The Role of Regional Trade Union Federations in Social Dialogue: A Comparison of the European Union and SADC

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1 INTRODUCTION

The central lesson is simply that the fortunes of nation states in the region can ultimately only be collectively protected and advanced. This is the key imperative driving regional integration (Nupen, 2000:29).

In the last century, this insight led to the economic and political co-operation of regional unions of states in various parts of the world. In Europe, there were attempts at regional co-operation as early as 1957, in the form of the Treaty of Rome. Today’s European Union (EU), established by the Maastricht Agreement of 1992/1993, may be described as a union of states with supranational decision-making competencies in various political fields, in the form of binding European law-making powers and the controlling authority of the European Court of Justice. In Africa, the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) was established in 1980 to counterbalance apartheid South Africa. The Southern African Development Community (SADC), formed by the Windhoek Agreement of 1992, developed from the SADCC. It is an intergovernmental association of sovereign states with the objective of advancing economic development in Southern Africa. Unlike the EU, SADC does not have a supranational body to monitor the implementation of SADC legal acts, the so-called protocols.¹

A great problem in SADC is the heterogeneous nature of member states. As many as eight SADC states are among the least developed countries (LDCs), with only South Africa being a threshold country. In the European Union, too, there is a North-South gap and, after the East and Central European States joined, an East-West gap. Such heterogeneity has negative implications in terms of economic integration, the dismantling of trade barriers and the co-ordination of economic and finance policy. In the social field, there is often talk of social dumping, that is, ‘... countries reducing their levels of social protection in order to thwart competition from low-cost competitors’ (Woolfrey, 1993:100). To deal with this problem, the European Union and SADC have taken steps towards a regional social policy in order to reinforce economic integration through political integration (Leibfried & Pierson, 2000).

In response to this ongoing social development, the national trade union federations in Europe began to organise regionally in order to influence socio-political policy. To a limited extent, the trade unions of Southern Africa have also reacted to this transfer of national competencies to SADC level. This has resulted in new forms of regional organisation with three distinct levels:

¹ The founding agreement provides for a SADC tribunal to settle internal disputes. To date, however, it has not been installed.
the intersectoral level, on which regional umbrella organisations like the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) and the Southern African Trade Union Co-ordination Council (SATUCC) were established;

the sectorial level, on which sector-organised regional trade union federations developed, including European Industry Committees (EICs) such as the European Metal Workers Federation (Ebbinghaus & Visser, 2000:780-785) and regional International Trade Secretariats (ITSs) in Southern Africa such as the International Metalworkers Federation (Jauch, 2001; Murphy, 2001);

the transnational corporate level, on which works committees were set up to co-ordinate workers’ representation in companies in various European countries (Streeck, 1996; Miller, 1999). In Southern Africa, this level does not exist. An African Works Council has been established by UNI at Barclay’s Bank, but this is still very new.

This study examines two regional umbrella organisations - ETUC and SATUCC.

Regarding this division, it must be noted that the first and second levels are not easily distinguished. In Southern Africa, for example, there has been close cooperation between ITSs and SATUCC for the past few years, while in the European Union, the EICs are formal members of the European Trade Union Confederation.

This study is confined to an analysis of the intersectoral level. To begin with, internal structures, objectives and problems of both ETUC and SATUCC are described in a brief historic overview. This is followed by a discussion of the role and possible influence of workers’ organisations on the social dialogue within the EU and SADC. Social dialogue for our purpose is to be understood as:

[the] interaction among governments, employers’ organisations and workers’ representatives in formulating or implementing labour, social or economic policy. …bipartite and tripartite arrangements may serve a purely advisory role to governments or may involve negotiations leading to agreements or social pacts that fix a framework for action during a defined period (Trebilcock et al., 1994:3).

The intended restructuring within SADC aimed at integrating the employment and labour sector with other sectors into a ‘Directorate on Social and Human Development and Special Programmes’ is not examined, because it is not yet clear what shape the new structures would take.
2 THE EUROPEAN TRADE UNION CONFEDERATION

2.1 Historical development of the ETUC

2.1.1 Membership structure

Developed in 1973 out of member trade unions from divergent territorial, political, religious and ideological affiliations, the European Trade Union Confederation comprised a wide range of labour representatives in Europe.\(^2\) Not only the trade unions of European Economic Community member states belonged to the ETUC, but also those of countries belonging to the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the Council of Europe. Furthermore, European organised sector unions apart from the national suprasector union federations joined the umbrella organisation.\(^3\) The initial restriction to socialist worker representation was followed in 1974 by the acceptance of various Christian unions and one communist union. More former communist trade unions followed at the end of the East-West conflict; organisations from Central and Eastern Europe were first granted observer status and then recognised as full members in 1995 (Dølvik, 1999:242).

The ETUC currently comprises 74 national trade union federations from 34 European countries, eight of which have observer status while 11 are European Industry Committees.\(^4\) Thus, the ETUC represents more than 90 per cent of all trade union members in the European Union (Ebbinghaus & Visser, 2000:778).\(^5\) However, on average only one-third of workers in the EU are unionised (Ebbinghaus & Visser, 2000:785).\(^6\)

The high degree of representativeness of the ETUC results in considerable heterogeneity of its members. This renders the process of formulating common positions and introducing them on a European level difficult. To date, great tension persists between the sectorial and intersectorial pillars, due to differences in membership and organisational structures, strategies and objectives, and also because the division of responsibilities within the ETUC is not clear-

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\(^2\) [See Appendix 1.] The European employers' association (UNICE) was formed in 1958 to represent the interests of private industry; and CEEP was set up in 1961 for employers of public companies.

\(^3\) The union federations initially had only observer status and a qualified vote in Congress – they could vote on all matters except financial and procedural ones.

\(^4\) See the ETUC website: www.etuc.org.

\(^5\) Two other regional organisations are the Confédération Européenne des Cadres (CEC), established in 1989 and having approximately 1 million members, and the Confédération Européenne des Syndicats Indépendents (CESI), established in 1990 with an initial membership of approximately 5-7 million members.

