Kosovo is the most recent case of the unchecked proliferation of socio-ethnic, civil war-like conflict which has become a fundamental threat to peace and security in the world following the end of the Cold War. »Complex emergencies, war-torn societies or failing states«, as these conflicts are appropriately called, may draw entire regions into chaos and bloodshed. In the Balkans, Europe and North America may have intervened just in time to prevent such a gloomy scenario. It is too early to make a final judgement. In several parts of sub-Saharan Africa, however, like the Horn of Africa, Central Africa and to some extent West Africa, this nightmare has become a reality. Entire states and societies fall apart, millions of people have perished and even more are either internally displaced or have become refugees.

Initially, the international community tried to contain and solve these conflicts with an instrument developed in the era of the Cold War: »Blue Helmets«, the traditional peace-keeping forces. The successful operations in Namibia and Nicaragua in 1989–1999, as well as the later operations in Cambodia, Mozambique and El Salvador created inflated expectations regarding the future role of the UN’s Blue Helmets in conflict management and resolution. These expectations were short-lived. In Somalia in 1993, UNOSOM II failed to stop the country’s descent into total fragmentation and self-destruction. UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia more or less shared UNOSOM’s negative fate. The leading global powers and the international community did not provide the UN with the capability and means necessary to successfully conduct such a demanding operation. The inability of a few Blue Helmets to stop the Serb attack on the »safe area« of Srebrenica and the ensuing mass murder of Bosnian civilians was one of the darkest hours in the history of UN peace-keeping. In 1994, an even greater lack of political will to act swiftly was responsible for the tragic genocide in Rwanda. Almost 1 million people were killed, despite the presence of roughly two thousand Blue Helmets (UNAMIR). The Security Council (SC) was not willing to send additional troops and to change UNAMIR’s mandate to prevent this disaster. In fact, most of the Blue Helmets were actually withdrawn.

Apart from the problem of political will, the operations in Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda etc. revealed the deep conceptual problems of traditional peace-keeping in dealing with the new type of conflict. It was not conceived to operate under such insecure conditions as continued to exist in these countries even after peace agreements or cease-fires had been signed. The use of force became inevitable, with sometimes disastrous consequences like in Mogadishu in October 1993 when American special forces tried in vain to capture Aideed, a warlord and leader of one of the parties to the conflict, in a surprise attack. Passing the Mogadishu-line has become a catchword amongst peacekeepers for keeping the proper balance between the use of force, consent and impartiality.

The question which follows is what is the proper use of force in civil war-type conflicts? Traditional peace-keeping doctrine has no answer to this question. Consent and impartiality, like the non-use of force in traditional peace-keeping, are just as difficult to uphold in conflicts where there are no clear geographical front lines and where the warring parties do not divide neatly into two hostile camps. Consent of whom? and impartiality with regard to which parties? Finally, the issue of co-ordination and joint management obviously becomes much more complicated in operations, which not only have to deal with an insecure...
environment, where there are several parties to the conflict, but also one in which the military, police and civilian personnel of the UN, humanitarian agencies and a host of NGOs have to work together to achieve successful post-conflict peace-building.

This paper will try to present an overview of the development from traditional peace-keeping to modern peace support operations (PSO) and their basic conceptional problems as well as the main areas of post-conflict peace-building.

From First to Third Generation Peace-keeping

The so-called first generation of peace-keeping was mostly limited to separating warring armies by interposing lightly armed and neutral international troops and observing or monitoring agreed cease-fires, like UNEF in the Sinai in the mid-fifties, UNFCYP in Cyprus from the mid-sixties onwards and UNDOF on the Golan Heights in the mid-seventies. Consent, impartiality, use of force solely for personal self-defense purposes, free mobility of troops as well as a Statute of Force Agreement (SOFA) with the respective country were the basic pillars of this first generation of peace-keeping, initiated by Lester G. Pearson, the Canadian Foreign Minister at that time, and Dag Hammarskjöld, Secretary-General of the UN.

