For the international system of refugee protection, creating more safe pathways through resettlement and humanitarian admission is key.

Based on an analysis of practice in six countries, this paper outlines steps that would revive resettlement and humanitarian admission until 2024.
A PATHWAY TOWARDS MORE RESETTLEMENT AND HUMANITARIAN ADMISSION
AT A GLANCE

Amidst the lack of safe pathways for refugees, resettlement and humanitarian admission stand out as offering safe channels for movement and long-term solutions for a selected few. However, the number of available places has taken an unprecedented hit. This is not only a problem for refugees themselves, but also for the entire international system of refugee protection. To survive, that system requires meaningful tools to support responsibility sharing.

In this paper, we identify the reasons for the current admission levels and propose a pathway towards more engagement over the next three years. We do so by looking at six countries that represent the backbone of international efforts on resettlement and humanitarian admission (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Sweden, and the United States). Despite difficult political contexts, a positive turn is feasible in many of these countries. Reflecting on the short-, medium-, and long-term horizons, we outline three steps that would revive resettlement and humanitarian admission.

1. Recovery, 2022: a short-term coordinated effort enables resettlement to recover from the shock of COVID-19; governments make additional commitments to resettle Afghans, in addition to evacuations.

2. Stability, 2023: resettlement and humanitarian admission are on a stable growth trajectory; new programmes emerge, and the size of established resettlement programmes increases.

3. Sustainability, 2024: resettlement and humanitarian admission are more established tools of responsibility sharing, narrowing the gap between need and available places (target: at least 200,000 places globally per year, excluding other complementary pathways); higher numbers of available places offer new opportunities to use these tools strategically in the future.

This paper is based on an analysis of factors in six countries (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Sweden, and the United States), as well as interviews with 17 key informants. For each of the six countries, we present separate, 3-page briefs as a joint annex to this paper, together with a bibliography.

This paper is part of series of publications on resettlement and humanitarian admission.

THE STATUS QUO: RESETTLEMENT AND HUMANITARIAN ADMISSION HAVE SUFFERED A DOUBLE BLOW

In a world in which crossing borders is becoming more difficult, resettlement\(^1\) and humanitarian admission\(^2\) have become ever more important, offering refugees a safe pathway towards a long-term perspective. Yet these tools are marginal. This is particularly apparent when we consider resettlement, which focuses on the people who are in a vulnerable position in countries of first asylum: Resettlement numbers have shrunk (figure 1) and the gap between need on the one hand, and places offered on the other hand, has grown considerably.\(^3\)

Over the past four years, however, two shocks have dealt resettlement and humanitarian admission a historic blow. First, the United States, which until that time had covered an average of 60 per cent of all resettlement places, sharply reduced its commitment under the Trump administration. The numbers fell from 85,000 available places in 2016 to just 18,000 in 2020.

Second, the COVID-19 pandemic has created a significant backlog of cases. Many refugees who had already been accepted for resettlement could not leave their country of first asylum amid travel and entry restrictions.\(^4\) Mobility restrictions also affected the missions of national migration agencies, many of which rely on personal on-site interviews to select refugees for resettlement and humanitarian admission. Even before the pandemic, admission processes in most countries took months. Now refugees are in limbo for even longer, and this situation is aggravated by the economic fallout from COVID-19.

These low numbers are not only a problem for individual refugees; they are also detrimental to the entire international

\(\text{\textsuperscript{1}}\text{For the definition of resettlement, see the infographic: Rights, Resettlement and Complementary Pathways, which is part of this series on resettlement by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung: UNHCR defines resettlement as the transfer of refugees from asylum country to another state that has agreed to admit them and ultimately grant them permanent residence. Resettlement aims to offer a durable solution for refugees who are in a particularly vulnerable situation in the country of first asylum, such as refugees with medical, legal or physical needs, survivors of torture, or women, girls and children at risk.}\)

\(\text{\textsuperscript{2}}\text{In light of the broad range of humanitarian admission programmes, we use the term humanitarian admission to refer to the transfer of people at risk, including refugees, from a country that is not their country of nationality to an admission country, with the aim of providing them with protection for the duration of risk. This can include state-led admissions and private/community sponsorships. We do not use the term to refer to more specialized complementary pathways, such as family reunification, education and employment pathways, or evacuations.}\)

\(\text{\textsuperscript{3}}\text{The gap between the worldwide refugee population in need of resettlement and the number of departures rose from 700,000 in 2011 to more than 1.3 million in 2019.}\)

\(\text{\textsuperscript{4}}\text{For example, almost one-third of the people to whom a visa was granted under the Australian resettlement and humanitarian programmes were not able to travel.}\)

system of refugee protection. The basic tenants of that system are under pressure almost everywhere, either because borders are closed or because economic challenges and a tense political climate mean that refugee rights remain an unfulfilled promise. In this context, both words and deeds – with regard to non-return, refugee rights, and sharing responsibilities with refugee-hosting countries, which are under strain from unequal displacement distribution – are necessary to prevent the international system of refugee protection from becoming meaningless. Internationally, countries have committed to responsibility sharing under the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR), brokered by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). However, two years after its adoption, many of the Compact’s objectives are not yet sufficiently underpinned by concrete action.

MOMENTUM FOR INCREASED RESETTLEMENT AND HUMANITARIAN ADMISSION COULD BE GENERATED IN KEY COUNTRIES

If the aim is to scale up resettlement and humanitarian admission to make them more meaningful tools and to reduce the populations of refugees most in need, then two central questions arise: What would a realistic goal look like? And how can different actors turn general commitments into politically viable courses of action? To answer these questions, we have considered six of the countries that help make up the international backbone of resettlement and humanitarian admission – Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Sweden, and the United States.  

Factors that Negatively Affect Resettlement and Humanitarian Admission

In all of these six countries, the factors that negatively affect the scope of resettlement and humanitarian admission (and the future prospects of scaling up the use of these two tools) are broadly similar. These factors relate to the admission process, the preconditions for achieving integration, and the general political environment (summarised in the table below). Overarching political factors rank highest in importance, which reflects a consistent perception among the experts we interviewed for this paper.  

GENERAL POLITICAL FACTORS

In all the countries we considered (albeit to a different degree), the admission of migrants – and refugees in particular – has become a divisive domestic political issue, intermingling with larger issues related to social welfare provision, cultural and religious identity, and security. Governments have either tried to exploit hard lines on migration policies for their own political gain or have feared losing out to other political parties making those gains. Such debates have also spilled over into local or regional contexts, where initiatives for refugee admission have been thwarted by the lack of central government acceptance, necessary to grant visas. The discretionary nature of resettlement and humanitarian admission (states are free to decide whether to engage in resettlement at all, how many and whom to admit), as well as the low levels of resettlement globally, have also presented challenges. These factors make it easy for opponents to point to low admission levels elsewhere, as well as to countries that outright refuse to admit refugees proactively.

ADMISSION PROCESS, POST-ARRIVAL AND INTEGRATION

For both resettlement and humanitarian admission, government institutions actively select refugees, organize their transfer and, jointly with non-governmental actors, manage the reception and facilitate integration. Beyond political factors, levels of resettlement and humanitarian admission are influenced by real capacity challenges on these elements in the admission process. First and fore-
most, regarding integration, this concerns tense job and housing markets, a challenge which many countries try to mitigate with regional distribution mechanisms for admitted refugees. However, a shortage of specialised service provision – such as language and vocational training – is also a factor. Second, there are capacity issues for staff involved in the selection and admission processes, including staff in the relevant migration agencies as well as consular staff. Such capacity challenges can also be exacerbated by high numbers of migrants and refugees applying via other migration channels, such as in Germany, where consular staff also process a relatively high number of family reunification applications. Meanwhile, the case of the United States shows that capacity issues affect the prospects for growth in resettlement and humanitarian admission. The drastic reduction in places under the Trump administration meant that many of the private service providers and non-profit organisations involved had to lay off staff or close entirely, which makes President Biden’s new announcements on resettlement and humanitarian admission difficult to attain.

Factors that Negatively Affect Resettlement and Humanitarian Admission

- Capacity limits/restraints among local, governmental, and non-governmental service providers
- Tense local markets in metropolitan areas, particularly with regard to housing
- Individual preferences – refugees have travelled onwards to other countries or regions
- Divisive domestic policy debates on all migration-related issues
- Rifts between those countries that engage in resettlement and those that outright reject their responsibility to do so
- State-centric nature of admission, which prevents local/regional admission initiatives which are not approved at the central state level
- Laborious/time-consuming procedures
- Practical challenges for selection missions (e.g., logistics, communications)

Factors that Positively Affect Resettlement and Humanitarian Admission

Despite these difficult political contexts, resettlement and humanitarian admission have also proven somewhat resilient, spurred by four factors in particular.

CROSS-PARTISAN, NON-STATE, COMMUNITY AND PRIVATE SUPPORT

First, cross-partisan support for resettlement and (to a more limited extent) humanitarian admission exists in all the countries we studied. In those countries where admission increased, milestones were achieved under both liberal, centre-left and more conservative, centre-right led governments. Tougher policies on asylum have usually focused on asylum seekers who arrive “spontaneously,” while resettlement is spared because it allows controlling admission numbers and other criteria like nationality, and because it has an orderly procedure. The United States is a notable exception to this overall trend.

We also observed other actors involved in resettlement and humanitarian admission playing an extensive role. Capacity issues are perceived to correlate with the strength of non-governmental, community, or private initiatives and support networks (in which refugees often self-organize). In several countries, one strategy to raise support has been to increase the extent of private or community sponsorship and funding for admission, thus facilitating integration via individual and community sponsors such as faith-based organisations, diaspora groups, and applicants’ families. Reliance on these actors can also shield admission from some forms of anti-migration criticism, given the cost borne by the state is lower.

---

8 President Biden committed to admitting 62,500 refugees in 2021 and 125,000 refugees in the fiscal year 2022. See country brief on the United States.

