Between Modest Ambitions and Limited Resources

An Outside Perspective on German Conflict Prevention Policy

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- After a promising start in the late 1990s, German efforts to develop a prominent international profile in peacebuilding have stalled. To move forward, Germany requires a clear national vision to develop a strategic framework for peacebuilding.

- The absence of inter-party consensus contributes to the absence of a national vision and strategic framework. Peacebuilding policy is, therefore, highly vulnerable to electoral cycles and shifts in governing coalitions.

- Germany has not demonstrated a consistent financial commitment to peacebuilding to indicate that it is a priority in terms of its overall foreign policy goals. Numerous funding models used in other countries could be referenced to develop better funding capabilities at the national level to further its influence and credibility in international peacebuilding circles.

- In contrast to the immediate post-war period, which put a brake on many aspects of German foreign policy-making, its historical legacies do not always constrict but sometimes present new and unexpected opportunities for German leadership on the global stage. Its post-war and post-unification experiences make it uniquely qualified to speak with authority about peacebuilding and conflict resolution in both post-conflict and post-transition settings. Drawing on these experiences might serve as useful starting points for the development of a strategic framework for German peacebuilding that draws on the past as a call and compass for action.

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1. Introduction

The end of the Cold War and unification with the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) are defining moments in Germany's post World War II political development. Released from the political and geostrategic limitations imposed by the Cold War, scholars and policy-makers contemplated how Germany would redefine its international role. The first test of Germany's post Cold-War foreign policy was presented by Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. The wars in the Balkans resulting from the break up of the former Yugoslavia represented additional turning points. A series of pivotal decisions by German political leaders to participate in NATO and UN missions in Bosnia and an historic ruling by the Federal Constitutional Court in 1994 concerning the deployment of German troops abroad reconfigured the possibilities for the *Bundeswehr's* role in advancing Germany's foreign and security policy goals. More recently, German participation in NATO's mission in Afghanistan after the attacks of 9/11, followed by its refusal to join the US in its war against Iraq in 2003, opened new chapters in chronicling Germany's international role and identity.

In sum, the past twenty years represents a period of redefining Germany's place in the world. Given its growing influence since the end of the Cold War, its pivotal role in the EU and other multilateral fora, its global economic might, and its past, one might reasonably expect Germany to lead from the front in international peacebuilding efforts. But it does not. While it has actively expanded its peacebuilding capabilities since the late 1990s, its international profile on such matters pales compared to other states with far less global influence. This is not to say that Germany is not involved in peacebuilding. Rather, the situation begs our attention as something of a puzzle. What accounts for this apparent gap between expectations and capabilities, between what Germany can do and what it is willing to do? What are the as yet untapped possibilities for German leadership?

2. Looking Back – The Development of German Conflict Prevention Policy

»Peacebuilding« both as a concept and practice, is the consequence of several violent intra-state conflicts that erupted in the immediate post-Cold War period.[1] Germany's peacebuilding policies developed within the context of Europe's collective failure(s) to prevent the wars in the Balkans during the early 1990s, and a series of critical political and legal decisions concerning its military role vis-à-vis NATO's efforts in Bosnia and later on in Kosovo. These decisions followed what were often difficult national debates touching on very sensitive issues related to World War II, the Holocaust, and Germany's unique moral responsibility to confront gross human rights violations. Many of the debates focused on the military side of the equation and the role of the *Bundeswehr* in situations of ongoing conflict. The other side, revolving around the civilian aspects of conflict management and post-conflict peacebuilding, stimulated far less national discussion. In an effort to begin addressing this gap, the coalition agreement between the SPD and *Bündnis'90/Die Grünen* in October 1998 declared, *inter alia*, that German foreign policy is a »peace policy«. Moreover, it emphasized multilateralism, and pledged to »do its utmost to develop and apply effective strategies and instruments for crisis prevention and the peaceful settlement of conflicts…« It also advocated »the establishment of infrastructure for crisis prevention and civilian conflict management…«[2]

2.1 Stability Pact South Eastern Europe and the Comprehensive Concept

With this, crisis prevention, conflict resolution, and peacebuilding became official goals of Germany's foreign and development policies. But what they meant in operational terms remained unclear. It took the crisis in Kosovo in 1999 to further develop different policy

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1. For example, UN Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali's *An Agenda for Peace* (1992), the OECD's *Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation* (1997), and the *Carnegie Commission's Preventing Deadly Conflict* (1997). Germany, along with France and other European powers typically invoke the term »civilian crisis management« and »conflict prevention« in lieu of »*peacebuilding*«, though the terms »peace promotion« (*Friedensförderung*) and »peace consolidation« (*Friedenskonsolidierung*) are prevalent in the German lexicon as well. In general, there is little consensus among either practitioners or scholars about how to define it as some actors focus on all phases of the conflict cycle and the UN tends to associate it with post-conflict endeavors. See, for example, »*Peacebuilding at the UN over the Last Ten Years*«, FriEnt Essay Series 06, 2011, http://www.frient.de/index.php?id=135&type=0 &juSecure=1&locationData=135%3Atx_dam%3A4136&juHash=5af97 b13a33bbfafe544132c2a8b30a09327f6ab.

2. »*Aufbruch und Erneuerung - Deutschlands Weg ins 21. Jahrhundert: The Coalition Agreement between the German Social Democratic Party and Alliance 90/The Greens of 20 October 1998*« pp. 43, 46. Available at: http://ia700309.us.archive.org/27/items/AufbruchUndErneuerungDeutschlandsWegIns21.Jahrhundert/1998_Koalitionsvertrag. pdf [accessed February 14, 2012].

options. In the wake of the breakdown of talks at Rambouillet and the launch of NATO air strikes in March 1999, Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer (*Bündnis'90/Die Grünen*) announced plans for a Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, which amounted to a comprehensive strategy for conflict prevention in the region.[3] The goal was to tackle the root causes of conflict in the region in an effort to prevent further violence and war. It offered the carrots of EU and NATO membership to incentivize the promotion of stability. And while the announcement was geared to develop a better EU response to potential threats in its own backyard, it also signaled a willingness on the part of the German government to play a new kind of leadership role in Europe across a variety of multilateral institutions. That role would leverage its economic and political strengths, and turn Germany's Achilles Heel, its troubled past, into a platform for action for peace and humanitarian purposes. Indeed, one cannot ignore the pivotal role that Fischer played in laying a foundation for German engagement in the areas of conflict-prevention, civilian crisis management, and peacebuilding several years before he assumed the post of Foreign Minister in 1998. For example, in 1995 he urged his traditionally pacifist party, and in many ways all of Germany, to actively confront genocide and other gross human rights violations when they were occurring.[4] In doing so, he evocatively reframed the post-war norm, first articulated by Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP), of *Verantwortungspolitik* (policy of responsibility) in German foreign policy. In its original Genscher formulation *Verantwortungspolitik* emphasized restraint, multilateralism, and humanitarianism. Fischer's reframing drew explicitly on the country's historical past as a call to action when critical values are at stake. In so many words, restraint is not always the best foreign policy option, morally or politically.

