



## SUMMARY

- This paper presents four alternative global futures for the monopoly on the legitimate use of force with the aim of stimulating discussion and assisting policy planning. They are not predictions, but aim to allow policy makers to embrace uncertainty and plan for the future.
- These futures were built on two key uncertainties: (1) Will security provision in 2040 be more consolidated or more fragmented? (2) Will security provision in 2040 be more inclusive or more exclusive?
- The continuation of the current trend toward fragmentation, privatization, outsourcing and commodification of security provision needs to be avoided, or at very least requires oversight, regulation and coordination.
- International cooperation and international solutions to transnational challenges are required at a time when tensions are once again on the rise.
- An effective and legitimate monopoly on the use of force needs to be established cautiously by assisting legitimate security provision and, once firmly established, it requires maintenance.

## The Future of the Monopoly on the Legitimate Use of Force: Four alternative global futures

by Jaïr van der Lijn

### INTRODUCTION

Public discussions and policy making about peace and security are generally driven by current events. Although long-term thinking about structural solutions regarding the issues at stake is important, it is generally suppressed by the urgent challenges to peace and security that require immediate attention. As a result, policy generally becomes a string of mostly short-term or ad hoc policies and approaches, which nevertheless may have serious long-term consequences for the structure of global governance regarding the legitimate use of force.

The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung has set up the Global Reflection Group »Monopoly on the use of force 2.0?« (hereinafter »Reflection Group«) as an initiative to raise awareness of the current constitution of international security. Its aim is to discuss the future of this system, which, at least in theory, consists of national monopolies on the legitimate use of force. The core of the »state monopoly of force« – a concept first spelled out explicitly by sixteenth-century European philosophers – is that the state is the guarantor of both internal and external security. Although this concept has functioned in some states in practice, in general its realization has been more the exception than the rule. Nevertheless, it is the ideal type of security governance aspired to throughout the world by different actors for a variety of reasons. Moreover, although the de facto international security environment appears to be moving even further away from this ideal type, the international legal and security order, as well as international relations theory, continues to operate on the assumption that de jure sovereign states are the main providers of security.

The Reflection Group analyzes the current state of these monopolies on the legitimate use of force and discusses progressive policy options that safeguard both human security and a just international order.<sup>1</sup> The present paper hopes to provide further input into this process.

<sup>1</sup> »Reflection Group »Monopoly on the use of force 2.0?« Is there a need for new peace and security rules in the 21st century?, available at: <https://www.fes.de/de/reflection-group-monopoly-on-the-use-of-force-20/> (last accessed on 02.01.2017).

### Why alternative futures?

When thinking about the future of the monopoly on the legitimate use of force, it is helpful to collect thoughts on possible long-term developments by identifying alternative futures in order to prepare and plan for what lies ahead. There are at least two reasons for this:

First, depictions of alternative futures stimulate discussions about the topic under review. They allow a more structured form of debate over what future developments may involve and hence how the current factors influencing these developments should be addressed and shaped. As such, discussions of alternative futures strengthen dialogue and may lead to commonly agreed-upon or joint solutions.

Second, alternative futures are an instrument for policy planning, as they constructively explore futures and realities that require forward thinking. Planning for alternative futures increases organizations' flexibility as it makes them think through what they aim to achieve and what will be required in each alternative future. As Dwight D. Eisenhower once said: 'Plans are worthless, but planning is everything.'<sup>2</sup> Scenario thinking has its origins in military planning, but was embraced by the private and public sector after the oil company Royal Dutch Shell proved to be better able to weather the 1970s oil crisis than its competitors. The reason why? It had thought through an alternative future of a potential oil crisis in advance; therefore, its policy and planning were much better prepared.<sup>3</sup>

In order to serve both purposes, alternative futures need to fulfil a number of criteria. They should be creative, but plausible. The alternative futures have to think the unthinkable and even explore uncomfortable options. Their aim is to make the reader think about what may happen in the future and why. Yet, they should not cross into the impossible because then they would lose their policy relevance and only serve as fiction. For this reason, each alternative future also has to be internally consistent.

The alternative futures presented in this report are not intended to be predictions. Their aim is to depict what may happen by providing a 360-degree view of all alternative global futures. For this reason, they try to cover the widest variety of potential futures in order to maximize the potential for discussion, enabling policy

makers to embrace uncertainty and be prepared for the different futures that may arise. This paper presents four alternative global futures for the monopoly on the legitimate use of force. As the future unfolds, it will not look exactly like any of the alternative global futures described below, but it is likely to include some features from some or all of them.

### METHODOLOGY

The alternative futures presented in this paper have been built using the Shell scenario methodology.<sup>4</sup> They are mainly based on the working theses prepared and discussed in the 2015 Spring Conference of the Reflection Group 'Monopoly for the use of force 2.0?',<sup>5</sup> a scenario session in that same conference, and a two-day workshop with the Reflection Group held in 2016 in Geneva. The participants consisted of academics, civil society and practitioners from the different regions of the world. Subsequently, the draft alternative futures were further tested and strengthened by reviewers.<sup>6</sup>

A four-step alternative future-building process was followed. First, the temporal horizon for projecting the alternative futures was specified. The year 2040 was chosen because it allows for the development of sufficiently differentiated alternative futures. However, this does not make the alternative futures less relevant for the more immediate future. Once the first traits of an alternative future have developed, these can be monitored with a view to potential policy adjustments. The second step was to identify global issues, trends and developments that might affect the monopoly on the legitimate use of force, both those which are very likely to occur ('probabilities'), and those which are uncertain ('uncertainties'). While the uncertainties determine the differences between alternative futures, the probabilities determine what they have in common. The uncertainties and the probabilities are equally important for projecting the contents of the alternative futures. Mistaken assumptions about the probabilities may lead to criticism that the alternative futures are unrealistic. The third step was to define key uncertainties, the most important and most uncertain variables that form the basis of the axis grid of the alternative futures. The final step was to build alternative futures based on how the remaining variables – uncertainties and probabilities, the driving forces and actors – develop in each future quadrant (see **FIGURE 1** below).

<sup>2</sup> 'Speech to the National Defense Executive Reserve Conference in Washington, D.C.' (November 14, 1957), in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States*, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957, National Archives and Records Service, Government Printing Office, p. 818.

<sup>3</sup> Royal Dutch Shell, 40 years of Shell scenarios, NP: 2012; available at: [http://www.shell.com/promos/forty-years-of-shell-scenarios/\\_jcr\\_content.stream/1448557479375/703c8a8b176922ae312712b-355706ce087652a860980d5ffecac769817903d88/shell-scenarios-40years-book080213.pdf](http://www.shell.com/promos/forty-years-of-shell-scenarios/_jcr_content.stream/1448557479375/703c8a8b176922ae312712b-355706ce087652a860980d5ffecac769817903d88/shell-scenarios-40years-book080213.pdf) (last accessed on 02.01.2017).

<sup>4</sup> Shell International BV, *Scenarios an explorers guide*, The Hague: 2008.

<sup>5</sup> Reflection Group Monopoly for the use of force 2.0?, Report on the Berlin Conference, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Berlin; available at: <https://www.fes.de/de/index.php?elD=dumpFile&t=f&f=4021&token=c56809b621922e7a7d28ef-f03c5f8a8000da246f> (last accessed on 02.01.2016).