9 By “asylum seekers who arrive ‘spontaneously’”, we mean people who apply for asylum after having crossed the border of a country in a manner different from resettlement or humanitarian admission, such as with a tourist visa or by irregular arrival. We use quotation marks because the term “spontaneous”, while commonly used as an antonym for resettlement, suggests that such asylum applications occur impetuously.
SHIFTING PUBLIC OPINION AND FLEXIBLE POLITICAL REACTIONS

The situation in the six countries we studied also makes it clear that public opinion and government policy can shift significantly, and in concert. All six countries witnessed a marked increase in active admission of refugees when displacement from Syria peaked and images of drowning men, women, and children led to widespread public demands that more should be done to save lives. Most governments reacted with ad-hoc humanitarian admission programmes. This demonstrates a clear preference at ministerial level (as opposed to several respective agencies in charge) for reactive, flexible admission at politically opportune moments rather than long-term commitments. This preference is also apparent in current resettlement programmes – almost all the countries we analysed for this paper make annual rather than multi-year commitments. Most recently, a shift in public opinion is also evident in debates on Afghanistan. In almost all the countries we studied, public support for stronger engagement on behalf of Afghans was on the rise. This was propelled – among other factors – by a sense of direct responsibility for the country and its people, given the presence of US and coalition forces, of development and humanitarian personnel, and the support Afghans had provided them. As a result, non-traditional actors – such as veterans – are advocating and appealing to different branches of the electorate as well as to policymakers. Here too, however, the appetite for fixed commitments is low. Thus, the October 2021 EU High-Level Forum on providing protection to Afghans at risk did not result in concrete pledges on additional admission.

FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS

States’ reactions to the displacement of Syrians and to the current situation in Afghanistan indicate moments at which public compassion (which means less political risk associated with increasing admission numbers) and humanitarian motives converge with foreign policy interests. Many governments do more than point to resettlement and humanitarian admission as tools of responsibility sharing that support host countries. They also pursue or highlight other foreign policy objectives. In particular, these include retaining credibility for the armed forces and for other government institutions among their former local employees (as apparent in respect of Afghanistan, for example), supporting regular, orderly forms of admission, or deterring irregular movement. The latter is most pronounced in Australia, which is the only country in the world in which every refugee who arrives as “spontaneously” triggers a reduction in the places available for resettlement and humanitarian admission. While the number of “spontaneous” arrivals of asylum seekers has been low, the policy has nevertheless propelled both a public and a government discourse in which “spontaneous” forms of asylum seeking are stigmatised as “queue jumping” and asylum seekers are detained.

A logic that links resettlement to action against irregular migration is also visible in Germany’s efforts to resettle refugees from Niger. The key driving factor for that resettlement was Niger’s efforts to stem irregular migration to Libya via Niger. What is more, in Germany as well as in other EU countries, one of the considerations at play in participating in the EU-coordinated resettlement of refugees out of Turkey is that it signals the EU’s support for Turkey. Turkey not only generously provides protection to Syrians, but also curbs irregular onward movement under the EU-Turkey statement.\(^\text{10}\)

Indeed, resettlement from Turkey has been the main contributor to higher resettlement in Europe, accounting for 27,000 of the 70,000 refugees resettled between 2015 and 2020.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Finally, beyond domestic political considerations, international cooperation has contributed to making more places available in some instances. Germany and France are co-ordinating on their commitments, which has also provided a push to a more common European approach. Funds provided by the European Commission to support resettlement (through the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, or AMIF) have contributed to increasing numbers in both nascent resettlement countries and in established programs. There also is a comparable but small financial mechanism on the international level.

As part of the GCR, the UNHCR-convened Global Forum on Refugees has led to a (low) number of new commitments on resettlement, humanitarian admission, and other pathways for refugees. For example, Canada introduced pilot programmes to increase educational and labour mobility pathways to resettlement in Canada.

On a global level, the Annual Tripartite Consultations on Resettlement (ATCR) has been bringing together UNHCR, governmental actors, NGOs, and other stakeholders since 1995 to support knowledge exchange on lessons learned with regard to procedures, advocacy, and capacity building on resettlement, as well as discussing a way forward. Other fora for international exchange include the ATCR’s Working Group on Resettlement and the Priority Situations Core Group, a more recent body for coordination which focuses on specific refugee situations.

A PATHWAY UNTIL 2024: THREE PHASES

This analysis of factors makes it clear that the political leeway for fixed, longer-term commitments to more resettlement and humanitarian admission is limited. However, resettlement and humanitarian admission have seen increases at moments when there was a clear picture of need, when humanitarian and foreign policy considerations converged, and when international cooperation was high.

---

Higher levels of meaningful engagement could have a quick, marked effect on the overall population of those most in need of a solution in another country. While there is a glaring gap between the level of need and offers for resettlement and humanitarian admission, the growth of resettlement needs is manageable: for example, the number of persons worldwide whom the UNHCR considers in need of resettlement has risen by 17,000 between 2018 and 2021 and will further increase by about the same number for the year ahead.

On this basis, we outline a pathway of three phases to revive resettlement and humanitarian admission, reflecting the short-, medium-, and longer-term perspectives from 2021/2022 through to 2024. The aim is to bring both of these tools onto a growth path, which would allow offering a solution to resettling the 1.4 million refugees most in need within the next ten years. Based on our analysis of the enabling factors, we propose a response centred around the following principles and approaches:

- Multilateralism – an international alliance, cooperating and coordinating in a spirit of mutual support;
- Flexibility – making commitments to common goals, without imposing anything resembling a quota;
- Multi-Stakeholder – enabling a broad variety of actors to contribute;
- Multi-purpose – promoting transparency on objectives, including those related to foreign policy interests;
- Compassion – supporting public communication of humanitarian needs.

1. Recovery: The 2021–2022 Afghanistan Moment

A short-term coordinated effort enables resettlement to recover from the shock of COVID-19. Governments make additional commitments to admit Afghans.

**Goal:** 130,000 departures in 2022.

To date, resettlement and humanitarian admission are suffering from the drop in the number of places since the advent of COVID-19 as well as the backlog that accumulated during the pandemic. As governments prepare their commitments for 2022, many are still not meeting their quotas for 2020 and 2021. The problem is both a bottleneck in the admission process and (to a more limited extent) a bottleneck in departures from the respective countries of first asylum. We suggest that now is the moment for governmental actors in resettlement countries and other stakeholders to commit to a coordinated response that ensures a post-COVID-19 recovery for resettlement and humanitarian admission. The goal for 2022 should be to bring resettlement and humanitarian

admission back to 2019 levels, and to provide additional places for Afghans (see next paragraph). Back in 2019, resettlement and humanitarian admission (excluding other complementary pathways like family reunification) were at an estimated 110,000 departures.\footnote{This number is an estimate. It uses the average share (past five years) that the six countries studied had in global resettlement, to extrapolate the 2019 baseline of resettlement and humanitarian admission from these six countries. To check for plausibility, we also considered the baseline number of all complementary pathways that UNHCR used for its three-year strategy (180,000). See UNHCR. 2018. The Three-Year Strategy (2019–2021) on Resettlement and Complementary Pathways. Available: https://www.unhcr.org/5d15db254.pdf [15 October 2021].} While the humanitarian motive for admission should be at the forefront, governments may also consider whether post-COVID-19 economic recovery plans present additional opportunities for other complementary pathways – as is currently being considered in Australia, for instance. On a more technical level, the following adjustments may help to achieve this goal and may also serve as a means of piloting practices that could continue once the pandemic is over:

- Pause the requirement for in-person selection missions and interviews to the benefit of remote selection;
- Facilitate exchange so that those countries which have engaged in dossier selection, remote interviews and speedy security checks can share their lessons learned;
- Introduce a pilot emergency procedure (a shorter, prioritised admission procedure) for pre-selected and at-risk individuals, as well as a pilot, “unallocated” quota that is not tied to specific countries of origin;
- Review consular staff levels needed for increased resettlement and humanitarian admission. In the EU context, explore opportunities for consular staff from different European countries to support their European partners;
- Where departure bottlenecks exist as a result of COVID-19 restrictions, coordinate to find practical solutions to help people to travel and to support those who are waiting in limbo;
- Review case management systems and plan for digitization of documents and processes.

Amidst the mounting humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan, many resettlement countries are witnessing stable public support for and political engagement on providing protection to Afghans. Opinions differ on the extent to which government responses will go beyond evacuation schemes to include more resettlement and humanitarian admission from Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries. Nevertheless, momentum has been building at the international level among the same actors that also engage in relevant resettlement and humanitarian admission processes.

- As states prepare their quotas for 2022, there is an opportunity to position resettlement and humanitarian admission as an additional response for Afghans living in Iran and Pakistan. UNHCR does currently not refer any cases from the two countries. For 2022-2023, countries that were part of the coalition forces should offer 40,000 places in total, with EU countries focusing on Iran (from which the US does not resettle) and the US, Canada, and Australia focusing on Pakistan.

- Governmental and non-governmental actors should engage in strategic messaging and publicly promote this approach instead of keeping it under wraps. Such efforts could include communicating responsibility for people who were partners while military, development, and humanitarian institutions were present in Afghanistan; explaining strategic considerations (particularly the need to be a reliable partner, given that these same institutions will have to rely on local partners in the future); and publicising individual success stories.

- Where Afghan communities exist, additional safe pathways such as family-sponsored humanitarian admission programmes for Afghans should be introduced.

2. Stability: The 2022–2023 GCR Anniversary Moment

Resettlement and humanitarian admission are on a stable growth trajectory. New programmes are emerging, and the size of established resettlement programmes is growing. Responsibility sharing should be promoted as “hard” foreign policy interests.

Goal: 170,000 departures in 2023.

Once resettlement and humanitarian admission have recovered from the fallout of COVID-19, it will be time to bring them onto a moderate growth path, starting with the commitments made in late 2022. The goal should be to achieve at least 170,000 departures worldwide for the year 2023, for both tools combined, without more specialised complementary pathways like family reunification.

In the six countries we studied, considerations of both domestic and foreign policy influenced higher admission numbers. Offering more places will require country-specific responses to confront domestic concerns about increased intake. For example, in the US, scaling up private and community sponsorship programmes appears to be the most promising avenue to confront political hurdles and deal with the depleted resettlement infrastructure. In a country like Sweden, on the other hand, efforts to scale up could concentrate on establishing partnerships at governmental and EU levels – given that governmental actors are more hesitant to distribute responsibilities among private actors and the public sees the government as the appropriate authority, due to a well-established welfare system.

