

A decorative graphic consisting of a grid of grey dots of varying sizes, with several dots highlighted in red. The dots are arranged in a pattern that roughly outlines the shape of the world map.

Trade Unions in Transformation

Mega Sporting Events in Brazil: Trade Unions' Innovative Strategies for the Construction Industry

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Januar 2018

- The hosting of both the 2014 FIFA World Cup and 2016 Summer Olympics in Brazil forced the country's trade unions to seek new methods of organisation and cooperation. Campaigns for decent work, launched by the Building and Wood Workers' International (BWI), proved to be successful and made the life of thousands of workers easier and safer.
- Brazilian trade unions have generally operated separately from one another, due to diversity in their historical and political affiliations, and were unaccustomed to conducting joint negotiations. The main challenge – and merit – in implementing the Decent Work Campaign was therefore to unite trade union organisations usually segregated by both geography and sector.
- Trade Unions in Transformation is an FES project that identifies unions' power resources and capabilities that contribute to successful trade union action. This study features among two dozen case studies from around the world demonstrating how unions have transformed to get stronger.



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Abstract

This paper analyses to what extent the Decent Work Campaigns *Towards and Beyond 2014* (World Cup) and *Towards and Beyond 2016* (Olympics) by the Building and Wood Workers' International (BWI) initiated a process of coordinating activities between national and international trade unions of the construction industry. The data collected will be analysed employing the power resource method. Based on those findings the achievements and permanencies of these two campaigns are identified. The World Cup Campaign was capable of mobilising a large part of the Brazilian trade union movement. One factor that motivated the trade unions to join the campaign was that the BWI already had experience of strategic campaigns before and after mega sporting events (MSE). Furthermore, it became increasingly apparent that negotiations had to be conducted with the organizers of the World Cup. Another reason was the lack of any coordinated approach at national level. The main outcomes of the 2014 World Cup campaign include a national bargaining agenda, which was supported by a series of strikes at the football stadiums under construction. This combination had direct influence on the negotiations at regional level. The 2016 Olympic Games Campaign achieved wage increases and had other positive outcomes such as the occupational safety protocol, which defines safety and security rules for construction work, and an agreement on the use of certified wood products. However, difficulties in developing a national bargaining agenda were identified during the 2016 campaign. The data indicate that the lessons learnt from the 2014 campaign with regard to the coordination of agendas on international-national and national-local level were applied inconsistently in 2016 with difficulties that stemmed from local unions' attempts to enforce their local priorities.

1. Introduction

In 2007 and in 2009 Brazil was officially nominated as host of the World Cup in 2014 and of the Olympics in 2016. This brought the construction sector onto the stage¹. It was estimated that dozens of billions of Brazilian Reals would have to be spent on the construction of ports, airports and other means of urban transport and on the construction or rehabilitation of stadiums in preparation for these mega events. This also meant that thousands of workers would be involved in the construction projects. The contradictions, which stem from the combination of public investments and private sector profit and working conditions, are similar to the ones that were observed during other games – for instance during the 2010 World Cup in South Africa and the Olympics in London in 2012. Just as in South Africa, innovative bargaining strategies that linked national and international trade union organisations were applied during the preparations for the MSE in Brazil.

The main topics of this paper are trade union activities and campaigns in the context of an ongoing economic

globalisation. It looks, in particular, at international trade union campaigns in the construction industry that are based on strategies for the improvement of working conditions during the preparations for the MSE in Brazil. The aim is to understand to what extent the Decent Work Campaign *Towards and Beyond 2014* by the Building and Wood Workers' International (BWI) initiated the internationalisation process of the Brazilian trade unions in the construction industry by means of coordinating agendas and strategies at national and international level and by linking different organisations. Moreover, the paper seeks to update previous thoughts on the campaign's effects and considers the continuity of the results that were achieved by the 2014 campaign and on how they were integrated into the 2016 campaign.

Generally speaking, the Brazilian trade unions at large joined the BWI's 2014 Campaign mainly because the latter already had experience of strategic campaigns directed at MSEs, because it proved to be necessary to negotiate with the organizers of the World Cup – not a traditional negotiating party for the trade unions – and because there was no coordinated trade union approach at national level. The fact that the trade unions joined the international campaign made it possible for one common international agenda concerning MSEs to be adopted in Brazil. Under the mediation of an international organisation, the Brazilian trade unions defined

1. The term 'construction industry' is used in a broad sense and covers the workers of both categories – civil and heavy construction. The author abstains from a distinction between both categories and refers to both unions, because the representation of workers is not clearly delimited. This is why there are cases, in which trade unions from the civil construction sector represent workers employed in the construction of infrastructure projects.

a national bargaining agenda – something never seen before – that had influence on the outcomes of the negotiations at local level. However, the results are faced with the challenge that they might prove not to be sustainable.

The author uses the power resource method² to analyse the trade unions ability to act strategically through joint mobilisation campaigns. This means analysing whether and how the trade unions are aware of and use the four basic powers of the trade union movement (structural, institutional, associational and societal). The data comes from two different sources. Firstly, interviews with trade union leaders in ten host cities of the World Cup in 2014, which were carried out as part of a post-doctoral research project. Secondly, interviews with trade union leaders from Rio de Janeiro and other BWI affiliates, which were conducted exclusively for this paper. In addition, campaign documents, collective bargaining agendas, regional collective agreements and secondary data from digital Brazilian newspapers on the impact of the trade unions' strategy in relation to the World Cup and the Olympics.

