The attacks of September 11 have widely – and rightly – been interpreted as attacks on the present international order. The targets clearly were selected in part because of their symbolic importance: the World Trade Center as the epitome of America’s economic supremacy, the Pentagon as the brain of America’s global military reach. Yet this was not only an attack on America: the terrorist acts also aimed at the United States as the flag bearer of the Western world and its core values and as the dominant power of the present international order. However warped al Qaeda’s ideas and objectives for an alternative order were, its acts were meant to mount a challenge to the very principles and norms underlying the present international order, as well as America’s pivotal position in it.

Although the terrorist attacks were broadly condemned and abhorred, there also was a widespread reaction of »schadenfreude«, a sense that »America had asked for this«, particularly in the Islamic world.¹ This lack of legitimacy reflects the realities of misery and violence in many parts of the South: the number of casualties claimed by the terrorist attacks would hardly register in the abject statistics of violence in places like Sudan, Afghanistan (before Oct. 7), or Central and West Africa. In short, al Qaeda’s attacks not only were motivated by a different view of international order (however twisted it may seem to us), but this view found considerable resonance worldwide, at least ex negativo – i.e., in its rejection of the prevailing Western views of international order.

In its response to »terrorism with a global reach«, the United States launched a war against al Qaeda and its backers, the Taliban regime, in Afghanistan. But Washington also assembled a broad coalition of governments and initiated a wide range of cooperative international initiatives. The attacks therefore have not only shaken international order and bared its limited legitimacy, but they also have stimulated new efforts to

consolidate, enhance and reform this present international order. Thus, the terrorist attacks have thrown wide open the future shape of international order: they could lead to a serious degradation, a return to pervasive low-level violence even within rich countries, with the situation in Israel and Palestine as a glimpse of our own future, or it could trigger new efforts at enhancing international order around the core values of non-violent resolution of conflict, social justice and political inclusion.

On the Concept of »International Order«

Yet what exactly is this »international order«, and what has come under attack on September 11? We first need to recognize that, while »international order« is not a Western concept, its present shape and prevailing notions about international order are Western in a rather deep sense: at present, international order and the debate about it is the product of what the historian William H. McNeill has called »The Rise of the West« – the ascendance of the European world through the dynamics of modernization, of which globalization represents but the most recent and most advanced stage.

Western notions of international order, however, are ambivalent. The present international order, as expressed, e.g., in the Charter of the United Nations, is built around several core norms: the norms of non-violent conflict resolution, of states rights (sovereignty) and of human rights. The latter two clearly are in tension with each other, and the UN Charter is profoundly ambivalent as to whose international order it establishes – is it an order of and for states, or of and for individuals? This tension is further accentuated by the fact that states are both indispensable sources of protection and massive violation of human rights. How then, should »international order« be conceived in the struggle against terrorism with global reach? Does »international order« concern only

2. This is the view of Martin van Creveld, expressed well before September 11. Cf. his: The Transformation of War, Houndsmill: Macmillan 1991
3. This view will be developed further below. For an authoritative expression of belief in such an order, see Kofi Annan’s speech on the occasion of presentation of the Nobel Peace Prize to the United Nations in November 2001: http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/01122004.htm (accessed Dec. 27, 2001)
states, or ultimately all human beings? And is international order a static or a dynamic concept? Does it discourage or promote change?

**International Order – for Whom?**

Traditionally, concepts of international order have settled on states as their constituency, and have accepted war as an evil to be exorcised or at least tamed. Consequently, one widespread notion of »international order« equates order with international stability, that is, stable, predictable and controlled relations between states, in which turbulence, chaos and violence are largely (though not necessarily completely) absent. This notion of order focuses on interstate relations, and more specifically on relations between the major powers.

By and large, international order over the last half century has been successfully secured in the sense of this definition. A major conflagration between the powers was avoided, and generally the incidence of interstate war has been declining. States indeed have been the principal beneficiaries of this order, as suggested by the fact that their number has increased very substantially since 1945.