Given that the convergence of foreign policy goals and humanitarian motives has been conducive to resettlement
and humanitarian admission in the past, all governments should reflect on and more openly communicate the relevant objectives. Foreign policy goals need not contradict the principles of refugee protection. The five-year anniversary of the GCR is the appropriate moment to convey that the GCR objective of shared burdens and responsibilities is a domestic and foreign policy necessity, and to underpin this with higher admission numbers. The current consensus among most “northern” countries is to promote and support refugees’ self-reliance and inclusion in national services – such as education, health, and social safety nets – in their countries of first asylum. In many countries of first asylum, however, this is a highly contentious topic in domestic policy. Resistance to inclusion is not simply a matter of money. Admitting refugees in “northern” countries can therefore be a critical act of political support, alongside other forms of assistance. It may also help these countries to retain credibility in promoting refugees’ inclusion in countries of first asylum, as well as in promoting other key tenets of international refugee law.

Given the state of the current refugee resettlement system (in which it is easy for opponents to point to low admission levels elsewhere), efforts to increase admission numbers will benefit from strong political leadership. The EU could emerge as a core network of countries leading efforts to increase resettlement and humanitarian admission. The 2022 incoming French presidency of the EU should prioritize facilitating the adoption of the European Resettlement Framework regulation, creating common procedures and rules for prioritising and pledging (among other issues) without making admission a legal obligation. The new national governments in Germany and France should jointly push for more resettlement and humanitarian admission. Turkey, Libya and neighbouring countries of Afghanistan are among the plausible priority countries for future EU Commission recommendations, given that EU foreign policy interests most clearly converge with the humanitarian benefits of resettlement and humanitarian admission in these countries.

Existing networks for international knowledge exchange and coordination are already strong on resettlement and humanitarian admission and can be used as a basis to further the exchange and to invest in capacity building. Engaged stakeholders should jointly address the more acute challenge of increasing the number of countries offering resettlement and humanitarian admission in order to make the system less vulnerable to a future shock – such as that imposed by the Trump administration. To support new countries in mounting resettlement and humanitarian admission programmes, several helpful tools should be in place by the end of 2023:

- A Global Resettlement Fund would function as an international equivalent to the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, which has helped to increase the number of resettlement programmes in the EU context.

- GCR signatory states should launch a data tool to provide a consistent, reliable, and transparent baseline number for humanitarian admission and all other complementary pathways offered in 2022. They should agree on terminology and on the criteria for distinguishing between UNHCR-referred resettlement, other resettlement, humanitarian admission, family reunification, and other forms of active admission for refugees, such as student visas.

- Knowledge exchange on humanitarian admission should be strengthened, including on private and community sponsorship programmes. It should include Canada as a champion of this model, as well as refugees themselves. In cases where states are still hesitant to invest public funds in community sponsorship programmes, blended programmes or private funding from pioneering actors – including formerly resettled refugees and their families – could fill the gap.

### 3. Sustainability: The 2023–2024 Global Refugee Forum Moment

Resettlement and humanitarian admission are established tools of responsibility sharing. Higher numbers offer new opportunities to use these tools strategically in the future. Goal: 200,000 departures in 2024.

In late 2023, the second iteration of the Global Refugee Forum will provide an opportunity to further narrow the glaring gap between the needs of refugees and offers for resettlement and humanitarian admission. The goal should be: a) to achieve at least 200,000 departures worldwide for the year 2024, through a combination of resettlement and humanitarian admission (excluding family reunification), and b) to ensure broader buy-in to common targets on resettlement and all forms of complementary pathways, for the years thereafter.

Attaining such levels does not require a sudden breakthrough, but rather a commitment to the growth path established in 2022. The EU, Canada, and the US – which by that time should have resumed its position as a number-one provider of resettlement and humanitarian admission – should coordinate to rally other states behind common goals for the years leading up to 2032. With a target of at least 100,000 places for humanitarian admission and 100,000 resettlement places in 2024, and an annual growth of 15,000 places for resettlement and 10,000 places for humanitarian admission, starting from 2024, today’s entire population of refugees in need of resettlement would be offered a solution within the next ten years. To assist less wealthy, emerging resettlement countries, the Global Refugee Forum should be an occasion for both national governments and the private sector to commit resources to the new Global Resettlement Fund, established in 2022.

In the past, resettlement and humanitarian admission have been criticised as insufficiently “strategic.” While this term is somewhat amorphous, it originally applied to using...
resettlement as a tool to improve refugee protection in countries of first asylum, or to the refugee protection regime in general. Today, however, resettlement and humanitarian admission numbers are so small that such expectations are hardly realistic – beyond the important political signal of resettlement in combination with other kinds of support. Even the comparatively high numbers of Syrians admitted to resettlement countries constituted a tiny fraction of the overall refugee population. However, if the scope of resettlement were to increase significantly after 2024, then opportunities to use resettlement strategically to improve refugee protection, as a tool of solidarity with third countries, and to stabilise the global refugee protection regime may well arise. As part of a larger-scale international resettlement and humanitarian admission system, by the end of 2024 it would be time for UNHCR to reclaim ownership of the concept of Strategic Use of Resettlement; to develop pilot programmes in cooperation with all stakeholders, including resettled refugees; and to evaluate them.

Figure 3: Growth Trajectory to Address Global Resettlement Needs within Ten Years

A 130,000 departures for resettlement and humanitarian admission in 2022. The goal for 2022 should be to bring resettlement and humanitarian admission back to 2019 levels, and to provide additional places for Afghans.

B 170,000 departures for resettlement and humanitarian admission in 2023. Resettlement and humanitarian admission are on a stable growth trajectory. New programmes are emerging, and the size of established resettlement programmes is growing.

C 200,000 departures for resettlement and humanitarian admission in 2024. Resettlement and humanitarian admission are established tools of responsibility sharing. Higher numbers offer new opportunities to use these tools strategically in the future.

D 400,000 places are offered per year (excluding other complementary pathways, like family reunification). A total number of 3 million places is offered within 10 years, among them 1.58 million resettlement places.
ANNEX A: COUNTRY BRIEFS

This annex consists of six country briefs to accompany the analysis “A Pathway to more Resettlement and Humanitarian Admission.” Each country brief outlines the recent trends in refugee resettlement and humanitarian admission in the respective country and proceeds to analyse the factors that explain these trends. On this basis, each brief describes the respective country’s prospects for committing to higher admission numbers as well as to increased international cooperation on refugee resettlement and humanitarian admission in the future.13

COUNTRY BRIEF: AUSTRALIA

TRENDS IN REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT AND HUMANITARIAN ADMISSION

Resettlement and humanitarian admission numbers are going down.

Australia has a long-standing Humanitarian Program that includes UNHCR-referred resettlement and other forms of humanitarian admission under the so-called “offshore” component for those people hosted outside of Australia (as opposed to onshore asylum applications). Although Australia is traditionally among the three largest resettlement countries worldwide, the size of its offshore component has fluctuated over the past decade: it peaked at 27,625 admissions in 2016, in contrast to the low of just 9,226 places in 2011. In 2019, the year before the COVID-19 pandemic hit and departures to Australia decreased sharply, the offshore Humanitarian Program comprised 18,240 places. Most recently, Australia announced a “ceiling” (as opposed to its previous language, which referred to a “target”) that caps the number of both onshore and offshore refugee admissions jointly at 13,750 places over two years (2020–2021). This not only means that the number of admissions is decreasing significantly, but also that the prospects for growth are moderate (as previous targets have often been exceeded). This number is expected to remain stable until 2024–2025.

After the Taliban took over Afghanistan in August 2021, Australia announced that it would accept 3,000 vulnerable Afghan nationals and Afghans with family ties to Australia. However, in contrast to past ad-hoc humanitarian admissions, these places are not in addition to, but are part of the number of places allocated under the existing Human-

Figure 1: Annual Numbers of Resettlement and Humanitarian Admissions 2015–2020 (Offshore Humanitarian Programme)

Source: Refugee Council of Australia (2021)
COUNTRY BRIEF: AUSTRALIA

This means the government will readjust the order of priority in its existing programme, in which demand already exceeds the number of available places eight times over.

Compared to other countries, Australia’s share of UNHCR-referred resettlement – that is, resettlement for which no community ties are necessary and which adheres to UNHCR’s vulnerability criteria – is exceptionally small. Within the offshore component, the number of community-sponsored resettlements (the so-called “Special Humanitarian Program”) consistently outweighs the number of non-sponsored refugees (the so-called “Refugee Program”), and non-governmental organisations are concerned that even the Refugee Program is moving towards greater consideration of existing community and family ties. Within the past five years, the share of people referred by UNHCR shrank from 48 per cent to just 9 per cent of the entire Special Humanitarian and Refugee programs.

In Australia, private investment covers an exceptionally high share of the costs of resettlement and humanitarian admission. Within the Special Humanitarian Program, sponsors not only nominate individuals, but also have to cover the costs of administration, travel, and certain initial service provisions. As a special case within the Humanitarian Program, 1,000 places are reserved for the Community Support Program – a sponsorship programme for “employment-ready” refugees in which all the costs are covered by individual or business sponsors.

REASONS FOR AUSTRALIA’S LEVEL OF ENGAGEMENT ON RESETTLEMENT AND HUMANITARIAN ADMISSION

Political support for resettlement and humanitarian admission are relatively high, but the tools suffer from highly contentious domestic migration debates.

More than any other country we studied, Australia uses resettlement as a central pillar of its asylum policy. Resettlement and humanitarian admission enjoy support across Australia’s two major parties, the centre-left Labor Party and the centre-right Liberal Party. Spikes in resettlement numbers can be observed under both Labor- and Liberal-led governments. In policy documents and public political discourse, Australian policy makers regularly point to the history and the relatively large size of the Australian resettlement and humanitarian admission programme without linking it to or committing to further future engagement. There is a favourable public view of resettlement and humanitarian admission, and some observers believe this support is even stronger for community-sponsored admissions, which carry a lower price tag for the Australian government.


15 Ibid.
Nevertheless, resettlement and humanitarian admission in Australia must be seen in the wider context of political debates on migration and asylum in particular. The domestic political environment, in which liberal positions on immigration are perceived as politically risky, is the key reason why resettlement and humanitarian admission are in decline. Australian policies explicitly position the tools as the only legitimate form of entry for refugees, in contrast to irregular, “spontaneous” onshore arrivals. Indeed, Australia is the only country in the world which imposes a joint quota for onshore arrivals and offshore resettlement and humanitarian admission. This means that a high number of onshore arrivals may reduce the number of available places in the offshore resettlement and humanitarian admission programme. Given that the number of onshore arrivals is low and those who arrive onshore and demand asylum receive the lowest level of priority for admission (resulting in asylum seekers waiting for years in detention centres), the practical effect of this policy on resettlement and humanitarian admission has recently been low. However, the policy has entrenched a political discourse which labels asylum seekers as “queue-jumpers,” cultivates cross-partisan support for highly restrictive onshore asylum policies, and promotes a highly unfavourable public opinion of onshore asylum seekers.