2. The Brazilian Trade Unions' Internationalisation and Mega Sporting Events

Sociological analyses of the transformations that affect labour relations point out that the national trade unions face new challenges. On the one hand, labour relations as well as specific characteristics of the working class and the way workers relate to activities have changed over time. On the other hand, the trade unions' institutionalisation happened recently and is characterised by the concentration of a high number of workers in nationally structured companies and, therefore, has seen its organising and mobilising capacity put to the test in certain professional categories. Within this context, the strategy of coordinating agendas and activities in an international forum contributed to the overcoming of organizational deadlocks.

The structural power of the Brazilian construction industry was strengthened during the PT governments under Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff as presidents when employment boomed in this sector. Several con-

struction projects, which were part of the Growth Acceleration Programme (PAC)³ and the preparations for the World Cup, were launched during this period and accompanied by a series of labour conflicts. According to a report by the Inter-Union Department of Statistics and Socio-Economic Studies (DIEESE)⁴, already in 2012 – one year after initiating the construction of the stadiums for the World Cup – 19 per cent of all strikes in the private sector took place in the construction industry. A survey commissioned by the National Federation of Workers in Heavy Construction (Fenatracop)⁵ estimated that 501,000 workers from the heavy and industrial construction sector participated in strikes in 2012. This data proves that the trade unions were able to mobilise the workers who were concentrated on the big construction sites around the country. This was also due to the bargaining power that trade unions had at this time as a consequence of the deadlines for the construction projects and the low levels of unemployment in the country⁶.

Nevertheless, conflicts that arose were related to the difficulties that the Brazilian trade unions faced in terms of their associational power. Strikes such as the strikes at the hydro power stations of Santo Antônio and Jirau in the Brazilian State of Rondônia in 2011 are good examples of these difficulties. On the one hand, 38,000 workers participated and on the other hand, the trade unions' leadership was so detached from the workers it represented that it was surprised by it (Veras, 2014).

There were wildcat strikes at some stadium construction sites, for example in the Maracanã stadium during August and September 2011 and in the Arena da Amazônia stadium in March 2012. These strikes share a common feature: the coordination between the workers and the trade unionists was only initiated after the strikes had started. The first strike at the Maracanã in Rio de Janeiro started off after a work accident. The second

3. The PAC contains a series of measures intended to boost economic growth in Brazil. It was launched in 2007 during Lula's government. This development program focuses on infrastructure projects.

4. DIEESE report »Strikes in 2012«, May 2013, www.dieese.org.br/balanco-dasgreves/2012/estPesq66balancogreves2012.pdf [accessed: 16/7/2015].

5. FENATRACOP report »An Evaluation of the Strikes in the Construction Industry in 2012«, www.fenatracop.com.br/index.php/informativo-aos-filiados/17-avaliacao-das-greves-de-2012/download [accessed: 16/7/2015].

6. In 2012, for instance, the unemployment rate was 5.5 per cent, which is considered a very low rate in comparison to the 12.6 per cent in 2002 during Fernando Henrique Cardoso's government or in January 2017 with Michel Temer as president (see IBGE/Average Annual Unemployment Rate).

2. See Schmalz & Dörre, 2017.

strike began with accusations that the consortium of construction companies led by the Brazilian corporation Odebrecht was supplying rotten food. In Manaus, the strike began after charges of harassment by employees with links to the Brazilian company Andrade Gutierrez. However, the institutional power of trade unions, which is based on, for instance, the right to annual collective bargaining, strengthened the trade unions' legitimacy⁷. Even in cases where they joined strikes that they had not predicted, they assumed the organisation and mobilisation, they broadened the agendas and brought in new demands and obtained positive results in the negotiations.

However, the start of the preparations for the 2014 World Cup also brought innovations, in terms of demands and strategies, into the Brazilian construction sector. Especially the Decent Work Campaign, launched by the BWI together with Brazilian organisations, facilitated the integration of new topics and approaches into the agendas of the local trade unions. The campaigns around the Brazilian MSEs marked the start of an internationalisation process that was new to this industry. Against this backdrop, this paper seeks to answer the following questions: to what extent is the strategy of internationalisation of trade unions an alternative to traditional approaches when dealing with the challenges of a transformed capitalist system? Which obstacles do trade unions face in their internationalisation process? To what extent did international initiatives such as the Decent Work Campaign influence the activities of local Brazilian trade unions in the construction sector?

The concept of International trade union activities refers to direct and bilateral cooperation between trade unions from different countries as well as to activities carried out by a GUF together with its affiliates. Such activities are generally directed at transnational corporations (TNC) and multilateral organisations or organised around topics such as gender equality, immigrants, and decent work and, in recent years, mega sporting events.

7. The trade union in Rio de Janeiro is the Workers' Union of the Heavy Construction Industry ((SITRAICP/RJ)). The trade union in Manaus is the Workers' Union of the Heavy Construction Industry of the Amazonas ((SITRAICP/AM)). It is worth mentioning, however, that the division of the construction sector into two professional categories (civil and heavy), which is imposed by the state, contributed to conflicts between different trade unions. As the issue of representation is unsolved between these categories, conflicts about who has the right to represent the workers frequently erupt between trade unions of the civil construction sector and trade unions of the heavy construction sector. This happened, for instance, at the sites of the stadiums in Recife and Belo Horizonte.

The ongoing internationalisation of trade unions is also shown by the fact that they participated in activities promoted by the International Labour Organisation (ILO)⁸, in negotiations on global governance mechanisms – such as Mercosur⁹ – and established international cooperation institutes¹⁰. However, this development is not homogeneous. Rombaldi (2012) gives the example of the internationalisation process of the metalwork and the telecommunication sectors – industries with specific characteristics such as the fact that different trade union centrals coexist and that an international exchange took place. These factors played an important role in decisions made by the trade unions to adopt the new strategies. The opportunity to acquire specific international competences¹¹ proved to be decisive for the success of projects that aimed at the internationalisation of the trade unions of these industries.