\(^6\) The number of unionised workers varies greatly, from under 10 per cent in France to above 80 per cent in Sweden and Denmark.
ETUC seems to have little grassroots support in constituent states.

Among national federations of trade unions, too, there have been internal disputes about the ETUC’s orientation. There was heated discussion, particularly between the wing leaning towards a more supranational organisation oriented towards influencing European institutions, and the wing favouring a continued loose European association focusing on co-ordinated action vis-à-vis multinational companies. It was only when EFTA countries joined the EC and association agreements were made that internal tension among ETUC members subsided.

Another ETUC problem is that – despite its high factor of representation – it enjoys little grassroots support in constituent states. This emerged when numerous national trade union federations opened lobby offices in Brussels. This lack of cohesion between the umbrella organisation and individual trade union members resulted in the ETUC losing credibility and becoming financially dependent on the European level (Dølvik, 1997).

2.1.2 Institutional structure

The ETUC’s initial institutional structure consisted of several organs:

- Congress as an assembly of all ETUC members;
- the Executive Committee;
- the Committee of Finance and General Affairs; and
- the Secretariat.

Neither the Executive Committee nor the Committee of Finance and General Affairs nor the Secretariat had a general mandate, and their duties were limited to co-ordinating and informing member federations. Although officially ETUC voting based on a qualified majority was possible, in practice decisions were only taken on a consensus basis; they tended to be vague and non-binding. It became obvious that member unions were not prepared to give up their sovereignty.

It was not until the Congress of Luxemburg in 1991 that reforms were undertaken. They had become necessary due to a greatly increased membership and developments within the EU that pre-empted the Maastricht Agreement. The most important changes were the recognition of the EICs as voting members, replacing the Committee of Financial and General Affairs with the Steering Committee, strengthening the Executive Committee’s political role, and extending the Secretariat’s financial and human resources. These reforms transformed the ETUC ‘into a genuine trade union confederation with capacity to conduct European collective bargaining’ (Dølvik, 1999:209). After a setback in 1993, when the capacity of the Secretariat and Executive Committee was once again restricted, the years of 1995/1996 saw a clarification of ETUC procedures.
in terms of its increased supranationalisation. As a result of fundamental strategic discussions within the ETUC, the Executive Committee was given the power to decide on entering European negotiations. Since then, the mandate and the negotiated agreement have been accepted with a qualified majority. Thus each member’s veto power was abolished. The EICs were given a much more influential role within the ETUC, whereby they could define areas of regulation where negotiations should be held on sectorial level. This is how the EICs were able to maintain their autonomy in the sectors (Dølvik, 1997, 1999, 2000).

Currently, as a result of the 1991 reforms, the ETUC’s organisational structure consists of:

- Congress:
  - the top organ of the ETUC,
  - comprises delegates of all national member federations in proportion to the size of membership,
  - convenes at four-year intervals,
  - determines the guidelines of ETUC policy, and
  - selects Executive Committee members, the president and the secretary general;

- Executive Committee:
  - meets four times a year,
  - numbers in proportion to the elected representatives of the national organisations,
  - decides with a two-thirds majority on the mandate and composition of the delegation at European social partner negotiations;

- Steering Committee:
  - consists of 21 elected Executive Committee representatives,
  - meets eight times a year, and
  - is responsible for implementing and monitoring the Executive Committee’s decisions between sessions;

- Secretariat:
  - takes care of daily business,
  - liaises with EU organs and labour representatives, and
  - is responsible for the ETUC’s internal functioning.?

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7 See the ETUC website: www.etuc.org
The ETUC has a staff complement of 45; its financial resources in 1996 were approximately 4.4m Euros,\(^8\) stemming from membership fees (roughly 10 cents per 1000 members). Compared to the position of its national trade union federations, the ETUC has modest resources (Ebbinghaus & Visser, 2000:779). However, the European Commission does fund the various ETUC institutes—the research institute (ETUI) and the educational institute (ETUCO); it also pays for travel and translation costs for participation in social dialogue, which considerably increases the ETUC’s dependence on the European institutions (Bieling & Schulten, 2001:26).

The institutional development of the ETUC reflects its members’ internal differences of opinion about the orientation of the organisation—either towards lose co-operation in national trade union activities or towards a supranational European umbrella organisation deeply involved in the European decision-making process. The current institutional structure has strengthened the ETUC’s ability to act on a European level and improved its flexibility towards the national members. However, the ETUC is a supranational organisation in a limited sense only (Dølvik, 1997:169).

2.1.3 Objectives and strategies

Because of the heterogeneity of the ETUC membership and its initially rather weak position, its objective was formulated rather vaguely at the founding congress in 1973:

[to] represent and advance the social, economic and cultural interest of the workers on the European level in general and towards the European institutions in particular— including the European Communities and the European Free Trade Association (quoted in Dølvik, 1997:144).

The ETUC initially served its national members by exchanging information and exploring the possibility of voluntary co-ordination of national policies and procedures. Collective bargaining on a European level was rejected explicitly, as this was seen to be the domain of the national trade unions.

Only in the late 1980s did Euro-optimism emerge among members, because national solutions and national corporate structures had proven inadequate to cope with the pressures of global competition. The strategic change of the Trades Union Congress (TUC), the British ETUC member, from rejection of European integration towards approval of European problem solving as a reaction to Thatcherism also contributed to the ETUC’s reorientation. Furthermore, the European Commission, then under President Jacques Delors, tried to involve the trade unions more closely in European decision-making. This new European consciousness among ETUC members resulted in a declaration of support for a common internal market, subject to certain conditions:

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\(^8\) More current figures were not available to the author.
it would be accompanied by a macro-economic policy, would avoid regional inequalities and create new jobs;

it would establish a European Social Space; and

it would develop a European industrial policy.

After ETUC had functioned mainly as a loose lobby organisation vis-à-vis community institutions during its first decade of existence, the single market project triggered renewed attempts of ETUC integration, eventually leading to adoption of an ambitious programme for Europeanisation of trade union policies at the 1991 congress (Delvik, 1997:127).

