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Nuclear Non-Proliferation From A Chinese Perspective

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Introduction

At present, the global nonproliferation regime is in crisis. The world has been faced with two kinds of serious nuclear threats: more and more nuclear-weapons states, and the possibility of nuclear terrorists. At the same time, the global nonproliferation regime has been seriously harmed by several incidents and issues. In 1998, both India and Pakistan carried out nuclear tests. The second North Korean nuclear crisis erupted in October 2002, and North Korea announced that it had conducted a nuclear test on October 9th of 2006. Now Iran has sped up the process of Uranium enrichment. The nuclear black market has been rampant. Some terrorists have made great efforts to get nuclear bombs or nuclear material.

Having entered into force in 1970, the NPT is the cornerstone of the global nonproliferation regime. Now only four countries in the world (namely, India, Israel, North Korea and Pakistan) are not parties to the treaty. However, the NPT regime is also facing a crisis in itself.

In order to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, the international community must do its best to make countries feel secure without nuclear weapons and to reject the view that nuclear weapons are needed to enhance a country's power status, just as Mr. Hans Blix said: "the best solution to the problem of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was that countries should not feel that they needed them; and violators should be encouraged to walk back and rejoin the international community."¹

At the same time, the international community must maintain and strengthen the global nonproliferation regime. As the sole superpower in the world, the United States should take the lead in strengthening the regime, including good results of the Review Conference of the NPT treaty to be held in 2010, bringing the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) into force, and negotiation of a global treaty to stop the production of fissile material for weapons. If it does so, the international community can strengthen the global nonproliferation regime. If it does not do so, we will see more nuclear-weapons states and the international community may suffer from a nuclear terror attack.

1 China's Non-Proliferation Policy

China has been pursuing an active nuclear nonproliferation policy. The Chinese Government has persistently followed the policy of no advocating, no encouragement, no engagement in nuclear proliferation, and no helping other country develop nuclear weapons. China advocates the prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons as part of the process of eliminating such weapons. The Chinese Government holds that nuclear proliferation should be prevented in the course of the process of reaching the objective of complete prohibition as well as by destruction of nuclear weapons.

China supports the three major goals set forth in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon (NPT): preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, accelerating nuclear disarmament, and promoting international cooperation in the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy. In May 1995, at the Conference on the Review and Extension of the NPT Treaty, the Chinese Government expressed its support for the decision to indefinitely extend the treaty. China believes that the indefinite extension of this treaty reaffirms the objectives of international cooperation in nuclear disarmament, the prevention of nuclear proliferation and the promotion of the peaceful use of nuclear energy and should not be interpreted as permitting the nuclear-weapons states to retain their possession of nuclear weapons forever.²

China has been playing a very positive and active role in resolving the second North Korean nuclear crisis, which erupted in October 2002. China hosted the three-party talks between it, North Korea and the United States in Beijing in April 2003. Since August 2003, China has hosted six rounds of the six-party talks between it, North and South Korea, Japan, Russia, and the United States in Beijing. The six-party talks have provided a suitable mechanism for resolving the North Korean nuclear problem through dialogue and negotiation. China has made great efforts to try to persuade North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons option. On the other hand, the Bush Administration had first pursued a hostile policy towards North Korea. After Pyongyang declared on October 9, 2006 that it had successfully conducted a nuclear test, the Bush Administration readjusted its policy towards the DPRK,

¹ The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, "Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms", Stockholm Sweden, June 2006, p.11, www.wmdcommission.org.

² Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, "China: Arms Control and Disarmament" (White Paper), Beijing, November 1995, p.28.

pursuing the policy of engagement with the North Korea.

On February 13, 2007, the third phase of the fifth round of the six-party talks in Beijing reached a joint agreement, which is an important breakthrough towards a nuclear-weapons-free Korean Peninsula. If honored, it will be a first step in the right direction. According to the joint agreement, North Korea "will shut down and seal its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon for the purpose of eventual abandonment". Other parties agreed to "the provision of emergency energy assistance to the DPRK".