<sup>6</sup> The author is grateful to all those who contributed to this process. The alternative futures sketched in this paper are essentially theirs and without their input this paper would not have been possible.

## PROBABILITIES AND UNCERTAINTIES

When imagining the monopoly on the legitimate use of force in 2040, it is important to be aware of what is probable. Participants in the workshops clustered a number of issues, trends and developments as probable, but at the same time were not sure how these would impact the monopoly on the legitimate use of force. A continuation of technological advances in general – and Information and Communication Technology (ICT) in particular – was regarded as probable. A related expectation was that global interdependence would continue to increase. However, the impact of both trends was regarded by the participants as much more uncertain. For example, it is not clear how autonomous weapons might impact the monopoly on the legitimate use of force. That identity politics, and in particular religious extremism and terrorism, would remain influential was also seen as probable. But would this lead to a (further) ›clash of civilizations‹? And, how would further terrorist attacks on the United States and the European Union affect their behaviour? Similarly, although climate change and global warming, the related rise in sea levels, resource scarcity and water shortages were regarded as probable, in what way they would impact the monopoly on the legitimate use of force was considered to be uncertain. For example, would they mean more conflict over natural resources? And what implications will they have for the monopoly on the use of force?

A number of uncertainties were identified: Will international and/or regional organizations be able to face common threats? What is the future of the current multilateral international system? Will nuclear disarmament and modernization of these weapons proceed in parallel? How is transnational organized crime, in particular, drug trafficking, going to develop and what impact will it have on society? How stable will the neo-liberal economies prove to be? How are the private security markets going to develop? And: will there be a global pandemic and what impact will it have?

## KEY UNCERTAINTIES

Based on the input from the workshops, two key uncertainties regarding the future monopoly on the legitimate use of force at the national and international levels were identified:

### 1. Will security provision in 2040 be more consolidated or more fragmented?

The first key uncertainty pertains to the extent of entropy in security provision. If future security provision becomes more consolidated, the state will (re)gain more grip and the state monopoly on the legitimate use of force will be strengthened. If security provision

becomes more fragmented, the state monopoly on the legitimate use of force will be weakened, and other security providers will become equally or even more important than the state. This, however, does not say anything about how the legitimacy or the quality of security provision will be perceived by the individual recipients.

### 2. Will security provision in 2040 be more inclusive or more exclusive?


The second key uncertainty concerns the character of security provision. If security provision becomes more inclusive, it will benefit a larger group of subjects and become more legitimate in the eyes of the population. This may be reached through more democratic control of the security sector, but autocracies – enlightened despots – may also serve the interests of the public. If security provision becomes more exclusive, it will serve the interests of a smaller group of subjects such as elites.

## THE ALTERNATIVE FUTURES

On the basis of these two key uncertainties, a grid was constructed in which the x and y axes represent the above two key uncertainties. Each quadrant represents one alternative future (see **FIGURE 1**).

In this report, the four alternative futures in the quadrants of the axis grid are further described. These are: (1) more consolidated and more inclusive security provision (The United Nations (UN) Charter's World); (2) more fragmented and more inclusive security provision (The Networked World); (3) more fragmented and more exclusive security provision (The Unregulated World); and (4) more consolidated and more exclusive security provision (The Orwellian World).

**FIGURE 1**  
FOUR ALTERNATIVE GLOBAL FUTURES FOR THE FUTURE MONOPOLY ON THE LEGITIMATE USE OF FORCE



## GUIDE TO THE READER

The description of each of the four alternative global futures starts with a future history of the period up to 2040. These are written in the past tense to emphasize that they present a retrospective view from 2040. They are followed by a description, in the present tense, presenting in broad strokes what the alternative future in 2040 looks like, both in general and with regard to the monopoly on the legitimate use of force at the ›international‹ and ›national‹ level. Each alternative future also includes a box with a brief summary of the main user(s) of force, the primary recipient(s) of security and the most important drivers for the alternative future. Illustrative ›quotations‹ from security recipients in each alternative future are intended to make concrete what security means in each alternative future. The paper ends with some conclusions on a number of the findings of the alternative futures with regard to their important drivers and actors, as well as the policy implications that follow from the exercise.

## THE UN CHARTER'S WORLD (Consolidated & Inclusive security provision)

### FUTURE HISTORY

Already in the early 2000s the first signs of a declining unipolar system became apparent. Slowly the US and Europe lost influence relative to rising powers. In the mid-2010s this led to increasing tensions between the West and Russia, and under US president Trump particularly between the West and China. At the same time, China and Russia remained mistrustful of each other, while other countries in the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) group continued to

focus on their own challenges. With commodity prices falling, many African, Latin American and Caribbean countries were riven by economic, political and social crises. The global trend toward an increasingly inward focus and a breakdown in international cooperation within multilateral institutions led, by the late 2020s, to transna-

**Main user(s) of force:** states (national); UN and regional organizations (international).

**Primary recipient(s) of security:** civilians.

**Important drivers:** environmental degradation; globalization; transnational challenges: terrorism, organized crime, irregular migration; multilateralism; international law; (state control over) technological progress; economic growth.

tional challenges ranging from terrorism and organized crime, to pandemics and environmental degradation, which posed dramatic threats to populations around the globe. Large-scale refugee and irregular migration movements, the spread of dengue fever and the Zika virus, the demise of agriculture in a number of regions, and the complete disappearance of whole

Pacific island nations were but some of the indications of the seriousness of climate change alone. Only within Europe did international cooperation intensify. After the healthy shocks of Brexit and the Donald Trump US presidency, there was a growing awareness that if Europe were not united it would lose its role in the world, while a new momentum for ›European‹ solutions to issues, such as the refugee crisis, and for strengthening the European Common Security and Defence Policy developed. Faced with threats from outside, the call for a joint European identity gained new traction, partly due to intra-EU migration, national identities underwent a slow but steady decline.

By the end of the 2020s, as civilians increasingly felt the effects of transnational challenges in both the Global South and the Global North, they began to organize in support of higher levels of investment in state institutions and international cooperation to deal with them. This was driven in part by regained political momentum from achieving the Social Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030. Moreover, at the Paris II conference in 2032 the decision was taken to invest in technological solutions, marking the first step toward bundling international efforts and counteracting further environmental degradation. The resulting technological breakthroughs in solar energy and battery technology in the late 2030s were important steps in the right direction. State institutions were driving international technological innovation, which allowed them to gain the upper hand in the race for control over innovation against non-state actors, such as terrorist and criminal organizations. The success of international cooperation in the field of technology was transferred to other areas such as arms control.

## THE WORLD AND THE MONOPOLY ON THE LEGITIMATE USE OF FORCE IN 2040

In 2040, states are generally strong and well organized and cooperate closely with each other in regional organizations. In Europe, the EU has even acquired some of the characteristics of a state and Turkey has become a member. Although, due to far-reaching regional integration in organizations such as the African Union (AU), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Southern Common Market (Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR)), and the Pacific Islands Forum, one might describe the international system as multipolar, these poles are not in conflict with each other – in fact there are overlapping memberships – and they cooperate multilaterally to meet global challenges. For example, international environmental regimes are in place which ensure that global warming and pollution is reduced to a minimum and in fact a massive clean-up operation of the oceans is being conducted. Global

regimes effectively manage migration, and the general improvement in living conditions all over the world means that there has been a decrease in the need to migrate. There is hope for a better life in all parts of the globe. International response mechanisms are in place to ensure that humanitarian disasters are dealt with expeditiously. Rather than prioritizing military efforts, as occurred in the past, civilian and political solutions to prevent conflict from breaking out and building peace receive most attention and funding. Lastly, close international cooperation has also led to great successes in countering terrorism and organized crime.