During the last decade, international trade union campaigns which aim at the improvement of working conditions, at the strengthening of the trade union movement and at the establishing of agreements in TNC have increased considerably¹². Brazil started to play an increasingly important role in these strategies. Not only because big corporations, at which international trade union campaigns were directed – such as Walmart, Prosegur and Arauco¹³ – are present there, but also because Brazil was going to be the host of the World Cup and the Olympics.

8. For example the ILO Conferences on Decent Work in 2012 and the several different forums and tripartite working groups on labour relations that were organised jointly with some Brazilian trade union centrals.

9. With regards to the trade unions' participation in the debates within Mercosur, see Working Group *Work – 10 and the recommendations of the trade union committee of the metalwork sectors on trade and production, such as the one on common custom tariffs from 1994*.

10. For example the CUT's Institute for International Cooperation founded in 2012. The Institute was established, amongst other things, in order to reverse the logic that international cooperation and solidarity between trade unions is always unilateral with the Brazilian partner being the beneficiary. For further information on the founding of the Institute see: www.cut.org.br/destaques/22842/cut-cria-seu-instituto-de-cooperacao [accessed: 09/09/2013].

11. Through their participation in international political projects and networking projects some of the CUT's leaders acquired international competences and represented a capital that proved to be decisive for the Brazilian trade unions' intervention capacity in global organisation (Rombaldi, 2012).

12. Since the start of the new millennium, nearly all global framework agreements were signed between a GUF and an TNC. In just a few cases such agreements were signed beforehand with companies, e. g. German companies due to the specific trade union relationships in these cases.

13. Walmart, Prosegur and Arauco belong to the sectors retail, security and forestry respectively. The first two were targeted by campaigns by the UNI Global Union, whereas Arauco was targeted by the Building and Wood Workers' International.

Such mega sporting events are an opportunity to introduce new strategies to trade unions as they involve a large quantity of workers during the preparations. Moreover and in terms of structural power, it became increasingly important to strengthen the bargaining capacities of the trade unions that had to deal with non-traditional negotiation partners such as the national and international organising committees, but also for the trade unions to gather expertise that could be used to support social organisations in the host country. An increased coordination of national and international agendas was also needed in order to strengthen the links between the different levels of the trade union structure.

The FIFA World Cups became a way of opening national economies for investors and capitalist interventions as markets have to be opened for sponsors. FIFA even started to promote activities that can be compared to those of a TNC¹⁴. FIFA's influence goes beyond the mere organisation of World Cups. It imposes a series of requirements on the host countries such as the need to invest heavily in infrastructure and to grant legal guarantees in order to protect sponsors – commercial zones and tax exemptions for instance – without any mention of social protection of the workers that are involved in the preparation of the sporting events (McKinley, 2011).

The mega events revealed the new strategies of the capitalist players and – as a consequence – the need for the global trade union organisations to adopt new organisational alternatives. Some of the GUF's initiatives around mega events were the Play Fair Campaign, which resulted in an increase in societal power. An international coordination between international trade union organisations and partner NGOs was established in order to jointly implement activities during the preparations for MSEs such as World Cups or Olympic Games. The International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) and IndustriAll, which also represent workers from the textile sector, were part of this campaign together with the BWI and the NGO *Clean Clothes*

Campaign. The campaign aimed at improving working conditions within the textile industry by defining minimum social standards for workers involved in the preparations of the games. The campaign was directed at the 2012 London Olympics and achieved relatively positive results, such as the agreement signed between British trade unions and the organising committee, the fact that trade unions were able to influence the employment conditions in subcontracting companies by defining and agreeing on a Code of Subcontracting, which safeguards internationally recognized human rights, as well as the public naming and shaming of the unacceptable social conditions under which Chinese workers had to manufacture the mascots for the games and of social audits that were considered dishonest and inefficient¹⁵.

Another campaign was directed at the 2010 World Cup in South Africa. This was the first time the BWI organised campaigns for the improvement of the working conditions during the preparations for a World Cup. The campaign was called Decent Work Towards and Beyond 2010 and helped to coordinate activities amongst national trade unions from different political camps, supported research activities, negotiation rounds and mounted lobby activities against FIFA. For instance, the BWI organised meetings in Zurich, in which trade unionists from South Africa and the ITUC met with FIFA representatives, such as the FIFA's president Joseph Blatter and FIFA's general secretary Jérôme Valcke. During these meetings, issues raised by the workers were presented to the South African government and the Local Organising Committee and dealt with. FIFA agreed to invite trade unions to partake in the inspections at the construction sites. Alongside the decision to include trade unions in the inspections, the campaign had other positive results. For instance, an increase in 39 per cent in the membership numbers in the industry between 2006 and 2009 and a 12 per cent increase in wages after a nationwide strike was held in July 2009¹⁶. The London and South Africa Campaigns contributed to a broadening of the national trade unions' agendas thanks to growing internationalisation.

14. One argument brought forward by McKinley (2011) to support the affirmation that FIFA is comparable to a TNC is the fact that International Sports and Leisure (ISL) is a marketing company with strong affiliation to FIFA. It was key to the relationships with the big sponsors and telecommunication corporations. ISL also held the naming rights of the World Cup in Brazil and played a central role in the drawing-up of contracts regarding the World Cup.