Attempts to institutionalise a social dialogue among ETUC members led to great scepticism and heated discussion: ‘An internal struggle over the further path of trade union Europeanisation was unleashed, revealing the contested nature of ETUC integration and the widespread diversity of views among the ETUC membership’ (Delvik, 1999:210). In 1993, this resulted in a compromise - a clear delimitation of the supranational aspect of ETUC structures and a declaration that European trade union activities were merely a supplement to their national policy and a means to secure minimum standards in labour practice.

It was not until the 1996/1997 strategic discussions - when the members' right of veto was abolished and further institutional reform was implemented - that the ETUC returned to a more active stance in shaping European social policy. The ETUC took the initiative in social partner bargaining on regulating part-time work, against an explicit request from the German Trade Union Confederation.9

Thus, the dual impact of qualified majority voting and clarification of the constituent units' control of ETUC decision-making has, paradoxically, strengthened membership confidence in ETUC policy and induced once reluctant national affiliates to accept a degree of Europeanisation hardly conceivable a few years ago (Delvik, 1999:213-214).

The ETUC eventually formulated its objectives in statutes adopted in 1999:

- the intensification of political freedom and the assertion of human and trade union rights;
- the elimination of any form of discrimination and the promotion of equal treatment of men and women;
- economic and social development, taking into consideration the environ-

9 This was the first time the ETUC annulled its members' right of veto in practice.
mental and geographic balance;
• free access to productive work for all;
• the development and improvement of vocational and continued training;
• the democratisation of the economy; and
• continuous improvement of the conditions of life and work (Dølvik, 1997, 1999).

2.2 Participation in the social dialogue of the European Union

Throughout the 1980s, ETUC struggled to play a larger role in social dialogue.

On a European level, implementation of the ETUC’s objectives and strategies presented many problems. Up to the Maastricht Agreement and its social protocol, the European social partners legally had no independent part in socio-political decision-making. The Economic and Social Committee (ESC), as the only body with both employers’ and workers’ representatives, had only minor advisory functions, while the Council decided unanimously on socio-political matters. Overall, however, social matters were settled on a national level rather than through EC activities (Falkner, 1999:84).

Suggestions of more involvement by employers and trade unions were made as early as the 1970s. However, they were not realised due particularly to the negative attitude of employers. It was only in the mid 1980s, under President Delors, that a quasi-institutionalised forum for employers and labour organisations was established on a European level (UNICE, CEEP and ETUC) – the so-called ‘Social Dialogue of Val Duchesse’ (Ebbinghaus & Visser, 2000:772-882).

Due to the continued refusal of employers to come to a binding agreement, these negotiations resulted in very general, non-binding statements and were unable to overcome the social policy blockade in the Council at the time. However, it emerged that the Commission, the European Parliament and the ESC supported concerted employers’ and workers’ action, and advanced it by means of a more active EC social policy (Ebbinghaus & Visser, 2000:767). It was only in the late 1980s that the Council pronounced itself in favour of European collective agreements (Falkner, 1999:87).

Further progress in the social dialogue was made with the EC Social Charter and the Commission’s socio-political action programme to implement it in 1989. Before this, ETUC had drawn up a 15-point programme for a ‘Social Europe’, which demanded minimum socio-political rights in various fields and more involvement of employers and workers in European decision-making. Eventually this programme was integrated into the charter (Dølvik, 1997:200). However, due to opposition from Great Britain, the charter itself was non-binding in nature. In its ensuing action programme, the Commission submitted concrete proposals for the consultation of employers and labour in numerous
new legislative initiatives. The European employers organisation, UNICE, which had opposed any European socio-political regulations in principle, was persuaded to take part in ‘corporate’ consultations in the run-up to Maastricht, which resulted in the social pact of October 1991 (Falkner, 1999:87-89).

2.2.1 The Maastricht Social Protocol

Following extensive negotiations, this social pact was eventually included in the Treaty of Maastricht, although only as a protocol addendum. After Maastricht, therefore, European social policy had two different legal bases – on the one hand the (old) provisions of contract, and on the other the social protocol regulations applicable in all member states except Great Britain (Falkner, 2002:5). In 1999 the virtually unchanged Social Protocol was included in the Treaty of Amsterdam, and Great Britain is now also subject to these provisions.

The Social Protocol deals with extended EU competences in various labour law fields, as well as a significant extension of its control over social policy. The agreement also has important provisions regarding employer and labour participation on a European level. Since Maastricht, therefore, the European Commission is legally bound to consult the social partners for proposals regarding socio-political guidelines and legislation. The social partners may interrupt the law-making process by notifying the Commission of their wish to come to a social partner agreement. Such an agreement may either be implemented as collective agreement ‘following the respective procedures and practices of the social partners and member states’ or be realised as a decision by the Council (in terms of a legally binding directive, regulation or decision). In both instances, member states may assign implementation of the directives adopted under the social agreement to the national social partners upon their joint application. The general implication is that the social partners act in lieu of or jointly with EU institutions; the latter cannot take action without having heard the former. With the possibility of adopting and directly implementing an agreement, the social partners thus have their own decision-making competence on a par with the Council (Falkner, 2002:8).

2.2.2 ETUC's practical experience in social dialogue

Though the Maastricht Social Protocol did not detail exactly which European federations should be included in the social dialogue, the EU Commission and Council confirmed the negotiation monopoly of the ETUC, CEEP and UNICE, which they had held since the Val Duchesse talks. No rules were laid down

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10 Excluding, however, questions of wages, right of coalition, right to strike and right to lock out – that is, areas directly affecting industrial relations (Bühninghaus & Visser, 2000:262).

11 Art. 4.2 of the Social Pact; now 159 paragraph 2 of the EC Agreement.

12 Various small interest groups opposed it. The Association of Trade, Small and Medium Size Enterprises (UEAPME) even instituted legal action before the European Court, but eventually lost (Falkner, 2002:17).
for concrete interaction of the social partners, although procedures were developed during the 1990s. Thus, in practice, UNICE and CEEP employers stand as a unified block against ETUC labour. Their bargaining takes place in plenary sessions attended by 28 representatives of each side, under a neutral chair, and in sessions of a preparatory committee of seven ‘influential’ people. All three parties must approve agreements reached at these meetings, and then accept it through their internal procedures. At the ETUC and CEEP, this has been through a qualified majority since 1995, while UNICE continues with the rule of consensus.