Several other initiatives followed in 1999 and 2000, which indicated that Germany, along with other countries such as Switzerland, Norway, and the UK, might play a »pioneering«[5] role in international peacebuilding. In 1999 the Civilian Peace Service (CPS) was established

within the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (*Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung* – BMZ) as »one pillar« of Germany's peacebuilding profile.[6] Also beginning in 1999, the budget of the Federal Foreign Office (*Auswärtiges Amt*-AA) included a special line item for »peace maintaining« activities (*Friedenserhaltende Maßnahmen*) (Dueckers, Mehler 2011: 256). And finally, at the December meeting of G8 foreign ministers in Berlin, following Germany's urging, the ministers pledged to »make conflict prevention a priority … for the years to come« and to generate »a new culture of prevention«.[7] The federal government followed up with these efforts in April 2000 by issuing its overall strategy for crisis prevention in a nine-point framework entitled »Comprehensive Concept of the Federal Government on Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace-Building« (*Gesamtkonzept der Bundesregierung*). While skeletal, the framework began defining the government's goals and how it would go about achieving them. The Comprehensive Concept stressed the interconnectedness of crisis prevention, conflict resolution, and post-conflict peacebuilding strategies and the need for multi-track approaches (for example, diplomatic, financial, environmental, judicial) at the national and international levels. It also prioritized the role of multilateral organizations – particularly the UN, the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation), and the Council of Europe – to address these issues, and stressed the need for developing the competencies of civilian personnel. Most noteworthy was point six which stated that »Germany will use its political weight in multilateral fora to strengthen civilian crisis and conflict management« signaling an explicit willingness to play a leading role.

In July 2000, a joint nine-page proposal by the SPD and *Bündnis'90/Die Grünen* in the *Bundestag* provided further impetus for the development of Germany's conflict prevention and peacebuilding profile.[8] After lauding nineteen initiatives of the government already under way, the proposal called for the continued development of capacities, and echoing the language of the Comprehensive Concept, called on the government to utilize

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3. See: http://www.stabilitypact.org/ [accessed February 14, 2012].

4. See, for example, Joschka Fischer, »*Die Katastrophe in Bosnien und die Konsequenzen für unsere Partei Bündnis90/DieGrünen: Ein Brief an die Bundestagsfraktion und an die Partei*«, 30 July 1995. Available at http://www.gruene.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Dokumente/Grüne_Geschichte/JoschkaFischer_Die_Katastrophe_in_Bosnien_und_die_Konsequenzen_fuer_unsere_Partei_1995.pdf [accessed September 6, 2012].

5. Federal Ministry for Development and Cooperation, Evaluation Reports, *The German Peace Service*, Synthesis Report, Volume 1, Main Report, April 2011, p.1.

6. Ibid., p.17.

7. See: http://www.international.gc.ca/g8fmm-g8rmae/g8_ministers_meeting_conclusion_dec99-en.asp [accessed March 13, 2012].

8. BT-Drs. 14/3862, July 7, 2000.

Germany's political and economic weight in order to make an »appropriate contribution« to the development of international civilian crisis management.

2.2 Action Plan for Civilian Crisis Prevention

The principles contained in the nine points of the Comprehensive Concept, then amplified and underscored in the SPD-*Bündnis'90/Die Grünen* proposal, laid the foundation for the May 12, 2004 Action Plan (hereafter Action Plan) entitled »Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace-Building«. Noting »the special skills that Germany can bring to crisis prevention efforts,« the Action Plan is divided into five broad sections and consists of 161 »actions« to be implemented over a 5 to 10 year period. They focus on strengthening Germany's contributions to multilateral efforts; rebuilding and safeguarding state structures with an emphasis on democracy, the rule of law and security; building civil society (media, education, culture, inter-cultural dialogue); safeguarding opportunities through economic and environmental measures; and developing a national infrastructure for civilian crisis prevention. Implementation and monitoring of the plan for coherence rests primarily on the shoulders of a Commissioner for Civilian Crisis Prevention in the Foreign Office who also holds the rank of ambassador. He or she chairs an interministerial steering group for civilian crisis prevention (*Ressortkreis zivile Krisenprävention*), whose membership is drawn from the different ministries' commissioners or representatives for civilian crisis prevention endeavors. An Advisory Board (Beirat) made up of civil society organizations and NGOs provides additional support for coherence and coordination.

Other concepts, papers, and reports followed the Action Plan. In June 2005 the BMZ developed its own general cross-sector strategy for peacebuilding (*Übersektorales Konzept zur Krisenprävention, Konfliktbearbeitng und Friedensförderung in der deutschen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit: Eine Strategie zur Friedensentwicklung*). It served as another important milestone in emphasizing the linkage between peacebuilding and Germany's development policies. In 2007 the BMZ published »Crisis Prevention with Civilian Measures«, and another strategy paper entitled »Development-Oriented Transformation in Conditions of Fragile Statehood and Poor Government Performance.« Both again underscored the nexus between peace, security, and development.

2.3 National Infrastructure

In addition to ministry-level developments, the Action Plan galvanized the creation of a national infrastructure to support implementation. The AA and the BMZ are primarily responsible for implementation at the national level. Each ministry then relies on a host of sub-structures and intra-ministerial departments or sections. In addition to the *Ressortkreis* and *Beirat* the AA's Section on the UN and Global Issues tackles some aspects of the Action Plan, particularly as they relate to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The AA also works closely with the government-funded *Deutsche Stiftung Friedensforschung* (DSF – German Foundation for Peace Research), founded in 2000, and the *Zentrum für International Friedenseinsätze* (ZIF – Center for International Peace Operations). The former, represented by the Federal Ministry for Education and Research, funds a variety of peace-related research projects; the latter, founded in 2002, develops, trains, and maintains a pool of civilian professionals for deployment in international peace operations (UN, EU, OSCE). ZIF also provides Analysis and Evaluation for the expert and policy community. In addition to these institutions, a joint effort of state and civil society actors from the field of peacebuilding established FriEnt (*Arbeitsgemeinschaft Frieden und Entwicklung* – Working Group on Peace and Development) in 2001. It is an association of nine governmental organizations, church development agencies, civil society networks, and political foundations who pool capacities »support networking and cooperation, and contribute to conflict-sensitive development cooperation«.[9] BMZ's efforts are further amplified by the GIZ (*Deutsche Gesellschaft für internationale Zusammenarbeit- German Agency for International Cooperation*).[10] This initiative, represented by both the BMZ and the Federal Ministry of Finance (BMF), supports the German government in the field of international cooperation for sustainable development. GIZ offers many services to an extensive range of clients, including peacebuilding and civil conflict transformation. Most of its projects are commissioned by the BMZ, although it also operates on behalf of other German ministries, the *Länder*, municipalities, and other

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9. See: http://www.frient.de/en/frient/about-us.html [accessed March 13, 2012].

