New Powers for Global Change?

Mexico – a Reluctant Middle Power?

OLGA PELICER
1 Introduction

Mexico is a nation whose territorial dimension, demographic tendencies, economic importance on the international level, geopolitical location and relative weight on the regional arena allow it to be considered as a candidate for inclusion within the group of middle powers of the 21st Century. However, its economic and political leaders have shown little interest in institutionalizing or improving their country’s position within this category.

A quick comparison with Brazil will readily illustrate this affirmation. For the Brazilian government, a permanent seat on the U.N.’s Security Council, participation in peace-keeping operations – such as the one it is currently leading in Haiti –, heading the Continent’s most important sub-regional integration processes – such as MERCOSUR –, or working towards improved South-South cooperation along with South Africa and India have long been critical priorities.

For Mexico, on the other hand, participation in the Security Council as a non-permanent member has aroused resistance amongst broad sectors of internal public opinion, as has any involvement in peace-keeping operations. Mexico’s influence in Central America or the Caribbean, its closest regions, is limited in the first instance and almost non-existent in the second; in general, neither public opinion nor the nation’s leadership have particularly sought to enhance the country’s role on the international stage.

This is not to say that Mexico is indifferent to the main issues of international affairs. Its diplomacy has consistently defended the United Nations as well as the rule of law in international relations. However, this has been more a policy of principles than one of greater practical influence. Mexican diplomacy has accrued respect for its professionalism, and not for its leadership in ground-breaking fields or the acquisition of positions of global power.

Mexican diplomacy has long been characterized, to a great extent, by caution and a distaste for a protagonist role. The country’s politicians and leaders seem unconcerned with expanding Mexico’s role within the group of middle powers of the 21st Century. What lies at the heart of this seeming reluctance?

The goal of this paper will be, firstly, to reflect upon the factors that have inhibited Mexico’s search for a greater presence in international politics, and secondly, to present certain ideas regarding the current juncture and its possible influence upon Mexico’s international position. To conclude, I shall also seek to shed some light upon the circumstances that might finally determine Mexico’s inclusion, or the lack of it, within the current group of middle powers.

2 Mexico: a bi-regional country

One of the largest obstacles for an improved Mexican position in international politics or the acquisition of middle power status has been the difficulty of defining the country’s specific regional identity. Is Mexico a Northwards-gazing nation, seeking alliances with the United States and Canada? Or is it an outstanding Latin American leader? Neither question can be answered in the affirmative. As we shall see, despite Mexico’s strong links to the United States, the two countries are not political allies; and although it forms part of Latin America, Mexico is not a regional leader. Both circumstances are key elements in its inability to establish an international presence.

Distant neighbors

“Poor Mexico, so far from God and so close to the United States” is a phrase that has become trivialized through repetition; and yet, it clearly reveals a central dilemma for Mexico’s foreign strategy, which is an inexorably growing proximity to the United States, tied to an equally inevitable political distancing. Its closeness to the U.S. has consistently defined and established Mexico’s position in the world. The attraction generated by the most powerful nation is vast, and is clearly reflected in extremely close ties and an active relationship. Mexico carries out more than 85% of its total foreign trade with the United States. There are now 10 million first-generation Mexicans living in the United States, 20 million if we include their descendants. Four out of every five families in Mexico have at least one relative in the United States. Mexico’s second most important source of income lies in the remittances sent home by relatives working north of the border. We should add, in order to evaluate the relative importance of such links, that the aperture of the Mexican economy, enshrined mostly in the North American Free Trade Agreement, has raised the importance of Mexico’s foreign trade to 60% of its current GNP.

Under such circumstances, prospects other than those of even tighter links to the United States are almost unimaginable for Mexico. The simple inertia of existing ties points in this direction. However, this is a relationship that is evolving
against a looming backdrop of mutual political misunderstanding. A growing unease concerning the handling of bilateral problems prevails on both sides of the border, migration being but one of the most central. There is a growing body of opinion within many important sectors of the United States that views undocumented Mexican workers as felons, to be halted through the use of insurmountable physical barriers along the border, and possibly the forcible roundup and repatriation of millions. Simultaneously, vast numbers of Mexicans still dream of a better income to be found across the border, a dream that many continue to pursue despite the myriad dangers posed by the crossing. These contradictory tendencies are at the heart both of the closeness and the distance that characterize the bilateral relationship.