›Security is a system that allows me to pick the government that takes best care of me.‹

*Friedrich Gremm, Germany*

The underlying logic in most international regimes and cooperation is subsidiarity. Multilaterally agreed global frameworks provide the broad direction for strong state apparatuses that decide on the rules and implement them. Interestingly, some of these global regimes are funded by wealthy individuals and foundations. Despite progress, conflict and armed violence have not been eradicated entirely. Regions that have never seen strong states and do not attract a lot of international attention, in particular, as well as those where no regional power is keeping a lid on conflicts, are the focal points of the remaining instability. Central Asia is one of these focal. Another region that deviates from the global trend toward increasing regional integration is South East Asia, where the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has made limited progress because in absence of instability there has never been a need to integrate.

At the national level the state is as a general rule firmly in charge of most aspects of society and the economy. Economies are stable, as Keynesian policies have been

›Security is IGAD strengthening my government, so that it is now able to provide in my security and needs.‹

*Achak Deng Akol  
South Sudan*

perfected. State intervention has led to less unemployment. Population growth is under control, state health programmes ensure increased life expectancies and people generally live a better life. Governance is generally democratic, but certainly not everywhere. China and Cuba, for example, have their own approaches to ensuring inclusive governance for and in the eyes of their citizens.

State institutions such as the police and armed forces enjoy a monopoly on the legitimate use of force and

they use it to protect their citizens. Since the threat of inter-state wars is very low, resources and attention have been rebalanced away from the military to the police. Moreover, in most cases the state has the advanced technological means at its disposal to stay ahead of non-state actors who might want to challenge its supremacy. Consequently, international organized crime has low yields and terrorist plots are mostly prevented.

In a number of cases states have decided to pool their monopolies on the legitimate use of force into a regional structure. The most prominent of these is the EU, which has a European army and a European border police. Many weaker states have effectively delegated their security provision to regional organizations or other countries. This is not only true of many Pacific island states. In addition, a number of European, Caribbean and African states have followed this approach. Far from being altruistic, such collective and bilateral assistance arrangements serve the interests of all parties involved because most of the challenges are transnational or global in nature. These arrangements arise from the deep understanding that the world is interdependent and is only as strong as its weakest link. If civilian, regional or global security is under threat, regional structures and the UN are able to deploy standing civilian, police and military rapid reaction capabilities in multilateral peace operations. The most straightforward conflicts have been resolved. Others, such as those in Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and South Sudan, remain intransigent. Intervening forces do not sufficiently understand these countries and their conflict dynamics, and thereby inadvertently perpetuate the conflicts and at times even make the situations worse.

## THE NETWORKED WORLD (Fragmented & Inclusive security provision)

### FUTURE HISTORY

During the second half of the 2010s the global economy picked-up again following the economic crises of the mid-2010s in Europe and some of the BRICS countries. Especially Trumponomics worked. However, the effects of greying populations in China, most of Europe, Japan and Russia gradually began to become apparent. Due to the shrinking labour force, government revenues decreased in relative terms, while demands on government systems increased. In the 2020s, structural adjustment and austerity measures were seen again as the solution in most parts of the Global North, and liberalization and privatization were the dominant economic paradigms. Other regions largely followed suit. For example, Latin American and Caribbean countries that remained committed

to their state-centred economic strategies during the economic crises of the 2010s, such as Bolivia and Venezuela, were forced to opt for a more liberal

**Main user(s) of force:** states (as a regulator); private military companies, private security companies, other non-state, sub-state, hybrid and state actors (as implementers).

**Primary recipient(s) of security:** Costumers of security services such as companies and citizens.

**Important drivers:** demography (greying and young populations); globalization; economic policy (liberalization, privatization); technological progress.

development model in response to public demand for change after years of economic crisis.

In a simultaneous process, globalization continued to deterritorialize economic authority while the state increasingly withdrew from implementation tasks into regulation and oversight of implementation. As a consequence, the character

of state power underwent a gradual change, as for the general public transnational and non-state actors became more visible than the state.

In effect, the state and governmental organizations in the Global North increasingly outsourced important implementation tasks to non-governmental actors, but remained in control of regulation and oversight, ensuring that the commercial service providers did not misuse their powers. In a number of European countries implementation tasks were also further transferred to sub-state units in the context of federalization processes.

In the Global South, states that had already been relatively weak were weakened further. Following World Bank advice on how to respond to the decrease in financial flows from the Global North to the Global South, the Global South generally followed the Global North in downsizing governments. In the Global North outsourcing state implementation tasks was viable because of strong government control. In places where the state was weak, however, these policies resulted in the state losing control to other actors. This had devastating effects in the greater Horn of Africa and Sahel regions where warlords and militias took over. In other regions, such as southern Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean, it led to further hybridization of the state in which the boundaries between companies, traditional authorities, such as tribal groups and elders, and the state became increasingly blurred. Those in power often pursued their own interests and did not necessarily aim for inclusivity for all citizens.

During the 2020s not only national economies, but also the global economy was further liberalized. Old

draft trade treaties that had been abandoned under the Trump presidency, such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), became the core of a global free trade zone. This Trade and Investment Partnership (TIP) was joined by the remaining Group of Twenty (G20) countries by the end of the 2020s and by most other countries during the 2030s. Increased global trade cushioned the impact of the greying of populations in the global North. The limited tariff walls in the Global North meant that India and parts of Africa, with their relatively young populations, could become the new drivers of global economic growth.

Technology continued to develop at high speed and life increasingly took place in the cyber world. Increased access opened up heretofore unknown possibilities for individuals to realise their potential. This trend further strengthened the development taking place in Africa and India. Progress was primarily commercially driven, but had major impacts on many of the global challenges. For example, commercial solutions and technological progress in the field of solar energy and battery capacity were essential in combating climate change and ensuring that carbon neutrality was almost reached in the energy, transport and agricultural sectors.

#### THE WORLD AND THE MONOPOLY ON THE LEGITIMATE USE OF FORCE IN 2040

In 2040 the state has retreated from a number of its traditional activities. Education, health and security provision have been outsourced to private companies and to other non-governmental or hybrid actors. In the global North, the state focuses on and has strengthened its roles in the regulation, oversight and coordination of these actors. As

a result, security provision in most regions of the global North is inclusive and, although not always implemented by the state, it is always regulated and

overseen by the state. In regions where the state is not strong enough to regulate and oversee security provision, non-state security providers are in control. They do not always strive for security provision as a public good, but instead pursue their own private interests.

Due to technological progress populations have easy access to information and are better able to hold governance structures accountable through democratic e-governance. Citizens in many places give real-time feedback on governing body policies and online

›Security is my firewall and my anti-virus software protecting my data.‹

*Krishna Mehta, India*

referenda are used to keep governance in check. Travel has become relatively cheap and 3D printing allows for inexpensive manufacturing of many items at home. In the physical world, specialists have grouped together in a number of different regions. What Silicon Valley used to be for high-tech corporations, the Sahel region nowadays is for solar energy generation.