Yet even before September 11, it was already clear that this rather narrow definition of international order was no longer very useful, for several reasons:

- First, this perspective neglects the realities of transnational and international interdependence. The state no longer resembles the billiard ball with which traditional models of international relations had played. Societies and states have become dependent on, and vulnerable to developments elsewhere. With the oil shocks of the 1970s, economic security joined traditional national security as a key concern of security policy makers; with the Chernobyl incident, environmental destruction and cross-border pollution were added. Now, international terrorism has been highlighted as a new security concern emanating from non-state actors, rather than from other states. In short, the sources of threats to

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security have broadened to include both states and non-state actors, and as the former have been successfully reigned in, sources of threats have tended to come from the latter.

Second, the concept of security in international relations has undergone subtle but important changes. Individual and social security concerns have come to assume greater salience in national security policies, while the traditional emphasis on territorial integrity and political autonomy has receded at least in the OECD world. During the Cold War, societies had been taken hostage by military security strategies of Mutual Assured Destruction. With the disappearance of this threat new risks to individual and collective security have assumed greater importance. Thus, the »new« security agenda of proliferation, organized crime, drugs, environmental destruction and, of course, international terrorism began to crystallize and make its ways into official security policy documents and policies.

The ultimate consequence of deficient global governance would be the advance of violence within states.

With the terrorist attacks of September 11, the concept of security has undergone a further mutation. Hitherto, it was assumed that international terrorism would pursue specific demands and hence be amenable to negotiation, and that it would respect certain thresholds: terrorists, it was argued, were interested in maximum media exposure but not in maximum casualties and wanton destruction for its own sake. With the rise of religiously motivated terrorism, this logic has looked increasingly shaky,7 terrorist attacks may now be justified in very broad, vague and non-negotiable terms and aimed at maximum destruction and loss of lives. Moreover, the sources of the terrorist threat may well lie within our own societies, both in the form of organizational nodes of transnational terrorist networks such as al Qaeda and through terrorists from our own societies (as seems to be the case with the anthrax attacks in the United States). While it is arguable whether globalization really should be considered as one – or even the – cause for the terrorist attacks of September 11, it is clear that the attacks represent globalization in action: al Qaeda

has perfectly understood and exploited the opportunities for networked terrorist operations in the age of globalization.

In sum, a notion of international order which abstracts from conditions within states and interdependencies between societies no longer is meaningful. What is needed is a concept which covers both intra- and interstate relations, both state and society. This has increasingly been recognized by the international community itself, as indicated by the shift in international law and international practice towards »humanitarian intervention«.8

Defense of the status quo or alliance for progress?

A second Western definition of »international order« tends to equate it with the prevailing international status quo. This definition is both broader and more narrow than the previous one. It is broader because it includes domestic political arrangements within states, at least to the extent they are important for sustaining existing arrangements of international governance. But it is more narrow because it is more resistant to change than the first definition, which does allow for changes in international governance, as long as the system’s essential structure remains intact.

This definition, too, has obvious flaws. Although the West in general, and the United States in particular, have been dominant in and beneficiaries of the present international order, they are only in part upholders of the status quo. America, in particular, is also an anti-status quo power.9 First, American foreign policy is profoundly value-oriented: the promotion of democracy and human rights, for example, has had – for all the political pragmatism and business acumen which undeniably has always loomed large in U.S. foreign policy – significant and important international repercussions against the political status quo. The demise of the Soviet empire, the Iranian revolution or the political changes in the Phi-


lippines from President Ferdinand Marcos to Corazon Aquino and in Indonesia (from President Suharto to Presidents Habibie and Wahid) illustrate this point.

Secondly, America constantly challenges the status quo through its espousal of capitalist market economics. As a form of economic organization, capitalism is highly dynamic, highly creative and highly destructive. America has long been the lead power in global capitalism and its most powerful proponent. America, and the West in general, therefore will not only try to uphold but also constantly challenge the status quo, in search of a wealthier and better world.