Social partner consultation was first used in 1993 during the negotiations on the directives for European works committees. The ETUC called this directive a ‘masterpiece of the social dimension’ (Delvick, 1997:320), while UNICE originally objected. After the Treaty of Maastricht and the Social Protocol had come into force, however, employers were prepared to ‘talk about talks’ which eventually failed because the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) within UNICE rejected the proposed wide-ranging measures (Falkner, 2000:707). The ETUC clearly indicated that in the final analysis it expected more from a Council decision than from UNICE and a trade union agreement based on the smallest common denominator. Council then approved a directive in the classic manner and, although celebrated as a formal success by the ETUC, it merely constituted an extension of national structures to representatives of other countries and required no thorough reform in member states (Ebbinghaus & Visser, 2000:769).

Nonetheless, in spite of the failed social partner negotiations, on a procedural level European social dialogue was strengthened, which made further development possible: ‘The process of negotiating the EWC has involved national and European trade union officials more concretely in the making of European industrial relations’ (Ebbinghaus & Visser, 2000:769).

The second attempt at binding social partner negotiations resulted in a parental-leave directive prescribing a minimum standard of three months’ parental leave during which all workers’ rights were guaranteed. Based on the agreement of the social partners, the Commission drafted a directive which was adopted by the Council in June 1996. ‘The next attempt was successful because both sides (and the Commission behind them) wished to ‘prove that they are capable of reaching binding agreements’ under the Maastricht Social Agreement’ (Ebbinghaus & Visser, 2000:770). This was followed by directives on part-time work (1997), fixed-term work contracts (1998), and tele-work (July 2002), all prepared through social partner agreements and eventually translated, virtually verbatim, into legislation. Thus indications were that, in practice, the Council accepted social partners’ decisions (Falkner, 2002:13-15). However, the ETUC had to make major concessions to employers on the part-time work directive, as the latter were able to push through relatively limited regulations. The directive covering fixed-term work contracts, on the other hand, was based on so vague a social partner agreement that it had significant impact only in Great Britain, while some of the other member states already had national pro-
visions which were far ahead of the European directive. 'In short, it seems that in both cases [the part-time work directive and the directive on fixed-term work contracts], low substantive standards were accepted by labour in exchange for greater involvement of the "social partners" at all layers of the European multi-level system' (Falkner, 2000:715, emphasis in original).

A general assessment must also take into account that several other proposals of the Commission during the 1990s did not lead to social partner negotiations or agreements - for example, the proposals on temporary work, gender discrimination, and information of labour on a national level (Falkner, 2002:11).

2.3 Interim conclusion

The internal strategic discussions and institutional reforms of the ETUC were marked by Europeanisation and supranationalisation on the one hand, and maintaining the national sovereignty of the trade union federations on the other. This could be seen in respect of the ETUC's organisational structure, its involvement on a European level, and its willingness to regulate social policy in a European way. In the early 1990s, this resulted in the ETUC pushing forward a social pact and the institutionalisation of the European social dialogue. Because it had little support from its national constituents, the decision-making powers of its executive committees were initially cut back severely, enabling national trade unions to reassert their sovereignty in ETUC decision-making. Only during strategic debates in 1995 and 1996 was the gulf between these two orientations narrowed. 'No longer can the ETUC be perceived as a "head without body". The credibility and legitimacy of the ETUC have been improved both among the membership and in the broader European public' (Dølvik, 1999:215). By abolishing the veto rights of ETUC members, it was possible to tackle socio-political regulations on a European level.

With the adoption of the Maastricht Social Protocol, the social partners' legal position on a European level had clearly improved. Employers and labour were given the same decision-making competence in socio-political affairs as the Council, and they can now regulate social affairs jointly or in place of the European institutions. The ETUC's ability to assert itself vis-à-vis employers' representatives, however, still depends on the political constellation and socio-political views in the Council; many employers are prepared to adopt social partner agreements only under threat of a more encompassing Council decision (Falkner, 1999:96). 'The bargaining power of the ETUC has thus hinged on the willingness of the Council to adopt legislation compatible with trade union interests' (Dølvik, 1999:201). Furthermore, among trade union representatives (and in part also among employers), the continued development of the European social partnership played an equally or more important part in their bargaining than the actual subject of negotiation (Falkner, 2000:720).
The actual political significance of the European social dialogue ... has therefore less to do with its few substantial results than with its political function to integrate European trade unions, at least symbolically, into the EU system of policy-making (Bieling & Schulten, 2001:25).

Overall, the social partners are accepted as bargaining partners only within the socio-political sphere, which plays an insignificant part in the European Union. In questions of economic and finance policy, the core of European integration, there is no institutionalised co-determination at all (Dølvik, 1999:206). Overall, an assessment of European industrial relations must take into account the following:

Opinion varies as to what compared with national antecedents or with other international regimes. Measured against the former, the emergent system of industrial relations at the EU level is indeed a bleak complement, but in view of the position of labour in other regional trade arrangements and in global institutions like the WTO, the advances of union representation and labour standards in the EU context is significant (Dølvik, 2000:4).

3 THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN TRADE UNION CO-ORDINATION COUNCIL (SATUCC)

3.1 Historical development of SATUCC

3.1.1 Membership structure

The Southern African Trade Union Co-ordination Council (SATUCC) was formed in Gaborone, Botswana, in 1983. Initially, it was a regional affiliate of the Organisation of African Trade Union Unity (OATUU) for Southern Africa. The Council first comprised nine national trade union federations from Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Angola, Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland and Tanzania (LaRRi, 2001:10). Its ideological orientation was marked by the East-West conflict - some of the SATUCC constituent trade union councils were part of the Communist International and the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), others of the pro-West International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), while others were independent. Only once the cold

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13 South Africa's largest trade union federations, SACTU and ATUCC, were then acting from exile.
war came to an end, and following the independence of Namibia in 1990 and the first free election in South Africa in 1994, was the ideological rift between SATUCC members overcome. Nowadays, problems tend to occur due to the strong alliance of some trade unions with the governing party (as in South Africa and Namibia) and the strong opposition of other labour representatives to their governments (as in Zimbabwe and Swaziland) (LaRRI, 2001:11).