10. In January 2011 the German government merged its three technical cooperation agencies – the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), the Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst (DED) and Internationale Weiterbildung und Entwicklung (InWEnt) – into a single agency known as the GIZ.

public and private sector clients in Germany and abroad (for example, governments of other countries, the European Commission, the United Nations, and the World Bank).[11] At the legislative level, civilian crisis prevention has become more integrated in the Bundestag's foreign policy agenda. The clearest example of that is the recently created Sub-Committee »Civilian crisis prevention and networked security.«

3. Looking Left and Right – Situating German Efforts and the Experiences of Other Countries

To better appreciate Germany's role in international conflict prevention and peacebuilding, its current limitations, as well as its untapped potential, a brief survey of how other countries have developed peacebuilding approaches is useful. Notwithstanding differences in terminology and emphases, both within and between countries, all actors that engage in peacebuilding are trying to prevent the reoccurrence of armed conflict using a variety of policy instruments. European efforts to develop and operationalize peacebuilding strategies began in earnest in 1999. In July, the development ministers from the UK, Germany, Norway and the Netherlands (the so-called U4) met at Utstein Abbey near Stavanger, Norway and drafted an eleven-point *Utstein Agenda* dedicated to, *inter alia*, conflict prevention and lasting peace settlements, better policy coherence for development, and enhanced donor coordination. Broader European efforts continued to evolve with the Gothenburg European Council (2001) and its *Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts* which established the goal of mainstreaming conflict prevention into all EU institutions and their respective areas of competence.[12] The Programme also outlined need for clearer political priorities concerning preventive actions, better early warning, action and policy coherence, enhanced instruments for long and short-term prevention and building more effective multilateral partnerships with the UN, the OSCE, NATO, and other regional organizations. Since the Gothenburg Programme was launched the European Union continues to expand its peacebuilding profile. Several other EU based initiatives, policies,

and instruments now exist in tandem or complementary to it, such as the European Security Strategy (2003), the European Consensus on Development (2005), the Instrument for Stability (2007), the EC Communication on Security and Development (2007), and the EC Communication on Situations of Fragility (2007). And while numerous deficits have been noted – for example, a lack of consistent investment (financial, human, institutional),[13] mismatch between institutional structures, and policy commitments in conflict prevention[14] – there can be no doubt that conflict prevention and peacebuilding are woven into many aspects of the EU's global identity.[15] Below is a brief survey of peacebuilding efforts in three European cases, the UK, Norway, and Switzerland, and one outside of Europe, the United States.

3.1 UK

The recalibration of the UK's foreign policy priorities to include peacebuilding coincided with the election of the left-of-center Labour government of Tony Blair in 1997. Labour's victory led to the creation of a new department, the Department of International Development (DFID), under the charismatic leadership of Secretary of State Claire Short. DFID's first and second White Papers *Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for the 21st Century* (1997) and *Eliminating World Poverty: Making Globalisation Work for the Poor* (2000) signaled a new approach to development explicitly linking poverty with violent conflict (Lawry-White 2003). After the second White Paper, a cross-departmental analysis of the UK's conflict prevention work concluded that its international contributions could be more effective if they were better coordinated interdepartmentally, and focused on conflict prevention, as well as conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction. To help achieve those goals the Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP) and the African

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11. See: http://www.giz.de/en/aboutgiz/profile.html [accessed March 13, 2012].

12. See http://www.unidir.org/pdf/EU_background_papers/EU_BGP_01.pdf [accessed October 10,2012].

13. See Catherine Woollard, *EPLO Review of the Gothenburg Programme*, January 2011, available at: http://www.eplo.org/assets/files/2.%20 Activities/Working%20Groups/EEAS/EPLO_Review_Gothenburg_Programme.pdf [accessed October 11, 2012].; Simon Duke, »*The EU and Conflict Prevention: A Ten Year Assessment*,« FriEnt Essay Series 02/2011.

14. *Thematic Evaluation of European Commission Support to Conflict Prevention and Peace-building*, Final Report, Volume 1, October 2011, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/reports/2011/1291_vol1_en.pdf [accessed October 9, 2012].

15. See Fraser Cameron, »*The European Union and Conflict Prevention*«, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.

Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP) were created. And while the UK still has no explicit peacebuilding strategy, there is nevertheless a »hub« for of all its peacebuilding efforts. The hub is made up of three departments that are jointly responsible for developing and implementing policies that fall under the general headings of »conflict prevention«: the Department for International Development (DFID), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), and the Ministry of Defence (MOD). Peacebuilding, therefore, even in the absence of a framework covers a range of tasks and nationally defined priority areas, such as the rule of law, security sector reform, building civil society, governance and accountability, and UN peacekeeping.[16] Peacebuilding is also embedded, though again not overtly, in the Government's *Building Stability Overseas Strategy* (BSOS) (2011) developed by the three departments and based on the October 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) and the National Security Strategy (NSS).[17] The *Building Stability Overseas Strategy* outlines areas of competence and cooperation between DFID, FCO, and the MOD, and establishes three »mutually supporting pillars« that are integrated across the UK Government, namely, early warning, rapid crisis prevention and response (including a £20 million early action facility within the UK's Conflict Pool) and what it calls »investing in upstream prevention.«[18] Implementing the BSOS rests in the hands of the three departments and the tri-departmentally administered Stablisation Unit. The Conflict Pool (CP), launched in 2009, funds the Stablisation Unit and discretionary activities that support conflict prevention, stabilization and other »upstream« endeavors.[19] Per the SDSR, the Conflict Pool will increase from £229 million in 2010-11 to approximately £300 million in 2014-15. In order to promote greater coher-

ence between the three departments, the CP requires that the three do joint analyses, articulate a shared set of priorities, and design and implement joint conflict prevention and management programs.[20] Assessments of this approach have been largely positive, notwithstanding inevitable differences of opinion over priorities based largely on departmental perspectives and cultures.