International Order equals rules-based international relations

In the final analysis, then, the Western concept of international order therefore is geared towards change, to accommodate the dynamics of capitalism and the values of democracy. It tries to integrate domestic, democratic politics, the vulnerabilities of interdependence and the realities of globalization in the notion of rules-based international relations. The »rules« for international order are those which inform our own political and economic systems. In the OECD world of Western industrialized democracies, problems of war and civil strife have been successfully contained: the West enjoys the »democratic peace« of Immanuel Kant – in political relations within states, but also between them. This historical experience of Western societies in »civilizing« the management of social conflicts through self-restraint and the establishment of effective monopolies of force has been analyzed most cogently by the German sociologist Norbert Elias. Elias’ model, which originally aimed at explaining the progress of »civilized« politics within states, can also be transposed, through processes of gradual »enlargement«, onto other political contexts above the nation-state, regionally (e.g., in the European Union) and even globally. The model can be summarized in six major objectives which Dieter Senghaas has called the »civilizational hexagon«. Those six objectives are interdependent; taken together, they describe a complex program for enhancing international order. The six objectives are:

- constraining and eventually monopolizing the use of force,
- developing a non-violent culture of conflict management,
- fostering the rule of law,

building institutions,  
providing for participation in decision-making by those affected by the decisions, and  
providing for social equity and fairness.

In sum, the Western concept of international order prescribes a process of controlled, peaceful and evolutionary change towards a more civilized world in the sense of the civilizational hexagon. »Change« makes clear that this concept transcends the status quo, both domestically and internationally; »evolutionary« recognizes that the realization of this utopian project can only be done step by step; »peaceful« emphasizes constraints on the use of force in this process; and »controlled« suggests that, as change ought to go in certain directions, it needs to be politically controlled – we are therefore taking about a process in which politics is in charge.

In this concept of international order, states are pivotal: they constitute the foundations on which international order rests by ensuring rules-based behavior and non-violent conflict management within their domain, but also between them. Together, they shape the evolving rules and institutions of international order by providing for the negotiation, legitimation and implementation of international agreements; and they provide the critical building blocks of international order through their support for such arrangements by supplying the political, financial and human resources and the political will needed to make those arrangements and their institutions effective. Their importance for international order can, therefore, hardly been overstated.

But if the state is pivotal to international order, it also continues to be its nemesis. For the state to be able to play its crucial role constructively, it will need to conform to the standards of a just order set by the civilizational hexagon. From this perspective, the task of ordering international relations concerns not just inter-state and transnational, but also intra-state relations; in fact, it implies a convergence and eventual fusion of principles of domestic and international order, as economic, social, political and cultural interdependencies between states and societies continue to thicken. Failure to promote and enhance international order, on the other hand, would lead to the degradation of domestic order through corrosive influences of international anarchy. The ultimate consequence of deficient global governance thus would be the advance of violence within states.
Sources of disorder

Sources of violence in international society include both highly motivated *actors* – individuals and groups willing to use force to promote their own political agenda – and enabling *circumstances* – which create widespread support for the use of force and thus provide openings for violence. From the perspective of international order, the threat thus is both »enemies« and »entropy«.

Enemies

An »enemy« of international order is any actor who a) wants to promote a different, incompatible system of global governance, and b) is willing and capable of seriously threatening prevailing conceptions. The challenge of »enemies« ultimately is ideological – it puts into question central norms and principles of the prevailing view of international order. Since the demise of the Soviet Union, with the possible exception of Islamic fundamentalism, there has been no other plausible enemy in this traditional sense any more. Some argue, however, that China eventually could become such an enemy.

The supply of international governance has fallen behind demand, and continues to do so.

