REGIONAL RENAISSANCE? SECURITY IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD
THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY

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1 Introduction

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) has been in existence for only twelve years. Even if its predecessor, the Southern African Development Cooperation Conference (SADCC), formed in 1980, is taken into account, SADC is still a young organisation. Furthermore, it has evolved in the context of a rapidly-changing and hence unstable regional political environment, dominated by South Africa’s transition from apartheid, but also involving civil wars in Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, rapid and unpredictable transitions to democracy and economic and political crises in many member states.

Although they are bound by a common history of independence struggles against colonialism and racial domination, SADC states are very disparate. The 14 members include small island states, large underdeveloped countries with poor communications, relatively wealthy countries like South Africa as well as some of the poorest ones in the world, states with one-party histories, former autocracies, those that attempted Marxist-Leninism, long-standing democracies, and nations that have only recently emerged from liberation struggles against apartheid and racial domination. Colonial histories also differ: British, French, Portuguese and settler colonial.

It is unsurprising, therefore, that SADC is in many ways still finding its way in terms of security cooperation. Levels of institutionalisation remain quite low. While treaties and protocols have been signed, there is a limited history of common action and collective policy formulation.

To answer questions about what ‘SADC’s views’ are is therefore quite difficult. The treaties and protocols have yet to be given much content. Public statements issued after meetings are often bland, reflect the ‘lowest common denominator’ and do not address the substantive issues. To a large extent, therefore, the issues addressed in this paper have to be dealt with at a relatively high level of abstraction and generality, and in some cases only the views of individual states can be taken into consideration.

In this paper, we argue that in ways similar to its counterparts elsewhere in the global South, SADC focuses on domestic sources of threat and insecurity. Together with poverty, underdevelopment and HIV/AIDS, political threats to regime stability are seen as the key priorities. Beyond this, the security agenda includes cross-border security issues, mainly in the criminal domain. Few SADC member states perceive international terrorism as a key security threat and it appears that none believe they face an immediate external military threat. SADC therefore shares some security concerns with countries of the North, but differs quite significantly from the latter’s emphasis on traditional and current security threats such as weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and terrorism. SADC has managed to develop a security function over and above its development priorities, and benefits from this specific form of functional cooperation, but it needs to put its recently agreed defence and security policies into practice. We argue that the region has had both negative and positive experiences with outside intervention, and it stands to benefit from continued close cooperation with selected global actors such as the UN and European countries in pursuing its common security agenda.

2 Perception of threat scenarios

What security problems are regarded as particularly pressing in SADC?

In this research paper, we limit ourselves to an attempt at understanding threat perceptions from states and groups of states (the human security terrain is quite wide and can be accessed elsewhere; see for example the 2003 report by the Commission on Human Security). It is generally accepted that states keep their analyses of threats (to the extent that they engage in systematic analysis) to themselves. It is therefore difficult to obtain ‘official’ accounts of the threat perceptions of state elites, except in the broadest sense. Instead, we rely on research to arrive at state perceptions of threat. Two sources informed the table below: results of a research project carried out by the Africa Institute of

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1 SADC consists of member states Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
South Africa (Solomon, 2004) and findings of a research project carried out by the Southern African Defence and Security (Sadsem) network (Sadsem, 2004). In addition, informal interviews were conducted with a small number of senior defence officers from SADC countries.

As Table 1 in the addendum indicates, the 14 countries of SADC all experience internal security problems relating to two clusters of issues: governance and socio-economic levels of development. SADC’s view of these security problems are examined in more detail in Section 2.3 below. The organisation acknowledges the existence of a range of external factors or influences upon its security (pressures for democratisation and neo-liberal reforms, globalisation) but its impact on the organisation, the region, and its members is not always clearly understood. Many SADC members are significantly affected by regional instability, resulting in cross-border problems. Finally, few of the SADC countries seem to prioritise external threats, and no mention is made of any external military threat. International terrorism is seen as a threat by Tanzania and Mauritius and illegal fishing by Namibia, Mozambique and the island states.

How does SADC differ from other regions in its perceptions of threat scenarios?

A detailed response to this question requires a thorough review of the threat perceptions of other regional organisations (if such expressions of threat exist at all). Generally speaking, and following Cawthra (2004), most of the regional organisations discussed below are state-driven projects, with the motivation for security cooperation being the mutual insecurities of state elites. In Latin America, Mercosur is primarily focused on trade, with a limited attention to political and security functions. The Organisation of American States (OAS) brings together countries from both North and South America yet is completely dominated by the US and by extension its security interests. Despite a range of confidence-building measures designed to reduce threat perception, levels of internal conflict and social violence in Latin America are still very high. The current problems include drug-related violence and drug trafficking, escalating urban crime, arms and small arms trade, migration and refugees, environmental degradation, and terrorism (Mills, Shelton and White, 2003: 84).