In the mid-eighties following the end of the Cold War and the unblocking of the SC a second generation developed which was multi-dimensional and dynamic in character. In contrast to the first generation, the military and their civilian counterparts were no longer limited to the monitoring of cease-fires. Finding political and social solutions to the conflict and removing the need for their presence as quickly as possible became equally important tasks. The operations became much more dynamic and complex in terms of conflict resolution. UNTAG in Namibia and UNOVEN in Nicaragua from 1989–1990, UNOSAL in El Salvador from 1991–1995, UNTAC in Cambodia from 1992–1993 and UNOMOZ in Mozambique from 1992–1994, are show cases for this enlarged, new type of peace-keeping. Police (CIVPOL) and civilians from various professions became important partners of the military in increasing numbers.

The unabated violence in cases like Somalia, former Yugoslavia, Liberia or Haiti quickly forced additional change on multi-dimensional peace-keeping. As was already indicated, the solemn signing of peace agreements or cease-fires no longer meant an end to violence. In Somalia, Liberia and Bosnia dozens of cease-fire agreements were broken. The peace-keepers, as well as humanitarian organizations were confronted with all kinds of violence. National, regional and local leaders, warlords and armed groups are involved—a difficult mix for the peace-keepers to handle. Establishing and upholding a secure environment for humanitarian aid and socio-economic and political reconstruction became a primary demand on the soldiers and the police. The old doctrine of non-use of force became untenable. In Somalia, the SC therefore felt compelled to provide UNOSOM II with a so-called robust mandate based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter, allowing for the limited use of force. UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia, UNMIH in Haiti, IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia, UNTAES in Eastern Slavonia as well as the French »Operation Turquoise« in Rwanda, MNF in Haiti and MISAB in the Central African Republic received similar authorisation. The third generation of peace-keeping, now mostly called multi-dimensional (robust) peace support operations outside the UN, had come into being.

Robust, multi-dimensional PSOs are properly defined as Chapter VI multi-dimensional peace-keeping, with consent and impartiality as basic operational pillars, plus the option of the threat or use of limited force for defending or implementing specific elements of the mandate, based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Politicians and the military as well the international public and academia are still struggling with this new concept. There is widespread mis-giving about the fact that it is blurring the clear distinction between traditional, Chapter VI-based peace-keeping and military enforcement based on Chapter VII. This is true and is perhaps unfortunate. But academics and traditionalists among peace-keepers who demand strict adherence to this distinction forget that the real-life dynamics of ethnic and similar conflicts have no regard for the

written provisions of the Charter and its theoretical distinctions. To put it in the blunt terms of a Canadian peace-keeper, speaking in context of the conditions in Somalia and Bosnia: »It was evident that traditional peace-keeping was being made a mockery of. There was almost a total absence of the conditions that are essential for peace-keeping to work.«

Ethnic conflict and civil war blur the lines between domestic and international, state and non-state actors, as well as that between Chapter VI and VII. Conflicts in which hundreds of thousands of people are killed or have to flee their country are a threat to international peace and security (Article 39 UN Charter) in a highly interdependent world. The Security Council was right to decide as it did in the cases of Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti etc. and to authorise robust operations on the basis of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

A Look Back – Third Generation Peace-keeping in the Congo 1960–64

It is little known that UNOC in the Congo with a military and civilian staff of more than 20,000 had been the largest peace-keeping operation under the authority of the UN until the operation in Cambodia. UNOC had had all the elements of third generation peace-keeping. Like most operations after Somalia it dealt with a conflict, which was internal in origin. It was multidimensional with a considerable number of civil police and other civilians. And, like in the mid-nineties UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it lost about 200 soldiers, when the mission suddenly switched over to an offensive use of force to prevent the secession of the province of Katanga and to quell public resistance.

The UN responded by escalating the mandate to a robust one. In a resolution of February 1961, the SC urged the UN »to take immediately all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo, including arrangements for cease-fires, the halting of all operations, the prevention of clashes, and the use of force if necessary, in the last resort«. Thirty-one years before Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for Peace declared that »national sovereignty was no longer absolute« for the UN, Dag Hammarskjöld was advocating to intervene in a civil war. The operation ended successfully. The secession of Katanga was prevented and the UN left the Congo in 1964. Yet, many Blue Helmets lost their life because they had not been either withdrawn or sufficiently reinforced in time, but remained in indefensible, exposed positions. The Blue Helmets of UNPROFOR, taken hostages by the Serbs and chained to public installations after the switch-over to an offensive use of force by NATO with the Pale bombing come to mind.

