").

Referring to the Graph 7.9, one can see how satisfaction with the work of public organizations and satisfaction with the work of trade unions are correlated. Taking into account that trade unions are public organizations, one can observe quite regular dependence: the higher the satisfaction with the work of trade unions, the higher the consent with the work of public organizations in general. In Kyrgyzstan such a dependency is not observed because the cells of contingency table are not filled in and the chi-square = 0,14 > 0,05 (Table 17.1, Appendix 1).

Analyzing the importance of cause-and-effect relationships between trust in public organizations (in this given case, to trade unions) and satisfaction with their work, it was found out, that in Russia such a relationship is expressed more distinctly. At the same time, in Kyrgyzstan the direct dependence between these variables is revealed too. The important conclusion follows that it is necessary to search and apply various methods to increase the trust in public organizations in order to enhance satisfaction with their work.

Graph 7.9 Satisfaction with the work of public organizations versus satisfaction with the work of trade unions (Russia)

Graph 7.10 Satisfaction with the work of public organizations versus trust in trade unions (Russia)

There is the same dependency in the case of trust in trade unions in Russia, as concerning the satisfaction with the work of trade unions: the higher the trust, the greater the satisfaction with the work of public organizations. It should be underlined that the number of satisfied among the respondents with the high level of trust in trade unions is increasing more than in two times in comparison to those who do not trust in trade unions (56,4% and 25,0% accordingly) (Graph 7.10). In Kyrgyzstan, there is no clear dependency of considered variables again (Table 19, Appendix 1).

7.10.2 Rule of law / Good governance

1. Civil and political human rights
1.1 Level of justice and corruption in judiciary

Considering the Graph 7.11, one can notice that there is no clear dependence of the satisfaction with the civil society development from the corruption level of judiciary. Nevertheless, there are some particular relationships that can be observed: 52,2% of those, who consider the Russian judiciary unfair (or corrupted), are not satisfied with the work of public organizations, and therefore with the civil society development. On the other hand, those who consider the judiciary to be fair, are completely satisfied with the development of civil society (100,0%).

These data illustrate the general world outlook problem: the negative mass consciousness often extends on estimations of many variables connected with activity of public organizations and as a whole – with development of civil society.

Therefore one of essential factors to influence the decision of problems of democratization of a society can be creation of optimistic mood, positive public opinion, including judgment about administrative structures.

Graph 7.11 Satisfaction with the work of public organizations versus corruption level of judiciary (Russia)

There is no relationship between considered variables in Kyrgyzstan – Chi square = 0,873, that is much higher than 0,05 (Table 21.1, Appendix 1).

1.4 Acceptance / Respect of law

Every person has not only the rights but the definite duties as well. As to the implementation of these duties, and namely, laws, tax payments, the better the laws are respected, the more people are satisfied with the development of civil society in their country (Graph 7.12). Consciousness of citizens is the integral element of the civil society; civil society in its turn increases the consciousness of people and stimulates them to respect the laws.

However, it becomes evident from the Graph 7.12, that even the maximum growth of "respect of law" is not the factor automatically providing high satisfaction with the work of public associations. Most probably the implication is that the cause-and-effect relationships between these variables in different economic and socio-political conditions can become apparent in different ways. For example, in view of negative dynamics of civil society development (regress), growth of "respect of law" can be a consequence of strengthening authoritative (or dictatorial) methods of management of the country, actions on getting things put in order, etc.

Graph 7.12 Satisfaction with the work of public organizations versus acceptance / respect of law (Russia)

There is no relationship between considered variables in Kyrgyzstan again – Chi square = 0,2 (Table 23.1, Appendix 1).

2. Degree of realization of personal freedoms

Variable reflecting the degree of freedoms' realization, created on the basis of four questions of the questionnaire, is not related to the major variable (as introduced in Tables 24.1 and 25.1 (Appendix 1). The only way in which this variable can be meaningful is to use it for comparison of distributions on two countries. Looking at the Graph 7.13, one can see practically equal distribution of this variable in Russia and Kyrgyzstan. The majority of respondents consider that human freedoms are partly realized; the differences by countries are not so high.

The obtained data can be important for studying dynamics of development of a socio-political situation in these countries as a step for further research. It would be especially important to investigate, how the correlation of number of those respondents, who consider that personal freedoms are realized completely, and those who answered, that these freedoms generally do not exist at all. Currently this correlation has a higher ranking in Russia, in comparison to Kyrgyzstan.

Graph 7.13. Degree of realization of personal freedoms.

7.10.3 Social discrimination / oppression of minorities

Constructing the variables of the types of discrimination, we can compare which groups of population, according to the public opinion, are mostly discriminated in Russia, and which in Kyrgyzstan. In order to better introduce this picture, we built a graph that represents all the six types of discrimination by countries (See Graph 7.14). It should be underlined that there was no one respondent in Russia or Kyrgyzstan who would consider that there is no discrimination at all. Absolutely everybody recognized the existence of some certain types.

Graph 7.14 Existence of types of discrimination by countries (% of respondents)

It is quite evident from the graph that the most discriminated social groups both in Russia and Kyrgyzstan are the national minorities (more details see in the section on **Notion of "national minorities" in Russia and Kyrgyzstan**) and females (the questions in the questionnaire on gender discrimination are referred namely to females). Oppression of minorities is recognized by 98,7% of respondents in Russia and 85,3% in Kyrgyzstan. Discrimination of females recognized 89,3% of respondents in Russia and 88,2% in Kyrgyzstan.

The most rare types of discrimination according to the public opinion are political and religious. It should be noted that in Kyrgyzstan this happens slightly more frequently rather than in Russia: political – two times higher (30,7% and 61,8% accordingly), religious – 1,4 times higher (34,7% and 50,0%). Economic discrimination is a little bit higher in Russia (86,7%), rather than in Kyrgyzstan (73,5%). But gender discrimination is, on the contrary, slightly higher in Kyrgyzstan (82,4%), rather than in Russia (69,3%).

Based on the received types of discrimination and using the constructed scales, we created the variable "Rate of discrimination". This enables us to consider how the rate of discrimination and satisfaction with civil society development are interdependent. The major hypothesis here is following: the higher the rate of discrimination in the country, the less satisfied population with the civil society development.

Concerning Russia, Table 26 (Appendix 1) confirms this assumption: increase in the number of discriminated groups reduces the number of people satisfied with the work of public organizations. Among those who consider that the level of discrimination in Russia is on rather low level (e.g. indicated one or two types of discrimination), half of them are highly satisfied with the civil society development. Meanwhile, among those who indicated 5 or 6 types of discrimination, the number of respondents is 42,3% (Graph 7.15). On the other hand, the higher the level of discrimination, the higher the rate of people to a low extent satisfied with the civil society development. Among those in Russia who consider the discrimination level to be low, 33,3% are not satisfied with the work of public organizations. 46,2% are those who are not satisfied and considering discrimination level to be high. The number of respondents, who are

on the average level satisfied with the work of public organizations, practically does not depend on the rate of discrimination.