The divergent democratic developmental stages in the SADC member states, and the trade unions’ heterogeneous position of power and method of organisation, created difficulties in formulating common regional positions and strategies and in showing a united front to the outside world (Jauch, 1999:2).

Thirteen national, suprasector trade union federations are currently united in SATUCC. Apart from South Africa (which is represented by COSATU and NACTU), every country is represented by only one trade union federation. ‘...SATUCC excludes certain “National Centres” in instances where there are several in one country (e.g. Lesotho) since SATUCC policy allows more than one affiliate per country only by exception...’ (Murphy, 2001:9). Except for the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Seychelles, which joined SADC in 1997, all SADC states have trade union councils that are SATUCC members (see Appendix 2).

Regionally organised sector trade unions - International Trade Secretariats (ITSs) - are not represented in SATUCC either, but they have been in contact since 1995. Since 1997 there has been close co-operation between SATUCC and the ITSs in the form of annual discussion forums (Murphy, 2001:14-18).

As far as general trade union density in the SADC region is concerned, on the national level an average of 42 per cent of labour in the formal sector is unionised (more than Great Britain, Germany or Italy) (Jauch, 1999:2). However, since just 25 per cent of the working population in Southern Africa is formally employed, the representativeness of trade union movements is a mere 14 per cent (Jauch, 1999:2; Murphy, 2001:12), and the membership trend is downward (Barrett, in SALB, 2001:77). As SATUCC does not comprise all trade union federations in the SADC states, the representativeness of the regional umbrella organisation in respect of the economically active population was thus a mere 6 per cent in 1998 (Torres, 1998:114). SATUCC’s influence on regional negotiations, therefore, is very low (Barrett, in SALB, 2001:77).

3.1.2 Institutional structure

Initially called the Southern African Trade Union Co-ordination Committee, the umbrella organisation changed its name to the Southern African Trade Union Co-ordination Council at the end of 1983. At first, SATUCC acted with an executive board of four representatives from Mozambique, Botswana, Tanzania and Zambia, with a woman appointed as an extra member. At the Maseru congress in 1984, the plenary session decided to run SATUCC as an autonomous organisation independent from OATUU, and appointed a Secretariat and a sec-
retary general. After several moves of the SATUCC head office and Secretariat due to political situations adverse to trade unions, the permanent representation was eventually reopened in Gaborone, Botswana, in 1996 (LaRRI, 2001:7-18).

The top organ is the Congress, in which representatives of all constituent organisations meet every four years. The Congress passes general action plans for SATUCC and elects members to the Executive Council, which convenes twice a year and is tasked with keeping up the political work of SATUCC between congresses (SATUCC Constitution).

The Secretariat is in charge of daily administrative work, implementing decisions, and representing SATUCC. It has very few resources. Apart from the secretary general, it employs a secretary as well as three people for the Occupational Health and Safety subdivision (Interview: Maserumule, 2002).

According to its statutes, SATUCC's financial resources come from the national member federations. However, due to the national members' financial difficulties, the general financial situation is very strained. SATUCC depends largely on donor funds, leading to a substantial dependence on funded projects and guidelines from donors (Webster, 2001:24-25). These funds do not come from SADC, but from international trade unions and organisations. The past few years have seen a certain donor fatigue, because SATUCC has been unable to finance itself as originally planned (Murphy, 2001:12).

In addition to the scant financial and human resources of SATUCC, the lack of communication between the permanent SATUCC representation and national constituents is said to be a problem. This is due partly to the non-existent communication infrastructure in some SADC countries, and partly to the vague task profile of the Secretariat for the periods between the relatively rare meetings of the Executive Council. Thus the implementation of adopted principles and decisions is checked only at official meetings; generally, the SATUCC communication culture is built around these meetings (Webster, 2001:24-25; interview: Maserumule, 2002).

It must be stated that SATUCC by no means constitutes a supranational organisation, but confines itself to co-ordinating the activities of the national federations as part of SADC (Webster, 2001:25).

3.1.3 Objectives and strategies

In the 1980s, SATUCC's main objective was to support the liberation struggle in South Africa and Namibia and the national trade unions involved in it. Right from the start, however, it tried to co-ordinate the interests and rights of workers in the entire region and to carry them through at SADCC. Its early activities included preparing reports on the economy and labour market in the region, making recommendations to SADCC, and organising courses and conferences

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14 No exact figures for SATUCC finance are available.
for trade union members. Following political developments in Namibia and South Africa in the early 1990s, the objectives of SATUCC changed, because the 'common enemy' was gone. A SATUCC co-ordinator writes about this time: 'We have transformed from an organisation that initially only had a political dimension to an organisation with a developmental approach' (Abisha Nyan- guwo, SATUCC trade union co-ordinator, quoted in LaRRI, 2001:27).

This development is reflected in the redefinition of challenges faced by the umbrella organisation. Thus SATUCC points to economic and social developments in terms of globalisation - for example, insecure jobs and dropping trade union membership - as new focus points, in addition to supporting the democratic development of the countries of Southern Africa. SATUCC’s concrete goals now include the promotion of vocational training, the co-ordination of activities and regulation in the field of occupational health and safety and social security, and promoting International labour standards and human rights. In this strategy, rural development and the situation of migrant labour in the region have priority. In 1991, SATUCC formulated a charter of basic social rights for workers in Southern Africa; it submitted a draft to SADC in 1995 (LaRRI, 2001:32-37).

3.2 Participation in the social dialogue of SADC

3.2.1 Institutionalisation of the social partnership in ELS

Following the change from SADCC to SADC in 1992, the Southern African Labour Commission (SALC) was established. As its name implies, the Commission confined itself to labour matters like the ratification and implementation of ILO labour standards in member states. SATUCC, as an umbrella body, had observer status in this Commission (interview: Maserumule, 2002). In 1995 the Employment and Labour Sector (ELS) was set up as one of several SADC sectors whose tasks and regulative competencies were laid down in sector protocols. The much broader objectives of the ELS are to:

- harmonise national economic, social and justice policies in order to support the labour market;
- regulate labour mobility;
- increase productivity in the SADC region;
- introduce and harmonise social security systems;
- harmonise regulations for occupational health and safety;

Two of SATUCC’s priorities are rural development and the situation of migrant labour in the region.
• develop the vocational and technical skills of workers; and
• promote social dialogue on national and regional levels.