Unfortunately, none of UNOC’s problems were systematically analyzed. Some deadly failures could have been avoided in Somalia and Bosnia if the lessons of the Congo intervention would have been thoroughly learned. Like in Bosnia in 1993, the UN began the Congo operation with lightly armed troops and ended with jet fighters. As two Canadian authors point out, deploying a fully equipped combat force, like in Bosnia and the Kosovo, is a better and safer way to do the job. It is safer and cheaper to start »robust« and then to reduce personal than to slide into an uncontrolled escalation. There are a number of additional lessons from the Congo in the field of command, control and communication, logistics, training etc. which could have been learned. Unfortunately, it took the General Assembly and the Security Council another thirty years to authorize the establishment of a Lessons Learned Unit in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). 3

The Problematic Use of Force

The proper use of force in PSO still needs a lot of doctrinal and operational clarification. It has to be explicitly stated that, as a rule, the possible use of limited force in the context of peace operations is very different from the massive use of force in war.

3. The author is a member of the informal International Advisory Group of this Unit. It has, starting in 1995, evaluated most of the UN operations since the early nineties, starting with UNOSOM in Somalia.
Politicians, journalists and the general public are confused. For most of them using force is synonymous with going to war and taking sides in a given conflict. The military still struggle with the question of how to use force without getting into a dangerous process of escalation and destroying the entire peace process. In Somalia, the confusion about the proper use of force amongst the military and politicians has led to tragic events and a rushed withdrawal. It took in particular the American military and their leaders a while to understand, that there is no war to win, there is no enemy («conflict is the enemy», as American doctrine later correctly stated) and any use of force has to be extremely careful with regard to so-called collateral damage, i.e. killing civilians and thereby loosing the support of the local populations. Several hundreds of non-combatant Somalis were killed in enforcement actions by UNOSOM II troops.

A number of lessons have been learned with regard to the proper use of force, as the more successful actions of MNF and HNMIH in Haiti, UNTAES in Eastern Slavonia and IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia and KFOR in the Kosovo have shown. Yet, there is still an urgent need to conceptionalize, differentiate and define the conditions under which the threat or use of limited force is called for and how to execute it, in order to promote what continues to be the ultimate goal of peacekeeping: the containment of violence and the resolving of conflicts with the co-operation and consent of the parties concerned. Doctrine and the Rules of Engagements (RoEs), which guide the everyday work of a peacekeeper, are still weak, as every practitioner will point out.

This doctrine and RoEs have to be based on what is the ultima ratio for the threat or use of force in peace support operations (in difference to all-out combat action like the bombing of Serbia by NATO with the aim of enforcing the agreement to a peace support operation): creating and maintaining a safe environment for the implementation of the mandate and its mainly non-military elements, in particular:

- the protection of UN and other international personnel and installations;
- closing the so-called «public security gap», due to the non-functioning or one-sided abuse of local security organs on the one hand, and the proliferation of small arms in the hands of armed gangs and militias on the other;
- protection of humanitarian aid transports and the necessary infrastructure (airports, harbours, bridges, etc.);
- the resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons;
- deterrence of attacks on declared safe-areas and no-fly zones;
- disarmament of combatants of the parties to the conflict and other armed groups.

Disarmament, which will be dealt with later, and the closing of the «public security gap» are obviously the most difficult tasks.