Using the obtained data, one can build up «the generalized portrait» of social groups which are most sharply discriminated in a different ways, both in Russia and Kyrgyzstan. In general, these are women of an average and senior age, belonging to the national minorities, and experiencing significant economic (material) difficulties (in many cases, unemployed). In Kyrgyzstan this "portrait" should be undoubtedly supplemented with essential types of discrimination in the sphere of politics and religion. The probability that these social groups are least satisfied with the development of civil society in their country, is high. These groups evaluate the work of public associations depending on extent the association can help to solve the problems relevant to discrimination.

Graph 7.15 Satisfaction with the work of public organizations (high, average, low) versus discrimination rate

There is completely different tendency in Kyrgyzstan: the growth of discrimination level increases the rate of respondents satisfied with the work of public organizations. In other words, the more social groups are discriminated, the higher the satisfaction with the civil society development. If under the low level of discrimination none of the respondents was satisfied with the work of public organizations, then under high level those are 63.2%. But such a result can not be considered as valid because the significance level of chi square (equal to 0,181) means that the received correlations could be mistaken, casual with the likelihood of 18,1% (Table 27.1, Appendix 1)!

7.11 Interpretation of the term „Democracy" by respondents in Russia and Kyrgyzstan

Materials of the social surveys always make us to think about unexpected facts, new dependencies and correlations. But this is partly normal, because our life is always brighter and more diverse than insights about it; it has more variety that all the perfect definitions, concepts, and particularly, preliminary programs and research projects.

That is why, in order to inquire what people understand by the terms "civil society" and "democracy" we scrutinized the answers to the open-end question "What is democracy in your opinion?", which is directed to reveal the perceptions of people in Russia and Kyrgyzstan.

The procedure of analysis was performed in the following way. First stage was to review all the variants of reply to the Question 89 and to reveal the most frequently met key words. The key words were merged in five blocks by principle of similarity of meanings. These blocks were assigned the numbers, which were used to codify the information in each questionnaire. The answers of respondents were divided into five blocks on the basis of highlighted key words such as equality, freedom, laws, etc. Since the question was open (without promptings), the definitions of democracy sometimes had mixed character (respondents could give the definitions containing several key words), e.g. with reference to different blocks. That is why in the tables of division of answers to this question (column of Perception) the total sum is more than 100% (Tables 1 and 2, Appendix 2).

Now we will consider in details what people in Russia and Kyrgyzstan understand by "democracy".

Two answers, which are more popular and the most frequent, coincided in both countries, but received slightly different number of replies. More than half of respondents in Russia (53,8%) and in Kyrgyzstan (56,7%) consider that democracy is a freedom of choice, of expression, of actions (and other freedoms), achievement

of their rights (Graph 7.16). Most probably, the meaning of it is that the state should provide the achievement of rights and freedoms to its citizens. In addition, most of the respondents pointed out that the freedom is inseparably linked with the responsibility for their actions ("freedom that bears the responsibility", "personal responsibility for their choice", "freedom of choice linked to the law compliance by all the citizens"). More than one third of respondents in Russia (35,4%) and almost the half in Kyrgyzstan (46,7%) consider that democracy implies participation of people in governing by the state. Most frequently they express it with the words „authority of the people". The most rare version of reply is "infinity, lawlessness, illegality, anarchy". This reply was given by 4,6% of respondents in Russia and 3,3% - in Kyrgyzstan. The distribution of other options of reply differs by countries. Almost equal number of replies in Russia are in the blocks of "Equality" and "Laws" (12,3% and 15,4% accordingly). In Kyrgyzstan, there are 3,3% for „Equality" and 36,7% are for the „Laws" and adherence to them.

Graph 7.16 Distribution of variable „Democracy"

Below we introduce the most specific answers according to their classification. It enables us to better understand the whole spectrum of the public opinion concerning identification of the term of democracy. It explains what does the name of each block imply (the style of answers is preserved; there are some editorial drafts only).

7.11.1 Russia

Equality
- Mechanism providing equal rights to all the categories of population, inhabiting the territory of the country

Power of people, participation in decision-making
- Power of people, free will of people, consideration the peoples' opinion by the authorities
- Ability to delegate the power of the people to the competent persons, who understand the development of different trends in the society
- Model of the development in a society, where a maximum number of people are able to influence the life of society by means of democratic institutions

Freedom of choice, actions, achieving ones rights, responsibility
- Freedom of everybody, limited only by the freedom of others
- Type of state structure where the rights and freedoms of people are achieved to the maximum
- Freedom that bears (implies) the responsibility
- Freedom to choose the life position, right on education, employment and health care. Worthy life of free person (not oppressed or humiliated)

Lawlessness, illegality, anarchy
- "Democracy in our country is the complete infinity and anarchy"
- „Take away everything and divide"

Fair laws, adherence to the laws, fairness
- Dictatorship of the law
- Adherence to the laws, even if they are not always perfect; discipline, obligatory for everything
- Rule of law

Mixed answers
- Equality of freedoms and responsibilities for all citizens

- Freedom and equality of the citizens in front of the law. Laws adequate to the modern situation in the country and in the world

Other answers (that do not fit to the classification)
- Idealized idea on the system of state governance
- Possibility to improve the life of the people in a civilized way, in compliance with the international law and liberal Western values
- The right of people to participate in the most important decision-making (for example, by referendum). Meanwhile, free will of citizens does not imply the "complete" freedom of actions. There should be some key measures to influence the society in order to avoid the anarchy.

7.11.2 Kyrgyzstan

Power of the people, participation in decision-making
- Right of the people to influence the politics by means of free choice of their governors in the power branches
- Permanent participation of every citizen in the state governance (decision-making) with all the appropriate rights and obligations
- Not only the right to express the opinion but also to be heard by those who make the decisions. Decisions should consider the interests of all the social groups; the rule of law is equal to any citizen regardless of status

Freedom of choice, actions, achievement of ones rights, responsibility
- Freedom plus responsibility
- Freedom of speech; rights of simple citizens are above all. Officials are the servants of the people.
- Freedom in social-political relations and responsibility in front of the society and personality

Lawlessness, illegality, anarchy
- Pressure upon the simple people

Fair rules, adherence to law, fairness

- Rule of law. Everybody, from president to the simple citizen should respect the law
- To live in compliance with the law and to be responsible for making decisions

Overall, many respondents named not only one but several key words, as it is reflected in the classification of the blocks. It implies that democracy is a complex notion that includes multiple elements, necessary for its development. The most comprehensive, in our view, definition of democracy gave the respondent from the OSCE in Kyrgyzstan:

> "Democracy is power of the people, a political system where the legitimacy of exercising power stems from the consent of the people and the power of the leaders is checked and restrained; representative institutions based on free elections, which provide a procedural framework for the delegation of power by the people; competitive parties, in which the ruling majority respects and guarantees the rights of minorities; and civil liberties, such as freedoms of speech, press, association, and religion."

It should be emphasized, that the received picture of understanding and interpreting the term of "democracy" in many cases does not coincide with an estimation of its level, stage and development. Moreover, the word "democracy" in mass consciousness has received a negative perception due to the circumstance that "democratization of the society" during last years took place on a background of various types of discrimination, growth of criminality, an aggravation of social problems, etc. Therefore the attitude of people to establishment of civil society in many respects is connected with expectation of overcoming these negative "consequences of democratization".