The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a classic case of states drawing together because of shared threat perceptions (Communist insurgencies) and common convictions about how to counter the threat (authoritarian capitalism). Its weakness (adherence to sovereignty and non-interference) has been exposed through its failure to adequately address major challenges over the past few years. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), created in 1993, overcomes this weakness by focusing on confidence-building measures and dialogues. Issues for discussion include transnational crime, the civilian conversion of defence industries, transparency in conventional arms and disaster management, and recently, terrorism (Mills, Shelton and White, 2003: 96).

The Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) is another example of states coming together on the basis of shared threat perceptions and regime insecurities. It is also dominated by one member. It displays an advanced degree of military cooperation but essentially relies on external security guarantees (the US and the UK). The League of Arab States, although having developed a range of inter-state security institutions, is weak when it comes to conflict prevention and resolution.

Of the various African sub-regional organisations, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and SADC stand out as having achieved some measure of security cooperation. Both are dominated by a powerful member – Nigeria and South Africa respectively. Both were created to promote subregional economic integration. In the case of ECOWAS, during its first 15 years its laudable economic objectives were often hampered by military seizures of power, in a milieu in which regime security was misconstrued as state or national security. As Aboagye (2003) notes, while the era of the military coup receded with the end of the cold war, West Africa’s security landscape has since been characterised by a new paradigm of fratricidal wars and internecine conflicts, particularly in the Mano River Union area – Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea and nearby Guinea-Bissau. SADC has not had extensive experience of military coups, but is familiar with threats to regime security (the DRC
and Lesotho), as well as the familiar range of cross-border threats to the security of people and states.

In summary, SADC seems to differ from the regional organisations discussed above in some respects. First of all, it has a unique history, including civil war and liberation from colonial and apartheid domination. It does not have external security guarantees in the form of the US or any other major western power. Its security cooperation activities exclude civil society participation. However it shares a number of features with various sub-regional organisations. It appears the principal driver of regional security co-operation is shared regime threat perception and a common interest between regimes – be they democratic or not – in supporting each other against sources of internal and external insecurity. Also, sub-regional organisations in the developing world are increasing in scope and extent as a direct response to globalisation. They can be seen both as a response to and further impetus for globalisation. Whether they serve to mitigate the exclusionary effects of uneven global development, however, is unclear. It could be argued that they serve to accelerate inequalities by serving neo-liberal economics through their outward orientations.

Do the countries of SADC share a common agenda of pressing security problems?

Co-operation on security in the region dates back to the early 1970s when Tanzania and Zambia formed the grouping of frontline states to lobby for the liberation of Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. Following the end of the cold war and apartheid, states in the region could begin to approach regional peace and security in a different framework. Two SADC agencies have been created to deal with regional security: the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) – established under the aegis of the then SADCC in 1983 – and the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) – established in 1996 by the SADC but only active since 2001 (IGD, 2001).

In August 2001, SADC heads of state and government agreed to the protocol on politics, defence and security co-operation – the key text that currently guides the organisation in its security function. The general objectives of the OPDS is to promote peace and security in the region.2 Following the restructuring of SADC institutions (approved by Summit in March 2001 in Windhoek), its Secretariat prepared a Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) in order to provide a clear orientation (strategic direction) for the policies and programmes of the organisation over the medium to long term (ten to fifteen years). RISDP recognises the link between SADC and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), particularly in the area of policy harmonisation.

In its analysis of the socio-economic situation in the SADC region, the RISDP makes the point that despite an overall improvement in the political situation in the region, and the fact that the SADC region’s GDP is equivalent to more than half the GDP of sub-Saharan Africa, it still displays all the characteristics of a developing region. Only Mauritius and South Africa have sizeable manufacturing sectors; most members depend on agriculture, mining or services; the average level of per capita income is low and has been declining over the last three decades; poverty is generally high and acute amongst certain vulnerable groups; half of SADC members have experienced a long-term decline in terms of trade; and most members have experienced an increasing external debt burden and high aid dependence over the last two decades.

In 2001 the Organ was mandated to prepare a strategic indicative plan for the Organ (SIPO) which would provide guidelines for the implementation of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation for the next five years. A Task Team developed various drafts of the

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2 Its specific objectives (there are 12) include protecting the people of the region against instability; promoting political co-operation and the evolution of common political values and institutions; developing a common foreign policy; promoting regional co-ordination and co-operation related to security and defence (including collective security capacity and a Mutual Defence Pact); managing conflict by peaceful means; developing close co-operation between the police and state security services to address cross border crime; developing peacekeeping capacity and co-ordinating the participation of members in such operations; and enhancing regional capacity regarding disaster management.
SIPO (currently a third draft exists, dated 15.07.2003). SIPO seeks to identify strategies and activities to achieve the objectives found in the protocol on politics, defence and security cooperation. The Plan discusses four sectors, namely political, defence, state security (intelligence) and public security (policing and justice).

The SIPO identifies the region’s security challenges as follows (SADC, 2003):

- **Political**: Underdevelopment and poverty; HIV/AIDS; inter- and intra-state conflict; consolidation of democracy; refugees and irregular movers; wealth imbalances; disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration (D2R3), resettlement and reconstruction (DDRRR); and disaster management.