In sum, since 1997 the UK has made considerable progress in developing a peacebuilding identity in the international community. It has also been very active in related areas, such as aid effectiveness, engagement in fragile states, humanitarian response, and reform of international aid.[21] After more than a decade of rethinking and restructuring, the UK has adopted a whole-of-government approach and developed mutually reinforcing cross and inter-departmental mechanisms to make it more responsive and effective in peacebuilding. Moreover, it has articulated a coherent approach to development that identifies peacebuilding as central to meeting its development assistance goals.[22]

3.2 Norway

The roots of Norway's peacebuilding policies date back to the third Labour government of Gro Harlem Brundtland (1990-96) and have been broadened since then. Several initiatives are worth highlighting. The government's White Paper No. 19 (1995-96) *A Changing World* illustrated the nexus between violent conflict and poverty, and highlighted priorities for Norwegian development assistance targeted to help build peace in conflict and post-conflict areas. This was followed by several other White Papers that reinforced these themes.[23] In 2001, during Norway's tenure in the rotating Presidency of the United Nations Security Council, its Presidential Statement highlighted a number of leitmotifs that were eventually incorporated into its 2004 strategic framework on peacebuilding.[24] The following year included a new

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16. Conflict Pool Annual Report, 2009/2010, p.3.

17. *Building Stability Overseas Strategy*, July 2011, available at: http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/Building-stability-overseas-strategy.pdf [accessed October 9, 2012]; »Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty, The Strategic Defence and Security Review,« October 2010, available at: http://www.direct.gov.uk/prod_consum_dg/groups/dg_digitalassets/@dg/@en/documents/digitalasset/dg_191634.pdf?CID=PDF&PLA=furl&CRE=sdsr [accessed August 21, 2012]; »*A strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty, The National Security Strategy*,« October 2010, available at: http://www.direct.gov.uk/prod_consum_dg/groups/dg_digitalassets/@dg/@en/documents/digitalasset/dg_191639.pdf?CID=PDF&PLA=furl&CRE=nationalsecuritystrategy [accessed August 21, 2012]

18. See: http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-news/?view=News&id=632657882 [accessed August 22, 2012]

19. See: http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-us/what-we-do/spend-our-budget/funding-programmes1/conflict-funding/ [accessed August 22, 2012]. The CP is the result of the merger between the GCPP and the Stabilisation Aid Fund.

20. See: http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-us/what-we-do/spend-our-budget/funding-programmes1/conflict-funding/conflict-pool/ [accessed August 22, 2012].

21. *DAC Peer Review: United Kingdom*. Development Assistance Committee, OECD, 2010, p. 13.

22. *DAC Peer Review: United Kingdom*, p. 27.

23. See, for example, White Paper No. 19 (1995-96); White Paper 13 (1999-2000).

24. *Strategic Framework: Peacebuilding-a Development Perspective*, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 2004, pp. 13–14.

initiative that again underscored Norway's leading role in international peacebuilding. It was the first country to establish a separate budget item called »Transitional Assistance.«[25] Soon thereafter, the Netherlands and Denmark launched similar transitional assistance funding mechanisms. In 2003 White Paper No. 35 *Fighting Poverty Together: A Comprehensive Development Policy* included a separate chapter on peacebuilding and transitional assistance. The Utstein evaluation report (2004) also played a pivotal role in Norwegian efforts to develop a strategic framework for peacebuilding.[26] Hilde Johnson, the Minister for International Development, officially presented the framework entitled *Peacebuilding – a Development Perspective* in August 2004. The framework puts three »mutually reinforcing dimensions« at its center: security, political development, and social and economic development.[27] It also includes a section on good donor practices that underscores the importance of tailoring peacebuilding measures to each case/environment. From there, special attention should focus on national ownership, women's and children's rights, coordination with multinational organizations (UN, IFIs), NGOs, timing, and sustained commitment of resources. Since the publication of the strategy, Norway has put particular emphasis on gender perspectives in peacebuilding.[28] In January 2011 the government updated the 2006 *Norwegian Government's Action Plan for the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security* (2000) with a new strategic plan focused on women entitled *Women, Peace and Security: Norway's Strategic Plan* 2011- 2013. Thus, Norway's peacebuilding profile should be viewed within the broader context of its commitment to humanitarian action, a »central pillar of Norwegian foreign policy – an intrinsic expression of Norwegian values and international solidarity…«[29] It has developed an ethos of peacebuilding that is deliberately and carefully woven into many of its foreign policy objectives, including development assistance[30], and infused throughout its foreign policy bureaucracy.

3.3 Switzerland

The Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs stated unequivocally in 2007 that »Switzerland's aim is to make an internationally significant and high profile contribution« to the furtherance of peace and human rights.[31] Switzerland's foreign policy identity is deeply rooted in national historical traditions that embrace humanitarianism and neutrality. Its commitment to human rights, democracy and peace is also firmly anchored in Article 54 of its 1999 federal constitution.[32] And like Norway and the UK, Switzerland has developed a comprehensive approach to peacebuilding[33] resting on the so-called »3 ds« of diplomacy, defense, and development, and includes both military and civilian actors to promote peace. This approach encompasses four mutually reinforcing components: (i) peace policies geared toward conflict prevention and mediation to promote long-term stability; (ii) the Swiss Expert Pool for Civilian Peacebuilding (SEP); (iii) the protection and promotion of human rights; and (iv) humanitarian and migration policies. The contours of Switzerland's current peacebuilding activities trace back to 2001 and the launch of the SEP to

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25. *DAC Peer Review: Norway.* Development Assistance Committee, OECD, 2005, p. 20. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/dac/peerreviewsofdacmembers/34622621.pdf [accessed August 25, 2012]

26. *DAC Peer Review: Norway*, p. 12.

27. Ibid., p. 16.

28. See, for example, Minister of Foreign Affairs Jonas Gahr Støre, »*Peace and security for all. Norway's implementation of SCR 1325*«, Meeting of the Standing Committee on Women (Scow), Oslo, 17 November 2011, available at: http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/Whats-new/Speeches-and articles/speeches_foreign/2011/speech_scow.html?id=663725 [accessed August 26, 2012]

29. *DAC Peer Review: Norway.* Development Assistance Committee, OECD, 2008, p. 18. [accessed August 26, 2012]

30. Similar to the other Nordic countries, Norway has successfully integrated peacebuilding into its development assistance and humanitarian foreign policy role identities. Central to that is a consistent, successful effort to meet or exceed the 0.7 percent ODA/GNI target to fight poverty. In the most recent data available (2009–2010), Norway ranks first among OECD countries in both meeting and exceeding the target at 1.10 percent. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/investment/aidstatistics/44285266.gif [accessed August 26, 2012]

31. Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Directorate of Political Affairs: *Human Security in Switzerland's Foreign Policy,* available at: http://www.eda.admin.ch/etc/medialib/downloads/edazen/doc/publi.Par.0222.File.tmp/EDA%20Broschuere%20Web%20e%20V.pdf [accessed October 14, 2012]

32. Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Directorate of Political Affairs, *Switzerland's Peace and Human Rights Promotion: Abridged English translation of the bill to parliament concerning the continuation of measures relating to civilian peacebuilding and the promotion of human rights*, presented 15 June 2007, available at: http://www.eda.admin.ch/etc/medialib/downloads/edazen/topics/peasec/peac.Par.0139.File.tmp/EDA%20Botschaft%20A5%20V.pdf [accessed October 14, 2012]

33. A recent report on Swiss efforts notes that institutional limitations of the Swiss Federal State currently hinder the development of a more comprehensive approach to peacebuilding, but that working toward a whole-of-government approach is useful nonetheless. See Thomas Greminger, *Swiss Civilian Peace Promotion: Assessing Policy and Practice*, Center for Security Studies, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, ETZ Zurich, 2011, p. 2. Available at: http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/Swiss-Civilian-Peace-Promotion.pdf [accessed October 12, 2012]

help achieve Switzerland's peace policy objectives and to enhance its international visibility in peacebuilding.[34] All four areas were supported in 2004 when the Swiss Federal Parliament passed legislation containing specific civilian measures for peacebuilding and the promotion of human rights. The legislation included a renewable credit facility for financing Swiss peacebuilding efforts. The Federal Council petitioned the Federal Parliament again in 2008 for 240 million Swiss francs for another four-year period running through 2012. The current four-year framework (2012-2016) provides 310 million Swiss francs. To shed additional light on the importance of financing, a recent report shows that in the period from 2006-2010 spending for the Political Affairs Division in the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, a key institutional actor for Swiss peacebuilding efforts, increased by 25 per cent for civilian peace promotion.[35] Consistency in funding, secured through a firm national commitment to peacebuilding as evidenced in the constitution and continued parliamentary support helps sustain Switzerland's ambitious peacebuilding agenda and gives it tremendous leverage and influence in international settings. On a domestic level, Swiss peace policy »appears institutionally sufficiently consolidated« to maintain that agenda over the long term.[36]

3.4 United States

US efforts to develop a comprehensive approach to peacebuilding has been described as a »work in progress.«[37] Historically, US peacebuilding and post-conflict efforts have been largely military-centered.[38] This stems from three interconnected factors: (i) a reliance on and the preponderance of U.S. military power in post-conflict situations; (ii) the multitude of resources available

to the military compared to civilian and development assistance agencies; (iii) strong public support for the military which furthers the tendency to frame peacebuilding as a traditional security-related matter. An analogous security-centered focus to development assistance has prevailed as well, though a notable exception to this trend is USAID's (US Agency for International Development) Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI).[39] But OTI is only part of the picture. While many of the US's allies were developing innovative approaches to peacebuilding in the later 1990s and early 2000s, it continued to employ an outdated model that left the heavy military lifting to it, and the messy »third-tier security concerns«[40] of fragile and failing states over to others. Now the US finds itself in the position of having to catch up. Change, therefore, has been largely driven by circumstances on the ground, not a shift in ideology per se. They are evident in several key documents and directives, including the 2002 and 2006 National Security Strategies, President George W. Bush's National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD) (2005), as well as what the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) characterized as »two game-changing«[41] documents, namely, the 2010 Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development, which promotes development as a core pillar of American power,[42] and the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), a comprehensive assessment of how the Department of State and USAID can best utilize what it calls »civilian power« (diplomats, development professionals and experts) to advance US interests, transform development, build civilian capacity for better conflict prevention and conflict response, and facilitate better partnering with the US military.[43] The shift in emphasis is also evident in the creation of new structures, such as the Department of State's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in 2004. NSPD 44 gave the S/CRS the lead role to coordinate a whole-of-government approach for post-conflict

34. Human Security Division, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, available at: https://www.civcap.info/fileadmin/user_upload/Switzerland/2012_-_Powerpoint_presentation_of_the_Swiss_Expert_Pool__in_civilian_peacebuilding.pdf [accessed October 14, 2012]. The Federal Council resolution of December 4, 2000 and the December 19, 2003 Federal Act on measures to promote civilian peacebuilding and reinforcement of human rights provide the legal basis for the SEP.

35. Greminger, *Swiss Civilian Peace Promotion: Assessing Policy and Practice*, p. 5.

36. Ibid., p. 15.

37. Weston Konishi and Charles McClean, »The US Approach to Peacebuilding: From a Whole-of Government to a Whole-of Alliance Approach with Japan,« *The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis*, 2011, p. 3. Available at: http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/PeaceBuildingApr2011/USpeacebuildingKonishi-McClean.pdf [accessed August 22, 2012]

38. Ibid., p. 5.

39. Since its establishment in 1994 OTI has executed 45 interventions in 36 countries. See http://transition.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/transition_initiatives/abouttoti_principles.html [accessed August 30, 2012]

40. See: http://transition.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/transition_initiatives/abouttoti_principles.html [accessed August 30, 2012] p. 4.

41. *DAC Peer Review:* United States, Development Assistance Committee, OECD, 2011, p. 11. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/dac/peerreviewsofdacmembers/48434536.pdf [accessed August 25, 2012]

42. See; http://www.state.gov/ppd/index.htm [accessed August 27, 2012]

43. *The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review*, available at: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/153109.pdf [accessed August 27, 2012]

stabilization and reconstruction activities.[44] Despite these changes the US still lacks a strategic framework for peace-building. The sheer magnitude of programs, coupled with persistent structural problems and uncertainty about funding translate into largely incoherent and fragment-ed policies.[45] Fragmentation among many departments, agencies, offices and frequent reshuffling of them under-cuts US credibility as an important player in peacebuilding, not to mention response time and overall effectiveness. Plus, there is a long-standing tendency to see peace-building in terms of short-term policy fixes, rather than a long-term commitment. Deficient understanding of the complexities associated with peacebuilding on the part of congressional representatives who make the funding decisions contributes to persistent underfunding and un-certainty about resources.[46] Future payoffs for newfound interagency cooperation between the Departments of State and Defense and USAID could be significant. But reaping them requires a consistent approach that is un-dergirded by a clearer vision of goals and a commitment to broaden the areas of interagency convergence.