Because the North Korean nuclear crisis is very complicated, it will take a long time to resolve the problem. China has supported efforts to resolve Iran's nuclear issue through negotiations. In June 2006, the five permanent members of U.N. Security Council, including China, put forward a comprehensive proposal to Iran about resolving the Iranian nuclear issue, in which they proposed that if Iran suspended its activity of uranium enrichment and gave up its nuclear plan, the international community would provide Iran with energy and economic "rewards". However, Iran did not accept the proposal.

In June 2008, China also agreed to join the US and other powers in a diplomatic initiative to contain the Iranian nuclear program. If Iran were to accept the offer – including international support for its civil nuclear energy program and other incentives in exchange for the suspension of uranium enrichment – both sides would get what they say they want: civil nuclear energy for Iran, reassurance on nuclear proliferation for the others. At the same time, China has made clear that it would continue to oppose significant sanctions against Iran and seek only further dialogue.

However, the Bush Administration has not ruled out the possibility of using force against Iran. It is possible that the Bush Administration will give tacit consent to a preemptive attack against Iran by Israelis.

After India and Pakistan conducted nuclear explosion tests respectively in May 1998, China and other members of the UN Security Council, including the United States, supported Resolution 984 of the UN Security Council. The Resolution imposed some sanctions on India and Pakistan. Since the Bush Administration took office in 2001, the United States has improved its relationship with India greatly. The two countries even reached the agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation in July 2005. The United States wants to make use of India to balance the rise of

China. During recent years, China-India relations have also made great progress. India would not like to become a follower of the U.S. in restraining China. China would like to have good-neighborly relations with India and has promised to have bilateral cooperation with India in civilian use of nuclear energy. In April 2005, the two countries established the strategic and cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity.

Since the first day it gained nuclear weapons on October 6, 1964, China has committed itself to the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons in the world.³ China also declared that it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and in any circumstance, and that it conducted its nuclear test only for the purpose of defense. If the two biggest nuclear powers, namely the United States and Russia, can reduce their nuclear warheads to 1,000 respectively, China would be willing to join a path to a nuclear-free world.

2 Global Governance of Non-Proliferation

The main fora where nuclear proliferation issues should be addressed globally or regionally include the United Nations, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, the NPT's Review Conferences and their Preparatory Committee sessions, the IAEA, NSG, CTBTO Preparatory Commission, the Zangger Committee, the six-party talks on North Korea nuclear issue, and so on.

Both the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations can play a bigger role in prevention of nuclear proliferation. For example, on July 31, 2006, December 23, 2006, and March 24, 2007, the U.N. Security Council adopted three resolutions concerning Iran's nuclear issue, including Resolution 1696, Resolution 1737 and Resolution 1747. In each of the three Resolutions, the U.N. Security Council asked Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities if Iran wants to avoid further sanctions. The Resolutions have showed the firm will of the international community to prevent Iran from having atomic bombs.

The IAEA should further strengthen its verification capability so that it can play more important role in findings the thread of a spider and trail of a horse in international nuclear proliferation.

³ Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, "China: Arms Control and Disarmament" (White Paper), Beijing, November 1995, p.27.

The NPT should continue to be the main global mechanism to implement a nuclear non-proliferation policy. However, the NPT mechanism has some important shortfalls:

Firstly, because the price of traditional energy sources, such as oil and natural gas, have been rising to very high levels and some of those sources, such as coal, lead to serious pollution, more and more states want to have nuclear energy, and this has led to the spread of technologies useful for nuclear weapons production. Peaceful use of nuclear energy has provided the opportunity for some states to use nuclear energy for illegal purposes. In fact some states go beyond the line of peaceful use of nuclear energy, and develop their capacity for nuclear weaponry. One of the purposes of these states is to gain the capability and technology for nuclear energy production, so that they can break through the limit of the NPT to produce nuclear weapons if necessary. The right to peaceful use of nuclear technology, permitted by Article IV of the NPT treaty, has been used as pretext by some countries to develop nuclear bombs. Dr. Mohamed El Baradei, IAEA Director General, warned that more and more states have begun to seek to develop nuclear weapons to protect themselves, if the international community is unable to pursue effective measures to stop the proliferation of nuclear technology, up to 30 states will get the technology for producing nuclear weapons in the near future.

