

**CHRISTOS KATSIOLIS****German Foreign and Security Policy Following the Interventions in Libya**

Libya has proven to be a heavy burden for Germany with respect to its role in NATO and the EU. Despite its reputation in both organizations as a hesitant partner that (for understandable reasons) has major reservations about deploying its troops abroad, it has become one of the most important participants in NATO and EU military operations (particularly in the Balkans and Afghanistan). As well as actively helping to shape EU and NATO policy, Germany also needs to return to playing a consistently active political role in the United Nations. Germany played a key role in the introduction of the norm of »responsibility to protect« at the United Nations, and the German government firmly supported this principle from an early stage. The decisions taken by Berlin to participate in the Kosovo operation but not in the Iraq War clearly conformed with this principle. Its abstention on the Libya issue, however, represents a departure from this line and casts Germany as an unpredictable foreign policy partner in one of its most important institutional frameworks. Germany therefore needs to conduct an intensive debate on the intervention instrument, since a responsible foreign and security policy geared towards human rights and peace must adopt a clearer and more logical position on this issue if it is to be viewed as reliable internationally. As the body that deploys the Bundeswehr abroad the Bundestag must make the formulation of key points on the deployment of the armed forces that would serve to structure a public and political discussion a priority on its agenda. This would increase the transparency of decisions, make decision-making more consistent in a long-term perspective, and enhance Germany's image as a reliable partner in the international forum.

## CARSTEN WIELAND

### **Between Democratic Hope and Centrifugal Fears. Syria's Unexpected Open-ended Intifada**

Baathist Syria as the last pan-Arab mouthpiece and frontline state against Israel seemed to have enough ideological resources and more political leverage during times of crisis than the pro-Western Arab authoritarian regimes. Unlike in Egypt and Tunisia it took longer until a critical mass of protesters was reached. The notorious security apparatus and some key pillars of Assad's legitimacy have been crumbling slowly. Among them has been a peaceful coexistence of religious groups. But in the end both the presumed ideological umbrella uniting regime and population has failed to keep people off the streets, and the peaceful scenario of religions in Syria is in mortal danger.

Attempts to find the key to Syria's developments in a personalized discourse about President Bashar al-Assad have their limits. On a structural level there is no room for absorbing societal and political shocks. The protests have triggered typical reflexes of a thoroughly authoritarian culture with a cruel history of civil wars and crackdowns. Survival is a zero-sum game where the winner takes all. The system is a complex web of control and counter control, suspicion, jealousies and overlapping competences.

The system is exclusively based on hard power, i.e. on the extinguishing of dissenters and threats. The circle of persons that the Assad clan can trust is contracting more and more up to the point that it may be difficult in the future to recruit enough staunch and qualified loyalists to effectively run a country. The regime has developed increasingly primordial features; it has become more Alawi compared to the times of Assad's father Hafez.

Assad was by no means on a serious reform track when the upheavals broke out. Now his credibility and his foreign policy successes lie in ruins, including the often proclaimed »family bonds« with Turkey. In case he survives the protests, it is improbable that he will ever recover politically and be able to rebuild the foreign policy environment that he had so arduously worked to achieve. If at all, Assad will rule a crippled Syria, domestically and internationally. This is dangerous since the tectonic plates of Iranian and Saudi Arabian interests pass through the Levant. Frictions will increase.

Assad is a president who has ruled his country under international sanctions most of the time. However, additional sanctions or the freezing of international assets will start hurting the regime and its population in times of rising security costs. Other factors are likely to aggravate international sanctions: Syria may no longer be able to fall back on its traditional allies such as Iran, Russia or China.

No charismatic central figure is in sight so far who could lead a transition with determination. No institution is visible either that could take over the task, like the military in Egypt or Tunisia. If Assad survives in a wounded and crip-

pled country, Syria's ruined economic and foreign policy options will be a heavy burden for him.