In general, due to the increasing virtualization of reality, crime has become less violent, as much of it takes place in the cyber world. However, that does not mean there is less crime. Security in the cyber world is a commodity. Individual persons and organizations can decide how much protection they require and can afford. One can choose to access the cyber world well protected, but one can also opt to spend less and be more vulnerable to cyber-attacks and cyber-crime.

Similarly, in the physical world one can choose to live in a secure region protected by, for example, a private security company; but one can also decide to live in a less secure area and earn a higher salary or pay lower housing prices. In some areas access to weapons is easy, while in well-protected areas private security companies, the security apparatus of a sub-state unit, such as municipal police, or so-called ›traditional‹ actors like elders, regulated and overseen by the state have a complete monopoly on the use of force, which is perceived as legitimate by its recipients. Local security provision in the Kivu provinces of the DRC is done by militia that are guided by local ›elders‹. At the same time, many of the world's large cities are completely in charge of security provision for their populations, either as a regulator in charge of oversight or as an implementer. As a consequence, however, in most regions there are overlapping security providers and architectures. Different police forces, private security and vigilante groups, but also intelligence services and courts, operate side by side. This may allow the consumer to shop around, but it also means that there is a

›Security is a well-regulated private security industry that protects my ship against pirates.‹

Captain Antonio Villamor, Philippines

lack of coordination by the state and, by extension, of effective oversight and accountability mechanisms.

As conflicts continue in regions such as the Sahel and Greater Horn of Africa where the state is not able to coordinate, regulate and oversee the provision of security, the international community may need to intervene. The UN has delegated many of its tasks to regional organizations. Military interventions and peace operations are generally implemented in

partnerships. In Africa, for example, the AU takes the lead, in South East Asia the ASEAN, in Latin America and the Caribbean the Organization of American States (OAS) and in Europe the EU. These regional organizations generally make use of private military companies to conduct their peace operations, as national armed forces have been severely downsized. Likewise, private military companies secure ships and shipping lanes against piracy. Military alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) still exist as a last resort to ensure security against external aggression, but their capacity has been restricted and they are used primarily in peace operations.

## THE UNREGULATED WORLD (Fragmented & Exclusive security provision)

### FUTURE HISTORY

Looking back, many historians describe the so-called ›Arab Spring‹ and the reactions to it by autocrats in the Arab world, as well as Russian and western interventions in the region, as the beginning of the demise of the Westphalian state system. Less visible at the time was how under President Vladimir Putin's attempt to strengthen his power in the Kremlin, Moscow had been losing power in the Russian periphery. As a consequence, in a creeping process the Russian Federation was increasingly hollowed out, which in the 2020s led to Moscow losing more and more control over large parts of its territory. This slow ›collapse‹ of the Putin regime in Russia coincided with a number of succession conflicts in Central Asia, of which Uzbekistan was the first following the collapse of the post-Islam Karimov triumvirate in 2017-18.

Similar processes were occurring elsewhere. Although many did not believe it possible, European integration unravelled. The Euro crisis followed by the migration crisis brought tensions within the EU between east and west, south and north, to the surface. Anti-EU sentiment in a number of northern and eastern European countries, combined with extreme right-wing nationalism, led to a steady dismantling of the European project from open borders (Schengen) to, in the end, the unifying currency, the Euro. The 2018 Brexit from the Eurozone and the 2019 implementation

**Main user(s) of force:** surviving state as well as hybrid actors, fiefdoms, criminal organizations, extremist groups, private military and security companies, vigilante groups, ›traditional‹ actors.

**Primary recipient(s) of security:** members of criminal and extremists groups, warlords, wealthy actors.

**Important drivers:** identity politics (nationalism and extremism); environmental degradation; pandemics; economic crisis; proliferation of technology.

of the Brexit from the EU were visible climaxes. The European outbreak of Ebola in 2024 meant that all free movement of persons and goods came to a halt. By 2027 the EU as a project of economic and political integration in essence ceased to exist. This fragmentation did not stop with the EU. Some of its member states also experienced internal fragmentation. In response to Brexit, Scotland declared independence following a referendum in 2023, which left England in a fragile union with Wales and Northern Ireland. Scottish independence in turn set the stage for a number of other regions in Europe, such as Catalonia, the Basque Country, Flanders, Tirol and Bavaria, to achieve independence during the 2020s and 2030s.

Like the collapse of the EU, the breakdown of China had a devastating impact on the world economy. After its housing bubble burst in 2019, China fell in a deep economic depression. Nationalism found fertile ground on the ruins of the Chinese (economic) dream. The resulting Chinese-Japanese War, the Great Southern War against Taiwan and ASEAN over the South China Sea, Tibetan independence in 2027 and growing strength of extremist groups in western China, meant that in 2035 little more remained of China than the Chinese heartland. There a number of warlords fought for control over the ruins of Beijing and Shanghai. As a consequence of the gigantic trade volume drops with China and the EU, the US, which had already been severely divided over the Trump presidency, went bankrupt and parts of its military materiel ended up in the hands of organized crime. Last but not least, India collapsed under the weight of its internal security problems and its Hindu-Muslim divide.

This breakdown of the great powers accelerated the economic, political and social crises in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean which were triggered in the mid-2010s by falling commodity prices. This economic crisis was accompanied by a turn away from democratic rule. Transnational organized crime, corruption and the impacts of climate change pushed many states toward state failure or even state collapse. There were military takeovers in some countries, both via traditional coups d'état and through new partnerships between authoritarian civilian governments and the armed forces. Although peace agreements were reached, for example, between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC)) in 2016, new guerrilla movements in opportunistic partnerships with drug traffickers expanded during the 2020s, not only in Colombia, but also in other countries in Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa and Asia.

Major international organizations, such as the AU, EU, OAS and UN, and informal groupings like the G20, BRICS and others, were unable to deal with the problems at hand and de facto ceased to exist. The international system was not able to respond to the economic and political crises or the results of environmental degradation. Shadow economies overtook the formal economy. Large parts of the world were unable to cope with resource scarcity and water shortages, and many areas became uninhabitable due to pollution. A few states, but primarily fiefdoms and warlords, criminal organizations and extremist groups, eagerly exploited the situation. Most remaining groups or units were either fighting for survival or trying to gain ground. This contestation of power, struggle for food and natural resources took place in the absence of international norms and in often extreme poverty. As a result, in 2035 the world had become as Hobbesian as it can get: a war of all against all.

#### THE WORLD AND THE MONOPOLY ON THE LEGITIMATE USE OF FORCE IN 2040

In 2040 much of what once was no longer exists. The world is in essence Hobbesian. The state has not disappeared, but in many regions it has become de facto irrelevant, hybridized or the ›prey‹ of thugs and has been infiltrated by what used to be the underworld. It has become one among many different actors. In general, it has lost control over regulation and oversight, and has limited influence over areas such as economy and security. Where states are still relevant, as, for example, in Europe and South East Asia, they are often dominated by companies or the underworld. With some notable exceptions, such as New Zealand and Switzerland, therefore, the remaining states often can hardly be called public anymore, since they no longer serve their populations, but instead their masters. Private military companies, criminal organizations, gangs and other illegitimate organizations are in charge. These actors scour the world for its riches. A happy few live in a sea of wealth, while the rest of the world's population lives in poverty. As a result of the crisis in many states, the UN has ceased to function, not de jure, but de facto. The international system has broken down. International regulation is absent and the ›law of the jungle‹ rules.

