NAZI

GERMANY

AND

FASCIST

ITALY

HAVE

INVADED

SPAIN

B89-559
A Solemn Appeal

The following appeal was contained in the Spanish Government's Note of April 5th, 1938, addressed to the British and French Governments:

It is necessary to face the fact that the German and Italian intervention in Spain appears, after all these months, as something so deeply rooted in and so firmly bound up with the historic course which their respective totalitarian regimes impose on the two countries, that it is puerile to imagine that the considerations, motives and objects which served as a basis for the Non-intervention Agreement can influence them in the slightest degree.

Aware of the importance of its decision, the Government of the Republic, at a critical point in the struggle which the discharge of these very duties has compelled it to accept, considers itself authorised to address to the Governments of France and the United Kingdom a solemn appeal, not only with regard to the profound and unbearable injustice which constitutes a continuation of non-intervention, but also with regard to the vast political perils which its blind and arbitrary continuation involves for the future.

It is an injustice which ought to be as intolerable for the interests of those who suffer as for the consciences of those who impose it, since non-intervention is maintained with the knowledge that it will be applied solely and exclusively against the Government, and the contrast between the firmness and energy used in the maintenance of non-intervention when the Government of the Republic is concerned and the absolute indifference shown to the constant and obvious violations on the part of Germany and Italy on behalf of the rebels cannot fail to arouse the indignation of every upright person.

This absolute inability to stop intervention and direct assistance to the rebels on the part of the German and Italian Governments has, on the other hand, created a situation in which non-intervention not only cannot ensure the achievement of one of its essential and more noble aims—namely, that the solution of the Spanish question should be the exclusive task of the Spanish people themselves—but in which it has become a most effective instrument to ensure that the contrary is achieved—namely, that the solution of the Spanish question should be achieved by the intervention and help given to the rebels by Germany and Italy.

Thus, besides being unjust and iniquitous, the maintenance of non-intervention by France and England constitutes a flagrant attack on the most elementary principles of logic.

While all this can still be effectively remedied, while there is still time to prevent the disastrous consequences of the injustice and the political error which the maintenance of non-intervention implies, the very people who initiated it having abandoned all hope and having renounced every serious practical intention of enforcing it in its entirety, the Government of the Republic would not feel that it had done its loyal duty to the Governments of France and the United Kingdom if it did not state in clear, unmistakable terms its point of view regarding a question so vitally affecting the permanent general interests of the Spanish people, and solemnly reaffirms its right to obtain the war material necessary for it to drive back the foreign invasion to which its national territory is being subjected.

Copy of document found in pocket of a German officer, Lt. Kurt Kettner, showing the organisation of eight squadrons of Heinkel 111. (See page 10.)
NAZI GERMANY’S AND FASCIST ITALY’S INVASION OF SPAIN

The “NATIONAL” GOVERNMENT says that “non-intervention” in Spain has saved the peace of Europe and has prevented foreign powers joining in the Spanish war.

The Labour Party says that the policy of so-called “non-intervention” has brought Europe to the brink of war and has been the mask behind which the Fascist powers of Italy and Germany have poured in their troops and war material to defeat the Spanish people; that “non-intervention” has never worked well; that since the dismissal of Mr. Eden it has worked worse and worse; that since the negotiations began with Italy, Mussolini and Hitler have redoubled their attacks on the Spanish people; and, finally, that non-intervention has become the thin cloak behind which the German and Italian armies, navies and air forces are carrying on a ruthless war against the Spanish people.

Which is right?

Here is the evidence. Judge for yourself.

Are the Foreigners Fighting for Franco Volunteers or Conscripts?

The “National” Government says that they are volunteers, and speaks of them in the same breath as the volunteers fighting on the Government side, the International Brigade.

The Italian and German “volunteers” themselves reply to the “National” Government.

Here is Alphonso Tanner, sergeant in the Italian Army and captured on March 28, 1938, by the Republicans, when his Italian Fiat tank overturned in the battle on the Aragon front.

“I didn’t come to Spain as a volunteer,” he wrote in a statement he made a few days later. “On the contrary, on going on board to come to Spain we were told we were going to relieve another battalion which was in Abyssinia...”