7.12 Measures to be Taken for the Civil Society Development

Highlighting the key words and expressions, in the same way, as with the analysis of the term "democracy", we classified the answers to the Question 91 "What measures do you think should be taken on federal and regional levels to improve the performance of public organizations and political parties towards the better development of civil society in Russia?" We do not provide here the division of

answers by percents, because not all the respondents could provide the specific recommendations that could promote the civil society development. Our objective is to identify the possible options of action, proposed by the respondents and to see whether and how the power branches would follow them or not. As far as many answers from both countries are identical (e.g. appropriate both for Russia and Kyrgyzstan), here we provide the joint classification of answers (the style of answers is preserved; there are some editorial drafts only).

Financing, support

- Assistance in financing the public organizations
- Provision of informational and financial support
- Offering financial support for successful activity
- Betterment of support for small business
- Solve the issue on financial support. But there should be such a mechanism that prevents abuse and does not serve for enrichment of particular concerned persons
- State financial support for political parties, movements and those who participate in elections
- Increase of financing, stronger control (accountability) on state spendings

Legal measures (creation and adherence)

- Laws that provide more freedom to public organizations
- To stimulate the entrepreneurs (by favorable laws) to support the public organizations
- Full adherence to existing laws
- To make the laws work but not remain just on the paper
- Undated laws on public organizations that provide more freedom, and therefore more space for effective activity of NGOs
- At the first stage, to create the laws that could help the United Nations, parties and their activity
- Adherence to accepted laws regardless of the social status of the person
- Discussion of the laws in the process of acceptance
- Laws that comply with the legal standards of the developed countries of the world
- Adopt the appropriate laws that create the conditions for progressive and effective functioning and growth of these organizations

- Control over the implementation of the acting normative and legal acts that enforce the interaction of power branches with the public organizations

Tax concessions, privileges

- Tax concessions to the donor-organizations
- Exempt of the sponsorship support from the taxes under the condition of having the objective information on public good from activity of organizations that receive support
- Reduction and simplification of taxation
- To provide economic privileges (for public organizations and political parties)

Elimination of corruption

- Reduce the level of discrimination and corruption on all the levels of power
- Strong pressure from the civil society and concerned citizens to promote reforms and get rig of corruption
- Get rig of corruption from the life of society

Creation of unified organization

- Create the „House of Public Organizations"; unify spited civil movements around the specific issues. This would make movements more significant
- Create organization that embraces all the public organizations

Delegation of power

- Give more power to the public local authorities
- Attract public organizations to participation in elections, and partly share the power with governmental structures

To give more attention to the public organizations

- Active dialog, understanding the problems of public organizations, work in informational field
- More consideration and support for public opinion
- Give more attention to public organizations
- Support the development of public organizations; not ignore but consider their opinion

- More attention to patriotic education

- Political parties should have a compromise with public organizations

- Consider the interests of the most possible number of social groups

Weaken the pressure, give more freedom to the public organizations

- It is necessary to weaken the pressure on these organizations

- Provide them with the workable mechanisms to influence the authorities

- Not interfere in the affairs (business) of NGOs

- More freedom of speech

- Freedom in formation of public organizations

- Stop interfering and persecute public organizations

- Stop persecutions and repressions!!!

- Provide the background (environment) for such organizations, give them possibilities to develop themselves and the society

- It is necessary that public organizations and political parties are recognized by the state; they should have the right to access and to apply to the top power branches

Active participation of public organizations in life of the country

- Public organizations should more actively participate in the life of the regions, create public councils under the governmental bodies (city administrations, etc.), learn (accept) more the democratic procedures. First of all, the initiative should come from the public organizations.

- Reinforced work of NGOs, political parties and mass-media towards the population with objective to highlight two capacities of citizen: taxpayer and voter

Social partnership

- Development of social partnership between the subjects of civil society, local authorities and the state power

- Increase the partnership between the sponsors (donors)

Political measures

- Separate parties from the president

- Conduct decentralization of the Moscow's power

- Restore the possibility for parties to participate in elections by party lists

- Measures to support institutionalization of parties

- Hold fair election

- Fair elections

All these proposals on how to develop civil society and democracy are rather approximate, but probably they can show the right direction to move forward. Governments of both countries could accept them as the guidelines for action as far as propositions of people reflect their opinions and incentives. One of the respondents replied: "I do not believe that democracy can be "established" from above or over the ocean!" Therefore, "without awareness by the society itself of the necessity for such a civil society none of the measure from above will be helpful".

7.13 Conditions for Development of Stable Democratic Institutions

Now we will consider the problems of development for stable democratic institutions. For this purpose, based on the question №90 we built the graphs that reflect the conditions necessary for development of stable democratic institutions (according to the public opinion). The question "What is the most important, in your opinion, for development of stable democratic institutions?" is partly open, because in addition to the choice of already existing three options of reply, respondent could also write his own answer. As in the previous question on civil society development, respondents could provide several answers. Therefore the total sum is exceeding 100% in the column Percent of Tables 3 and 4 (Appendix 2).

With reference to the graphs, the following conclusions can be drawn. The majority of respondents considers that there should be, first of all, free and fair elections for promoting the development of civil society institutions. 74,6% of respondents from Russia and 90,9% from Kyrgyzstan expressed this opinion. Another not less important condition for both countries is the freedom of speech: 50,8% of respondents from Russia and 87,9% from Kyrgyzstan marked this point. In spite of the fact, that constitutional courts rank the last place on the share of respondents who marked this point, one should not conclude that this condition is not important. This is because rather big number of respondents marked this option: every third in Russia and every second in Kyrgyzstan. The results are introduced in Graph 7.17:

Graph 7.17 Distribution of variable "Conditions for development of stable democratic institutions"

Concerning the open-end promptings (answers), the replies were identical to those on the measure of effective civil society development. The explanation here is that the terms "democracy" and "civil society" in public perception are tightly interlinked. Therefore the conditions for development of both of them should be similar. We do not list here the received answers because they are described comprehensively in the previous section on *"Measures to be taken for the civil society development"*.

According to the survey results, the above-mentioned conditions of development of stable democratic institutes are estimated a little bit more modestly in Russia, in comparison to Kyrgyzstan. Probably, this is relevant to the fact that Russia has passed a much longer way of socio-political and economic transformations. Therefore the opinion of the Russian experts is more realistic at this point.

7.14 Perception of the Term "National Minorities" in Russia and Kyrgyzstan

In order to concretize the term "national minorities" we will consider more closely the Question N57: What do you consider as the "national minority"? The perception of this term in both countries can not be similar because of the different ethnic and

national composition and various migration processes. Therefore we will analyze this question separately for Russia and Kyrgyzstan.

40,8% of respondents in Russia by „national minorities" understand the representatives of national autonomies (Tatarstan, Bashkiria, etc) or representatives of non-Russian population, that do not have national autonomy on the territory of Russia (Table 7.9, and Graph 7.18). One third of respondents in Russia implies by national minorities the illegal migrants from China, Korea, Vietnam, etc (33,8%) and refugees (32,4%), a quarter of respondents – migrants of indigenous nationalities from the CIS countries (25,4%).