Beyond the use of resettlement as a tool to manage and deter onshore asylum applications, the Humanitarian Program adheres to humanitarian objectives (such as finding permanent solutions or family unification) and other strategic goals, namely “to help stabilise refugee populations […] and support broader international protection.” However, these goals are not further fleshed out in announcements of annual programme targets or ceilings, even though they influence the choice of priority countries for resettlement and humanitarian admission programmes. What is more, examples from the recent past show that deterring onshore arrivals will take precedence over other strategic goals. In May 2015, Australia had an opportunity to support Indonesia and Malaysia, which had offered initial protection to Rohingya refugees who arrived by boat on the condition that they would be resettled. Australia refused to assist for fear of setting a precedent that would attract further arrivals by boat.

In the recent past, there is one clear outlier to a declining number of places for resettlement and humanitarian admission: in 2015, the Abbott government announced that it would resettle 12,000 Syrians in addition to existing targets under the resettlement and humanitarian admission programme that year. This is widely attributed to public sympathy for and intra-government reaction to the death of Alan Kurdi in September 2015. The announcement by then-Foreign Minister Bishop came after several high-level politicians had demanded that Australia increase the number of its resettlement places. Meanwhile, the Syrian example also shows that a cumbersome admission process can impose limits on the scope of ad-hoc growth: given the checks on identity, health, character, and security, Australia initially only managed to resettle about half the number of Syrians it had planned to admit.

Finally, in the current discussions on humanitarian admission of Afghans, some observers believe that further announcements of additional admissions will occur, given growing public support and ongoing advocacy on the part of individuals and non-traditional actors – particularly those associated with the Australian armed forces.

PROSPECTS FOR COMMITTING TO HIGHER NUMBERS AND INCREASED INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Resettlement and humanitarian admission could increase moderately under the condition that the beneficiaries come from certain countries of origin, receive private sponsorship, or settle outside metropolitan areas.

A government that opts for positive rhetoric on the benefits refugees can offer to Australian communities, to the host country in general, and to their countries of origin may well moderately increase the size of the resettlement and humanitarian programmes. As this issue currently lacks a polit-
ical champion, and since the government has committed to a ceiling, there is only modest potential to increase numbers. Several possible avenues stand out: First, the country could build on the momentum around the admission of Afghans, given Australia’s military presence in and therefore its responsibility to the people of Afghanistan, and its local partners in particular. Second, the government could promote community sponsorship in addition to, rather than at the expense of a humanitarian and resettlement programme that ought to focus primarily on vulnerability. Finally, a 2019 government review of the resettlement policy recommended that the government explore “regional settlement” – that is, reducing admission to metropolitan areas (in which 70 per cent of refugees have settled) and instead focussing on areas in which suitable labour is in demand. The government is already committed to such regional settlement, so it could combine this with efforts to increase resettlement in order to maximise public acceptance.

As for international cooperation, Australia is likely to emphasise its independence in all areas related to migration, but it may well contribute to international efforts to increase resettlement and humanitarian admission in other countries, given its current track record on capacity building as well as its involvement in the Annual Tripartite Consultations on Resettlement.
TRENDS IN REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT AND HUMANITARIAN ADMISSION

Resettlement and humanitarian admission is enjoying slow but steady growth, propelled by the Private Sponsorship Program in particular.

Canada is a pioneering resettlement country due to its long history of resettlement, sophisticated programmes, and relatively high absolute admission numbers. In recent decades, all three of its resettlement streams grew steadily before shrinking during the COVID-19 pandemic. These three streams consist of (1) government-assisted refugees referred by UNHCR and supported by the government; (2) privately sponsored refugees nominated and supported by individuals, groups, or organisations; and (3) the mixed approach of the “blended visa office-referred” programme, in which refugees are referred by UNHCR and also privately sponsored. If we count these three streams, which Canada defines as humanitarian resettlement, then Canada is among the top countries worldwide in terms of accepting resettled refugees.

The country’s versatile approach enables a broad range of actors to be involved. In 2019, only one-quarter of those resettled (7,638 people) were referred by UNHCR as government-assisted refugees. Instead, most of the refugees who arrived in Canada did so under private sponsorship, with no UNHCR referral, and Canada pledged to continue its engagement and to promote this approach internationally. The private sponsorship programme’s significance for resettlement in the country is unique and internationally recognised.

The government regularly and openly communicates the reasoning behind its programmes, especially when it comes to compassion for people in need. Following the events in Afghanistan, the government announced a special humanitarian programme to resettle particularly vulnerable Afghans, which corresponds to its resettlement streams.

All resettled refugees immediately receive permanent residency, and consequently a work permit and the prospect of applying for citizenship. Experts consider the necessary vetting processes prior to a person’s resettlement lengthy but somewhat flexible. Resettlement officers can spend more time on and prioritise more complex cases over those that are more routine. The duration of the process depends on the refugee’s emergency scale status: the “normal” process takes about one year from submission to departure, while emergency cases for refugees in imminent danger can be processed within a few days. In an important achievement that contributes to increased flexibility, Canada has recently introduced case management software which allows case managers and embassy staff all over the world to access and work on administrative files for resettlement applications, among other things.

Through the digitisation of documents and processes, Canada aims to simplify and accelerate these processes.

Source: UNHCR (2018)²⁶

Not more than 5% of resettled refugees with high medical needs are accepted

Source: UNHCR (2018)²⁹

Canada provides up to 100 emergency cases

Source: UNHCR (2018)²⁹


Ibid.
by avoiding long waiting times and increasing flexibility. While there are no specific sub-quotas, refugees with extensive medical needs may not make up more than 5 per cent of the total number of refugees Canada resettles. Moreover, apart from family reunification admissions, unaccompanied children cannot participate in resettlement procedures.


21 Ibid.

REASONS FOR CANADA’S LEVEL OF ENGAGEMENT ON RESETTLEMENT AND HUMANITARIAN ADMISSION

Bipartisan government and public support as well as successful precedents contribute to consistently high numbers.

Canada’s immigration programmes have included refugee resettlement since 1978. As early as 1979, Canada resettled more than 70,000 refugees from Vietnam. Today the country still thrives on the narrative that refugees are seen as as-

---

**Figure 4: Annual Average Share of Resettled Refugees (UNHCR departures and all resettlement streams) to Overall Population**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>UNHCR Resettlement Departures</th>
<th>Three Resettlement Streams</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>0.03%</td>
<td>0.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>0.06%</td>
<td>0.12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
<td>0.07%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
<td>0.07%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
<td>0.08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average 2015–2019</td>
<td>0.03%</td>
<td>0.08%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Government of Canada and UNHCR

**Figure 5: Resettled Refugees to Canada**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Privately Sponsored Refugee</th>
<th>Government-Assisted Refugee</th>
<th>Blended Sponsorship Refugee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>9,290</td>
<td>9,405</td>
<td>805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>18,315</td>
<td>23,555</td>
<td>4,415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>16,665</td>
<td>8,830</td>
<td>1,285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>18,560</td>
<td>8,090</td>
<td>1,145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>19,140</td>
<td>9,950</td>
<td>990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>5,305</td>
<td>3,875</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>1,135</td>
<td>2,780</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Government of Canada

---
sets, not as “needy” people. Immigration and “multiculturalism,” enshrined in the 1985 Canadian Multiculturalism Act, are part of Canada’s self-image as a state. Given its geographic location, the country can exercise a high level of control over access, which allows for a balance of different migration streams, including economic migration (for which targets are considerably higher) and resettlement. Since Justin Trudeau’s electoral promise in 2015, refugees and migration policy more broadly have become part of the liberal brand, adding partisan interests to the debate. However, these themes played no role in the 2021 electoral campaign.

From the earliest days of resettlement, Canada has facilitated privately sponsored refugees. The private sponsorship programme is well known in Canada, and public support for it is high. Research confirms successful integration outcomes for privately sponsored refugees in their host communities and in Canada more generally. Oftentimes privately sponsored refugees are nominated by family members who previously took part in the programme.

In recent years, two events significantly influenced the number of resettlement places available in the different streams: First, with the escalating crisis in Syria, and more specifically the death of Alan Kurdi (whose family was partly in Canada and had unsuccessfully nominated him for the private sponsorship programme), resettlement became a decisive topic in the 2015 electoral campaign. Justin Trudeau was elected after promising to resettle 25,000 Syrian refugees in 2015–2016. While Canada’s lead resettlement agency Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada was sceptical with regard to available capacity, this number was achieved with civil society support. The second influential factor was the Trump administration’s refugee policies: as the US largely disappeared as a resettlement country, the Canadian population felt a sense of urgency to offer more spaces via the private sponsorship programme. At the same time, the government-sponsored programme showed less of an inclination to fill the gap in global resettlement numbers created by the US and in fact reduced the high admission numbers it had achieved during the spike corresponding to the crisis in Syria.

Alongside the federal approach, the province of Québec follows its own regulations and takes responsibility for the selection process. Admissions to Québec are counted in the national statistics. On average (2015–2019), the province resettles more than 40.4 per cent of the country’s resettled refugees (despite representing only 22.7 per cent of the Canadian population). Québec is generally more hesitant

![Figure 6: Number of Asylum Applications (all application types and stages of procedure) According to UNHCR Increased Before the COVID-19 Pandemic](source: UNHCR, N. d.)

to increase resettlement numbers, arguing that most irregular arrivals occur on its border with the US. Disagreements over resettlement between the federal government and Québec are associated with the “more porous” border and the fact that Québec receives more refugees via other programmes, which it uses as a reason to reduce or keep resettlement numbers at the current level. Moreover, as a reaction to the increase in asylum applications associated with border crossings under the Trump administration (from 2015 to 2019, refugee application numbers more than tripled), the Canadian government accepted only half of the refugees who crossed the US border, basing this decision on the 2004 Safe Third Country Agreement (STCA) between the two countries. This agreement serves as a legal basis for banning refugees (apart from a few exceptions for family reunification and unaccompanied minors) from crossing the Canadian–US border to seek protection.