- **Defence**: Armed conflict within states; HIV/AIDS; need for trained units ready to be deployed by AU or UN; capacity development for defence technology; clearance of landmines; responding to external aggression; D2R3; inter-operability doctrine; and small arms proliferation.

- **State security (intelligence)**: capacity to prevent state subversion; negative effects of globalisation; terrorism; enhancement of bilateral relations; implementation of an early warning system (EWS); HIV/AIDS; food security; and maritime resources.

- **Public security (policing)**: crime; drugs; small arms; money laundering; human trafficking; violence against the vulnerable; conflict diamonds.

Despite the seeming shared threat perceptions, it needs to be noted that SADC member states have at times disagreed on the nature of and preferred response to various crises (see below). SADC did not act as one regarding the long-standing crisis in Angola (1975-2000), Lesotho (1998), the DRC (1998-2001), or more generally the neighbouring Great Lakes Region in central Africa. Making a common response more complicated was the inability of the organization to get the Organ off the ground. Although it was created in 1996, mutual mistrust and personality clashes delayed its operationalisation until 2001 (see below).

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**Is there a common understanding of threat perceptions shared by the countries of SADC and the countries of the North?**

This question can be answered only at a high level of abstraction and generality. As an indication of the threat perceptions of Northern countries we will examine the US, NATO, the G8, and the EU. As far as the Bush administration is concerned, the threat is terrorism. A year after the September 11, 2001, terror attacks in America, it released a revised National Security Strategy (US, 2002). In the preamble to the document, President Bush identifies the ‘enemy’ as being “terrorists and tyrants”, „shadowy networks of individuals”, and „nations that are compromised by terror, including those who harbor terrorists”. Compromised nations are those characterised by „poverty, weak institutions and corruption [that] can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders”. These terrorists, Bush argues, „are organised to penetrate open societies and to turn the power of modern technologies against us. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction.” He warns that America will act against such emerging threats.

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3 The National Security Strategy document describes the threat as follows: „The USA is fighting a war against terrorists of global reach. The enemy is not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology. The enemy is terrorism - premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents.” It acknowledges that „legitimate grievances“ exist in many regions, and that „conditions and ideologies promote terrorism“ especially in the Muslim world. The document also identifies „critical regional disputes“ including the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the India-Pakistan conflict, drug cartels in Latin America, and Africa, where „promise and opportunity sit side by side with disease, war, and desperate poverty. This threatens both a core value of the US - preserving human dignity - and our strategic priority - combating global terror“ (US, 2002: 10).

However, the US believes that no cause justifies terror, and that the US will „make no concessions to terrorist demands, strike no deals with them, and make no distinction between terrorists and those who knowingly harbor or provide aid to them” (NSS, 2002: 5). The NSS document identifies the enemy as Afghanistan (which has in the meantime been „liberated”), the Taliban, and al-Qaida. It also notes that „Thousand of trained terrorists remain at large with cells in North America, South America, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and across Asia“ (US, 2002: 5).
before they are fully formed (the so-called doctrine of pre-emptive action, whereby the US will act pre-emptively if necessary in order to forestall or prevent hostile acts (US, 2002: 15)), and may need to cooperate with other countries - coalitions of the willing - to combat terror, although it will also act unilaterally if necessary.

The traditional view of the G8 (Group of Eight – the US, UK, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, Japan and Russia) is that its main focus is in the field of economics and that security activities are of secondary importance. Following 9/11 and the subsequent ‘war on terror’, new views of the mission of the G8 have been proposed. For example, Penttila (2003) argues that given the resources at its command, the leadership of the G8 should play an increasingly important role in international peace and security. The G8 has indeed played a role in rooting out sources of finance for terrorism. Both the 2002 and 2003 summits (in Canada and France respectively) included security as one of the priority agenda items. This trend is continuing, as is evident from the 2004 summit preparatory documents (to be hosted in Georgia in June).

On 12 September 2001, less than 24 hours after the terrorist attacks against the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) declared the attacks to be an attack against all the 19 NATO member countries. However, relations in the area of security cooperation between the US and key European states France and Germany have soured following the latter’s reluctance, in early 2003, to endorse the American war on Iraq. Furthermore, when comparing the mission and roles of NATO with that of the common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) it appears that there is severe policy overlap and confusion. Europe is far from having worked out its preferred security architecture (Smith, 2004). The European dilemma is that by adopting NATO as the premier security instrument, it chooses to work with the dominant – and domineering – US, and its threat agenda; if it chooses ESDP it risks losing American security guarantees, given the weaknesses evident in the evolving ESDP (Sangiovanni, 2003).