When it was established, the ELS was the only SADC sector institutionalising the social dialogue of employers, labour and government. These three parties are also represented in the ELS's two subcommittees - occupational health and safety, and employment and productivity.

3.2.2 SATUCC's practical experience in social dialogue

Right from the start, SATUCC was acknowledged by ELS as the regional labour representative in social dialogue. It has participated in ELS annual conferences since it was established (LaRRI, 2001:30), although it only has observer status. Tripartite negotiations take place among delegations of the SADC member states, which comprise one government, one labour and one employer representative each, with every delegate having one vote. The sub-committees each consist of seven workers, seven employers and 14 government representatives.

All three parties have the right to initiate legal provisions. After a motion has been submitted to the ELS, it is passed on to the national social partners in the SADC member states for consultation. This is followed by negotiation at the annual ELS conference, which may lead to adoption by a qualified majority; in practice, however, consensus is always strived for (interview: Kachima, 2002). The consensus reached is then passed to the Council of Ministers, consisting of government representatives. The Council must adopt the ELS draft and have it ratified at a summit of heads of state (interview: Bodiba, 2002).

SATUCC plays a co-ordinating role in this process in that it convenes conferences and workshops before and after negotiations with the labour representatives of the national delegations, and agrees on a common position in the ELS (interview: Bodiba, 2002). According to SATUCC Secretary General Moses Kachima (interview: 2002), it is normally possible to find a common stance in SATUCC as part of the social dialogue. However, individual cases have presented problems due to labour's involvement in the national consultation process, which sometimes complicates the object of regional co-ordination. Co-operation among the three parties in the individual SADC countries varies. For instance, in Zimbabwe and Swaziland employers and labour stand jointly against government; in other countries, there are alliances between government and trade unions or between government and employers. This renders the search for consensus within SATUCC and in the ELS social dialogue difficult (interview: Mserumule, 2002).

Another problem is the fact that some of the national delegations in the ELS do not represent all three parties, but only have a government representative present. Furthermore, some governments have problems meeting their obligations to pay for their social partners' participation in the ELS social dia-
logue. According to Kachima (interview, 2002), however, labour participation in ELS has increased significantly of late.

In the ELS social dialogue, negotiations have focused particularly on HIV/AIDS, occupational health and safety, social security and equal treatment. In 1997 a Code of Practice on HIV/AIDS was adopted, ratified, and implemented by most member states. Government representatives and social partners in ELS adopted a Code of Practice on Safe Use of Chemicals at Workplaces in 1999, which has been implemented by only a few member states. ELS has also drawn up guidelines for a transnational grant of social security benefits as well as a Code of Practice on Social Security. The improvement of continued education programmes in social security institutions is at an early stage of negotiation (interview: Bodiba, 2002). In respect of equal gender treatment in SADC, the governments and social partners are discussing a programme which would harmonise the legal provisions in member states, the vocational and continued training programmes, and scientific research to examine national policies, legal principles and practices. The main focus of ELS in all these fields of policy is on gathering information, evaluating the situation in SADC states, and promoting national projects. ELS also monitors the ratification and implementation by SADC member states of ILO labour conventions. Examples are the protection of mothers and the fight against child labour, for which ELS action programmes were devised (Chitambo, 2001; SADC, 2002).

It has been underlined by various partners that the above-mentioned regulations in the ELS sector were uncontested and passed by consensus. Implementation in member states is rather more difficult (Murphy, 2001:11). An exception is the Charter of Basic Social Rights of Workers, the subject of heated discussions at SATUCC since 1992 and at ELS since 1995. In February 2001 employers, labour and government representatives in ELS eventually adopted a compromise (LaRRI, 2001:32-37); however, due to individual provisions on pensions (touching on national budgets), it was returned to ELS by the Council of Ministers for further national consultation (interview: Bodiba, 2002; SADC, 2002:28). This social charter formulates for the first time minimum standards in labour and social affairs for the SADC region. For a long time, discussions had turned around the demands of SATUCC regarding the regulation of migrant labour, which were refused by the governments. The employers’ demand for the right to lock-out to be included in the charter was rejected by trade union representatives. Only after drawn-out negotiations and several changes did employers finally submit a proposal for the charter, facilitating an agreement in 2001. SATUCC proclaimed this a success of negotiation, but compared to the initial SATUCC drafts, it was merely a compromise based on the smallest common denominator (interview: Bodiba, 2002).

The fact that the Council of Ministers rejected this compromise points to a lack in national co-ordination between foreign and finance ministers (in the Council of Ministers) and their Labour Ministers (in ELS) (interview: Kachima, 1983). Although agreement is often reached on regulations, implementation is more difficult.

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15 According to Kachima, SATUCC often convenes other events around the ELS negotiations, for which they find donors, so that attendance at ELS is indirectly co-financed.
2002), and generally to the limitations of the social dialogue within SADC. The equal status of labour, employer and government representatives in the consensus-driven ELS is clearly restricted by the right of final decision of the Council of Ministers, so that the social dialogue loses its binding nature (interviews: Bodiba, 2002; Maserumule, 2002). Nonetheless, it must be noted that since the social dialogue was institutionalised in ELS in 1995, SADC could not take decisions in social matters without consulting its social partners.

3.3 Interim conclusion

The following can be noted about the Southern Africa Trade Union Coordination Council:

- The regional umbrella organisation cannot be called supranational in respect of its institutional structure or its role in the regional social dialogue. Because the ELS consists of national employer, labour and government representatives, SATUCC constitutes a forum for co-ordination of national trade union positions and activities in SADC. Despite the small membership and low representativeness of SATUCC, this co-ordination of the social dialogue presents several problems - the heterogeneity of its members, their divergent involvement on a national level, poor co-ordination and a lack of communication between SATUCC and the national trade union organisations, the shortage of financial and human resources, and a dependence on donor funds. 'As a result, activities are often determined not by strategic need but by the areas in which funds are available' (Ngcobo, in SALB, 2002:14).