Secondly, some states outside the NPT have made great efforts to get nuclear bombs without being punished, which has a negative impact on the attitudes of non-nuclear-weapons states in the NPT regime, so that some of the non-nuclear-weapons states want to change their original non-nuclear-weapons position. It is not difficult and costs very little for a state member of the NPT to withdraw from the Treaty. In order to get nuclear weapons, some countries joined the NPT treaty and then withdrew from it without being punished, seriously hurting the authority of the treaty, which allows members to withdraw at will. Some countries have not formally joined or ratified the Additional Protocol to accept comprehensive safeguards.

Thirdly, thirty-eight years after the entry into force of the NPT, the nuclear-weapons states parties to the Treaty, especially the United States as top nuclear superpower as well as sole superpower of conventional forces in the world, have failed in their duty to achieve nuclear disarmament through negotiation. The United States even retreated from its commitment, which was

made in 1995 in order to get the Treaty extended to unlimited duration. Despite post-Cold War reductions, some 12,000 nuclear weapons remain in active service ('deployed'). Over 90 percent of those weapons are in the arsenals of the United States and Russia. The total of both deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons is estimated to be in the vicinity of 27,000.⁴ Furthermore, there is currently a risk of a new phase in nuclear arms competition through the further modernization of nuclear weapons. For example, the US Committee on Nuclear Weapons issued the design plan of a type of new nuclear warhead called "reliable replacement warhead". If the plan is signed by the US President and ratified by the US Congress, the United States will spend \$100 billion to produce the new warheads and may not follow its commitment to a moratorium on nuclear tests. Many non-nuclear-weapons states feel upset about the development of the new type of nuclear warhead by the United States.

Fourthly, illicit nuclear trade has been running wild, and the black market for nuclear material and technology has been rampant. According to an assessment by the IAEA, from 2003 to 2004, there were 121 incidents of trafficking or loss of nuclear material and radioactive elements in the world; in 2005, the number of the incidents reached 103.⁵ Terrorist organizations throughout the world have been playing some role in the nuclear trafficking. At the same time, nuclear technology has been spreading extensively via the internet and nuclear scientists have been moving across the world. The situation has made it possible for some middle or small countries and even terrorist organizations to gain the capability to produce nuclear bombs.

The main conflicts of interests between key actors that limit the binding force of the NPT include:

- The United States has pursued a policy of double standards towards nuclear proliferation. For example, on March 2, 2006, the United States and India reached an agreement that would provide U.S. nuclear power assistance to India while allowing that country to substantially step up its nuclear weapons production. Although we understand that India needs more energy, including nuclear energy, some other countries

⁴ SIPRI Yearbook 2006, Appendix 13A, pp.639-668.

⁵ "Trafficking in Nuclear and Radioactive Material in 2005", IAEA Releases Latest Illicit Trafficking Database Statistics, <http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2006/traffickingstates2005.html>.

would think that the United States has a double standard in dealing with non-proliferation issues, so that some of them may try to acquire nuclear bombs.

- The Bush Administration has regarded Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as an "axis of evil". The United States launched the Iraqi war and overthrew the Saddam Hussein regime in 2003. The Bush Administration has also pursued tough policies toward Iran and North Korea. What the Bush Administration did has caused increased tension in these regions and has given the hardliners of the two countries an excuse to develop nuclear capabilities.

In order to strengthen the binding force of the international nonproliferation regime, the international community must reform the NPT and take following measures:

- States party to the NPT Treaty should establish a standing secretariat to handle administrative matters for the parties to the Treaty. This secretariat should organize the Treaty's Review Conferences and their Preparatory Committee sessions. It should also organize other treaty-related meetings upon the request of more than half of the state parties.
- All parties to the NPT treaty revert to the fundamental and balanced nonproliferation and disarmament commitments that were made under the treaty and confirmed in 1995 when the treaty was extended indefinitely.
- To revise Article X of the NPT Treaty as follows: "Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. *It shall give notice of such withdraw to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance.* Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests." (*Italics added*)
- The nuclear-weapons states parties to the NPT Treaty should provide legally binding negative security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapons states parties. The states not party to the NPT Treaty that possess nuclear weapons should separately provide such assurances.