Table 7.9 Distribution of answers to question
"Whom do you consider as the "national minority" in Russia?"

"National minority" in Russia	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
1. Representatives of national autonomies (Tatarstan, Bashkiria, etc) or representatives of non-Russian population, that don't have national autonomy in Russia	40,8%	24,4%	24,4%
2. Russian speaking population living in national autonomies	21,1%	12,6%	37,0%
3. Forced Russian speaking migrants from the CIS (Central Asia, Caucasus)	14,1%	8,4%	45,4%
4. Migrants of indigenous nationalities from the CIS	25,4%	15,1%	60,5%
5. Illegal migrants from other countries (China, Korea, Vietnam etc)	33,8%	20,2%	80,7%
6. Refugees	32,4%	19,3%	100,0%
Total	167,6%	100,0%	

Graph 7.18 Distribution of answers to question "Whom do you consider as the "national minority" in Russia?"

The majority of respondents in Kyrgyzstan (65,6%) consider other nationalities (than Kyrgyz) permanently living in Kyrgyzstan as national minorities (Table 7.10 and Graph 7.19). 28,1% of respondents there consider refugees and one fifth referred to migrants of indigenous nationalities from the CIS and Russians (by 21,9% accordingly).

Table 7.10 Distribution of answers to question "Whom do you consider as the "national minority" in Kyrgyzstan?"

"National minority" in Kyrgyzstan	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
1. Russians	21,9%	12,7%	12,7%
2. Russian-speaking population	15,6%	9,1%	21,8%
3. Other nationalities permanently living in Kyrgyzstan	65,6%	38,2%	60,0%
4. Migrants of indigenous nationalities from the CIS	21,9%	12,7%	72,7%
5. Illegal migrants from other countries (China, Korea, Vietnam etc)	18,8%	10,9%	83,6%
6. Refugees	28,1%	16,4%	100,0%
Total	171,9%	100,0%	

Graph 7.19 Distribution of answers to question
"Whom do you consider as the "national minority" in Kyrgyzstan?"

Distinctions in answers to this question in Russia and Kyrgyzstan imply that in mass consciousness the new attitude to the so-called "national question" is actively formed. Internationalism is receding into the background, and the national consciousness, connected with realization of national interests of these countries is gradually put in the forefront.

7.15 Major Conclusions and Findings on Public Opinion Survey

- The structure of satisfaction with the work of public organizations in Russia and Kyrgyzstan is similar: the number of satisfied and unsatisfied respondents is practically equal in both countries. The conclusions and findings are introduced in the Graph 7.20:

Graph 7.20 The structure of satisfaction with the work of public organizations in Russia and Kyrgyzstan

- The level of respondent's participation in politics is linked to the satisfaction with the civil society development in the following way. None of those, whose level of personal political participation is considered to be high, is satisfied with the work of public organizations, and therefore, with the civil society development in overall. The highest satisfaction experience those who moderately participate in political life of the country. This conclusion refers to both countries.

- The higher the level of respondent's participation in social life (measured by membership in public organizations and time spared / frequency of engagement in group activity) the higher his satisfaction with the civil society development.

- The link between satisfaction with civil society development and satisfaction with the work of democratic institutions is ambiguous. In Russia the high level of satisfaction with civil society development is positively linked to the satisfaction with the work of democratic institutions. E.g. the greatest number of highly

satisfied respondents (73,7%) with the civil society development is observed among those who are mostly satisfied with the work of democratic institutions, and the least number (28,0%) – among those who are not satisfied with the work of democratic institutions. There is no direct or clear interdependence of these variables in Kyrgyzstan.

- Trust in different public organizations is also of great importance. The higher the trust, the greater the satisfaction with their work, accordingly. This tendency is observed only in Russia.

- The dependence of satisfaction with civil society development from the degree of corruption in judiciary is revealed in the following aspects. All the respondents from Russia who consider the Russian judiciary to be fair, e.g. not corrupted, are completely satisfied with the civil society development. Among those who consider this system to be corrupted, only 39,1% are satisfied. Therefore there is an inverse negative relationship between the level of corruption in the country and civil society development. This conclusion does not apply to Kyrgyzstan.

- The higher the discrimination level, the greater the number of people who are not satisfied with the civil society development. This conclusion is applicable only to Russia, as far as the significant linkages between the variables "Satisfaction with the civil society development" and "Rate of discrimination" in Kyrgyzstan are not observed. Therefore the hypothesis on linkage between the level of discrimination and civil society development can be proved only partly (in Russia).

8 Conclusions

8.1 Discussion

The notion of civil society is gaining increasing attention in the new millennium. The growth of civil society organizations with autonomy from the state is interpreted variously as a measure of the social richness and depth of a society, as a nostalgic retrieval of some 'golden age' community, as a utopian progression towards increasing private freedoms secured against public expressions of power, as a sign of chaos caused by competing interest groups, or as a move towards more synergetic governance through active partnerships and shared responsibilities between state and society. The concept itself, however, raises many questions. What precisely is civil society, and is it a useful descriptive, prescriptive, or critical concept for thinking about all societies that participate inescapably in the dynamics of globalization? Conversely, what are the implications of the often unavoidably international or transnational dimensions of civil society itself? How much influence should organizations, which are not elected and possibly represent a narrow interest group, have on state policy? Does concentrating on the notion of civil society, rather than upon state policy, enable us to see history in a new light? How do contemporary civil society organizations relate to older, more informal conceptions of community? Does the concept itself limit the frontiers of, indeed set up obstacles to, what civil society organizations can be or what they can do?

8.2 Summary

The overall objective of the study was to digest the relevant literature and distil a conceptual framework, which is useful for research purpose. The purpose of this study was to give a theoretically informed diagnosis of Russia and Kyrgyzstan with respect to the development of civil society:

- The respective state of affairs,
- The path to this state,
- The assessment of stability, problems etc.
- The prospects.

The study was conducted on both theoretical and empirical levels. Furthermore, cross-national comparison made an added value to this research, as far as the results can be used for comparison across the survey countries, e.g. Kyrgyzstan and Russia.

Chapter 2 provided the general discussion on civil society, literature review and conceptualization. Chapter 3 established the system of measurements and indicators used in this research. Chapter 4 introduced the theoretical framework for explaining different problems of civil society. To overcome the complexity around the term of civil society, this study was concentrated and limited to NGOs in order to examine what role the NGOs play in overcoming the corruption and discrimination. Chapter 5 represented the method used for data collection throughout the field research and evaluation afterwards. Chapter 6 provided the empirical evidence from both countries, Kyrgyzstan and Russia. Chapter 7 is about the public opinion survey conducted in these countries and its results.

8.3 Conclusions

Since the breakdown of the USSR, during the last 15 years, significant progress was demonstrated by the NGOs of Russia and Kyrgyzstan toward the highly desirable goal of sustainability, compared to other countries (like Tajikistan or Moldavia) where the situation is much more discouraging and far from stability. However, they are still far from achieving permanent influence and popular recognition, even in the areas where the NGOs have reached the most remarkable results (like human rights, ecological, antimilitary movements). The study shows that NGOs have potential to contribute to sustainability, to distribute and implement the best practices, to enforce coherence between their programs and policy implications, to provide more effective services to the target groups of the society.