Despite the intense economic relationship, Mexico is not a preferential ally of the United States. We do not have a “special relationship”, such as that enjoyed by the United Kingdom. For the United States, Mexico is but a commercial partner, and occasionally uncomfortable neighbor. Mexico’s attempts to establish bilateral handling mechanisms for crucial issues such as migration or border security have failed.

Such differences have led many Mexican political leaders to dismiss the relationship as a central factor in their foreign policies. Recent electoral campaigns, for example, consistently referred to the relationship with the United States as one that must be conducted with dignity, and most of all, “in defense of national sovereignty”. Certain constitutional principles that guide Mexico’s foreign policy, such as that of non-intervention, which are of a defensive nature and inspired by the nation’s historical experiences dating back to the 19th Century, have acquired a growing preponderance. At the time of writing, an accelerating rate of economic interaction has strengthened, rather than diminished such attitudes.

This explains the absence of a shared understanding between the United States and Mexico regarding each nation’s role in international politics. To be defined as a middle power, Mexico requires a dialogue with the United States, not in order to become a subordinate actor, but rather to establish the clear limits for a differentiated role which should have margins of independence, and which will on occasion, or frequently, be openly opposed to the positions adopted by the superpower on the international stage. This is a matter that has so far either been ignored, or never dealt with openly by both nations.

Mexico and Latin America; theory and reality

Mexico’s role in international politics is not defined in terms of its proximity and growing interaction with the United States; it might be sought, with scarce results, in terms of its belonging to the Latin American region. Although Mexico is clearly a valid member of the Latin American community in terms of language, culture, tradition and shared attitudes – Mexico is a constant presence in Latin American music and literature – in economic and political terms, already lukewarm relations have become increasingly tepid over recent years.

Mexico’s relationship with Latin America faces a yawning gap between discourse and reality, between what is said and what is actually achieved. For years, Mexico’s political elite has referred to the relationship with Latin America as a vital priority; however, this generalized attitude has not been reflected in closer ties to the region, and this is confirmed by the data.

Trade with Latin America forms a relatively insignificant part of Mexico’s total foreign trade. The growing weight of the relationship with the United States was clearly felt from NAFTA’s inception, which established a new frontier between Mexico and other countries in the region. In other South American nations, the treaty was viewed as a watershed, placing Mexico squarely within North rather than Latin America; and amongst other consequences, this sentiment has generated obstacles, so far insurmountable, for a free trade agreement with Brazil, the most important nation in MERCOSUR.

This economic distance is reflected in the proportion of Mexican exports to the region, which were but 2.2% of Mexico’s total exports in 2003, as compared to 87.5% of total exports that went to the United States. Trade agreements signed with nine countries in the region have proved largely symbolic. In general terms, they have not benefited Mexico as, with the exception of Venezuela and Bolivia, they have generated trade deficits, particularly with Chile and Costa Rica.

In terms of cooperation, the relationship has focused mostly on Central America. Cooperation has significantly improved communication with these countries, although little has been done to generate multilateral political activity, or to lay the foundations either for a significant economic
relationship or for a scheme for sub-regional integration.

In the political realm, relations with Latin America have largely pivoted around coordination groups, within which Mexico has played a key role, such as the creation of the Contadora group (1983), the Rio Group (1986) or the foundation of the Ibero American summit (1991). However, these mechanisms have not proved to be exceptionally far reaching. The vast diversity of countries in the region has allowed them to reach at best extremely general agreements that reflect a minimal common denominator. Frequently, such agreements merely reiterate accords already established in other forums, such as the U.N. or the OAS, and have little impact upon broader coordination mechanisms, such as the Latin America-European Union Summit, or the Summit of the Americas. In any case, despite having played a pioneering part in their inception, Mexico is no longer particularly visible or active in any of these forums.

On the bilateral level, Mexico has paid greater attention to the problems posed by certain specific countries and regions, such as Central America, Cuba (a special case) Guatemala, and Chile. However, none of these instances has generated a true strategic alliance, conceived as a program for political cooperation and orchestration with the ability to generate substantive and consistent benefits for both parties. Plans for a strategic alliance with Chile were derailed by personal vanities; calls for other strategic alliances, such as the so-called Puebla- Panama Plan, have evaporated.