Observers such as Stevenson (2003-4) remind us that Africa has had a negative attraction for the North (source of threats, receiver of humanitarian aid) but a positive attraction as well (economic interests, supplier of oil). On the one hand, Nigeria, Angola and others are able to provide the US with up to 18% of its oil imports. On the other hand, the North fears that Africa is a potential staging area for transnational Islamic terrorist operations. Regardless of whether the positives outweigh the negatives (one can argue either way), America and Europe are in a process of redefining their strategic relationships with Africa, and in particular with the so-called ‘anchor states’ of Nigeria and South Africa (Stevenson, 2003-4: 163-4).

Based on this short overview, to what extent can one say that the countries of SADC share a threat perception with countries of the North? There seems to be limited overlap and significant divergence. The obvious area of overlap is international terrorism. Kenya, Tanzania and to a limited extent, South Africa have experienced incidents of international terrorism. Even so, few SADC countries have put it high on their list of threats; rather, they acknowledge that they have little option but to cooperate in the ‘war on terror’. Other areas of overlap would include global networks of crime (drugs, money laundering, prostitution, and so on). This is where the similarities appear to end. For SADC countries, globalisation, structural adjustment programmes, and demands for democratisation or regime change – all Northern agendas – often threaten the security of people and states in Africa. Its concern is therefore largely with domestic instability. SADC countries have taken a somewhat different approach to the North’s concern with the threats related to nuclear weapons and WMD (South Africa, for example, has argued that the Non-Proliferation Treaty should not only prevent proliferation but should also lead to dis-

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4 There are strong arguments against such a vision. First, the US does not believe it needs an ‘emboldened’ G8 to fight the war on terror. Second, there is no consensus amongst its members regarding such a new role. Third, many (including global social justice as well as anti-globalisation movements) believe the G8 is simply a club of the rich, not to be entrusted with leading the fight against poverty (generally recognised as a root cause of terrorism). And fourth, many oppose the notion of a strengthened G8 replacing the role of the UN Security Council.
armament), and have endorsed the Pelindaba Treaty on a nuclear weapons-free Africa.

Even where there seem to be shared threat perceptions, SADC countries often differ from their counterparts in the North regarding the appropriate responses. Several SADC countries, together with their counterparts elsewhere in the South, voiced their concerns over the decision by the US and the UK to invade Iraq.

What elements of regional security cooperation are already in evidence?

In March 2001, an extraordinary SADC Summit approved the proposed recommendations for far-reaching changes in SADC’s institutional framework and the structure for executing its 1992 mandate. These included changes in SADC’s governing structures at the regional and national level, but most importantly a plan for the abolition of the 21 sector co-ordinating units and commissions located in 12 of its member countries, which will be brought together in four clusters in a strengthened SADC Secretariat in Gaborone, Botswana.

At the Council of Ministers Meeting and Summit in Blantyre in August 2001 these changes in SADC structures were further consolidated. The SADC Treaty was amended to take into account these institutional changes. In addition the Summit signed a Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation which formalised the Organ of the same name. The Organ has its own set of regional structures and mechanisms for policy formulation and implementation but the protocol also specifies that the SADC Secretariat is the Secretariat of the Organ.

The Summit is the supreme policy-making institution of SADC. It is led by a Troika system consisting of the chair, incoming chair and the outgoing chair. It should meet at least twice a year (under the previous arrangement it normally only met once a year). The first meeting should take place before 31 March each year, focusing primarily on regional economic development matters and the SADC Programme of Action. The second should take place in August/September, focusing on political matters. Decisions are be taken by consensus and are binding.

The Council of Ministers, which oversees the functioning of SADC, should meet at least four times year. It consists of one Minister from each member state, preferably the Minister responsible for the SADC National Contact Point. The National Contact Point is either the Ministry of Finance/Development Planning or, in most cases and increasingly, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The Integrated Committee of Ministers (ICM) is, apart from the Organ, the main innovation in the governing structure of SADC (Isaksen and Tjønneland, 2001). It oversees the implementation of the core areas of integration, which include the four clusters (see below) and provide policy guidance to the Secretariat. The ICM has decision-making powers to ensure rapid implementation of programmes. See Figure 1 in the addendum for more details regarding the SADC organisational structure.

The adoption of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation in 2001 represented something of a breakthrough. In 1996 SADC decided to create the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security. It never became operational and a variety of problems erupted. The chairing of the Organ, the permanence of that position and its status vis-à-vis SADC became hotly contested issues. At the 2001 Summit, and after intense negotiations and pressure, it was decided to bring the Organ firmly under SADC control. A Troika composed of the new chair (Mozambique) the outgoing chair (Zimbabwe) and the incoming chair (Tanzania) was appointed.

The Protocol also provides for an elaborate structure of the Organ. Under the Chair and the Troika there is a Ministerial Committee comprised of the SADC ministers responsible for foreign affairs, defence, public security and state security. It operates much like the SADC Council of Ministers and has a partly overlapping membership.

The Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC) comprises the ministers responsible for foreign affairs. It performs such functions as are necessary to achieve the objectives of the Organ relating to politics and diplomacy.

The Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) comprises ministers responsible for defence, public security and state security. It is an
established committee formed more than 20 years ago as the Frontline States (it became ISDSC when South Africa, Malawi, Swaziland and Lesotho joined after 1994). It has a fairly elaborate substructure, especially under the Defence subcommittee and a range of sub-sub-committees on functional areas of co-operation.

Under the public security (police) ministers there is the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-ordination Committee (SARPCCO) which has a permanent secretariat hosted by the Secretariat of the Interpol Sub-Regional Bureau for Southern Africa located in Harare.

The ISDSC itself has never had a permanent secretariat. These services are provided by the ISDSC chair on a rotational basis.

Security co-operation was further enhanced in 2003 with the adoption of a SADC Mutual Defence Pact, providing both for non-aggression and for mutual defence against an attack on a member state (including an internal threat). This falls short of automatic mutual defence, however, as it provides that ‘each state party shall participate in such collective action in any manner it deems appropriate’ (SADC 2003: Article 6).

What is the scope of cooperative regional security arrangements?

According to SADC’s Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (SIPO) its scope includes the following issues (SADC, 2003):

In the political sector:
- Protect the people and safeguard the region against domestic instability
- Promote the evolution of common political values and institutions
- Prevent, contain and resolve conflict by peaceful means
- Promote democracy and human rights
- Observe and encourage states to implement the UN Charter, AU CA
- Develop peacekeeping capacity of national defence forces
- Enhance regional capacity re disaster management and coordination of international humanitarian assistance
- Develop a common foreign policy approach on issues of mutual concern

In the defence sector:
- Protect the people and safeguard the region against domestic instability
- Promote regional cooperation on matters related to security and defence
- Consider enforcement action as a matter of last resort
- Consider the development of a collective security capacity and conclude a mutual defence pact to respond to external military threats
- Observe conventions and treaties on Arms Control & Disarmament
- Develop peacekeeping capacity
- Enhance regional capacity re disaster management and coordination of international humanitarian assistance.

In the state security sector (intelligence):
- Protect the people and safeguard the region against domestic instability
- Promote regional cooperation on matters related to security and defence
- Prevent, contain and resolve conflict by peaceful means
- Consider the development of a collective security capacity and conclude a mutual defence pact to respond to external military threats
- Develop close cooperation between the police and state security services

In the public security sector (law enforcement):
- Protect the people and safeguard the region against domestic instability
- Promote regional cooperation on matters related to security and defence
- Consider enforcement action as a matter of last resort
• Promote democracy and human rights
• Develop close cooperation between the state security and defence forces
• Observe conventions and treaties on Arms Control & Disarmament
• Develop peacekeeping capacity
• Enhance regional capacity for disaster management and coordination of international humanitarian assistance

In summary this rather exhaustive list of issues has been prioritised by SADC to include democracy building, peacekeeping training, police cooperation especially regarding cross-border crime, disaster management, conflict management (with the emphasis on conflict resolution), and food security. In the longer term the organisation plans to promote institution-building, peace enforcement and harmonisation of foreign policies.

3 Security policy in the SADC region

What role is played by regional or global actors in conflicts or for cooperative security arrangements in the SADC region?

The southern African region has extensive experience of external involvement in promoting violent conflict and other threats to its security. The region’s history speaks of colonialism and apartheid, liberation struggles, civil wars, secessionist wars, genocide, ideological and proxy wars. Indeed, the region has provided terrain for the superpowers to engage each other during the cold war era. Although conventional military battles have largely come to an end, global demands for neo-liberal economics and democratic governance have generated further tensions.

If we focus on the recent (post-cold war) period, it is clear that global actors have maintained a presence, pursuing mainly economic and donor interests. European and Scandinavian countries have actively supported the creation of SADC and its security functions. This continues today. Because the region does not have the required peacekeeping or -building capacity, the UN has played a key role in at least four major conflicts: Namibia in 1979-1980, Mozambique in 1992-4, and Angola, and together with the AU, and the French, it is currently active in the DRC and Great Lakes Region. Its specialized agencies have also assist the region in managing its humanitarian crises such as food shortages, flooding or mine victims.

The activities of outsiders are not without controversy, though. The war in the DRC attracted a range of outsiders, many pursuing self-interests (the UN investigated and found instances of serious resource exploitation by various governments and international businesses).

The EU together with the US has taken a strong position against the current Zimbabwean government in the form of limited sanctions, and individual donor countries have withdrawn development assistance from Zimbabwe and Malawi.

One should also point out that other global forces are present in the southern African region. SADC is witnessing a shadowy, illegal global presence in the form of illegal resource extraction, international terrorism, illegal fishing, international crime syndicates, illicit small and light arms trade, money laundering schemes and narcotics trafficking.

What actors have been actively involved in security processes and discussions, and how can the spectrum be broadened?