At the same time, prospects for NGOs are more closely associated with the reality of current problems, particularly for democracy and human rights groups that often serve as the courageous and locally underestimated forefront of the NGOs sector, would be a significant step forward. The encouraging popular democratic movements and revolutions in Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine and Georgia along with a number of promising

innovations rising from the ranks of NGOs across the whole area of the former Soviet Union represent a dramatic reminder that the NGO sector is a resilient, vibrant, influential and potentially stable source of power helping to shape the development of these societies in transition.

One of the most important problems for the NGOs in Russia and Kyrgyzstan is their financial sustainability. This problem is more complicated and difficult to solve in provincial cities and those which are located in the Eastern part of Russia and in the Southern part of Kyrgyzstan. Those NGOs that have been most successful in solving their financial problems have involved a set of legal instruments that enable NGOs to have greater chances to modify their funding bases according to their organizational demands. Their success also to great extent depends on international financial support rather than on local assistance from the government or other sources of income. Authorities, in cooperation with NGOs, should seek for the various possible sources of NGO's income in order to promote the transformation of NGO sectors to better financial sustainability. Raised issues should comprise promotion of greater opportunities for charity, but also enhanced strategy for government funding and special attention to repeatedly disregarded and neglected spheres, such as encouragement of volunteerism.

The model of civil society and its function in determining the steps made by Russia and Kyrgyzstan continues to develop over time. Impact that civil society and NGOs have played in these countries was conceptualized and evaluated by many significant books and articles. These publications represent a practical guideline and strong interest for both academic and political circles. The issues presented there are of international importance, as the works here make clear, and the challenge for practitioners in the CIS area will be to agree on the common strategically line, namely, on how to apply and adjust the lessons learned to local conditions and environment.

9 Appendices

Appendix 1

1.2 Political Participation
1.1.1 Degree of personal political participation

Table 1. Contingency square/table "Satisfaction with the work of public organizations" and "Degree of personal political participation" (Russia)

Satisfaction with the work of public organizations	Degree of personal political participation			Total
	High	Average	Low	
High		57,1%	44,6%	44,6%
Average			13,8%	12,2%
Low	100,0%	42,9%	41,5%	43,2%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Table 2. Contingency square/table "Satisfaction with the work of public organizations" and "Degree of personal political participation" (Kyrgyzstan)

Satisfaction with the work of public organizations	Degree of personal political participation			Total
	High	Average	Low	
High		88,9%	33,3%	46,9%
Average			14,3%	9,4%
Low	100,0%	11,1%	52,4%	43,8%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

1.1.2 Acquaintance with existence of public organizations in the region

Table 3. Contingency square/table "Satisfaction with the work of public organizations" and "Abstract Acquaintance" (Russia)

Satisfaction with the work of public organizations	Abstract Acquaintance (number of organizations' names)		Total
	0	>0	
High	24,2%	61,0%	44,6%
Average	21,2%	4,9%	12,2%
Low	54,5%	34,1%	43,2%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Table 4. Contingency square/table "Satisfaction with the work of public organizations" and "Abstract Acquaintance" (Kyrgyzstan)

Satisfaction with the work of public organizations	Abstract Acquaintance (number of organizations' names)		Total
	0	>0	
High	42,9%	75,0%	46,9%
Average	7,1%	25,0%	9,4%
Low	50,0%		43,8%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

1.2 Participation in other groups / organizations

Table 5. Contingency square/table "Satisfaction with the work of public organizations" and "Degree of participation in other groups / organizations" (Russia)

Satisfaction with the work of public organizations	Degree of participation in other groups / organizations			Total
	High	Average	Low	
High	67,6%	36,4%	17,9%	43,8%
Average		18,2%	25,0%	12,3%
Low	32,4%	45,5%	57,1%	43,8%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Table 6. Contingency square/table "Satisfaction with the work of public organizations" and "Degree of participation in other groups / organizations" (Kyrgyzstan)

Satisfaction with the work of public organizations	Degree of participation in other groups / organizations			Total
	High	Average	Low	
High	60,0%	50,0%	36,4%	48,3%
Average			27,3%	10,3%
Low	40,0%	50,0%	36,4%	41,4%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

1.3. Church / Religious Activity

Table 7. Contingency square/table "Satisfaction with the work of public organizations" and "Relevance to religious public organization" (Russia)

Satisfaction with the work of public organizations	Relevance to religious public organization		Total
	Yes	No	
High	33,3%	45,1%	44,6%
Average	33,3%	11,3%	12,2%
Low	33,3%	43,7%	43,2%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Table 8. Contingency square/table "Satisfaction with the work of public organizations" and "Relevance to religious public organization" (Kyrgyzstan)

Satisfaction with the work of public organizations	Relevance to religious public organization		Total
	Yes	No	
High		48,4%	46,9%
Average		9,7%	9,4%
Low	100,0%	41,9%	43,8%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

1.4 Economic Activity (Activity in Protecting Labor Rights)

Table 9. Contingency square/table "Satisfaction with the work of public organizations" and "Membership in trade/labor union or any other professional organization" (Russia)

Satisfaction with the work of public organizations	Membership in trade/labor union or any other professional organization		Total
	Yes	No	
High	47,1%	43,9%	44,6%
Average	5,9%	14,0%	12,2%
Low	47,1%	42,1%	43,2%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Table 10. Contingency square/table "Satisfaction with the work of public organizations" and "Membership in trade/labor union or any other professional organization" (Kyrgyzstan)

Satisfaction with the work of public organizations	Membership in trade/labor union or any other professional organization		Total
	Yes	No	
High	40,0%	52,9%	46,9%
Average	13,3%	5,9%	9,4%
Low	46,7%	41,2%	43,8%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

2.1 Perceived Quality of Public Organizations
2.1.1 Satisfaction with the work of democratic institutions

Table 11. Contingency square/table "Satisfaction with the work of public organizations" and "Satisfaction with the work of democratic institutions" (Russia)

Satisfaction with the work of public organizations	Satisfaction with the work of democratic institutions			Total
	Low	Average	High	
High	28,0%	41,4%	73,7%	45,2%
Average		27,6%	5,3%	12,3%
Low	72,0%	31,0%	21,1%	42,5%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

a COUNTRY = Russia

Table 12. Contingency square/table "Satisfaction with the work of public organizations" and "Satisfaction with the work of democratic institutions" (Kyrgyzstan)

Satisfaction with the work of public organizations	Satisfaction with the work of democratic institutions			Total
	Low	Average	High	
High	58,3%	41,7%	50,0%	50,0%
Average		16,7%		6,7%
Low	41,7%	41,7%	50,0%	43,3%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Table 13. Contingency square/table "Satisfaction with the work of public organizations" and "Satisfaction with the work of democratic institutions" (Russia)