Other circumstances explain Mexico’s difficulty to acquire greater presence in Latin America. The region itself has shown little enthusiasm for such a presence. Mexico has been excluded from certain more recent projects, such as that of the South American Community of Nations. Certain regional theorists, particularly in Brazil, have argued that Mexico “belongs to the North”, not solely in terms of geographic location, but also in terms of its foreign relations.

The lukewarm relationship between Mexico and Latin America now faces new obstacles derived from the region’s growing ideological diversity. The so-called New Wave of Latin American left wing policies contains many shades. We cannot portray Michelle Bachelet’s attitude as similar to the radicalism of Hugo Chavez, for example. Be that as it may, it has placed Mexico in an unusual situation where internal politics are interrelated with foreign policies. I shall not expand here upon the tensions between Vicente Fox and Hugo Chavez at the Summit of the Americas in 2005; this can be viewed as a merely anecdotic incident. However, Mexico’s elections of 2006, whose outcome is as yet uncertain at the time of writing, will have repercussions for the Latin American political balance as a whole, posing new dilemmas for any incoming Mexican president.

There are substantial differences between Felipe Calderón and López Obrador. Should the former be declared the winner, diluting the wave of leftist politics in the region, it remains to be seen whether he will either normalize relations or deepen the animosity towards President Chavez, whether Mexico’s current critical stance towards Cuba’s human rights record will remain in place, or if new alliances will be brokered with either right or moderately conservatives leaning governments in the region. If the latter is declared victor, the situation becomes more complex. An increased proximity with the radical leftists, particularly in Venezuela or Bolivia, would intensify the voices of those in Mexico, particularly from the business sectors, that have sought to tar candidate López Obrador as a “danger” for Mexico; consequently, he will be forced to act cautiously. New ties with either Peru or Colombia would not be favorably received by his followers. López Obrador, therefore, would have limited margin of maneuverability, most likely dictating a low profile foreign policy towards Latin America, and the world as a whole.

At this point, we can draw certain preliminary conclusions regarding Mexico’s difficulties in emerging as a middle power from a unique regional identity. Clearly, Mexico cannot be situated within a single region; it is a nation of double regional pertenence. It belongs to North America, both geographically and by virtue of the close and growing links between its economy and that of the United States. Nonetheless, it also belongs to Latin America, in terms of shared language, history and culture. Mexico is thus an example of that exceptional instance, a “bi-regional nation”, one whose role within the global community can only be conceived in terms of this duality. For such a role to acquire meaning and momentum, Mexico must reach an understanding with both the North and the South, gaining acceptance by both parties as a bridge that connects the most powerful nation on the planet with the under-developed world, the Anglo-Saxon world view with Latin American...
culture and attitudes, the world of welfare and opportunity with that of unemployment and inequality. Such a role as a bridge nation has yet to be visualized by Mexico’s political or economic leadership, or by leaders in either North or South America. The task of establishing Mexico as a bi-regional nation, with a specific role and an established margin for action in international politics, has yet to be carried out.

3 The present juncture

The international panorama is subject to rapid and unforeseen transformations; we might well wonder whether future junctures might lead Mexico to assume a position of greater responsibility on the stage of international politics, not because such a position forms part of a structured project, but rather due to circumstances that might force the Mexican hand. The following section will explore this possibility in greater depth.

At the present time, there are two circumstances from very different fields that might compel Mexico to assume a greater level of influence in international politics. These circumstances are firstly, the political situation in Latin America, and secondly, the growing attention being paid to the future of multilateral institutions; human rights issues, in particular, are at the very center of the multilateral debate. Might Mexican politics in those areas overcome the traditional reluctance to become a distinguished player in international politics? Could such a process allow Mexico to emerge as an accepted middle power?

Challenges in Latin America

A first warning as regards the Latin American situation has to do with the region’s potential for rapid change of the political landscape, arising largely from electoral results in Brazil and Mexico. Lula’s re-election in Brazil would extend Latin America’s left-leaning attitude (either moderate or radical) for a number of years. On the other hand, a triumph for the opposition in Brazil, combined with a win for the conservative candidate in Mexico, would modify many of the expectations and fears that prevail today regarding Latin America’s political future.

Over and beyond unforeseen course transformations, there are certain situations that present a clear risk for the region’s immediate future. Three might be pointed out here: the urge to intervene in Cuba, precipitating the downfall of Fidel Castro’s regime; tensions caused by the unpredictable and strident nature of the Venezuelan President; and the erosion of democratic governance in certain nations, caused either by social discontent or by the actions of organized crime.