Regarding resettlement, public opinion on the national level has consistently been positive and open, and hardly any federal party has argued against it in recent decades. No party with an anti-immigrant position would be successful in an election. All the political parties have agreed to resettlement as a tool, debating how best to apply it rather than whether to apply it at all. Most of the critical voices do not base their arguments on racist, anti-Muslim, or fear of terrorism narratives, but rather on concerns about funding. However, this does not represent the majority opinion.

**PROSPECTS FOR COMMITTING TO HIGHER NUMBERS AND INCREASED INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION**

There are prospects for moderate growth in admission numbers, and Canada is likely to remain an active advocate for private sponsorship programmes.

Given that Canada reconfirmed the Liberal Party’s leadership under Justin Trudeau and that it pins great hopes on more stability in the US following the change in government, Canadian policies on government-sponsored programmes are likely to remain unchanged over the next few years. A conservative government might have initiated more discussions about privatising an even larger share of Canada’s resettlement programmes, but it would not have called the number of places into question. Despite receiving an increased share of the popular vote, none of the candidates for the recently founded anti-immigration party (People’s Party of Canada) were elected to parliament.

Given the positive political environment, the prospects for increasing admission numbers are positive. A recent study by the Environics Institute for Survey Research and Refugee 613 concluded that about four million Canadians are open to participating in the private sponsorship programme, mostly because they feel the “desire to help people in need.” After the Taliban took over Kabul, Trudeau pledged to expand Canada’s resettlement programme and accommodate 20,000 Afghans (this number was later raised to 40,000) who would be forced to flee over the coming months and years. These places will be part of existing resettlement streams, including government and private sponsorship streams, which should also be used to accommodate particularly vulnerable groups and individuals from Afghanistan.

On the international level, Canada is likely to continue playing an active role. The current government is heavily involved in international networks such as the Annual Tripartite Consultations on Resettlement (ATCR), which it chaired in 2020. In particular, it will continue to coordinate and exchange knowledge on private sponsorship programmes, including advantages and lessons learned. Canada already uses its experience to promote more cooperation around private and community sponsorship for resettlement, benefiting from its nimbus as a pioneer. For example, Canada took a leading role in international coordination by launching the Global Refugee Sponsorship Initiative (which aims to broaden the scope of resettlement programmes internationally) together with UNHCR and various civil society organisations in 2016.
COUNTRY BRIEF: FRANCE

TRENDS IN REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT AND HUMANITARIAN ADMISSION

The number of ad-hoc admission programmes has increased significantly since 2015, topping up the country’s small permanent resettlement programme.

France’s resettlement system is characterised by several scattered programmes which run over one or two years and feed into biannual admission pledges. France began to scale up its admissions in 2015, with biennial commitments to resettle approximately 10,000 refugees over two years (2016–2017, 2018–2019, and 2020–2021, although the numbers for the latter period were halved due to the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic) through various streams and programmes, most of which are coordinated under the EU resettlement framework. The numerical commitments are distributed across different programmes, and the majority of places (7,000) is intended for Syrian refugees in specific countries of first asylum, while 3,000 places are intended for sub-Saharan refugees, including evacuees from Libya. Concrete numbers on which programmes count as resettlement and which are humanitarian admission programmes differ when we compare the UNHCR database to that of the French Interior Ministry. These different programmes are organised under two main tracks intended to fulfil France’s commitment. First, the annual permanent resettlement programme was launched in 2008 with a commitment to admit 100 cases (not individuals) based on UNHCR dossier submissions. This programme admits 150 to 200 individuals per year and has no set geographic focus.

Second, since 2015 the French government has committed to admitting refugees in several stand-alone, shorter-term “ad-hoc resettlement programmes” which are only for individuals referred by UNHCR who come from certain countries of origin and are resettled from certain countries of first asylum. Within these programmes, some refugees are resettled via the EU resettlement scheme (for example, between July 2015 and July 2017, France committed to resettle 2,375 Syrians from Lebanon and Jordan), while others are “special operations” (for example, France accommodated 3,000 refugees from sub-Saharan countries who were resettled from Chad and Niger in 2017–2019). Additionally, France aimed to resettle 6,000 Syrian refugees from Turkey as part of the 2016 EU–Turkey deal, and in the same year, France made a

---


![Figure 7: Biannual Commitments for Resettlement](image-url)
bilateral agreement with Lebanon to create a humanitarian corridor for 2,000 individuals.

Over the past two years, France has begun to expand its narrow procedures, making submission through UNHCR somewhat more flexible. While France still concentrates on very few countries and prioritises selection via missions, additional first asylum countries were added (namely Chad, Rwanda, Cameroon, and Ethiopia), and the government aims to enable selection via videoconference. Additionally, since 2014 France has run a private sponsorship programme for refugees from Iraq. This programme was subsequently also opened to Syrians, and over 4,000 individuals received a humanitarian visa in 2016. The programme seems to be ongoing but does not adhere to an annual quota. Another private sponsorship programme for 500 Syrians or Iraqis from Lebanon has been run by five faith-based French NGOs since 2017.

**PROSPECTS FOR COMMITTING TO HIGHER NUMBERS AND INCREASED INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION**

Resettlement and humanitarian admission would be at risk under an extreme right-wing government. If centrist parties prevail, France is unlikely to emerge as a leader in resettlement and humanitarian admission, but it may moderately increase its numbers if there were momentum on the EU level, with Germany taking the lead.

Ahead of the 2022 presidential elections, the prospect for change in resettlement ambitions is limited. In the short term, an increase in numbers and partnerships with stronger commitments than those already existent is unlikely. NGOs deplore the lack of perspective for the coming years. Since there is no legal basis for resettlement, programmes could be terminated without a parliamentary order. With the extreme right emerging as a runner-up in the polls, the upcoming elections put resettlement and humanitarian admission at risk, given the lack of cross-partisan support. The permanent programme is likely to remain active regardless of the outcome of the 2022 presidential elections. The majority of refugees, however, would probably continue to be admitted via humanitarian admission programmes, which are more prone to be cut as they are not linked to long-term, established agreements. If the current government remains in power, then France might continue in the same direction as the current trend, slowly expanding its procedures to a limited extent and allowing for more flexible admissions from more countries. Given France’s high degree of coordination with Germany and alignment with European Commission priorities at the moment, this outcome would be more likely if there were joint European momentum, with Germany taking a leading role.

**REASONS FOR FRANCE’S LEVEL OF ENGAGEMENT ON RESETTLEMENT AND HUMANITARIAN ADMISSION**

- Asylum in general is under pressure amidst a divisive domestic policy environment, and the government is prioritising the reduction of irregular migration.

Migration has become a divisive political topic and a decisive distinguishing factor in recent elections. Migration and asylum regulations will again play a major role in the upcoming elections in 2022, and policies are likely to be affected by the outcome of these elections. However, resettlement remains a rather minor subject, less well known and not often debated. There are no obvious numbers linking political orientation to advocacy for more or less resettlement.

With its ad-hoc humanitarian admission programmes that are limited according to country of origin, France also prioritises specific countries of first asylum. As in other countries, one of the considerations at play when it comes to taking part in resettlement has also been a quest to deter irregular movement. In this context, President Macron underscored France’s ambition to engage strongly on the EU level regarding the current crisis in Afghanistan: he advocated for a joint initiative to prevent irregular migration and to promote cooperation with host countries such as Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey. With regard to resettlement, the French government has not made a public announcement, but it did evacuate 2,800 individuals in August 2021.

In France, the bulk of integration support is offered by an active network of non-governmental organisations. The number of different organisations involved has increased since 2015 in response rising needs. The view that quality should not come at the expense of quantity is widespread among the organisations involved in integration programmes. As France’s resettlement and humanitarian admission programmes are becoming more complex, civil society is grappling with the procedures and regulations of different admission schemes. Civil society organizations are thus rather hesitant in calling for increased numbers. Moreover, NGOs deplore the fact that significant delays can occur in clarifying refugees’ legal status post-admission: apart from the few refugees resettled via the permanent programme, entry visas for all the other resettled refugees do not include work permits or other allowances while an application for refugee status or subsidiary protection is still pending. Finally, a high number of resettlements could not be pursued during the pandemic due to France’s reliance on selection via missions in first asylum countries.
TRENDS IN REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT AND HUMANITARIAN ADMISSION

Resettlement and humanitarian admission are steadily becoming established tools of Germany’s asylum policy.

Over the past 10 years, a dynamic trend has been developing in Germany: resettlement and humanitarian admission are steadily becoming established tools of Germany’s asylum policy. Although (West) Germany has had a history of ad-hoc humanitarian admission programmes since the 1950s, more recently a variety of permanent programmes on both resettlement and humanitarian admission have been put in place. This trend has been marked by several milestones. An ad-hoc humanitarian admission programme for 2,500 Iraqis in 2009/2010, in response to the war in Iraq, has paved the way for a small resettlement pilot in 2012, and a permanent resettlement programme since 2015. The size of this program, determined yearly by the interior ministers of the federated states (Länder), has grown to 1600. The number of refugees resettled since 2012 has risen to 5,871 people. This trend was accelerated by the crisis in Syria: Germany’s three humanitarian admission programmes for Syrians are more important numerically than the resettlement programme and have led to the admission of 20,000 individuals from Syria and its neighbouring countries, as well as Libya and Egypt (2013–2016). Humanitarian admission programmes for Syrians in Turkey in pursuance of the March 2016 agreement between the EU and Turkey (the 1:1 scheme) have led to the humanitarian admission of more than 108,000 Syrian nationals by Germany (2016–2021).

Since 2013, an admission scheme for at-risk Afghans who were contracted by the German armed forces or German development institutions has been in place. Most recently, 24


Figure 8: Number of Granted Visas for Family Reunifications (complementary to resettlement and humanitarian admission)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family Reunification for Beneficiaries of Subsidiary Protection</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>2019</th>
<th>2020</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>for Refugees</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,612</td>
<td>11,133</td>
<td>5,311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(moratorium on family unification)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Reunification for Subsidiary Protection</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Germany’s Federal Foreign Office has only recently begun to distinguish between different residency titles of applicants for family reunification.

Source: Deutscher Bundestag (2019) and Krause, Sigrun et al. (2021) and Pro Asyl (2021)


Germany announced the evacuation of an additional 2,600 Afghans and their families who are considered at-risk due to their public political profiles and past activities. Moreover, approx. 4,000 to 5,000 local staff at risk (plus their family members) will be admitted on the same legal basis.45

In addition to federal-level humanitarian admission and resettlement, almost all the federated states have created independent humanitarian admission programmes for Syrians with family ties to Germany, which have led Germany to issue more than 25,000 visas. These private sponsorship programmes require approval from the Federal Ministry of the Interior and a declaration of commitment with comprehensive financial obligations has to be signed by the sponsors. On the federal level, community sponsorship still plays a minor role: In 2019, the federal government started a pilot community sponsorship programme called “NesT – New Start in a Team” for 500 individuals.