- All non-nuclear-weapons states parties to the NPT Treaty should accept comprehensive safeguards as strengthened by the international Atomic Energy Agency Additional Protocol, so as to enhance the effectiveness of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The NPT must be observed in full and in good faith. The countries which have not joined the NPT should do so at the earliest possible date so as to make the treaty truly universal.

The United States should take the leadership in strengthening and reforming the international nonproliferation regime, because it is the only superpower and the biggest nuclear power in the world. Nuclear-weapons states should take the responsibility assumed by them in the NPT. Especially, both the United States and Russia should continue to reduce the number of nuclear warheads in their arsenals. If the United States and Russia speed up the process of their nuclear reductions, it will be conducive to strengthening of the international nonproliferation structure.

Non-nuclear-weapons states should support the revision of Article X of the NPT and the establishment of the international nuclear fuel banks.

An internationalized, multilaterally controlled nuclear fuel cycle should be an element of a global non-proliferation regime. States party to the NPT Treaty should make their best efforts to reach an agreement to reduce the proliferation risk connected with the nuclear cycle, and should make active use of the IAEA as a forum for exploring various ways to do it, such as proposals for an international fuel bank, internationally safeguarded regional centers offering fuel-cycle service, including spent-fuel repositories, and the creation of a fuel-cycle system built on the concept that a few "fuel-cycle states" will lease nuclear fuel to states that forgo enrichment and reprocessing activities.

China's aims and interests in the NPT Review Conference in 2010 will be "to consolidate and constantly strengthen the existing international regime on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation."⁶ China stresses, "currently, the international process of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation is at a crucial cross-

⁶ The White Paper of the Information Office of the State Council of China, "China's Endeavors for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation", Beijing, September 1, 2005, p.2, <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-09/01/comment/>

sroads.”⁷ According to the views of China, as an integral part of the global security order, the international regime on arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation is still playing an important role in safeguarding world peace and stability.

The new situation, new challenges, and new problems have made it urgent that the international community take practical and effective steps to maintain and enhance the universality, effectiveness, and authority of the NPT regime. For this reason, it is necessary to comprehensively and evenly promote the three major goals of the NPT, namely, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament, and support for peaceful uses of nuclear energy.⁸ The three goals are interlinked and inseparable.

China has all along adhered to the policy of not advocating, encouraging, or engaging in the proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as not assisting other countries in the development of nuclear weapons. China has strictly fulfilled its non-proliferation obligations under the NPT and firmly opposes the proliferation of nuclear weapons by any country in any form.

China holds that the NPT is the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. China will make great efforts to observe the NPT in full and to maintain the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

China opposes proliferation of nuclear weapons in any form, calls upon all those outside the NPT to join as non-nuclear-weapons states, and is in favor of continued efforts to enhance and improve the existing nuclear non-proliferation regime in accordance with new developments.

3 Regional Governance of Non-Proliferation

Regional efforts can play a very important role in nuclear nonproliferation.

For example, nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ) have become one of the key elements of world

nuclear nonproliferation efforts and the most important supplement to the global nonproliferation regime. Nuclear-weapon-free zones are parts of the architecture that can usefully encourage and support a nuclear-weapon-free world. The progress of NWFZs has been taking us nearer and nearer to the ultimate realization of a nuclear-weapons-free world. Until now, there are five existing populated NWFZs, created by the Treaty for Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga), the African Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba), the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Bangkok) and the Central Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Semey). Until now, 113 non-nuclear-weapons states (NNWS) have signed the five existing NWFZ treaties. In addition, the Antarctic Treaty demilitarizes the Antarctic Continent and makes it a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The combined areas of the zones created by the Antarctic, Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba, Bangkok and Semey treaties account for more than 50 per cent of the Earth's surface. Virtually all of the southern hemisphere and parts of the northern hemisphere have been covered by NWFZs.