Any of these issues has the potential to engage Mexico’s political attention. The manner in which the country responds may, in turn, either strengthen its regional standing, or further accentuate its current marginalization.

The Cuban instance is particularly difficult in view of the evolving and contentious relations between the two nations over recent years. After a long period of friendship in which at one point Mexico was the sole Latin American nation to maintain relations with the island, events began to change course, culminating with a series of conflicts during the Presidency of Vicente Fox. The greatest point of contention has derived from an increased concern within the Mexican government party, or PAN, for human rights issues in Cuba, particularly political human rights and the defense of democracy.

The real effectiveness of such political pressure over Cuba is not under discussion here; suffice it to say that there is little evidence to suggest that it has produced any significant results. However, Mexico’s vote in favor of a resolution passed by the Human Rights Commission in Geneva that tacitly questioned the situation of Cuban human rights became the starting point for a series of altercations and misunderstandings that climaxed in 2005. Contentions over the Mexican vote in Geneva were exacerbated by alleged Cuban interference in Mexico’s internal affairs, leading to an almost complete breakdown in relations. Cuba’s Ambassador to Mexico was asked to depart, along with the withdrawal of the Mexican Ambassador on the island.

One first observation regarding these conflicts is that Mexico has stood alone amongst the Latin American nations in its differences with Castro’s government. Other nations, such as Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and of course, Venezuela, have preferred to abstain from much explicit commentary on Cuba’s internal affairs, and have in fact made friendly overtures to the island’s government. Secondly, it should be noted that there are widely divergent notions amongst the Cuban opposition as to how to achieve a democratic transformation in their country. Internal dissident groups differ greatly from those in Miami for example, and Mexico should not expect to find itself in tune with the purposes and strategies of Cubans themselves. A
third observation concerns the almost symbolic value that the relationship with Cuba holds within Mexican society. The recent series of altercations between the two governments were accompanied by an extraordinary amount of debate, both in Mexico’s Congress and amongst public opinion. In the total absence of a consensus in this matter, the Mexican government, determined to maintain its disagreements with Cuba, is unable to act from a position of internal legitimacy. And finally, we must bear in mind that all relations with Cuba lead of necessity to the relationship with the United States; any form of intervention aimed at hastening the demise of Castro’s regime will ultimately come from that country. Any action that suggests that Mexico shares such intentions would have an extremely negative impact on its image, both internally and externally.

There are some similar problems regarding Mexico’s relations with the government of Venezuela. Mexico present government, for example, lacks Latin American allies in its confrontation with Chavez, or at least it lacks allies that share its own motives. This has become a largely verbal conflict between both Presidents, visible enough to create tension but also trivial enough not to act as a significant precedent. Accusations such as those made during recent electoral campaigns in Mexico, alleging that Chavez was intervening in Mexican affairs by supporting one of the candidates were patently not proved. Differences might lead to a more serious situation should the United States adopt a more aggressive stance against Venezuela (which has yet to occur under the government of President Bush, to a great extent because its attention is focused elsewhere), and the Mexican government decided to align its position with Washington. In such a case, Mexico’s role as a nation with the ability to broker differentiated positions in international politics would be badly tarnished.

Mexico faces a different set of problems from the erosion of democratic policies in Latin America, deriving from social unrest, or from the activities of organized crime. Social unease in Latin America reflects the persistence of poverty and inequality, which affect all of the nations in the region to varying degrees. The dangers posed by the inability of such unease to be channeled through peaceful means, producing either isolated or more generalized outbreaks of violence, is closely tied to the fragility of democratic institutions in the region. We should bear in mind that in many instances these institutions are barely being consolidated, after long periods of authoritarianism, vote rigging and repression.

Social turmoil will almost certainly affect Mexico in the years to come. The traditional inequality of its society, further polarized in the wake of recent electoral campaigns, indicates that the demands of various groups will become increasingly vociferous. To address these demands, preventing them from spreading into overt violence, will be a challenge faced by whoever ultimately takes power in December of the current year.