4. Taking Stock – Where Does German Conflict Prevention Policy Stand Now?

Germany's 2004 Action Plan, resting on a now well developed national infrastructure dedicated to crisis prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict peace-building, and a new *Bundestag* sub-committee focused on peacebuilding issues suggest that it could play a very important international role on these issues. Indeed, Ger-many is already active on a host of international fronts dedicated to peacebuilding. These, combined with the aforementioned domestic-level efforts, could be utilized as springboards to further develop and deepen its inter-national peacebuilding profile. For example, Germany's financial support for the UN, UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding is enviable. It is the third largest donor to the UN (after the US and Japan) in terms of assessed and voluntary contributions to the regular budget (over 900 million Euros annually). It is the fourth largest contributor

to the UN peacekeeping budget (after the US, UK, and Japan), and it was one of the founding members of the UN Peacebuilding Commission, to date donating more than 18 million euros to its own Peacebuilding Fund.[47] In addition, Germany provides generous amounts of bilat-eral assistance and technical expertise to a host of coun-tries.[48] Above and beyond these achievements, it was a founding member (2008) of the UN Group of Friends on Conflict Prevention.[49] It is a member of »Friends of 1325,« an informal group of UN member states working for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolu-tion 1325 (2000), the first Security Council resolution on women, peace and security that highlighted the unique impact of armed conflict on women, and the under-valued/under-utilized contribution of women to conflict prevention, conflict-resolution, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. It is also the coordinator of the UN Secretary General's Group of Friends for Georgia. Be-yond the UN, Germany plays a key role in EU Common Security and Defense Policy Missions (CSDP), not just in financing, but also in sending seconded personnel for civilian CSDP missions. It is also active in the OECD's In-ternational Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS), an initiative launched in Accra in 2008 as an inter-national forum for political dialogue between countries affected by conflict, their international partners, and civil society.[50] In spite of these impressive achievements, there are several challenges that German leaders must confront to close the gap between what Germany can do more of and what it is willing to do to further develop its peacebuilding profile.

4.1 Need for Strategic Vision

The first, and perhaps more basic, challenge is the ab-sence of a vision for peacebuilding. Frustration with the current state of affairs is evident in a 2009 proposal

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44. Following the publication of the QDDR the State Department re-christened S/CRS as the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) in 2011 with a mandate focusing on conflict prevention, crisis response, and stabilization activities. See http://www.state.gov/j/cso/scrsarchive/ [accessed August 27, 2012]

45. See *DAC Peer Review: United States*, pp. 11–12.

46. Konishi and McClean, »The US Approach to Peacebuilding,« p. 7.

47. See: http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Aussenpolitik/Friedenspo-litik/VereinteNationen/ReformVN/PeaceBuildingCommission_node.html [accessed October 9, 2012]; http://www.unpbf.org/donors/contribu-tions/ [accessed October 12, 2012].

48. See: http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Aussenpolitik/Friedenspo-litik/Krisenpraevention/Wo-helfen-wir/Uebersicht_node.html [accessed October 11, 2012]

49. It is interesting to note that between 1990 and 2009 the number of »Friends,« »Contact Groups,« or »Core Groups« to support the work of the UN's peace efforts grew from four to more than thirty. See Theresa Whitfield, »*Working with Groups of Friends*« (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 2010) , p. 5.

50. See: http://www.oecd.org/international%20dialogue/aboutthedia-logue.htm [accessed October 12, 2012]

by the opposition *Bündnis'90/Die Grünen* to give crisis prevention and peacebuilding a new »push,« as it was called, to put Germany, along with the UK, Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries, back at the forefront of such efforts, and to reposition the focus on the civilian side of the equation.[51] This involves an expansion of civilian competencies and capacities, clarification of the concepts »crisis prevention« and »peacebuilding,« better coherence between the various ministries and their sub-units in executing the Action Plan, more financing, better coordination among international actions, and a strategic framework reflecting Germany's overarching vision for these issues. In January 2011, the SPD rang this alarm bell again in a proposal entitled »Germany Urgently Needs a Coherent Strategy for Civilian Crisis Prevention.«[52] *Bündnis'90/Die Grünen* continued the push in May 2011 with a separate proposal entitled »Putting Civilian Crisis Prevention at the Center of German Foreign Policy.«[53] It chastised the CDU-FDP government for »losing the opportunity to play a leading role for civilian crisis prevention, to participate in setting the agenda in this important area,« and bemoaned the dearth of German influence on these issues internationally. At a public hearing of the *Bundestag's* new Sub-Committee on Civilian Crisis Prevention and Networked Security in June 2010, an expert witness lamented the absence of German visibility on these issues in the UN and elsewhere, in spite of the fact that Germany had much to offer, namely a history »with a clear mandate to put itself out for civilian crisis management.«[54]

4.2 Need for Cross-Party Support

The absence of an overarching vision renders policy and the policy-making process highly vulnerable to shifts in governing coalitions. The Action Plan is a good example. The genesis of the Plan dates back to the Red-Green government (1998–2002). Foreign Minister Fischer's leadership was instrumental in shaping this particular dimension of Germany's foreign policy role identity. He articulated a vision that rested on a strong moral argument for German leadership and international hu-

manitarian intervention that explicitly drew upon the country's historical past. That vision was carried forward by the SPD after elections in 2005. In the 2005 grand-coalition agreement, the CDU-CSU and the SPD pledged to implement the Action Plan, and to strengthen the interministerial steering group. The results were mixed. Since 2009 neither the CDU-FDP government nor the current Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle has made the Action Plan a priority. Invoking a new, somewhat ambiguous term for Germany's peacebuilding lexicon, the current coalition agreement refers to a so-called »networked security« policy approach requiring »modern and efficient armed forces and suitable civil instruments for international conflict prevention and management, and for closer integration and co-ordination.« References to crisis prevention in it are indirect or embedded in the context of other priorities, and there is no explicit mention of the Action Plan.[55] To some extent, this can be explained by the overwhelming importance of the Eurozone crisis and the consequent dislodging and/or reprioritization of other issues from Germany's foreign policy agenda. Low voter concern for foreign policy issues further dampens the incentive to take the Action Plan beyond a blueprint and transform it into a full-blown operational strategy. Thus, without a clear and perhaps more persuasive vision at the highest levels of government that would transcend the vicissitudes of politics and electoral cycles, policy-making is largely ad hoc and reactive as different parts of the political system respond to crises as they unfold. Ideally, peacebuilding policies should fit into a larger set of goals and principles that are clearly articulated at the top and then disseminated throughout the relevant government ministries and agencies. Agreement on them across the political spectrum would inoculate against ad-hocism and incoherence.

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51. BT-Drs. 16/13392

52. BT-Drs. 17/4532.

53. BT-Drs. 17/5910.

54. Auswärtiger Ausschuss, UA Zivile Krisenprävention und vernetzte Sicherheit, 2010, p 15.

55. Crisis prevention is referenced four times in the English translation of the coalition agreement: in the context of utilizing the federal police in international police missions (p.139), the role of diplomacy in crisis prevention (p. 175), the role of the Bundeswehr in crisis prevention and crisis management (p. 177), and the importance of Germany's cultural relations and education policy for crisis prevention, the protection of human rights and promoting freedom (p.180). See *Growth. Education. Unity. The Coalition Agreement Between the CDU, CSU and FDP.* Available at: http://www.cdu.de/en/doc/091215-koalitionsvertrag-2009-2013-englisch.pdf [accessed February 20, 2012].