Satisfaction with the work of public organizations	Satisfaction with the work of democratic institutions					Total
	Completely dissatisfied	Mostly dissatisfied	Indifferent	Partly satisfied	Mostly satisfied	
High		30,4%	41,4%	71,4%	80,0%	45,2%
Average			27,6%	7,1%		12,3%
Low	100,0%	69,6%	31,0%	21,4%	20,0%	42,5%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

2.2 Perceived Quality of Public Organizations

Table 14. Contingency square/table "Satisfaction with the work of public organizations" and "Trust in non-political public organizations" (Russia)

Satisfaction with the work of public organizations	Trust in non-political public organizations			Total
	Completely trust	Partly trust	Do not trust at all	
High	85,7%	42,2%	33,3%	43,8%
Average		11,1%	19,0%	12,3%
Low	14,3%	46,7%	47,6%	43,8%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Table 15. Contingency square/table "Satisfaction with the work of public organizations" and "Trust in non-political public organizations" (Kyrgyzstan)

Satisfaction with the work of public organizations	Trust in non-political public organizations			Total
	Completely trust	Partly trust	Do not trust at all	
High	100,0%	47,8%		46,9%
Average		4,3%	40,0%	9,4%
Low		47,8%	60,0%	43,8%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

2.3 Perceived Quality of Economic Institutions

Table 16. Contingency square/table "Satisfaction with the work of public organizations" and "Satisfaction with the work of trade unions" (Russia)

Satisfaction with the work of public organizations	Satisfaction with the work of trade unions			Total
	High	Average	Low	
High	68,4%	38,5%	32,1%	43,8%
Average	10,5%	26,9%		12,3%
Low	21,1%	34,6%	67,9%	43,8%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Table 17. Contingency square/table "Satisfaction with the work of public organizations" and "Satisfaction with the work of trade unions" (Kyrgyzstan)

Satisfaction with the work of public organizations	Satisfaction with the work of trade unions			Total
	High	Average	Low	
High	100,0%		44,0%	48,4%
Average			8,0%	6,5%
Low		100,0%	48,0%	45,2%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Table 17.1 Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	6,932	4	,140
Likelihood Ratio	9,220	4	,056
Linear-by-Linear Association	2,259	1	,133
N of Valid Cases	31		

Table 18.Contingency square/table "Satisfaction with the work of public organizations" and "Trust in trade unions" (Russia)

Satisfaction with the work of public organizations	Trust in trade unions			Total
	High	Average	Low	
High	56,4%	36,8%	25,0%	44,6%
Average	7,7%	31,6%		12,2%
Low	35,9%	31,6%	75,0%	43,2%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Table 19. Contingency square/table "Satisfaction with the work of public organizations" and "Trust in trade unions" (Kyrgyzstan)

Satisfaction with the work of public organizations	Trust in trade unions			Total
	High	Average	Low	
High	66,7%	12,5%	50,0%	48,4%
Average		25,0%		6,5%
Low	33,3%	62,5%	50,0%	45,2%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

III Rule of Law/ Good Governance
1. Civil and Political Rights
1.1 Level of corrultion in judiciary

Table 20. Contingency square/table "Satisfaction with the work of public organizations" and "Level of corruption in judiciary" (Russia)

Satisfaction with the work of public organizations	Level of corruption in judiciary			Total
	Fair	Partly fair	Unfair	
High	100,0%	33,3%	39,1%	44,4%
Average		27,8%	8,7%	12,5%
Low		38,9%	52,2%	43,1%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Table 21. Contingency square/table "Satisfaction with the work of public organizations" and "Level of corruption in judiciary" (Kyrgyzstan)

Satisfaction with the work of public organizations	Level of corruption in judiciary			Total
	Fair	Partly fair	Unfair	
High	50,0%	66,7%	47,6%	51,7%
Average			9,5%	6,9%
Low	50,0%	33,3%	42,9%	41,4%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Table 21.1Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	1,231	4	,873
Likelihood Ratio	1,745	4	,783
Linear-by-Linear Association	,093	1	,761
N of Valid Cases	29		

1.2 Acceptance / Respect of Law

Table 22. Contingency square/table "Satisfaction with the work of public organizations" and "Acceptance / Respect of Law" (Russia)

Satisfaction with the work of public organizations	Acceptance / Respect of Law			Total
	Respected completely (or almost always)	Sometimes	Rarely	
High	60,0%	42,5%	35,3%	44,4%
Average	6,7%	15,0%	11,8%	12,5%
Low	33,3%	42,5%	52,9%	43,1%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Table 23. Contingency square/table "Satisfaction with the work of public organizations" and "Acceptance / Respect of Law" (Kyrgyzstan)

Satisfaction with the work of public organizations	Acceptance / Respect of Law			Total
	Respected completely (or almost always)	Sometimes	Rarely	
High	80,0%	50,0%		48,3%
Average		10,0%	25,0%	10,3%
Low	20,0%	40,0%	75,0%	41,4%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Table 23.1 Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	5,990	4	,200
Likelihood Ratio	7,943	4	,094
Linear-by-Linear Association	4,248	1	,039
N of Valid Cases	29		

2. Realization of freedoms / rights

Table 24. Contingency square/table "Satisfaction with the work of public organizations" and "Realization of freedoms / rights" (Russia)

Satisfaction with the work of public organizations	Realization of freedoms / rights			Total
	Realized completely	Partly	Not realized	
High	50,0%	44,1%	100,0%	45,7%
Average	10,0%	13,6%		12,9%
Low	40,0%	42,4%		41,4%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Table 24.1 Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	1,366	4	,850
Likelihood Ratio	1,749	4	,782
Linear-by-Linear Association	,017	1	,896
N of Valid Cases	70		

Table 25. Contingency square/table "Satisfaction with the work of public organizations" and "Realization of freedoms / rights" (Kyrgyzstan)

Satisfaction with the work of public organizations	Realization of freedoms / rights			Total
	Realized completely	Partly	Not realized	
High	66,7%	47,8%	50,0%	50,0%
Average		8,7%		7,1%
Low	33,3%	43,5%	50,0%	42,9%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Table 25.1 Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	,713	4	,950
Likelihood Ratio	1,053	4	,902
Linear-by-Linear Association	,181	1	,670
N of Valid Cases	28		

IV Social Discrimination / Oppression of Minorities

Table 26. Contingency square/table "Satisfaction with the work of public organizations" and "Rate of discrimination" (Russia)

Satisfaction with the work of public organizations	Rate of discrimination			Total
	Low	Average	High	
High	50,0%	45,2%	42,3%	44,6%
Average	16,7%	11,9%	11,5%	12,2%
Low	33,3%	42,9%	46,2%	43,2%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Table 27. Contingency square/table "Satisfaction with the work of public organizations" and "Rate of discrimination" (Kyrgyzstan)

Satisfaction with the work of public organizations	Rate of discrimination			Total
	Low	Average	High	
High		33,3%	63,2%	48,4%
Average		11,1%	5,3%	6,5%
Low	100,0%	55,6%	31,6%	45,2%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Table 27.1 Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	6,257	4	,181
Likelihood Ratio	7,386	4	,117
Linear-by-Linear Association	5,424	1	,020
N of Valid Cases	31		