Conscripted at the beginning of the war for a foreign service whose nature was concealed from them, Italian soldiers are, says Sergeant Tanner, kept prisoner in Spain by their own government.

“Leave to return to Italy,” he remarked, “is never granted. I know one case of a so-called Italian ‘volunteer’ whose son died and whose wife is seriously ill and who was not given leave though he asked for it. Only disabled soldiers return to Italy. Wounded men who can recover are sent back to the front...”

Perhaps you suspect the evidence of a captured prisoner. Very well then, here is a document which cannot lie.

It is the mobilisation order found on the body of a dead Italian left on the field at Guadalajara. There is very little of the “volunteer” about this document:

By the order of His Majesty the King, Bessi, Benso, son of Giuseppe, belonging to Class 1910, is recalled to the colours.

He must report, provided with this order and his discharge papers, at the Order of the Legion 35, M.V.N, in La Spezia, in the first hours of the morning of 25-11-1936.

Those who have been recalled, and do not present themselves within the time stated, without giving legitimate reasons will be, according to the law, sent before the military courts.

THE CONSUL, Commander of the 99 Legion
(Ciani Ferdinando).

Even the dead cry out: “We are not volunteers.”

Judge for yourself. Who is right? The “National” Government, or Sergeant Tanner. Which do you accept; the assurances of Mr. Chamberlain, or the mute evidence of the dead Italian soldier?

Who Commands these Foreigners Fighting for the Spanish Fascists?

The “National” Government says that they are under the control of the rebel Spanish generals.

To this the foreign soldiers themselves again reply.

On the same day as Sergeant Tanner and Second Lieutenant Poggi were captured, there was also brought down a German Heinkel 59 plane, No. 526. The pilot, Bruno Stotzen, who freely admitted that he belonged to the German Air Force, made a short statement explaining how he got to Spain.

It is significant that he never mentioned in it ever having received an order from, or even having spoken to, a Spaniard.
“Major Nanken asked me to go to Spain. I don’t know the name of the ship (on which he went to Spain), but the crew spoke German... I and a ground mechanic named Eberhardt went to Valladolid and from there to Cadiz. We were met by a German in civilian clothes who took us to a merchant ship in which we went to Palma... I reported to my commander Major Hallinghausen, who said that he expected us to do our duty in the same way as when we were serving in Germany.”

Compare his experiences with those of his Italian counterpart, the pilot, Gino Poggi, brought down the same day.

“I never take any orders from the Spaniards,” he wrote bluntly, in his statement previously referred to. “Our orders come from General Vernasconi, as he is known in Italy. In Spain he goes under the name of Garda...”

Indeed, he is most frank and revealing on this question of change of name which however much it may have confused the “National” Government is no mystery to this junior officer.

“The head of the Air Force in Palma is General Vellarni or Vellarde. He uses one name in Spain and another in Italy, but I never knew which was which. ... (At Logrono) Lieutenant-Colonel Vicentelli, whose name in Italy is Cupini is in command of... group 12 as well as group 8... The Commander of my squadron is known as Parini in Italy.” And apparently well-known, too, for Second Lieutenant Poggi goes on to say: “I got my passport from him in Rome. He brought it from the Air Ministry there.”

Not only, say these prisoners, do the Germans and Italians have their own superior and senior officers. They have their own organisations within Spain itself, a real army of occupation.

“The Italian Fascist party militiamen,” explained the Italian tank driver, Sergeant Tanner, “are not sent to the wars. In Italy they are employed in watching the roads and frontiers and in police work. In fact, they are Mussolini’s private police. Some of these militia have also come to Spain. They don’t serve at the fronts, but they do the work which they did in Italy and control the roads which are used by Italian cars. There are also Italian ‘carabinieri,’ who act as military police for the Italian soldiers...”

To this picture of the Italian occupation of Spain Second Lieutenant Poggi adds one significant little detail. “I send my mail with Italian stamps.”

How Important to Franco is this Foreign Help which He is Receiving?

The “National” Government tries to conceal and minimise it.