»Enemies« used to be other states. Traditional notions of national security are rooted in the modern history of state power: states traditionally have been the most important repositories of power, because they are better able to mobilize, motivate and coordinate individuals to exert themselves, even to sacrifice their lives, than any other entity (with the possible exception of religion). States also can form alliances with other states and non-state actors (including religious movements) to enhance their power. But as the attacks of September 11 have shown, non-state actors may now be able to project power on a scale comparable to that which traditionally has been confined to states. Enemies no longer need to be states, although non-state actors may need some attributes of statehood (such as territory where they may train, prepare and take sanctuary, or diplomatic passports). But this power is purely destructive – only states are likely to be able to mobilize power sufficient to build (rather than destroy) order.
Entropy

The real problem of today’s world, therefore, may well be »entropy«, rather than »enemies« – i.e. structural weaknesses in the system of governance in international relations both at the level of the state and of international institutions. One consequence of those weaknesses are turbulences, such as the volatility of international financial markets and private capital flows. Nobody intended to destroy the economy and the state of the largest Muslim society in the world, Indonesia, but the Asia crisis of 1997, which still reverberates, came pretty close to doing so. (This is not to deny the responsibility of the ancien regime, but this regime and its greed were indulged not only by its own people, but also by the »international community«). Nobody wanted to have a synchronized cycle of boom and bust in major economies, and nobody wanted a decade-long depression in Japan, which continues to endanger the health of the world economy. Yet all those things happened: proof of the profound vulnerabilities created by processes of globalization.

Those processes are, in any case, highly ambivalent and destabilizing. They promote growth but also inequality, they offer solutions to problems of poverty and destruction but also accentuate differences between those within and those outside the networks of globalization, they are highly demanding in terms of individual adjustment and therefore produce frustration as well as achievement, and they corrode traditional social structures and therefore create a void which can be filled easily by ideologies and violence. Globalization thus may not be the cause of »terrorism with global reach« in a strict sense, but it provides a conducive environment.

Secondly, with rapidly rising levels of education and accelerating social mobility and communications, the number of individuals with the necessary skills and knowledge for sophisticated terrorist attacks has grown, and the size of a group needed to realize acts such as the attacks of New York and Washington has declined. As a consequence of technological innovation, small groups or even individuals now have at their disposal unparalleled means of massive destruction. World power has thus shifted, relatively speaking, away from the state towards societal actors and even individuals. In the process, power has dissipated, and the differential between constructive and destructive uses of power has grown: while it has become easier to wield destructive force, it has become more difficult to exercise control over events.
Third, globalization also creates conditions favorable to «enemies» in their efforts to undermine this international order. «Networked» economies and societies provide the channels to prepare and implement large-scale attacks across huge distances, or even without regard to distance at all. They are also very vulnerable to disruptions, and reliance on advanced technologies to contain such vulnerabilities often creates new vulnerabilities (a classical case being nuclear energy, a means to reduce dependence on oil imports but also a source of new vulnerabilities related to nuclear accidents and waste management problems).

A fourth important (but often neglected) problem of globalization is its lack of normative appeal. Globalization emphasizes scientific and economic rationality and tolerance, which easily can be confused with neglect of spirituality. This makes it difficult to articulate globalization as an attractive vision, a persuasive ideology for those looking beyond the material promise of science and technology.

Only functioning states can provide the building blocks for a vibrant international order; yet there are preciously few strong states around.

Fifth and last, globalization also affects the most important vehicle for dealing with pressures of globalization, the state. Although it is a myth that the survival of the modern nation-state itself is threatened by globalization, challenges to its autonomy and actual operations are pervasive.\[11\] The state can no longer autonomously fulfill what it is expected to deliver by its citizens; it needs the help of others. Moreover, globalization confronts states with new demands at a time when many have not even come close to consolidating modern nation-state institutions.\[12\]

The result of all this has been state deficiency and state failure; this, in turn, has become one of the main sources of disorder in world politics. As a consequence, the supply of international governance (defined here as politics and policies which sustain and promote international order) has fallen behind demand, and continues to do so. It is easy to see why this has been the case: after the end of the Cold War and its massive mo-

\[11\] See, e.g., Held, David/McGrew, Anthony/Goldblatt, David/Perraton, Jonathan: Global Transformations, Politics, Economics and Culture, Stanford, Cal.: Stanford UP 1999, Ch.1

bilization efforts against the »Soviet threat«, Western societies have been disinclined to support comparable efforts against the new challenges, and their governments often have, for similar reasons, not done enough to promote international cooperation and integration between them. The result has been a rise in political entropy and violence.