What is the best way to close the «public security gap» is still a contentious issue. It obviously cannot be done by CIVPOL the way it operates at present. CIVPOL units are normally only mandated to observe and monitor the local police and/or assist in building up and training the local police (see for instance IPTF in Bosnia and Herzegovina). With an exception now in Kosovo, they are unarmed and have no direct authority with regard to public security. The military, however, do not consider public security their job, although they may be forced to fulfill it temporarily, like at present in Kosovo, until the international police arrives and the local one is functioning. IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia in a number of occasions have reacted negatively to appeals by the civil international authorities, i.e. the OHR (Office of the High Representative) to intervene in risky cases of public security, for instance to quell violent mass demonstrations. «We are not equipped for such a job. Our soldiers are not trained to do policing» is the regular reason given for their refusal.

In Bosnia civil authorities in the end had no other choice than to bring in a so-called Third Force, the MSU (Multinational Special Unit) with a personal of more than three hundred, based on the concept of the Guardia Civil in Spain and the Carabinieri in Italy. Similarly, in the Kosovo the Secretary-General in his report following SC–Res. 1244 (June 10, 1999) has recommended to deploy a Special Police Unit (SPU) in addition to the CIVPOL units. In difference to MSU, this special unit will be under the command of the civilian component (UNIC) and not, like in Bosnia, form a part of the military command and control structure.
One may argue, whether this a wise solution. It may bring the civil authority into great difficulties, when the situation is very rough and a close co-ordination with the military is necessary. The debate whether it is not better to retrain certain military units, for instance the military police, for handling the rather violent challenges of public security in a post-conflict peace-building phase, is still unresolved. In Haiti in the early nineties and in Germany after the Second World War, military police took care of public security and it worked well.

Whose Consent?

Obviously, more tasks could be added to the above list, in particular, the maintenance of cease-fires and the prevention of mass killing and ethnic cleansing. In the final analysis however, the over-riding purpose will always be to bring the warring parties back to the negotiating table and to contain the destructive, violent dynamics of conflict. This can only be done, if consent and impartiality continue to be guiding principles of PSO.

As far as traditional peace-keeping was concerned, according to the rule of international law, only the consent of the governments of the countries involved in the conflict was actually required. This rule was then extended to include the one or two dominant, clearly defined parties to the conflict, like SWAPO in Namibia, RENAMO in Mozambique or the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. It has to be understood, however, that international law is only the starting point for the need of consent. There are, in addition, two very practical reasons for taking this principle serious. First, it minimizes the danger and eventually the need to use force and therefore protects not only the local civilians but also the international personal of the operation. Second, most important, peace-building and a successful conclusion of the peace process is only feasible, if the local population in its majority is behind it or – as is now frequently said – owns it. Consent is a yardstick as to what extent this is the case.

In socio-ethnic conflicts, particularly if taking place in a failing state, this rule has become difficult to apply. As was mentioned before, the lines of conflict as well as the numbers of parties fighting each other are fragmented and in flux. Peace-keepers have a hard time deciding which actors’ consent is relevant or not. In Somalia and Bosnia this became an almost impossible task. Violent groups acquired a great deal of leverage over the peace-keepers by denying consent.

British peace-keeping doctrine was the first to look for a practical solution to this problem. The concept of »wider peace-keeping« was developed based on the experience in Northern Ireland and then Bosnia. Its innovation was the distinction between »operational/strategic« and »tactical/local« consent. With regard to the first, consent continued to be unchallenged as an absolute rule. If consent was withdrawn at this level, peace-keepers also had to withdraw. Its existence was considered to be absolutely basic for a continuation of the peace process. At a tactical level, however, they could use force or threaten the use of force if consent for the implementation of elements of the mandate, for instance delivering humanitarian aid, was denied by a local party.

As a result of the lessons learned in Bosnia, the British military has abandoned this doctrine as impractical. Some of its assumptions are flawed. For instance, the distinction between operational/strategic and tactical/local consent is questionable. In reality it does not exist in a systematic way. An incidence which may look like being only local in character, for instance the blockage of a humanitarian transport by women, old people and children, may quickly turn into one of strategic relevance and bring the entire peace process into deep trouble when blood is spilled and some women and children are killed. On the other hand, crossing the so-called Mogadishu line, i.e. the line of operational consent, is not necessarily irreversible. It may actually be the prelude to reestablish consent and new dialogue, like with the Serbs after the Pale bombing.