The Labour Party says that it is entirely due to the foreign invaders that the Fascists have been able to secure their successes over the Spanish people.

Let us go to a source not likely to be “tainted” by any great sympathy for Labour. On March 26, The Times wrote:

“Nothing now can save the cause of the Government in Spain unless foreign intervention comes to their rescue on terms approximately equal to the help Italy and Germany are giving to General Franco.”

Labour does not accept the easy assumption of the defeat of the Spanish people, which The Times had already made after the advance on Madrid in November, 1936, after the fall of Malaga and again after the fall of Bilbao.

But it is interesting to see that even The Times endorses Labour’s view that it is foreign intervention which has enabled the Spanish rebels to gain their victories.

How far does documented evidence bear this out?

Aerial warfare is one of the deciding factors in the war. What do the prisoners say about General Franco’s air force?

“The only planes which the Spanish nationalists fly,” says Second Lieutenant Poggi, “are Savoia 79’s and two groups of Fiats. I think the Spaniards have fourteen or fifteen Savoias... All the Italian planes are flown by Italians... At Palma (Majorca)... the only Spanish we saw on the aerodrome were the sentries...”

“I think that General Franco is only a figure generalissimo. For Germans are in command of Germans and Italians in command of Italians. Franco has practically no air force.”

Compared to this tiny Spanish Nationalist force of two groups of chaser planes, and fourteen or fifteen bombers — sixty planes at the most — what is the extent of the German and Italian air forces?

On March 14, 1938, the Spanish Ministry of National Defence issued a note giving details of the German air force then taking part in the offensive on the Aragon front. At that date, they gave the numbers as follows:

- 8 squadrons of heavy Heinkel 111 bombing planes.
- 8 squadrons of Messer-Schmidt chasers, type 109.
- 2 squadrons of Heinkel 57 chasers.
- 1 reconnaissance group of 22 planes composed of Dornier type 17 and Heinkel type 45.

Compare this crushing force of 220 German planes used in one offensive alone with Franco’s total air force for all Spain of less than 60 planes.

In addition to these used in the Aragon offensive, there are, of course, other German planes used in Spain by the German air force. Notable among these are the slow, ponderous Junkers 52 which so effectively bombarded the undefended towns of Bilbao and Guernica. But it is their latest air force machines which Germany is to-day employing against the Spanish people.

What evidence can be produced to substantiate the Spanish Government’s figures?

Take, for example, the first item on the list: 8 squadrons of Heinkel 111.

When asked by Mr. Seymour Cocks, in the House of Commons, in July last year, Viscount Cranborne said that “a few machines” of this Heinkel 111 type were first observed in Spain in April, 1937. So, if there are to-day engaged in the Aragon offensive 8 squadrons — that is to say, with reserves, well over 100 planes of this make alone — there has been some large scale intervention since April, 1937, when the control scheme and the ban on volunteers had already been in force for a month.
Interrogatorio del Sottotenente Poggi Oino

del 1 aprile 1938

Siamo stati mandati a combattere in Spagna per che l’Italia ha degli interessi da difendere nel Mediterraneo. La minaccia di Mussolini credo sia quella di impossessarsi di Salò di Maiorca.

Se la Spagna fosse una delle regioni dell’Italia potrebbe utilizzare i porti spagnoli in caso di guerra.

Certo non si deve trattenere solo la questione di Maiorca.

In questi ultimi mesi (marzo 1938) sono continuati ad arrivare di più a Logroño ne sono arrivati quindici un po’ di setti e, non sono stati destinati ad altri campi di aviazione. A Logroño sì sono formati alcuni, tra cui un certo Severini, questi ultimi arrivati hanno detto che altri 15 aviatori sarebbero arrivati col prossimo pirocafo.

I pirocafì che trasportano gli aviatori sono: "Amine", "Kienze" e prenda vassoio.

A Logroño vi è il comando italiano dell’Aeronautica.

Il Severini che si è fermato nella mia squadriglia, è sottotenente credo già ventuno col pirocafo "Amine".

I piloti vengono generalmente ai pirocafì. Solo gli ufficiali del maggiore in su a quelli che pilotano il proprio apparecchio, vengono in Spagna per via aerea. Gli ufficiali superiori vengono con il servizio re- sultato dell’ALATA ITALIANA.