›Security is my armed guard and the barbed-wired wall around my house.‹

*Alvaro Martinez, El Salvador*

However, the situation is improving again. Even this Hobbesian world knows some order as a war of all against all requires some organization and regulation. The anarchy has triggered a move toward a new modus vivendi involving some cooperation primarily on



a bilateral level and sometimes in the form of collective defence. Consequently, although not based on law, some regulation has returned after the almost total anarchy of the years 2035-8. Armed groups and warlords control territory and enforce order, often ruthlessly, to ensure that they are not attacked from within. Also criminal organizations have realized that they need at least some form of order, because otherwise they do not have any markets for their products or any means to buy popular acquiescence to their power. Many criminal organizations in the Americas and extremist groups in the Middle East have introduced forms of governance to ensure the livelihoods of the population under their control. Moreover, vigilante groups sprang up all around the world to provide collective security, while, internationally, the ASEAN is the only remaining organization providing collective defence. It had already united against the Chinese common enemy in the Great Southern War and now its members stand together to fend off the surrounding instability. Limited provision of social assistance has returned in some areas, primarily in the Global North, and actors have regained some sort of legitimacy in the eyes of ›their subjects.

In spite of some progress, conflict has taken many unspeakable forms, ranging from ethnic cleansing, human trafficking, forced prostitution and child labour, but also massive cyber fraud and cybercrime. Most of the world's population lives in poverty, fighting a daily struggle to survive. Many flee to drugs as these provide a mental way out and make one forget the hunger and pain. These people are consequently easy targets for

›Security is a warlord, drug lord or religious extremist organization that leaves you at peace.‹

*Laila Popalzai, Afghanistan*

recruitment by criminal organizations, warlords and extremists.

There is no monopoly on the legitimate use of force, either on a ›national‹ or the ›international‹ level. The state is only one arbiter of power among a variety of other (in)security actors, such as armed groups, rebels, warlords, armed fiefdoms, criminal organizations, vigilante groups and ›traditional‹ actors, like tribal groups and elders, as well as remaining local police forces and private military and security companies. It is relatively easy to organize groups and protests through social networks in cyberspace, allowing citizens to quickly protest and rebel. As a consequence, levels of protests and social violence are high. The proliferation of cheap and easily accessible technology means that in principle everyone has access to weapons – almost anyone can get hold of a 3D-printed hand gun.

Much like 30 years ago, urban centres of insecurity and securitized zones continue to exist side by side. Digitalized services and surveillance systems as well as technologically advanced means of transportation for the rich deepen the chasm between these zones. Consequently, virtual and real boundaries have emerged and hardly any physical exchange occurs between the respective zones any longer. Decentralized small-scale forms of political cooperation are possible, especially in the countryside. Where strong security providers are absent, self-help and vigilante groups and so-called ›traditional‹ actors protect populations as well. Those who are wealthy enough can live relatively safe lives in their gated communities, walled cities and fenced states. They enjoy ›a la carte protection‹ by private security and military companies. Also some of the warlords, criminal organizations, states and extremist organizations have established islands of security provision for the populations under their control, in particular when they are under external threat. Outside these havens of security, violence dominates the world. Crime thrives because those with power do not care about ›petty‹ crimes, such as theft, robbery and murder, among the have-nots. Also organized group violence is common. Warlords, the remaining states, extremist groups and criminal organizations often battle over power, food and natural resources. It is not always clear what the underlying causes of these conflicts are, because they are not only about ideology or religion, protecting the group interests – such as ethnicity and haves versus have-nots – economy and territory, but also about controlling drug and other markets that once counted as ›illicit‹.

## THE ORWELLIAN WORLD

### (Consolidated & Exclusive security provision)

#### FUTURE HISTORY

During the second half of the 2010s, nationalism and populism increasingly came to dominate global politics. In Russia and China, for example, governments fostered nationalism to ensure popular support for their leadership. This contributed to the tensions in Ukraine and the South China Sea. The West did not have an irreproachable record either. The election of Donald Trump as the president of the US was only the beginning. During the 2010s, right-wing parties had also become stronger and sometimes gained power in Europe, but it was the second financial crisis of 2019 and the series of terrorist attacks in major European and North American cities that really changed the political face of both continents. Now one by one other countries fell to administrations which claimed that all the social and economic problems were caused by

the political elites, bankers and the influx of migrants and refugees during the refugee crisis. By 2023 almost the whole West was governed by extreme right

**Main user(s) of force:** predominantly the state; on occasion terrorists, rebels and coalitions of states.

**Primary recipient(s) of security:** regime, elites, the mainstream population (in the Global North).

**Important drivers:** authoritarianism; identity politics (nationalism and extremism); irregular migration, terrorist attacks; protectionism; economic crisis; (state control over) technological progress.

wing governments and dictatorships. During the 2020s these new leaders tightened their grip on society through their security apparatuses and the media and comprehensive surveillance enabled by the digitalization of all aspects of societies. They stressed that uncontrolled travel and migration increased the risk of pandemics and that counter-terrorism

required harsh measures. The public often rallied behind them, because they claimed they would clean up the mess caused by ›the establishment‹ and the EU. Borders were closed, public surveillance increased and international cooperation broke down. International travel underwent a dramatic decline as a result of visa restrictions. National solutions were preferred to international approaches in the hope that challenges could be kept at bay. This also meant the definitive end of development cooperation.

Although ›trade‹ was argued to replace development assistance, the simultaneous strengthening of tariff barriers meant that in the Global South the poor were left to their own devices. Southern elites strengthened their grip on societies and also in a number of southern countries strong leaders promising radical solutions were elected to office. As a consequence, dictators and authoritarian governments in the Global South who were already in power generally strengthened their position, while most regions that had enjoyed different levels of democracy joined the trend toward authoritarianism. President Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines was one example of a strong leader with drastic solutions. The central African leaders who extended their stay in office in the mid-2010s by changing constitutions were also an early indication of this trend, not unlike developments in South and Central America in Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua a decade earlier.

As states increasingly focused on their own direct interests, the UN and other international organizations decreased in relevance and were forced to drop their human security agendas and focus on collective regime security. Internationally, governments

increasingly preferred to take unilateral or collective action in ad hoc alliances rather than through supra-national organizations.

#### THE WORLD AND THE MONOPOLY ON THE LEGITIMATE USE OF FORCE IN 2040

In 2040 the world is dominated by authoritarian regimes. Although elections still provide a facade of legitimacy to dictatorships, democracy is seen as an ideology from the past. In Europe and North America authoritarian regimes or right-wing governments have firm control over the state apparatus. Some of these regimes have close ties with criminal organizations such as the Mafia. Together with the Communist Party of China and the Tsar of the Russian empire they participate in the ›scramble for the Global South‹. There dictatorial regimes are firmly under the control of security apparatuses which ensure amongst other things that resource extraction and trade based on cheap labour with the Global North is protected. Southern dictatorships are often tied to a northern regime.

In the Global North social cleavages at the national level have increased although general economic growth has picked up after the 2020s. Governments have securitized their responses to problems. Every aspect of society is subjected to Orwellian governance through high levels of surveillance; but this guarantees that the majority of the population has an acceptable life, while elites enjoy their riches in Saint-Tropez. In the Global South dictatorships are generally all about small elites getting rich by amongst other things extracting resources and exploiting cheap labour. Some have submitted their countries to patrons in the north in order to guarantee support for their personal position. Informal military alliances guarantee the survival of the supported regimes through technologically advanced weaponry like drones and robots. The majority of the worldwide population is impoverished and marginalized or enslaved. In the centres they are firmly under the control of state security apparatuses, while health care and education are maintained at the minimum levels required to ensure regime stability.