REASONS FOR GERMANY’S LEVEL OF ENGAGEMENT ON RESETTLEMENT AND HUMANITARIAN ADMISSION

Political support for resettlement and humanitarian admission are high, particularly when common EU responses are in place and when these tools support wider foreign policy goals on steering migration.

Political factors are the primary explanation for the level and priorities of current resettlement and humanitarian admission. Despite high numbers of asylum seekers arriving spontaneously in the past, in principle resettlement and humanitarian admission are tools with cross-partisan support in the German political landscape (with the exception of the extreme right-wing AfD party). In the electoral cycle (2017–2021), members of government have regularly hinted at the fact that resettlement is part of the four-year coalition agreement. Positions of political parties and line ministries have been

Figure 9: Number of Asylum Applications, Resettlement and Humanitarian Admission Programmes

Source: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (2021), Caritas Deutschland (n.d.) and Deutscher Bundestag (2020).
more nuanced. The Left, Social Democratic, and Green parties have been the most vocal on increasing resettlement and humanitarian admission at the federal level. The conservative-led government position has emphasised European coordination and consistency among the federated states, even at the expense of greater engagement on resettlement and humanitarian admission. In the autumn of 2021, for example, the Ministry of the Interior refused to grant approval for a private sponsorship programme for Afghans, given that there was no common approach at the time among the federated states and EU member countries.

Past examples show that Germany uses its own resettlement and humanitarian admission programmes as leverage to push for joint European efforts. For example, Germany strongly promoted the European Council’s conclusions on Iraqi resettlement in 2008, including making substantive commitments of its own. Likewise, Germany has heavily invested in resettlement under the common 1:1 scheme agreed between EU member states and Turkey, contributing roughly one-third of the entire number of resettlement places offered.

The federal government generally underlines the humanitarian character of both resettlement and humanitarian admission, referring to these tools as instruments for the development of international refugee protection and of responsibility sharing or support for heavily affected countries. However, admission directives also regularly mention more general foreign policy objectives in relation to country selection criteria, although these objectives are not spelt out. Following the sudden, extreme increase of “spontaneous” arrivals in 2015/2016, the government’s primary goal has been to gain control — in Merkel’s words, to “steer” migration and to “put it in order.” In the case of resettlement from Niger (600 places in support of UNHCR’s Emergency Transit Mechanism from Libya), the key factor in Germany’s initial support was Niger’s efforts to stem irregular migration towards Libya. Similar considerations were at play with respect to the 1:1 scheme and resettlement from Turkey, along with considerations of how to support host governments in maintaining favourable conditions for refugees. What is more, migration flows have further mainstreamed the argument that supporting African and Middle Eastern countries in crisis is in Germany’s self-interest, and the government has led efforts to formulate a more coherent policy response to root causes. In both the Nigerian and the Turkish examples, the Federal Chancellery’s leadership was a decisive factor in offering resettlement, with places announced during high-level talks between Chancellor Merkel and her Nigerien and Turkish counterparts, respectively.

Civil society advocacy, its coordination with governmental resettlement stakeholders, and its capacity to support people arriving in Germany appears to have played a role in the initial creation of a permanent resettlement programme, as well as in retaining the general humanitarian and vulnerability-focused character of resettlement and humanitarian admission.

Beyond these political factors, staff capacity within governmental stakeholders’ offices (the Federal Asylum Agency and the Foreign Office) and among communal service providers is a bottleneck for resettlement and humanitarian admission. In the short term, high numbers of “spontaneous” arrivals, a variety of admission schemes, and complementary pathways with regard to family reunification mean that resettlement and humanitarian admission can only be scaled up modestly. Practical considerations with regard to the feasibility of selection missions, security checks, and consular staff capacity (to issue visas) likewise play a role.

PROSPECTS FOR COMMITTING TO HIGHER NUMBERS AND INCREASED INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

There is potential for a modest increase in resettlement numbers as well as more political investment in coordinating frameworks.

After parliament election in September 2021, coalition talks are ongoing at this time of writing. No agreement on the contours of a future asylum policy have been reached. In a potential Social Democratic-led government in which the Green and the Liberal parties participate, resettlement and (to a more limited extent) humanitarian admission will not be overly controversial. To what extent the federal government would support higher admission numbers, however, is less clear. Given admission numbers are coordinated with the governments of the federated states, which remain in office, some continuity is likely. However, a new federal government may well be more open to humanitarian admission programs at the level of the federated states.

In respect of international cooperation, meanwhile, higher international numbers and a more coordinated response would fall squarely in line with the government’s policy objectives. Even now, Germany’s policy is tightly coordinated with the EU and UNHCR. For federal-level programmes, the Ministry of the Interior usually issues a directive once per year, specifying the number of admissions as well as the countries of first asylum and eligible nationalities. In doing so, the government follows the priorities identified by the European Commission on the EU level and coordinates with the French government. Government stakeholders also exchange information and closely coordinate with UNHCR on priority countries and nationalities. Whether Germany will be ready to invest political capital in promoting these instruments to other resettlement countries,
remains to be seen. In 2015, the Foreign Office considered sounding out the potential among key partners for a more formalised international resettlement alliance on behalf of Syrians, but it ultimately rejected the idea. Given its investment in common EU responses, a realistic political scenario for Germany in the next few years would be to invest more heavily in the adoption of the EU resettlement framework.
COUNTRY BRIEF: SWEDEN

TRENDS IN REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT AND HUMANITARIAN ADMISSION

→ Sweden maintains a well-established, permanent programme of UNHCR-referred resettlement at a relatively stable size.

Sweden’s current resettlement programme has been ongoing since 1950. The country is generally considered a champion of resettlement given its relatively high admission numbers, especially compared to its population size. In 2015, in response to the increasing number of asylum seekers in Europe, Sweden significantly increased its quota, which had been stagnant at 2,000 individuals for a long time. Since 2018, the quota has been set at 5,000 individuals per year. With the 2005 Aliens Act, the Swedish Migration Agency, the Public Employment Service, and the County Administrative Boards established a distribution quota for each of Sweden’s 21 counties. Since 2016, when new legislation was passed, municipalities can no longer refuse to take in refugees.

Almost all of Sweden’s active admission is UNHCR-referred resettlement. In 2021 the government evacuated 700 refugees directly from Afghanistan, their country of origin, as an exception and on top of the standard resettlement quota. This reaction, however, might not necessarily be replicat- ed for other situations of armed conflict, as Sweden was more closely linked to Afghanistan and had already accommodated a relatively high number of Afghan refugees. Moreover, Prime Minister Stefan Löfven declared that Sweden would not host as many asylum seekers from Afghanistan as it had from Syria in 2015, although some municipalities had explicitly agreed to accommodate additional Afghan refugees.

Sweden allows several hundred emergency and urgent cases to be transferred via the Priority Global Quota for Resettlement, a programme for un-earmarked UNHCR referrals (600 of 5,000 quota places in 2019, as well as at least 700 Afghans evacuated in 2021). Thus far, it is the largest programme of its kind with no geographic or temporal restrictions, and it allows UNHCR a relatively high degree of flexibility. If these places are not needed for emergencies, then Sweden cooperates with UNHCR to fill them in different ways. Sweden has no other sub-quotas, but the majority of places are earmarked for specific numbers of people from certain countries or regions of origin. Most resettled refugees receive a permanent residence permit before they arrive.

900

Sweden takes up to 900 emergency cases (within the annual quota of 5,000 people)

Source: UNHCR (2018)'
The acceptance rate of UNHCR submissions was over 98% and over 92% in 2018 and 2019 respectively.

Source: UNHCR (2021)

The duration of the procedure from UNHCR submission to actual arrival varies according to the refugee’s first asylum country and their country of origin, and it usually takes about two years. Apart from screening by the Security Police, no other assessments are required in the clearing process. In selecting refugees for resettlement, Sweden not only decides on individuals during in-person selection missions to the country of first asylum, but also makes use of dossier applications based on documents provided by UNHCR, which allows for more speed and flexibility. In very exceptional cases, Swedish embassies or diplomatic missions can also submit a case without involving UNHCR. There are no private programmes in Sweden; if companies aim to employ resettled refugees with specific labour skills, they collaborate with UNHCR and the government on an ad-hoc basis.

Civil society does not play a major role in official resettlement procedures because the general understanding is that this is part of the government’s responsibility in a social welfare system with a well-established resettlement programme. Municipalities take care of integration processes and are sometimes hesitant about handing over responsibilities to engaged civil society actors – among other considerations, they want to avoid inconsistencies in their approach.

The social democratic government (in power since 2014) has not called into question the approach or the increased quota, given that the number of resettled refugees always remained below that of other asylum applications. The government underlines the narrative that resettlement is a predictable and orderly approach, offering protection to those who would otherwise not receive it and sharing responsibility globally. But there is no momentum or immediate political will in Sweden to further increase the quota if other European countries do not do so. The government is also hesitant to clearly distinguish itself on issues of migration and admitting asylum seekers, in order to avoid public backlash and to allow for compromise. The increase in admission numbers in recent years is seen as a counterbalancing measure to send a positive signal to voters in favour of migration, given that the government simultaneously introduced stricter measures to reduce the number of asylum seekers arriving spontaneously. The recent reaction to the situation in Afghanistan (resettling refugees as emergency cases while immediately communicating that the events of 2015 would not be repeated) illustrated the Swedish government’s reluctance to further reinforce their pioneering role in resettlement, not least to avoid public backlash.

Many municipalities, especially those in more remote areas, have publicly come forward and agreed to take in more refugees, not least to counterbalance the depopulation of rural areas. However, divergent voices in certain municipalities – mainly larger cities – have expressed their concerns about lack of space and capacity, which might be one reason why admission numbers have not increased even more. Given the legislation on distribution within the country, one concern is that the different needs of different municipalities cannot be adequately addressed.