Critical role of the state

Entropy therefore, on balance, seems the more serious threat to international order. It is entropy which enables al Qaeda (and others which may be following in its tracks) to mount such a horrendous challenge to international order, and it is, in the last analysis, only a reversal of trends towards entropy which may allow the world to contain and control the threats posed by transnational violence. Not by chance, the challenges are aimed at the state – specifically, the political regimes in the Islamic world which al Qaeda would like to overthrow, the United States and Western states which are seen as the pillars supporting existing state arrangements in the Islamic world and thus need to be defeated, and the state as a secular modern concept which is seen as incompatible with Islam.13 The response to those challenges will therefore have to come from the state – the state, in general, but specifically governments around the world which need to act to contain the threats.

This will not be easy. At the core of the supply/demand gap in international governance caused by globalization, and hence of the precariousness and fragility of international order, lies an overburdened state. Effective international governance requires functioning states as a necessary (though not a sufficient) condition; in reality, however, states often seem overburdened and overstretched even in the successful »first world« and deeply deficient, if not completely defunct, in much of the world beyond. Only functioning states can provide the building blocks for a vibrant international order; yet there are preciously few strong states around.

Enhancing International Order: Strategies, Instruments and Agents

Securing and enhancing international order in the sense outlined above can only be done through patient building of structures; it is architecture, not repair work, and its focus will have to be on the state (including on cooperation with other states). The tasks are formidable, but there are at least two good reasons for assuming that it can be done.

First, the Western notion of international order enjoys broad-based support throughout the world: demands for democracy and human rights have strong resonance everywhere, and they have led to revolutionary political changes in many parts of the world during the 1970s and 1980s. Second, the Western model so far has been the only one which could deliver success in terms of growth, rising standards of living and quality of human development.

Strategies

How could international order best be promoted? Appropriate strategies will have to address the threats from "enemies" as well as from "entropy". Although the focus needs to be firmly on proactive strategies to close the gaps and roll back the deficiencies of the present international order, in practice this will often have to be done reactively, through crisis management.

It will probably be easier to deal with "enemies". To the extent that they share or at least accept parts of the Western agenda, they can be drawn into negotiations, and thus hopefully eventually turned into partners. Regional and international cooperation and integration may be particularly helpful in this regard. If "enemies" are fundamentally opposed to international order in the sense defined here, however, then they will have to be contained and, if necessary, coerced. This will also have to involve international cooperation, most obviously in intelligence gather-

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14. This is Samuel Huntington’s "third wave" of democratization; as the author predicted, it has been followed by a reverse wave, but also by consolidation of democratic transformations in many instances. Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave*, *Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press 1991

ing, police work and law enforcement, but also through collective defense and collective security arrangements. Strong, legitimate states will be essential to make this cooperation effective.

»Entropy« will be much more difficult to contain. As we have argued, entropy in international reflects a demand/supply gap in global governance. It is thus rooted on the one hand in the proliferation of social conflict as a natural consequence of the growing complexity and interdependence of societies and a willingness by some participants to resort to violence (the demand side of the global governance equation), and the institutional deficiencies in arrangements of global governance to address both the causes and the manifestations of violent protest (the supply side). To deal with entropy or, in other words, to remove conditions which facilitate the widespread use of violence to secure advantages and express grievances, is a herculean political undertaking requiring clear priorities. Some of those priorities today are

» the promotion of a political settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through outside involvement,

» efforts to find a political solution to the Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan, and

» moves towards sustained improvements in the situation of the poor and the marginalized in many parts of the South.

To do so, the West will have to practice what it preaches. The accusation of »double standards« probably is the most condemning threat to international legitimacy of the Western concept of world order, and the West must try to reduce this lack of credibility.16

The West will also have to engage the »rest«, i.e. other powers and states outside the OECD world, in dialogue about the principles and norms of international order and create opportunities for them to participate in setting the rules and norms of international order. Ultimately, Western concepts of international order can only be sustained if they are persuasive to non-Westerners, that is, if they become truly universal. For that, the power of ideas, rather than the power of military force, and a sense of ownership through participation in decisions will be decisive.