Both in the Global North and the Global South, the monopoly on the legitimate use of force

lies firmly with the state. Security provision in the Global North clearly favours the elites, although the majority of the population who are part of the system and obey it also enjoy maximum security in exchange for individual freedom. Those who are ›useless to society‹, such as those who are deemed to be ›different‹

›Security is the absence of risk to my safety, if necessary at the cost of my individual freedom.‹

*John McCallaghan, US*

or who are not willing to be part of the system, are excluded from security provision. Security for the majority is the leading principle. In general, those who are not among the majority are perceived to be a potential risk to the nation and its stability. Therefore, the general population is closely monitored by state police, security and intelligence organizations. Every citizen receives an embedded identity chip at birth and data is collected on every movement or activity. Privacy is seen as a notion from the past. After all, unless one is a terrorist or a criminal, one has nothing to hide. Only a few among the elites are really trusted; therefore,

›Security is not being perceived as an obstacle potentially interrupting the continuous flow of resources.«

Dieudonné Muhindo,  
DR Congo

surveillance and punishment of the masses have been turned over to a network of police robots and autonomous weapons. They ensure that those holding subversive views disappear, but also that criminals, homeless people, drug addicts and other outcasts are ›cleaned-up‹. The only groups other than the state capable of using force every once in a while are ideologically inspired 'liberal' terrorist groups that occasionally stage small bomb attacks against government institutions, often with the stated aim of re-establishing democracy.

In the Global South security provision serves even more the narrow interests of the elites. More than state security, regime security is the leading principle. The elites live in gated communities and travel freely around the globe. Apart from ensuring security in their centres, Southern state security institutions often neglect peripheral regions that are not essential to their interests. They are generally militarized and frequently apply active divide and rule strategies to ensure that rebel organizations are unable to challenge the elites and the centre. Without a real government presence, the periphery is subject to anarchy which leaves the population highly insecure. At times, rebel or insurgency organizations stand up and claim a fairer distribution of wealth; but these uprisings are managed and controlled by the state so that they do not pose a serious threat to the centre.

Internationally, collective security is the predominant form of security provision. As different northern regimes compete, wars occasionally take place in the Global North. However, the primary battle ground is the Global South, where the North competes for the spoils and southern leaders entangle their Northern patrons in their own conflicts. International law provides at best


a weak framework for managing these conflicts and institutions such as the UN are regarded as obsolete.

## CONCLUSIONS

The four alternative futures described above are intended to present a picture of how the monopoly on the legitimate use of force might look in 2040. These alternative futures can be depicted as four quadrants of a grid (see **FIGURE 2**) whose axes are determined by the two key uncertainties:

1. Will security provision in 2040 be more consolidated or more fragmented?
2. Will security provision in 2040 be more inclusive or more exclusive?

**FIGURE 2**  
SECURITY PROVISION IN ALTERNATIVE FUTURES



## MAIN FINDINGS

Some of the main messages of the alternative futures are:

*The current trend is heading in the wrong direction:* Current global developments regarding the monopoly on the legitimate use of force are directed toward more fragmented and more exclusive security provision. This is worrisome. If this trend continues, the least favoured alternative futures are likely to transpire. Members of the Reflection Group generally take the view that: (a) inclusive security provision is to be favoured for moral reasons over exclusive security provision; and (b) consolidated security provision is to be preferred over fragmented provision of security, since the former is generally considered to be more effective and easier to oversee, while the latter would be inherently drawn toward exclusive security provision. Consequently, although the alternative future The UN Charter's

World is favoured over the other alternative futures, the global trend is toward the alternative future The Unregulated World, which is least favoured. However, this is not a forecast, merely the extrapolation of a trend. Such a general trend does not exclude simultaneous counter-trends driven by efforts at regulation (leading to a Networked future) or suppression (leading to an Orwellian future). State initiatives to regulate and oversee security provision by a range of other actors, while at the same time making use of the emancipatory effects of fragmentation and context-specific ›solutions‹, as well as the potential efficiency gains of privatization, could make the Networked World a second best choice to the UN Charter's World.

*The state is required, at the very least to regulate, oversee and coordinate:* The state monopoly on the legitimate use of force is preferred. Members of the Reflection Group generally conclude that, freely adapted from Winston S. Churchill, the state is the worst form of monopoly on the legitimate use of force, except for all the others. Some members called it ›the devil we know‹, others claimed that ›without the state, there is no future‹. The starker the choice between more state and less state, the greater the support for the choice to stick with the state. This was based on the assumption that there is no recent empirically viable alternative in which the abandonment of the classical political system of the state would not entail sacrificing higher values and collective interests. A future with inclusive, but fragmented, security provision was therefore difficult to imagine and was not seen as possible unless the state plays, at the very least, a strong regulatory, oversight and coordinating role.

*The world is diverse and complex:* Although the future world may find itself on average in one quadrant, it is unlikely that all of the different relevant aspects, be it different countries, regions or themes, will be located in the same quadrant. The alternative futures show that trends give rise to counter-trends and unexpected outcomes. For example, in the face of the fragmentation of The Unregulated World, ASEAN is expected to strengthen its cooperation and thus to behave more in line with The UN Charter's World. In a similar countertrend, countries in Central Asia are expected to experience more fragmentation in The UN Charter's World. Latin America and the Caribbean are expected to generally follow developments in the West. Most African members of the Reflection Group feared that many African countries would have a hard time steering clear of the The Unregulated World, whatever quadrant the rest of the world may find itself in, but there are also

›Orwellian‹ countries on the African continent. This inherent global diversity will also require diverse and tailor-made policies.

*›Fragmentation‹ is not synonymous with ›chaos‹ and ›commodification‹:* In fact, fragmentation may also mean emancipation of the individual or local. Although the fragmentation of security provision is often seen as ›non-governance‹ and ›chaos‹, both alternative futures The Networked World and The Unregulated World show that even in fragmented orders there is some kind of collective social organization that, at local or regional levels, may be inclusive and legitimate in the eyes of the recipients of security provision. Similarly, fragmented security orders are not necessarily commodified or marketized. Security provision by traditional, communal or collective, security institutions does not necessarily follow a market-based logic. The critical question remains, whether and how these security architectures should be acknowledged or endorsed and linked back to public governance mechanism at higher levels.

*Inclusive security provision does not equal democratic security provision:* Members of the Reflection Group noted that undemocratic or autocratic forms of governance may still provide inclusive security provision. They referred to Cuba and China as prime examples of cases where this is currently the case. In the future some countries may follow similar paths of security provision.

*Exclusivity and fragmentation, at least in their extreme forms, are bound to be temporary:* When looking further into the alternative futures, members of the Reflection Group generally argued that disorder is likely to be only temporary. Even The Unregulated World shows signs of the reestablishment of order, as the various actors using force in this fragmented alternative future begin to cooperate again. Likewise, there is the understanding that exclusive security provision will eventually lead to rebellion and also that the repression depicted in the alternative future The Orwellian World cannot last forever.