15. Data collected from the agreement signed between the London Organising Committee of the Olympic Games and Paralympic Games (LOCOG) and the *Trade Union Congress/Play Fair* in February 2012 and from the ITUC's reports *Toying with Workers Rights* and *Rio 2016: The Social Performance of Event Organisers and Key Corporations*.

16. Data collected from the evaluation report of the BWI Campaign, 2010.

3. The Decent Work Campaign Towards and Beyond 2014

The preparations for the 2014 World Cup in Brazil and the new jobs that were expected to result from the preparations depended strongly on big investments in infrastructure. According to the Sport Ministry's report from 2010,¹⁷ it was estimated that around 330,000 permanent jobs would be created between 2009 and 2014 in addition to the 380,000 temporary jobs in 2014. The increase in construction jobs was mainly due to the work at 12 airports, six ports and 44 other urban transport projects¹⁸. Furthermore, 12 stadiums¹⁹ were either newly built or rehabilitated and a total of 8.3 billion Brazilian Reals invested²⁰. In May 2012, however, the media estimated that only 25 per cent of all the tenders for urban transport projects had been completed²¹ and 41 per cent of all construction projects for the World Cup had not been started yet²². This scenario – delays in the execution of construction projects together with the pressure to finish the projects within the deadlines imposed by FIFA – proved to have had a negative impact on the working conditions in the sector but also a positive impact on the trade unions' negotiating power.

The same contradictions, which were identified during the preparations for the 2010 World Cup in South Africa and which resulted from the combination of public investments, private sector profit and the negative impact on social conditions, were seen in Brazil (Rombaldi & Cottle, 2013). Against this backdrop and based on experiences with previous trade union campaigns such as the London Olympics Campaign and the South African World Cup Campaign, the BWI launched its Decent Work

Campaign Towards and Beyond 2014 in Rio de Janeiro on March 31 and April 1, 2011. The fact that the organisers of the World Cup were different to the traditional trade unions' negotiating partners as well as the BWI's previous experiences with campaigns around MSE and the high visibility of the Cup at international level help to explain why the international campaign was so attractive for Brazilian trade union organisations in the construction sector. The campaign led to an impressive increase in the BWI's membership numbers. In 2010, only five trade union organisations were affiliated with the federation, while in December 2012 it was already 25.

In Brazil the BWI was the driving force and main coordinator of the activities of 17 trade unions, six federations at state level and two confederations at national level²³. It brought together organisations from different political camps, consolidated data and distributed information on strikes and agreements that were signed locally. It produced material for the campaign, organised events at national and international level, in which trade union organisations, the organisers of the Cup and representatives of the government and the ILO participated, and sought to negotiate with FIFA in Switzerland. The BWI further tried to increase its social influence by cooperating with different partners such as the ITUC and Streetnet²⁴ based on strategic agreements. The aim was to develop a national action programme and mechanism. However, there were hardly any joint initiatives together with other economic sectors.

The campaign involved Brazilian trade union organisations from different camps – a fact that brought some complexity into the structure and made an expansion of structural power difficult. The majority of the participating trade unions were local unions that represented the workers at the construction site in the host cities²⁵ of the World Cup. They were affiliates of four different trade

17. Data collected from the Ministry of Sport's report on economic impacts of the 2014 World Cup in Brazil from March 2010.

18. Data collected from the Ministry of Sport's final evaluation report on the FIFA World Cup in Brazil from December 2014.

19. In fact 14 stadiums were built or rehabilitated during this period. As well as the 12 stadiums for the 2014 World Cup, two more private stadiums were included in the preparations. These are the Arena Grêmio stadium in Porto Alegre and the Arena Palmeiras stadium in São Paulo.

20. Data collected from the Ministry of Sport's final evaluation report on the FIFA World Cup in Brazil, quoting

21. Dimmi Amora: «Only 25 % of all tenders for urban transport projects for the World Cup finished» in: Folha de S. Paulo, 2/5/2012: www1.folha.uol.com.br/esporte/1084662-copa-tem-so-25-de-obras-de-mobilidade-urbana-licitadas-diz-tcu.shtml [accessed: 24/9/2013].

22. «40.6 % of all construction projects for the 2014 World Cup still not initiated, says the Federal Government» in: UOL Copa 23/5/2012: <http://copadomundo.uol.com.br/noticias/redacao/2012/05/23/41-das-obras-da-copa-do-mundo-de-2014-ainda-nao-comecaram-segundo-governo-federal.htm> [accessed: 24/9/2013].

23. Trade unions that participated in the campaign: STICC-POA, SINTRACON-CTBA, SINTRAPAV-PR, SINDECREP-SP, Trade Union Solidarity – São Caetano/SP, SINDPRES-SP, SINTRAPAV-SP, SINDECREP-RJ, SITRAICP-RJ, SINTRACONST-ES, SITRAMONTI-MG, STICMB-DF, SINTRACCCM-MT, SINTEPAV-BA, SINTEPAV-CE, STICONTTEST-AM, SINTRACOM-SBC. Federations at state level: FETICOM-SP, FETICOM RS, FETRACONSPAR, FETRA-CONMAG-ES, FETIEMT, FSCM-CUT. Federations and confederations at national level: FENATRACOP, CONTICOM/CUT.

24. Streetnet is the international alliance of street workers and was founded in 2002 in South Africa. It promotes street workers' rights.