Le bombe che usiamo sono italiane e ne arrivano continuamente. A Logroño ho visto 14 carri marci pieni di bombe.

Le polveriere di Logroño sono piena di bombe provenienti dall’Italia.

L’invito accelerato dal materiale in questo ultimo tempo è dovuto al fatto che Mussolini vuole finire la guerra in Spagna.

Correva la voce che tutti gli italiani sarebbero rimastati tra i mesi.

Mussolini ne ha preso degli 1 peggiori con l’Inghilterra di non mandare materiale certo non c’è bello che non tanghi fede agli 1 peggiori, anco che pure sia d’accordo con l’Inghilterra, cioè che Chamberlain sia anche lui d’accordo che si dice che non si mandi materia, ma che poi sia d’accordo che si mandi.

Questo anche perché ha sentito dire che l’Inghilterra avrebbe mandato del materiale a Franco in cambio di minerali di Bilbao.

Credo che tra Mussolini e Chamberlain vi sia un accordo nel senso che Chamberlain sa dell’invito di armi ed uomini, sa che Mussolini e Chamberlain si gioca una corda.

L’Inghilterra cerca di mettersi d’accordo con l’Italia per salvare le sue vie di comunicazione marittime. Noi pensiamo pure che il Mussolini che comanda ed ha ottenuto delle concessioni dall’Inghilterra.

In previsione della guerra con l’Inghilterra, Mussolini (all’epoca delle sanzioni) aveva fatto vivere cento-cinquanta ufficiali piloti che si peggiano da setti e, con degli apparecchi sopra le vie della Inghilterra e dovrebbero essersi col pendio e avviarono una flottainglese.

Certo che Mussolini non avrebbe avuto tutti i porti della Spagna all’Inghilterra, non avrebbe niente da fare nel Mediterraneo.

Nei nostri commedai lo si possono pensare molte cose, ma si possono solo dire quelle che sono contro le autorità e il governo fascista.

Reproduction of last two pages of a signed declaration made by Second Lieutenant Poggi, an Italian officer captured by the Spanish Government forces. The declaration proves beyond doubt that Italian reinforcements continued to arrive in Spain during March, 1938. (See pp. 6, 7, 14, 15.)
However, the most dramatic commentary upon the Spanish Government’s statement is the document (reproduced on page 3) which was found in the pocket of the German officer Kettner captured a few days after the Spanish Government had issued its statement.

But first to deal with Lieutenant Kurt Kettner. Observe the date on his identity card. It is March 3, 1938.

Pilot; Second Lieutenant Hermann Strohscheier, Radio Operator; Sergeant Schmitz, Mechanic. They came, they said, from the German base at Pollensa, Majorca, and their Commander there was Major Hallinghausen. It was this same Major Hallinghausen, you will remember, who told Sergeant Stotzen that he expected the German air force in Spain to do their duty in the same way as when they were serving in Germany.

The Italian air force is approaching the German in numbers. Second Lieutenant Poggi estimated that there were at least ten Breda 65’s, ten Breda 20’s, twenty-one Savoia 89’s, eighteen Savoia 81’s, seven Romeo 37’s, and 130 Fiats employed in the Aragon attack.

Next to the air force perhaps the most important weapon is the tank. Who, on the Spanish rebels’ side, controls it?

Sergeant Tanner, himself a non-commissioned officer in the Italian tank corps, thus describes the position on the southern Aragon front in the last weeks in March.

There were, he said, sixty-five tanks employed, under the command of Colonel Babini Valentino, an officer of the Italian regular army. Of these, sixty-four were of the Fiat two-seater type, and had come from Italy.

Out of the total of 65, only 13 were manned by Spanish rebel soldiers. The crews of the remaining 52 were drawn from the regular Italian armed forces, and were responsible to the Italian higher command.

After aeroplanes and tanks, men.

In the House of Commons on February 17, 1937, Viscount Cranborne, then Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, said the British Government’s information was that one-half of the troops which entered Malaga were Italians.