*Technology is not neutral (either as regards purposes or effects):* Technology is likely to be an important driver of the future monopoly on the legitimate use of force, and of social models and values in general. In which way it will determine the future is less clear, but it is unlikely that its effects will be only ›positive‹ or only ›negative‹ categories. Technology can either be a tool for repression or a major force for equalization and liberation. In the alternative future The Orwellian

World technology becomes a force for government control, while in The Networked World it turns out to be the great equalizer. It can be disruptive of governance structures and cause fragmentation, as in The Unregulated World where anyone can print a handgun in a 3D printer; but it can also lead to stronger and more consolidated, and more frightening, state control, such as in The Orwellian World. Its disruptive character will be largely determined by the extent to which the state and the international system are able to stay ahead of the curve of technological development, so that they are prepared to counter and regulate the disruptive forces of technology before they end up in the hands of unchecked autocratic regimes or uncontrolled non-state actors. More nuanced and forward thinking on this topic will be required, since the alternative future The Orwellian World in particular shows there are still a lot of normative questions to be answered.

*A lot of very policy-relevant questions are still unanswered:* The alternative futures exercise leads to a whole range of questions that require further attention:

- **How does globalization affect the monopoly on the legitimate use of force?** Especially in the alternative future The Unregulated World, and to a lesser extent in The Orwellian World, globalization appears to largely come to a halt, while in the other two alternative futures it continues. But does that mean that further globalization will automatically lead to more inclusive security provision?
- **What are the effects of climate change and environmental scarcity on the future monopoly on the legitimate use of force?** In general, their effects are seen as important, but uncertain driving forces. We still lack sufficient understanding of how people will respond to the effects of climate change and environmental scarcity. If they remain unchecked, climate change and environmental scarcity are likely to lead to fragmentation and exclusion of security provision; but they may also trigger growing civil pressure on governments to adequately deal with the challenges, as in the alternative future The UN Charter's World. What has become clear is that climate change, global economic policies, irregular migration and violence cannot be tackled in isolation and with exclusively technocratic means.
- **How pressing do the transnational challenges – for example, terrorism, irregular migration, organized crime, pandemics and environmental degradation – have to be before they mobilize (enough civil pressure for) international cooperation to deal with them?** Two archetypal responses to transnational challenges appear to be either to close all borders and try to keep them out (as in The Orwellian World and The Unregulated World), or to cooperate with external partners to address the challenges together. In the inclusive alternative futures the latter seems to be the case, with the state taking the lead in the case of The UN Charter's World and non-state actors in the case of The Networked World.

- **What are the effects of identity politics, terrorism and extremism on the future monopoly on the legitimate use of force?** Identity politics, terrorism and extremism are also viewed as important but uncertain driving forces. If unchecked they may lead to exclusion – The Orwellian World and The Unregulated World, in particular, are examples of this. Much less is known about the conditions under which identity politics, terrorism and extremism can be overcome to achieve inclusion, as in The UN Charter's World. Do global challenges require international cooperation, and therefore force us to tear down our fences? Or may they even become instrumental in creating inclusion through new processes of state building, as seems to be the case in The Unregulated World?
- **Under what conditions can illegal or informal organizations assume positive roles and states assume negative roles, and in which contexts do these actors gain and lose influence?** In The Unregulated World the role of criminal organizations is not necessarily entirely negative or viewed as illegitimate by local population, while in the case of the alternative future The Orwellian World the role of the state is not all that positive. We still have insufficient understanding of the conditions under which what is seen as legal or formal is not necessarily good, and what is deemed illegal or informal is not necessarily bad.
- **How will the international system develop, and in particular how will it look in a future in which security provision is more fragmented and the state is no longer the dominant actor?** This question is already difficult to answer with regard to inter-state relations. Yet, in an increasingly fragmented world our imagination is stretched to think of how a variety of actors can coordinate and cooperate with state actors, and how those hybrid security architectures at different levels can be incorporated into global structures. Although local systems may provide for legitimate and inclusive security, it must also be asked whether and to what extent this security provision may diverge from universal norms and values (like human rights).

## POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The alternative futures and findings presented above imply a three-pronged strategy. The first prong is directed at how to reach the most favoured future,

namely, the quadrant of inclusion and consolidated security provision, and how best to avoid fragmented and exclusive security provision. These are the normative policy implications. The second prong concerns the exploratory projection of policy implications. Since our ability to determine and control our future is limited, exploratory scenario planning aims to think through what may be required in each alternative future in order to be prepared for what may transpire. Given the diversity of the world, the policy implications for one alternative futures are also expected to have some relevance to other futures, and any policy implication will require a flexible and tailor-made operationalization. The third prong of the strategy, finally, is to monitor the alternative futures, either for the world as a whole or its different constituent parts, like a particular state, thereby allowing policy makers to adjust the policy implications to achieve tailor-made solutions.

#### **NORMATIVE POLICY IMPLICATIONS: REACHING THE MOST DESIRABLE FUTURE**

A majority of the Reflection Group clearly favours the quadrant of inclusive and consolidated security provision, The UN Charter's World, which preserves the state monopoly on the legitimate use of force. In fact, this quadrant requires the strengthening of the state's responsibility as a security provider where it performs this role, and establishing this role where this is not yet the case. Additionally, members of the Reflection Group generally stress the importance of support for actors and institutions responsible for democratic oversight and strengthening accountability checks. Public governance of security provision is the aim. This means, however, that current ›mainstream approaches‹ (such as institution building and security sector reform processes that stress training and equipping over political processes) would need to be reviewed and contextualized. Moreover, the policy-relevant questions raised above should be openly discussed.

At the same time, the current global trend is toward the proliferation of security providers. Yet, hybrid inclusive security architectures tend to be fragile. Therefore, more complex security architectures such as these require safeguards for sustainability and cooperation among, regulation of and oversight over the different actors. At the very least the state should play the role of a regulator and coordinator in charge of oversight in such a multi-layered system, in order to avoid sliding down into the quadrant of exclusive and fragmented security provision, The Unregulated World. If the state has sufficient capacities and political will to do so, the Networked World would be a second best choice.

To steer developments in the direction of the inclusive and consolidated security provision, further fragmentation, privatization, outsourcing and commodification must be avoided or, at the very least, regulated and overseen. This would also call for international cooperation and international solutions to transnational challenges at a time when tensions are again on the rise, and re-erecting border controls seems to be easier and less frightening than tearing down walls. This may require states(wo)manship. And, in order to regulate and oversee transnational or even global activities, such cooperation must go beyond exclusive state-initiated negotiations and treaties and include other non-state and private sector actors, in what are currently known as ›multi-stakeholder partnerships‹.

#### **EXPLORATORY POLICY IMPLICATIONS: TO BE BEST PREPARED FOR THE FUTURE**

It would be imprudent of the international community to build a strategy exclusively on the preferred The UN Charter's World, since it represents but one of four alternative futures. Even if global efforts to reach this quadrant were to become the focus, one still needs to think through the requirements in the other alternative futures in order to be prepared should these efforts prove to be unsuccessful. Given that accurately predicting the future is beyond our reach, focusing on policy implications that are relevant in several or all quadrants is the most robust strategy.