The government’s willingness to achieve the targets set is fostered by some flexibility in its approach. For example, during the period in which travel restrictions were in force due to the COVID-19 pandemic, Sweden made use of the regulation which states that eligibility can be based solely on a dossier, rather than on in-person interviews in host countries. Despite the fact that the programme came to a complete standstill between April and July 2020, Sweden resettled 3,599 refugees in that year – almost 72 per cent of its quota. In addition, the remaining places were transferred to 2021, with Sweden aiming to resettle 6,401 individuals this year. Counting the evacuation of Afghans as resettlement is another example of the flexibility in Sweden’s approach.

The rapid, significant growth of the resettlement programme since 2015 demonstrates how quickly the govern-
ment can, when desired, scale up resettlement, including its funding, capacity building and personnel. Potential administrative hurdles (such as a lack of language skills, slow information flow, or administrative necessities delaying the procedure) are not considered to have had an influence on the overall number of resettlement places.

PROSPECTS FOR COMMITTING TO HIGHER NUMBERS AND INCREASED INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Sweden will continue to engage actively in international cooperation, but growth prospects for resettlement and humanitarian admission will depend on other European countries’ commitments.

Amidst a high level of resettlement and a strong perception that it is a frontrunner in resettlement, Sweden’s prospects for increased engagement will likely depend on common EU approaches and initiatives. Moreover, the EU level seems to be decisive for Sweden as a direct comparison when it comes to discussing international coordination regarding stronger commitments, such as increased quotas. Sweden has been actively engaged in many initiatives, sharing experiences and lessons learned to scale functioning approaches and to motivate other states to become (more) active in resettlement, especially on the European level. For example, Sweden headed up the EU–FRANK project (2016–2020), in cooperation with European partners on a European level. This project led to research initiatives, multilateral exchange via trainings, and improved monitoring and evaluation, and more European countries became engaged in resettlement on a small scale. Nevertheless, the project did not lead to a Europe-wide breakthrough.

Sweden recognises the engagement of Canada and the US as non-European partners, but these countries are not seen as direct points of reference. Despite this, Sweden is likely to continue to engage and to cooperate with other resettlement countries, and to stand ready to align with major multilateral initiatives, were they to come forward. As a long-standing actor, Sweden has participated in the Annual Tripartite Consultations on Resettlement (ATCR) since these consultations were established in 1995 and also chaired the consultations as well as the Working Group on Resettlement in 2009–2010.30

Looking ahead with a view to knowledge exchange, Sweden could capitalise on its openness and engagement to exchange knowledge and inspiration on a multilateral level; for example, it could build on the EU–FRANK project. A new point of entry could be a network of actors active in integration processes, for example, by connecting municipalities in Sweden with NGOs involved in integration procedures in other countries. Additionally, Sweden could increase its engagement in actively supporting resettlement through its embassies – for example, by sharing capacities with other EU member states.

TRENDS IN REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT AND HUMANITARIAN ADMISSION

With refugee admission drastically reduced under the Trump administration, the United States of America is struggling to reclaim its previous position as the world’s top resettlement country.

The USA has traditionally been the global frontrunner in resettlement and humanitarian admission, with the highest absolute number of resettled refugees worldwide. Beginning in 2017, both global leadership in resettlement and the entire US resettlement system lost their bipartisan support and were dismantled by the Trump administration. Since 2017, the declared admission ceiling has continuously plummeted – from its historic average of almost 79,000 to a ceiling of 18,000 for the fiscal year 2020, the lowest number in the history of the US Refugee Admission Program. The COVID-19 pandemic further diminished a programme already weakened by drastic cuts. For example, in 2020, only 5,459 individuals were resettled via UNHCR, which corresponds to 8.6 per cent of those resettled by the US in 2016.

Shortly after taking office, the Biden administration highlighted the importance of resettlement. In February 2021, President Biden committed to admitting 62,500 refugees in 2021 and 125,000 refugees in the fiscal year 2022, which starts in October 2021. In the fiscal year 2021, the government missed this goal by a significant number (only 11,411 refugees were admitted), and it is doubtful whether the USA can achieve its ambitious 2022 objective, given different actors’ needs when it comes to reconstituting the programme’s depleted infrastructure: over the past four years, many of the actors involved in admission and integration, including the accredited national resettlement agencies, had to lay off staff and close offices. This led to huge gaps in the admission pipeline as well as the loss of institutional knowledge.

The USA prioritises individuals in three categories: individuals referred by UNHCR as well as certain NGOs or embassies are in Priority Group One (P1); groups of special humanitarian concern and those who hold certain nationalities are Priority Two (P2); and family reunifications count as Priority Three (P3). The country also reserves specific admission places for certain countries, most importantly the Special Immigrant Visas (SIV) for Iraqi and Afghan citizens. Since 2017, by far the largest number of resettled refugees are originally from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, followed by Myanmar.

The duration from referral to arrival is estimated to be between one and three years, depending on the country of origin and the country of first asylum, as well as on the state and resettlement office. The vetting process (which is by interview only) is considered especially extensive and time consuming. The USA does not have an emergency proce-

### 78,865
The average admission of refugees between 1975 and 2017 was 78,865 individuals annually

Source: Department of State (2021)

### 60.3%
Between 2003 and August 2021, the USA resettled 60.3% of all UNHCR departures globally

Source: UNHCR

---

There is a (rather limited) capacity to accelerate the process and shorten it to four to six months.

NGOs play an important role in the entire cycle, including overseas processing. In 1980, Congress formalised the engagement of many faith-based organisations, and some of them became one of the nine official “resettlement agencies.” This multi-actor approach was hindered in the four years of the Trump administration given the funding shortfall. In terms of complementary pathways, different types of public-private partnerships exist, as do various models of community-sponsorship programmes and responsibility sharing between the government and civil society actors – for example, universities and foundations offer scholarships for refugees. Upon arrival, public and private non-profit organisations can also provide sponsorship, reception, and placement services for 30–90 days.

Recently, the situation in Afghanistan has drawn additional attention to resettlement. Public communication on showing compassion and support to welcome Afghan refugees has grown since the Taliban took control of Kabul. However, the differences between evacuation and resettlement remain blurry, as both public discourse and the administration refer to resettlement for “in-country refugees” – those whose countries of origin include the former Soviet Union, Cuba, or Iraq. The USA evacuated over 120,000 Afghans from Kabul, declaring that it would issue more SIVs and that certain Afghans could be considered P2 if they were not eligible for an SIV. Moreover, the USA requested that several countries – for example, Uganda – take in Afghan refugees before resettling them elsewhere. In October 2021, the government appointed a special envoy for Afghan resettlement and relocation.

**REASONS FOR USA’S LEVEL OF ENGAGEMENT ON RESETTLEMENT AND HUMANITARIAN ADMISSION**

After decades of cross-partisan consensus, resettlement has fallen victim to anti-immigrant, partisan politics. General public and bipartisan support for resettlement has existed for decades. Among policymakers, more recent friction arose on the state rather than the federal level, or around the question of whether ceilings should be aspirational (and not met in reality) or should realistically reflect the projected annual intake.

Since the electoral period of 2015–2016, bipartisan support on the federal level has decreased. As in other coun-
tries, the crisis in Syria was a pivotal moment. However, unlike in Australia, Canada, and Europe, the plight of Syrians did not lead to more resettlement and humanitarian admission in the USA. Instead, President Trump used displacement and the ascent of the “Islamic State” terrorist militia to raise concerns about an increase in global terrorism, fuelling fear during the electoral campaign and making resettlement an electoral issue for the first time. Despite high vetting standards, public willingness to support resettlement declined. Public opinion and actual numbers also depend on refugees’ countries of origin: resettlement from predominantly Muslim countries in the Middle East, as well as from Latin America, remained significantly below the established ceilings under the Trump administration.

The numbers are likely to increase significantly under the Biden administration, as the president promised during his electoral campaign. At the same time, public support for resettlement increases when people are faced with situations like that of Afghanistan in 2021, especially when it comes to refugees who have ties to the USA. This reflects similar trends in the past. Historically, both humanitarian and geostrategic concerns related to refugees’ countries of origin or asylum have driven resettlement programmes: an estimated 70–75 per cent of refugees are admitted from countries of origin where the US military is engaged. Military leaders argue that supporting local populations through evacuation and resettlement in situations such as present-day Afghanistan is essential to maintaining the US’s credibility as a reliable partner and paving the way for future engagement.

While Biden has allocated resources to support resettlement, rebuilding structures, hiring staff, and reopening offices remains a logistical challenge. Staff numbers and financial resources must exceed prior levels under the Obama administration if the numbers are to increase. Apart from imminent technical and procedural hurdles following the breakdown under the Trump administration, general issues have also arisen. Most prominently, a lack of overseas capacity and lengthy, complicated vetting procedures slow down resettlement processes considerably. At the same time, the multitude of programmes and pathways, such as permitting an “in-country resettlement” process for people from certain countries of origin allows for some flexibility.

Prospects for committing to higher numbers and increased international cooperation

The USA is already extensively engaged in existing international exchange forums on resettlement and humanitarian admission. The USA is the 2021–2022 chair of the Annual Tripartite Consultations on Resettlement (ATCR) and co-chair of the Priority Situations Core Group. It is invested in knowledge exchange on lessons learned, including how to better explain the humanitarian and strategic implications to the public and how to expand resettlement globally.

Meanwhile, both currently and looking ahead, joint commitments to specific quotas or numbers do not seem to be an option for the US government. The annual ceilings fixed by the federal administration have a rather aspirational character which is not directly linked to other countries’ levels of engagement. The USA sees resettlement as an individual approach taken by each country and believes it has limited leverage to mobilise other countries’ commitments. This builds on its experience during the 2016 Leaders’ Summit on Refugees, convened by President Obama, in which the USA aimed to mobilise other countries to commit to significantly increased admissions of resettled refugees. However, many of the countries that initially committed to this cause walked back from those commitments later. Nevertheless, the USA might make bilateral agreements with other resettlement countries independently of UNHCR resettlement. It could build on the experience gained as a result of the bilateral agreement made with Australia: the 2016 Australia–US Refugee Resettlement Deal is non-binding and considers resettlement from Nauru and Papua New Guinea to the USA, and from Costa Rica to Australia.