4.3 Institutional Fragmentation

The second major challenge Germany faces in developing a higher profile in international peacebuilding is institutional fragmentation, a problem acutely evident in the American example, but also noted in numerous assessments of the EU's crisis prevention and peacebuilding efforts.[56] How governments are organized and structured is to a large extent a reflection of the priorities of dominant groups and issue/problem areas from the time they were created.[57] Changing them to account for new issues is often difficult. Hence, administrative structures can facilitate policy-making or inadvertently hinder it, depending on the issue. In the case of German peacebuilding the latter seems to be the case, in part because several different actors have both differing and overlapping areas of responsibility, and because of inertia in revamping institutional structures to account for a changed international environment. Crisis prevention and peacebuilding efforts are currently spearheaded by two separate federal agencies: the AA and the BMZ. Cooperation and coherence between the AA and the BMZ is often very difficult to achieve.[58] Notwithstanding the primary role assigned to the interministerial group by the Action Plan, and the AA's Representative for Civilian Crisis Prevention to provide overall information flow and coordination between ministries, it acts mainly as a cop on a busy street of traffic, moving only in east-west directions. The north-south axis is virtually nonexistent as it has few links to senior departmental levels within each ministry represented in the group, and no power to initiate or push policy down the chain of command. It meets approximately once every six weeks. Regular attendees include representatives from the BMZ, the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI), the Federal Defense Ministry (BMVg) and the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU), but other ministries do not attend.[59] Feedback to, from, and between the various ministries depends largely on the personalities of the participants.[60] Furthermore, it has no financial resources of its own. Three implementation reports of the Action Plan by the federal government (2006, 2008, 2010) repeatedly call for a strengthening of its role, but this has been largely ignored. Moreover, the contributions of the Advisory Board to overall policy-making appear negligible.[61]

Division of roles and specialization areas further exacerbates fragmentation. The AA is largely responsible for security-related issues, and what it calls »rule of law matters« which fall under the general rubric of post-conflict peacebuilding. Its primary focus is diplomacy and conflict prevention, not the complicated and messy tasks of post-conflict reconstruction or peacebuilding. Within the AA the number of personnel dedicated to the three substantive areas of the Action Plan is very small (typically under 5), who rotate out of their posts every two to three years, thus undermining continuity and institutional memory.

The BMZ's agenda is in many ways more wide-ranging, covering everything from rule of law and development to virtually anything that might impact security in the broadest sense. The Ministry of Justice focuses primarily on technical and legal assistance, especially in developing trade and economic law to facilitate commerce in post-conflict settings. Remarkably, and in stark contrast to the British example, the Defense Ministry seems largely sidelined from these efforts. The Defense Ministry's White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the Future of the *Bundeswehr* references the Action Plan only once. This is all the more surprising given the *Bundeswehr*'s role in Afghanistan which revolves around peacebuilding, stabilization and reconstruction as per the *Bundestag* mandate.[62] In short, the two documents do not speak to one another in a way that suggests any meaningful interagency cooperation or coordination. What is more, the link between civilian and military actors in these fields is remarkably imprecise.

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56. See, for example, Woollard, *EPLO Review of the Gothenburg Programme; Duke, »The EU and Conflict Prevention: A Ten Year Assessment,«* in FriEnt Essay Series 02/2011; *Thematic Evaluation of European Commission Support to Conflict Prevention and Peace-building*, Final Report, Volume 1, October 2011.

57. See Laurel Weldon, When Protest Makes Policy: How Social Movements Represent Disadvantaged Groups (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2011), pp. 38–39.

58. Frank Stengel and Christoph Weller, »Action Plan or Faction Plan? Germany's Eclectic Approach to Conflict Prevention,« International Peacekeeping, Vol. 17, No. 1, p. 99.

59. See http://www.zif-berlin.org/fileadmin/uploads/analyse/dokumente/veroeffentlichungen/Policy_Briefing_AG_VerSic_Nov_2011.pdf, p. 2 [accessed March 13, 2012]

60. See: http://www.zif-berlin.org/fileadmin/uploads/analyse/dokumente/veroeffentlichungen/Policy_Briefing_AG_VerSic_Nov_2011.pdf, p. 2 [accessed March 13, 2012]

61. D. Dueckers and A. Mehler, »Deutsche Aussenpolitik und Krisenpraevention,« in *Deutsche Aussenpolitik: Sicherheit, Wohlfahrt, Instiutionen und Normen*, eds. T. Jaeger, A. 2nd edition, (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag) p. 247.

62. See, for example, James D. Bindenagel, »Afghanistan: The German Factor,« Prism, vol. 1, no. 4, July 2010, pp. 95-112.

Apart from the executive level, developments at the legislative level offer perhaps a new avenue for reframing the discussion about Germany's role in international peacebuilding. Until recently, the *Bundestag* was largely seen but not heard on these issues, though the Action Plan did anticipate a role for the *Bundestag* by requiring the federal government to submit biannual reports to it outlining progress on the Plan's implementation. Building from that, however, has been slow. At the parliamentary debate on the first interim report on December 15, 2006 only one state secretary and fewer than 30 MPs stayed for the debate.[63] Parliamentary debates following the submission of subsequent reports have been better attended, but in general the *Bundestag* appears to be struggling to find its footing on these matters. The new Sub-Committee on Civilian crisis prevention and networked security could become the fulcrum of legislative influence. For now, one of the main criticisms involves the meaning of »networked security« and what is understood in terms of implementation. Given the fact that foreign policy-making is largely shaped and driven at the executive level between the Chancellor and the relevant ministries, one should perhaps not expect too much from the Bundestag. Nevertheless, it plays an important oversight function and this presents perhaps the best opportunity for influence. But that influence is highly contingent on how it is leveraged in a broader landscape of institutions and actors, each vying for control and authority.

In sum, the German government has a rather long way to go to make peacebuilding a cross-sectoral/interministerial endeavor along the lines of the British or Norwegian models.[64] Since ministries are divided up on the basis of electoral outcome and the horse-trading that comes with coalition agreements, a change in government means a change in emphasis or direction in foreign policy among the various ministries and the ministers who oversee them.