We can distinguish between domestic, regional and international actors, as well as security processes in the domestic (national) and regional context. Regarding state security, we can identify the following (human security processes involve additional actors):

Local actors:
• National processes: The state (security sector agencies, decision-makers, parliament), limited civil society involvement, some NGOs;
• Regional processes: State representatives, very limited non-state involvement (e.g. business, NGOs);

Regional actors:
• National processes: SARPCCO, SADC Parliamentary Forum;
• Regional processes: SADC structures (Organ, Secretariat), SADSEM;

International actors:
• National processes: Donor countries promoting D2R3, Security Sector Reform, War on Terror, INGOs;

• Regional processes: Donor countries promoting D2R3, security sector reform, war on terror, UN agencies, INGOs

4 Security policy as multilevel policy

As noted earlier, despite its immaturity, SADC security cooperation has taken place at a number of different levels. Heads of State (although not necessarily all of them) have met regularly and informally for many years, notably through the Front-Line States. This has been formalised since the inception of SADC through the Summit, which meets annually (now bi-annually) and is well attended by the presidents. Regular informal communication takes place, and SADC has adopted a system of delegating key issues to smaller groups of heads of state. Between Summits, the Troika of Heads of State is responsible for overseeing community issues.

Ministerial cooperation is now entrenched within SADC through a Ministerial Committee resorting under the SADC Heads of State Troika. This involves the ministers primarily responsible for SADC’s economic cooperation functions – typically ministers of trade and industry. Security cooperation is carried out at ministerial level through another Ministerial Committee resorting under the Troika of heads of state responsible for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDS). Up to 56 ministers (four from each member state) might be involved in this, as the committee provides for cooperation between ministers responsible for foreign affairs, defence, state security (intelligence) and public security (policing or home affairs). However, while the SADC ministerial system is well established, OPDS ministerial cooperation is relatively new and it remains to be seen how such a large body at executive level might be made functional, especially as there are currently only two officials within the SADC secretariat responsible for all its political and security functions.

At the level of officials, two committees exist: the Interstate Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) and the Interstate Politics and Diplomacy Committee (IPDC). These also meet at least annually and the Troika principle is used to cover ongoing activity. For example officials from Lesotho, South Africa and Mozambique, which at the time constituted the Troika at this level, met regularly in 2003-4 to discuss ways strategic plans for the implementation of the Organ, which were agreed at ministerial level.

At the national level, the SADC Treaty provides for National Committees, which are supposed to include the private sector, civil society and workers’ and employers’ organisations and are meant to interact with SADC policy issues. However, with few exceptions, they do not appear to be functioning (Isaksen 2002:4). There is thus little participation of civil society and non-governmental organisations in SADC matters and security issues in particular are the preserve of governments alone.

How are existing security structures in SADC assessed?

It took SADC four years to agree to establish an integral security function in the form of the Organ, which was agreed to in 1996: prior to that some countries favoured a separate structure for politics and security. After the adoption of the Organ, however, the argument continued, as it was unclear whether the Organ reported to the SADC Summit or should have a separate structure at Heads of State level. The matter was only resolved in 2001, with the adoption of Protocol in which it was made clear that the Organ was a SADC structure reporting to the Summit but that it would have, at Heads of State level, a different chair and hence Troika to that of SADC itself.

In the five years between 1996 and 2001 the Organ did not therefore really exist either legally or in practice, but that did not deter its chair, President Mugabe of Zimbabwe, from issuing statements and making decisions in its name. The situation was further complicated by tensions between President Mugabe and President Mandela of South Africa. Matters came to a head in August 1998, when Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia decided to dispatch troops to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to counter a rebellion backed by Uganda and Rwanda. This was done in the name of the Organ and SADC, but it the decision had in fact been taken by only a few SADC states, although
it had been referred to the ISDSC (which has no mandate to take such decisions) (Nathan 2002:18).

This deployment brought the community close to breaking point, although the cracks were papered over at the Summit held a month later, where SADC formally endorsed the decision. Divisions, especially between South Africa and Zimbabwe, remained, however, and South Africa and most other SADC countries flatly refused to send troops to DRC, preferring to seek a negotiated solution, which was eventually achieved only in 2002, under South African leadership.

A further crisis followed almost immediately after the DRC intervention, when in September 1998 South Africa and Botswana despatched troops into Lesotho to put down an army mutiny, and met with unexpectedly strong resistance. South Africa claimed it was acting under SADC auspices, but the basis for this decision was unclear, although it was later endorsed by the Summit.

While both these interventions may eventually have had positive outcomes - preventing Rwanda and Uganda from occupying the DRC, and the restoration of democracy in Lesotho - they highlighted the danger of military action being taken in the name of a regional organisation without clear rules and decision-making processes being in place. Subsequently, however, SADC has made some progress in establishing appropriate frameworks and procedures, notably through the Organ Protocol and the adoption of a Mutual Defence Pact in 2003.

Collective defence pacts are, of course, double-edged swords. While they build confidence between the members they also potentially threaten neighbouring countries outside them, and can thus be potentially destabilising or contribute to bloc-building and arms-racing. However, the SADC pact was watered down at the insistence of South Africa and other member states, so that a provision for 'immediate collective action' in the face of an external attack on a member state has been modified to specify that 'each state party shall participate in such collective action in any manner it deems appropriate' (SADC 2003: Article 6). The pact is also in part a non-aggression treaty and provides for a wide range of defence and security co-operation.