The five nuclear-weapons states (NWS), namely the United States, Russia, Britain, France, and China, have signed the relevant protocols of the Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, and Pelindaba treaties, committing themselves not to use or threaten the use of nuclear weapons against regional state parties. The progress experienced in the realm of NWFZs has demonstrated that regional nuclear nonproliferation mechanisms based on NWFZs have been playing a role as important as the global nuclear nonproliferation regime, and, in some cases, even more important. For example, both non-nuclear weapons states and nuclear-weapons states undertake more responsibilities in NWFZs than in the global nonproliferation regime. All five existing NWFZs have their own supplemental safeguards with regional mechanisms and procedures, so the scope of the verification regimes of NWFZs goes beyond the full application of the IAEA safeguards. Nuclear-weapons states provide negative security assurances to regional parties, including a commitment not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against regional state parties. Furthermore, that nuclear threshold states or *de facto* nuclear-weapons states return to the status of non-nuclear-weapons states will depend mainly on the relaxation of the regional security situation. Both NWFZs and the International Atomic Ener-

⁷ The White Paper of the Information Office of the State Council of China, “China’s Endeavors for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation”, Beijing, September 1, 2005, p.2, <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-09/01/comment/>

⁸ Zhang Yan, Head of the Chinese Delegation and Director-General of Department of Arms Control of Chinese Foreign Ministry, *Statement in the General Debate at the 2005 NPT Review Conference*, <http://www.china-un.org/eng/smhwj/t196288/htm>

gy Agency (IAEA) are also necessary to complement each other to prevent the status of the states from reversing.

Regional non-proliferation mechanisms like the Bangkok Treaty in South East Asia and the Semei in Central Asia (CANWFZ) can play a bigger role in the face of the crisis of the global non-proliferation regime. The process of NWFZs and the global nuclear nonproliferation regime should be more closely integrated. The two kinds of mechanisms are like two legs of the international nonproliferation regime. They complement each other. For example, all five existing NWFZs rely mainly on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards to ensure compliance and verification, but each of them also has its own mechanism to oversee and review the application of the IAEA safeguards system, and to provide for a number of additional control measures. The international community should have a policy of "walking with two legs" to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.

For example, the establishment of a CANWFZ is a very important step forward in complementing the global nonproliferation regime. CANWFZ will be the first nuclear weapon-free zone located entirely in the northern hemisphere. The establishment of CANWFZ is particularly significant because thousands of Soviet nuclear weapons were once based in Central Asia. The new zone also borders on regions with proliferation concerns, such as the Middle East and South Asia. CANWFZ will also border on two nuclear-weapons states, Russia and China. The terms of the treaty itself buttress the nonproliferation regime as they oblige the Central Asian states to accept enhanced International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on their nuclear material, and require them to meet international recommendations regarding safety of nuclear facilities. Considering current concerns that Central Asia could become a source or transit corridor for smuggling of nuclear materials by terrorists, these terms of the CANWFZ should be viewed as a very positive step in the ongoing international struggle against terrorism, especially nuclear terrorism. In a unique feature, the treaty also recognizes the environmental damage done to Central Asia by the Soviet nuclear weapons program and pledges to support environmental rehabilitation. Although none of the five states in the region has nuclear weapons, the treaty will prevent the reintroduction of nuclear weapons into this region by either the formerly dominant regional nuclear power Russia, or by the United States, which now has air bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.

The CANWFZ will also serve as an island of non-nuclear stability to the north and east of the Middle East and South Asia.

These regional mechanisms are significant for China's non-proliferation policy, so China actively supports these regional mechanisms as part of its regional security policy. China thinks that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is of great importance to the advancement of nuclear disarmament, the prevention of nuclear proliferation, and the promotion of international and regional peace and security.⁹ In a statement to the NPT Review and Extension Conference on April 18, 1995, the Chinese Foreign Minister stated: "China supports the efforts of relevant countries and regions to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones or zones free of weapons of mass destruction through voluntary consultations."¹⁰ In its white paper on arms control and disarmament issued in November 1995, China stated that it "has always respected and supported the demands of the countries concerned for the establishment of (NWFZs) on the basis of voluntary consultation and agreement and in accordance with actual local circumstances, China welcomes the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty and supports the proposals by relevant nations on the establishment of nuclear-free zones in the Korean Peninsula, South Asia, Southeast Asia and the Middle East."¹¹