16. A blatant recent example was the insistence of the West on full respect for commercial intellectual property rights in drugs (including drugs for treatment of AIDS in Africa) at a time when the U.S. government was pulling all stops to pressurize pharmaceutical corporations into lowering the prices for their anthrax-treatment antibiotics.
This list of priorities already adds up to a formidable agenda. But policy conceptualization is only one part of the strategic equation. The proof of the pudding is in the eating: policies will need to be implemented effectively. Here, the argument once more focuses on the state. In fact, containing entropy will need strong states. Yet even in the (post-modern) »First World« states are rarely well-prepared and well-equipped for those huge tasks of implementation; their focus tends to be on domestic problems, rather than on issues of world order. In the (modern) »Second« and in the (pre-modern) »Third World«, state institutions are often profoundly underdeveloped or flawed and need to be empowered, often with the help of other states and international institutions. Among strategies for international order, state building will therefore have to loom large.

Where deficiencies in the policy inventory are most glaring is in the realm of state building.

In sum, the policies to promote international order will be highly demanding – not least in terms of the domestic politics needed to sustain them. The reconstitution of the state in line with the demands of an age of globalization will need to become a key policy objective. In the First and the Second World, the state will have to adapt to the new demands of globalization and entropy; in the Third World, it will often have to be fundamentally (re-)built. All states will also have to enhance their capacity to cooperate with other states and share their sovereignty and autonomy in international institutions: in effect, state functions will have do be re- configured at the level above the state through international cooperation and supranational integration. Domestically, international order will require strong, versatile and democratic states; internationally a new quality of interstate and transnational cooperation and coordination will be called for, often involving de-facto transfers of national sovereignty. States will have to be able to do both – maintain domestic order and legitimacy, and carry their weight in international cooperation.

Instruments

In their international fight against enemies and entropy, what instruments do states have at their disposal? Traditionally, the most powerful instrument of the state has been military force. Clearly, military power will have an important role to play. But it needs to be wielded with caution and restraint, in full awareness of its tendencies to develop a momentum and a logic of its own. For military power basically is destructive; in order to turn it into an element of order, it needs to be wedded to political institutions to enforce authoritative, non-violent management of conflict. Tellingly, many of the international interventions of the 1990s – such as in Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor and now Afghanistan – have been followed by efforts at state-building through the international community.

Under present and foreseeable future circumstances, the use of military force will, in its logic, often resemble police enforcement action in domestic affairs, rather than on redressing power imbalances. It will also have to be based on a broadly shared sense of legitimacy.18

To contribute effectively to international order, military force will thus have to be embedded in a comprehensive strategy to restructure national and international »security systems«. For such an approach to be effective, force will have to be supplemented by material incentives. »Smart sanctions« and the capacity to identify and reward those local forces willing to support non-violent, institutionalized forms of conflict management will therefore assume a more important role as policy tools in the service of world order politics.

Where deficiencies in the policy inventory are most glaring is in the realm of state building. There, even the conceptual foundations are still shaky, let alone are the resources to do the job effectively be made available. Much of the task in practice has been assumed by the military in international post-conflict peace-building missions, and the international community has been learning by doing.

Agents

Who could be the promoters, the principal agents for a more civilized international order? There are really only two candidates for this role, the

18. Cf. the importance attached to mandates by the UN Security Council throughout the 1990s in all major interventions (the exception of the Kosovo war so far confirms, rather than negates, that rule).
United States and the European Union. Ideally, they should work in tandem as the core of an international community for world order. There will be others ready to join this community, such as Canada and Australia. Yet most of the burden will have to be carried by those two. Japan, the third industrial power, not only has been severely weakened by its prolonged economic and political crisis, but its energies will probably largely be absorbed by the rise of China in East Asia. More fundamentally, it is not clear whether Japan really shares Western values sufficiently to participate effectively in this community. Russia and China are in the throes of a difficult transition towards post-modern economies and state structures. This transition can be expected to last quite some time, and to be politically turbulent. Their participation in arrangements for international order, desirable and important as that may be, will therefore for some time be hesitant and uncertain. Still, their constructive involvement needs to be carefully nurtured, and if and when Russia and China manage to consolidate pluralist political systems and to contribute to regional and global order, overcoming the challenge of entropy would be enormously facilitated. It will therefore be critically important for the rest of the world to support and channel China’s and Russia’s efforts in that direction, and to avoid anything which could turn them into enemies of the West.