The relationship between consent and the use of force in complex emergencies therefore remains a complicated one, in terms of doctrine as well as clear rules of engagement. Consent is a moving target on all relevant levels: the local people, the parties to the conflict, the national and international media. They all tend to have different understandings of consent in specific situations of conflict. It is a minefield for any peace-keeper.

Many unsolved problems remain. However, a few lessons have been learned: Firstly, there is a
direct relationship between the level of international military power in the field and the solidity of the consent by the parties to the conflict. As a rule of thumb one may state that the stronger the international capability, the better the prospect of consent not being withdrawn. The need to use force will actually be reduced. This is obviously a forceful argument for going in with oversized rather than undersized forces at the beginning of a PSO.

Secondly, consent-promoting or inducing techniques become very important so that the use of force remains ultima ratio. These techniques demand much skill from each and every military and civil peace-keeper, particularly at leadership level. A wide spectrum of consent-promoting instruments exists, some of which involve behind-the-scenes pressure, sticks and carrots, economic and other sanctions, psychological operations (PSYOPS), public pressure (use of the media) and the show of force.

Impartiality – a Dynamic Understanding is Needed!

The principle of neutrality obviously made sense in conflict between states and conventional armies, with clearly defined lines of separation and deployment. It was, however, too simplistic and static when it had to be applied in other kinds of conflict, with less clearly defined actors and lines of conflict. The term changed to the need for the peace-keepers to be »impartial«. The 1995 UN-General Guidelines for Peace-keeping Operations provide a valid definition of this more dynamic concept, which is not identical with neutrality:

»Impartiality must not promote inaction. On the contrary, peace-keepers must discharge their tasks firmly and objectively, without fear or favour. Neither side should gain unfair advantages as a result of the activities of a peace-keeping operation.... Impartiality should not be interpreted as equidistance between the mandate and the party’s newly revised position. It is the Security Council mandate which manifests the legitimate will of the international community.«

In the practice of modern peace-keeping operations impartiality faces problems similar to those of consent: Impartiality with regard to which parties to the conflict? Which parties are relevant and which are not? There is also a widespread assumption among politicians, journalists and academics that the use of force is per se incompatible with impartiality. The moment peace-keepers use force beyond the purpose of self-defense, they become accused of »taking sides«.

This is a flawed understanding of impartiality. Impartiality is not equal to neutrality or passivity. The UN Charter is not neutral – it demands respect for certain basic values and norms (see, e.g. Articles 1 and 2) –, nor are the mandates given by the Security Council neutral, in particular if the reason, or one of the reasons for international intervention are humanitarian. Undertaking activities towards the implementation of mandates, including the use of force, does not automatically equal taking sides, even if the activity happens to be to one of the parties’ detriment. If, for instance, in the case of an armed bank robbery, the police were to free the hostages, nobody would accuse the police of taking sides; they merely would have fulfilled their public mandate. Actually, the non-use of force may violate impartiality, for instance if the mandate demands the disarmament and demobilization of the combat units of all parties to the conflict and one side complies and the other does not. Impartiality is clearly unbalanced and consent in danger because those parties having disarmed feel treated unfairly. The critical issue therefore is whether the activities undertaken by the international personal, in the political as well as in the military field, are in conformity with the mandate and are undertaken in an even-handed manner.

Finally, there is a further fundamental problem: Mass murder, rape, ethnic cleansing and genocide have become frequent patterns of socio-ethnic and similar conflict. They are not accidental but increasingly part of the military-political strategy of one or the other of the warring factions. This is as true for the conflicts on the Balkan as well as those in Africa. Any action by the peace-keepers and their civilian counterparts to prevent such crimes is bound to pit them against one side or the other. Old concepts of »neutrality« or »static impartiality« cannot deal with such perpetrations although they concern the very rationale behind why the international community is sending peace-keepers in.