SADC’s track record with regard to military interventions is thus at best a mixed one, although in future it may contribute more successfully to stability as the procedures and mechanisms for such action are spelt out in detail in the Protocol. With regard to peace-making and post-conflict peace-building, SADC has had few successes, but its efforts have almost always contributed to stability and security. In practice, the community has seldom been able to resolve matters as a collective and has tended to devolve diplomatic processes and negotiations to one or more member states. South Africa (and before it Botswana) for example brokered the Inter-Congolese Dialogue and South Africa, Botswana and Mozambique were mandated to resolve the Lesotho crisis.

SADC played little role in the Angolan civil war, however, preferring to leave it to the Angolan government to find a military solution, although it considered regular reports on progress from the Angolan government. Nor has SADC taken a position on the crisis of governance in Zimbabwe, other than to deplore the US and the EU sanctions (SADC News Release 07.08.03).

It is thus argued by some that SADC enhances state or regime security, but that by failing to address issues such as human rights violations within member states it might do this at the expense of citizen security (see for example Hammerstad 2003). The implicit argument in this is that in the long term the concentration on state security through mutual regime solidarity might lead to instability if citizens are alienated or repressed.

SADC is effectively a ‘club of states’ and it functions on the basis of ‘sovereign equality’ and on the principle of ‘non-interference in internal affairs’. At the same time, however, SADC contains within it a potential regional hegemon in the form of South Africa. South Africa’s economic dominance is overwhelming - its GDP is larger than that of all the other 13 states combined - but it is less hegemonic in military and political terms. Indeed, as noted above, much of the contestation around the Organ was a result of Zimbabwe attempting to assert its regional leadership. On the whole, South Africa has not
attempted to act unilaterally within the region, and has been keen to promote multilateralism, even to the extent that in some cases this has damaged its relations with the US and the EU countries, for example over Zimbabwe. Political tensions have periodically emerged over South African trade policies, especially its negotiation of a trade agreement with the EU, although in some cases South Africa has been able to act on behalf of SADC as a whole (for example with Mercosur). Regardless, over time the reality of South Africa’s dominance within SADC will inevitably lead to asymmetries.

**To what levels should tasks and decision-making competencies be transferred?**

Historically, regional security decisions were made at the highest level, by Heads of State within the Front-Line States, acting informally. Some states, led by Zimbabwe, have tried to keep it this way, but more formal decision-making processes have now been introduced through the Organ and its sub-structures.

At the level of officials, through the ISDSC in particular, security co-operation is routine and well-established. During the period when the Organ was inoperative, and a political logjam occurred at the Heads of State level, officials were nevertheless able to continue meeting and to develop strategies for cooperation on functional issues such as border protection, organised crime, disaster management and peacekeeping.

Parliamentary participation in SADC security issues has been very limited, although the SADC Parliamentary Forum increasingly acts as voice for parliamentarians within the region (it was the only SADC body, for example, to reject the results of the Zimbabwean election of 2002). Civil society has been largely excluded from security tasks in the region, although there are some large and effective security analysis NGOs (although all based in South Africa). It has been argued by some that interstate security co-operation would be well served by opening issues up for discussion with civil society and involving civil society and involving it in delivery (Hammerstad 2003).

While it is clearly essential that co-operation takes place at Heads of State and ministerial level, functional co-operation between officials has been shown to be effective, and there is scope for greater involvement of civil society.

**What level of political and cultural acceptance is met with by different forms of intervention?**

SADC statements consistently point to a rejection of any forms of external security intervention, except though the AU or the UN. The collective stance on Zimbabwe is the clearest indication of this (see for example Summit Communiqué 07.08.2000, par 11), where SADC has refused to co-operate in any security matters concerning the region if Zimbabwe is excluded, on the basis of regional solidarity. With regard to intervention, SADC is committed to multilateralism - even if member states have come perilously close to violating this principle, as South Africa did in Lesotho in 1998. However, it is unlikely that it would accept the bona fides of NATO in this regard, preferring to work within the framework of the UN and the AU, as a Chapter VIII-recognised structure of the UN. Many SADC states, including South Africa, for example, took a strong stand against the US and UK intervention in Iraq, arguing that this violated the multilateralist principles of the UN.

It is notable, however, that during the 1995 crisis in Nigeria resulting from the execution of Ogoni human rights activists including Ken Saro-Wiwa SADC offered strong support to the Commonwealth in dealing with the crisis (Extraordinary Summit Communiqué 11.12.1995; Summit Communiqué 28.06.1996). However, with Zimbabwe’s enforced withdrawal from the Commonwealth, such a consensus today on the role of the commonwealth in security mediation would be unlikely.