Will America chose to be both architect and resident of a new international order? Will it accept to leave the remnants of splendid isolation behind, and be constrained by the new order?

To have America and Europe cooperate in reconstructing international order should be easy in principle. The conception of international order outlined above is broadly shared by both, and the two also by and large hold compatible views on strategies and instruments. There is one major stumbling block, however – differences in their foreign policy role concepts.

For the United States, that role concept contains strong doses of unilateralism and an inclination to seek solutions through military force. It is not clear, in other words, whether America is willing not only to organize international order, but also truly to become a part of it. For the European Union, a strong commitment to multilateralism and international institutions in principle is marred by lack of cohesion and an inclination by member states in practice to put other, national considerations first.
Moreover, the EU still has not developed the capacity to systematically mobilize and apply its – considerable – economic and political power.

Those differences in the role concepts of America and Europe have implications for their respective views about appropriate strategies and tactics, in particular about the right mix of military and non-military means, and of preventive policies and crisis management. There thus exists considerable scope for disagreement between America and Europe. A new European-American alliance for world order will thus not only require, on both sides of the Atlantic, the ability to agree on a common vision, a clear shift of political priorities away from domestic preoccupations, and the political will to mobilize the required resources, but also – and perhaps most importantly – changes in role concepts on both sides of the Atlantic which would enable the two to cooperate effectively. With America, the key issue will be the way in which the United States defines its future role in the world. Will America chose to be both architect and resident of a new international order? Will it accept to leave the remnants of splendid isolation behind, and be constrained by the new order? With the European Union, the key issue will be capability. The role concept of the European Union is largely consonant with a civilized international order, except for a dose of realism, and the EU also offers an attractive model of a civilized regional order. But the EU’s cohesion and capabilities are deficient.

Conclusions

Four major conclusions can be drawn from this discussion of the future of international order.

First, a functioning international order for a globalizing world will require the reconstructing and reconfiguring of statehood. In the world of industrialized democracies, this means overhauling the state to make it stronger (which does not mean less firmly democratically controlled and inspired!), less overburdened, less entangled with society, more of a pilot than an engineer – in short, more in tune with the requirements of globalization. Beyond the OECD world, the challenge will be to fully develop the modern nation state in the first place: to that end, state defects will need to be overcome, and failed states or quasi-states will need to be (re-)built. This will often be possible only with external support, ranging from IMF conditional loans to full-scale protectorates by the international community. State building in areas where statehood has failed, has been perverted
or has never really existed will remain, probably increasingly, an important task for the international efforts at reconstructing statehood.

Second, international co-operation and integration will need important qualitative advances, in fact a complete overhaul in what might be called an »international reconfiguration of statehood«. What states traditionally have done autonomously within their own realm will henceforth increasingly have to be done at the regional and/or at the international level; in other words, state functions will have to be disentangled from the traditional territorial context of the nation state, to be reconfigured through a mixture of inter-state co-operation, supranational integration and public-private partnerships (»public policy networks«). This complex reconstruction of statehood at the regional, functional and global level in no way implies a world government or even a European super-state. Nor does it threaten the nation state’s position as the highest public authority in international relations. What is at issue is the operational autonomy of the state, and this it has been losing for some time.

Effective cooperation towards enhancing international order may at times require Europe to do just that: stand up to America, to make America stop think.