Appendix 2

Interpretation of term "democracy" by respondents in Russia and Kyrgyzstan

Table 1. Distribution of answers to question "What is democracy in your opinion?" (Russia)

Democracy	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
1.Equality	12,3	10,1	10,1
2.Power of people, participation in decision-making	35,4	29,1	39,2
3.Freedom of choice, actions, achieving ones rights, responsibility	53,8	44,3	83,5
4.Infinity, lawlessness, illegality, anarchy	4,6	3,8	87,3
5.Fair laws, respect of laws, fairness	15,4	12,7	100,0
Total	121,5	100,0	

Table 2. Distribution of answers to question "What is democracy in your opinion?" (Kyrgyzstan)

Democracy	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
1.Equality	3,3	2,3	2,3
2.Power of people, participation in decision-making	46,7	31,8	34,1
3.Freedom of choice, actions, achieving ones rights, responsibility	56,7	38,6	72,7
4.Infinity, lawlessness, illegality, anarchy	3,3	2,3	75,0
5.Fair laws, respect of laws, fairness	36,7	25,0	100,0
Total	146,7	100,0	

Conditions for development of stable democratic institutions

Table 3. Distribution of answers to question
"What is the most important in your opinion for development of stable democratic institutions?" (Russia)

	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Freedom of speech	50,8	32,0	32,0
Free and fair elections	74,6	47,0	79,0
The constitutional courts	33,3	21,0	100,0
Total	158,7	100,0	

Table 4. Distribution of answers to question
"What is the most important in your opinion for development of stable democratic institutions?" (Kyrgyzstan)

	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Freedom of speech	87,9	38,7	38,7
Free and fair elections	90,9	40,0	78,7
The constitutional courts	50,0	21,3	100,0
Total	228,8	100,0	

Appendix 3

QUESTIONNAIRE
for Russia
Problems and Perspectives
for Participation of Public Organizations
in Civil Society Development

Dear colleagues,

University of Bonn under the support of the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation (Germany) and the United Nations Volunteers (UNV) are conducting social survey among experts, analysts, and all those who are engaged and interested in politics. The survey is devoted to the study of the problems for development of public (non-governmental) organizations and political parties, and their participation in civil society development.

We believe that the results of survey, conducted with your help, will be claimed by the society and will promote to certain extent the more effective public participation in governance, reduce the level of social discrimination, corruption and other negative trends, improve the social climate for population and the development of social partnership. Your expert opinion is of great importance to us!

Rules for completing the questionnaire:

It is easy to complete this questionnaire. Please read the question attentively, think of it and clearly circle the number of the answer that best corresponds to your opinion. If none of the offered answers is appropriate for you, please use the free space below for your own answer. If you complete this questionnaire in electronic form please mark the chosen answer by *green* color.

We kindly request you to answer ALL THE QUESTIONS. Answering will take about 20 minutes.

Thank you very much in advance for your cooperation, contribution of your time and expertise to this project! Should you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact us directly.

Sincerely yours,
Igor Kustov
Project Coordinator

Mobile phone: 8 913 947 5057

E-mail: Igor.Kustov@unvolunteers.org

How satisfied are you – overall – with the work of public associations (non-governmental organizations, movements, parties, associations, etc.) in Russia?

1. Completely dissatisfied
2. Mostly dissatisfied
3. Indifferent
4. Mostly satisfied
5. Completely satisfied

Which public organizations, in your opinion, are the most popular in your region? Please, mark up to 5 items and indicate the names.

1. Charitable organizations:

_____

_____

1. Public associations, supporting children and mothers:

_____

_____

2. Veteran public associations:

_____

_____

3. Youth public organizations:

_____

_____

4. Political parties:

_____

_____

5. Female councils and other female organizations:

_____

_____

6. Interest and leisure groups and associations:

_____

_____

7. Creative unions:

_____

_____

8. Religious public organizations:

_____

_____

9. Sports and tourist clubs:

_____

_____

10. Trade unions advocacy (human rights) organizations:

_____

_____

11. Other public associations and non-governmental organizations:

_____

_____

How satisfied are you - overall - with the democratic institutions, supreme power branches and top officials in your country?

Evaluated item	Completely dissatisfied	Mostly dissatisfied	Indifferent	Mostly satisfied	Completely satisfied
14. Constitutional Court	1	2	3	4	5
15. Head of Constitutional Court	1	2	3	4	5
16. President	1	2	3	4	5
17. Government	1	2	3	4	5
18. Prime-Minister	1	2	3	4	5
19. State Duma	1	2	3	4	5
20. Speaker of State Duma	1	2	3	4	5
21. Federation Council	1	2	3	4	5
22. Head of Federation Council	1	2	3	4	5
23. Political parties	1	2	3	4	5

24. How strongly are you interested in politics?

1. Very strongly
2. Moderately

4. Indifferent, not interested at all
5. I perceive it negatively

25. Are you a member of any public organization?

1. Yes   2. No

26. How often you are engaged in public activity in your free time?

1. Every day   2. Once a week   3. Once a month   4. Never

27. Does it make any difference for you which political party has a majority at the Parliament (State Duma)?

1. Yes   2. Little difference   3. No difference

28. Are you a member of a political party?

1. Yes   2. No

29. Whom of the political party leaders do you consider as the most influential?
_____
_____

30. How satisfied are you with the overall possibilities for participation in political life of your country (political movements, meetings, gatherings, processions)?

1. Completely dissatisfied
2. Mostly dissatisfied
3. Indifferent

4. Mostly satisfied
5. Completely satisfied

31. How do you estimate the degree of your influence on governmental actions?

1. Very high   2. High   3. Neutral   4. Low   5. Very low

32. Do you think that the role of the state in the society should be limited?

1. Yes   2. Partly   3. No

33. How much do you trust in political parties?

1. Completely   2. Party   3. Indifferent   4. Don't trust at all

34. How much do you trust in non-political public organizations?

1. Completely   2. Party   3. Indifferent   4. Don't trust at all

35. In what degree do you think the freedom of association and assembly is realized in you region?

1. Completely realized   2. Partly realized   3. No freedom

36. How do you evaluate the *freedom** of the elections in your region?
*Freedom – the right to be a candidate, freedom to decide for whom you vote

1. Completely   3. Not at all
2. Partly

37. How do you evaluate the *fairness** of the competition for votes among the candidates?
*Fairness – the equal conditions of electoral competition for the candidates

1. Completely   3. Not at all
2. Partly

38. Which level of governance is more important for your personal life?

1. Federal   2. Regional   3. Local

39. What do you think the system of political decision-making by power structures in Russia is like?

1. This system is decentralized   3. This system is centralized
2. This system is mixed

40. Do you think that the federal (executive) government should interfere more in regional and local politics?

1. Yes   2. No

41. Do you consider yourself a religious person?

      1. Yes   2. Yes, to some extent   3. No

42. Are you a member of religious public organization?

                  1. Yes   2. No

43. Do you regularly attend church services?

      1. Very often   2. Often   3. Rarely   4. Don't attend at all

44. Are you a member of trade union or any other professional organization?

            1. Yes   2. No

45. Are you a member of the professional/working council or any other governing body of your organization?

           1. Yes   2. No

46. How satisfied are you – overall – with the trade unions and professional organizations in your city?

      1. Completely dissatisfied   4. Mostly satisfied
      2. Mostly dissatisfied   5. Completely satisfied
      3. Indifferent

47. How much do you trust in trade unions and other professional organizations in your city?

    1. Completely   2. Partly   3. Indifferent   4. Don't trust at all

Do you think that there are some social groups or minorities excluded from participation in political decision-making?