The evidence of Italian prisoners-of-war is amply confirmed by their own Government, which boasts that Italian regular troops have played as great a part in the rebel victories in Aragon as they played in the taking of Malaga, Bilbao and Santander.

"The Italian legionaries," announced the National Directorate of the Italian Fascist Party on March 22, 1938, "are an essential factor in the victory of General Franco."

Statements of Italian infantry prisoners given in answer to a questionnaire show that these Legionaries are divided into four divisions; the Blue Arrows, the Black Arrows, the March 23rd, and the Littorio. A semi-official message from Salamanca on March 27 refers to them as "an army corps."

In a statement made on March 18, 1938, another Italian air force officer, Lieutenant Mario Minervi, estimated the number of regular Italian troops alone, not counting Blackshirts, at 60,000. But far more important than their numbers are their armament and their mechanised equipment which includes two light and one heavy machine-gun to each fifteen men.
“Every one of them,” added Sergeant Tanner, “has an Italian gas-mask.”

As on land, and in the air, so at sea. Questioned in the House of Commons on March 23, 1938, Mr. Geoffrey Shakespeare, Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty, admitted: “In the late autumn of last year . . . General Franco’s forces received four additional destroyers and, as my Right Honourable Friend, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs indicated on March 16, there have been reports that these vessels were of Italian origin.”

While upholding “non-intervention” Signor Mussolini has given General Franco an army and air force and a navy.

Has Italian and German Intervention Increased since the National Government began Negotiations with Italy?

First, how much reliance can be placed on the “National” Government’s assurances?

Just a year ago (March 18, 1937), speaking of non-intervention, Lord Cranborne said: “In our opinion, it has been made effective.”

A few weeks later (March 22, 1937) Mr. Eden said, in answering a question on the Italian troops in Spain, “If by Italian troops, the Honourable Member means units of the Italian army, I have no evidence which establishes the landing of such units in Spain.”

In June, he went even further: “I have heard nobody suggest that since the scheme of supervision has been in force there have been any large gaps in it . . . I maintain that naval and land supervision have been effective.”

Viscount Cranborne was even more positive: “. . . The flow of foreign nationals to Spain,” he said on June 30, 1937, “has been checked and no instances of such arrival have been notified to the Board For Non-Intervention since the entry into force, February 20, 1937, of the scheme of observation at the Spanish frontier.” However, finally there did come a time when both Mr. Eden and Lord Cranborne realised that Italian Intervention had not, in fact, been checked. Rather than begin negotiations with Italy before the withdrawal of Italian troops had begun in earnest, they resigned.

No troops were withdrawn. Despite their resignations Mr. Chamberlain still continued to assure the House of Commons that the British Government had no new positive evidence of intervention. Asked by Mr. Noel-Baker what reports had been received concerning the arrival in insurgent territory of war materials from Italy and Germany, Mr. Chamberlain, on March 2, 1938, replied: “No recent reports of this nature have been received.”

Are there any other reports, not received presumably by the British Government, which have been made?

On March 28, 1938, the Spanish Ministry of National Defence issued an extremely detailed account of recent German and Italian intervention:

“On February 27, twenty-eight German pilots left Totow, near Stralsund, Germany, for Spain. They travelled on a Junkers 86 plane, and flew direct to Burgos. On February 28, eighty more German pilots of the Magdeburg flying school, flew direct to Portugal and from there went over to rebel territory. On March 19, fifty-four pilots left Zellsdorf aerodrome for Spain. On March 16, the ss. ‘Franca Fassio’ landed 250 Italian pilots in Seville. On March 2, a body of German troops arrived in Bilbao. On March 10, the Spanish steamers ‘Andraca-mendi’ ‘Ultra-mendi’ and ‘Jupiter’ arrived in Cadiz . . . and on March 11, the Italian steamer ‘Trieste’ . . . also arrived . . . These vessels landed a total of 4,500 infantry troops, 500 Blackshirts, 90 soldiers belonging to the Italian air force, 200 artillery men, and a number of drivers.”