25. The BWI's strategy was initially based on the establishing of contacts and networks between the different trade unions in the host cities. However, during the campaign, also trade unions from other regions joined in the activities.

union centrals – the Unified Workers' Central (CUT), the Union Force (FS), the General Workers' Union (UGT) and the New Workers' Union Central. As well as the tensions that were identified between the trade unions of the different centrals, there was also a clear lack of exchange and coordination between the trade unions and their respective confederation. Until 2011, hardly any negotiations were conducted at national level on issues such as a sector wide wage agreement that would apply to all federal states in Brazil. This is a very frequent demand of the trade union leaders interviewed. Moreover, during the three years of the international campaign there were no regular nationwide campaigns organised by the confederations. Against this backdrop the GUF served as the linking element or focal point between the Brazilian trade unions. As a trade union leader put it, the international campaign became a forum in which »only the possible was discussed in order to reach consensus (...) non-negotiable differences were left out«.

Until the campaign's kick-off event in Rio de Janeiro, at which many international trade unionists were present, there was hardly any form of coordination or cooperation between the Brazilian trade unions that participated in the campaign and the BWI. In 2014, 25 Brazilian trade union organisations were affiliated with the BWI, while it was only five in 2011²⁶. As more and more trade unions joined this pioneer campaign it was decided to establish an executive committee for the campaign with originally eight organisations²⁷. This number was later increased as many others were interested in participating in order to represent all affiliated trade unions. This committee was responsible for further developing and revising the campaign's strategic plans.

Just as during the campaign in South Africa, the BWI and the Brazilian trade unions developed a platform for activities, which resulted in the development of a joint manifesto. For the first time a document contained commonly agreed demands for the construction sector in Brazil. This manifesto was the basis for the development of the Common National Agenda, a document containing jointly agreed demands in a way never achieved before amongst trade unions of the sector in question. The trade unions

demanded a sector wide collective bargaining agreement at national level with uniform minimum wages for each category, social benefits and the right to organise per site²⁸.

However, the innovations in the *modus operandi* of the trade unions did not stop at the consensus on demands. Behind all the campaign's activities in the host-cities, to which the BWI convened, was a logic that was new to the fragmented trade union movement in Brazil with different trade union centrals. The activities were generally organised by the host trade union and all organisations that participated in the campaign were invited. The host facilitated visits to the stadium, organised meetings with representatives from the government, local organisers of the World Cup, the press, etc. Information on these activities was published via the BWI's homepage. A blog was established to pass on information on activities. Moreover, the BWI involved key trade unions from abroad, mostly from Europe, which supported the activities in Brazil.

Another point worth mentioning refers to the Common National Agenda. On 18th November 2011 while the Brazilian organisations participating in the campaign met in São Paulo in order to develop this document, BWI representatives met with FIFA representatives in Zurich, Switzerland, in order to present a joint agenda on working conditions on construction sites and strikes in Brazil. As soon as the meeting with FIFA was over, the BWI's secretary general joined the meeting in São Paulo via conference call to exchange information on both of the meetings.

On 6th March 2012 and according to the logic that »the workers should also be part of the 2014 games« the Common National Agenda, which constitutes a clear framework in the sense of framing and contained the fundamental demands of the workers in the sector, was presented to the National Confederation of Industry (CNI) in Brasilia, Although a sector wide agreement was never achieved, the trade union leaders interviewed stated that the initiative allowed influence on definition of the agenda for negotiation in the different regions of the country. This shows how the campaign contributed to expanding the scope of societal power. The Common Agenda was more than a mere reference list of demands. It was used by the trade unions to support their own demands in local negotiations as the national demands helped to justify local demands.

26. CONTICOM, FETICOM-SP, FETICOM-RS, SINDPRES and the Trade Union Solidarity – São Caetano/SP.

27. CONTICOM, FENATRACOP, SITRAICP-RJ, SINTRAPAV-PR, FETRACON-MAG-ES, SINTEPAV-BA, FETICOM-SP and the Trade Union Solidarity – São Caetano/SP.

28. Information obtained from the Common National Agenda.

The negotiating periods between 2011 and 2014 were marked by intense conflicts at the stadiums under construction or being rehabilitated as well as in the wider construction sector²⁹. During this time 28 strikes were registered, most of them during the first two years (table 1). This is mainly due to the fact that fewer workers were employed during the last two years as some stadiums were finished by June 2013³⁰ and fewer workers were needed during the finishing phases of the construction project.

Table 1: Strikes at stadiums 2011–2014

Year	Strikes	Stadium
2011	12	Castelão (1), Arena Pernambuco (3), Fonte Nova (1), Maracanã (2), Mineirão (2), Arena Grêmio (2), Mané Garrincha (1).
2012	11	Arena Amazônia (1), Castelão (2), Arena Dunas (3), Arena Pernambuco (2), Fonte Nova (2), Arena Grêmio (1)
2013	3	Arena Amazônia (1), Maracanã (1), Arena da Baixada (1)
2014	2	Arena da Baixada (1), Beira-Rio (1)
Total	28	

Source: own compilation

According to a report by DIEESE³¹, just over half of the strikes were related to working conditions or to the infringement of rights that were safeguarded in agreements or by law. Despite the guidance given by the Common Agenda, the different strikes at the stadiums were not coordinated jointly. This lack of coordination can be explained by the fact that the yearly negotiations between trade unions and employers do not take place at the same time at all sites, which means that local mobilising campaigns take place at different periods of the year. Another reason might be that in some cases the strikes broke out without any involvement of trade

unions. This was the case with the strikes that started due to bad working conditions, such as rotten food (Maracanã), a work accident (Maracanã, Arena Amazônia), poor hygiene conditions in the changing rooms and payment of extra hours (Mineirão) or lack of proper clothing for work (Arena Grêmio). It should be highlighted that nine fatal accidents happened at the sites during this period, which is symptomatic of the working conditions during the preparations for the World Cup. The stadiums on this sad list are Pantanal, Corinthians, Grêmio, Amazônia, Mineirão and Mané Garrincha.