4.4 Financial Needs for Developing a Coherent Peacebuilding Profile

The third challenge is financial. Germany has not demonstrated a sustainable financial commitment to peacebuilding in a way that indicates that it is a priority in terms of its overall foreign policy goals. While there are funds available for peacebuilding, they are not located in one line item or funding instrument, but rather nested in or poached from other sources. There is one budget-line for crisis prevention, peace maintenance and conflict management (*Förderung von Projekten zur Unterstützung von internationalen Maßnahmen auf den Gebieten der Krisenprävention, des Friedenserhalts und der Konfliktbewältigung*) from the AA (Referat VN 02). It covers many aspects of peacebuilding for a variety of actors (including political foundations and NGOs who can apply for funds from the budget line). But the funding priorities are not clear or articulated according to priorities. And compared to the BMZ, the administrative capacity to manage more substantial amounts of project funds is quite limited. This impacts overall coordination and coherence between the various ministries. Also, in contrast to the UK, true resource pooling efforts are lacking such that »German conflict prevention policy remains a field of inter-ministerial competition rather than coordination and coherency« (Stengel and Weller 2010: 102). To make matters worse, the AA's budget for crisis prevention activities has been rather volatile, which might be interpreted that this field of engagement is currently not a high priority in German foreign policy. This weakens Germany's influence internationally.[65] Moreover, there is a comparatively small lobby at the national level to raise public awareness or build pressure from below for greater funding.[66]

5. Conclusions and Recommendations

While there may be some evidence of an emerging assertiveness in limited areas of German foreign policy, one does not see it in the areas of crisis prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Indeed, a new self-confidence[67] detected in other aspects of German foreign policy-making (for example, Eurozone and other EU matters)[68] seems largely absent. In fact, the opposite appears to be the case, suggesting that Germany's political leadership has not fully come to terms with what

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63. Stengel and Weller, »Action Plan or Faction Plan?,« p. 101.

64. See BT-Drs. 17/5910 and BT-Plenarprotokoll 17/88.

65. BT-Drs. 17/4532 and BT-Drs. 17/5910.

66. F.A. Stengel and C. Weller, »Action Plan or Faction Plan?,« pp. 101-102.

67. See Gunther Hellmann, »Normatively Disarmed, But Self-Confident,« *Internationale Politik*, , no. 3, pp. 46-51.

68. Simon Bulmer and William E. Paterson, »Germany and the European Union: From ›Tamed Power‹ to Normalized Power?,« International Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 5, pp. 1051-1073.

it can do more of in these areas in ways that appropriately reflect its power, influence, expanding roster of international responsibilities in the post Cold-War era, and builds on an already existing network of domestic efforts and relationships with international actors. In short, after a promising start in the late 1990s, analogous to developments in the UN, and Europe more generally, the further deepening of Germany's peacebuilding profile has stalled. To enhance its profile and build on available potential, several steps are recommended. Sequencing them properly could be key to Germany's future success.

First, and perhaps most difficult, Germany needs a national vision to guide the development of a strategic framework. After that, concerted efforts should be made to re-engage the government in making the Action Plan the precursor of a strategic framework for peacebuilding that incorporates a whole-of-government approach. The OECD's DAC Peer Review of Germany in 2010 noted the success of the whole-of-government approach in developing German policy in Afghanistan and recommended using it as a starting point for rethinking the German approach to peacebuilding in conflict-affected and fragile states.[69] That model could be replicated in some form based on the outline already articulated in the Action Plan, but to date not well operationalized. The potential to develop such a framework is definitely there, but the political will is not. Harnessing it is perhaps harder now given the major European economic crisis overshadowing German foreign policy making and strains within the governing coalition.

In the meantime, the second-best avenue for moving forward is perhaps the *Bundestag's* Sub-Committee on Civilian crisis prevention and networked security. Public testimony of its activities in 2010 suggested that in this setting at least, cross-party consensus on the importance of peacebuilding is the norm. Building on that constitutes another route in putting pressure on those

higher up to give the Action Plan and peacebuilding new energy and traction. Admittedly, the *Bundestag* is in a very difficult position. Without pressure from below, which could be generated by a more creative and sustained drive to get the information out (that is, by doing a better job in announcing the interim reports) in a way that is interesting and accessible to the public, the Bundestag's influence is diluted. The federal government abandoned the idea of creating a special post for civilian conflict prevention, a position that might have helped generate public awareness, which could then feed back to the Bundestag. At the same time, the Sub-Committee itself could do a better job of publicizing its efforts.

Finally, in contrast to the immediate post-war period, in which the war and the Holocaust put a brake on many aspects of German foreign policy-making, its past does not necessarily constrict but can present new and unexpected opportunities for German leadership in the field of peacebuilding and conflict prevention. Its twin historical experiences make it uniquely qualified to speak with authority about peacebuilding and conflict resolution in both post-conflict and post-transition settings. In the post-war period the Allied powers directed denazification programs and established the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg to confront the horrors of the Third Reich. EU CSDP (Common Security and Defense Policy) missions in Bosnia and Kosovo, as well as the UN sponsored International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), reflect a similar approach whereby external actors administer various peacebuilding efforts in an effort to rebuild countries and right the wrongs of the past. After unification Germany's political elites had to consider, for a second time in the country's history, how to build institutions and forge a new national identity in the East based on democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law. Such experiences could be used as starting points for developing special niche competencies in the expanding menu of peacebuilding mechanisms. The Civilian Peace Service (CPS) is a good example of such potential. The CPS represents a particular understanding of civil society's role in peacebuilding that draws explicitly on Germany's World War I and World War II history and the linkages between peace (peace education), development, non-violence and reconciliation.[70]

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69. *DAC Peer Review: Germany.* Development Assistance Committee, OECD, 2010, p. 44. The report specifically highlights the »[r]egular meetings involving the state secretaries of the ministries involved – the Federal Foreign Office, the BMZ, the Federal Ministry of Defense (BMVg), the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI) and the Federal Chancellery – serve the political management of Germany's involvement in Afghanistan. In addition, the respective ministers meet regularly to discuss Germany's Afghanistan policy…[a]t the working level, weekly video conferences involving the ministries concerned and an intensive process of consultation at working level are helping to establish a dense network that allows continuous and close co-ordination with the policy framework.«

70. See Federal Ministry for Development and Cooperation, Evaluation Reports, *The German Peace Service, Synthesis Report*, Volume 1, p 17.

Similarly, through the EU's CSDP missions and the ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) NATO-led mission in Afghanistan, Germany is actively engaged in multiple security sector reform efforts around the world. Indeed, it has developed specializations in these areas drawing on the lessons of history concerning the importance of building civil-military relationships that are compatible with democracy and the rule of law. Its post-war experiences with economic assistance (Marshall Plan) and recovery (*Wirtschaftswunder*) left indelible impressions on German leaders on the important links between peace, non-violence, and economic development. This is exemplified today in the generous amount of development assistance (material, financial, technical know-how) that Germany provides on both a bilateral and multilateral basis. More recently, German unification with the former East Germany led to the development of several transitional justice mechanisms to reckon with the legacy of the East German communist past, including a parliamentary commission of inquiry, the vetting of former East German civil servants for continued employment in reunified Germany, and trials of former leaders for various criminal offenses and human rights violations. Drawing on these experiences might serve as useful starting points for the development of a national vision and a strategic framework for peacebuilding that draws on the past as a compass for action.

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