Note how minute the information is, and how simple it would be to check. Is it not significant, that though the British Government pretend to have no knowledge that Italy or Germany have sent any recent reinforcements, they have never attempted to deny the allegations in detail which, were they untrue, it should be easy to do.

Thus, if the Spanish steamers “Andraca-mendi” “Ultra-mendi” and “Jupiter,” and the Italian steamer “Trieste” did not bring troops to Cadiz on March 10 and 11, surely the British Government could show either that those ships did not visit the port of Cadiz on that date at all, or else that, though they indeed happened to be there, they were carrying an innocuous cargo? After all, we have a British consul in Cadiz.

Similarly, in a note issued on March 31, 1938, the Spanish Government gave the numbers of German planes arriving within the previous few weeks.

The list is as follows:—

48 Heinkel chasers
12 Heinkel bombers
52 Messer-Schmidt chasers.
6 Ruehrbruch fast heavy bombers
18 Junkers 3-engined bombers
2 Junkers 4-engined heavy bombers

Which do you believe, the Spanish Government or the “National” Government? Which statement of the case do the Italian and German prisoners confirm?

Sergeant Tanner, at any rate, would not agree with Mr. Eden that there was no evidence which established the landing of units of the Italian army in Spain.

“On January 16, 1937,” he said in his statement, my battalion embarked . . . The ship was the Italian vessel ‘Tevere’ and she was escorted during the whole trip by an Italian destroyer. On the same ship came an infantry battalion . . ."
Judge for yourselves; is or is not an Italian battalion a unit of the Italian army?

Second Lieutenant Poggi’s own experiences bear out Sergeant Tanner’s evidence.

"In August, 1937," he said, speaking of the passage of his “Stormo” to Spain, “two complete squadrons left for Spain. Afterwards another one. And then on December 24, 1937, we ourselves set out for Palma...” Such was Signor Mussolini’s Christmas message of peace and goodwill!

Sergeant Stotzen, the German pilot, left even later. Indeed, he and his seventy other German companions could scarcely have been in Spain a week when Mr. Chamberlain made his statement to the House of Commons that the British Government had no information upon recent foreign help being sent to the Spanish rebels. (March 2, 1938.)

What evidence is there that Italian intervention has increased with the opening of the Anglo-Italian negotiations? On this point, nothing could be more significant than Second Lieutenant Poggi’s declaration.

Look at the last two pages of his statement taken down in his native Italian. It is worth while quoting his actual words in his native tongue:

“L’invio accelerato del materiale in questo ultimo tempo è dovuto al fatto che Mussolini vuole finire la guerra in Spagna.”

“The increased import of materials in these last days is due to the fact that Mussolini wishes to finish the war in Spain.”

In the mind of this serving soldier the period of the recent Anglo-Italian negotiations stands out as the great period of Italian intervention. What is more he gives details:

“During this last month (March, 1938) pilots have continued to arrive. About two weeks ago, fifteen arrived at Longrono. Among these was one of the name of Severini (a Second Lieutenant in the Italian air force it later emerges) The steamers which bring over the air force men are the ‘Aniene,’ the ‘Fierenze’ and the ‘Franca Fassio.’... The bombs which we use are Italian and arrive the whole time. At Longrono, I saw fourteen railway trucks full of bombs. The arsenal at Longrono is filled with bombs from Italy.”

Second Lieutenant Poggi’s statement is dated April 1, 1938. It is a small point, but not without significance. The Spanish Government in their note, issued three days before, and which has already been quoted, cited the “Franca Fassio” as one of the Italian ships which brought over the Italian pilots.

Once again subsequent information bears out the Spanish Government’s official communiques. The “National” Government still refuses to accept them.

Weigh up the evidence for yourself. Do you accept the word of the Spanish Government or that of the “National” Government who “have no recent reports” upon foreign intervention in Spain?

Here is the evidence. It is for you to judge it for yourselves.

Second Lieutenant Poggi has his own explanation. “Mussolini,” he says, “will declare that he is no longer sending anything to Franco, but intervention is being increased so as to trick England.”

You may, or you may not, accept this explanation. But whether or not the “National” Government is the dupe or is the accomplice of General Franco, it is clearly unfit to safeguard the interests of this country.