Third, the present challenge from international terrorism, as well as the larger task of creating a viable international order, are ultimately ideological in nature. »Enemies« will base their challenge on fundamentally different concepts of political order; they will have to be persuaded or defeated through ideas. »Entropy« will require the mobilization of societies for the purposes of order, both nationally and internationally. Since the state of the state has become precarious as the power of individuals has increased, it will have to persuade people to make voluntary sacrifices. What it needs, therefore, are new ideas, visions and justifications for statehood and the state.

19. One way to secure such sacrifices traditionally has been nationalism, the prime ideational mover of the modern era. Nationalism still is a very potent force in many parts of the world, but historically it is probably already in retreat. One reason may be that nationalism is becoming dysfunctional: it tends to complicate international cooperation, which will be critical in efforts to enhance international order. An example for this decline may be found in the evolution of Palestinian nationalism: Palestinians, which in many ways represented a secular and strongly (if involuntarily) modernized society, have more and more turned away from the old national
The fourth conclusion concerns the relationship between America and Europe, which will make or break international order. If their respective foreign policy role concepts, their »grand strategies«, become compatible with such a concept of international order, differences over strategy or over the appropriateness of specific instruments could still arise, but they would be manageable, and even constructive. But if that compatibility did not exist – if America pursued multilateralism »à la carte«, keeping its options open and its own policies above the constraints imposed on others, and if its approaches tended towards military solutions for political problems, while the European Union continued to lack cohesion and the capacity to contribute strategically to international order – then the transatlantic community will be headed for trouble, and international order will stagnate and eventually slide back.

What should Europe do under the circumstances? From a European perspective, the options vis-à-vis an America unwilling to change its approach to international order would be »division of labor«, the »UK approach«, the »French approach«, or a policy of »going it alone«.

► The »division of labor« approach may work for a while, but it is unlikely to be sustainable. Without an underlying compatibility of role concepts, a division of tasks and responsibilities – be it regional (with Europe ensuring order in Europe and its vicinity, and America taking care of the Middle East and Asia) or functional (with America in charge of military intervention and Europe taking care of post-conflict peace building) seems unlikely to work, as problems in today’s world cannot be neatly compartmentalized. It would also easily cause resentment on both sides of the Atlantic over a perceived lack of solidarity and issues of burden-sharing.

► The »UK approach« would consist of Europe following the U.S. lead irrespective of any misgivings about American objectives and strategies. It is difficult to see, however, how the European Union could accept such an abdication of influence. Nor would this be desirable for America itself, as it would deprive U.S. policies of a useful external »reality check«.

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ideology of secular nationalism towards Islamic fundamentalism in their struggle against Israel. While Israel ironically has actively supported this shift through its early encouragement of Islamic movements as a means to weaken the PLO, at the core of this shift lies the dismal performance of Palestinian nationalist leaders, which has largely discredited Palestinian secular nationalism.
The »French approach« of cooperation and controlled confrontation would have the EU trying to pursue different approaches but giving in if America refused to budge. This approach, if freed from irritations rooted in the specific ways in which France has tried to be difficult within the Alliance, and supported by the weight of a European Union capable of acting together, could well help to influence U.S. policy debates, and thus play a constructive role. Its precondition would, of course, be a cohesive and capable EU.

Lastly, there will be the choice of »going it alone«. The EU will, for the foreseeable future, be the only international actor capable of standing up to the U.S. – not least because of its close ties and shared values with America. Effective cooperation towards enhancing international order may at times require Europe to do just that: stand up to America, to make America stop think. To be constructive, this option will have to be used selectively and sparingly, and within a context of overall cooperation. It will also require, as the previous option, a European Union fully capable of designing strategies and deploying policy tools for enhancing international order.

Only with a constructive and cooperative European-American partnership, an international order in the sense of the Western vision would be a realistic policy objective. Such a partnership implies rather fundamental adjustments in foreign policies on both sides. That partnership would still be asymmetrical in many ways, and it would still need to proceed by division of labor, building on each side’s particular strengths and weaknesses. Its management would still no doubt be difficult at times, and fraught with disagreements. But it would be united by a common sense of power and purpose, and hence able to move ahead with reconstructing a sustainable international order.