Going forward, the next few years will be crucial in determining whether the USA can return to the stage as a reliable, engaged actor in resettlement and humanitarian admission. Depending on which administration is in power, the prospects for increased resettlement and humanitarian admission are generally positive. As bipartisan consent is no longer guaranteed, policy decisions and implementation will largely depend on how quickly the Biden administration can put its promises into practice, as well as on the outcomes of elections for the House of Representatives and the Senate in November 2022. Overly high international commitments and admission promises might lead to resistance from sceptics, mainly on the Republican Party side. Nevertheless, this polarisation might be less severe than is sometimes perceived: on the federal level, support for resettlement continued under the Trump administration, as demonstrated by the backlash against an executive order that required states and local governments to give consent to federal resettlement decisions. What is more, the Biden administration is interested in expanding private- or community-sponsorship programmes (and in learning from the Canadian experience), with a pilot programme scheduled to begin in January 2022. This could lead to increased support from engaged individuals, if training, monitoring, and evaluation are provided and the programme is adequately supported.
ANNEX B: RESETTLEMENT AND HUMANITARIAN ADMISSION NUMBERS

Figure 1: Share of New UNHCR Resettlement Departures by Resettlement Country Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>25.2 Mio.</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
<td>0.03%</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>37.4 Mio.</td>
<td>0.03%</td>
<td>0.06%</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>0.03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>83.5 Mio.</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.001%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>65.1 Mio.</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.004%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>10 Mio.</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
<td>0.03%</td>
<td>0.05%</td>
<td>0.05%</td>
<td>0.04%</td>
<td>0.03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>329.1 Mio.</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Figure 2: Share of New Resettlement and Humanitarian Admission by Resettlement Country Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>0.07%</td>
<td>0.07%</td>
<td>0.09%</td>
<td>0.07%</td>
<td>0.05%</td>
<td>0.04%</td>
<td>0.07%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>0.05%</td>
<td>0.12%</td>
<td>0.07%</td>
<td>0.07%</td>
<td>0.08%</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
<td>0.08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.003%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.005%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
<td>0.03%</td>
<td>0.05%</td>
<td>0.05%</td>
<td>0.04%</td>
<td>0.03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
<td>0.03%</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3: Resettlement and Humanitarian Admission Country Details

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Iraq, Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)</td>
<td>Yesb</td>
<td>Yes: Emergency Rescue visa subclass under the Refugee Categoryc</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>9,963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Syria, Iraq, DRC</td>
<td>not more than 5% with high medical needs; no unaccompanied children (exceptions for extended families)d</td>
<td>yes: up to 180 persons under urgent protection program, UNHCR equivalent emergencyf</td>
<td>11,002–14,000g, 41,000–46,000h, 25,000i, 27,000i, 29,150i, 31,700i</td>
<td>27,430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Syria, Sudan, Somalia</td>
<td>Yesb</td>
<td>no: But emergency cases could be admitted outside of resettlement programj</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Syria, Sudan, Eritrea</td>
<td>Nok</td>
<td>no: But emergency cases can be prioritizedl</td>
<td>600m, 10,000, 10,000, 5,000</td>
<td>4,120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Syria, DRC, Eritrea</td>
<td>Nok</td>
<td>Yesm</td>
<td>1,000m, 1,100, 3,400, 5,000, 5,000, 5,000</td>
<td>3,440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>DRC, Myanmar, Syria</td>
<td>Nok</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>70,000m, 85,000, 110,000, 45,000, 30,000, 18,000</td>
<td>68,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4: Total Number of Resettlement and Humanitarian Admission in Key Admission Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>17,393</td>
<td>21,703</td>
<td>21,703</td>
<td>16,901</td>
<td>11,976</td>
<td>9,963</td>
<td>17,935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>19,490</td>
<td>46,300</td>
<td>26,580</td>
<td>27,805</td>
<td>30,070</td>
<td>9,230</td>
<td>30,049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>1,239</td>
<td>3,016</td>
<td>3,200</td>
<td>4,889</td>
<td>1,679</td>
<td>2,571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>1,328</td>
<td>2,505</td>
<td>5,109</td>
<td>4,544</td>
<td>1,211</td>
<td>2,837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1,808</td>
<td>1,868</td>
<td>3,346</td>
<td>4,871</td>
<td>4,993</td>
<td>3,567</td>
<td>3,377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>69,933</td>
<td>84,995</td>
<td>53,716</td>
<td>22,491</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>6,740</td>
<td>52,227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sum</td>
<td>109,835</td>
<td>157,433</td>
<td>110,866</td>
<td>80,377</td>
<td>86,472</td>
<td>32,390</td>
<td>108,997</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ANNEX B: RESETTLEMENT AND HUMANITARIAN ADMISSION NUMBERS
Several countries formulate yearly targets (some of which are called ceilings), indicating a maximum number) that can differ significantly from actual admission numbers (which are depicted in the overarching analysis paper).


42. Several countries formulate yearly targets (some of which are called ceilings, indicating a maximum number) that can differ significantly from actual admission numbers (which are depicted in the overarching analysis paper).


44. Ibid.

45. Australia introduced the language of a “ceiling” for the first time in 2020.


47. Ibid.


51. Ibid.


53. Ibid.


55. Ibid.


57. Ibid.


60. Ibid.

61. Ibid.


63. Ibid.


68. Between 2015 and 2017, resettlement and humanitarian admission data from France are vague and reported differently by different sources, including from the French government. We thus use UNCHR resettlement data for 2015–2017, despite the fact that the French government reported lower admission numbers to Eurostat. UNCHR. N. d. Resettlement Data Finder. Available: https://rsq.unhcr.org/en/#Rc1c [01 November 2021].


70. Ibid.


72. Ibid.


## ANNEX C: INTERVIEW PARTNERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>University of Melbourne</td>
<td>Associate Professor</td>
<td>Maria O’Sullivan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Refugee Council of Australia</td>
<td>Senior Policy Advisor</td>
<td>Louise Olliff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Canadian Council for Refugees (Jesuit Refugee Service)</td>
<td>Working Group chair: Overseas Protection and Resettlement</td>
<td>Hugo Ducharme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>UNHCR Canada</td>
<td>Senior Resettlement Officer</td>
<td>Michael Casasola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Embassy of Canada to Germany and Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (Government of Canada)</td>
<td>Migration Programme Manager and Assistant Director, International Network</td>
<td>Vladislav Mijic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Université Laval</td>
<td>Assistant Professor</td>
<td>Adèle Garnier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Forum Réfugiés-Cosi</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Entraide Pierre Valdo</td>
<td>Resettlement Project Officer (Cheffe de projet reinstallation)</td>
<td>Isabelle Mestre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>UNHCR Germany</td>
<td>Assistant Protection Officer</td>
<td>Rebecca Einhoff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Deutscher Caritasverband</td>
<td>Referentin Flucht und Migration</td>
<td>Katharian Mayr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Swedish Migration Agency (Migrationsverket)</td>
<td>Expert, Office of the Director General, Office for International Affairs, EMN European Migration Network</td>
<td>Bernd Parusel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Åre municipality</td>
<td>Head of Immigration Service and Settlement Coordinator Sustainable Integration in Åre Municipality</td>
<td>Kicki Lundström Persson and Anja Skålen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Ministry of Justice</td>
<td>Kerstin Lindblatt</td>
<td>Director Division for Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>Policy &amp; Advocacy Senior Officer</td>
<td>Alice Games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>University of North Texas</td>
<td>Professor</td>
<td>Idean Salehiyans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>Senior Resettlement Coordinator</td>
<td>Michelle Alfaro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>Resettlement Officer, Europe Office</td>
<td>Nathalie Springuel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

83 The interview partner wishes to remain anonymous.
ANNEX D: BIBLIOGRAPHY

INTERNATIONAL


CANADA


FRANCE


84 If not further specified, all online sources were last accessed on November 01, 2021.


United States


ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Dr. Julian Lehmann is a project manager at the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) in Berlin. His interests and expertise lie at the interface of law and policy, development and humanitarian assistance, and rights-based approaches.

Marie Wagner is a research associate at the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi), contributing to the institute’s work on humanitarian action and on migration. Her research interests include anticipatory humanitarian action, forecast-based financing and evaluation in international organizations.

GLOBAL AND EUROPEAN POLITICS

The Department of Global and European Policy provides advice on key European and international policy issues to policymakers, trade unions and civil society organizations in Germany, Brussels and at the UN offices in Geneva and New York. We identify areas of transformation, formulate concrete alternatives and support our partners in forging alliances to implement them. In doing so, we reflect on national as well as European and international policy. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development with its far-reaching political claim to promote a social-ecological transformation provides a clear orienting framework for pursuing our work.

Coordinator responsible for the publication:
Tobias Schmitt, Policy Officer, Migration, Integration and EU-Fundamental Rights, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Brussels
Tobias.Schmitt@fes-europe.eu

Felix Braunsdorf, Policy Officer, Migration and Development, Department of Global and European Policy, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Berlin
Felix.Braunsdorf@fes.de

IMPRINT

Published by:
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e. V.
Godesberger Allee 149
53175 Bonn
Germany
Email: info@fes.de

Register no.: VR2392
Bonn Register of Associations
Bonn Local Court

President: Martin Schulz
Secretary General: Dr Sabine Fandrych

Responsible for content and editing:
Renate Tenbusch, Head of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung’s EU Office, Brussels

Contact: Tobias.Schmitt@fes-europe.eu
and Felix.Braunsdorf@fes.de

For more information about the project, please consult:
https://www.fes.de/en/towards-a-global-resettlement-alliance

Design:
AdGrafics Design Studio | https://www.adgrafics.eu
pertext | corporate publishing | https://pertext.de/

The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Commercial use of media published by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) is not permitted without the written consent of the FES. Publications by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung may not be used for electioneering purposes.

ISBN 978-3-98628-044-4
© 2021
Resettlement and humanitarian admission stand out as tools that offer safe pathways for refugee movement and long-term solutions. However, the number of available places has taken an unprecedented hit, posing a problem for affected people themselves and the international system of refugee protection. To survive, that system needs meaningful tools to support responsibility sharing. This paper unravels reasons for current admission levels in six key countries (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Sweden, and the United States). Despite difficult political contexts, a positive turn is feasible in many of these countries.

Reflecting on the short-, medium-, and long-term, the paper outlines three steps to revive resettlement and humanitarian admission until 2024. A coordinated effort and momentum on the admission of Afghans can enable resettlement and humanitarian admission to recover from the combined shock of the COVID-19 pandemic and cuts imposed by the past US government. The next Global Refugee Forum could be an opportunity to crystalize support. Bringing the two tools on a steady growth path would allow offering a solution to all those in need of resettlement today within the next ten years.

Further information on the topic can be found here: https://www.fes.de/en/towards-a-global-resettlement-alliance