According to the DIEESE report, strikes that fought for new demands or for progress regarding existing rights focused mainly on the introduction or increase of the food allowance, on medical care for the workers and on wage increases. The campaign contributed to create a sense of unity around those demands. The workers demanded equal pay and equal rights in the different regions of the country. In addition, in March 2012, just before the Common Agenda was presented to the CNI, the news of a possible general strike in the construction sector raced through the Brazilian press.

Even though no sector wide agreement at national level was achieved, the trade unions' negotiations in the twelve host cities, where the stadiums were being built, can be deemed successful. As the DIEESE's³² data on the development of wages (table 2) show, all agreements contained increases in the minimum wage of the different professional categories above inflation and above the increase in the official minimum wage.

All wages that are above the minimum wage per category were also increased above inflation. Their real increase was higher than all the other average real increases that the DIEESE registered for all professional categories including the categories of the construction and furniture industry. However, there were some differences in the wage increases at the different stadiums. Nonetheless, several other results were achieved such as an increase in the food allowance, in the money paid for extra hours, in transport tickets, health insurance, monthly bonuses and profit sharing schemes. This confirms the affirmation that the strikes were successful, generally speaking, as they did not only lead to an increase in wages but also to improved working conditions.

29. The stadiums Arena Grêmio in Porto Alegre and Arena Palmeiras in São Paulo were not used during the World Cup. They were nevertheless included in the analysis, as they were built at the same time as the others. The credit for the construction of those two stadiums was also financed by funds that were destined for investments into construction projects in preparation for the World Cup.

30. Besides the Arena Grêmio stadium that was inaugurated at the end of 2012 six other stadiums were finished by June 2013. Those were: Maracanã, Fonte Nova, Arena Pernambuco, Castelão, Mineirão and Mané Garrincha.

31. Data was collected from the DIEESE report »Review of the Decent Work Campaign Towards and Beyond 2014«, 2014.

32. Ibid.

Table 2: Average real wage increase at construction sites for the World Cup and real increase in the official minimum wage – comparison with the inflation index, 2009–2013

	2010	2011	2012	2013
Sites	5,95 %	6,70 %	7,41 %	6,53 %
Minimum wage	6,02 %	0,37 %	7,59 %	2,64 %

As stated above the negotiations proved that the trade unions were committed to achieving and consolidating significant progress despite the fact that some trade unions were taken by surprise by some strikes. On that note and despite the contradictions regarding the execution of the World Cup Campaign in Brazil it becomes evident that collective bargaining and strikes on the sites for the World Cup achieved positive results. At international level the negotiations and attempts to enter a dialogue with FIFA had not lead to an agreement by the end of the Campaign in April 2014 that was comparable to the agreement reached during the South African Campaign, which granted the participation of trade unions in the inspections of the stadiums. In addition, more than a year after the World Cup, no negotiation was effectively established, which could lead to a sector wide agreement on the regulation of the minimum wages for each professional category and the other demands from the Common Agenda. The Common Agenda may be considered a fundamental pillar of the campaign. However, there are no signs that the unity that was created around it still exists.

4. (Dis)continuities with the Decent Work Campaign Towards and Beyond 2016

It was estimated that 37.5 billion Brazilian Reals³³ would be necessary to get Rio de Janeiro ready for the Games, including the construction of all the sport facilities and of an urban transport systems that would be left as a legacy to the city. The Ministry of Employment (MTE)

estimated that around 50,000 workers from the construction sector were employed in works for the Games. They worked on the light rail system, the underground line, the dual carriageway, the fast bus transport system Transbrasil, the rehabilitation of the Engenhão stadium and the building of the Museum of Tomorrow. Just as during the preparations for the World Cup the trade unions found themselves faced with a scenario, in which international pressure played a relevant role due to the deadlines that had to be respected.

The Decent Work Campaign Towards and Beyond 2016 was launched in 2014 in order to give continuity to the trade union campaign during the World Cup. As part of the 2016 campaign awareness raising material on occupational safety at sites for the Games was developed and there were negotiations with the organising committee about the use of certified wood³⁴. International visits were organised as a way of exerting pressure on local authorities to conduct negotiations with the local trade union. The public was informed about accidents and conflicts at the sites as a way to influence public opinion.

The construction workers in Rio de Janeiro are represented by two trade unions. The Workers' Union of the Heavy Construction Industry (SITRAICP), which has been a BWI affiliate since it joined the international World Cup Campaign that was launched in front of the Maracanã stadium in 2011. It represents about 15,000 workers in the state Rio de Janeiro in the heavy construction industry, including infrastructure and urban transport projects. The second trade union is the Workers' Union of the Civil Construction Industry (SINTRACONST), which is not affiliated to any international federation. Generally speaking, the campaign was organised by the BWI and SITRAICP. The civil construction union SINTRACONST participated merely in some individual activities. In contrast to the 2014 campaign, the BWI was not able to break down the barriers that separated the trade unions or to promote activities commonly agreed on by the two trade unions.

Based on the lessons learnt from the Play Fair Campaign in London, the BWI was expecting a complex scenario for the construction sector in terms of occupational

33. According to data from the fourth edition of the Brazilian Court of Auditors' report from 2016 entitled The Court of Auditors and the Olympic Games 2016. From these, about 24 billion BRL were spent on urban infrastructure, public transport, mobility, sanitation, etc.