A dynamic, normative definition of impartiality is therefore needed, taking so-called »erga omnes«
norms of international law (genocide, massive violations of humans rights etc.) into account. SC mandates and RoEs need to be formulated accordingly! The existence of the two UN War Crimes Courts for former Yugoslavia and the genocide in Rwanda as well the agreement on establishing a permanent International Criminal Court most probably will reinforce this trend for a more normative understanding of impartiality. In addition the international public and media have to be educated to understand this normative, dynamic interpretation of impartiality. Peacekeepers who are incorrectly accused by the international media of not being impartial cannot pursue their task properly. The judgement by the international media will be abused by local parties to the conflict against them.

From Peace Operations to Post–conflict Peace-building

In modern, multi-dimensional peace operations, post-conflict peace-building has become of strategic importance. The concept, therefore, figured prominently in UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for Peace of 1992. It was further developed in the supplement to an Agenda for Peace in 1995 and explicitly welcomed by the Security Council and the General Assembly of the UN in a number of resolutions.

The purpose of post-conflict peace-building is to prevent violent conflict from re-emerging and to rebuild the capabilities of a society to resolve conflict without fighting. Therefore, the essence of post-conflict peace-building is that of a political undertaking, even if it comprises activities which transcend the political domain, like development co-operation, humanitarian assistance, protection of human rights and institution building. Post-conflict peace-building is different from development co-operation in as much as it includes, inter alia, emergency assistance, de-mobilisation and reintegration of former combatants, and the restoration of public order and security. Time constraints within which it operates are short and medium-term, as opposed to the long-term perspective of co-operation. Indeed, lack of time is characteristic of post-conflict peace-building. Nevertheless, in principle, short-term concerns should not be allowed to undermine long-term goals. Another important lesson learned in past missions is that the so-called »emergency-to-relief-to-development continuum«, which for a while was very popular in parts of the development and donor community, is not a useful basis to work on. For example, the short-term necessity to prevent combatants, by whatever means, from taking up their arms again, may well clash with long-term development objectives demanding their integration into productive occupations as participants in the national economy. Furthermore, emergency, relief and development activities often need to take place simultaneously, and should therefore be approached in an integrated manner.

It seems natural to think that post-conflict peace-building should start only after a cease-fire has been agreed upon. However, experience in Cambodia, Mozambique, Haiti, Angola, Rwanda, Former Yugoslavia and other places, demonstrates the importance of an early beginning of post-conflict peace-building in order to limit the damage caused by violence and to lay the foundations for a more vigorous peace-building effort in the future. In as much as post-conflict peace-building aims at preventing violent conflict from re-emerging, it may appear as a form of preventive diplomacy and to some extent that is so. Still, the point of departure is different, post-conflict peace-building applies to situations where the worst has already happened, leaving behind traumata to be healed, mine fields to be cleared, former combatants to be disarmed and refugees to be repatriated and reintegrated.

Apart from the ever urgent problem of emergency aid and relief activities, it has become clear in recent years that there are three fields of strategic importance for successful peace operations and peace-building:

- disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of combatants and other armed groups;
- elections and constitution building;
- justice and reconciliation.

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegra
tion: With regard to DDR, it is important to note that tensions and violence which are at the origin of a conflict, do not suddenly disappear as soon as a peace agreement or cease-fire is signed. Progress in the field of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, and progress in the peace process
are highly interdependent. DDR is one of the most demanding elements of peace-building. In affluent western societies there is a notion that »violence does not pay.« However, in ethnic and similar types of conflict well-considered economic interest is more often than not, the dominant reason for rampant and continued violence. It is therefore extremely important to understand the economics of violence and economics of war. Warlords represent a sinister combination of military commander, gang leader, business man and political leader. Unemployment, particularly among the young, provides a further ground for recruitment. The wide availability of small arms and light weapons in most conflict regions makes it easy and comparatively cheap to arm these youngsters. Coercive disarmament in the context of these types of conflict carries considerable risk. Consent-based strategies therefore are preferable, but – depending on local conditions – are not always feasible.

Disarmament and demobilization without rigorous programs of reintegration will inevitably fail. Therefore, much attention has to be given to the social and economic impact of externally sponsored demobilization programs. Success also very much depends on the extent to which the former warring parties and individuals believe that their physical and economic security will be maintained after relinquishing their arms and abandoning, what for many has become a way of life and economic survival.