Mexico’s ability to deal with the problems posed by poverty and inequality will have an influence far beyond its borders. Presently, the search for means to alleviate the social problems that ail the majority of the planet’s population has become a priority for many international institutions. We have, for example, the efforts undertaken to implement the United Nations Millennium Development Goals, or the labors being carried out by the World Bank. These discussions pivot around many problems that bring into question the so-called Washington Consensus, such as appropriate mechanisms for State participation, the forms and means for economic aperture, the manner in which governments might intervene to foster redistribution, the role of international cooperation and its conditions, and so on. In view of its dimension, strategic situation, relative importance within Latin America, and other factors, the case of Mexico will no doubt warrant particular scrutiny. Its successes or failures may tilt the balance towards the legitimization or the undermining of routes chosen by other countries in the region. Mexico’s actions will be closely followed, and time will reveal whether it is forging a promising path, or becoming bogged down along with other countries in a mire of poverty and social inequality. Regardless of its wishes, Mexico has arrived at a juncture that can either strengthen its international image, or maintain it on a minor plane.

Of a different nature, though somewhat related, are those problems deriving from the possible erosion of democratic governance due to the actions of organized crime. Such actions currently plague many Latin American nations; we need only recall the disturbances that have on a second occasion now rocked Sao Paulo, Brazil, or the problems facing Colombia, where drug traffickers and guerrillas are becoming increasingly and dangerously intertwined. In
Mexico, the problem or organized crime has surged in recent years, largely as a perverse result of the beheading of certain large organized crime cartels. This violence has spread throughout many States in the Republic, arousing widespread concerns that some regions are rapidly spiraling out of control.

In Mexico, organized crime has certain special and particularly complex consequences that derive from its proximity to the greatest illegal drug market in the world, giving rise to occasionally serious tensions and demands between Mexico and the United States.

At the present time, there are as yet no indicators as to how the problem of organized crime can be tackled by Mexico’s incoming President; however, it is safe to assume that it will form a part of his international agenda. It has often been pointed out that organized crime can only be combated through a sound structure for cooperation within the neighborhood; this is a disease whose very capacities, resources and existence derive from its connections to other countries. In many instances, there is no clear line between organized crime on the national level and the transnational level.

Mexico’s geographic location will allow it to serve as a testing ground for a variety of modalities in the struggle against organized crime. These various modalities will have an increased chance for success to the extent that they are implemented on a multi-national level. A successful proposal with visible results would enhance Mexico’s international prestige; the opposite, of course, would also hold true.

**Strengthening multilateral forums**

There are a number of other challenges that may present Mexico with an opportunity to play a relevant role on the international level. These refer, for example, to the current debate on multilateralism versus unilateralism, and the ability of either one or the other to contribute towards a more stable and less fragile international order. This debate is already reaching certain tentative conclusions within the U.N., as it searches for means to attenuate tensions and halt acts of open aggression. It is well known that many potentially productive fields are closed to the U.N. due to certain permanent members of the Security Council, who are implicitly against any form of overt action. Such is the case in disputes involving Israel, for example, where the United States veto has paralyzed the Council at a number of critical junctures.

However, various avenues for action remain for the U.N. The problems caused by Iran’s nuclear program, for example, have been addressed in a manner that emphasizes diplomacy over confrontation. Nonetheless, Mexico does not form part of the Security Council, and there are no mechanisms other than regional ones through which Mexico could contribute towards the solution of specific problems; presently, it has room to maneuver in the fields of Human Rights, and in the general reform of the United Nations.

For Mexico, one of the most crucial foreign policy decisions of recent years came with the creation of the Group of Friends for the Reform of the United Nations. Made up by 14 nations with a regional influence and a long-standing history within the U.N., the main goal for this group has been to promote an integral reform of the international organization, which is to say, a reform that goes beyond the exclusive expansion of the Security Council, a tendency which was being promulgated largely though not solely by the four nations which aspired to become permanent Council members. Against this tendency, the Group of Friends established common positions regarding a list of issues including the revitalization of the General Assembly, the strengthening of the ECOSOC, working methods for the Security Council, the so-called “responsibility to protect”, the organization’s administrative reform, and so on. The results of the Group’s deliberations were submitted to the Secretary General for inclusion within the Report presented at the Summit of 2005.

It is not my intention to analyze the extent to which the positions presented by the Group of Friends were reflected or not within the poorly executed reform of 2005. What is most important for Mexico, setting a precedent for the expansion of its role as a middle power, was the fact that it was able to create a mechanism that worked efficiently prior to the 2005 Summit, and which now can conceivably be maintained, if at least as a reference point for future reform efforts within the U.N.