- In the SADC decision-making process, the social dialogue in ELS regarding employment and socio-political matters tends to have an advisory function. Although the social partners work towards consensus in negotiations with national governments and have to be heard, the Council of Ministers is entitled to make the final decision. Furthermore, the ability of SATUCC labour organisations to influence ELS is rather limited. 'For SATUCC to come to a tripartite forum such as SADC with a low factor of representation and a lack of material resources (i.e. funds) means that SATUCC is inevitably in a very weak bargaining position in that forum' (Murphy, 2001:12, emphasis in original). In negotiations as well as the ensuing implementation of decisions, SATUCC depends on the willingness and support of the national governments. It has no means of exerting pressure, especially since national action such as strikes is not a SATUCC tool (Torres, 1998:114; interview: Kachima, 2002). Generally, however, it must be conceded that the regional social dialogue is far ahead of national consultation among social partners, with the exception of a few countries like South Africa. The involvement of the social partners in SADC has a symbolic meaning to the continued de-
development of national social dialogue in SADC member states (interview: Maserumule, 2002). Also, compared to the regional co-ordination efforts of national governments and employers, SATUCC is much more successful:

...while SATUCC is confronted by challenges, co-operation, solidarity and alliances between national labour federations is still far stronger and more resourceful than any regional structures of business organisations or employers. National governments also seem to be troubled by regional tensions. On this background, labour has a huge advantage in building regional structures for a regional market (Torres, 1998:14).

- Overall, the social partners are involved in SADC negotiations only in the employment labour sector. No other sectors – for example, agriculture, finance and investment, or trade and industry – grant them any institutionalised co-determination (interview: Bodiba, 2002). Word is still out on how the coming restructuring, combining the ELS and other sectors into a Directorate on Social and Human Development and Special Programmes will affect the social dialogue (SADC, 2002:7). However, it is fairly clear that, despite demands from SATUCC, the social partners will not be involved in the entire directorate (interview: Kachina, 2002; interview: Bodiba, 2002). Furthermore, the regulative competences of ELS and SADC in the labour and socio-political fields are confined to information-gathering and co-ordination of national social policies; they do not pass binding socio-political legislation.

4 INFLUENCE, PROBLEMS AND DEVELOPMENTAL POSSIBILITIES - A COMPARISON

When comparing the development, internal structures, objectives and strategies of the European Trade Union Congress and the Southern Africa Trade Union Co-ordination Council, as well as the part they play in regional social dialogue, the following conclusions can be drawn:

- ETUC membership is much broader-based than that of SATUCC. The representativeness of the former among the working population (nearly 30 per cent) is much greater than that of the latter (6 per cent). SATUCC is faced with a dilemma, however – while its low representativeness is a reason for the minor influence it has on social dialogue in ELS, an extension of its membership would increase heterogeneity and multiply the existing problems of interest aggregation.
• The institutional structure of the ETUC currently comprises various supranational elements. The executive committee uses a qualified majority to decide the mandate for European bargaining and adopts the agreements of the social partners. Furthermore, the ETUC itself participates in negotiations in the European social dialogue. In SATUCC, the positions of labour only serve as guidelines only to the national trade union delegations (Interview: Bodiba, 2002). While the ETUC Executive Committee convenes four times a year and ETUC activities are managed by a Steering Committee, SATUCC Executive Committee meetings occur just twice a year; between these meetings there is limited co-ordination of activities—a problem for SATUCC.

• Although the European umbrella organisation has very few financial and human resources, the Commission finances its participation in the social dialogue. SATUCC is in a much more difficult position in this respect. Generally it depends on donor funds, mostly project-linked. When taking part in ELS conferences, it receives some financial support from the national governments. At times, some of the national social partners are not represented in the social dialogue because governments refuse to make the required funds available. Despite this problem, trade union representatives are convinced that such an arrangement should remain in place for reasons of governmental political responsibility (Interviews: Bodiba, 2002; Kachima, 2002; Maserumule, 2002).

• Regarding strategic orientation, discussions within the ETUC were governed by the question of what part the organisation should play on the European level and whether socio-political regulations should be adopted on a European or a national level. Only once the European internal market and the institutionalisation of the social dialogue had been introduced did the desire for a more active influence on the European decision-making process take root. SATUCC was initially focused on the liberation struggle, and gave attention to labour’s interests on a regional level only following democratisation in Namibia and South Africa and the institutionalisation of social dialogue in ELS in the mid 1990s.

• Since the Maastricht Social Protocol, European labour and employer representatives have the same status as the Council when adopting and implementing socio-political regulations; they are fully-acknowledged players in the European law-making process. Due to the bilateral structure of the social dialogue, they are formally independent from the national governments; labour representatives can negotiate binding agreements with employers and implement them directly. When such agreements are confirmed by council decisions, as is usually the case, the governments adopt the social partners’ consensus virtually verbatim. The social partners’ legal status in SADC, on the other hand, is much lower. Social dialogue in ELS can only recommend, and the government representatives in the Council of Ministers have the final word on implementation of the consensus reached. Furthermore, labour representatives in the tripartite negotiations in ELS are
facing not just employers but also governments, which renders a consensus even more difficult.

- Practical experience in social dialogue has shown that both SATUCC and the ETUC depend on national governments in order to stand their ground against employers. Only under threat of legislation from the Council that deals with more extensive regulations on socio-political matters, did employers agree to a social partner agreement, to avoid worse to come, as it were.

- The results of social dialogue in both regions differ, especially in that the European directives are legally binding as opposed to the non-binding provisions and action programmes adopted in the ELS. As far as content is concerned, the European and the African socio-political measures are aimed predominantly at safeguarding minimum labour standards, and are often based on the smallest common denominator. The difference, however, is that the implementation of SADC provisions in the member states has proved extremely difficult, while the implementation of the European directives is monitored and guaranteed by the European Court of Justice.