Weapons buy-back programs may play an important role in disarmament and demobilization, like in El Salvador and Eastern Slavonia. In sum however, their record is mixed. Particularly if connected to money and offered as compensation, buy-back programs can create streams of weapons flowing from one region to another. It may be better to spend these funds on improving the police and judiciary to improve the security conditions in the country concerned. Weapons destruction programs are the most effective way to reduce arms flows and to get rid of collected weapons. If done in public with a ceremony and in the presence of the media, it sends a strong political signal to combatants and to society. The case of Mali and its public burning of collected weapons was powerful evidence of this. The «flamme de paix» has become a symbol for a society at peace.

Elections and constitution-building have been a strategic objective in UN peace missions conducted since the end of the Cold War. Internationally monitored elections have become the concluding activity in most cases. They are conceived to be the best mechanism to guarantee an orderly, peaceful, participatory and transparent succession of governments and to make executive power more accountable to the people. These manifest advantages may be the reason for the fact that elections have often been held too soon in conflict-ridden societies and not terminated the conflicts in the way which had been hoped for. Indeed elections in fragmented societies may result in increased fragmentation as, inter alia, the cases of Angola and Sierra Leone demonstrate. Sometimes elections are simply a continuation of war with other means, particularly in the case of »winner-takes-all« elections.

The right timing of elections therefore is a central issue for elections in peace-building and, like other elements of peace-building, they have to be planned well in advance, ideally two or three years before they take place. Sufficient demobilization and integration of combatants into the new army, police force, or civil society and a satisfactory restoration of the judicial system and of public administration are necessary preconditions. Credibility and integrity of the electoral process help to prevent disputes over the outcome and forestall a relapse into violence. International monitoring should continue throughout the electoral process and even beyond. This is important because of the lasting distrust of the parties to a conflict towards each other. In extreme cases of fragmentation and violence it may even be better to go for power-sharing as an interim solution in the general transition from war to peace and democracy. Western-style democracy will not work, at least in the short run; governments of national unity may be the only way to forestall a fall back into fighting. In such cases the international community should at least try to establish a mechanism to monitor minimum standards of human rights. Finally, one lesson of past democratization processes, inside and outside of peace operations is crystal clear: Elections are only a starting point for democratization, not its successful conclusion. Past international peace-keeping and peace operations by the international community therefore have been rightly criticized, as having abused elections as a quick exit...
option from difficult peace-processes. This was particularly the case in war-torn Liberia.

*Justice and reconciliation:* Finally, there will be no lasting peace and stable democracy in war-torn societies without truth, justice and reconciliation. Mass killing, ethnic cleansing, rape and other brutal forms of conducting war in ethnic, religious and similar types of conflict render reconciliation extremely difficult. Although it is a long-term process, it has to be started as soon as the peace operation and peace-building are initiated. Different models for reconciliation have emerged.

- »Forgive and Forget« has been frequently practised in Africa, for instance in Zimbabwe, Namibia etc. It is based on the assumption that civil wars have their own dynamic and that its atrocities cannot be judged in normal legal terms. It is reinforced by the assumption that African cultures in particular, have a great capacity for forgiving.

- »Justice and Reconciliation Through Truth« is a more recent model. The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission has become well-known for its endeavors to heal the atrocities of both sides of the anti-apartheid struggle. The Truth Commission in Guatemala operates in a similar way, where as the Purification Commission in Mozambique was based on more traditional concepts of healing and reconciliation. Obviously, the commissions in South Africa and Guatemala are based on a Christian understanding of forgiving by confession.

In societies in which systematic genocide has occurred, justice, truth and reconciliation are of even greater importance, but even more difficult to achieve. Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo are cases in point. In Rwanda more than 100,000 perpetrators of the genocide in 1994 are still kept in primitive conditions of detention by the Kigali government. In view of the barely functioning judicial system in Rwanda, one wonders how much justice is needed on the one side and how much can be realistically expected to reconcile the Tutsi and Hutu. How much justice and reconciliation the international criminal tribunals, which have been created by the UN Security Council for Rwanda and Former Yugoslavia, can actually contribute remains an open question. The fact that the accused in Arusha, where the Tribunal for Rwanda is based, enjoy a tribunal »deluxe« with two or three attorneys and do not have to fear the death penalty, although they are the main perpetrators, puts a severe strain on justice. Those who are dealt with by the barely developed judiciary in Rwanda do not enjoy these privileges. Some of them have already been condemned to death and executed.