For Mexico, the definition of alliances within the multilateral forums should not entail that it remains within the heart of its regional group; this would be unproductive. In such forums, Mexico should assume itself as a nation with greater relative economic development, clearly distinct from the group of more industrialized nations, yet able to share arenas with them in the company of other emerging countries. The
Group of Friends has proved itself to be one of the most interesting concrete proposals in this direction to date.

Regarding human rights, we should bear in mind that one of the few results produced by the 60th General Assembly was the creation of a new Human Rights Council, replacing the badly discredited Commission on Human Rights. Mexico, one of its 47 elected members, assumed the presidency of this new organism in 2006.

The challenges faced by the president of the HRC are multiple. The new organism has been assigned gargantuan labors, such as monitoring human rights in all U.N. member nations, and in particular, in case of those members who also belong to the HRC, and stand to lose this membership in case of a negative evaluation. The procedures for the implementation of such monitoring, the resources to be allocated, and the manner in which results will be brought before the Council are as yet unclear; the chairman will play an important role in orienting discussions in this regard.

Clearly, the chairman’s authority and his ensuing ability to maneuver within the Council will largely depend on Mexico’s own credibility as a country with a vested interest in the defense of human rights. Should the council develop, as many hopes, into an organism that unites countries on a truly determined search for human rights, then it will be Mexico’s responsibility, particularly from its present position, to remain above all expectations. Should this be the case, its legacy in having established a dynamic for the HRC’s future actions will no doubt allow Mexico to attain a position of greater responsibility in international politics.

4 Conclusions

The preceding sections have presented a varied panorama containing a series of factors (clearly not all) which might impinge upon Mexico’s passage towards the rank of a middle power, with weight and influence in the great international transformations of the present century. The scant attention paid to this passage by the country’s political leadership has been explained by the difficulties in establishing the nation’s regional identity. Such reflections lead us to conclude that Mexico is a bi-regional country, a condition which has a major, not necessarily easy, influence upon its ability to act on the international arena.

However, the level of a nation’s influence is not solely dependent on its established purposes, but also on the specific junctures that emerge, and which may or may not have been foreseen by its leadership. The current transition being undergone in Latin America presents challenges for Mexico that will gradually define its global role. Some of those challenges are not promising for Mexico. Regime change in Cuba or relationships with Venezuela of Chavez are a good example. There is a clear distance between Mexico’s position and that of southern countries. MERCOSUR just welcomed full membership of Venezuela and gave a kind and smiling reception to Fidel Castro, who unexpectedly arrived at MERCOSUR meeting in Cordova, Argentina. By being critical of those extreme left leaders, Mexico accentuates distances from some of the most influential Latin American countries, without becoming necessarily a leader itself.

Of a different nature are the possibilities and challenges opened by problems of internal character such as fight against poverty or organized crime. Advancements on those areas shall certainly enhance the international stature and prestige of Mexico. Nevertheless, prospects for success are uncertain.

Mexico’s role in the world will by to a great extent be determined by its capacity to forge alliances within multilateral forums, not solely with the Latin American group but with a larger group of middle income countries which are eager to commit themselves with multilateralism. The activities carried out by the Group of Friends for the Reform of the United Nations, formed by Mexico, are a promising example for future progress.

Finally, a promising window is opened by Mexico’s position in the newly created HRC. If credibility in Mexican situation in human rights is enhanced, then the influence of its diplomacy might play a constructive and prestigious role in that area.

In conclusion, will Mexico become a major player in the international arena in the decades to come? The answer lies in three evolving and interlinked circumstances: First, the existence of a well structured project which takes into account the bi-regional nature of the country and establishes objectives and priorities to acquire a greater influence in well defined international issues; the legitimacy of such a project “North and South Mexico” is a needed condition for its success. Second, the advancement towards social cohesion and
enhancement of national security in Mexico. Third, the capacity to create strategic alliances with peer countries in order to counteract unilateralism by great powers and strengthen multilateral institutions. Shall those circumstances become truth; Mexico will play a role as one of the middle powers of the XXI Century.

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About the author:
Olga Pellicer is a Professor and Researcher at the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM).

The FES holds a series of regional dialogues devoted to the new foreign policy role played by a number of key countries in Asia, Latin America and Africa (“New Powers For Global Change?”), their strategies for the regional and global order and perceptions of geopolitical change in these countries, in Germany and the European Union.

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