Name of group or minority	Yes	No
48. National (ethnic)	1	2
49. Religious (confessional)	1	2
50. Persons living in Russia without local registration (propiska)	1	2
51. Other groups (please indicate which)_____	1	2

_____

52. Have you got any experience of your human and political rights being violated (participation in political parties, movements, meetings, processions and gatherings)?

      1. Yes, very often   2. Sometimes   3. No

Do you think that the rate of some national minorities or gender groups in State Duma is:

Name of the groups	Factually	Very high	High	Average	Low	Very low
53. National minority groups	%	1	2	3	4	5
54. Females	%	1	2	3	4	5
55. Elderly people (older than 55)	%	1	2	3	4	5
56. Youths (younger than 30)	%	1	2	3	4	5

57. Whom do you consider as the "national minority in Russia"?

1. Representatives of national autonomies (Tatarstan, Bashkiria, etc) or representatives of non-Russian population, that don't have national autonomy in Russia;

2. Russian speaking population living in national autonomies;

3. Forced Russian speaking migrants from the CIS (Central Asia, Caucasus);

4. Migrants of indigenous nationalities from the CIS;

5. Illegal migrants from other countries (China, Korea, Vietnam etc);

6. Refugees;

7. Others (please write whom):_____

How do you think the national/ethnic minorities are treated in society?

	58. Non-Russians	59. Refugees	60. Legal Migrants	61. Illegal Migrants
1. Fully integrated (enjoy the same rights as the major part of the population)	1	2	3	4
2. Only partly integrated	1	2	3	4
3. Discriminated against	1	2	3	4
4. They are given too much freedom	1	2	3	4

62. What do you think is the approximate percentage of the national/ethnic minorities in Russia?

1. Less than 2 %   4. 11 to 20 %
2. About 3 -5 %   5. More than 20 %
3. 6 to 10 %

63. Do you think that intermarriages between all the different national and ethnic groups in Russia are:

1. Very often   2. Exist but not so often (average level)   3. Very seldom

64. How friendly do you think are people in your city towards:

Foreigners from the CIS and other legal / illegal migrants
Very friendly   1

Warm attitude	2
Indifferent	3
Unfriendly	4
Hostile	5
Difficult to answer	6

65. Do you think that the rate of people with the negative attitude towards minorities (people of different nation, race or religion) is:

    1. Very high   2. High   3.Average   4. Low

66. What do you think is the rate of violence against citizens form other CIS countries and national minorities:

    1. Very high   2. High   3. Average   4. Low

67. How often do you think the state prosecutes those responsible for violence against or harassment of particular groups of society?

    1. Always   2. Very often   3. Sometimes   4. Never

68. If the job opportunities for local population become scarce, should the alien residents of Russia be sent back home?

    12. Yes   2. No

69. Do you think that foreigners „steal" opportunities to work from the local population?

    1. Yes   2. Partly   3. No

Do you think that the foreigners are *useful* (because they pay taxes) or *not* (because they exploit the social welfare system)?

	Yes	No
70. People from Europe and Northern America	1	2
71. Refugees from Asia	1	2

Do you think that there are inequalities in payment and employment among hired workers?

	Yes	No
72. On gender basis	1	2
73. On national and ethnic basis	1	2

74. Do you think that female workers get less paid if woman and man do the same job?

    1. Yes   2. No

75. Do you think that constitutional or statutory guarantees of equality, regardless of gender, race, color, tribe or national or ethnic origin are provided?

          1. Yes   2. No

76. Do you think that judiciary is free of outside pressure or influence?

1. Free   3. Partly free
2. Free in most cases   4. Not free

77. Do you consider that you can practice the right to have your conviction and sentence reviewed by an independent judicial tribunal in case of being convicted of a crime?

1. Always   2. In most cases   3. Rarely   4. Not at all

78. Do you think that state prosecutors also prosecute government officials, members of pro-government forces, or parliamentary members who violate the law?

1. Always   2. In most cases   3. Rarely   4. Not at all

79. Do you think that the law is generally accepted/respected in Russia?

    1. Fully   2. Partly   3. Not at all

80. Do you think that the people generally pay the taxes that they are obliged?

    1. Yes   2. Rarely   3. No

81. Have you ever been in a situation when you were asked to pay bribe (for example, to release your son from the army or to get the driving license)?

          1. Yes   2. No

82. Do you think that bribes in Russia are:

          1. Common   2. Uncommon

83. To what extent do you think the freedom of expression is realized in Russia?

      1. Completely   2. Partly   3. Not at all

84. Do you think there is direct censorship of any of the media?

      1. Fully   2. Partly   3. Not at all

85. To what extent in your opinion are media independent financially and organizationally from government?

1. Completely independent	2. Partly independent	3. Absolutely dependent

86. To what extent in your mind does the government have an influence on the content of media?

1. Completely	2. Partly	3. No influence

87. If lots of media are controlled by the economic/financial groups, are these groups independent from government or not?

1. Completely independent	2. Partly independent	3. Absolutely dependent

88. Do you think there is a censorship of mail, phone-tapping or governmental surveillance?

1. Wholly	2. Partly	3. Not at all

89. What is democracy in your opinion?

_____

_____

90. What is the most important in your opinion for development of stable democratic institutions? (Please mark any number of items)

1. Freedom of speech
2. Free and fair elections
3. The constitutional courts
4. Other:

_____

_____

91. What measures do you think should be taken on federal and regional levels to improve the performance of public organizations and political parties towards the better development of civil society in Russia?

_____

_____

Finally, we have some few questions for statistical purpose:

92. Your age_____(number of years)

92.1. Your sex: 1. Male   2. Female

93. Your occupation, social status or profession_____

94. Kind of your education: 1. Humanities/Arts   2. Technical   3. Economic   4. Juridical   5. Social Sciences   6. Other_____

95. Level of your education

1. Doctor or candidate of sciences

2. Higher/University degree

3. Vocational

4. Undergraduate

5. Secondary

96. Name of your settlement (city, town, village, etc) _____

Thank you very much for taking part in our public opinion survey!

Please note: It is not necessary to indicate your surname, first or second name. However, if you are interested in results of our inquiry and would like to participate in **interview** and our further social surveys, please indicate your contact information:

Surname, first, middle name_____

Organization_____

E-mail:_____

Phone_____

Fax:_____

Postal address:_____

We wish you all the best!
Sincerely yours,

Igor Kustov
Project Coordinator

Mobile phone: 8 913 947 5057

E-mail: Igor.Kustov@unvolunteers.org

Note: The questionnaire for Kyrgyzstan is not included here, because it is very similar to the questionnaire for Russia. Only several questions and proposed answers are different, taking into consideration special political structure and situation in both countries.

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