Within a UN and AU framework SADC has been supportive of a wide range of Chapter VI- and Chapter VII-type activities, including observer missions, peace support operations, preventive deployments, and peace-building activities such as disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, reintegration and rehabilitation exercises. This is seen most clearly by the collective and individual support for UN- and AU-authorised peace support activities in the DRC, Burundi and Ethiopia-Eritrea. In other words, the entire gamut of
Chapter VI- and Chapter VII-type actions appear to be acceptable to SADC providing they are carried out within the framework of the UN and the AU.

5 On the way to a new global security architecture?

What are the demands raised by SADC?

SADC itself has not directly raised any demands with regard to a new global security architecture, nor has it made any statements about what elements of global security policy should be strengthened (with the possible exceptions of some statements regarding debt cancellation and the Highly Indebted Poor Countries initiative) (Summit Communiques 18.08.99 and 07.08.2000).

However, individual countries, led by South Africa, have made repeated demands for the reform of the global collective security system, in particular to make the UN Security Council more representative. Moreover, SADC countries, especially South Africa and Mozambique, have played leading roles in the reform and reconstitution of the OAU into the AU, which seeks to entrench principles of collective security in the Continent.

How can SADC contribute to a cooperative global architecture?

With the exception of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), SADC has advanced further than any other regional economic community in Africa in terms of developing a framework for collaborative security. In this, SADC has always been clear that it sees itself both as subsidiary to and a building block for the AU, which in turn has a legitimate security role in terms of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. On a formal level, therefore, SADC can be regarded as subsidiary structure (albeit at second remove) of the UN’s collective security system.

While implementation remains a problem – levels of institutionalisation are low, decision-making processes are unclear, solidarity is often elevated into a principle that overrides commitments to other rights and obligations – the SADC policy frameworks nevertheless constitute a firm foundation as a building block within the global security architecture. Agreements have been put in place to deal with a wide range of multilateral security functions, including mutual defence, non-aggression, conflict resolution, peacekeeping, intervention and peacebuilding. At the same time, the SADC Charter and its economic and social programmes constitute a framework for human security and development.

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Mills, G, G Shelton and L White (2004) ‘Comparative security arrangements in the Americas, Asia, and


Stevenson, J (2003-4) ‘Africa’s growing strategic resonance’, Survival 45.4


### Addenda

**Table 1**

SADC countries’ perceived security problems (according to two research reports)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Nature of perceived security problem (threat)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Internal (domestic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Instability flowing from civil war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Separatist tendencies (Cabinda)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Armed &amp; violent crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HIV/AIDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uneven resource distribution</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>Economic grievances</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rising crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HIV/AIDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Small arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Generally: impact of misrule and war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Internally displaced persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poverty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Violent conflict</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Small &amp; light arms</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>Underdevelopment and poverty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HIV/AIDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weak state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>Weak state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poverty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HIV/AIDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>Social exclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Religious tensions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Lack of economic development,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>infrastructure, training</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increasing crime and violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unconsolidated democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>Violent crime (from a low base)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secessionist tendency</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Caprivi uprising)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HIV/AIDS</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poverty (income inequality)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethnic tensions, social exclusion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Methodological note: this table was generated by using data from two recent research reports on security in southern Africa (Africa Strategic Alternatives, 2004 and the Southern African Defence and Security Management Network, 2004). The resultant matrix should not be identified with official SADC security perceptions.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Social costs associated with the structural adjustment programme</th>
<th>Environmental disasters</th>
<th>Poaching/illegal fishing in the EEZ</th>
<th>External shocks (wars, oil prices)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>Drug abuse, HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>Illegal immigrants</td>
<td>Trafficking in illegal arms</td>
<td>Money laundering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Apartheid legacy - socio-economic inequality, Violent crime, Terrorism (white right, Qibla)</td>
<td>Regional instability, Illegal immigrants, Environmental degradation, The spread of communicable diseases, Trans-border crime (vehicles, drugs, weapons, sex workers)</td>
<td>International crime syndicates, Illicit small and light arms trade, Money laundering schemes, Narcotics trafficking</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>Stalled transition to democracy, generating political tensions, Socio-economic inequalities, HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>Environmental degradation, Dependence on South Africa, Labour migration, Cattle rustling</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Emergence of political, racial, religious divisions, Secessionist tendencies (Zanzibar), Destabilisation caused by refugees, Crime, debt, drug trafficking</td>
<td>Regional instability (Rwanda, Burundi, DRC), Refugees</td>
<td>International terrorism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>Political instability, Socio-economic inequalities, HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>Regional instability (DRC, Angola), Trans-border crime</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Economic crisis, Political crisis, Social crisis</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Breakdown in relations with donors, IFIs, Dependence on transport routes via SA, Moz</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1

Simplified version of the SADC structure
(Source: Isaksen and Tjonneland, 2001; SADC, 2004a)

The focus of the program “Security in a Globalized World” lies on the specific perceptions and processes of security and security policies in the regions of the South. The program is part of the international work of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and contributes through conferences, workshops and publications to the debates on cooperative security structures.

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