34. Amongst other things, the BWI promoted initiatives that support the tripartite dialogue between workers, the government and companies. The BWI's policy on socioecological certification of wood (FSC) derives from such initiatives.

safety. Therefore it prepared a safety protocol for the construction sites in Rio de Janeiro. Data on accidents at the construction sites for the 2014 World Cup were used as a reference. This protocol was also used to establish a constant dialogue between the GUF and the trade union on the one hand and the local organising committee on the other. This dialogue finally led to the adoption of the protocol by the committee that integrated it into its own safety policy³⁵.

Notwithstanding this, there were several work accidents on the construction sites for the Olympics, as data of the MTE reveals³⁶. During the preparations for the Games 11 people died and three were severely injured. 1,600 infractions were reported and the work at 44 sites was stopped and cancelled. These numbers are not higher than the numbers verified during the preparations for other Olympic Games. Such a scenario is rather frequent and is in contrast to the image of an Olympic spirit and fair play, which is being propagated by the organisers of MSE. During the preparations for the 2012 Winter Olympics in Sochi, Russia, for example, 70 workers died at the construction sites³⁷. Two workers have already died during the preparation for the Winter Olympic Games in South Korea in 2018³⁸. The prospects for the 2022 Olympic Games in Qatar are not very encouraging. The international Play Fair Campaign points out that in Qatar more than 1,000 workers had died in work accidents by the end of 2015. It is estimated that some other thousand fatalities will have been added to the list by the launch of the event³⁹.

According to representatives of the MTE the majority of the problems faced at the construction sites in Rio de Janeiro were due to a lack of occupational health and safety rules for construction works. Such rules could also have been used by the City Government as guidelines during the contracting process of the companies that

would carry out the construction projects for the games. Due to the lack of such rules supervision was difficult; the challenge was intensified by the fact that some contractors were exchanged during the period. Among the main problems at the construction sites were issues related to poor hygiene standards in the changing rooms and bathrooms and to water and food that was supplied.

The trade union movement in Rio de Janeiro has its own characteristics that make it difficult to apply the same approach as during the 2014 campaign. According to Nilson Duarte Costa, SITARICP president, during the preparations for the 2014 World Cup there were agreements in place between companies and trade unions that allow trade union leaders to be present at the sites at the stadiums and other big projects. During the preparations for the Rio Games such initiatives were hampered by the fragmentation of sites and companies – many of them subcontracted⁴⁰. Such a scenario is a breeding ground for conflicts. The three years of run up to the World Cup were marked by a strike wave in the industry – especially 2012. These strikes were concentrated at the stadiums. During 2014–2016 there were 15 strikes registered in the state of Rio – two of them at state level⁴¹ – that involved about 37,000 workers⁴² and led to an increase in wages of around 23 per cent⁴³ in this period.

At international level the BWI's global strategy for MSE has brought positive results through different activities. One such activity was the signing of an agreement⁴⁴ between Swedish trade unions that are affiliated to the BWI, the Swedish Football Association and the Swedish Olympic Committee in 2016. This agreement guarantees decent working conditions for all workers involved in sporting events in the country and outside of Sweden through the international organisations of which they are members. In Russia, the BWI, the Russian Workers'

35. The fact that the protocol was integrated into the security policy, which was to be applied to all construction works related to the 2016 Games, is shown by similar information being used in the two documents. The Olympic Committee even confirmed the influence that this BWI material had had. For further information: www.bwint.org/default.asp?index=6843&Language=EN.

36. According to data that was presented by the Labour Inspector Elaine Castilho during the closing ceremony of the BWI Campaign Towards and Beyond the 2016 Games in June 2016.

37. According to data from the *Decent Work, Fair Play for All Teams* report by the BWI, 2014.

38. www.bwint.org/default.asp?index=7261 [accessed: 12/9/2016].

39. www.playfairqatar.org.uk/category/uncategorized/ [accessed: 8/9/2016].

40. According to the dossier by the CUT 'Subcontracting and Development: A Plan that Doesn't Work Out' from 2015 that was published jointly with the DIEESE, contracted workers tend to work longer hours, earn less, and are more likely to be substituted or fall victim to an accident.

41. The strikes at state level took place at the start of 2014 and 2015 within the collective bargaining process and lasted six and three days respectively.

42. According to BWI data on the mobilisation during the campaign.

43. According to the collective conventions of the SITRAICP in 2014, 2015, 2016.

44. www.bwint.org/default.asp?Index=7211&Language=EN [accessed: 10/7/2016].

Union of the Construction Industry (RBWU) and the Local FIFA Organising Committee signed a cooperation agreement⁴⁵ that guaranteed decent and safe working conditions during the construction and rehabilitation of the stadiums for the 2018 World Cup. Despite the success that the international trade union strategies had during the 2014 World Cup Campaign and the lessons learnt from previous campaigns related to MSE, it proved difficult to coordinate the international agenda and the local agenda as well as the agendas of Brazilian trade unions from different states or political camps during the preparations for the Olympic Games. The BWI faced difficulties when it attempted to integrate international strategies at local level within the trade unions of Rio de Janeiro. One possible interpretation is given by Hermes Costa (2005) who stated that the priorities that are imposed on the local trade unions by everyday issues might have hampered their internationalisation. In the case of Rio de Janeiro labour relations are strongly regulated. Annual negotiations about wages and other issues are laid down by law. This and the fact that the number of construction sites and therefore workers increased abruptly may have contributed to traditional activities being opted for and a lower inclination to join international activities. A contradiction can be identified between the establishment of a structural power at local level and the lessons learnt from the 2014 Campaign. Moreover, local priorities prevailed, which made it difficult to create a framework for dialogue that could link successful international campaigns to local efforts.