On 15 September 1997, China presented its seven principles on the creation of NWFZs, in which there are three important principles, including: 1) Establishing nuclear weapon-free zones should follow the purpose of the Charter of the United Nations and established principles of international law; 2) nuclear-weapon-free zones should be established on the basis of equality and voluntary consultations between relevant countries according to the reality of region; 3) the geographical scope of nuclear-weapon-free zones should not include continental shelves and exclusive economic zones (EEZ) as

⁹ "Speech by Head of the Chinese Delegation to the International Conference 'Central Asia--Nuclear Weapons Free Zone'", Tashkent, Uzbekistan, 15 September 1997.

¹⁰ "Statement by Qian Qichen, Vice Premier and Foreign Minister and Head of Delegation of the People's Republic of China at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons." April 18, 1995.

¹¹ "China: Arms Control and Disarmament", Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, November 1995.

well as areas, over which there are disputes with countries outside the nuclear-weapon-free zone about territorial sovereignty and marine rights.

Until now, China has signed and ratified the following relevant legally binding documents related to nuclear-weapon-free zones: the Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the relevant protocols of the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone (Treaty of Rarotonga), and the African Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Pelindaba). On 15 July 1999, during his visit to Mongolia, then Chinese President Jiang Zemin stated that China respects the nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia. On 27 July 1999, during the ASEAN Regional Forum, the Chinese Foreign Minister said that the Chinese government has agreed in principle to sign the Protocol of the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. The Chinese Government has also expressed its support for the CANWFZ.

China has been playing a very positive, active, and significant role in the resolution of the nuclear stand-off on the Korean Peninsula, especially having hosted the six rounds of the six-party talks, which have provided a suitable mechanism for the process of resolving the North Korean nuclear problems through dialogue and negotiations. Furthermore, the six-party talks may develop gradually into one important mechanism of sub-regional security dialogue and cooperation in Northeast Asia, if North Korea's nuclear problems can be resolved under the framework.

4 Conclusion

The main elements of a future non-proliferation regime should be both the strengthening of the NPT regime and continued nuclear reductions by the U.S. and Russia. If they can reduce their nuclear warheads to 1,000 respectively, other nuclear-weapon states should join the process of nuclear disarmament.

Key actors could take following concrete steps to prevent collapse of the current regime:

- **Bring the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) into force as soon as possible.**

Until now, US Senate has not ratified the CTBT. That has exerted great negative influence on the process of international nonproliferation and may lead to new nuclear proliferation. Concerned with the intention of the United States, some other coun-

tries have slowed down the process of their ratification of the Treaty. In order to strengthen the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, the Senate of the United States should ratify the CTBT soon.

- **To negotiate and implement the Fissile Material Production Cut-off Treaty (FMCT).**

That treaty will ban the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons, so that it will be beneficial to both nuclear disarmament and prevention of nuclear proliferation. Because of disagreements about relations between the negotiation of the treaty on prohibiting weaponization of the outer space and the negotiation of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), the Committee on Disarmament (CD) has been unable to reconvene the *ad hoc* committee charged with negotiating the treaty.

- **To stop research and development on nuclear weapons.**

The two nuclear superpowers, namely the United States and Russia, should do so first and set good examples for other nuclear-weapon states. Because the nuclear weapons of these two states are far superior in quality and quantity to those of other nuclear-weapon states, what they do in terms of nuclear weapons development has been one of the reasons that some nuclear threshold states have not joined the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

China would like to contribute to the NPT reform process. China supports the establishment of an internationalized multilaterally controlled nuclear fuel cycle. Beijing would not oppose the revision of Article X of the NPT Treaty. If the U.S. Senate ratifies the CTBT, the Chinese People's Congress would ratify it soon. If the U.S. agrees that the Committee on Disarmament (CD) should begin to negotiate the treaty on prohibiting weaponization of outer space, China would agree to let the CD to begin the negotiation of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.

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