Generally speaking, participation in the social dialogue and further institutional development of industrial relations on a regional level play an equally important part in the ETUC and SATUCC, as do the material results of bargaining. Involvement of the social partners in the EU’s regional decision-making compared to the situation in individual EU states is still in its initial stage, yet far advanced if compared to SADC. For SADC, the social dialogue has low priority, although seen in a regional context it is much more advanced than in most SADC member states. This may constitute an incentive for further development of national social partner consultations in SADC. It must be remembered that the European Trade Union Confederation developed in parallel to European integration in respect of its internal structures and objectives, as well as its influence on decision-making in the EU. It is to be hoped, therefore, that with efforts around more integration within SADC, SATUCC, too, will change into a more efficient and more supranationally-oriented organisation.

In both the ETUC and SATUCC, socio-political measures are aimed predominantly at safeguarding minimum labour standards.
5 REFERENCES


Interviews

Oupa Bodiba, COSATU Representative in ELS, 10 July 2002.

Moses Kachima, General Secretary of SATUCC, 7 July 2002.

ACRONYMS

CBI Confederaton of British Industry
CED Confédération Européenne des Cades
CEEP European Centre of Enterprises with Public Participation and of Enterprises of General Interest
CESI Confédération Européenne des Syndicats Indépendents
COSATU Congress of South African Trade Unions
EC European Community
EFTA European Free Trade Association
EIC European Industry Committee
ELS Employment and Labour Sector
ESC Economic and Social Committee [of ETUC]
ETUC European Trade Union Confederation
ETUCO European Trade Union College
ETUI European Trade Union Institute
EU European Union
EWC European Works Council
FES Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
ICFTU International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
ILO International Labour Organisation
ITS International Trade Secretariat
LaRRI Labour Resource and Research Institute
LDC Least Developed Country
NACTU National Council of Trade Unions
OATUU Organisation of African Trade Union Unity
SADC Southern African Development Community
SADCC Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference
SALC Southern African Labour Commission
SATUCC Southern Africa Trade Union Co-ordination Council
SWOP Sociology of Work Project [University of the Witwatersrand]
THE ROLE OF REGIONAL TRADE UNION FEDERATIONS
IN SOCIAL DIALOGUE: A COMPARISON OF THE EU AND SADC

TUC  Trade Union Congress
UEAPME  Association of Trade, Small and Medium Size Enterprise
UNICE  Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe
WFTU  World Federation of Trade Unions
WTO  World Trade Organisation
Appendix 1

*Members of the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC)*

**National Trade Union Confederations (66)**

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See ETUC website at [www.etuc.org](http://www.etuc.org)
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<td>Türkiye Hak Isci Sendikalari Konfederasyonu</td>
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<td>KESK</td>
<td>Kamu Emekçileri Sendikalari Konfederasyonu Servants</td>
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<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>TUC</td>
<td>Trades Union Congress</td>
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Observers (8)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>SSHU</td>
<td>Saveza Samostalnih Sindikata Hrvatske (Union of Autonomous Trade Unions of Croatia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>EAKL</td>
<td>Eesti Ametiühingute Kesk Liit (Association of Estonian Trade Unions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TALO</td>
<td>Estonian Employee's Unions' Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>LBAS</td>
<td>Latvijas Brivo Arodbiedribu Savienība (Union of Independent Trade Unions of Latvia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>LDS</td>
<td>Lietuvos Darbininkų Sąjunga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LPSS</td>
<td>Lithuanian Trade Union Unification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>SSM</td>
<td>Federation of Trade Unions of Macedonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>VSA</td>
<td>Vereinigung Schweizerischer Angestelltenverbände</td>
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**European Industry Committees (11)**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EEA</td>
<td>European Entertainment Alliance</td>
<td>EFBWW</td>
<td>European Federation of Building and Woodworkers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FETBB</td>
<td>Fédération Européenne des Travailleurs du Batiment et du Bois</td>
<td>EFFAT</td>
<td>European Federation of Food, Agriculture and Tourism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trade Unions - Fédération Européenne des Syndicats de l'Alimentation, de l'Agriculture et du Tourisme</td>
<td>EPJ - PEJ</td>
<td>European Federation of Journalists - Fédération Européenne des Journalistes</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMCEF</td>
<td>European Mine, Chemical and Energy Workers' Federation</td>
<td>EMF - FEM</td>
<td>European Metalworkers' Federation - Fédération Européenne des Métallurgistes</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPSU</td>
<td>European Federation of Public Service Unions - Fédération Syndicale Européenne de Services Publics</td>
<td>ETF</td>
<td>European Transport Workers' Federation - Fédération Européenne des Travaillleurs des Transports</td>
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<tr>
<td>ETUCE</td>
<td>- European Trade Union Committee for Educ - Comité Syndical Européen de l'Éducation</td>
<td>CSEE</td>
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<tr>
<td>ETUF-TCL/FSE-THC</td>
<td>European Trade Union Federation - Textiles Clothing and Leather / Fédération Syndicale Européenne du Textile, de l'Habillement et du Cuir</td>
<td>UNI-EUROPA</td>
<td>Union Network International</td>
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APPENDIX 2

MEMBERS OF THE SOUTHERN AFRICA TRADE UNION COORDINATION COUNCIL (SATUCC)\textsuperscript{17}

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>UNTA</td>
<td>Angolan Organisation of Workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>BFTU</td>
<td>Botswana Federation of Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>LTUC</td>
<td>Lesotho Trade Union Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>MCTU</td>
<td>Malawi Congress of Trade Unions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
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<td>Mauritius Labour Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>OTM</td>
<td>Organisacao dos Trabalhadores de Mocambiqu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>NUNW</td>
<td>National Union of Namibian Workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>COSATU</td>
<td>Congress of South African Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NACTU</td>
<td>National Council of Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>SFTU</td>
<td>Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>TFTU</td>
<td>Tanzanian Federation of Trade Unions</td>
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<td>Zambia</td>
<td>ZCTU</td>
<td>Zambia Congress of Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
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<td>Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions</td>
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\textsuperscript{17} LaRRI, 2001:20-75.