In addition, one can monitor the monopoly on the legitimate use of force both at the global level as well as at the level of regions, states or subthemes, by tracking the direction of developments in the four quadrants of the alternative futures grid. The more an alternative future description resembles reality, the more its policy implications become relevant. The following policy implications (see also **FIGURE 3**) are based on the discussions in the workshops, notes from other meetings of the Reflection Group, submitted papers and the logic of the alternative futures<sup>7</sup>:

#### *Universally relevant implications*

- **Keep it up, and keep it good:** Where there is an effective and legitimate monopoly on the use of force, it should be preserved and maintained.

<sup>7</sup> The titles ›Keep it up and keep it good‹, ›ineffective but legitimate? Strengthen it!‹, ›The more the less merrier‹, ›Not for sale: Lethal force‹, ›If it is not broken, don't fix it‹ and ›If it is repressive, civilize it‹ are taken directly from Marius Müller-Hennig, Take aways of the first reflection group meetings, Fall conference 2015, Mexico City.

**FIGURE 3**  
POLICY IMPLICATIONS IN ALTERNATIVE FUTURES GRID



#### *Implications in the inclusive quadrants*

- **Moving from military to police:** In terms of public attention, dominance of the political decision making agenda and resource allocations, military affairs generally overshadow police matters. Yet, because the incidence of inter-state wars remains low or even decreases in the inclusive quadrants, it is crucial for citizen and human security to focus more attention on the police – in terms of political scrutiny and attention, as well as financial resources.

#### *Implications in fragmented quadrants*

- **If it is not broken, don't fix it:** If there is largely inclusive governance and a minimum use of force – a basic form of a monopoly on the legitimate use of force – pushing to establish an ideal type monopoly may neither be realistic nor desirable, as is shown by the unintended negative effects of recent state-building endeavours.
- **Whatever works well enough, but also democratize:** In absence of a functioning monopoly on the legitimate use of force, it is generally not a realistic option to wait until an ideal typical monopoly of force is

created. It is preferable to cautiously assist imperfect but more legitimate monopolies or oligopolies on the use of force and to civilize or strengthen them down the line. However, state building without strengthening the democratic aspects of the state and trust vis-à-vis the state, as well as among different groups, produces ›ramshackle democracies‹ that are easily hijacked by strongmen.

- **Coordinate the cacophony:** Avoid supporting competing security providers and support coordination both among the different security providers – either by helping to establish a regulator and oversight mechanism or by supporting a process of concentration – as well as among the different outside actors who are trying to ›do good‹.

#### *Implications in The UN Charter's World*

- **Ineffective but legitimate? Strengthen it!:** Where the monopoly on the use of force is weak, but legitimate, it is advisable to build capacities in the security sector.
- **Democracy or democratize, but not at all costs:** Ideally, an inclusive and consolidated monopoly on the use of force is also accountable to its population. However, this is not always the case: states can provide inclusive security but may not be democratic in its purest sense. Although democracy is ideal, democratization should not be sacrosanct.

#### *Implications in The Networked World*

- **The more, the less merrier:** Places with more security providers and little regulation, oversight and coordination are bound to witness more ineffective security governance, conflict and perceived and/or real insecurity at the individual level. Consequently, where possible the number of security providers should be kept as small as possible.
- **Capitalize on the emancipation of individuals:** The state has not always been the best provider of security. States have often preyed upon their citizens. Less state-centric monopolies on the legitimate use of force have the positive effect that they emancipate individuals. They can create room for the creativity of individuals in caring for their own security.
- **Reinforce the regulator:** For this purpose, in regions with a variety of security providers and a weak state to regulate them, it is advisable to reinforce and strengthen the state's oversight, regulatory and coordination capacities. This may also prevent or defuse conflicts between the different security providers and guide their behaviour. Establishing a set of criteria for what are legitimate security providers and inclusive security practices (as safeguards against conflicts and abuses) might also be helpful.

- **Reinforce the regulator:** The inherent tension in this quadrant is bound up with the fact that, unless there is equality, the wealthy are always in a better position to acquire security. In the absence of sufficient regulation and oversight, therefore, security provision in this quadrant is expected to turn increasingly exclusive.
- **Embracing hybridity:** The state is not the only actor that has problem-solving answers. If embedded in a regulated system with, among other things, strong oversight and accountability, hybridization is a possible contractual arrangement that makes use of the creativity of the diverse actors besides the state.
- **Not for sale: lethal violence:** The use of lethal force should always be inclusive, regulated and overseen, and it should be guided by equality, regardless of wealth. Although some of the functions associated with the monopoly on the legitimate use of force may be commodified, lethal force should never be made into a commodity.

#### *Implications in The Orwellian World*

- **Fear is a bad counsellor:** In response to the fear of threats and challenges, citizens are sometimes willing to grant their government powers to ensure security that come at the cost of their individual freedoms. Although removing safeguards on the monopoly on the use of force in the name of security may initially appear to be an acceptable sacrifice, it should be avoided because the long-term costs for citizens cannot be foreseen.
- **If it is repressive, civilize it:** In places where a strong but repressive monopoly on the use of force is established, security sector reform may contribute to civilizing it and making it more inclusive.
- **Boxing in big brother:** Control, oversight and regulation of a monopoly on the use of force is important to establish the required checks and balances – institutions and capacities – in the system to ensure it does not go rogue.

#### **MONITORING THE ALTERNATIVE FUTURES**

The alternative futures grid can be used to monitor developments regarding the monopoly on the legitimate use of force. In principle, the world currently finds itself on average in the middle of the grid, in between all of the alternative futures. However, the different relevant aspects, be it different countries, regions or themes, are likely to be located in one of the four quadrants. Only when combined do they add up to the average middle position. So, for example, many African countries find themselves already in The Unregulated World quadrant and some in The Orwellian World quadrant, while many Asian nations are currently located in The UN

Charter's World quadrant and some in The Orwellian World quadrant. The so-called ›West‹ is predominantly in The UN Charter's World and The Networked World quadrants, but there are trends toward both The Unregulated World as well as The Orwellian World quadrants. If indicators are assigned to the different quadrants of the alternative futures, developments in the grid regarding the legitimate monopoly on the use of force in countries, regions or themes, can be monitored on an individual basis or for the world. Such a monitoring process can be helpful in tracking changes in the relevance of specific policy implications, because the more reality resembles one of the quadrants of the alternative futures, the more the policy implications associated with this alternative future become relevant.



## ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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### REFLECTION GROUP MONOPOLY ON THE USE OF FORCE

The Reflection Group »Monopoly on the use of force 2.0?« is a global dialogue initiative to raise awareness and discuss policy options for the concept of the monopoly for the use of force. Far from being a merely academic concern, this concept, at least theoretically and legally remains at the heart of the current international security order. However it is faced with a variety of grave challenges and hardly seems to reflect realities on the ground in various regions around the globe anymore. For more information about the work of the reflection group and its members please visit: <http://www.fes.de/de/reflection-group-monopoly-on-the-use-of-force-20/>

### THINK PIECES OF THE »REFLECTION GROUP MONOPOLY ON THE USE OF FORCE 2.0?«

The Think Pieces serve a dual purpose: On the one hand they provide points of reference for the

deliberations of the reflection group and feed into the final report of the group in 2016. On the other hand they are made available publicly to provide interested scholars, politicians and practitioners with an insight into the different positions and debates of the group and provide food for thought for related discussions and initiatives worldwide. In this sense, they reflect how the group and selected additional experts »think« about the topic and hopefully stimulate further engagement with it.

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