## **ACHIM VOGT**

### **Jordan's Eternal Promise of Reform**

Jordan has so far weathered the storms of the Arab upheavals of 2011 remarkably well. Protests which began in early January have never gained the momentum seen in other countries of the Middle East and North Africa. But beneath the surface of a moderate reform process managed and controlled by the monarchy, the inherent fragility of the Jordanian political system has been deeply affected by the protests at home and in the region. King Abdullah II has to deal with two very different protest movements, one representing the democracy activists and another formed by conservative representatives of the Trans-Jordanian establishment which fears losing its traditional privileges to the modern business elite mainly consisting of Jordanians of Palestinian origin. The king's delicate balancing act is further complicated by the fact that each step of a substantial political reform will necessarily endanger the societal balance between Palestinians and Jordanians. On the other hand, the monarchy can still capitalize on its widely accepted role of stabilizing actor tying both segments of society. After more than six months of protests in Jordan and the region it is hard to tell how far the monarchy is willing to engage in a substantial reform process rather than mere cosmetic changes. On paper, some of the reform proposals recently presented by two committees initiated by the king seem to indicate a step forward in the transition to the rule of law. In reality, however, many details still remain to be clarified. Due to the deeply complex political environment, long-term developments in Jordan are less predictable – and might even prove to be difficult to anticipate and manage for the regime itself. While the monarchy has a realistic chance to shape Jordan's political future by actively promoting and managing a peaceful reform process, it also faces the difficulty of having to cope with the different currents of a protest movement. At the same time, failing to appease these different currents might still constitute a severe risk of endangering the very foundations of the Hashemite regime and a violent eruption of unrest along Jordan's ethnic fault lines.

## **JENS HEIBACH**

### **National Dialogues as a Means for Conflict Resolution and Political Transformation using the example of the Arab World**

In the course of the Arab uprisings in early 2011, announcements of upcoming national dialogues abounded and were hotly debated among anti-regime activists,

who bore in mind experiences with previous dialogue projects which had been held from the 1980s onwards. National dialogues are not confined to the Arab world, however, but widespread, especially in Africa and Latin America. Yet they are widespread and still need to be comparatively analyzed and conceptually framed. Using the example of the Arab world, this paper explores the nature of and the putative benefits most commonly associated with national dialogues in (post-) authoritarian regimes, i.e. the resolving of national conflicts and the bringing about of political change, and presents some tentative findings on the functions and preconditions of successful national dialogues.

At an abstract level, national dialogues can serve as a means for the renewal of a country's social contract. Although no existing theory explicitly deals with national dialogues, some implicitly address its inherent functions: e.g. agency-based transition theory suggests considering national dialogues as institutions in which transitions to democracy can be negotiated by ruling and opposition elites; from a transitional justice-perspective, national dialogues add to the consolidation of post-conflict societies by addressing past human rights abuses and coming to terms with the past; furthermore, conflict resolution approaches perceive dialogues as one possible way of resolving violent conflicts and civil wars, often by the mediation of a third party.

On the other hand, studies of authoritarianism suggest that national dialogues merely strengthen incumbent regimes as they provide authoritarian elites with legitimacy without actually enlarging social and political freedom. As a matter of fact, national dialogues in the Arab world predating the recent uprisings more often than not resulted in pseudo-liberalizations. On account of national dialogues conducted in the Arab Middle East in the past this paper argues that one must be careful to equate national dialogues with the round-table discussions leading to democracy in several states of the former Eastern bloc. National dialogues can be understood as a means for negotiated transitions only if opposition elites are on a par with ruling elites and, therefore, capable of positively influencing the scope of participants, its agenda, and the process of dialogue; and also if national dialogue takes place in an environment conducive to the bargaining process and final agreements are binding and must be implemented by the government.

## **ULRICH KÜHN**

### **Global Zero: »Perhaps not in my Lifetime«**

The program proclaimed by Barack Obama in Prague in 2009 to free the world of nuclear weapons has run into difficulties. After initially chalking up a number of successes, it has experienced several setbacks and increasing resistance since the end of 2010. This applies to disarmament negotiations at the multilateral as well as the national and international levels. A provisional assessment of the program's

achievements is therefore likely to draw negative as well as positive conclusions. In particular Obama's financial concessions to the Republican members of the Senate look highly dubious when analyzed more closely. The current inertia of some of the national and international actors involved and the rather early commencement of the US presidential election campaign mean that arms control is likely to be put on the back burner for the time being. The coming years will probably see only preparatory steps such as transparency proposals for sub-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe, new conceptual considerations for a CFE follow-up process, and a comprehensive approach to achieving a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. Although the danger of international proliferation and hence an erosion of the nonproliferation treaty is increasing, conservative critics in particular are calling for a renunciation of the goal of Global Zero. A closer examination of their arguments reveals them to be reckless and misleading. Concrete steps towards achieving the goal of Global Zero will continue to be possible in the future. There is no viable long-term alternative to Obama's goal.