Furthermore and in contrast to the trade unions' experience during the preparations for the 2014 World Cup, it turned out to be difficult to mobilise the support from other trade unions of the industry from other regions and other centrals. With the exception of the seminars organised by the BWI in the host-cities, in which trade unions from different political camps and regions participated, no other significant act of solidarity or joining of the campaign by trade unions from other federal states was identified. Regarding the sustainability of the lessons learnt from the 2014 Campaign, the data above indicates that there were some obstacles to their continuity. It proved to be difficult to maintain the high level of unity and consensus that was achieved during the previous campaign and led to the Common Agenda.

Another important fact is that – in certain moments – it seemed as if SITRAICP had not fully incorporated the campaign that was promoted by the BWI and supported by the local trade union. Although SITRAICP carried out its activities in cooperation with the BWI and participated in events and meetings with the organising committee and local authorities and further contributed to the planning of visits to the construction sites by delegations, a range of its activities during the campaign followed rather traditional negotiation and mobilisation patterns. There were no significant changes introduced by the campaign to the way negotiations and the dialogue with the employer or strikes were executed. These activities were not classified by the trade union as part of an international strategy but rather as the result of local labour relations and the way they are structured.

Looking at the results of the 2014 and the 2016 international campaigns, it becomes apparent that specific features of the national/local trade union structure play a decisive role in whether international trade union strategies are successful or not. Carlos Antonio Q. Añonuevo, coordinator of the BWI's global campaign said about the results that were achieved that »international campaigns need to be designed according to the local negotiation and mobilisation capacities. This influences directly, which objectives are defined for each activity and what results can be expected«. One example that proves this affirmation is the campaign directed at the preparations for the World Cup in Qatar in 2022. In this case the GUF is aiming at driving the development of organisations that are capable of representing local workers. If a large amount of the workers are immigrants, one option is to apply strategies, which aim at organising workers within the communities that have developed as a consequence of the influx of immigration. With this in mind it might be possible to assert that the chances of success for international campaigns in such a context are different. This would to a certain extent relativize comparisons that aim at measuring the success of campaigns. In Qatar's case the international campaign plays a significant role, as there are no local trade unions. In Brazil the mere fact that there are local trade unions, which are capable of conducting collective bargaining and of maintaining their structure, contributed to the definition of agendas related to occupational health and safety issues and other more specific issues of local trade unions at the workplace.

45. www.bwint.org/default.asp?index=7298&Language=EN, [accessed: 28/8/2016].

5. Closing Remarks

During the preparations for the London Olympics and the 2010 World Cup in South Africa the national trade unions integrated new strategies and topics into their agendas due to cooperation with international trade union organisations. Likewise the Brazilian trade unions started to become part of the international environment through their participation in the Decent Work Campaign Towards and Beyond 2014 – an international strategy coming from outside of Brazil that aimed at improving the working conditions during mega events. At local level the campaign aimed at establishing participation mechanisms that would help to overcome the political differences between the Brazilian trade unions and contribute to the definition of a Common National Agenda with the standards that were defined by trade unions for the construction industry. At international level the campaign promoted negotiation with non-traditional negotiating partners such as FIFA and the local organising committees. It further strengthened the institutional links between the trade unions and the BWI – the number of Brazilian organisations that are affiliates of an international federation increased considerably and a number of lessons learnt were drawn from the international campaigns directed at MSE.

The 2016 Olympic Games Campaign benefited from the *permanencies* of the World Cup Campaign. An expertise in campaigning can be identified that allowed objectives and expected results to be defined according to the specific characteristics of Rio de Janeiro. Although both campaigns aimed at putting pressure on authorities, there were differences between the ways the local trade unions led negotiations. The World Cup Campaign sought to influence public opinion by developing a Common Agenda and negotiations around it. This agenda was presented to the CNI and resulted in the attempt to achieve a sector wide agreement with the employ-

ers from the construction industry at national level. The 2016 campaign on the other hand focused on the improvement of safety standards for construction workers by developing a safety and security protocol, on the negotiations about the use of certified wood and on the support of the local trade union in its dialogue with the organising committee.

The Rio Campaign also differs from the World Cup Campaign in the sense that it proved to be difficult to mobilise trade unions from other states to support the Rio Agenda. One of the main reasons for this is the fact that the Olympic Games were concentrated in one city and that the political differences had not simply disappeared with the Common Agenda. This *made it difficult to widen the scope of action into the other trade union organisations in the construction industry*. It can further be stated that the lessons learnt from the 2014 Campaign were applied inconsistently due to the difficulties that the already existing institutional power had caused. As a consequence, the focus of the workers' representation remained mainly on local priorities. Generally speaking this made it difficult to prepare the ground for linking successful international campaigns to the efforts at local level.

Taking this into consideration, a comparison between the 2014 and 2016 Campaigns indicates that the specific characteristics of the Brazilian trade union movement had considerably influenced the international strategy as well as its possible results. It became evident that specific characteristics regarding local labour relations should be considered during the planning of international campaigns, namely the capacity to mobilise, to coordinate with other trade unions and to conduct negotiations. These factors determine which objectives should be defined and which results can be expected for each activity and are potential guidelines for activities during the preparation of other mega events such as the World Cup in Russia (2018) and in Qatar (2022), etc.



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The paper is a continuation of earlier research projects on international trade union strategies regarding the 2014 World Cup. It further analyses the trade unions strategies in the run-up to the Olympics in Rio in 2016. This is what the term ›permanence‹ in the title refers to.

Imprint

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung | Global Policy and Development
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ISBN
978-3-95861-906-7