**Co-ordination and Integrated Management**

In multi-dimensional peace operations and peace-building the co-ordination and management of the multitude of military and non-military instruments and actors is of strategic importance for their success. An integrated approach is needed and has to be planned for from the very beginning. This is easier said than done or, as one popular sentence amongst practitioners goes, »everybody wants co-ordination but nobody wants to be co-ordinated«. During »Operation Provide Comfort« in Northern Iraq in the early nineties, the allied forces had to cope with about 500 aid organizations, some with more than a hundred employees, some with only three. In Somalia, the number of NGOs was about two hundred. About the same number is know active in Kosove. Soldiers and NGOs have very different operational cultures. The military are used to following commands without much questioning. Not so in NGOs, in particular those working on a voluntary basis. To complicate matters still further, the international NGO community itself is extremely heterogeneous. All organizations have their own raison d’être, peculiarities and vanities. Nevertheless, most of them are valuable for rendering humanitarian assistance and peace-building. They can do work which military organizations cannot do at all, or at least not as well or cost-effectively, in particular with regard to complicated socio-economic and socio-cultural issues. Operation Provide Comfort, UNOSOM, UNPROFOR and others have shown that soldiers and NGOs can learn to work together constructively if certain prejudices and psychological barriers are overcome.

Unity not only of purpose, but also of strategy and action are the sine qua non for success. Joint structures for distributing and sharing information to all actors, joint analysis and planning, as well as implementation mechanisms have proven their effectiveness, as well as joint pre-mission training
and regular executive meetings to monitor developments. At all stages the relevant actors (especially the World Bank, UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR, the donor community and NGOs) should be closely involved in the decision-making process, led by the UN or a regional organization. There may be a need for earmarking a lead-agency to take over co-ordination in the early stages. CIMICS, i.e. Civil-Military Co-operation structures have been tried with some success in Bosnia. Some countries, like the Australians in Somalia, have established their own CMOTs (Civil-Military Operations Teams). And it is of prime importance to enhance and clarify the role and authority of the SRSGs (Special Representative of the Secretary-General) or similar leaders of peace operations and peace-building as the »head of the family and team leader«.

More Unsolved Problems

Robust, multi-dimensional peace support operations are obviously an extremely demanding task for the military as well as for the civilians involved. Mandates, even when sufficiently clear in the formulation of tasks, cannot be implemented in a rigid manner. Flexibility and an understanding of the consequences of the use of force in a specific situation for the overall mission, and in particular consent and impartiality have to be further developed. Peace-building has to be started and integrated into the operation at an early point in time. A lot remains to be done in terms of improving doctrine and concept, dealt with in this article.

Yet, good doctrine and conceptual clarity are only one precondition for successful peace support operations. Sufficient capabilities, early planning and quick deployment, adequate equipment, sufficient pre-mission training, good logistics and intelligence as well as an integrated, unified command, control and communication system, a radio and/or tv-station operated by the international mission and other assets are as important for stemming the violent tide of complex emergencies, socio-ethnic conflict and failed states and turning it into a steady river of peace-building, reconstruction and democracy building. Evidently, these capabilities and assets are not cost-free.

With regard to the UN, unfortunately, the Security Council and the international community at large must be blamed for rather hindering than supporting to improve its institutional set-up and capabilities for doing this job. Important initiatives, like for instance the Canadian proposal of »Enhancing the UN’s Quick Reaction Capability«, have been torpedoed and come to a stand-still. The fact that multidimensional peace support operations and peace-building will be one of the main pillars of peace and security in a highly interdependent, globalised world, i.e. of global governance, has apparently not been sufficiently understood.