## **URSULA JASPER / CLARA PORTELA**

### **European Defence Integration and the Nuclear Weapons Issue**

As it strives to develop a fully integrated security and defence policy, the European Union faces a dilemma. While integration is proceeding apace and now embraces a number of key areas of national security policy, the Union still shies away from holding a serious debate about the future of European – that is, British and French – nuclear weapons. Paris and London have thus been able to modernize their arsenals of nuclear weapons almost unnoticed by the European public and to bring their operational doctrines into line with a host of new scenarios without entering into any obligation to take decisive steps in the direction of nuclear disarmament. These two European states have sought to justify their continued ownership of nuclear weapons by citing their own (and Europe's) benevolent intentions and the fact that their actions are guided by an »awareness of their responsibility.« This leads one to suspect that even in the future their willingness to disarm will be very limited, despite the »Global Zero« initiative. France's repeated proposals for a common European nuclear deterrent also create the impression that this is simply another way of legitimizing the continued existence of these national arsenals. A *dissuasion concertée* of this kind would, however, have serious implications for international security: it would shake the very foundations of the international nonproliferation regime and ultimately undermine the Union's own nonproliferation policy.

If the EU wishes to maintain its credibility in global security policy, it is not sufficient simply to point a finger at nuclear *rogue states* such as Iran or North Korea, to demand the withdrawal of US tactical weapons, or to pay lip service

to further global nuclear disarmament. Instead, Europe must begin to question critically the nuclear weapons policy of its own members and demand that concrete measures be taken. This could be a real stress test for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU. Yet by engaging in a proper debate about its own policies, the EU also has an opportunity to make a key contribution to international security and to boost its image as a credible actor with convincing arguments.

## **DEFNE ERZENE-BÜRGIN**

### **Adapting the Turkish Agricultural Sector to the EU Acquis Communautaire: Problems and Potential**

A particularly unfortunate combination of domestic and EU-related factors is hampering the process of bringing the Turkish agricultural sector into line with the EU's Acquis Communautaire. Turkish agriculture is structurally backward. Productivity is low, farms tend to be small, and the sector is labor-intensive, making harmonization with EU standards difficult. These problems have been compounded by an often flawed agricultural policy, whereby reforms have been undertaken primarily with an eye to winning votes. This short-sighted approach means that reforms have failed to be systematically implemented or properly evaluated. The state has also neglected to help farmers organize themselves better. Because they generally bring their products onto the market in an unprocessed form, they earn very little from them. The adaptation process is also being hindered by two EU-related factors. First of all, the rejection by some European politicians of Turkey's bid for EU membership, irrespective of whether it fulfils the Copenhagen criteria, has damaged the EU's public credibility in Turkey. This has created internal resistance to reforms and hence raised the political costs of pushing them through. The starting point for a thoroughgoing reform of the agricultural sector in Turkey differs fundamentally from that in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe prior to their accession to the EU. For the EU's clear commitment to the accession of these countries put wind in the sails of the reform forces, enabling governments to garner popular support for necessary reforms. Second, even if Turkey were to become a member of the EU, its agricultural sector would receive far less financial assistance than the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Turkey would therefore find it difficult to modernize its backward agricultural sector sufficiently to be able to compete with the EU states. We can assume that EU membership (or alternatively the complete integration of the agricultural sector in the Customs Union) would have only a minor impact on the European agricultural market if Turkey were not competitive. Indeed, a complete liberalization of agricultural trade might even mean a loss of income for farmers in north-eastern and eastern Turkey as well as in the Black Sea region, because those

areas farm mainly less competitive products such as sugar, cereals, and livestock. Farmers in the Aegean and the Mediterranean regions grow more competitive products such as fruit, vegetables, and cotton and hence have the potential to hold their own in the EU market.